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With the Kremlin ignoring calls for a compromise peace, the only way to advance negotiations is by putting more pressure on Putin. Failure to do so could have disastrous consequences that would be felt far beyond the borders of a subjugated Ukraine.

The current Russian plan is to drag out negotiations indefinitely while grinding down Ukraine’s resistance and sowing division among Kyiv’s international allies. Moscow seeks to entice the United States with promises of lucrative economic cooperation, while supporting populist political forces across the EU in a bid to weaken European support for Ukraine. If this strategy succeeds, Ukraine may at some point become unable to defend itself.

The collapse of Ukrainian resistance would not bring peace to Europe. Instead, a victorious Russia would take control of Ukraine’s formidable military and the country’s rapidly expanding domestic defense industry. Putin would then command the two most powerful armies in Europe, with unrivaled combat experience and knowledge of drone warfare. In such circumstances, it is dangerously delusional to think that Russia would not seek to go further. At the very least, European governments would be forced to increase defense budgets to levels that would dwarf the current cost of supporting Ukraine.

The steps necessary to secure peace through strength are no secret. First and foremost, this means adequately arming Ukraine. Trump suggested in 2025 that if Russia continues to reject peace efforts, he may provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles. This would be a welcome and meaningful step. Other partners including Germany have also spoken of increasing Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Now is the time to do so.

In parallel, sanctions measures targeting Putin’s war economy must be expanded and tightened. This should include steps to increase the costs for international customers who continue to purchase Russian oil and gas exports, thereby funding the Kremlin war machine.

Western leaders have always had the tools at their disposal to counter the Russian threat. Unfortunately, however, they have so far failed to demonstrate the political will necessary to deploy these tools effectively. This excessive caution is counter-productive and only serves to embolden the Kremlin. Moscow believes it is already at war with the West and treats calls for compromise as signs of weakness. If Kyiv’s partners are serious about stopping Russia, they must abandon appeasement and increase the pressure on Putin.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party and a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

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Many Ukrainians saw Tuesday’s attention-grabbing airstrike on a non-military target in central Lviv as part of Kremlin efforts to terrorize the civilian population and break Ukrainian society’s will to resist the ongoing Russian invasion. “This is how Russia tries to make normal life impossible,” commented Ukrainian member of parliament Inna Sovsun.

Over the past year, Russian attacks of civilian targets have risen sharply. According to United Nations data, 2025 was the deadliest period for Ukrainian civilians since the initial months of the full-scale invasion, with the number of deaths rising by 31 percent compared to the previous year.

Many of these civilian deaths came as a result of an escalating bombing campaign made possible by the dramatic expansion of Russia’s domestic drone production capacity. Whereas aerial attacks in 2023 and 2024 typically involved dozens of drones, it is now common for Russia to launch hundreds of unmanned bomber drones at targets across Ukraine in a single day. For example, Tuesday’s strike in central Lviv was part of a nationwide attack involving almost one thousand drones over a 24-hour period. The sheer scale of these bombing raids means that Ukrainian air defenses are often overwhelmed.

The recent winter season saw Russia’s most extensive bombing campaign against the Ukrainian civilian population of the entire war, with a coordinated air offensive targeting critical heating and power infrastructure amid Arctic temperatures. This apparent attempt to freeze millions of Ukrainians into submission in their own homes ultimately failed, but it did serve to underline Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin’s readiness to employ terror tactics as he seeks to increase the pressure on the Ukrainian authorities and push Kyiv toward capitulation.

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Moscow’s mounting attacks on Ukrainian civilians have come against a backdrop of growing battlefield frustration for the Kremlin. Despite enjoying the military initiative throughout 2025, Russia managed to seize less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory while suffering catastrophic losses.

This underwhelming military performance has continued in recent months. For the first time in more than two years, Ukraine actually liberated more land during February 2026 than Russia was able to occupy. The Russian army’s inability to achieve a decisive breakthrough is now causing rumblings of discontent on the home front, including among Russia’s vocal pro-war blogger community.

Despite his army’s lack of progress on the battlefield, Putin shows no signs of a willingness to compromise on the maximalist goals of his invasion. Instead, he continues to insist on peace terms that would leave postwar Ukraine isolated, defenseless, and completely at his mercy.

The Russian ruler knows he cannot afford to settle for anything less. After all the sacrifices of the past four years, a negotiated peace that left 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and firmly anchored in the Western world would be viewed in Moscow as a defeat of historic proportions.

With no obvious route to military victory in Ukraine, Putin finds himself trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end for fear of weakening his grip on power and tarnishing his place in Russian history. So far, he has responded to this dilemma by increasing attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population.

There is very little evidence to suggest this approach is working. On the contrary, recent polls indicate that the bombardment of civilians has hardened Ukraine’s resolve to fight on rather than accept peace terms dictated by the Kremlin. Nevertheless, Russian attacks on civilians are likely to expand further in the coming months as Putin lacks credible alternatives to revive his faltering invasion.

Russia’s decision to bomb a heritage site in the middle of a major Ukrainian city in broad daylight was a signal of intent that points unmistakably toward a coming escalation. Putin is clearly struggling to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, but he remains committed to extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and is prepared to ruthlessly target the civilian population in order to break the current deadlock and force the country’s surrender. Tuesday’s attack on a UNESCO site in the heart of Lviv sent a chilling message that nobody and nowhere in Ukraine is safe.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Lukashenka’s decision to release 250 detainees was widely welcomed. Many of those freed had been in prison since the crackdown that gripped Belarus following the country’s 2020 presidential election, which sparked unprecedented nationwide protests amid allegations of massive voter fraud. The released prisoners included Valiantsin Stefanovich and Marfa Rabkova of Belarusian human rights group Viasna, along with journalist Katsyaryna Andreyeva.

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Under President Trump, the United States has sought a thaw with Minsk. These efforts have so far led to the release of hundreds of political prisoners and an easing of US sanctions against Belarus.

Increased engagement between the US and Belarus represents a significant change in strategy following years of growing tensions between Minsk and Western capitals. Western governments have expressed alarm over Lukashenka’s repressive domestic policies, along with his involvement in Putin’s hybrid war against Europe and his complicity in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Trump administration initiative to reengage with Lukashenka has brought clear humanitarian benefits and has had a life-changing impact on released prisoners along with their families. Nevertheless, concerns remain that the current US approach risks creating incentives for the Belarusian authorities to imprison more domestic opponents.

Despite a number of large-scale releases over the past year, human rights groups claim there are still almost one thousand political prisoners in Belarus, with new names regularly being added to the list as arrests continue. Activists have likened this process to a “revolving door” of repression, with new political prisoners regularly detained as others are pardoned and released.

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Beyond the humanitarian dimension, the US diplomatic outreach to Minsk is seen as an attempt to counter Lukashenka’s near complete dependence on Moscow. Since the 2020 protest movement that almost ousted the Belarus dictator, he has been heavily reliant on Russia for his political survival. In exchange for its support, the Kremlin has sought to expand its grip on neighboring Belarus. This has led to what some have labeled as a “creeping annexation.”

Trump has sought to restart dialogue with Minsk against a backdrop of faltering US-led peace efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine War. So far, however, there is little indication that Lukashenka may be prepared to downgrade his backing for Putin’s invasion or offer any assistance to advance negotiations.

The Belarusian ruler has been a key Russian ally throughout the invasion. This support has included allowing Putin to use Belarus as a gateway for Russia’s initial attempt to seize Kyiv in 2022. More recently, Lukashenka has agreed to host Russian nuclear weapons. He is also accused of aiding Moscow’s drone attacks on Ukraine and partnering with China to produce ammunition for the Russian army.

Lukashenka may now be on track to join Putin among the criminal suspects wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. On March 12, the ICC officially opened an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed by Lukashenka and his security apparatus against political opponents. In March 2023, the ICC issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest in connection with his alleged involvement in the large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children.

The latest Belarusian prisoner releases are an indication of improving relations between Washington and Minsk. However, it remains to be seen whether the benefits of this diplomatic outreach will extend beyond humanitarian goals and lead to broader gains in the security sphere. Lukshenka is no doubt ready to offer more pardons in exchange for economic incentives, but he has yet to demonstrate a willingness to decrease domestic repression or distance himself from the Kremlin.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Putin is counting on Western disunity to hand him victory in Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 20:14:13 +0000

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine recently entered a fifth year and has now been underway for longer than the entire cataclysmic conflict between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during World War II.

This historical comparison does not flatter Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has turned veneration of the fight against Hitler into an unofficial state religion. While Red Army troops played a key role in the Nazi defeat and managed to advance thousands of kilometers from Stalingrad to Berlin, today’s Russian army is in many cases still stuck within walking distance of their positions when the invasion first began in February 2022.

Despite this lack of progress on the battlefield, Putin has so far demonstrated zero interest a compromise peace. Instead, he continues to insist on maximalist demands during negotiations that would destroy Ukraine as an independent state and as a separate nation.

This uncompromising stance makes perfect sense when viewed from Putin’s perspective. After all, the invasion he unleashed in 2022 has cost countless Russian lives and plunged the country into a new Cold War. Putin knows that only total victory can justify these sacrifices.

If Putin accepted the peace terms currently on offer, this would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine free and beyond Kremlin control. Most Russians would regard that as a disastrous defeat. Putin’s dreams of entering Russian history alongside Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Stalin would be shattered. Instead, he would be condemned as the man who lost Ukraine.

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In a very real sense, Putin is caught in a trap of his own making and has no real choice but to fight on. At the same time, however, it would be wrong to suggest that the Kremlin dictator is merely seeking to postpone the inevitable. On the contrary, he remains convinced that the goals of the invasion are still achievable and is now counting on Western disunity to hand him victory in Ukraine.

Putin’s low opinion of the democratic world is based on personal experience. Time and again throughout his reign, Russia’s aggressive actions have sparked vocal condemnation from Western capitals followed with indecent haste by calls for a return to dialogue and “business as usual.”

Western leaders loudly condemned Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, but were soon queuing up to reset relations with the Kremlin. The same lack of resolve was on display following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, with minimal costs imposed on Moscow and multiple European countries actually increasing their dependence on Russian energy exports.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Putin treats the proclamations of his Western counterparts with thinly veiled contempt. While he has been unpleasantly surprised since 2022 by the scale of support for Ukraine, the Russian leader’s own dealings with his Western counterparts have encouraged him to conclude that this unity will prove temporary. As the war grinds into a fifth year with no end in sight, Putin believes he can ultimately outlast the West.

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Shifts within the Western alliance over the past year are fueling confidence in Moscow that current levels of support for Ukraine will not last forever. Since returning to the White House in January 2025, US President Donald Trump has cut military aid to Ukraine and sought to reposition the United States as an intermediary in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

This has placed the burden of supporting the Ukrainian war effort firmly on Europe. According to recent Kiel Institute data, Ukraine’s European partners have done a good job of filling this gap. However, the majority of aid is now coming from a relatively small group of nations including Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain. This places Ukraine’s war effort on fragile foundations.

Meanwhile, a ninety billion euro financing package agreed by EU leaders remains blocked by Hungary. This is part of long-term pattern that has seen Hungary’s pro-Kremlin Prime Minister Viktor Orban repeatedly obstruct or delay efforts by the European Union to strengthen Ukraine or increase pressure on Putin.

With far-right populist parties currently riding high in the polls throughout Europe, Putin also has good cause for optimism over the possible imminent appearance of more Orban-style allies. This could help the Kremlin in its efforts to divide and weaken Europe from within.

Broader geopolitical developments are also placing new strains on Western unity and threatening to undermine backing for Ukraine. The US-Israeli joint operation against Iran is currently causing unprecedented tension among NATO allies, with European countries reluctant to participate in efforts to safeguard the Strait of Hormuz. This has highlighted a growing transatlantic divide that could seriously weaken Ukraine’s position.

Putin cannot risk a compromise peace in Ukraine, but he remains confident that time is on his side. While the Russian army has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, Putin is prepared to wait until Western disunity leaves the Ukrainians stripped of support and at his mercy. While this would not mean an immediate end to the carnage, Putin believes a dramatic decline in Western support would finally allow Russia to pummel an exposed and abandoned Ukraine into submission.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Lack of mandate

Put simply, the current Syrian government inherited an exceedingly complex and dire set of challenges from the Assad regime, both within the country’s borders and beyond. The fact that the most unified and potent military force in the country did not have a broad political mandate caused concern amid the general rejoicing that Assad was gone. The new government in Damascus assumed office upon taking control of the capital and appointed individuals from within Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, or HTS) to key positions to manage the transition, driving international concerns over continued extremism and the lack of representation. The announcement of a more diverse transitional government in March 2025 was a good sign, as were President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s negotiations with Kurdish and Druze factions, but the potential for inclusive governance remains far from being realized.

Internationally, Syria has been under painful and wide-ranging sanctions since the 1980s, isolating the banking system, restricting trade, and limiting import-export activities. The December repeal of the Caesar Act—which was a US response to war crimes under the Assad regime—lifts nearly all sanctions on Syria and is an important step in both unlocking the investment needed for the nation’s reconstruction and improving economic conditions. However, the scale of needs is immense, with conservative reconstruction estimates exceeding $200 billion.

President Trump’s “peace through prosperity” policy, implemented under the leadership of Ambassador Thomas J. Barrack Jr., is pushing Syria to be open to the West and its allies, a big shift from sponsorship by the likes of Russia, Iran, and China. European and American engagement has brought focused attention from international firms—especially US and Turkish companies. Google and Apple have resumed service in the country, ending what has been called “a digital siege,” while the US Chamber of Commerce has seen strong interest in its new Syria program. Turkish firms engaged in energy, construction, and other critical stabilization sectors have flocked to their southern neighbor.

Trump’s influence

Trump’s return to the White House played a crucial role in creating an opening for positive change in Syria and its relations within the region for two key reasons. First, his excellent relationship with President Erdogan enabled diplomatic coordination and top-level trust during the final eleven days of the Assad regime and the immediate aftermath of its fall. “Erdogan is somebody I got along with great. . . . He’s built a very strong, powerful army,” Trump said on December 16, 2024. He added: “Right now, Syria has a lot of, you know, there’s a lot of indefinites . . . I think Turkey is going to hold the key to Syria.”

Second, Trump’s strong pro-Israel stance and unrivaled popularity among Israelis gave him unique standing to press back on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he called for action in Syria to deter Turkey and weaken the grip of al-Sharaa. Trump’s admonition “you have to be reasonable,” regarding Turkey in Syria, lowered the temperature a few degrees at least, buying important breathing space for the new government to try and stabilize a fragile situation.

Following the appointment of former HTS head al-Sharaa (nom de guerre Jolani) as interim president, the United States initiated the removal of sanctions, including those that had been in place since 1979 This action was prompted by Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa in Riyadh on May 14, 2025, brokered by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. This meeting provided hope for the Syrian people and offered an opportunity for their future reconstruction; it also gave the international community a sign of normalizing engagement with the newly created regime in Damascus.

A key focus has been the unity of Syria. The United States, Turkey and the Syrian government have consistently emphasized the need for Syria to stay united with a central government in Damascus. This stance is crucial in countering the narratives and demands of advocates for decentralization, including Kurdish groups in the northeast, which advocate for a federal system, and the Druze aligned with Hikmet al-Hijri in Suwayda, who seek independence. Damascus has refused both while insisting that differences should not be overcome “through blood.”

Internal dynamics with minorities

The Kurds and the Druze received a lot of press over the summer months in 2025, but lingering problems in predominantly Alawite areas pose another challenge to successful stabilization. Following Assad’s ouster, the coastal area, once the primary base for Assad’s loyalists and a major source of volunteers for the Syrian army, transformed into a haven for former army and intelligence officers. Tensions boiled over into a significant cycle of atrocities when Assad loyalists attacked the new government forces, killing hundreds. The Syrian army responded with overwhelming force, leading to clashes that claimed numerous lives—and atrocities against civilian communities described by the United Nations as “widespread and systematic.”

A Syrian investigative committee acknowledged provocations and atrocities by both pro- and anti-government forces, and the Syrian government committed to accountability on all sides. International scrutiny and concern grew, however, when Druze and Bedouin fighters in Suwayda engaged in another round of attacks and atrocities, resulting in hundreds of casualties. By late summer there had been no new major incidents to add to the list of 2025 armed uprisings, reprisals, and atrocities, but the general impression of fragility and low trust persists.

Incidents likes these prompted some Washington-based observers to oppose removal of sanctions. Others argued that isolating or punishing the new authorities in Damascus would not moderate them, though engagement and incentives might. In the end, much of the international community, and most critically Trump and Barrack, chose to support relief and engagement with al-Sharaa.

A year-end deadline for the March 2025 agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), long backed by the United States, and the SDF’s associated Democratic Union Party (aka PYD), came to naught: The Kurdish side faced a stalemate as they refused to take any trust-building steps and persisted in their demand for “federalism.” The American side, led by Barrack, committed to a political solution and held multiple talks in Damascus, Erbil, and northeast Syria, but these efforts yielded no tangible results.

On January 16, al-Sharaa issued a presidential order granting Syrian citizenship to Syrian Kurds. This decision, which had been denied by the Assad family for decades, included other privileges such as recognizing Nowruz, marking the first day of spring, as a national holiday and allowing the Kurds to use and teach the Kurdish language.

This presidential order came in response to clashes between the Syrian government and Kurdish groups in Aleppo that lasted for two days and resulted in the evacuation of those groups to northeast Syria.

Following further clashes, the Kurdish-led forces withdrew from the Aleppo countryside, which served as the front line for the PYD against the Syrian government. This withdrawal led to a rapid domino collapse, resulting in the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from Raqqa and most of Hasakeh province. This allowed the Syrian government to seize control of the oil resources and liberate two major cities overnight.

In an attempt to salvage what could be salvaged, Mazloum Abdi, the head of the SDF, flew to Damascus to meet with Barrack on January 18, 2026. Abdi announced that a new agreement had been reached with Damascus, allowing the SDF to be integrated into the Syrian army and interior ministry. Additionally, the Syrian government would receive control of the oil wells and all governmental institutions, including prisons. After Sal-haraa and Abdi signed a revised implementation agreement on January 30^th, fighting subsided and substantive, though preliminary and fragile, reintegration began.

Fragile ideological middle

Al-Sharaa has gone through a massive personal transformation that may presage the political transformation envisaged for Syria. He removed his military attire and addressed the Syrian people in a suit, adopted a conciliatory approach to various communities within Syria, and sent a clear message to the international community that Syria would be governed by a president rather than the military or religious councils of some sort.

This transformation faced—still faces, to a degree—challenges from his own base. Al-Sharaa wasn’t the only leader in HTS and other opposition movements, and some who shared his objective of defeating Assad advocated a more theocratic vision as the endpoint of revolution. This placed al-Sharaa in the fragile ideological middle: He needed to avoid a clear breach with more radical elements to gain their acquiescence to a governance model far different than that applied in Idlib during the war, one rooted in pragmatism and good relations among Syrians and with neighboring countries.

At the same time, the interim government must balance Turkish-Israeli competition, repatriation of refugees, and a massive reconstruction challenge. Will the path al-Sharaa publicly advocates—moderation, integration, balancing—succeed in managing the various pressures and challenges? It is too soon to say, but nearly a year after Assad’s fall, al-Sharaa is clearly on the right path. Continued pressure from Israel, internal challenges from Syrian hard-liners, the difficult path to reintegrating Druze and Kurds amicably, and immense reconstruction challenges mean that al-Sharaa remains at a critical juncture. Failure on any of these files could undermine faith in his leadership at home and abroad to a degree that momentum in stabilizing Syria would stall. Yet for now, al-Sharaa remains the indispensable man: The lack of alternatives may be his surest safeguard for staying on the path and keeping key domestic and international backers on board.

Asaad Sam Hanna is an intelligence analyst specializing in conflict resolution, regional security, policies, and strategic affairs.

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Western leaders must abandon false hopes of negotiated peace with Putin

Oleksandr Merezhko — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 21:35:07 +0000

For more than twelve years, Ukraine has been defending itself against an escalating Russian invasion that seeks to erase the Ukrainian state from the map of Europe and overturn the existing world order. So far, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield or break the Ukrainian nation’s resistance. Despite this lack of progress, however, he shows no sign of compromising on his maximalist goals.

Many in the West are still in denial over the scale of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia and continue to believe a negotiated settlement is the only realistic option to end the war. This is dangerously delusional. In reality, attempting to make deals with Putin today is as shortsighted as seeking to bargain with Adolf Hitler at the height of World War II. In the 1940s, the allies rejected that idea because they recognized Hitler would never stop and had to be defeated. There is a desperate need for such clarity today.

For the past year, Putin has sabotaged US-led peace talks with endless stalling tactics and diplomatic distractions. It should now be obvious that the Russian ruler is only engaging in negotiations for cynical reasons. First, he seeks to avoid further pressure from the United States. Second, he wishes to buy time to continue destroying Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure. Third, he intends to divide the West and deter further support for Kyiv.

Putin signals his lack of interest in peace by making absurd demands that no Ukrainian government could possibly accept. He calls for Ukraine to surrender the country’s most heavily fortified region without a fight, despite the fact that the Russian army has been unable to capture this territory for more than a decade. He demands a Russian veto over security guarantees for postwar Ukraine, while insisting on the right to interfere in Ukrainian domestic affairs. He questions the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and calls for wartime elections, despite having systematically dismantled Russia’s own fledgling democracy during his twenty-six year reign.

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Putin’s uncompromising position makes perfect sense when viewed through the prism of Russian imperialism. The peace terms being offered by Trump, which would allow Moscow to retain the approximately 20 percent of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation, may seem generous, but the Kremlin dictator knows he cannot accept anything less than Kyiv’s complete capitulation. For Putin, the survival of a sovereign, democratic Ukraine would be a political death sentence. Russian audiences would view such a deal as a defeat of historic proportions. Rather than securing his legacy as one of Russia’s greatest rulers, Putin would be condemned as the man who lost Ukraine.

In practical terms, Putin has also come to depend on the war. Over the past four years, it has become the main source of his legitimacy and power. The Russian economy now relies heavily on war-related spending. Russian society as a whole has undergone a radicalization, making it possible to impose new levels of censorship, repression, and propaganda. Without the war, this entire edifice could collapse.

Then there is the issue of Russia’s military veterans. Almost a million men are currently serving in Ukraine. Most have been brutalized by a daily ration of war crimes amid staggering casualties. The vast majority are also now accustomed to receiving salaries far in excess of anything they could hope to earn in Russia. Putin is no doubt painfully aware that if he demobilizes these damaged and dangerous men, he would be unleashing a destabilizing force that could cause chaos across Russia. The only way to prevent this is by extending the invasion indefinitely.

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None of this means that peace is impossible. In order to secure a sustainable settlement, however, current efforts to appease Putin must end. It is a grave mistake to treat the aggressor and the victim as equals, and an even bigger blunder to pressure the victim into further concessions. Bringing Putin out of international isolation only emboldens him. In Putin’s zero-sum world, goodwill gestures are signs of weakness. It is no coincidence that as calls for a compromise deal have grown louder over the past year, Russia’s bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian population has intensified.

Western leaders must instead send an unambiguous message to Moscow that they are not prepared to reward Russian aggression. The objective should be to raise the costs of the invasion for the Kremlin until continuing the war poses risks to Putin’s grip on power inside Russia. This goal is realistic. With Putin’s army struggling to achieve any major breakthroughs in Ukraine despite suffering catastrophic casualties, rumblings of discontent are growing. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the Russian economy is beginning to show signs of serious strain. Now is the time to increase the pressure on Putin.

Tightening economic sanctions is critical. This means tougher measures against Russia’s energy exports along with Putin’s shadow fleet of tankers. It also means implementing secondary sanctions against those who fund the war by purchasing Russian oil and gas. Recent decisions to relax sanctions temporarily in response to the US war in Iran and spiraling global energy prices are a step in the wrong direction that threatens to rescue the Russian economy and fuel international instability. Putin will not stop the invasion until he runs out of money.

Kyiv’s partners must also provide Ukraine with the military backing to defeat and deter Russia. This should include credible long-term commitments that dash any Russian hopes of outlasting the West in Ukraine. Western countries must overcome their crippling fear of escalation and provide Ukraine with the long-range weapons that will make it possible to strike deep inside Russia. This will allow Ukraine to target Putin’s war machine and create the kind of deterrence that could prevent future repeats of the current invasion.

If Putin is unable to advance in Ukraine while facing mounting economic costs and escalating destruction on the home front, he may finally have to accept that continuing the war poses very real dangers for the stability of his regime. At that point, genuine peace talks could prove possible.

Subsequent negotiations must focus on protecting Ukraine against further Russian aggression. It is vital that any security guarantees transcend political cycles in Western capitals and leave Putin in no doubt that a renewed attack on Ukraine could spark the collapse of the Russian Federation.

The best security guarantees of all remain NATO membership or nuclear status. If these options are currently not feasible, Ukraine needs to receive clear commitments from its major partners that spell out the responses Russia can expect.

Above all, Ukraine’s own armed forces must receive the necessary support to serve as the country’s ultimate security guarantee. European countries have an obvious self-interest in maintaining Ukraine’s military strength. After all, a strong Ukraine is now indispensable for Europe’s broader defense strategy as the continent confronts resurgent Russian imperialism.

Current Western efforts to broker a compromise peace with Putin are based on false assumptions and wishful thinking. This misguided approach only encourages Russia and other authoritarian regimes including Iran, China, and North Korea to pursue aggressive foreign policies. If the West wants a sustainable peace in Europe, it must work to ensure Putin’s defeat in Ukraine.

Oleksandr Merezhko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament for the Servant of the People Party and Chair of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

Freedom’s name

After enduring the coldest winter in memory and the most intense Russian attacks of the entire war, Ukrainians had welcomed the end of winter and a perceptible shift in momentum on the battlefield. According to Ukrainian generals I spoke with, successful counterattacks on the southern end of the thousand-kilometer conflict zone had regained hundreds of square kilometers of territory, in part because Elon Musk had denied Starlink communications to Russian military forces. A homegrown, long-range Ukrainian cruise missile had severely damaged a Russian military production center in Votkinsk, a thousand kilometers deep into Russia, causing panic among Russians. Unmanned interceptors have blunted Russian attack drones and are now being deployed in the Middle East to defend against Iranian attacks—attacks that are being aided by Russian intelligence, which is helping Iran target US military facilities.

Some Ukrainians I spoke with held out hope that the ongoing negotiations among Ukraine, Russia, and the United States could lead to a cease-fire. Most, however, were skeptical that the Russians were serious.

The author meets with Ukrainian soldiers and staff at a rehabilitation clinic in Kyiv, Ukraine, on February 25, 2026. (Credit: RECOVERY)

Ukrainian soldiers expressed grim determination to hold off and even push back Russian attacks. They appreciated the US and European support that had sustained them for the past four years. One captain described a moment of panic when, alone in a trench on the contact line, he was unable to contact his supporting command and felt momentarily abandoned. In that moment, he questioned whether all their sacrifices had been worth it. It was an intensely personal account, but he was also making a larger point that US support—military, financial, political, and moral—was supremely important to Ukrainians’ ability to continue defending their country. Left unsaid was the understanding that US support enables Ukrainians to defend the rest of Europe and vital US national interests against an aggressive Russia.

While the Trump administration might pay less attention to a principled rationale for supporting Ukraine—they have other strong reasons—one young woman nonetheless put it clearly and forcefully; she said, “Freedom’s name is Ukraine.”

Trump’s opportunity

The US president is uniquely capable of ending the war in Ukraine, the most difficult conflict he has addressed. And while progress over the past year has at times been slow, Putin knows that Trump has the leverage to force him to stop the killing. Putin fears long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles coming into Ukrainian hands. Trump seriously considered sending these weapons to the Ukrainians last fall and could still do so—or, even better, he could allow the Ukrainians to manufacture these weapons themselves.

There are other steps Trump could take, too. Despite a temporary reprieve for Russia’s oil revenues due to the oil price spike caused by the Iran war, Putin is terrified by the prospect of resumed pressure on the oil exports that fund his war on Ukraine. The Trump administration has already levied tariffs against India for buying Russian oil, sanctioned the two largest Russian oil companies, and seized Russian-flagged oil tankers used to evade sanctions on Russian oil exports (as have the French, Belgians, and British). Trump could use this military and financial leverage to force Putin to stop the war.

Europe’s moment

With or without Russian agreement on a cease-fire, the Ukrainians will need the ability to deter and defeat, if necessary, another Russian invasion. After all, Putin has blatantly disregarded previous promises not to invade Ukraine. The first line of defense will be the Ukrainian army—which is trained, equipped, supported, and funded with Western help. The French and British, the two nuclear-armed European powers, are leading the planning for a military force to be deployed on Ukrainian territory, which has the support of more than thirty other nations. Moreover, Trump has agreed to back up this European-led reassurance force with air power based in Eastern European NATO nations. The current thinking is that this “coalition of the willing” would deploy in western Ukraine after a cease-fire. But since the Russians refuse to negotiate seriously and a formal cease-fire might not be possible, the coalition should deploy this force now.

Because they understand the threat from an imperialistic Russian autocrat more immediately than the United States, the Europeans have augmented their military planning with impressive financial support to Ukraine. Stymied so far by a couple of European Union (EU) member states in the effort to use hundreds of billions of dollars in Russian frozen assets to support Ukraine, a majority of EU nations plan to borrow ninety billion euros to keep Ukraine solvent and able to purchase weapons, including from US defense manufacturers, for another two years. That $200-plus billion in blocked Russian assets also remain available if the bloc were to agree to use it.

The Europeans are also offering Ukraine another security guarantee—membership in the EU on an accelerated basis, perhaps as early as next year.

The Ukrainians continue to defend themselves and the rest of Europe from a hostile Russia. The Europeans are stepping up both militarily and financially. Trump has the unique ability to force Putin to stop the killing. When the Iran operation ends, he could reestablish himself as a man of peace by using that leverage to end the war in Ukraine.

The post When the Iran operation is finished, Trump should prioritize ending the war in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Europe must not seek Putin’s approval before sending troops to Ukraine

Stephen Blank — Mon, 02 Mar 2026 22:49:46 +0000

European leaders will not send troops to monitor a ceasefire in Ukraine without first securing permission from Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Britain’s Telegraph reports. The news represents a significant political victory for Russia and comes following a coordinated Kremlin campaign of intimidation designed to deter any European military deployment to Ukraine.

This informal Russian veto over European troops in Ukraine places a key element of the current peace process in jeopardy. Ever since the so-called Coalition of the Willing began to take shape in early 2025, participating countries led by Britain and France have been developing plans to send a significant number of troops to Ukraine following a ceasefire in order to monitor adherence and serve as a reassurance force. However, Putin has consistently signaled that he will not agree to a European military presence, with Kremlin officials stating that any European soldiers sent to Ukraine would be “legitimate targets.”

These threats appear to have worked. With the Coalition of the Willing reportedly unwilling to act unless Putin gives them the green light, the entire concept of a reassurance force is now in doubt. This means that a viable and independently monitored ceasefire in Ukraine looks to be unattainable. All Putin need do to block the process is withhold his approval indefinitely.

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Europe’s reluctance to sanction a military mission to Ukraine without Russia’s prior agreement is the latest setback to a faltering peace process. After more than a year of false starts and fruitless talks, many now believe that Russia has no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire and does not genuinely seek peace.

Critics argue that Putin is using the current US-led negotiations to buy time and as an opportunity win over the Trump administration. The Kremlin dictator remains adamant that despite the slow progress of his invasion, Russia will still ultimately achieve its goals in Ukraine. It came as no surprise when reports emerged recently claiming that Russian officials are privately mocking Trump for his naivety about Putin’s true intentions.

With little prospect of progress toward a negotiated peace settlement, Western leaders should be focusing their energies on steps to secure Russia’s defeat in Ukraine. Unfortunately, however, there currently appears to be little chance of this happening. Since 2022, the West has largely wasted Ukraine’s sacrifices while failing to arm Kyiv for victory or impose sufficiently stiff sanctions on Moscow. As the invasion enters a fifth year, there are now some signs of growing European resolve, but much more needs to be done in order to stop Russia.

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Putin’s ability to intimidate European leaders on the issue of troop deployments to Ukraine underlines Europe’s continued lack of credibility in the international security arena. While there has been plenty of talk in European capitals over the past year about the need for greater strategic autonomy, this has yet to translate into concrete action. European governments are still not ready to provide credible deterrence against Russia and suffer from an absence of overall leadership that makes decisive action in the security sphere particularly challenging.

The Trump administration’s efforts to step back from transatlantic security commitments have highlighted the need for increased European defense spending, but Europe remains reliant on the US and has no practical alternative to NATO. It is therefore important to reinvigorate rather than undermine the alliance. Instead, the opposite is happening, with faith in NATO’s collective security commitment presently at all-time lows. This only emboldens Putin. Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump is actually validating European fears by demanding that Ukraine and not Russia make concessions to end the war.

Intelligence agencies and Western government officials increasingly acknowledge that Russia is preparing for a wider European war. This makes it all the more vital to increase backing for Ukraine and integrate the country deeper into Europe’s defense architecture. There are signs this is well understood, with encouraging recent developments including the co-production of weapons in a number of European countries for use in Ukraine.

Putin has long since made clear that he will only negotiate under duress. The Kremlin dictator remains committed to erasing Ukrainian statehood and will not enter into serious talks to end the war until the alternative is defeat. In order to reach that point, Europe must continue to rearm while incorporating the lessons learned on the battlefields of Ukraine and developing the drone capabilities that will define the wars of the future.

Crucially, European leaders must also recover their political nerve and demonstrate to Putin that he cannot hope to intimidate them indefinitely. They can begin by declaring that Russia does not get to decide whether European troops are deployed to a sovereign and independent Ukraine.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Even in an optimistic scenario, any agreement between Kyiv and Moscow will demand long-term readiness and self-reliance. Ceasefires can be violated. Commitments can erode. What endures is force posture: Trained units, predictable rotation, and the resilience to absorb pressure.

Deterrence is not a document. It is a condition and it rests on how effectively a state mobilizes and prepares its population. Yet Ukraine’s mobilization still reflects post-Soviet assumptions. Men between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-nine are treated as the default defenders of the state, while women are viewed as supplementary. That division no longer matches battlefield realities or Ukraine’s strategic needs.

Since 2024, Kyiv has tightened mobilization rules, expanded enforcement, and narrowed exemptions. These measures have stabilized force levels, but they have not solved the underlying problem: Ukraine is fighting a prolonged war of attrition against a far larger adversary. Pulling more men into the system without changing how the system functions will not produce sustainable results.

One weakness is preparation and allocation. Many men still only receive limited training before mobilization. At the same time, tens of thousands of women with in-demand support skills in fields such as logistics, communications, medicine, intelligence, engineering, IT, and drones, remain outside the recruitment and training pipelines.

The result is inefficiency on two fronts. Front line units are overstretched and denied predictable rotation, while rear area roles are often filled by personnel whose skills are misaligned with their assignments.

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Ukraine does not need to mirror Russia’s mass mobilization model. It needs smarter force management. Women can be systematically integrated into roles currently performed by men far away from the front, including checkpoints, border duties, logistics hubs, training commands, communications and intelligence units, and other rear-area security functions.

In a war of attrition, regular rotation is essential to combat effectiveness. Reallocating personnel this way would relieve pressure on front line units. Over time, it would create a broader preparedness posture in which more Ukrainians have the skills to resist renewed aggression. It would also broaden the pool of people with military experience, which strengthens deterrence long after any ceasefire.

The case for integration is not hypothetical. Ukrainian women have volunteered in large numbers since 2014. Legislation adopted in 2018 granted women equal rights and responsibilities in the Ukrainian armed forces. By 2025, more than 70,000 women were serving in the Ukrainian military, including in drone units, medical evacuation teams, intelligence cells, and logistics chains. Recruiting data from the past year indicates that roughly one in five new candidates entering the pipeline was female.

Despite the growing prominence of women, the Ukrainian military has not yet fully adapted. Legal equality has not translated into institutional integration. Access to training and promotion is inconsistent. Women are still too often treated as volunteers rather than a core element of force planning. Discrimination and sexual harassment persist, while accountability is uneven.

Many barriers are practical. Units often lack properly fitted equipment and uniforms. Separate barracks, showers, and toilets are not universal. Access to gynecological care is inconsistent. Mechanisms to prevent and address harassment and misconduct are sometimes poorly enforced. These are not symbolic deficiencies; they directly affect retention, readiness, and morale.

A modern defense strategy is not built on weapons alone. It is built on resilience. Russia’s theory of victory assumes Ukrainian society will fracture under prolonged pressure. Zelenskyy’s diplomacy aims to deny Moscow that outcome by securing international backing and buying time. But society must disprove Russia’s assumptions in practice.

A whole-of-society defense that mobilizes women across military and security roles sends a strong signal of endurance. It demonstrates that Ukraine is prepared for years of deterrence and reinforces the message that Ukraine is building a modern European state.

This signal will also matter to allies. Western support is increasingly constrained by domestic politics. Ukraine’s strongest argument is not moral clarity alone, but strategic credibility. A country that can sustain defense over time is easier to support than one perpetually dependent on emergency assistance.

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Other states facing serious long-term threats have updated their security cultures. Israel mandated conscription for both genders in 1949. Norway introduced gender-neutral conscription in 2015; Sweden followed in 2018.

Ukraine has taken steps toward modernization. In 2024, it updated defense education curricula in secondary schools. By 2025, pilot programs expanded civilian preparedness. But beyond high school, structured pathways for women to acquire military training remain limited. Lyceums and military academies are still underused as talent pipelines.

The costs of delay compound. Exhaustion erodes combat effectiveness. Poor rotation accelerates burnout, desertion, and casualties. No peace plan, however carefully negotiated, can compensate for a force structure that excludes half the population from systematic preparation.

Whether Zelenskyy’s peace initiative succeeds or stalls, Ukraine will require endurance. The policy agenda should be clear. First, Kyiv should extend mandatory service to women aged twenty-five to sixty for designated non-front line support roles currently filled by men such as logistics, medical support, communications, and administration.

It will be crucial to clearly codify exemptions based on factors including parental and family commitments, along with professional status and medical limitations. This will make it possible to free more male personnel for front line duty while sustaining continuity of operations.

Second, the Ukrainian authorities need to fix the basics that determine retention and readiness. This includes properly fitted uniforms and equipment, adequate facilities, reliable medical and gynecological care, and strict enforcement against harassment and misconduct.

Third, Ukraine should expand training and education pipelines that actively target women, including military higher education. Recruiting data already shows demand; the state should convert that demand into readiness, while civil society tracks progress.

Fourth, Ukraine’s allies should support women’s integration through training exchanges. Western military commanders have decades of lessons to share on integrating women into units and training pipelines.

Finally, Kyiv will need to invest in long-term societal preparation. Ukraine cannot rely on emergency mobilization alone; youth must be educated early for the responsibility of defense. When service is framed as an expected civic duty rather than an abrupt wartime shock, conscription becomes a sustainable pillar of national security.

Security guarantees will shape Ukraine’s future, but guarantees are not substitutes for national capacity. Zelenskyy is right to pursue diplomacy that does not mortgage sovereignty; he is also correct to insist peace must be durable. Durability, however, will be measured in battalions, rotations, and readiness, not in signatures.

Ukraine’s most reliable long-term defense asset is its people: Men and women alike. Mobilizing and integrating women is not about ideology. It is a strategy for victory and long-term security.

Calin Trenkov-Wermuth is the former principal security governance advisor at the US Institute of Peace and co-author of The Future of the Security Sector in Ukraine, published by USIP. Sofia Kryshtal is the former executive coordinator of the USIP Task Force on the Future of the Security Sector in Ukraine.

The battlefield itself has also changed, with the clearly defined front lines of the early years giving way to a shifting grey zone dominated by ubiquitous drone coverage. As a result, major offensives featuring armored units and massed infantry are now extremely difficult to conduct. Russia has refined its tactics in response to these changes, shifting away from a reliance on human wave assaults toward the use of small infiltration groups that probe Ukrainian defenses while seeking to establish footholds.

With Putin’s commanders under intense political pressure to capture more ground, the impetus is on Russia to continue offensive operations. As the defending force, this places Ukraine in a strong position. According to Ukrainian officials, Russian casualties have recently reached record highs of more than 30,000 per month. For the first time in the war, this means Russia’s losses are now higher than monthly recruitment levels.

The Russian army in Ukraine has recently experienced disruptions to Starlink connectivity, creating further challenges for the coordination of offensive operations. Without stable links between front line units and commanders, Russian forces are likely to become even more vulnerable and easier to eliminate. This has already led to a number of successful Ukrainian counteroffensives and could create the conditions for additional increases in Russian casualty rates.

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Since the onset of the invasion, the Kremlin has been careful to reduce the risk of any backlash over heavy losses in Ukraine. Recruitment has concentrated on Russia’s ethnic minorities and the country’s poorest communities, with prisoners offered amnesties in exchange for military service. For the past few years, the emphasis has increasingly turned to attracting volunteers via large enlistment bonuses and generous salaries. Nevertheless, Russia’s ability to absorb casualties is not limitless. The longer the war drags on, the harder it will be for Moscow to maintain the current tempo, especially if Russian casualties continue to climb.

As part of efforts to maximize Russian losses, Ukraine has established a digital infrastructure to turn drone warfare into a systematic campaign of attrition. Through mechanisms such as the ePoints system, all Russian personnel and equipment losses are logged, verified, and analyzed. Ukrainian commanders can identify which units are most effective and adjust tactics as needed.

Ukraine’s strategy is producing striking results. In December 2025 alone, Ukrainian drone units claim to have hit over one hundred thousand Russian targets, a 31 percent increase compared to the previous month. Russian war blogger Dmitry Rogozin is one of many on the opposing side to acknowledge the effectiveness of this approach, noting that Ukraine is “building a model for the conflict as a long-term project designed to exhaust and exert systematic pressure.”

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The Russian army in Ukraine is already beginning to show signs of strain. According to UK Defense Secretary John Healey, Moscow is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign recruits as Russian commanders lose men faster than they can replace them. “Putin likes to give the impression that they’re making relentless and inevitable progress,” Healey noted recently. “But he’s weaker than he’s been and more reliant than he’s been on foreign fighters.”

Russia’s efforts to attract foreign mercenaries are a clear indication of the country’s mounting manpower challenges. Putin remains deeply reluctant to order a new mobilization due to concerns that this could destabilize the home front and spark a repeat of the exodus of fighting age Russian men that took place in 2022. However, with the Russian economy struggling, paying for new volunteers may become more challenging and lead to budget cuts elsewhere that could also fuel discontent.

If Russian losses continue to outpace recruitment, Putin may find himself with no good options. He could be forced to choose between mobilization, diverting state funds to sustain recruitment incentives, or scaling back offensive operations. All of these choices have the potential to fuel domestic instability. In recent days, there has been widespread speculation that Russian efforts to block the Telegram app may reflect growing Kremlin concerns over the possibility of unrest.

For much of the war, the Russian public has experienced the invasion of Ukraine as a distant conflict. Mounting casualties, particularly if paired with growing economic hardship, may gradually erode this sense of detachment and increase the pressure on the Kremlin. As the war enters a fifth year, Ukraine is hoping escalating Russian losses can finally force Putin to rethink his invasion and seek a meaningful settlement.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

After US President Donald Trump unveiled the Abraham Accords in 2020, there was a burst of optimism about Middle East integration. In Washington, this optimism focused on prospects for expanding diplomatic relations between Israel and its neighbors. In the Middle East, officials often point to a broader integration agenda that is helping de-escalate tensions and facilitate stronger economic cooperation in one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. This broader integration includes the resolution of the Qatar rift, de-escalation between Gulf countries and Iran, improved relations between Gulf countries and Turkey, and the reintegration of Syria into the region.

Hamas’s attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the war in Gaza that followed ruptured much of this optimism. But around this time last year, there was still a sense of forward momentum and prevailing belief that integration would continue once the war concluded. Positive political change in Syria, a brief Gaza cease-fire, and expectations that Trump would seek to build on the Abraham Accords in his second term buoyed this sense of momentum.

Attitudes are different in 2026. There is a real fear that the current trajectory is toward greater fragmentation and conflict, rather than toward integration and stability. While peace efforts in Gaza have progressed over the past year, the reality of implementation underscores the difficulty of a durable solution in Gaza, let alone a resolution to the Palestinian issue. Several of the leaders and policymakers I spoke with at the MSC fear that renewed conflict is inevitable in the face of Hamas’s unwillingness to disarm.

Arab countries are also shaken by the Israeli military’s actions in the region over the past several months, particularly the strike targeting Hamas leadership in Doha in September 2025. Arab officials question what Israel may do next and whether the Israeli government still prioritizes improved relations with its neighbors. And while the Trump administration has prioritized strengthening cooperation bilaterally across the Arab Gulf, it has not taken meaningful steps to expand or strengthen the Abraham Accords, beyond a statement from Kazakhstan on joining the Accords in November 2025.

Beyond Gaza and Israel, other regional developments are shaping the trajectory of regional integration. The eruption of a public rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—two influential regional players who were until recently close partners—risks dragging other countries into a new divide that is increasingly being framed in terms of ideological differences, including about regional integration itself. Excitement over the emergence of a pragmatic new Syrian government has been subdued by reminders of just how fragile that political transition is. And while the weakening of the Iranian regime may mitigate its immediate ability to support destabilizing proxy activities in the region, the potential for renewed conflict appears high, as the United States announced that a second US aircraft carrier would arrive in the region.

Charting a path forward

The Middle East is undergoing a period of significant turmoil. Most of the experts I spoke with at the MSC agree that things will get worse before they get better. This turmoil is making it difficult for countries that normally excel at long-term planning to see past the current storm and imagine a future of greater cooperation and stability.

No one should downplay the depth of the turmoil and how it is impacting past assumptions about the future of regional integration. As a result of this turmoil, many Arab officials now argue that the Abraham Accords as they were construed in 2020 do not provide a viable framework for brokering new normalization agreements between Israel and Arab countries. Future progress on normalization, particularly between Saudi Arabia and Israel, they add, will require a significant shift in the Israeli posture on the Palestinian issue. Further, achieving the kind of political and economic integration that can deliver tangible improvements in regional stability and prosperity will require addressing other regional fissures, beyond those between Israel and its neighbors.

The storm the Middle East is currently facing will pass, however, and there are still powerful undercurrents supporting integration that will persist after it does. As Arab Gulf countries diversify their economies away from oil, they will depend on a more stable regional environment that facilitates trade and investment, including stronger intra-regional trade. There is also a lasting fatigue from decades of war and extremist ideologies that is driving more pragmatic, cooperative approaches, most clearly embodied in the approach of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. And while the Saudi-UAE rift could pose a serious threat to regional integration, the muted nature of this rift compared to the 2017 Qatar rift is an illustration of the more cautious approach of Gulf leaders in recent years.

Start small now

My discussions in Munich helped to underscore the importance of taking small steps now that preserve past accomplishments and maintain forward momentum for Middle East integration amid the ongoing turmoil.

In the near term, the United States and its partners should focus on mitigating the impact of the Saudi-UAE rift and ensuring that political transition and reconstruction efforts in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza foster stronger regional cooperation, rather than serving as arenas for competition and proxy battles. Washington should also seize upon opportunities to strengthen economic cooperation where it is still viable while recognizing that it will not serve as a replacement for resolving political differences.

Leveraging the Middle East’s strategic location between Europe and Asia will require supporting initiatives that look outward from the Middle East, such as components of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and related trade corridors. And while it is not the right time to create a new institutional architecture for regional integration, now is the time to be planning for such an architecture. One of the most important lessons from the Abraham Accords is that without a formal structure, even the most promising agreements will struggle to translate into tangible cooperation beyond the bilateral level.

The past year has underscored the potential for change in the Middle East—both for good and for bad. The next year will provide an important opportunity to channel that change in a positive direction, toward greater integration and stability.

The post Dispatch from Munich: Pursuing Middle East integration during a time of upheaval appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A bad Ukraine peace could ignite new wars in Russia’s former empire

Joseph Epstein — Tue, 17 Feb 2026 21:38:40 +0000

A fresh round of US-brokered peace talks between Russia and Ukraine is taking place this week as the Trump administration seeks to reach a deal by early summer. While pro-Ukrainian voices warn that any agreement lacking ironclad security guarantees for Kyiv could embolden Moscow to go further into Moldova or test NATO in the Baltics, the biggest threat may be to countries elsewhere in the former Soviet space.

There are already signs that Russia is turning its imperial appetite toward the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where the groundwork for destabilization appears to be well underway. Any negotiated settlement in Ukraine that ignores these regions will not end the current war; it will merely relocate it.

Russian nationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin, who is often called “Putin’s brain,” declared last month that no post-Soviet state should possess sovereignty. Instead, he argued, Moscow “has no choice but to restore the Russian Empire.” Days earlier, leading Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov called for Russia to conduct “special military operations” similar to the invasion of Ukraine in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The Russian Foreign Ministry sought to distance itself from these comments by dismissing Solovyov as a “private journalist,” but few were convinced. In a country where the Kremlin controls news coverage and individuals can face prison for holding up blank signs, any talk of private journalism lacks credibility. Instead, this rhetoric is a further indication that even while bogged down in Ukraine, Russia is already waging shadow wars against other neighbors.

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Evidence of Russia’s intentions goes beyond mere revisionist rhetoric. In early February, Azerbaijani security services released recordings of Ramiz Mehdiyev, the former head of the country’s presidential administration, allegedly coordinating coup plans with Russian FSB agents. This echoed events in Armenia last summer, when the authorities arrested Samuel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian oligarch on the US Treasury Department’s Kremlin List, for allegedly plotting to overthrow Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government in cooperation with Gazprom and Russian Railways.

Two alleged Russian-backed coup attempts in the South Caucasus in a single year should be enough to alarm every policymaker in Washington and across Europe. Meanwhile, in Central Asia, leaked Russian military intelligence documents claim to reveal plans for active operations to destabilize Kazakhstan. The initial focus was set to be the country’s northern regions, where Kazakhstan’s ethnic Russian population is concentrated. The plans included bribing elites, weaponizing accusations of “Russophobia,” and funneling propaganda through front organizations; tactics that echo earlier destabilization efforts in Ukraine.

The Kremlin has particular cause for concern due to the growing American presence in regions that Moscow regards as its own backyard. Over the past year, the United States has displaced Russia as the principal mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and has brokered a peace deal including US oversight of a corridor that could become a key trade route connecting Europe to Asia while bypassing Russia entirely.

US Vice President JD Vance’s recent visit to Yerevan and Baku underlined the changing geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus. This was the highest level American engagement in the region for nearly two decades. It represented a statement of strategic intent that the Kremlin cannot ignore.

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US President Donald Trump has made ending wars a signature promise, but his team must know that some peace deals could end up accelerating hostilities elsewhere. If a settlement in Ukraine frees up Russian military resources without establishing credible deterrents against further Kremlin aggression, Moscow will have the means and the motive to reassert dominance elsewhere in its former empire.

History warns us to take this seriously. The tragedy of the war in Ukraine is not only the scale of the killing but its repetition. In his book “War and Punishment,” Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar chronicles how Russia systematically repressed Ukrainians for centuries to extinguish statehood aspirations. Zygar traced this process from the abolition of Cossack autonomy in the eighteenth century to the prohibition of Ukrainian language and literature in the nineteenth century, and on to the artificially engineered 1930s famine, known as the Holodomor, that killed around four million Ukrainians.

Strikingly similar templates exist throughout the former Soviet domains. “Perished Civilization,” a volume published under the nom de guerre “Kuzari” and drawing on leaked Russian archival files, has gained attention in the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, and Ukrainian media since Dugin and Solovyov’s provocations. The book documents how Moscow justified its conquest of Muslim Central Asia as a sacred duty to defend Orthodoxy, a civilizational framing that lent permanence to what began as territorial opportunism. Following the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks retained every inch of this conquered land, swapping religious justification for ideological mandate.

The human cost was staggering. Kazakhstan experienced its own artificially engineered famine during the Soviet era, known in the country as the Asharshylyk. This mirrored Ukraine’s Holodomor and annihilated around 38 percent of the Kazakh population. Today’s concerns are not ancient grievances; they are unhealed wounds in societies that understand what Russian imperial restoration could mean.

With painful memories of Russian rule still widespread in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, few residents will accept the argument that Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine makes further aggression unlikely. Instead, they will point to Moscow’s record of learning from its failures.

Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia was tactically successful but operationally embarrassing. The invasion was mired by aircraft losses, poor coordination, and drunk soldiers wandering through villages and reportedly wobbling at roll calls. Six years later, Russia seized Crimea with “little green men” in an operation that was both remarkably swift and highly professional. A hasty Ukraine peace could once again enable Russia to learn from its mistakes and implement key lessons against new targets.

A number of steps are required to prevent a settlement in Ukraine from serving as the spark for further Russian aggression in Central Asia or the South Caucasus. First, any security guarantees for Ukraine should also cover other at-risk post-Soviet states through bilateral defense pacts or a multilateral framework.

Second, the United States should seek to amplify its economic footprint throughout the region by committing to infrastructure and resource development projects. This will help counter Russian influence while creating incentives for stability. Third, sanctions relief should be dependent on concrete criteria such as halting Kremlin destabilization efforts in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and beyond.

By embedding regional safeguards into a Ukraine peace deal, President Trump can deliver on his promise to end wars without igniting new conflicts. The Kremlin’s propagandists are telling us exactly where they plan to go next. This time, we should listen.

Joseph Epstein is director of the Turan Research Center.

Drawing on lessons from the past

The Board of Peace, established and endorsed by United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025, bears similarities to several earlier transitional administrations led by the UN.

The UN established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and took full control of the territory from late 1999 until independence in 2002. The mission had to rebuild government institutions and basic services amid major instability following the violence that accompanied the 1999 vote for independence from Indonesia. UNTAET made significant progress in some areas: it helped restore security, organized elections, established new administrative structures, and laid the groundwork for an independent state that eventually became East Timor.

A girl carrying a baby watches as a Portuguese soldier, part of the first contingent of an estimated seven hundred Portuguese troops serving with the United Nations mission in East Timor, stands guard after arriving at Dili’s Komoro airport February 9, 2000. (REUTERS)

Nevertheless, the mission was criticized for being overly top-down. Decisions were largely made by international staff, with little substantive input from Timorese leaders or communities, especially at the outset. Local participation was limited throughout much of the administration, which frustrated many East Timorese and left the new institutions feeling disconnected from everyday people and traditional modes of social organization.

A similar pattern emerged with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, established in 1999 under Security Council Resolution 1244. Although the mission held a broad mandate to govern the territory and promote self-government, its highly centralized structure, in which international officials retained ultimate control, intensified ethnic divisions, slowed progress toward local rule, and left Kosovo in prolonged uncertainty over its final political status.

Going further back, the League of Nations’ administration of the Saar Territory from 1920 to 1935, established under the Treaty of Versailles, serves as another cautionary example. An international commission administered this coal-rich region as a neutral buffer zone. However, the largely German population strongly resented external rule, and when the promised plebiscite finally took place in 1935, over 90 percent voted to reunite with Germany—even though it was then under Nazi control.

A more recent example is the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq following the 2003 invasion. The US-led authority dismantled the Iraqi army, pushed through sweeping policies that barred many former Baath Party members from government jobs, and attempted to impose new technocratic structures alongside free-market reforms. These decisions played a major role in sparking the rapid rise of insurgency, sectarian violence, and instability that cost hundreds of thousands of lives in the years that followed.

Similar issues appear in other cases. One example is the UN Temporary Executive Authority administration of West New Guinea from 1962 to 1963. The UN temporarily assumed control to oversee the territory’s transfer from Dutch to Indonesian rule, under an agreement between the two countries. The mission focused primarily on ensuring a smooth transition rather than on long-term local governance. However, the rapid transfer and the 1969 “Act of Free Choice” process, widely criticized as heavily managed by Indonesia, left enduring disputes over self-determination among the Papuan population.

The 2003 Road Map for Peace, put forward by the Quartet (the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia) to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, offers another instructive example. Although the plan outlined phased steps toward a two-state solution, including security commitments and institutional reforms, it faced sustained criticism for vague timelines, failure to address core issues decisively, and an inability to halt violence or settlement expansion.

Another relevant case is the post-Dayton governance structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the 1995 peace agreement. International high representatives were given extensive “Bonn Powers” to impose laws, remove officials, and override local decisions when deemed necessary. While these authorities helped bring initial stability and enabled early state-building steps, critics argue that they also deepened ethnic divisions, increased dependence on foreign oversight, allowed local elites to evade genuine compromise, and contributed to recurring political deadlocks through expansive veto mechanisms rather than addressing the underlying drivers of conflict.

To succeed in the present

Taken together, these cases reveal a recurring pattern. When external actors rely heavily on top-down governance or loosely designed institutional frameworks, they tend to displace genuine local ownership and undermine the long-term prospects for sustainable self-government.

The Board of Peace incorporates several distinctive features that could potentially improve upon these earlier efforts. With Trump holding the charter-based permanent chairmanship, the body benefits from high-level direction and a deal-making approach reminiscent of initiatives like the Abraham Accords. The tiered membership structure, in which permanent seats are allocated based on a one-billion-dollar commitment, concentrates participation among states and entities willing to make substantial financial investments in outcomes.

If the board emphasizes high-level diplomacy, investment, and reconstruction oversight, it does so, however, without any Palestinian representation. Similarly, the Gaza Executive Board, which includes overlapping members, has no Palestinians among its appointees.

The structure excludes remaining Hamas factions, which continue to hold influence in parts of northern Gaza.

Day-to-day operations are managed by the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, a separate Palestinian technocratic body intentionally insulated from Hamas influence and current Palestinian Authority leadership. This body oversees routine administrative functions and seeks guidance from international experts. Such institutional separation aims to allow reconstruction priorities, including humanitarian aid distribution, infrastructure repair, and institution-building, to advance without becoming entangled in factional political disputes.

Oversight of the arrangement involves Arab administrative staff, potentially significant Gulf financial backing, and a security framework led primarily by the United States, even though it carries a UN label. The structure excludes remaining Hamas factions, which continue to hold influence in parts of northern Gaza. Meanwhile, the Palestinian Authority remains sidelined pending reforms whose specific details have yet to be finalized.

The charter employs relatively general language. Although UN Resolution 2803 describes the arrangement as a “transitional administration with international legal personality,” the charter itself references only its status as an international organization and does not explicitly define Gaza’s legal status. It establishes no firm deadlines, measurable benchmarks for progress, or clear enforcement mechanisms. This ambiguity could generate prolonged uncertainty and delays, similar to challenges experienced by the UN in East Timor, where the mandate lacked a clearly defined endpoint. Early signs, such as the partial reopening of the Rafah border crossing under EU supervision, indicate that the ceasefire mechanism might, even in a limited and reversible form, provide tangible humanitarian and mobility improvements.

The exclusion of certain political actors, however, may create instability. Marginalizing Hamas elements may resemble aspects of the CPA’s de-Baathification policies in Iraq, decisions that contributed to insurgency and later extremist mobilization in the country. Such exclusions could also reinforce perceptions of inequitable governance, similar to criticisms sometimes directed at the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Past experience indicates that externally driven governance arrangements often face significant challenges when they lack strong local legitimacy. In Bosnia, international oversight halted violence but struggled to bridge deep ethnic divisions. In Iraq, CPA policies contributed to prolonged instability and violence.

The donor-led coalition-of-the-willing model

Legally, the board’s relationship with the United Nations remains ambiguous. Resolution 2803 invokes Chapter VII enforcement authority, yet the open-ended nature of external governance raises complex questions under customary international law concerning Palestinian sovereignty and the application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions governing occupied territories.

The arrangement raises broader questions about the UN Charter’s foundational commitment to equal respect for fundamental human rights. By structuring peacebuilding around donor-led coalitions, an innovative but selective mechanism, the board sidelines less-resourced states. It also risks reducing the influence of neutral institutions such as the International Criminal Court, by centralizing control over territory, aid, and governance, which can obstruct independent investigations, and excluding justice-focused mandates from the peace framework, focusing instead on economic recovery and stabilization without addressing alleged atrocities.

This dynamic could foster the perception that peace is accessible primarily to actors with sufficient financial leverage, potentially weakening principles of self-determination and encouraging unilateral initiatives, including controversial land policies or externally driven regional projects. Over time, arrangements of this nature could also erode established multilateral norms and diminish long-standing commitments to universal fairness.

At the same time, the board’s design attempts to address several common pitfalls. It avoids direct foreign rule by incorporating a Palestinian technocratic governance layer, aims at securing substantial funding from dedicated donors, and promotes active Arab participation to enhance regional legitimacy and sustainability.

Given the increasing fragmentation of multilateral cooperation, this donor-led coalition-of-the-willing model offers a faster-moving alternative to the slower consensus-driven UN mechanisms. By emphasizing results-oriented governance, participating states may help break Gaza’s recurring cycle of destruction and lay a more durable foundation for Palestinian self-governance while also addressing Israeli security concerns.

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Vladimir Putin is trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 12 Feb 2026 22:50:16 +0000

More than a year since he returned to the White House vowing to end the Russia-Ukraine War within 24 hours, US President Donald Trump remains upbeat about the prospects for peace. “Very, very good talks today,” Trump stated on February 6 following the latest round of negotiations in Abu Dhabi. “Something could be happening.”

Few in Kyiv share this optimism. While Ukrainian officials are loathe to dismiss Trump’s peace efforts for fear incurring his displeasure, a majority of Ukrainians remain utterly unconvinced that Russian President Vladimir Putin has any interest whatsoever in ending hostilities. A poll conducted by Kyiv’s International Institute of Sociology in late January found that only 20 percent of Ukrainians think the war will end by July, while 43 percent expect fighting to continue into 2027 or beyond.

Such skepticism is easy to understand. Ukraine agreed to an unconditional ceasefire way back in March 2025, but Putin has so far refused to follow suit. Instead, he has spent much of the past year engaging in blatant stalling tactics while constantly moving the diplomatic goalposts in a transparent bid to prevent any progress toward a lasting settlement. This has resulted in what most Ukrainians and many others regard as a phony peace process.

As fruitless US-led negotiations rumble on, Putin has underlined his true intentions by dramatically increasing Russian attacks on the Ukrainian population, leading to a 31 percent surge in civilian casualties during 2025. The most recent escalation saw Russia attempt to freeze millions of Ukrainians in their own homes by systematically bombing critical heating and power infrastructure amid Arctic conditions. Some believe this ruthless winter bombing campaign qualifies as an act of genocide; it is most certainly not the act of a man seeking a compromise peace.

Trump has difficulty reading Putin’s true intentions because he fundamentally misunderstands the motivations behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine. To Trump, the current negotiations are a geopolitical real estate deal, with the Russians playing hardball to secure better terms. In reality, Putin is operating on a completely different wavelength altogether.

The Kremlin dictator is not looking to make deals, acquire additional land, or push the Russian border a few hundred kilometers to the west. Instead, he wants to secure his place in history. Putin genuinely believes he is on an historic mission to reverse the injustice of the Soviet collapse and revive the Russian Empire. In order to achieve this, he has convinced himself that he must erase Ukraine as a state and as a nation.

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For more than two decades, Putin’s Ukraine obsession has shaped his reign and defined Russian foreign policy. His relationship with the West first became openly hostile in the aftermath of Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, which Putin bitterly denounced as a Western plot to destabilize Russia.

Since that watershed moment, Ukraine has been at the heart of virtually every single new crisis in relations between Moscow and the democratic world, from the 2014 seizure of Crimea to the full-scale invasion of 2022. Throughout this period, Putin has repeatedly demonstrated his readiness to sacrifice Russia’s other national interests in pursuit of his anti-Ukrainian crusade.

Meanwhile, he has used the full weight of the formidable Kremlin propaganda machine to poison Russian society against all things Ukrainian and prepare the ground for a war of national extermination. Putin has become notorious for insisting that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has repeatedly dismissed independent Ukraine as an illegitimate state and an artificial “anti-Russia.”

Anyone in Ukraine who dares to disagree with Putin’s claims has been dehumanized and branded a Nazi or a stooge of the West. This hate campaign has proved remarkably successful and has contributed to the almost complete absence of visible anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia, despite widespread public knowledge of the atrocities taking place in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s importance to Putin is twofold. As the largest non-Russian former Soviet republic by population and the closest to Russia in terms of shared heritage, Putin sees Ukraine as the key to undoing the verdict of 1991. If he can end what he regards as the aberration of Ukrainian statehood, this will redeem Russia and reestablish the country’s credentials as a great power.

Likewise, Ukraine’s perceived closeness means that the further consolidation of an independent and democratic Ukrainian state represents an existential threat to authoritarian Russia. As a KGB officer in East Germany during the late 1980s, Putin witnessed firsthand how grassroots movements can topple empires. If Ukraine’s transition from Kremlin vassal to European democracy continues, he fears this could serve as a catalyst for the next stage in a Russian imperial retreat that began in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

This helps to explain why Putin has shown so little interest in the seemingly generous peace terms proposed by Trump. The US leader has indicated that Russia would be allowed to keep the territories it has captured in Ukraine while facing no meaningful consequences for launching the largest European invasion since World War II. At first glance, these terms might appear to represent a major Russian victory, but Putin himself obviously does not think so.

Putin’s reluctance to accept Trump’s offer makes perfect sense when viewed from the perspective of the Russian ruler’s revisionist worldview and imperial ambitions. Crucially, Putin is well aware that any peace deal based on the current front lines of the war would leave 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and free to integrate into the democratic world. That is exactly what he is fighting to prevent.

In line with the present proposals, the Kremlin would retain control over the rust belt towns of the Donbas, but would cede iconic Odesa and sacred Kyiv, the mother city of all Russia, to a hostile neighbor. Most Russians would regard this as a defeat of historic proportions. Instead of being remembered as a new Peter the Great, Putin would be doomed to enter Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine.

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With a compromise peace out of the question, Putin has no real choice but to fight on. Doing so offers some obvious advantages. As long as the war continues, Putin can delay a reckoning over the huge Russian losses in Ukraine and the damage done to the country’s international standing. But as the fourth anniversary of the invasion draws near, it is becoming increasingly difficult to disguise the fact that the war is not going according to plan.

Putin’s problems are most immediately apparent on the battlefield. When he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Putin vowed to “demilitarize” Ukraine. Four years on, Ukraine now boasts the largest army in Europe and has emerged as a world leader in drone warfare.

The radically upgraded Ukrainian military has already defeated Russia in multiple major engagements and is now seeking to gain the upper hand in a grueling high-tech war of attrition. Putin’s army suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties in 2025, while seizing less than one percent of Ukraine. At the current glacial pace, it would take the Russian military decades to conquer the country.

In public, at least, Putin continues to project confidence and insist that the goals of Russia’s invasion will be unconditionally met. However, his boasts of battlefield dominance are now starting to ring hollow. With so few actual victories to cheer, he has recently resorted to inventing imaginary advances.

Putin’s habit of exaggerating Russian gains came back to haunt him in late 2025 when he repeatedly claimed to have captured the Ukrainian city of Kupyansk, only for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to personally visit the city and record a selfie video exposing the Russian ruler’s lies. This embarrassing episode underlined the growing credibility gap between Putin’s bold talk of inevitable Russian victory and the far less impressive battlefield reality of his faltering invasion.

Putin’s other stated war aim was the “denazification” of Ukraine. This is Kremlin code for the erasure of a separate Ukrainian national identity and the imposition of Russian imperial doctrine in every sphere of public life, from education and culture to politics and religion. If this was the intention, it has backfired disastrously.

The war unleashed by Putin in 2022 has fueled an unprecedented consolidation of Ukrainian patriotism alongside a wholesale rejection of all things Russian throughout Ukrainian society. As a result, the entire notion of a pro-Kremlin government in Kyiv is now inconceivable unless propped up indefinitely by Russian bayonets, which would be ruinously expensive for the Kremlin.

This geopolitical divorce is also evident in the international arena. For centuries, Ukraine was widely seen by the outside world as indivisible from Russia itself. Putin still clings to this imperial mythology, but his propaganda slogans of “brotherly nations” now sound absurdly outdated. Instead, today’s Ukraine is widely recognized as an emerging democracy and a member of the wider European community of nations.

It would be extremely reckless to underestimate the Russian military, of course. Russia’s sheer size means that it remains a formidable threat and will likely continue to grind forward in Ukraine. However, after nearly four years of limited progress and staggering losses, it is now difficult to imagine how Putin could achieve the maximalist goals of his invasion on the battlefield.

Many Russians had pinned their hopes on a new Trump presidency, but even the dramatic reduction in US military aid to Ukraine over the past year has failed to produce any significant Russian breakthroughs. Furthermore, US weapons continue to flow to Ukraine via the PURL initiative, with indications that the White House has also relaxed earlier restrictions on strikes inside Russia.

America’s withdrawal from transatlantic commitments also means European leaders are more motivated than ever to maintain their support for Ukraine in the coming years. In a rapidly changing security environment, they are acutely aware that the Ukrainian army is now indispensable for the defense of Europe. With Ukraine’s own revitalized defense industry meeting around half of the country’s military needs domestically, Kyiv looks well positioned to continue defending itself despite the decline in support from the United States.

As the war enters a fifth year, Putin finds himself in an unenviable predicament. He has no obvious pathway to victory but cannot agree to a compromise peace without acknowledging what would amount to an historic defeat and placing his own political survival in question.

Faced with a bloody quagmire on the front lines, Putin will likely seek to break Ukrainian resistance in the coming months by expanding Russian attacks on the general population and making as much of the country as possible unlivable. In parallel, he will continue to play for time on the diplomatic stage, while attempting to bribe the United States with wild proposals and bully Europe into inaction with thinly-veiled threats of escalation.

If President Trump is serious about ending the war, he needs to recognize that his Russian counterpart currently dare not risk any peace that safeguards Ukrainian independence. Putin knows that if Ukraine survives, he loses. A sustainable settlement will therefore only be possible if he comes under significantly more pressure and is confronted with the prospect of a fate far worse than failure in Ukraine.

Putin will abandon his invasion when he begins to fear that continuing the war could threaten the future of his regime and the stability of Russia itself. The current occupant of the Kremlin still dreams of emulating Stalin and Katherine the Great, but he has no desire to become the next Tsar Nicholas II.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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If European leaders wish to participate as equal partners in discussions to determine the future security of their own continent, they cannot afford to rule out the deployment of troops to Ukraine. The Coalition of the Willing initiative, which is being led by the UK and France, was conceived in early 2025 as a way of keeping Trump engaged in European security; it is now the most realistic route to securing a European role in the peace process.

European troops could have a meaningful impact in Ukraine without engaging in combat operations. They could perform a range of support and training roles far from the front lines. For example, European contingents could take on much of the burden for monitoring the Ukrainian border with Belarus and the unrecognized Transnistrian Republic in Moldova, thereby allowing Ukrainian units to be used elsewhere. The deployment of European soldiers could also free up Ukrainian forces currently involved in the protection of critical infrastructure such as power plants and logistics hubs.

Boots on the ground in Ukraine could enhance existing training programs undertaken by Kyiv’s NATO partners. From a practical standpoint, it would certainly make military and economic sense to conduct training inside Ukraine rather than requiring large numbers of Ukrainian troops to travel internationally. The presence of European colleagues would boost morale within the Ukrainian army and demonstrate solidarity.

Crucially, a European military presence in Ukraine would undermine Russian efforts to prevent progress toward the implementation of credible security guarantees. While US officials have endorsed the concept of an assurance force to safeguard any peace deal, this is currently recognized as being conditional on Russian permission. However, Putin will not agree to any measures that rule out the possibility of further Russian gains. Deploying troops would send a signal that Moscow cannot define the debate over security guarantees.

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Critics will argue that any decision to deploy European troops to Ukraine would provoke Russia and lead to escalation. Kremlin officials are well aware of these concerns and have frequently warned that any Western military contingent in Ukraine would be legitimate targets. At the same time, the price of continued inaction may be Russian victory in Ukraine or a Kremlin-friendly peace that would leave European security in jeopardy for years to come.

Past experience strongly suggests that calling Putin’s bluff is the right strategy to adopt. Since launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine almost four years ago, the Kremlin dictator has repeatedly announced red lines and warned of serious consequences, only to subsequently back down when confronted with a resolute response. Previous Russian red lines have included the supply of various categories of military aid to Ukraine, along with the use of long-range Western weapons inside Russia. On each occasion, Putin’s threats have proved to be empty.

Any move to place European forces in Ukraine would involve significant risks, but failure to act would risk leaving Europe sidelined and irrelevant. If European leaders want to secure a place at the negotiating table and avoid finding themselves on the menu, they must assert their agency. This can be achieved by demonstrating to the Kremlin that Russia does not have a veto over security guarantees for Ukraine.

Dr. Iulian Romanyshyn is a senior fellow and lecturer at the Center for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies (CASSIS) at the University of Bonn.

William Dixon, Maksym Beznosiuk — Tue, 13 Jan 2026 21:42:39 +0000

The new year has begun much as 2025 ended, with Russia rejecting key elements of peace proposals aimed at ending the war in Ukraine. In early January, Russian Foreign Ministry officials confirmed they would not accept the presence of European troops in Ukraine as part of proposed postwar security guarantees for Kyiv.

This followed a series of similar recent statements from Kremlin officials reiterating Moscow’s uncompromising position and dismissing a 20-point peace plan prepared by Ukraine, Europe, and the United States. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared in December that Russia’s war aims in Ukraine will be met “unconditionally” and vowed to “liberate” what he termed as Russia’s “historical lands.”

Moscow’s approach toward peace talks has remained consistently uncooperative ever since US President Donald Trump returned to the White House one year ago. While Putin has been careful not to directly rebuff Trump in order to avoid provoking fresh sanctions, there have been ample indications that the Kremlin is not ready to engage seriously in US-led diplomatic efforts. Instead, Russia seems intent on stalling for time while escalating its invasion.

There are no signs that this trend will change anytime soon. Despite mounting economic challenges on the home front amid falling energy export revenues, Russia’s defense budget for 2026 remains close to record highs. Moscow will continue to prioritize domestic drone production this year, while also allocating large sums to finance the system of generous bonus payments and salaries for army recruits who volunteer to serve in Ukraine.

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Russia’s refusal to embrace the idea of a compromise peace should come as no surprise. After all, Putin has built his entire reign around the promise of restoring Russian greatness and reversing the perceived humiliations of the Soviet collapse. After nearly four years of full-scale war, a negotiated settlement that secured Ukraine’s status as an independent country would represent a major political failure.

Since 2022, Kremlin officials and Russian state media have consistently portrayed the invasion of Ukraine as an existential struggle against Western aggression with the aim of establishing a new world order and returning Russia to its rightful place as a great power. However, a peace deal based on the current line of contact would leave approximately 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and firmly anchored in the West. Such an outcome would be viewed in Moscow as an historic Russian defeat.

This framing creates a political trap of Moscow’s own making. Putin knows he would face a potentially disastrous domestic backlash if he accepted anything less than a clear Russian victory in Ukraine. Peace terms that failed to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit would raise difficult questions about the enormous costs of the invasion. Russians would want to know why the country had spent vast sums of money and sacrificed so many men in order to achieve so little. Putin would risk entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine.

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Putin has begun 2026 in a challenging position. He remains reluctant to upset Trump, but he dare not accept the compromise peace the US leader is proposing. Instead, Putin needs either total victory in Ukraine or indefinite conflict. Any attempt to end the war without establishing complete political control over Ukraine would threaten the stability of Putin’s own regime. His interests are therefore best served by seeking to prolong negotiations while working toward a military solution.

If Western leaders wish to change the current political calculus in Moscow, they must first acknowledge that there is no alternative to increasing the pressure on Putin. At present, the Kremlin dictator views escalation as necessary for regime survival and has no plans to end the war.

Two scenarios could disrupt this trajectory. A collapse in global oil prices combined with successful secondary sanctions enforcement could create an economic crisis that would force Putin to revise his priorities. Alternatively, mass casualties during a failed spring 2026 Russian offensive could trigger domestic instability, while also highlighting the fading prospects of a military breakthrough.

Both these outcomes are realistic but would require significant additional action from Ukraine’s partners. If the West is unable to muster the requisite political will, escalation remains Moscow’s most rational path in 2026. Putin has little choice but to continue his invasion. Even if Russian victory remains out of reach in the coming year, he knows he cannot accept any peace deal that secures Ukrainian statehood.

William Dixon is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute specialising in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.

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Evidence of Belarusian involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine is not new, of course. On the eve of the invasion, Lukashenka allowed Putin to station tens of thousands of Russian troops in Belarus. The country then served as the main gateway and logistics hub for Russia’s blitzkrieg offensive to seize Kyiv in spring 2022. The Lukashenka regime is also implicated in the Kremlin campaign to abduct and indoctrinate thousands of Ukrainian children.

Reports of Lukashenka’s ongoing involvement in the Russian war effort come amid speculation of a potential thaw in diplomatic relations between Belarus and the United States. In December, 123 political prisoners were freed by the Belarusian authorities, with the US easing sanctions measures in exchange. This followed two smaller scale trade-offs earlier in 2025 as the Trump administration seeks to increase diplomatic dialogue with Minsk as part of ongoing efforts to broker a negotiated settlement to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Despite these headline-grabbing humanitarian steps, there is little sign of a more comprehensive shift in Minsk away from domestic repression or any reduction in support for Russia’s aggressive foreign policy agenda. On the contrary, the available evidence indicates that while Lukashenka may seek increased engagement with the West, he has no intention of turning away from Moscow or ending human rights abuses inside Belarus.

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By continuing to provide Moscow with its full backing, Belarus enhances Russia’s ability to wage war in Ukraine. This is undermining the Trump administration’s efforts to end the Russian invasion and secure a lasting peace settlement. Belarus also remains deeply implicated in Putin’s hybrid war against Europe and stands accused of weaponizing everything from migrants to balloons against its EU neighbors.

US outreach to Minsk over the past year has secured the release of many prominent prisoners, but continued arrests mean that the overall number of political detainees in the country remains high. Naturally, Lukashenka is happy to reengage with American officials in order to secure a relaxation of sanctions pressure, but there are also concerns that the current approach risks incentivizing hostage-taking.

Yes, a less isolated and more neighborly Belarus remains a worthwhile goal, but in the current circumstances, Lukashenka has little motivation to compromise. He is looking at possible gains without actually reducing the current level of repression in Belarus.

Sanctions relief would be a significant gain for Lukashenka. In exchange for that, the US should be able to achieve some limits on Belarusian facilitation of Kremlin aggression in Ukraine or, at a minimum, a notable decrease in the number of political prisoners in Belarus.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Former Iraqi Prime Ministers Adel Abdul Mahdi and Nouri al-Maliki stand at a polling station inside Al-Rasheed Hotel during the parliamentary election in Baghdad, Iraq, November 11, 2025. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

But this perspective conflates personal leadership qualities with deeper structural problems that have haunted Iraq historically. Iraq’s political system has weak checks and balances, and the state is seen as a source of rewards by the political elite. In this kind of political landscape, one leader staying in power too long can turn temporary authority into lasting control. Even capable leaders can weaken institutions if they stay for a second term.

The main issue for the country’s stability is not whether Sudani is like al-Maliki, but whether Iraq’s political system allows real competition. For true contestability, losing groups must believe they can return to power through talks and elections, and rivals should keep competing within the system instead of looking for power elsewhere. In Iraq, this kind of competition is important for security, not just for democracy.

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The structural risks of a second term

Since the overthrow of the former Iraqi regime in 2003, Iraq’s politics have been competitive but lack strong limits. The political elite have utilized ministries and agencies not just for policy but also to manage coalitions by handing out jobs, contracts, and security roles to keep alliances together. All former prime ministers have been guilty of turning the state into a system of political favors, but they have differed in how far they pushed it. Prime ministers such as Haider al-Abadi, Adel Abdulmahdi, and Mustafa al-Kadhimi were not aggressive enough and lost power. Still, they left the state more stable than their predecessors.

In comparison, leaders who treated the state as spoils of war and built strong patronage networks, such as al-Maliki, served longer.

Iraqi prime ministers are often perceived as practical in their first terms, because they take office through a quota-sharing bargain that parcels out ministries and senior posts across blocs. This limits a premier’s control over a bureaucracy shaped by party patronage. This is visible at the point of government formation. For example, former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi was sworn in in October 2018 with only a partial cabinet after parties deadlocked over key portfolios, and Mustafa al-Kadhimi began in May 2020 with several ministries still vacant as blocs continued to bargain over nominees.

Under those constraints, first-term premiers tend to lower immediate friction among rival power centers and prioritize deals, including Baghdad-Erbil arrangements such as budget-oil agreements. They also try to contain armed factions through a mix of formal incorporation and selective pressure. For example, the 2016 law that placed the Popular Mobilization Forces on a state footing to Kadhimi’s June 2020 raid on a Kata’ib Hezbollah site was followed days later by the release of most detainees after militia pushback.

In contrast, a second term changes the incentives by making it more rewarding to hold onto power. Leaders expecting to stay longer often put loyal people in top jobs, use government contracts to protect themselves, weaken oversight bodies, and use audits or investigations more against their opponents than their allies. Sudani’s government began moving in this direction toward the end of its first term, including by directing a federal oversight committee to scrutinize the Kurdistan Regional Government’s revenues and spending. In 2025, similar audit claims were often cited to justify delaying or withholding the Kurdistan region’s federal budget transfers.

This is the second-term trap in Iraq: It does not always lead straight to authoritarianism but slowly turns appointments, contracts, and enforcement tools into a system that limits political change and weakens institutions. This process often happens quietly and is often explained as being efficient or stable by outsiders who may not see how serious it is.

How state capture unfolds

In Iraq, administrative capture usually happens gradually through legal, political, and economic steps, rather than through open announcements.

This process often begins with key appointments in areas such as the interior and intelligence agencies, which control force; as well as finance and planning ministries, which manage spending; and justice positions, which oversee investigations. It continues with hard-to-audit procurement practices, such as emergency approvals, unclear contracts, secret spending, and the use of state-linked groups to move money. Over time, oversight bodies and courts may start enforcing rules selectively, targeting opponents more while letting allies off the hook, especially when these institutions are open to political pressure.

The main effect of administrative capture is on how the state functions, not just its reputation. It weakens the state’s ability to handle crises by distorting information and valuing loyalty over skill. Intelligence becomes less open, leadership roles become more political, and contracts are awarded for favors rather than for readiness. This creates a false sense of strength at the top level but breeds public distrust by hiding real problems. As people lose trust, the state’s legitimacy and its ability to respond effectively during crises like insurgencies, militia violence, or protests are greatly reduced.

Iraq has gone through this before, though it is often forgotten during quieter times. In 2014, military units that looked strong on paper fell apart when faced with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Reports blamed this on corruption, poor leadership, political appointments, and sectarian splits—problems that happen when security forces serve politics instead of acting as professional institutions. What seems stable can quickly fall apart in a crisis.

This is the main lesson from al-Maliki’s second term in office, which can be defined as the slipping slope toward the end of Iraq as one unified country. The problem was not just one leader’s style but the failure of institutions to stop power from becoming too personalized once someone stayed in office too long.

Supporters of Sudani point out his focus on service, his governance style, and the alleged deliveries to the Iraqis. Even his critics often admit he handles competing pressures with discipline.

However, in Iraq, a leader’s personal style cannot overcome deeper systemic pressures for long, especially when seeking a second term. Sudani’s support comes from the Shiite Coordination Framework, which brings together many groups with different interests, including some close to Iran. This coalition is more about bargaining than unity, so individual goals often take a back seat to group dynamics.

If Sudani wins a second term, he is likely to use the state to advance his personal power in the absence of real checks and balances, a concern reflected by the Shia Coordination Framework’s veto of his staying in power. Even if he secures a second term, his coalition partners could also impose strict demands and conditions on him, expecting that Sudani would use his power to make appointments that strengthen their networks, financial benefits, and use enforcement to help his allies and further limit rivals. The same practical skills that help manage coalitions, such as avoiding conflict and keeping support, can also make administrative capture worse by slowly tying state institutions to political groups.

Contestability as a stabilizing force

Since 2014, Iraq has faced instability, with mass protests, political deadlock, and repeated crises of legitimacy. Still, things have experienced somewhat incremental improvements since then because prime ministers have not been able to see their power as permanent. Even during messy transitions, the belief that no leader stays forever has kept politics open and allowed for change.

This openness changes how political groups act. When they think losing an election means they can still bargain later, they are more likely to take part in elections, talks, and building coalitions, and less likely to use force. But if it looks as though leaders cannot be replaced, rivals try to block decisions, build armed groups outside the system, and see politics as a fight for survival. In a country where armed groups exist alongside the government, this can slowly, then suddenly, destroy stability.

From this point of view, the real question for US policymakers is not about the personal qualities of Iraq’s next prime minister but whether the political system is open enough to stop the state from becoming a tool for narrow group interests.

What should the United States do?

The United States has limited influence in Iraqi politics, and being too direct can backfire by increasing nationalism, helping spoilers, or making it look as though the United States is picking leaders. So, any good US strategy should be careful and focused, aiming to support strong institutions and political change without backing any one leader.

Although it’s understandable that Washington seeks stability in Iraq after years of upheaval, its strategy should prioritize institutional processes over individual leaders to achieve that end. Iraq’s history demonstrates that apparent calm can coincide with institutional erosion, and the consequences of such hollowing become evident during subsequent crises.

The key question is not whether Sudani is like al-Maliki, but whether a second term would reduce competition and weaken institutions. Keeping the same leader can help stability only if there is real oversight and a chance for political change. Without these, stability is a credit borrowed on time until the next crisis happens.

Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

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Ukraine security guarantees are futile without increased pressure on Putin

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 07 Jan 2026 15:57:40 +0000

Kyiv’s allies hailed progress toward “robust” security guarantees for Ukraine on January 6 following a meeting in Paris attended by representatives of more than thirty countries who together make up the Coalition of the Willing.

As details of a possible security framework for postwar Ukraine continue to take shape, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a joint declaration committing to deploy troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement between Moscow and Kyiv. Crucially, US officials attending the talks in France also voiced American backing for security guarantees, with the United States expected to play a supporting role that will focus on ceasefire monitoring.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy praised the “substantive discussions” and suggested that he was now more confident about the credibility of the security commitments being proposed by Ukraine’s partners. “Military officials from France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine worked in detail on force deployment, numbers, specific types of weapons, and the components of the armed forces required and able to operate effectively. We already have these necessary details,” he commented.

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This was the latest in a series of meetings over the past year that have sought to define workable security guarantees for Ukraine as a key element of the US-led push to end Russia’s invasion. Since early 2025, Britain and France have been at the forefront of ongoing efforts to establish a Coalition of the Willing bringing together countries prepared to contribute to postwar security measures. The objective is to prevent a resumption of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The Paris Declaration signed on January 6 is a step in the right direction, but many key questions remain unanswered. The document does not provide the kind of NATO-style commitment to collective security that many believe is essential in order to deter Putin. Nor does it clarify the exact role of a potential European military contingent on Ukrainian territory, or define whether their mandate would include defending themselves in the event of a Russian attack. Instead, it contains vague references to “the use of military capabilities.” This language is hardly likely to convince the Kremlin, especially in light of the escalation fears that have dominated the Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The other obvious problem with the current peace plan is implementation. The signatories of the Paris Declaration all agree that the envisioned package of security guarantees for Ukraine can only be put in place once a ceasefire has been agreed. This will inevitably strengthen Moscow’s objections. Over the past year, Russia has repeatedly rejected ceasefire proposals while stressing its unwavering opposition to any Western military presence in Ukraine. That is exactly what the Coalition of the Willing is now proposing.

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As Ukraine’s partners discuss the technical aspects of security guarantees, the elephant in the room remains Russia’s lack of interest in peace. The Kremlin was not represented at talks in the French capital this week, just as it has been absent during a similar series of recent meetings between US, Ukrainian, and European officials.

While the Trump administration has sought to maintain a parallel dialogue with Moscow, there is no indication whatsoever that Russia shares the optimistic assessments being offered by Zelenskyy and other Western leaders. On the contrary, Putin and his Kremlin colleagues continue to signal that they have no intention of compromising and remain committed to the maximalist goals set out at the start of the invasion in February 2022.

Throughout the past year, Putin has been careful to avoid openly rejecting US peace proposals due to concerns over possible retaliatory sanctions. Nevertheless, his actions speak for themselves and underline his opposition to ending the war.

Just one day after Trump and Zelenskyy met in Florida in late December and announced significant progress toward a settlement, Putin called the US leader and accused Ukraine of launching an attack on his presidential residence. The news appeared to shock Trump and placed the entire peace process in jeopardy. However, it soon transpired that the incident had been hastily invented in a bid to discredit Ukraine and derail peace talks. Trump has since acknowledged that Putin’s resident was not targeted. “I don’t believe that strike happened,” he told reporters on January 4.

The Kremlin dictator’s apparent readiness to lie directly to Trump says much about his determination to disrupt peace efforts. The faked attack on Putin’s residence was the latest in a series of Russian steps over the past year to stall or otherwise obstruct negotiations. This has led to mounting claims that Putin is playing for time without having any intention of ending his invasion.

Putin’s rejection of a negotiated settlement should come as no surprise. His army is advancing in Ukraine and retains the upper hand in a war of attrition that strongly favors Russia. With the Ukrainian military suffering from increasingly acute manpower shortages and Kyiv’s allies showing growing signs of weakening resolve, Putin remains confident that he can achieve a decisive breakthrough in 2026.

Even if he did not believe that victory was on the horizon, Putin would be highly unlikely to risk a compromise peace involving limited territorial gains. After all, he is not fighting for land in Ukraine; he fighting for Ukraine itself.

Putin views the invasion of Ukraine in the broadest of possible historical contexts as a sacred mission to reverse the injustice of the Soviet collapse and revive the Russian Empire. The terms currently on offer would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and free to pursue further European integration. To Putin, that would not be a partial victory; it would be a catastrophic defeat.

In the coming weeks, Russia will almost certainly reject the latest peace framework agreed in Paris. How will the Coalition of the Willing respond to this setback? Unless they are willing to impose more costs on the Kremlin and bolster Ukraine’s ability to hurt Russia militarily, all talk of postwar security guarantees and reassurance forces will continue to ring hollow. If Western leaders are serious about ending the war in Ukraine and safeguarding European security, they must acknowledge that there is no alternative to increasing the pressure on Putin.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Evolution of freedom

Between 1995 and 2025, Colombia has gone through five institutional phases. Each phase could be characterized by progress and tension, where advances in democracy, improvements in the rule of law, and economic openness were frequently challenged by fiscal limits, political crises, and persistent inequality and informality.

The rooting period (1991–2002)

A fresh chapter of institutional development arrived in Colombia during the early 1990s. The 1991 constitution emerged from a collective determination to eliminate centralism and violence through establishing a participatory and decentralized state which protected rights for all. Social and cultural rights were integrated into the legal framework along with expanded civic freedoms. In addition, the government in the 1990s initiated structural market reforms which included trade liberalization, financial system modernization, and the establishment of an autonomous central bank to manage inflation and create responsible and prudent macroeconomic policies.

Colombia earned economic policy credibility from these reforms which established fiscal and monetary stability for three decades. Nevertheless, these reforms produced a paradox within the country: The economic liberalization process outpaced the transformation of the country’s productive base. As many authors, such as Juan Carlos Echeverry, have noticed, Colombia opened international trade doors without having first constructed its economic base. The nation developed openness, but industries remained defenseless, and infrastructure remained behind. On the other side, the constitution guaranteed a wide range of rights (related to health, education, justice, and more) which had to be funded and created ongoing fiscal burdens exceeding the state’s financial resources. In the 1990s, Colombia emerged as a nation with promising reforms, but its ambitions outpaced its capabilities. This is the tension in which Colombia has operated for many years.

Security and stabilization (2003–2015)

Between 2003 and 2015, Colombia experienced a phase of security along with stabilization. The country managed to regain territorial authority from insurgent forces while attaining public trust in its institutional structures. The government’s “democratic security” strategy was combined with macroeconomic discipline to create a virtuous cycle of investor return, economic growth, and advancement in the rule of law.

During this time, institutional development advanced significantly in response to various policies. A fiscal rule was established while the central bank kept its independence and debt remained controlled. Changes among political ruling parties in Colombia continued without violence while international observers recognized the country’s democratic progress. However, structural problems remained hidden. The security improvements brought undeniable benefits to Colombia, but fighting insurgent forces led to human rights violations that damaged the country’s legitimacy and ability to govern. Colombia made progress on security but failed to improve equality and strengthen its institutions.

Polarization and the post-peace era (2016–2020)

The third stage in modern Colombian history began with the 2016 Peace Agreement, which put an end to fighting with FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the country’s largest guerrilla force. The peace agreement meant to unite society but instead divided it more deeply. The national plebiscite opposition to the agreement, together with its congressional approval, created an impression that the government had disregarded public opinion.

The government could not maintain the ambitious goals of the peace agreement because it lacked sustainable implementation capacity. The implementation of programs for rural reform and reintegration and financial support for these programs remained insufficient. Progress on truth, justice, and reparation was also uneven. At the same time, non-repetition mechanisms—designed to prevent former combatant or affiliated groups from committing the same crimes and to reduce the likelihood of renewed violence—were only partially carried out. Meanwhile regional territorial conflicts increased as coca production grew (due to the dismantling of aerial coca fumigation), and new criminal organizations appeared. The anticipated “post-conflict” situation was instead a reshuffling of existing threats. By 2020, people in Colombia had grown exhausted and increasingly disappointed that the global celebrations of peace appeared so distant from their actual experiences.

Pandemic and social unrest (2020–2022)

The fourth phase revolves mostly around the COVID-19 pandemic. Although Colombia managed to avoid major economic and social setbacks through its proactive countercyclical economic approach, the pandemic nonetheless revealed structural weaknesses of inequality and informality, which led to multiple indicators falling before they partially recovered in 2021 and 2022. The impact of COVID-19 pushed more people into informal work while increasing poverty and inequality and reducing the number of available jobs. The result was diminished economic freedom. The public protests, in part triggered by illegal support and tax increases announced in the wake of the pandemic, revealed deep societal inequalities and perceptions of corruption and political manipulation. These combined to damage institutional trust, hindering investor confidence and consequently the economy.

Uncertainty and political confrontation (2022–2025)

The fifth phase covers the developments since 2022. The current political environment is marked by a confrontational atmosphere, which disrupted consensus-building efforts and created conditions that decreased investment potential and caused institutional uncertainty that destroyed trust in all government institutions. Since 2022, Colombia has faced fresh difficulties caused by inadequate and debatable policies on energy, public services, education, pensions, health, taxes, and land that drive political polarization and create economic instability. The decline of institutional dialogue has diminished investor trust and created uncertainty about Colombia’s future course while democracy persists. The current state of ideological conflict has displaced the practical economic management approach that used to guide the country’s economic affairs. Colombia now confronts the dual challenge of building trust between government and markets and connecting its citizens with their representative institutions.

The 1991 constitution established institutional structures which form one of Colombia’s most valuable assets. The Acción de Tutela gave citizens legal tools to protect their rights, and decentralization increased local government accountability, capacities, and options. The central bank’s autonomy enabled uninterrupted monetary and exchange rate policy and protected the nation from the populist cycles that ravaged most regions on the continent.

But legal systems cannot ensure freedom by themselves. Governance remains weak due to corruption, excessive regulations, and persistent informalities and social inequalities. Over 55 percent of workers remain outside the formal economy, and millions of firms are microbusinesses with low levels of formality, undermining tax collection and labor protections. Colombia needs to protect its democratic institutions while extending institutional benefits to formalize the excluded population.

Over 55 percent of workers remain outside the formal economy … undermining tax collection and labor protections.

The security situation represents the second vital point in Colombia’s recent timeline. During the 1990s, the Colombian state faced three concurrent threats from drug cartels, guerrilla insurgents, and armed groups that fought for territory; used kidnapping, extortion, and narcotrafficking to fund their operations; and exported large-scale violence to cities. The homicide rate ticked up, and many people were forced to abandon their homes. Business owners lost their local enterprises and had to defend themselves because municipal authority disappeared from vast sections of the country. By 2005, Colombia regained its administrative control and normalized daily activities, which permitted people to travel more freely, reduced transportation expenses, and extended investor horizons. Companies prospered under fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability, which directed workers toward new regions for economic enterprise.

Over the course of three decades of social and economic development, women gained visibility and access to opportunities in both the public and private sector. Women’s participation in the workforce increased as did leadership diversity and social policies aimed at gender balance. The boost in household earnings together with more stable societies proved that inclusive growth strengthens both economic prosperity and social freedom.

The business environment in Colombia developed according to its political dynamics. Institutional predictability and consistent rules produced the best investment conditions from mid-2010-2020s. The trust in Colombia has been diminished by inconsistent policies and growing polarization since 2022. The business community shows apprehension toward taxation due to its inconsistent design and enforcement.

The country’s most effective reforms happened when governmental authorities joined forces with business leaders and academic experts to craft public policy that integrated regulatory, infrastructure, and labor initiatives to achieve common goals. Economic strategy has lost cohesion because the dialogue that used to inform it has diminished. Because freedom and prosperity depend on a foundation of predictability, the loss of predictability stands as the most critical institutional threat facing Colombia in the short term.

Colombia’s democracy has shown more stability compared to other regional nations, but 2016–18 marked a fundamental change. The nation experienced a rapid deterioration of political rights and a decline in civil liberties during this time frame. The rejection of the peace agreement in the plebiscite triggered political polarization, which worsened after congressional ratification of the plan. This resulted in widespread public concern about the institutional bypassing of political processes. During this period, both cocaine cultivation and illegal mining activities expanded while violence shifted its operational patterns and power dynamics among different actors. The political rights indicator shows further deterioration during the 2020 emergency period, which also witnessed social uprisings, but there was some improvement in 2021–22 once restrictions were lifted.

At present, legal operations are restricted in Colombia because of two fundamental elements. Most labor markets and business activities operate predominantly beyond the formal sector. The rule of law, measured by the legal subindex, experienced a rapid increase in 2014–15, followed by a dramatic decline. Formalization efforts expanded when security conditions improved, and economic activity rose only to retreat once economic performance declined and labor costs increased. Research shows that greater informality reduces enforcement capacity as well as social insurance coverage and tax revenue. Corruption and bureaucratic scandals from 2010 to 2018 reduced judicial public trust, and illegal activities in unregulated territories eroded local government authority.

Inequality, widespread informality, and growing insecurity … had been eroding democratic rights well before the pandemic triggered massive job losses and overwhelmed public services.

Governance quality worsened during these processes even though other sectors showed signs of improvement. While problems existed before the pandemic, COVID-19 made them more apparent. Social unrest spiked sharply in 2019, subsided during COVID-19 lockdowns, and intensified again in 2021. Data reveal that political freedom declined both before and after COVID-19. Yet the underlying causes—rising inequality, widespread informality, and growing insecurity—had been eroding democratic rights well before the pandemic triggered massive job losses and overwhelmed public services. The political situation since 2022 has been more confrontational, hindering consensus-building between government, business, and academic partners and stirring tensions between autonomous institutions and regulatory bodies. The key goal of economic recovery requires the establishment of stable economic directions along with trustworthy dialogue mechanisms that will rebuild private-sector confidence and restore normal market expectations.

Evolution of prosperity

Freedom and prosperity in Colombia have developed concurrently, although their progression has never been perfectly aligned. The 1990s and 2000s market liberalization, alongside expanded rights in the new constitution of 1991 and fiscal and monetary discipline, created the foundation for Colombia’s largest social change in contemporary history. The nation’s average per capita income tripled while poverty dropped by 20 percentage points and life expectancy increased by around ten years. This growth, however, contained a key warning since its uneven distribution meant delayed economic benefits for many Colombians. The clear lesson was that growth without fairness damages society just as severely as economic stagnation.

The inequality trap

Between 2005 and 2016, many observers believed Colombia had entered a positive feedback loop.¹ Economic growth remained healthy while job creation improved, and social programs reduced extreme poverty levels. Market freedom finally found a way to work harmoniously with social policy to benefit society.

People will tolerate slow economic growth, but they will refuse to support a system that fails to reward hard work or equitable treatment.

After 2016, the positive cycle started to break down. Economic growth decreased, and productivity reforms came to a halt while the wealth gap between rural and urban Colombia remained the same. Informal employment increased yet again while people lost hope for their future because inequality returned to its former levels. Then the pandemic struck, revealing structural defects the country had delayed addressing. Education interruptions, female job losses, and strained public finances pushed the country to its limits.

The 2021 protests were triggered by discontent over taxes, but they served to express people’s deeper sense of exclusion. Many Colombians felt that prosperity had become an exclusive privilege rather than a universal promise. The widespread perception damaged people’s trust in democracy and transformed economic inequality into a political moral crisis. People will tolerate slow economic growth, but they will refuse to support a system that fails to reward hard work or equitable treatment.

Colombia achieved indisputable progress through its recognition of Indigenous and Afro-descendant community rights. However, many of these advancements failed to deliver real benefits in practice. From 2010 to 2020, minority inclusion freedom indicators experienced a decline. The absence of governmental security in peripheral regions, combined with ongoing displacement and illegal expansions of mining and drug production, continue to drive social marginalization.

The disconnect between greater formal rights and stagnant living conditions is clearly visible. For many Colombians, equality before the law failed to translate to real equality of opportunities. The main takeaway is that inclusion demands more than official recognition; it requires continuous financing for education, infrastructure, and peacekeeping that creates national investment incentives for all territories.

Since 2018, Colombia has received over two million Venezuelan migrants. Managing this massive influx tested national institutions but also brought new energy, talent, and entrepreneurship to Colombian society. Border communities became overburdened because social services reached their limits. The “Temporary Protection Statute” along with other pragmatic policies transformed what could have been a humanitarian crisis into a demographic boon over time. Formal labor market workers contributed to the economy through tax payments while bringing new and energetic workforce potential. Amid regional tendencies to respond with populist fervor, Colombia demonstrated a distinct approach that blended openness with strategic foresight. Institutional flexibility combined with inclusiveness demonstrated that migration could be a driver of renewal instead of instability.

Colombia has achieved one of its most remarkable successes through environmental policy initiatives. From 2010 through the early 2020s, Colombia transitioned from setting green targets to producing tangible achievements. The economic policy established through CONPES 3934 (2018) and CONPES 4075 (2022) proved that green growth had become an integral economic plan instead of merely aspirational.

The addition of electric vehicle incentives, together with renewable energy auctions in La Guajira and enhanced prosecution of illegal mining, transformed environmental defense into a core competitiveness element. Mercury emissions decreased while wind and solar power capacity expanded, and the nation began perceiving sustainability as an advantage rather than a limitation. Although environmental issues such as deforestation remain, Colombia has advanced to where economic and environmental goals are more in sync.

Human development presents the clearest demonstration of how freedom relates to prosperity. People in Colombia have experienced longer lifespans and enhanced health outcomes over the past three decades. Infant mortality rates dropped dramatically while literacy rates increased, and healthcare access became almost universal. As a result of the 1993 and 2011 reforms, Colombia’s health care systems transformed to become one of Latin America’s most comprehensive.

Education in Colombia remains divided: Urban schools have developed quickly but rural areas continue to lag behind. Digital access and trained teachers remain scarce in many classrooms while educational results show significant differences across regions. The pandemic intensified educational inequalities, emphasizing to policymakers that offering coverage without proper quality or relevance is insufficient. Future development requires better integration between educational systems and productive sectors to create job opportunities which could also lead to social stability.

The path forward

Colombia is approaching a critical point which will define its future direction. Thirty years of institutional advancement delivered stability alongside credibility, yet the country continues to struggle with social inequality, economic informality, and declining public trust. Challenges arose after 2016, when investment diminished, economic growth declined, and political polarization intensified. But the real issue is greater than Colombia’s ability to grow: The crucial challenge is to achieve inclusive growth that transforms freedom into equal prosperity.

The foundation of prosperity rests on establishing stable public finances. After the necessary spending during the pandemic period and the increase in public debt, Colombia started to make a fiscal adjustment which was successfully implemented between 2020 and 2023. However, since then, public debt and the fiscal deficit have risen high enough to make investors nervous. As a result, Colombia needs an effective reform that expands the taxpayer base while making compliance easier; it should also eliminate tax benefits that favor a select few while preserving support for small regional businesses.

The restoration of fiscal rules (which were suspended in 2025) would demonstrate Colombia’s commitment to disciplined governance while enhancing market and public confidence in the country’s fiscal management. Decentralized fiscal authority with proper accountability mechanisms would enable state institutions to connect with citizens more effectively while distributing growth benefits more fairly.

Peacebuilding requires more than negotiation-based approaches while demanding consistent territorial governance. Large rural areas of Colombia still live under alternative and illegal power systems that impose fear instead of upholding legal authority. Road construction alongside internet connectivity and new schools serve as development tools which could also be useful in strengthening citizenship.

Government investments in infrastructure yielded clear advancements across Antioquia, the coffee region, and parts of the Caribbean region in the form of decreased violence, increased job opportunities, and population retention. Security improves only when people have access to opportunities to replace coercive systems. The practical and moral lesson that emerges is that prosperity requires peace, and peace demands governance from a state whose presence is felt where people reside.

Informality blocks the path that unites freedom with a prosperous future. More than 50 percent of Colombian workers lack contracts and protections since they work outside the formal system. The workplace formalization process would be achievable by easing procedures and reducing labor expenses and modernizing ways to connect workers with employers.

Simultaneously, Colombia needs to transition from an extraction-based economy to an innovation-driven economic model. Productivity functions as the link between immediate economic recovery efforts and enduring prosperity. This requires industry-university coordination along with technological implementation support and local business development investment. Subsidies will not reduce inequality nor sustain freedom because productivity growth serves as the fundamental solution.

Colombia’s greatest challenge, however, springs not from fiscal concerns but from the political domain. The current political division has turned policy discussions into entrenched conflicts, making compromise look like weakness. Future development in Colombia depends on institutional pragmatism, which requires leaders to prioritize results over political statements.

Non-negotiables must be to protect the independence of the central bank and to maintain the autonomy of courts and oversight agencies. Dialogue between government, business, and civil society needs to be reestablished through structured channels. Economic freedom depends not only on predictable rules for investors but also on the social contract that allows it to endure. Transparent institutional operations promote both economic and public trust.

Non-negotiables must be to protect the independence of the central bank and to maintain the autonomy of courts and oversight agencies.

The transition toward clean energy creates difficulties while promising new possibilities. Even though oil and gas continue to generate substantial government revenue, Colombia possesses vast renewable energy potential. The appropriate approach involves slow and responsible market transition combined with building new industries based on sustainable agriculture, clean energy, and ecotourism while preserving fiscal stability.

Environmental stewardship could become a competitive advantage when established through consistent regulations and patient investment. Colombia is endowed with geographical diversity, biodiversity, and abundant water resources that would enable green industries to thrive—as long as institutions remain constant, regulations are simplified, and public-private partnerships are strengthened.

Throughout the thirty-year period from 1995 to 2025, Colombia has been trying to balance its aspirations against its limitations. It strengthened its democracy and opened the economy, but it continues to battle persistent problems of inequality, informality, and insecurity. Freedom in the country has never been fixed since each generation must labor to preserve and renew it.

The next chapter depends on Colombia’s ability to tether freedom to present-day opportunities. Achieving fiscal stability together with security systems, educational advancement, and institutional trust is a moral obligation essential for democratic success. Once trust returns to citizens and government bodies, between investors and institutions, and among regions with their central authorities, Colombia will convert its practical liberty to enduring economic prosperity.

The future direction of the nation depends on making decisions between opposing forces, including confrontation versus consensus, populism versus pragmatism, and empty rhetoric versus courageous social and economic reforms. With the right decisions, Colombia can become an example of democratic stability and inclusive development throughout the Americas.

about the author

José Manuel Restrepo is an economist, academic leader, and former public servant with experience in education management and economic policy. He has served as president (rector) in Universidad EIA, Universidad del Rosario, and CESA Business School in Bogotá. He held cabinet roles as Colombia’s minister of commerce, industry and tourism and later as minister of finance and public credit. He holds a master’s degree in economics from the London School of Economics and a Ph.D. in management from the University of Bath.

A strong advocate for innovation, sustainability, and institutional ethics, Restrepo has championed policies such as the Entrepreneurship Law, Green Sovereign Bonds, and the modernization of Free Trade Zones 4.0. His leadership experience extends to academia, government, and business, where he seeks to foster collaboration as a means to turn policy into progress. As a frequent speaker and columnist, he reflects on productivity, education, and governance, emphasizing that economic progress must always serve people.

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1 Otaviano Canuto and Diana Quintero, “Colombia: Getting Peace, Getting Growth,” Policy Center for the New South, March 23, 2017, https://www.policycenter.ma/blog/colombia-getting-peace-getting-growth; avid Felipe Perez, “After a Decade of Growth and Political Stability, It’s Time to Invest in Colombia’s Future,” World Finance, accessed [insert access date], https://www.worldfinance.com/wealth-management/after-a-decade-of-growth-and-political-stability-its-time-to-invest-in-colombias-future.

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‘Putin is lying’: Zelenskyy visits front to expose false claims of Russian gains

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 16 Dec 2025 23:00:14 +0000

According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the invasion of Ukraine is going entirely according to plan, with Russian troops advancing everywhere and conquering all before them. This swaggering stance is intended to bolster Russian support for the war while demoralizing Ukrainians and deterring Kyiv’s partners. Most of all, it is designed to secure US President Donald Trump’s support for a Kremlin-friendly peace by convincing him that Russian victory is inevitable.

In order to maintain this air of inevitability, Putin stands accused of routinely inflating Russian battlefield achievements. At a time when Kyiv is already coming under mounting pressure to make painful concessions, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is clearly conscious of the dangers posed by these exaggerated claims. In a bid to expose the Kremlin’s disinformation efforts, Zelenskyy traveled personally to the front lines in eastern Ukraine last week to visit a city that Putin and his colleagues have repeatedly bragged of seizing.

Zelenskyy’s trip to Kupyansk came amid a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the vicinity that resulted in significant gains. The selfie video he recorded during his visit was masterclass in wartime messaging that debunked Putin’s boasts while also underlining Ukraine’s continued ability to defeat Russia on the battlefield. “Putin publicly lied, claiming that Russian forces had already taken the city. So I went to Kupyansk myself to show the world that Putin is lying,” the Ukrainian leader commented. “We must keep exposing every single Russian falsehood because truth restores justice.”

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Kupyansk is a strategically important city located close to the Russian border in northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region. It was occupied by Russian troops in the initial stages of the full-scale invasion before being liberated during Ukraine’s September 2022 counteroffensive. In recent months, the city has once again become a key target for the advancing Russian army, with Putin and his generals announcing the capture of Kupyansk on multiple occasions.

Putin’s proclamations of victory in Kupyansk began in late October, when he issued an invitation to international journalists and promised to provide them with safe passage to witness the encirclement of Ukrainian units trapped in the city. Days later, he told a meeting of Russia’s National Security Council that Kupyansk was “practically in the hands of Russian forces,” with victorious troops engaged in mopping up operations. “The city’s future has already been determined,” Putin stated.

On November 20, Russia’s top general Valery Gerasimov informed Putin that Russian forces had established full control over Kupyansk. The following day, Putin invoked the alleged fall of the city in an attempt to project Russian strength and intimidate Ukraine. “If Kyiv does not want to discuss President Trump’s proposals and refuses it, then both they and the European warmongers should understand the events that took place in Kupyansk will inevitably be repeated in other key areas of the front,” he warned.

Similarly bold Russian statements continued into the current month. On December 2, Putin remarked that Kupyansk had been under Russian occupation “for several weeks now,” and accused the Ukrainian authorities of being completely detached from reality. In fact, it is now apparent that Ukrainian assessments of the battle were broadly accurate, while Putin was guilty of spinning fantasies about the imaginary conquest of Kupyansk. Speaking on the outskirts of the evidently unconquered city, Zelenskyy openly mocked the Kremlin dictator’s dishonesty. “The Russians have had a lot to say about Kupyansk,” he commented. “The reality speaks for itself.”

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Zelenskyy’s latest front line appearance was much more than a high stakes photo opportunity or a chance to troll the Kremlin. In his selfie video, the Ukrainian leader acknowledged the importance of challenging false Russian narratives and stressed the need to shape international perceptions of the war in order to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position. “Today, achieving results on the front line is crucial so that Ukraine can achieve results in diplomacy,” he noted. “This is exactly how it works: All our strong positions within the country translate into strong positions in the negotiations to end the war.”

Ukraine’s recent gains in the Battle of Kupyansk do not alter the country’s precarious position at various other points along the vast front lines of Europe’s largest armed conflict since World War II. Nevertheless, Zelenskyy was right to shine a spotlight on the city. His headline-grabbing selfie video served as a timely reminder that Putin is a proven liar whose word cannot be trusted. It also confirmed that contrary to Kremlin propaganda, the Ukrainian army is far from collapse and remains a formidable fighting force.

These are exactly the messages Ukraine needs to convey to the current US administration. Donald Trump seems remarkably susceptible to Putin’s portrayal of Russia as an irresistible military force, and has repeatedly suggested that Ukraine should accept a Kremlin-friendly peace or risk destruction. The facts on the ground simply do not support this defeatist assessment.

While the Russian military holds the overall initiative and is currently advancing, it is grinding forward at glacial pace while suffering catastrophic losses. Nobody understands this better than Putin himself, who must be acutely aware that he would not need to exaggerate Russian gains and invent new triumphs if his invasion had not yielded such underwhelming results at so high a cost.

Last week’s front line visit by the Ukrainian leader underscored the fact that Russian victory is anything but inevitable. The military outlook for 2026 is actually far more nuanced. With enough international support, there is good reason to conclude that the Ukrainian army could replicate its recent Kupyansk success elsewhere and eventually stem the tide of Russia’s invasion. This is a realistic recipe for peace. Indeed, it may be the only way to pressure Moscow into serious negotiations. Putin wants the world to believe he cannot be beaten on the battlefield, but the Russian troops retreating from Kupyansk would likely tell a different story.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Although Hamas has not yet released all of the bodies of deceased hostages and occasional exchanges of fire continue, the cease-fire is likely to hold in the near term. Hamas needs time to recover from the blows it has endured, and Israel is unlikely to defy Trump as he seeks to claim this win and bolster his campaign for a Nobel Peace Prize.

But phase two of Trump’s twenty-point plan will be far more difficult, with multiple obstacles to implementation.

Gaza’s future hinges on who governs

The core elements of phase two are Hamas’s disarmament, the reconstruction of Gaza, the establishment of an interim Palestinian technocratic government under an international “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump, the deployment of an international stabilization force, and the gradual return of a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) to governance in Gaza.

All of these objectives hinge on Hamas’s disarmament. That fact has been made irrefutable by videos circulating on social media showing Hamas using its weapons to engage in retribution killings against Palestinians who have resisted the group’s authority—a gruesome method of tightening its grip on the roughly 47 percent of Gaza it still controls.

Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, I led a State Department task force on “day-after” planning for Gaza. We immediately established as one of our core planning assumptions that unless Hamas was defeated, disarmed, and removed from power, there would be no “day-after.” Following the worst attack on the Jewish people since the Holocaust, neither Israel’s leaders nor its citizens would accept Hamas emerging from another war battered but intact—still armed, still clinging to power, and still preparing for the next round of fighting.

There were also pragmatic reasons for our assessment. The postwar gains we envisioned—Gulf-funded reconstruction, an international security force, and PA involvement in governance—would all be impossible if Hamas remained armed and in control.

No stabilization without disarmament

Since these objectives also form the foundation of phase two of Trump’s plan, it is no surprise that his administration is already confronting those very challenges. Gulf states are reluctant to fund reconstruction in Gaza without a long-term solution to the conflict. Meanwhile, the countries expressing some willingness to deploy stabilization forces—including Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Morocco—have made clear that they will not engage Hamas directly and would prefer to deploy only after the group has been fully dismantled. The PA’s track record does not inspire confidence in this regard either; after all, it was routed from Gaza by Hamas in a brief civil war in 2007.

Disarming Hamas must therefore be the overriding priority. Without it, the conflict will likely remain in suspended animation, recovery will stall, and Gaza will drift toward renewed war.

Leaving disarmament solely to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is, at best, a flawed strategy. While the risk of further hostage killings has been removed, other concerns persist: rising civilian and IDF casualties, deepening international isolation of Israel, and the risk of a full-scale Israeli occupation of Gaza—all of which would severely damage US and Israeli national interests and undermine prospects for expanding regional integration.

Qatar and Turkey could play a crucial role

The most viable alternative is the same tool Trump used to persuade Hamas to release all hostages after the Doha strike: leverage over Qatar and Turkey. While Trump pressed Israel to agree to a cease-fire, he used Qatar’s fear of regional escalation—and its long-standing financial ties to Hamas—to pressure the group’s leadership.

Trump also brought in Turkey, which had been largely absent from the Biden administration cease-fire efforts. Trump’s relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—who shares Hamas’s Muslim Brotherhood ideology and has allowed its leaders to live and even operate on Turkish soil—proved pivotal in persuading the group to accept the deal.

Trump leaned heavily on his transactional instincts, declaring a security guarantee for Qatar, signaling openness to an F-35 fighter jet program for Turkey, and, according to reports, easing US legal action against the country’s state-owned Halkbank, which faces charges related to helping Iran evade sanctions.

Qatar and Turkey have proven that, when properly motivated, they can exert decisive influence over Hamas. Trump should once again leverage both, using fresh incentives to press Hamas to surrender its arms to an agreed third party. A critical mass of Hamas fighters and remaining leaders could then accept safe passage into exile, allowing an international stabilization force and technical experts to safely decommission Hamas’s remaining tunnel networks. The United States and Israel have already struck a tentative agreement to allow safe passage for approximately two hundred Hamas terrorists currently in tunnels under Rafah, which, if implemented, could serve as a test case for a much larger effort across Gaza.

The road to recovery

There is precedent for this. In 1982, US diplomats helped arrange the peaceful departure of some fourteen thousand Palestine Liberation Organization personnel from Beirut while the Israeli military besieged the city. A similar effort, coordinated with and financed by key Arab states, could open the door to genuine recovery and a peaceful future for Gaza.

More than Gaza’s future is at stake. Significant opportunities to expand Middle East integration remain as well. With Iran and its proxy network profoundly weakened by Israeli and US strikes, a strengthened coalition of Israel, the United States, and Arab partners would advance the interests of all parties. A Hamas refusal to disarm, however, would freeze Gaza’s recovery and undermine progress toward Israeli-Saudi normalization, or even more modest steps such as renewing and expanding the Negev Forum—a regional cooperation framework comprising Israel, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt—improving Israeli-Indonesian ties, or completing a non-aggression pact between Israel and Syria.

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s motivation to launch the October 7 attacks included a desire to derail Israel-Saudi normalization. Hamas must not be allowed to continue obstructing this brighter regional future. The United States must marshal all its partners in the region to ensure that the group’s disarmament becomes a shared, non-negotiable priority.

Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.

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In Southeast Asia, the promise and pitfalls of tariff diplomacy are on full display

Amy Searight — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 19:45:00 +0000

This article is part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s series Inside Trump’s Peace Plans, which assesses the patterns, tools, and strategic choices that characterize Trump‘s peace deals—and evaluates whether they can deliver lasting results.

Back in July, US President Donald Trump played a key role in brokering a cease-fire between Thailand and Cambodia—a diplomatic effort that earned him a Nobel Peace Prize nomination from Cambodia and a starring role at an elaborate cease-fire signing ceremony during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Kuala Lumpur in October. The timing of Trump’s intervention, combined with his use of tariffs as economic leverage, was instrumental in securing the initial cease-fire agreement. Although the truce was fragile and unraveled within a few months, it nonetheless prevented a dangerous escalation and created space for ASEAN-led mediation to briefly take hold.

Trump’s “victory lap” in Kuala Lumpur served both as a boost to his self-proclaimed campaign for the Nobel Peace Prize—earning him a nomination from Phnom Penh—and as a reminder to Southeast Asian nations that the United States remains a key player in shaping regional dynamics and promoting regional stability. Yet his visit also underscored the region’s growing unease over the United States’ retreat from its traditional role as a reliable economic partner and champion of free trade. Trump’s role in the Thailand-Cambodia conflict highlights a new US embrace of economic coercion, transactional bargaining, and exclusionary dealmaking. His abrupt departure from Kuala Lumpur—skipping the East Asia summit—followed by his early exit from South Korea just before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting, left China in the spotlight to promote its role as the region’s most dependable partner for free trade, infrastructure investment, and development assistance.

Recent events have more starkly called into question the effectiveness of Trump’s tariff-driven diplomacy. The Thai-Cambodia peace process quickly unraveled in November after Thai soldiers were injured by a landmine, sparking renewed fighting and causing Cambodian casualties along the border. Trump again sought to mediate with phone calls to both leaders, but this time Thailand’s Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul publicly dismissed the threat of economic coercion, saying “I no longer care” about trade and tariff negotiations: “If we can’t sell to this country, we’ll find others. How can we put our lives in the hands of one country?”

On December 8, the situation worsened dramatically when Thailand carried out air strikes on Cambodian military sites it claimed were stockpiling long-range Chinese-made rockets. Hundreds of thousands of civilians fled the ensuing violence, and the cease-fire crumbled—underscoring how fragile the truce always was. The latest turn of events came on December 12, when in a Truth Social post, Trump announced that he had again spoken with both Anutin and Manet and secured their agreement to halt all shooting. It remains far from certain, however, whether this new pledge will hold amid ongoing tensions. In all, the crisis lays bare the limits of tariff-based diplomacy in resolving conflicts rooted in nationalism, territorial rivalry, and domestic political pressures.

Bitter conflict over an ancient temple and colonial map

The Thai-Cambodia border dispute centers on Preah Vihear, an ancient Khmer temple perched atop a sheer escarpment along a poorly demarcated stretch of the frontier. The roots of the conflict stretch back centuries to the rivalry between the Khmer Empire and the Kingdom of Siam. In the modern era, the dispute rests on a colonial-era treaty and a French-drawn map whose ambiguities have fueled competing territorial claims.

Cambodia brought the case to the International Court of Justice, which ruled in 1962 that Preah Vihear lay on Cambodian territory. But the court did not decide who owned the surrounding plateau—an area far larger and strategically more significant than the temple. That unresolved question, combined with Thailand’s persistent rejection of the French map that informed the ruling, has left the Preah Vihear region a recurring flashpoint.

The last major clashes erupted from 2008 to 2011 after the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization listed Preah Vihear as a Cambodian world heritage site, a move that inflamed nationalist sentiment on both sides. For Cambodians, the temple is a potent symbol of Khmer identity, and political leaders have often invoked heritage and historical grievances to boost their popularity. Thai leaders who have sought compromise have faced backlash from nationalist groups, and the Thai military has at times exploited the issue to bolster its domestic standing and assert leverage over civilian authority. As a result, the dispute over Preah Vihear remains not only a legal matter but also a deeply emotional and politically combustible issue in both countries.

Escalating border clashes and the search for a cease-fire

The latest crisis erupted in late May 2025, when a Cambodian soldier was killed in a border skirmish, triggering a full-blown diplomatic confrontation and rapid troop buildups on both sides. Fighting escalated dramatically in late July, with heavy artillery exchanges, cross-border incursions, and sporadic air strikes. The human and economic toll mounted quickly: at least thirty-eight people were killed, more than 300,000 displaced, and cross-border trade ground to a halt.

ASEAN was initially caught off guard by the rapidly escalating conflict. As the fighting intensified, Malaysia—serving as ASEAN chair—stepped in to try to broker a cease-fire. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim worked diligently behind the scenes, coordinating closely with the United States and China to open channels for talks. But these efforts were rebuffed by Thailand, which has long resisted third-party involvement in the dispute.

It was at this critical juncture that Trump’s personal intervention helped break the impasse. On July 26, he called Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Thailand’s acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai. His message was blunt: sign a cease-fire or face consequences in ongoing trade negotiations. The threat carried weight because US tariffs were set to rise sharply for Cambodia, Thailand, and most other Southeast Asian countries unless they reached trade agreements before the “Liberation Day” tariff deadline on August 1.

Within twenty-four hours, both governments agreed to meet in Kuala Lumpur, and on July 28 they signed an unconditional cease-fire. Trump announced on social media that he had “saved thousands of lives” and declared himself the “President of PEACE.” Manet seized the moment to curry favor with Trump by nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize, citing his “extraordinary statesmanship” and “visionary and innovative diplomacy.”

Eager to secure Trump’s attendance at the ASEAN summit in October, host country Malaysia invited him to preside over a formal cease-fire signing ceremony. The event was carefully choreographed to spotlight the US president’s role in brokering the deal and the commitments made by Thailand and Cambodia to continue pursuing peace. China was pointedly excluded from the ceremony as a result of US demands for Trump’s participation. Cambodia’s Manet used the moment to remind Trump of his Nobel Peace Prize nomination, Thailand’s Anutin publicly thanked the president for his “personal dedication” to peace, and Malaysia’s Anwar praised Trump for his “tenacity and courage.”

A fragile peace—and its collapse

Despite the July cease-fire, the situation on the ground remained volatile. Violations persisted through August and September. The fragile truce was vulnerable to ultranationalist provocations, inflammatory disinformation circulating on social media, and the absence of any credible monitoring mechanism. Still, the cease-fire had prevented a return to all-out fighting and created space for negotiators to craft a more durable framework to resolve the underlying border dispute.

The agreement signed at the ASEAN summit added several new commitments: withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front line, monitoring by ASEAN observers, and repatriation of Cambodian prisoners of war. The hope was that once these steps were taken, the two countries would tackle the far more difficult process of technical border demarcation, which has remained stalled for years. Yet the most critical ingredient for any lasting settlement is sustained political will at a time when both governments face potentially volatile political situations at home. As Thai analyst Thitinan Pongsudhirak cautioned in October, leaders in both countries “appear intent and incentivized to stoke the flames of nationalism for domestic political gains.”

The rapid unraveling of the peace process in November and December proved these warnings prescient. Just two weeks after the Kuala Lumpur signing, Thailand announced that it would suspend participation in the peace process after four Thai soldiers were wounded, one critically, by a landmine that Thailand claimed was planted by Cambodia after the October peace accord had been signed—an allegation Cambodia denied. The crisis escalated dramatically on December 8, when Thailand launched airstrikes on Cambodian military targets, asserting that Cambodia had mobilized heavy weaponry and repositioned combat units. Fighting spread quickly into civilian areas, causing dozens of casualties and forcing hundreds of thousands to flee, with both sides accusing the other of breaking the truce. Anutin has taken a firm public stance, rejecting ASEAN-led mediation and US tariff pressure in favor of handling the dispute bilaterally with Cambodia. Then came Trump’s December 12 announcement that Anutin and Manet agreed to halt “all shooting” once again.

The confrontation has also offered Anutin a platform to project strength and nationalism at home at a time of economic anxiety and political turbulence in Thailand. This week, Anutin dissolved parliament, setting up a general election in early 2026.

Strategic takeaways for Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia broadly welcomed US involvement in the Thailand-Cambodia crisis and Trump’s visit to the region. After years of sporadic presidential attendance at ASEAN-centered summits under both Trump and former US President Joe Biden, Trump’s presence at the Kuala Lumpur meeting was well received and gave a diplomatic boost to Malaysia and ASEAN.

Yet the downsides were equally clear. The fact that Trump skipped both the East Asia summit and the APEC Leaders’ Meeting reinforced the perception that US engagement remains intermittent and unpredictable. In contrast, Chinese President Xi Jinping seized the opportunity to present China as a stable and reliable partner—championing multilateralism, expanding trade, and financing infrastructure from Laos to Indonesia.

Trump’s use of economic leverage—conditioning tariff relief on cease-fire cooperation—was undeniably effective in bringing Thailand and Cambodia to the negotiating table. But the collapse of the peace process just two weeks after the comprehensive cease-fire was signed also showcases the limits—and potential counterproductive effects—of coercive tariff diplomacy when issues of sovereignty and nationalism are at stake. Tariff pressure may even have backfired, giving the Thai prime minister an opportunity to demonstrate resolve and bolster his nationalist image at a politically opportune moment at home.

More broadly, Trump’s tariff-centric approach sends a highly visible and deeply troubling signal to the region. The United States, once seen as an engine of growth and leader of the liberal trade system, increasingly appears transactional and willing to weaponize trade for political ends. Ironically, that has long been the critique of Chinese engagement in Southeast Asia. Now, with Beijing positioning itself as a defender of free trade and regional multilateralism, the United States risks flipping the script—mirroring the coercive tactics it once condemned.

Meanwhile, China—though still resorting to economic coercion—has deepened its economic engagement, signing free trade agreements, financing ports, railways, and power plants through the Belt and Road Initiative, and expanding development assistance. The United States, by contrast, has dismantled the US Agency for International Development, retreated from ambitious trade deals, and remained a modest player in infrastructure development.

If the United States hopes to re-establish itself as Southeast Asia’s preferred strategic partner, it will need to pair high-level diplomacy and security cooperation with long-term economic engagement—demonstrating that US leadership is durable, reliable, and aligned with Southeast Asia’s long-term development priorities.

Amy Searight is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and senior adviser at Vriens & Partners. She previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia.

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From the DRC to Sudan, Trump’s disruptive moves could revive stalled negotiations

Maureen Farrell — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 19:45:00 +0000

This article is part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s series Inside Trump’s Peace Plans, which assesses the patterns, tools, and strategic choices that characterize Trump’s peace deals, and evaluates whether they can deliver lasting results.

The Trump administration’s global push for peace is aimed both at ending wars and at improving the president’s chances of winning a Nobel Peace Prize. Regardless of the motivations, the diplomatic energy the administration is expending to resolve conflicts in Africa is creating movement and shaking up systems in a way that could break stalemates or at least disrupt patterns of violence for short-term gains.

US President Donald Trump’s proclivity for dealmaking and leveraging influence may not generate long-term solutions, but the administration’s disruption of the conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda represents an unorthodox approach to creating negotiation space. Stepping into this space created by Trump’s style could offer an opportunity to forge new short-term paths to peace.

Unconventional moves, unforeseen results?

Building on the diligent efforts of the Joe Biden administration, the Trump team gave significant political weight to the DRC-Rwanda negotiations early in the term by tapping Massad Boulos, the US senior advisor for Africa—and father-in-law of the president’s daughter Tiffany Trump—to lead the talks. This resulted in a “declaration of principles” in April, followed by the “Washington Accord” in June, both signed by the countries’ foreign ministers. Then, on December 4, the presidents of the DRC and Rwanda signed the “Joint Declaration” in Washington, with Trump and leaders from Qatar, Kenya, Angola, Togo, Burundi, Uganda, and Nigeria witnessing.

This peace agreement was violated just four days later, and the Rwandan-backed M23 militia continues to gain ground in eastern DRC. Burundi’s involvement in the conflict is also increasingly concerning. However, the US administration’s diplomatic investment has created international momentum for peace, providing the parties and regional actors more room to maneuver in their respective domestic politics. For the DRC, the political push from the White House has generated a buzz of activity in the critical-minerals sector, as exemplified by myriad recent forums in Washington policy circles and the interest of several companies in capitalizing on the “peace.” Similarly, Rwanda, which has long faced criticism for greenwashing and sportswashing its reputation for human rights abuses and autocracy, has had the opportunity to burnish its image as a promoter of peace on the global stage by signing this series of high-profile agreements. In that sense, both countries are already benefiting from Trump’s political signaling, though the stickiest details of a long-term solution remain unaddressed.

In Sudan, US foreign policy faces its toughest test

The same may be true in Sudan, where Trump recently announced that he intends to focus on resolving the crisis after meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. While there might be a short-term gain, the US approach is unlikely to deliver a sustainable political path toward an enduring peace. Still, Boulos’s engagement on Sudan could inject some much-needed energy into a stalled mediation process led by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A lasting resolution to the conflict in Sudan, where the world’s largest humanitarian disaster is unfolding, would be a real feather in Trump’s cap.

Most Sudan watchers have argued that any solution must start with the United States exerting political pressure on the UAE to terminate its support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a Darfur-based paramilitary group. In January, the outgoing Biden administration determined that the RSF has committed genocide, and continued Emirati support has allowed the group to perpetrate more atrocities, such as those widely reported during its late October siege of the Sudanese city of El Fasher. However, the UAE is an important US ally and a key strategic partner in other global conflicts—from the war in Gaza to countering the Houthi threat in Yemen. Using US leverage to squeeze Abu Dhabi on Sudan has therefore proven politically impractical.

If Trump were to pull it off, an Emirati pivot on Sudan would indeed result in a power shift on the battlefield. Still, spearheading an effort for lasting peace would require another seismic political shift. The US administration would also need to elevate legitimate Sudanese political actors who could lead this fractious and war-ravaged country—and that is no easy feat. After all, neither of the two main belligerents, the Sudanese Armed Forces or the RSF, maintains any political legitimacy, as Michelle Gavin of the Council on Foreign Relations argues. If Trump or Boulos could pick up those two giant rocks—Emirati support for the RSF and legitimate Sudanese political leadership—and move them even inches forward, that would represent real progress that evaded the Biden administration.

Small wins can produce big diplomatic yields

As Trump continues his pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize, there are myriad other conflicts across the African continent that may receive a burst of diplomatic attention as his administration seeks to unlock sustainable paths to peace. The Ethiopia-Egypt-Sudan dispute around Nile River water access and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) may be one of those cases. Although it should be acknowledged that Trump has previously overstated his claim of resolving the conflict, he could still theoretically pull off an agreement, as argued by Allison Lombardo and Peter Quaranto. While Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has little motivation to strike a deal on the GERD, Egypt might be more amenable to negotiations.

During his July 2025 travel to North Africa, Boulos continued discussions with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on both the GERD and on emerging space to possibly broker a deal on Libya. There may yet be developments in this arena as the US administration seeks to create opportunities for energy-sector deals for US companies.

The administration is also pursuing solutions to several other security challenges in Africa, including the metastasizing terrorist threats in Mali and across West Africa. Here, the United States has been increasingly sidelined, with regimes from Burkina Faso to Niger pivoting to Moscow. However, there is an opportunity to redirect Sahelian states’ attention away from Russian patrons if the United States steps up with its own counterterrorism support.

In northern Somalia, a new collaboration between Somaliland and Puntland may provide a vehicle for the United States to advance locally driven counterterrorism solutions aimed at containing or degrading threats posed by the Somali affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, al-Shabaab, and even the Houthis operating in the Red Sea region. Likely with a lighter touch than was needed to advance DRC-Rwanda negotiations, the Trump administration could make near-term counterterrorism gains that may open space for partner governments—including Western allies, Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar—to share burdens and claim political and diplomatic wins.

It is easy to criticize the administration’s nontraditional approach to peace promotion, particularly when paired with sizable tariffs, visa bans, and misleading narratives about marginalized groups in South Africa and Nigeria. However, the reality is that the political disruption that Trump’s style can generate, combined with his unpredictable decision-making and pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize, has shifted political thinking about what is possible in the DRC and Rwanda. With sustained and credible engagement, similar diplomatic openings could emerge in Sudan, Libya, and other terrorism hot spots in Africa. In many of these cases, small victories may prove more valuable than prolonged stalemates.

Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and vice president for global partnerships at Valar, a Nairobi-based strategic advisory and risk firm. She previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs and director for African affairs at the US National Security Council.

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Inside Trump’s peace plans

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 19:45:00 +0000

US President Donald Trump has focused much of his second-term foreign policy on the idea that he is a peacemaker, and his administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy states that he has been personally involved in resolving eight conflicts within the first eight months of his second term. He has openly campaigned for the Nobel Peace Prize, and he was recently awarded the newly minted FIFA Peace Prize for his “unwavering commitment to advancing peace and unity.”

But what results have Trump’s peace efforts yielded so far—and where do the agreements that the US administration has facilitated over the past months stand today? This series takes stock of Trump’s peace deals across the world, highlights the patterns, tools, and strategic choices that characterize them, and assesses whether they can deliver stability over the long run.

From negotiations with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to talks with Cambodia and Thailand, several cross-cutting themes emerge. Trump uses economic tools such as trade deals, tariff pressure, and targeted incentives to bring parties to the table and further US interests, while highly visible announcements and signing ceremonies serve to reduce tensions and lock parties into deals.

With this unorthodox style, Trump aims to position the US economy as a driver of cooperation abroad while simultaneously securing domestic wins, such as beneficial agreements on critical minerals. His style produces rapid outcomes and creates political openings that might otherwise be unattainable. However, it also runs the risk of substituting short-term gains for long-term peace.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.

—Bailey Galicia is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Read our expert analysis

From the DRC to Sudan, Trump’s disruptive moves could revive stalled negotiations

By Maureen Farrell

Across Africa, US President Donald Trump’s unorthodox diplomacy is unsettling old patterns—reviving talks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and injecting new momentum into mediation in Sudan. The gains may be fragile, but the openings are real.

It’s all about Hamas’s disarmament

By Daniel B. Shapiro

In Southeast Asia, the promise and pitfalls of tariff diplomacy are on full display

By Amy Searight

US President Donald Trump’s high-profile intervention in the Thai-Cambodian border dispute delivered a cease-fire, but its violation exposes the fragility of tariff-based pressure and raises questions about the durability of coercive US diplomacy in the region.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Inside Trump’s peace plans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s insistence on a defenseless Ukraine betrays Putin’s true intentions

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 11 Dec 2025 08:21:08 +0000

As American, Ukrainian, and European officials continue to debate potential peace plans among themselves, there remains very little to indicate that Russia is genuinely interested in ending the war. On the contrary, many of the Kremlin’s key demands during negotiations appear tailored to facilitate a continuation of the invasion on more favorable terms.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s territorial claims alone should be enough to set off alarm bells. He insists that in order to secure a ceasefire, Ukraine must first hand over the remaining 10 percent of the Donbas region that his troops have failed to seize since the invasion first began eleven years ago.

As the ruler of what is by far the largest country in the world, Putin has no pressing need for the approximately 6600 square kilometers of Donbas territory still under Ukrainian control. Nor does the region contain any particularly important natural resources or historic sites that could justify its present position at the very heart of the peace process.

Putin’s true motivation is not difficult to discern. The unoccupied portion of the Donbas that he now so openly covets may seem relatively inconspicuous on the map, but it plays host to some of Ukraine’s strongest fortifications. Developed over the past decade, this fortress belt represents a formidable obstacle to Moscow’s invasion.

Analysts estimate that it could take years for Russia to occupy the area by force, and would likely cost the Kremlin hundreds of thousands of additional casualties. Beyond the fortress belt, the way would be open for further sweeping Russian advances into central Ukraine and toward Kyiv itself. This vital role in Ukraine’s overall defense explains why Putin is prepared to reduce his demands elsewhere but remains so eager for Kyiv to hand over this particular territory without a fight.

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Among Moscow’s many demands, the biggest red flag of all is the Kremlin’s determination to demilitarize Ukraine and deprive the country of international allies. Ever since the first round of peace talks during the initial months of the war, Putin has consistently sought to impose restrictions on the size of the Ukrainian military and the categories of weapons the country can possess. While recent drafts envision a Ukrainian army of 600,000 troops, the fact that Russia remains so keen on limiting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself is an unambiguous signal of Putin’s bad intentions.

Likewise, the Kremlin’s bitter opposition to continued international support for Ukraine betrays the reality behind Moscow’s current peace posturing. This extends far beyond Russia’s well-documented objections to Ukrainian membership of NATO. Putin’s negotiators also seek to block future arms supplies to Kyiv and have completely ruled out the possibility of even a symbolic Western troop presence in postwar Ukraine, while demonstrating a deep reluctance to accept anything resembling credible security guarantees.

Attempts to defend Russian objections on security grounds are unconvincing. Putin has debunked his own claims of a NATO security threat to Russia by reacting with obvious indifference to neighboring Finland’s NATO accession in 2022, just months after using the issue as a convenient pretext for the invasion of Ukraine. According to this bizarre Kremlin logic, Ukraine’s slim hopes of joining NATO in the distant future were sufficient grounds to unleash the largest European war since World War II, but Finland’s almost immediate membership of the alliance was “no problem” for Moscow, despite the fact that both countries share long land borders with Russia.

Putin’s refusal to countenance purely defensive commitments from Kyiv’s allies that are clearly designed to safeguard Ukrainian sovereignty is even harder to justify. If the Russian ruler intended to coexist with an independent Ukraine, he would surely recognize the need for international involvement in efforts to reestablish stability in the region. Instead, he has adopted the opposite approach. While Ukraine appeals for security guarantees, Putin seeks to guarantee Ukraine’s insecurity.

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The insincerity of Russia’s current approach to the US-led peace process should come as no surprise. After all, while Putin may be willing to consider a pause in hostilities if it comes on Kremlin-friendly terms, he simply cannot risk a peace deal that secures the continued existence of an independent Ukrainian state. Any settlement based on the present front lines of the war would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and free to continue along the path toward greater European integration. That is exactly what Putin is fighting to prevent.

The Kremlin dictator has always viewed his war against Ukraine in the broadest of historical contexts as a crusade to reverse the verdict of 1991 and return Russia to its rightful place as a global superpower. Like many of his contemporaries, Putin remains embittered by the Soviet collapse and determined to avenge what he perceives as modern Russia’s humiliating fall from grace. This has fuelled his obsession with independent Ukraine, which he has come to regard as the ultimate symbol of the historical injustice resulting from the breakup of the USSR.

Putin’s increasingly rabid opposition to Ukrainian independence reflects his Cold War experience as a KGB officer in East Germany, where he witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Empire firsthand. This traumatic experience has helped to convince him that the Ukrainian state-building project now poses an existential threat to Russia itself. If Ukraine is able to consolidate its statehood and emerge as a recognizably European democracy, Putin fears this could serve as a catalyst for the next phase in a Russian imperial retreat that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Over the past two decades, Putin’s determination to undermine Ukrainian statehood has come to dominate his entire reign and has led directly to a new Cold War. From the 2004 Orange Revolution to the 2014 seizure of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of 2022, Ukraine has been at the epicenter of each new milestone in the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West.

Time after time, Putin has demonstrated his readiness to sacrifice all other Russian national interests in his quest to subjugate Ukraine and force the country permanently back into the Kremlin orbit. He has reversed decades of integration into Western economies, placed Russian society on a wartime footing, and sent hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers to their deaths. It is deeply delusional to think that he is now suddenly ready to abandon all of this and accept the reality of Ukrainian independence in exchange for the marginal gains of a compromise peace.

Putin’s own position during peace talks betrays his complete lack of interest in ending the war. His territorial demands would rob Ukraine of crucial fortifications and set the stage for further Russian advances, while his calls for restrictions on the Ukrainian armed forces and Kyiv’s ability to maintain military ties with the West would leave postwar Ukraine disarmed and defenseless. In isolation, any of these demands would look deeply suspect. Taken together, they represent overwhelming evidence of Putin’s intention to continue the invasion.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Despite these incredible challenges, the Ukrainian military continues to adapt and innovate as it seeks to hold the line with new tools and evolving strategies. The will to resist remains unbroken, but the toll this struggle exacts on soldiers, their families, and the entire Ukrainian nation often feels unbearable.

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As Ukrainians fight for national survival on the battlefield, another struggle is also playing out against domestic corruption. Ukraine’s efforts to move toward a more accountable and democratic system of government are a key cause of Moscow’s escalating aggression, with Putin viewing Ukrainian democracy as an existential threat to Russian authoritarianism. Ukrainians understand that battling corruption is just as vital in this war as resisting Russia on the battlefield.

Ukrainian society has been attempting to combat corruption for decades. Exactly twenty-five years ago, the Kuchmagate scandal rocked Ukraine. This implicated then-president Leonid Kuchma in the murder of my husband Georgiy Gongadze, a prominent investigative journalist and the founder of the Ukrainska Pravda news site. On that occasion, the pathway to the truth began with a lone whistleblower from the presidential security team, who took huge risks to expose what he saw as grave misconduct.

A quarter of a century later, there are strong indications that Ukraine is making progress in the fight against corruption. In late November, one of Ukraine’s most powerful men, presidential administration head Andriy Yermak, resigned following a search of his home by the country’s anti-corruption authorities amid a rapidly unfolding scandal involving figures close to the very highest levels of power.

Once again, Ukrainska Pravda journalists were instrumental in breaking the story, but the differences between then and now are also striking. Back when my husband was murdered, there were no institutional checks in place and no raids on the homes of senior officials. Today, Ukraine has built institutions capable of pushing back and producing results.

Clearly, the ghosts of corruption still haunt Ukraine’s corridors of power, but impunity is giving way to accountability. This is exactly the transformation that many Ukrainians are fighting for, and one of the main reasons why Ukraine scares Putin so much.

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After nearly four years of full-scale war, most Ukrainians want peace, but they also realize that peace will only be possible if accompanied by justice and security. For a generation, Ukrainians have fought for these goals. They know that simply stopping the shooting will not bring real peace, and are committed to ending the war in a way that will last.

From Kyiv to Lviv, I hear the same message from people who desperately want the war to be over but understand that a rushed peace could have disastrous consequences. “We have sheltered too long in the dark to accept a peace that isn’t just,” one woman commented. “Our sons and daughters are not only fighting to defend our land, but for the justice that must come after,” a taxi driver told me.

The world needs to understand that Russia’s invasion is already reshaping global security. Putin is not just seizing Ukrainian territory; he is trying to erase Ukraine as a nation and erode the entire international order. If the world lets this happen, a much larger war will no longer be a distant risk. It will become inevitable.

There is now a clear danger that Western leaders will support a hurried and unfair peace deal. This would send a dangerous message that aggression pays. Autocrats around the world would draw the obvious conclusion that they can change borders by force. This would undermine the foundational principles of international relations established in the post-World War II era. Europe cannot afford to set such a precedent.

With the Russian invasion entering a critical phase and Moscow’s hybrid war spreading across Europe, the time to act is now. Ukraine’s defense is Europe’s defense. The West must increase support and stop Putin before he goes even further. It is delusional to think that sacrificing Ukraine will satisfy Russia. Instead, a bad peace will only lead to a bigger war. The price of hesitation will be far higher than the cost of action.

Myroslava Gongadze is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior fellow at Friends of Europe.

What is indisputable is that Russia’s mass deportations are now among the best-documented crimes of modern warfare. Among numerous other investigations, the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab identified at least 210 facilities inside Russia or Russian-occupied territory where deported Ukrainian children have been sent for “re-education,” forced assimilation, and in many places, military-style training.

The evidence is overwhelming and includes coerced relocations, illegal adoptions and naturalization under Russian citizenship, ideological indoctrination aimed at erasing Ukrainian identity, and numerous violations of international law. This is not incidental collateral damage. It is a deliberate state policy of population transfer and Ukrainian national identity destruction; a Russian program that mirrors the legal definitions of numerous atrocity crimes, including genocide.

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So far, it has only been possible to rescue a small fraction of abducted children. As of November 2025, 1,859 children have returned to Ukraine, while international experts estimate that 90 percent of the burden of rescue currently falls to Ukrainians themselves.

Moscow’s refusal to facilitate repatriation and its ongoing efforts to conceal identities and locations underscores the impossibility of any stable post-war order without addressing this crime. Humanitarian language alone obscures a critical truth: The forced transfer of children is not a peripheral human rights issue; it is a central obstacle to any credible security settlement in Europe.

For months, United States and European officials have been exploring frameworks for eventual peace talks with Russia and long-term security guarantees for Ukraine. But these conversations often treat Russian atrocities, including child deportations, as adjacent to the real business of hard security. This is a mistake.

Russia’s abduction of children is a window into its strategic intent. The Kremlin campaign to kidnap young Ukrainians and turn them into Russians reveals that Moscow’s war is not merely about territory but about imperial restoration. If Vladimir Putin only sought to adjust borders, the millions spent on relocating, indoctrinating, and militarizing thousands of Ukrainian children would make little sense.

Putin’s ominous intent becomes clearer when viewed alongside Russia’s broader atrocities. The Russian ruler clearly seeks to diminish the demographic future of an entire neighboring nation, while preparing the next generation for future Russian military aggression.

The issue of abducted Ukrainian children is especially relevant for Ukrainians as they debate painful political compromises, territorial concessions, and security guarantees premised on Western assurances. If world leaders cannot secure the return of the most vulnerable victims of Russia’s aggression, how could Ukrainians trust that those same leaders can prevent Russia from reigniting the war or committing new atrocities?

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Western policymakers insist that any post-war settlement must include credible enforcement mechanisms. But credibility is not defined by rhetoric; it is a matter of capability and political will. Right now, both are in question.

If the United States, with its immense military, diplomatic, and economic power, cannot compel Russia to return thousands of abducted Ukrainian children, it becomes harder to argue that Washington can deter further aggression or prevent violations of a future peace agreement. Ukrainians understand this reality well.

Demonstrating US leverage over Russia is therefore not merely symbolic. It is a strategic prerequisite to any durable peace. The United States has untapped tools at its disposal. These include sanctioning individuals and institutions directly involved in the abduction of Ukrainian children, while supporting multilateral accountability efforts. It should be also possible to condition further diplomatic engagement on verifiable steps toward repatriation. Meanwhile, the United States could lead a coordinated information effort to identify children and counter Russian concealment tactics.

These measures are proportional responses to atrocity crimes recognized under international law. The forcible transfer of children is a premeditated crime designed to shatter Ukraine’s future. A successful effort to bring Ukrainian children home will demonstrate that the United States can influence Russian behavior. This is a critical condition for any effective peace initiative.

Securing the return of abducted children would also help to build the trust needed for Ukrainian society to accept Western-backed security frameworks. After many failed efforts to constrain Russian aggression, Ukrainian society needs to know that Western promises are not empty.

Ignoring the issue, or relegating it to the humanitarian margins, undermines the very negotiations that the Trump administration is seeking to advance. Ending the war requires Ukrainian faith in international guarantees.

Child abduction is among the clearest moral red lines in global conflict. Failure to uphold this red line in Ukraine will invite repetition elsewhere. If Russia can abduct tens of thousands of children with impunity during a major European war and face no real consequences, then no norms protecting children in conflict can hold anywhere.

This week’s hearing marks an opportunity for Congress, the Trump administration, and Ukraine’s other partners to clarify that returning abducted Ukrainian children is not optional, negotiable, or separate from security discussions. It is central.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Laura Linderman

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Michta interviewed in Defense24 on Ukraine peace plan

dfitzsimmons — Wed, 26 Nov 2025 14:00:00 +0000

On November 26, Andrew Michta, nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center, was interviewed for an article in “Defense24”. He argues that as proposed, the deal could reward Russia and prove costly for Ukraine.

If the Russians managed to reach an agreement, they would be rewarded for aggression. From their point of view, they would have beaten NATO… In my view they would then be even more willing to take risks in pressing for concessions from Europe.

Andrew Michta

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Andrew A. Michta

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Trump’s latest Ukraine peace proposal sparks strong Republican reaction

Doug Klain — Tue, 25 Nov 2025 22:39:27 +0000

A new attempt by the United States to broker peace between Russia and Ukraine has sparked fresh hopes for an end to the largest European war since World War II, while also drawing accusations of echoing key Kremlin demands. Launched late last week, this peace initiative has provoked a particularly strong reaction from some of US President Donald Trump’s colleagues within the Republican Party.

Trump’s team is now working with counterparts in Ukraine and the rest of Europe to agree on a potential common framework for a settlement with Russia. Despite tensions between Republicans in Congress worried by White House pressure on Kyiv, US efforts to end the war will only be strengthened by a more activist Congress that resumes legislating on foreign policy.

The original US plan envisioned a peace built on twenty-eight points. These included a cap on Ukraine’s armed forces, a ban on Ukraine joining NATO, and the surrender of some of the most heavily fortified land in eastern Ukraine to Moscow.

The proposal drew criticism from a number of congressional Republicans. “Those who think pressuring the victim and appeasing the aggressor will bring peace are kidding themselves,” wrote Senator Mitch McConnell, who likened the plan to “a capitulation like [former US President Joe] Biden’s abandonment of Afghanistan.”

“This so-called ‘peace plan’ has real problems, and I am highly skeptical it will achieve peace,” said Roger Wicker, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

A Wall Street Journal report that Trump would withhold arms sales to Ukraine if Kyiv didn’t accept the proposal by Thanksgiving elicited a rebuke from Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, who wrote: “Correction: The United States wants Russia’s answer on an unconditional withdrawal of Ukraine by Thursday. This Russian-drafted propaganda must be rejected and disregarded for the unserious nonsense that it is.”

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Comments from US Vice President JD Vance indicate that the White House has received significant pushback from Republicans in Congress over its recent handling of the Russia-Ukraine peace process. “The level of passion over this one issue when your own country has serious problems is bonkers,” he posted on November 24.

Perhaps the biggest challenge to the Trump administration’s position on Ukraine peace talks has come from Fitzpatrick, who filed a discharge petition to force a vote in the House of Representatives on Russia sanctions once a majority of members have signed on. This is the same mechanism used in 2024 to pressure Speaker of the House Mike Johnson to pass a $61 billion aid package for Ukraine.

A more prominent congressional role in Russia-Ukraine peace efforts would mark a departure from recent trends. At present, 2025 is the first year since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion that Congress has not passed any legislation to assist Ukraine. From the US-Ukraine minerals deal to shuttle diplomacy in Istanbul and arms sales to NATO, the White House has made it clear that ending the war in Ukraine is Trump’s portfolio.

This helps to explain why the Sanctioning Russia Act, introduced in April 2025 by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), has gone nearly eight months without a vote despite pledges of support from 85 percent of senators. Originally written to signal strong congressional support for Russia sanctions, the legislation has since undergone technical changes to improve the effectiveness of the sanctions and gain Trump’s approval, according to congressional staff.

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Fitzpatrick’s initiative could now change things. The discharge petition, which he says would force a vote on a version of the Sanctioning Russia Act and potentially also the Democrat-led Ukraine Support Act, which includes both sanctions and new military support for Kyiv, could mobilize Republicans uneasy with current peace efforts.

After nearly a year of deferring to Trump to manage a peace process, Republican criticism in Congress is growing. “The President’s appeasement plan to Russia is forcing our hand,” commented Rep. Don Bacon (R-NE), who says he considered resigning from Congress in protest over the recently proposed peace plan.

To force a vote, the discharge petition will require majority support from House members. Most Democrats will likely back the move, though some are privately sharing concerns about granting Trump increased authority to levy tariffs, should that provision remain in the final legislation attached to the petition. A handful of Republicans could push it over the line.

Further action to back Ukraine and pressure Russia is likely to find support among Trump’s base. Fresh polling from the right-leaning Vandenberg Coalition found that only 16 percent of Trump voters agree with the proposal that Ukraine should surrender territory to the Kremlin, while 76 percent support sanctioning Russia.

The reality is that without serious additional pressure on Russia, Putin is unlikely to agree to any of the peace frameworks currently being floated. However, if Congress pushes to enact crippling sanctions, extend military assistance to Ukraine, and codify security guarantees, the Trump administration’s peace efforts could finally bear fruit.

The last few days have shown that Congress is eager to help Trump force Russia to end its war in Ukraine. Capitalizing on the revised peace framework agreed by US and Ukrainian negotiators in Switzerland will now require action from both sides of Pennsylvania Avenue.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He also serves as deputy director for policy and strategy at Razom for Ukraine, a US-based nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

Every city the Russian military bombs, every child it kidnaps, every Ukrainian life it destroys today can only be understood within the long genealogy of Russia’s imperialistic state ideology. For centuries, this violent brand of expansionism has been directed at Ukraine.

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The present full-scale invasion of Ukraine will soon pass the four-year mark, but the war did not begin in 2022. It was preceded by eight years of warfare in eastern Ukraine following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea. This has been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights, which has ruled that Russia has been conducting sustained military operations in Ukraine since at least 2014. But even this is only the most recent chapter in a far older story.

During the eras of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the authorities consistently pursued policies aimed at dismantling Ukrainian identity. Tactics included banning the Ukrainian language, repressing cultural and religious leaders, and imprisoning advocates of Ukrainian independence.

Most devastatingly, Stalin and his regime engineered an artificial famine in the 1930s that killed at least four million Ukrainians in less than two years. Today, this deliberate mass starvation of Ukrainians is known as the Holodomor (“killing by hunger”). No outlier, the Holodomor was central to a broader Soviet campaign aimed at breaking Ukrainian resistance and other assertions of political autonomy. The lawyer who coined the term “genocide,” Raphael Lemkin, identified this attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation as the “classic example” of Soviet genocide.

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What unites these episodes is not only the violence itself but the ideology behind it. Moscow’s long history of crimes in Ukraine reflects an imperial worldview that treats human beings as resources to be harnessed for the state and as obstacles to be eliminated in the pursuit of total domination.

This ideology has evolved over time, but its core logic has remained remarkably consistent. Crucially, it has never faced sustained, meaningful repudiation by the international community. Because it was never confronted, Russia’s imperial ideology has been allowed to regenerate. A clear line of impunity links Stalin’s starvation of Ukrainian society in the 1930s to today’s Kremlin rhetoric insisting Ukraine is not a real nation at all.

This continuity is not abstract; it directly shapes present-day atrocities. When a state views humans as raw material for empire, the kidnapping and forced Russification of thousands of Ukrainian children becomes an acceptable instrument of policy rather than an aberration. This logic also applies to other aspects of the current invasion including filtration camps, torture chambers, rape and sexual violence, and mass deportations, along with the systematic destruction of Ukrainian cultural and religious life throughout every area under Russian control.

Ukraine’s top prosecutor notes that the number of open war crimes investigations has reached 178,391 documented cases. Indicating deliberate Kremlin policy, the former US ambassador-at-large for global criminal justice recently stated that Russian atrocities in Ukraine are “systematic” and have been identified “literally everywhere that Russia’s troops have been deployed.”

The current actions of Putin’s occupation forces in Ukraine are the same state practices that have long defined Russian imperial rule: Absorb what can be absorbed, erase what cannot, and turn the conquered into fuel for the next stage of expansion.

Russia’s genocidal intent is not limited to eliminating Ukrainian identity. Putin’s extreme ideology drives him to pursue the incorporation of Ukrainians into Russia’s war machine against the West. The danger is not only the destruction of Ukraine as a nation, but the possibility that Russia will assimilate as much of Ukraine’s territory, cutting-edge technology, and population as it can before continuing further.

Contemporary Russian rhetoric makes this explicit. Strikingly, the Putin era has witnessed the resurgence of the slogan “We can do it again.” Originally graffiti scrawled on the Reichstag by Red Army soldiers in 1945, the popularity of this phrase surged after Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea to become a menacing mantra of modern Russian nationalism that signals a society intent on conquest and domination.

The atrocities we are witnessing today in Ukraine reflect centuries of Russian impunity. Impunity not only allows perpetrators to continue; it invites them to escalate. Russia’s imperial ideology has never been confronted with the kind of accountability needed to dismantle it. As long as this ideology persists unchallenged, the threat will not stop at Ukraine’s borders.

The international community now finds itself confronted with the consequences of a genocidal worldview that has been left intact for generations. The urgent question is not only how to halt Russia’s genocidal actions against Ukrainians today, but how to ensure that the world finally repudiates the extremist ideology that made this war possible. Without that repudiation, millions of Russians will remain convinced that they can, in fact, “do it again.”

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

John Herbst

The meaning of this deadline is unclear. In addition to this statement, Trump said that the deadline could slip if there is “positive movement.” It is also true that despite the Kremlin’s rejection of Trump’s cease-fire proposal in August, Trump ignored his own deadline for Russian compliance. There is no reason to assume that the president would severely sanction Ukraine for not quickly accepting a document that appears to have many Kremlin-friendly points.

What do you make of the draft twenty-eight-point peace plan that has been circulating in reports?

John Herbst: I think that some version [of the reported draft]—or similar to that—is being discussed in Kyiv, if not that actual draft.

Security is the principal problem. You have massive aggression by a nuclear superpower against its neighbor. One of the points in the reported draft appeared to suggest giving the Kremlin strategic territory that it has been unable to conquer in over three and a half years of the massive invasion. This would seem to be a fatuous idea, rewarding the aggressor. Then there are the limitations on the Ukrainian military, the victim. Now, it’s true that the points suggest a sizable Ukrainian military of 600,000 people, but that’s still less than the Ukrainian armed forces today and maybe less than they need. The plan also talks about limitations on arms that Ukraine could have. Here too, why are there limitations on the arms and forces of the victim nation and none on the aggressor? So these points are on the negative side. I’m not sure they comport with Trump’s stated objective—which I believe he’s serious about—of achieving a durable peace which leaves Ukraine an independent and secure nation.

On the other side of the ledger, a possible positive is this discussion of US security guarantees. Now, if this phrase turns out to be security guarantees as solid as Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, then that’s a very serious and positive development. The Russians, of course, don’t want that. But if you had a bilateral security guarantee from the United States, like Article 5, that would certainly deter future Russian aggression, because the Russians are afraid of our military, as they should be. After all, they can’t even beat the Ukrainian military, as we’ve seen.

It is worth noting that there is some clarity in the reported draft on the items that work to Moscow’s advantage, but no similar clarity on the security guarantees that are supposed to deter and to protect Ukraine from future Russian aggression.

Obviously, there would have to be true clarity on what that NATO-like commitment means for Ukraine if a deal were to be reached with that as the key security point.

Do you see anything in the draft plans that would prevent Russia from invading Ukraine again?

John Herbst: In theory, Moscow would make a commitment, just like it did in its peace treaty with Ukraine in the 1990s and in the Budapest Memorandum, to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity. But Moscow’s war on Ukraine and “annexation” of Crimea and other oblasts show Moscow cannot be counted on to meet its commitments.

Zooming out, this war has been going on for nearly four years—nearly twelve years since Russia’s initial 2014 invasion. Why do you think all this activity is happening now?

John Herbst: This is just part of who Trump is and his policy world. He’s constantly in motion, bringing up ideas. He fancies himself a peacemaker. And I say that with respect, because he’s done some remarkable things—from Africa to the Middle East to East Asia. So he’s wondering why he can’t get this thing done [in Ukraine], and his team goes from one idea to another. That, I believe, explains this.

Does the corruption scandal that Zelenskyy is dealing with in Ukraine have any tie-in here?

John Herbst: It’s certainly related. There were clearly Kremlin narratives in the press that Ukraine is losing on the battlefield, [and] Zelenskyy is besieged because of corruption in Ukraine, now’s the time to push him to make concessions. I think those types of narratives demonstrate a misunderstanding of Ukraine. For example, the anti-corruption groups in Ukraine, the civil society folks whom I know well, they’re also the strongest opponents of Kremlin aggression. And if Zelenskyy is weak vis-à-vis them, the worst thing he could do is to make ill-considered, dangerous concessions to Moscow, right? I think there was some wishful Kremlin-type thinking being channeled to American media by people who, in fact, due to their limited knowledge, are all too accommodating of Kremlin aggression.

It wasn’t so long ago that we were talking about a major drone deal between the United States and Ukraine. Trump has helped broker deals for European countries to provide more weapons to Ukraine, plus provided intelligence support. And then we have these latest reports about threats to withdraw US support for Ukraine if it doesn’t sign this peace deal. How do you assess the state of US support for Ukraine in this moment?

John Herbst: One thing we have not heard amid all this sound and fury in the past several days is that the sale of arms and the drone deal are off the table—these are two separate deals, both of great importance. In my understanding, serious negotiations are going on regarding those arms deals. So I don’t see what we’ve seen this week as a rejection of that part of administration policy, but you can be sure that whoever was briefing Axios doesn’t like those deals.

Trump is a mercurial figure. He moves in this direction, in that direction, as he tries to come up with a solution. There have obviously been times when that’s worked for him. I don’t think that works in the current war because Putin’s aim has not changed. He is not going to give up his desire of achieving effective political control of Ukraine. So if a deal along the lines that have been outlined were to go into effect, Putin may lie low for six months, twelve months, twenty-four months before he makes his next move to take additional Ukrainian territory—until either he has a government he wants in Kyiv or he has so much territory that he’s reduced Ukraine to a landlocked, small state somewhere in the western part of its territory.

The only way Trump can be a Nobel Prize winner for ending this brutal aggression is by making sure Putin can’t do that. And that’s ultimately why I think that efforts, including by credulous people who have access to President Trump, to make a deal that enables Putin to achieve his goal are not going to succeed. The only way Trump gets the peace he wants is by making it clear to Putin that he’s going to pay a very high price to continue his aggression.

European partners will now reportedly meet on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Johannesburg to develop their own peace proposal. Do you think that has legs?

John Herbst: Yes. Active European engagement with President Trump has made it much harder for Putin to persuade Trump of something that is against not just Ukraine’s interest or Europe’s interests, but also American interests. Steps like increasing defense spending and a willingness to put European troops on the ground in Ukraine have been important in making it harder for Putin to sell snake oil to the White House. Several European leaders have terrific relations with Trump.

It sounds like you’re saying what we’re witnessing isn’t necessarily the endgame of the war or even the beginning of the end.

John Herbst: We’re really, really, really far from any true endgame negotiation. This is just one more turn of the wheel, and we’re going to have a lot more turns in the future.

There’s clearly a play led by [Russian envoy Kirill] Dmitriev, because of his special relationship with [US envoy Steve] Witkoff, to get a deal that hands over to Russia hard-to-conquer territory in western Donbas and improves relations between Trump and Putin. From Dmitriev’s perspective, the goal is to create conditions that allow Putin to gobble up more of Ukraine—eighteen months, twenty-four months down the road, or maybe right after Trump leaves office. That’s the game. And because the White House does want a deal, which I think is laudable, there are some people playing on that desire to accommodate Russia in ways that undermine American interests in Europe, create an existential threat to the Ukrainian people, and increase the possibility of Russia taking even more provocative actions against NATO allies.

Moscow is conducting ever more serious provocations in Europe—having a MiG [fighter jet] in Baltic airspace for thirteen minutes, having all these drone flights, the sabotage of the railroad in eastern Poland—and NATO has done very little. It’s important for NATO to take serious countersteps to make Russia pay a price for this. President Trump, who considers himself to be a very strong leader, should be taking the lead on that. That’s another way to let Putin know that he cannot simply waltz into the rest of Ukraine.

Say Trump calls you into the Oval: What guidance would you give him? How would you brief him regarding what to do next?

John Herbst: I start by saying, Mr. President, you proved yourself a remarkable peacemaker, but you’re having a hard time on this one, and here’s why: You’ve established a goal which meets American interests. You say you want to create a durable peace by having roughly a cease-fire along the present [battle] lines. In fact, that is a real gift to Putin, because the US is not saying Putin has to withdraw from conquered territory or pay a price for the great evils he’s inflicted on millions of Ukrainians. Still, in an imperfect world, that’s not a bad outcome—if, in fact, you put in place conditions that ensure that Russian aggression is not renewed. The problem you face is Putin does not want that. He wants effective political control of Ukraine. That means he wants to control all of the cities on the Dnipro River, from the north to the south, including especially Kyiv and Odesa. He wants to make sure that Ukraine, as it exists following any peace deal, has no access to the Black Sea. And obviously, if he were to agree to President Trump’s basic concept for peace, he cannot achieve those objectives.

You have to choose what’s more important: a friendly relationship with an aggressor—whose policies are, in fact, adversarial to the United States—or a durable peace. The only way you get [a durable peace] is to make it unpleasant for Putin to continue his war of aggression.

That means you need to send more advanced weapons to Ukraine. That means you have to help Ukraine find a way to finance the war. If you’re not going to send American assistance, okay, but you have these $300-billion worth of frozen Russian assets sitting in the Western financial system. American advocacy of handing those over to Ukraine to deal with its economic needs and to purchase weapons would go a long way. And of course, the sanctions the administration finally put down on Lukoil and Rosneft were excellent, but more needs to come. The administration mentioned after those sanctions that they want to calibrate this. That, frankly, is Biden talk—gradual escalation, which is not the way to persuade Putin to make peace.

Putin thinks, correctly, that he’s outwaited every Western leader in conducting this now nearly twelve-year war of aggression and nearly four-year war of big invasion. And he’s been right. He’s been able to outlast them. He thinks he can outlast President Trump. I think Trump is too smart to allow Putin to do that. Trump has actually made that point in public.

So the administration needs to bring the hammer down on President Putin at the same time it expresses its willingness to have the best relations in the world with him and with Russia once they stop this aggression. Trump was very successful in the Middle East because he was willing to put the hammer on Iran. And until it puts the hammer down on the aggressor in Europe, it’s not going to achieve a durable peace there.

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Any serious Ukraine peace plan must address Putin’s imperial ambitions

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 20 Nov 2025 22:21:33 +0000

This week has seen a flurry of diplomatic activity around a new US peace plan to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. White House officials stated on Thursday that the plan had been developed by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff over the past month based on input from both Ukrainians and Russians. However, other reports have claimed that the document was drafted by Witkoff and his Russian counterpart without Ukraine’s involvement.

Details of the 28-point proposal have not yet been made public, but the terms are believed to include extensive Ukrainian concessions along with a series of economic and political incentives for Russia. This has led to widespread alarm, with many critics dismissing the proposal as a call for Ukraine’s “capitulation.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has so far offered a more diplomatic response. The Ukrainian leader received the plan in Kyiv on Thursday and commented that he intends to speak with US President Donald Trump in the coming days about “diplomatic opportunities and the key points required to achieve peace.”

While Zelenskyy is understandably eager not to alienate Trump, there is little optimism in Kyiv or across Europe that this latest US initiative can end the continent’s largest invasion since World War II. Multiple similar attempts to secure a settlement by offering the Kremlin generous terms have already been made without success.

This approach reflects a fundamental failure to recognize that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not driven by the same straightforward cost-benefit rationality as his Western counterparts. On the contrary, Putin believes he is engaged in an existential struggle to revive Russia’s great power status and secure his own place in history. It is therefore delusional to think that he can be satisfied by promises of minor territorial concessions or future economic opportunities.

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The disconnect between Moscow and Western capitals over Russia’s war aims has been most immediately apparent during Trump’s attempts to broker a peace agreement. Since February 2025, US-led discussions over a possible negotiated settlement have featured plenty of vague talk about lucrative joint ventures and potential US investments in Russia. Some Trump administration members may have interpreted the prominent role of Putin’s economic envoy Kirill Dmitriev as a positive signal that Moscow is open to such overtures. However, promises of business opportunities have not translated into any meaningful progress toward peace.

Trump has also often given the impression that he views the issue of a territorial settlement between Russia and Ukraine from the perspective of a real estate developer solving a property dispute. The US leader has spoken of the need for “land swaps” and described Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine as “prime territory,” while indicating that the two sides should sit down and agree on new boundaries. This overlooks the awkward but important fact that Putin is not actually fighting for Ukrainian land. He is fighting for Ukraine itself, and will regard the war as lost unless he is able to reassert complete Russian dominance over the whole country.

Another issue that highlights the tendency of Western leaders to project their own logic onto Putin is the topic of Russian military losses. Western officials and media outlets often identify the extremely high Russian casualty figures in Ukraine as a key argument for ending the war, while pointing to Russia’s slow advance as evidence that the invasion has reached a strategic stalemate.

From a Western perspective, this makes perfect sense. But high casualty rates are a traditional feature in the Russian army, which has always relied on mass to win wars. Furthermore, Putin has been careful to make sure his army’s heavy losses in Ukraine do not destabilize the domestic front. Since 2022, the Kremlin has focused recruitment efforts on the poorest provinces of Russia and has enlisted large numbers of inmates from the country’s vast prison network, while also offering extremely attractive financial packages to volunteers. This has helped reduce any social pressures to a minimum, despite the high death toll of the invasion.

Some Western leaders have sought to strike a chord by underlining the damage Putin is doing to Russia’s long-term prospects and his own legacy. Outgoing British MI6 chief Richard Moore offered a good example of this in his September 2025 farewell speech, which highlighted the threats posed by the ongoing invasion of Ukraine to Russia’s economic and demographic outlook. Moore’s logic would certainly have resonated with Western policymakers and electorates, but it meant little to an ageing autocrat guided by imperial delusions and his own distorted reading of history.

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If Western leaders wish to end the war, they must stop trying to implement peace plans that they themselves would find persuasive and accept that Putin’s motivations are altogether different. He sees the invasion of Ukraine as part of a sacred historic mission that will define his reign and determine Russia’s place in the world for decades to come. Extinguishing Ukrainian independence is only one part of this process. Putin ultimately aims to reshape the global order and end what he sees as the period of geopolitical humiliation suffered by Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Most of all, Western policymakers must finally come to grips with the sheer scale of Putin’s imperial ambitions and acknowledge the central role these ambitions play in fueling Russian aggression in Ukraine and beyond. This would be long overdue. Since 2022, Putin has publicly compared himself to Russian Emperor Peter the Great. He frequently claims to be returning historically Russian lands, and has declared that “all Ukraine is ours.”

Attempting to bargain with such a man by appealing to common sense or offering limited concessions is worse than futile; it actually helps convince Putin that his Western opponents are too weak and overindulged to grasp the historical significance of the moment. This makes him more confident than ever that his enemies will ultimately back down and hand him victory in Ukraine.

Instead of trying to appease Russia, Ukraine’s allies must first admit that Putin is playing for the highest possible stakes and has no interest whatsoever in a compromise peace. They must then demonstrate that they have the political will to prevent his twisted imperial fantasies from becoming reality.

Peace, pacts, and recognition: Saudi Arabia at the forefront of a new Middle East

R. Clarke Cooper — Tue, 18 Nov 2025 10:30:00 +0000

Ever since the historic signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords, the prospect of a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel has entailed high hopes and great expectations. With last month’s cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas as part of the US-led peace plan for Gaza, there is a renewed possibility of a Saudi-Israeli normalization—and with it, the potential of a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians.

Soon after phase one of the cease-fire deal was announced, the Saudi Foreign Ministry issued a supportive statement, saying that US President Donald Trump’s comprehensive plan “seeks to pave the way for a comprehensive and just peace.” A regionally supported reconciliation and reconstruction of Gaza could enable a Red Sea rapprochement and mark the opening of a new chapter: one that recognizes the mutual benefits of cooperation while honestly confronting the grievances that have fueled conflict. It could realize the long-sought normalization with Israel—not as an eventual endpoint, but as a platform for shared prosperity and security in which Gaza’s reconstruction becomes the measure of regional seriousness. If mismanaged, there is the danger of a diplomatic mirage—all optics and little substance—that leaves residents of Gaza more disillusioned and regional tensions exposing heightened levels of risk to shared US and Saudi interests.

Now, with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s—or MBS’s—first official visit to Washington since 2018, Trump and other US officials remain eager to add Saudi Arabia to the Abraham Accords rota and to strike a defense pact. Regardless of whether a normalization deal proves achievable during this visit, officials in Washington and Riyadh still have the opportunity to enhance defense cooperation to address shared security interests.

MENASource

Nov 18, 2025

The Trump-MBS meeting should center on Iran nuclear strategy

By Danny Citrinowicz

The Saudi crown prince has significant incentive to raise the need to renew Iran nuclear negotiations in his meeting with the US president.

Iran Middle East

MENASource

Nov 18, 2025

The Trump-MBS meeting comes at a pivotal moment for Vision 2030

By Frank Talbot

Saudi Arabia is looking to attract more international investors, keep supply chains running, and maintain a consistent stream of visitors.

Economy & Business Middle East

In a Washington-Riyadh bilateral defense pact, Saudi armed forces would benefit from continuous technical advice and support from the US military, and the United States would enjoy greater access to Saudi territory and airspace. Further, as a foundation to increase security cooperation, the defense elements of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 plan aim for the kingdom to spend 50 percent of its military budget domestically, and there is a mandate that foreign defense firms establish partnerships with local Saudi firms or open local offices inside the kingdom. Since 2018, US firms have increasingly taken note and sought to support localization and co-production.

From the US perspective, the door for Israeli-Saudi normalization has been wide open since the 2020 Abraham Accords, penned under Trump’s first administration— and followed up into the Biden administration and Trump’s second term. Before the horrific October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel that launched the war in Gaza, Saudi Arabia had been working toward a significant deal with the United States to normalize ties with Israel, in return for a US defense cooperation agreement and cooperation on the development of a civil nuclear program.

Even before the war in Gaza, it was generally recognized that in order to formalize bilateral relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem, Washington could not ignore the Saudis’ steady advocacy for a two-state solution, with the Palestinians achieving a formally recognized statehood.

During the US-Saudi Strategic Dialogue in the autumn of 2020, then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urged his counterpart, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al Saud, toward recognition of Israel, stating, “we hope Saudi Arabia will consider normalizing its relationships as well, and we want to thank them for the assistance they’ve had in the success of the Abraham Accords so far.”

Since the war in Gaza began, MBS and other senior Saudi officials, have re-emphasized the commitment to the two state solution. That includes Saudi Ambassador to the United States Princess Reema bint Bandar, who observed that the “two-state solution is the only framework that can end the bloodshed, rebuild Gaza, and create a sustainable future.” She also emphasized that any Saudi normalization with Israel would only occur with credible, irreversible efforts towards Palestinian statehood.

On the margins of the 2024 UN General Assembly, the kingdom formed a global alliance to push for a two-state solution, and this summer, the Saudi foreign minister affirmed the kingdom’s efforts “to advance the implementation of relevant UN resolutions calling for the establishment of two states.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has historically rejected the idea of a Palestinian state. After last month’s cease-fire deal, he noted that “Palestinians should have all the powers in a peaceful day to govern themselves, but they can’t have the powers to threaten our survival. That sovereign power of security must remain with Israel.”

Security concerns dominate Israeli thinking, and justifiably so. Any rapprochement that does not take seriously Israel’s legitimate security requirements will have little staying power. That reality need not be incompatible with robust reconstruction. In fact, a Gaza reconstruction program that improves living conditions and creates credible, locally accountable governance reduces the long-term security threats that feed cycles of violence.

Israel, its Arab partners, and wider international actors should therefore craft arrangements that couple reconstruction with security cooperation, aimed at preventing arms smuggling, extremist exploitation, and the reconstitution of militant capabilities—while ensuring that such measures do not subvert civilian oversight or the delivery of aid into Gaza.

If Palestinian statehood is achieved in the future, it will be incumbent upon neighboring states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to ensure the Palestinian state exists according to both law and practice. Any sort of two-state solution cannot allow for the development of a proto-state permissive to radicalization and terrorist facilitation to exist next to thriving neighboring countries. Understandably, Israel’s neighbors that are committed to border integrity and a shared interest in regional security, such as Egypt and Jordan, will expect other Arab states to recognize the requirement to de-radicalize Gaza and keep Hamas out. This is where the United States, via its Central Command, will have an essential regional security cooperation role as a trusted agent for information sharing and coordination.

This autumn, officials in Riyadh publicly signaled—and internally communicated—that Saudi Arabia will back multilateral efforts to disarm and marginalize Hamas and strengthen the role of the Palestinian Authority as part of a political settlement in Gaza. According to an internal Foreign Ministry report, the kingdom plans to “support the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission in Gaza,” and that it “aims to present the kingdom’s vision for enhancing stability in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian territories.”

There are practical reasons why Saudi engagement matters. Riyadh offers economic heft with the $600 billion investment deal, diplomatic legitimacy in the Arab world with the Saudi-French push for the two-state solution, and a strategic relationship with the United States that can help underwrite security guarantees and reconstruction financing. Saudi buy-in could broaden the donor base, encourage private investment, and make sanctions relief or targeted incentives politically palatable in capitals that might otherwise be reticent.

The art of modern diplomacy is sometimes critiqued for the trading of ideals for expedience. The real test of statesmanship in this transitional moment is whether pragmatism can be married to principle: whether diplomatic openings for rapprochement can be structured so that political normalization pays dividends for Palestinians through concrete stability, reconstruction, and governance.

A rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel that addresses Riyadh’s key defense requests and places Gaza’s reconstruction at its moral and practical center could turn a new alignment into something more than a strategic realignment—it could become a test of whether the Middle East can convert rapprochement and security cooperation into stabilization, reconstruction, and a rebuilt Gaza into viable regional reconciliation.

R. Clarke Cooper is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.

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Pınar Dost interview with Radiotelevisione Svizzera about Turkey’s role in Gaza

aozen — Tue, 11 Nov 2025 14:15:06 +0000

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Twenty-five years on, advancing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda is more urgent than ever

Melanne Verveer and Ana Lejava — Fri, 31 Oct 2025 13:04:26 +0000

Twenty-five years ago today, the United Nations (UN) Security Council, under the chairmanship of Namibia, unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security—a landmark recognition of women’s vital role in peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and post-conflict recovery. Spearheaded by Namibia’s then minister of women’s affairs, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, and advanced through the persistent advocacy of women’s rights and civil society groups, the resolution transformed decades of activism into binding international policy. Supported by leaders such as Anwarul Chowdhury, the then ambassador of Bangladesh to the UN, Resolution 1325 marked the first time the Security Council affirmed that women’s equal participation is essential to sustainable peace. Yet, a quarter century later, the stakes could not be higher. According to the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security Index, cited in the UN secretary-general’s latest report on women, peace, and security (WPS), a staggering 676 million women and girls now live within fifty kilometers of active conflict zones—the highest number recorded in recent history.

Resolution 1325 was designed to increase women’s participation across UN peace and security efforts, urge parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, and establish operational mandates with direct implications for member states and UN entities. Since its adoption, nine follow-on resolutions have built on 1325, providing substantive guidance to member states on implementing the agenda and addressing challenges to peace and security. However, implementation by member states remains weak, leaving civil society and women’s movements as the primary drivers of progress on the ground.

Smaller nations now carry the mantle of moral leadership, just as Namibia did in 2000 when it led the UN Security Council to adopt the resolution.

Women are not waiting for peace to be delivered from above; they are building it from the ground up, often in the most dangerous and fragile contexts. In Afghanistan, for example, where basic human rights have been stripped from women and girls, organizations such as DROPS are sustaining underground networks and using innovative digital tools to hear and respond to women’s needs despite constant surveillance. Even in exile, Afghan women leaders’ advocacy to codify gender apartheid as a crime under international law could open new pathways for accountability against the Taliban and deter governments from normalizing relations with the regime. Even in times of unprecedented repression, women continue to define the parameters of justice and equality.

In Myanmar, where a brutal military junta continues to massacre civilians and suppress dissent, women now represent nearly 60 percent of pro-democracy and human rights defenders. They have built decentralized resistance networks that embody the WPS agenda in real time—organizing humanitarian corridors, documenting abuses, shaping local governance in liberated areas, and convening regularly across ethnic and religious lines to coordinate strategies for protection, response, and political reform. Their work illustrates that inclusion and security are not post-conflict luxuries—they are the foundation for democratic resilience.

In Ukraine, where the war grinds on, the WPS agenda has taken on a forward-looking form, focused not only on survival but on recovery and justice. Through the leadership of the government commissioner for gender equality and survivor networks such as SEMA Ukraine, the country has become the first in history to establish urgent interim reparations for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence during an ongoing war. Ukraine’s advocacy is having an effect: In August, the UN secretary-general warned Russia that it risked being listed as a state using sexual violence as a tactic of war, a designation that could lead to barring Russia from participating in UN peacekeeping missions. Ukrainian women leaders have also spearheaded the Alliance for a Gender-Responsive and Inclusive Recovery for Ukraine—a $48 million initiative uniting governments, civil society, and the private sector to embed gender equality in reconstruction.

The same spirit of persistence defines Colombia’s experience. The 2016 peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, remains a global model for gender inclusion. This is thanks to the tireless advocacy of women’s civil society groups and the work of a dedicated Gender Sub-Commission, which ensured that commitments to equality and protection against sexual violence were embedded throughout. But as international funding declines and the implementation process falters, women leaders warn of backsliding. In Quibdó, Afro-Colombian mothers have emerged as the quiet architects of peace—organizing neighborhood dialogues to protect children from recruitment, running “ARTivism” programs that use creativity to resist violence, and demanding justice for those killed in ongoing clashes. Their daily acts of courage remind us that peace is not just negotiated in conference rooms; it is built each day in kitchens, classrooms, and community centers.

In Yemen, where water scarcity has fueled years of conflict and community division, women have stepped in to mediate what politics could not. Women leaders at Food4Humanity and the Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership helped broker a local water-sharing agreement between warring tribes—an act that prevented further fighting and restored access to safe water for thousands of families. Their work demonstrates how women’s leadership in conflict prevention extends beyond formal negotiations to the everyday essentials of human security—water, food, and dignity.

These examples matter deeply because they reveal shared patterns of abuse and resistance across continents. First, sexual violence is increasingly used as a deliberate tactic of war—a means to terrorize, displace, and destroy the social fabric of communities by attacking culture and identity itself. Second, there is a growing disregard for the rules of war, with the systematic targeting of civilians and destruction of critical infrastructure—from hospitals in Gaza to kindergartens in Ukraine—undermining the very notion of humanitarian restraint. Third, the lack of international accountability mechanisms continues to embolden perpetrators; too often, justice remains out of reach. Most concerning is the interconnected web of enablers, including UN member states that provide weapons, funding, and political cover that link actors across regions.

In recent months, the WPS agenda has faced a major backlash. The US Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017, the first national legislation mandating the integration of WPS into foreign policy anywhere in the world, has been sidelined within the State Department and the Department of Defense, with annual reporting to Congress faltering. Simultaneously, cuts at the US Agency for International Development and in global funding have undermined women’s organizations’ capacity to sustain essential work. According to a global peace-builder survey by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security published this month, 40 percent of respondents reported decreased funding over the past two years, while 43 percent identified long-term funding as critical to achieving their peace and security goals.

In the absence of a strong and united UN Security Council, where veto powers often block meaningful action, it is vital to defend Resolution 1325 and deliver on its promise. Smaller nations now carry the mantle of moral leadership, just as Namibia did in 2000 when it led the UN Security Council to adopt the resolution. Countries such as Denmark, Panama, Greece, Slovenia, and other nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council have shown openness to leading on the agenda, offering hope that breakthroughs remain possible. As the world marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of Resolution 1325, these examples remind us that while power may shift and institutions may falter, women’s leadership continues to light the path toward peace, accountability, and shared security.

Melanne Verveer is the executive director of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security, a former US ambassador-at-large for global women’s issues, and a member of the Atlantic Council board of directors.

Ana Lejava is a senior policy officer with the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security.

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The Hague vs. KLA leaders: Justice or tragedy? | A Debrief with James Rubin

sjones — Wed, 29 Oct 2025 18:00:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Twenty-five years after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the men once hailed as heroes now stand accused of war crimes at The Hague.

Former US Assistant Secretary of State James Rubin joins Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, on #BalkansDebrief to reflect on his testimony before the Special Chambers, where former President Hashim Thaçi and other Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leaders face charges of crimes against humanity.

This conversation revisits a story that shaped a nation and continues to test the conscience of international justice.

Rubin reflects on:

His personal friendship with Hashim Thaçi and hopes for the court’s verdict;
What a conviction could mean for Kosovo’s democracy and its ties with the EU; and
The enduring responsibility of the international community to uphold justice while preserving peace.

“A conviction of Hashim Thaçi would leave a terrible scar on the international legal system and a tragedy for those who fought and died for freedom.” – James Rubin.

ABOUT #BALKANSDEBRIEF

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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Rich Outzen interview with The New Arab on proposed Gaza stabilization force

aozen — Mon, 27 Oct 2025 13:09:27 +0000

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Budapest summit postponed as Putin rejects Trump’s ceasefire proposal

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 21 Oct 2025 21:27:35 +0000

Just days after US President Donald Trump announced plans for a new peace summit with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, their proposed Budapest meeting has been thrown into doubt. Trump first shared news of the summit late last week following a lengthy and “very productive” telephone call with Putin. Speaking on Tuesday, however, White House officials said there were now “no plans” for the two leaders to meet in the “immediate future.”

This sudden change in tone came after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reportedly failed to make any meaningful progress during a preliminary call ahead of planned talks in Budapest. Lavrov later confirmed that Putin had dismissed Trump’s ceasefire proposal and remained fully committed to achieving the maximalist goals of his invasion. “A ceasefire now would mean only one thing: A large part of Ukraine would remain under Nazi rule,” Russia’s top diplomat stated.

Lavrov’s latest comments serve as a timely reminder that Moscow’s objectives in Ukraine go far beyond limited territorial concessions and extend to regime change in Kyiv. His insistence on branding the Ukrainian government as “Nazis” is nothing new, of course, but it does underline Russia’s rejection of peaceful coexistence with an independent Ukraine, while also highlighting the scale of the current disconnect between Moscow and Washington. While Trump attempts to broker a geopolitical real estate deal, Putin is seeking to secure his place in history by extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and reviving the Russian Empire.

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It is not surprising that some within the Trump administration still struggle to grasp the true motives behind Russia’s attack on Ukraine. After all, the current invasion has been accompanied by an unprecedented deluge of disinformation designed to distract international attention from Putin’s imperial ambitions. Since 2022, the Kremlin has sought to pin the blame for the invasion on everything from NATO enlargement to phantom fascists. Moscow’s many excuses have undeniably succeeded in clouding perceptions of the war, but none of the justifications presented by the Kremlin can stand up to serious scrutiny.

Putin has repeatedly framed the war as a response to decades of NATO expansion that has brought the alliance ever closer to Russia’s borders. His own actions, however, have largely debunked this argument. When neighboring Finland responded to the invasion of Ukraine in spring 2022 by announcing plans to join NATO, Putin did nothing and said he had “no problem” with Helsinki’s decision. He has since gone even further and withdrawn most Russian troops from the frontier with Finland. Given the fact that Finnish accession virtually doubled Russia’s shared border with NATO, this nonchalance is revealing. Clearly, Putin knows very well that NATO poses no threat to Russia itself. His real problem is with Ukrainian independence not NATO expansion.

The Kremlin’s claims to be waging a crusade against Ukrainian Nazis are even more far-fetched. Russian attempts to equate Ukrainian national identity with Nazism date all the way back to World War II and have been enthusiastically revived by the Putin regime. This approach shamelessly exploits the Russian public’s reverence for the Soviet role in the defeat of Hitler, while conveniently ignoring the political realities in today’s Ukraine.

Ever since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Far Right political parties have been relegated to the margins of the country’s fledgling democracy. During Ukraine’s last prewar parliamentary election in 2019, most nationalist parties formed a single coalition in a bid to overcome years of ballot box disappointment. They failed miserably, receiving just 2.16 percent of the vote.

Nothing has exposed the absurdity of Kremlin attempts to portray Ukrainians as Nazis more than the election of Jewish candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy as the country’s president. Ever since Zelenskyy won the presidency by a landslide in 2019, Putin and other Kremlin officials have engaged in deeply unsavory mental gymnastics as they have struggled to explain how a supposedly Nazi nation could overwhelmingly vote for a Jewish leader. The most notorious example of this disgraceful trend came in spring 2022, when Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov declared during an Italian television interview that “Hitler also had Jewish blood.”

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Putin has typically been far franker about his war aims when speaking to domestic Russian audiences. For years, he has argued that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”) who are occupying historically Russian lands and have no right to a separate nation of their own. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he began referring to Ukraine as an artificial “anti-Russia,” and took the highly unusual step of publishing a rambling 5000-word history essay that read like a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. Following the outbreak of hostilities, he began proclaiming the “return” of Russian lands and comparing his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great.

The criminal actions of the Russian army in Ukraine have been profoundly shaped by Putin’s bitter opposition to Ukrainian national identity. In areas under Kremlin control, anyone viewed as a Ukrainian patriot or deemed a potential threat to the occupation authorities is likely to disappear into a vast network of camps and prisons. A United Nations probe has ruled that these mass detentions represent a crime against humanity.

Huge numbers have also been deported. This includes tens of thousands of children, who are subjected to ideological indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian identity. Those who remain in occupied Ukraine are being forced to accept Russian citizenship amid a brutal campaign to systematically erase all traces of Ukrainian history, culture, language, and identity. This genocidal conduct makes a complete mockery of attempts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a mere border dispute that can be settled via limited land swaps.

Putin’s Ukraine obsession is rooted in his experience as an eye witness to the collapse of the Soviet Empire while serving as a KGB officer in East Germany, and reflects his fears that the further consolidation of a democratic and European Ukraine could act as a catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat. Beginning with the 2004 Orange Revolution, his determination to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit has come to dominate Russian foreign policy and has slowly but steadily compromised Moscow’s relationship with the wider Western world. Putin has now bet everything on the reconquest of Ukraine and knows that his entire reign will be judged by the outcome of the current war.

If Trump wishes to end the bloodshed in Ukraine and secure his precious Nobel Peace Prize, he must first recognize that Putin is playing for the highest possible stakes on the stage of history and will never compromise unless forced to do so. Indeed, he dare not back down. At this point, anything less than the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation would be regarded in Moscow as a major defeat that would plunge the Kremlin into crisis.

Putin will doubtless continue to profess his desire for peace while engaging in stalling tactics and playing for time. He will string Trump along with yet more seductive phone calls and headline-grabbing summits that flatter the US leader’s ego, but he will almost certainly not enter into genuine peace negotiations until the alternative is defeat in Ukraine and disaster for Russia itself. The sooner Trump accepts this reality, the sooner we can move beyond the current phony peace process and begin the hard work of securing a sustainable settlement through the long overdue application of Western strength.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Specifically, Trump’s engineering of a deal between Israel and Hamas was a tour de force achieved through military and diplomatic pressure. The US president utilized both brilliantly.

The military pressure came mainly from Israel but also from the United States. Israel’s full-bore assault on Gaza after the horrors of Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack immediately put Hamas on the defensive. But as often happens when Israel responds to a Palestinian attack with major force, this led to major international pressure on Israel to ease up. The Trump administration largely—but not entirely—worked to shield Israel from that pressure, which meant that Israel kept the heat on Hamas.

Israel further strengthened its position with its ingenious operations against the leadership and soldiers of Hezbollah, dealing a near-fatal blow to Iran’s principal instrument of influence in Lebanon. US and Israeli strikes against the Houthis also weakened Iran’s surrogate in Yemen. Finally, the Israeli and US strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities in June significantly set back its nuclear program. As a result of these operations, Israel and the United States greatly weakened Iran, Hamas’s major sponsor and principal source of arms.

But that was not Hamas’s only problem. Trump’s diplomacy applied additional pressure on the group. He leveraged the close relationships he has cultivated with Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt to push Hamas to accept his terms for peace, something they were more willing to do because Trump’s twenty-point peace proposal left open the prospect of an independent Palestinian state. Trump also applied diplomatic pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept the terms, despite the plan’s deep unpopularity with the far-right members of his coalition.

What’s needed in Europe

The Trump administration has devoted at least as much effort to achieving a durable peace in Ukraine as it has to ending the conflict in Gaza, but the results thus far have been inconclusive. The principal difference between the administration’s approach to the two wars is this: In the Middle East, the White House energetically followed its overarching principle of peace through strength. In Europe, the administration has applied this principle inconsistently.

By the end of April, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s deflection of numerous Trump cease-fire proposals—proposals that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accepted—made clear that the Kremlin was the obstacle to peace. From that point forward, the Trump administration began to talk about sending advanced weapons to Ukraine, which European countries would pay for, and about putting major tariffs and restrictive economic measures on Russia and its trading partners.

On three occasions, the White House appeared to be on the verge of ramping up pressure on Moscow. In May, Trump threatened to join European leaders in placing additional sanctions on Russia if it did not implement an immediate cease-fire. Later in the summer, Trump set a deadline for restrictive measures and advanced weapons supplies if Russia did not stop shooting by August 8. And this month, Trump spoke publicly about the possibility of providing Ukraine with Tomahawk cruise missiles—which have the ability to travel 1,500 miles and accurately deliver a heavy payload—to make clear to Putin that the Russian leader’s goal of conquering Ukraine is futile.

On the first two occasions, Trump let the moment pass without providing Ukraine major new weapons systems or putting in place heavy restrictive measures against the Russian economy (with the exception of pressing India to reduce Russian oil purchases). In his October 17 meeting with Zelenskyy, Trump made it clear that he was not ready to offer Ukraine Tomahawks, and he was counting on an upcoming meeting with Putin in Hungary to establish a cease-fire.

Notably, each of Trump’s decisions not to increase pressure on Russia followed a suggestion by Putin to restart negotiations on a peace agreement. Equally notable is what followed. In May, once the United States decided not to add new sanctions against Russia, Putin lost interest in meeting with Zelenskyy to talk peace. In August, when meeting with Trump in Alaska, Putin offered no flexibility—and no progress was made toward an actual end to the fighting.

This is no surprise because Putin does not want to end the war. He wants effective political control of Ukraine, which requires his military to take far more Ukrainian land.

So, what can the White House do? The United States, working with its partners in Europe and elsewhere, has the power to put substantial pressure on Russia’s faltering economy. The United States also has the weapons that would make it far more difficult for Russia to conquer more Ukrainian land or to prolong the war. Some advisers to Trump follow the lead of their Biden administration predecessors and say that since Russia is a nuclear-weapons power, the United States should not dare give Ukraine advanced weapons. They seem to believe that even Tomahawks, which are based on technology from the last century, would “escalate” the conflict. The fact is that Russia has escalated the conflict on numerous occasions, including when it chose to use ballistic missiles, which are far more dangerous than Tomahawks. This form of self-deterrence by the United States is not peace through strength. It only persuades Putin that he can have his way.

Trump seems to understand this. He told the press this past Friday that perhaps Putin is “playing him” for time, but that others had played him before and he still came out on top. He also mentioned at the Sharm el Sheikh summit—held to formalize the Hamas-Israel agreement—that there would have been no agreement had he not bombed Iran. This suggests that he may be biding his time before applying the screws to the Kremlin. It is not clear, however, why he sees a need to wait.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine. He also served as a US consul general in Jerusalem and in other roles at the US Embassy in Tel Aviv.

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Pınar Dost op-ed for Turkiye Today on Russia-Ukraine and Gaza conflicts

aozen — Mon, 20 Oct 2025 13:17:18 +0000

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Gray on Fox News ‘America Reports’ on the Gaza ceasefire deal

dfitzsimmons — Mon, 20 Oct 2025 13:00:00 +0000

On October 20, Alexander B. Gray, nonresident senior fellow of the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center, appeared on Fox News to discuss the terms and implications of the Gaza ceasefire deal.

Ultimately, President Trump is going to have to continue to exert pressure through Israel and other means to keep Hamas and all of them to their word.

Alexander B. Gray

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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Twenty questions (and expert answers) about the next phase of an Israel-Hamas deal

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 15 Oct 2025 14:58:39 +0000

On Monday, in the first part of a cease-fire deal brokered by the White House, Hamas released all twenty living hostages that it still held following its October 7, 2023, terrorist attack, while Israel released nearly two thousand Palestinian prisoners, paused strikes, and began to pull back Israeli forces within Gaza. “A big burden has been lifted, but the job IS NOT DONE,” US President Donald Trump posted on social media on Tuesday. “Phase Two begins right NOW!!!”

So what should this next phase include? Who or what might play the spoiler in further peace-building efforts? And what moves should we expect from the different sides and stakeholders? To better understand what could come next, Atlantic Council experts answer twenty pressing questions below.

1. Will Hamas return deceased hostages to Israel?

The question of Hamas’s ability to return deceased hostages still in Gaza not only concerns the human aspect of returning their bodies and bringing closure to their families, but also the future of phase two of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas.

If Hamas fails to return all the bodies and Israelis do not sense that Hamas is doing everything in its power to return them, an already fragile level of trust between the parties will be further damaged. It will complicate the capacity to implement the following stages of the deal. In fact, we are already seeing this dynamic play out in the deal’s opening days.

It is certainly possible that Hamas has lost contact with the areas where it buried the bodies, due to the aggressive Israeli military campaign waged in the Gaza Strip. Yet the central question is not whether all the bodies will be returned—and I certainly hope that all affected families will have a grave to visit—but rather Hamas’s willingness to help. Will Hamas go to great lengths to find all of them as a means of trust-building with Israel and the mediators, in a way that will show a deep willingness to lead to an end to the war and comply with the terms of the deal? We don’t yet know the answer.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He is also a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. He previously served for twenty-five years in Israel Defense Intelligence.

2. Will Israeli forces exit Gaza?

When it comes to the question of whether the Trump-brokered cease-fire deal will progress out of “phase one” into a full Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from Gaza, caution is in order.

First, although the Trump plan calls for a timed phasing of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, elements in the plan are clear “yes or no” conditions. These include critical matters such as the verification of Hamas’s disarmament, the establishment of international security forces, and an alternative governance structure for Gaza. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on October 10 that “in the second phase of the deal, Hamas will be disarmed, and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized. It will happen either diplomatically, according to the Trump plan, or militarily, by us.”

Second, Israel’s security requirements will override any political concerns regarding US dissatisfaction with its adherence to any withdrawal timeline. Elements number thirteen and sixteen of the comprehensive plan indicate that Israel has the latitude to maintain IDF presence in Gaza to ensure that Hamas’s military capability is eliminated and that the group cannot be reconstituted. In addition to disarmament requirements, Israeli security officials have repeatedly insisted on the importance of maintaining geographic control over strategic areas inside Gaza. For example, Israeli officials previously insisted that Israel will not withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor despite terms indicating that Israeli will eventually need depart the security buffer zone. This almost nine-mile buffer zone along the Gaza-Egypt border remains under Israeli control, and it is likely to continue to represent an obstacle to Israel withdrawing from the strip. Third, Gaza’s political vacuum must be filled with a competent governing authority. The Palestinian Authority is not trusted by Israel to manage this task, nor does it have the capacity to govern, secure, and oversee the rebuilding of Gaza.

Finally, even if the above conditions are all met, Netanyahu’s political coalition remains a formidable constraint. Netanyahu leads a government dependent on far-right parties that vehemently oppose any withdrawal. Senior Israeli officials, through the Israeli press, have emphasized that the cease-fire creates only “a ‘reduction in fire,’ not a full cease-fire,” and that the IDF will remain “deep inside Gaza.” An Israeli official described the deal’s novelty as allowing Israel to “get all the hostages, stay in Gaza, and keep negotiating.” This framing suggests that Israel already sees the cease-fire as a net benefit for the country, with both the release of hostages and the preservation of an ongoing presence as key achievements. Consequently, the most realistic projection for phase two is partial, tactical Israeli redeployments within Gaza. These movements will include reducing troop presence in some areas while maintaining control over strategic corridors, buffer zones, and border areas, instead of the complete exit that phase two formally stipulates. After what Israel experienced on October 7, it is unwilling to do anything less. The full withdrawal of Israel Defense Forces from Gaza will depend on the US administration’s ability to oversee the implementation of Trump’s plan.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

3. What are Gaza’s humanitarian needs—and will they be met?

Much of Gaza is destroyed, Israel is still occupying half of the strip, and the vast majority of the population is displaced. Gazans, therefore, need everything from food and nutrient packages to bring famine under control to resources such as baby incubators for hospitals and parts to repair water and sewage lines. Additionally, winter is approaching, and the population needs tents and other winterization items.

While a cease-fire deal earlier this year permitted food entry in sufficient quantities, it did not permit shelter items. Medical evacuations also need to be permitted to surge, and countries need to step up and agree to accept cases. Road- and rubble-clearing machinery is needed to open more routes for aid trucks, and the trucks themselves need spare parts so that more vehicles can be put back on the roads. The humanitarian organizations on the ground in Gaza know how to get the job done, but that’s if and only if they are allowed to do so. And that is very much up to Israel and the Trump administration continuing to turn the pressure screws.

Israel controls how many trucks are permitted to enter Gaza and the routes that the humanitarian community can use to access pick-up points. These routes, especially the main one that goes through Rafah to the Kerem Shalom crossing, have historically been nicknamed “looter alley.” As humanitarians have long stated, and as a recent Sky News investigation revealed, looting along these routes has been carried out by gangs that Israel has armed. So another big question is whether Israel will force these gangs to stand down. Desperate Palestinian civilians also have looted convoys. Allowing sufficient aid into Gaza will eliminate both these dynamics, as civilians will no longer be as desperate, and the aid that the armed gangs sell on the market will no longer have financial value. In other words, the scarcity that creates looting will be eliminated.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need lifesaving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

4. Will Hamas renounce political power and disarm?

Hamas will try to maintain a significant political role in postwar Gaza, and it will resist proposals to totally disarm. The group’s acceptance of the cease-fire and return of hostages represents pragmatism, not moderation.

Hamas apparently agreed to the cease-fire and return of all remaining hostages under heavy pressure from regional states ready for the war to end. The group also recognized that the leverage it had gained from holding the hostages was declining significantly. Israel’s military operations were taking a heavy toll, and Israel had a green light from the United States to continue its assaults on Hamas positions in Gaza City if the group did not agree to exchange the hostages for Israel’s Palestinian prisoners. And Palestinian civilians in Gaza, after two years of being displaced from their homes and experiencing dire humanitarian conditions, were increasingly demanding an end to the war, risking Hamas being blamed by Gazans for refusing Trump’s plan for peace.

But even as it signed onto the cease-fire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange that mark the first phase of the US peace plan, Hamas has registered its opposition to key terms of phase two: that it disarm and end its role in the governance of Gaza. The group also objects to the plan’s call for an international security force to police Gaza, arguing that postwar security and governance should be handled by Palestinians. And the group quickly backed up its rhetoric with action, placing uniformed Hamas police on the streets as the cease-fire went into effect, and the Israeli military withdrew from parts of Gaza.

Hamas may try to deflect pressure for its full disarmament and removal from governance in Gaza by offering partial measures and securing the backing of key regional states. In negotiations earlier this year, Hamas leaders signaled some flexibility on these issues, saying they would consider giving up the group’s heavy weapons, such as rockets and missiles, and were willing to have some senior Hamas officials leave Gaza. Hamas also will likely try to enlist support from Egypt, which has advocated that the group have a voice in future Palestinian governance in Gaza, and Turkey, whose leaders call the group a legitimate resistance movement and oppose Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Egypt has announced plans to convene a Palestinian national dialogue on the future of Gaza in which Hamas will take part, allowing the group to exercise significant influence over the postwar debate.

—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He previously served for thirty-seven years at the Central Intelligence Agency, covering the Middle East and counterterrorism.

5. What’s next for the Abraham Accords?

US experts on the Middle East are trained by experience to be pessimists. After all, given the nature of the region, a reflexive fatalism generally allows one to appear prescient. But this tendency can also blind us from recognizing truly positive developments when they occur. The Gaza cease-fire agreement, which reflects Hamas’s defeat (but not destruction), is one such development. The US decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities was another, as was the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus, and so were the Israeli military and covert action successes against Hezbollah. And all these geostrategic earthquakes followed the most important positive change in the region in the last decade, the announcement and expansion of the Abraham Accords—a development that at the time I called a strategic victory for everyone except Iran.

So, what’s next for the Abraham Accords? The conventional wisdom today among US experts is typically pessimistic, that any further movement on the integration of Israel into its wider region has been set back immeasurably by the horrors that Israel has inflicted upon the Palestinian people in Gaza, including tens of thousands of innocents who were used as pawns and shields by Hamas. There is obviously a degree of truth to this conclusion. The images of real Palestinian suffering at Israeli hands that dominated social media across the Arab and Muslim worlds for the last two years will not be forgotten anytime soon. Indeed, the prevention of any further expansion of the Abraham Accords, especially to Saudi Arabia, was almost certainly a major driver of Hamas’s decision to murder and kidnap Israeli innocents, and thus intentionally trigger so much destruction upon the Palestinians.

Nevertheless, this conventional wisdom is wrong. Indeed, this is the time for newfound optimism. Depending on what diplomatic steps follow the recent agreement, it wouldn’t be surprising if the Abraham Accords are expanded again even before the end of Trump’s second term. This is certainly a priority for the White House, and the events of the last few weeks demonstrate how much that still matters within the region. Much of this hinges on whether the agreement’s first phase can be followed by others—building along the path laid by the intentionally vague twenty-step plan that is now on the table—and thus whether Trump, Arab leaders, and the Israeli and Palestinian peoples can relaunch a legitimate peace process that leads toward a two-state solution.

This is the real opportunity ahead of us, a once-in-several-generations opportunity that has been won from the blood and pain of Israelis and Palestinians, and the remarkable Israeli military victories over Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, all critically assisted by Washington across two administrations. The opportunity is to remake the region geopolitically, economically, and militarily into one in which the Iran-led so-called “Axis of Resistance” is defeated both ideologically and physically, and the Middle East is at peace, prosperous, and finally inclusive of Israel. It would be a historic tragedy if those who took so many risks in wartime fail now to have the courage to take the diplomatic risks necessary to secure a lasting peace.

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director for Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council. His last position in the US government was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combatting terrorism.

6. Will Israel agree to a Palestinian state?

Trump’s twenty-point plan contains political kryptonite for Netanyahu in one provision: the call for discussions on a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. This was surely an element Trump forced Netanyahu to swallow. Ahead of the 2026 Israeli elections, Netanyahu likely will argue that the conditions for Palestinian Authority reforms and reconstruction in Gaza have not been met. But he will also likely go further, asking Israeli voters who they trust to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state—him, with his long record of opposition to that outcome, or less experienced rivals. The argument may have salience with some voters he needs to win back, as many Israelis after October 7, 2023, are not open to the prospect of a Palestinian state, although it is unclear if converting those voters would be enough. That theme in Israeli political discourse could also depress the enthusiasm of Arab states to play their part in the day-after in Gaza—from reconstruction funding, to stabilization forces, to supporting Palestinian Authority reforms and Gaza governance.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.

7. What’s coming next in the West Bank?

October 7 and the war that followed shifted public attention away from a sharp rise in Israeli settler and IDF attacks on Palestinian people and property in recent years. With a cease-fire now allowing for the broader redeployment of Israeli forces, that trend is likely to continue.

Already in 2025, the United Nations has documented 180 Palestinian deaths linked to settler and military violence, and the IDF has bolstered its presence in the West Bank significantly in recent weeks in advance of the Jewish holidays. Levels of violence are likely to rise as the security situation there becomes even more unstable.

This instability will be fueled by renewed Palestinian and international attention on the long-expired and corrupt mandate of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Trump’s long-term peace plan envisions a role for the Palestinian Authority in both the governance and security of Gaza, but only after key reforms addressing these issues are undertaken. Netanyahu, however, opposes such an expanded role for the Palestinian Authority. As Abbas continues to benefit from his long-extended time in office, he and Netanyahu may find themselves unlikely allies in stymieing any move to greater Palestinian Authority legitimacy even as violence continues to spike.

—Jennifer Gavito is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. She previously served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Iraq and Iran.

8. What’s the future of the Trump-Netanyahu relationship?

During Trump’s speech before the Knesset on Monday, he had a surprising request for the Israeli president, regarding the corruption case hanging over Netanyahu: “Why don’t you give him a pardon?”

Netanyahu was already going to be relatively indebted to Trump, but the US president’s support is even more important now politically, even a pardon is unlikely anytime soon. While a permanent cessation of the war is likely to eventually thaw some of the hostility that Jerusalem is facing from much of the international community, Netanyahu’s reliance on US support has only grown since the beginning of Trump’s second term. Netanyahu’s popularity in Israel is diminished. And while the hostages coming home may give him a bump in support, a large swath of the population will never stop blaming him for October 7 and its aftermath—as Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and former senior adviser, experienced firsthand.

At the same time, Trump—who will relish the lavish praise Israelis across the ideological and political spectrum are giving him—will likely recognize that his leverage with Netanyahu is at an all-time high as the future of the US-Israel bilateral relationship is in flux. For example, the ten-year US-Israel memorandum of understanding will expire in 2028, and negotiations on a new one will have to begin long before then. They will do so at a time when Trump’s “Make America Great Again” wing of the Republican Party increasingly aligns with the left of the Democratic Party in its skepticism of support to Israel.

Given Trump and Netanyahu’s relationship today, Jerusalem may need to be more deferential to Washington’s preferences in the coming months. But history has repeatedly demonstrated that if the United States and Israel aren’t aligned on a policy, then the Israelis are unlikely to simply defer to Washington’s preferences. And if that happens, the mirage of today’s unbreakable relationship between Trump and Netanyahu could end up evaporating quicky, just as it did at the end of the president’s first term.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

9. How will the far-right in Israel react?

Elated over the release of the hostages from Gaza, Israelis nonetheless are torn over the parameters of the bargain that has won their freedom. Nowhere is that dilemma felt more intensely than among the ranks of Religious Zionism (RZ) and Jewish Power (JP), the two far-right partners to Netanyahu’s government, which were most ideologically invested in the prime minister’s promise of “total victory.”

In the days since the cease-fire took effect, the IDF has withdrawn from approximately half of the Gaza Strip, where armed Hamas operatives have redeployed prominently to the streets. Those developments alone—without consideration of additional Israeli concessions yet to come—already stand in direct contravention to red lines set by RZ and JP, whose leaders are telegraphing that their days in the Netanyahu coalition may be numbered.

But those threats belie a complex political reality confronting those two parties, which are both in danger of shrinking sizably when Israelis next go to the polls. RZ and JP apparently have resolved to keep their powder dry and remain in the coalition for the time being. Resigning against the backdrop of captives being reunited with their families would be a losing strategy. It could also prove to be in vain. With details and timelines of the agreement’s subsequent phases still amorphous, and the possibility that negotiations could thus run aground, RZ and JP have cause to wait and see whether their hopes of resuming the war until Hamas is totally eradicated might materialize after all.

Conversely, plenty of triggers could accelerate their departure and a collapse of the government. There are a few possible scenarios that could send RZ and JP running for the exits, including a formal declaration that the war has ended—something that the United States and other mediators are proclaiming openly, despite Israel not acknowledging this—and any degree of tolerance demonstrated for renewed attacks against Israel.

All that said, many of the cards remain in Netanyahu’s hands. The prospect of snap elections—far from certain, but possible if Netanyahu decides to try and capitalize on the deal—would make any ultimatum by RZ and JP moot. In that case, ironically, the far right could then find itself embedded within a caretaker government but stripped of its leverage.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administrations of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

10. Will an international security force for Gaza be created?

The current Trump plan is based on a plan by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, which calls for the Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA) to be supported by an International Security Force (ISF) of troops from Arab, Muslim, and other nations. GITA and ISF need to provide security and reconstruction under a common command structure, which it looks like former British Prime Minister Tony Blair will lead. If Hamas refuses to lay down its weapons, as seems likely, GITA and the ISF should take over the parts of Gaza where Hamas is not present. Hamas will try to force out the ISF, so the ISF will need to have the backbone to stand its ground and resist Hamas’s destructive efforts. Security and reconstruction are linked: where there is no security, there will be no reconstruction.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

11. Who will be involved in the postwar governance of Gaza?

The Gaza International Transitional Authority will be overseen by a “Board of Peace” that Trump will chair. Heads of state or other very senior international figures want to join the board. This board will set policy guidance for GITA, with Blair playing a leading role. Expect to see Egypt, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Indonesia, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries involved. But the key question is, who will contribute troops to the International Security Force?

—Thomas S. Warrick

12. Will the Palestinian Authority be involved in Gaza?

Yes, eventually. The current violence among the remnants of Hamas and other gangs in Gaza is a stark reminder that there must be a clear and strong Palestinian hand in charge in the strip. The continued violent jockeying for power only deepens the disaster for Gazans.

Hamas agreed to a Palestinian Authority (PA) role, and it will not stop fighting any Palestinian faction it sees as being backed by Israel. As imperfect as the PA is, it does have credibility as a governing body and is best placed to attract wide support among Gazans. Both credibility and support would only be strengthened if PA officials and the international community take seriously the efforts to reform the PA that the Trump peace plan demands. Good governance standards must be enforced among a reinvigorated PA.

Though Palestinian leadership elections haven’t been held in years, the PA would be the strongest partner to help organize them. Elections are critical to build trust and sustain credibility in the long-term process.

—Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley is a distinguished fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Malta and as special assistant for the Middle East and Africa to the secretary of state. Her Middle East assignments included election monitoring in the Gaza Strip.

13. What role will Arab states play in Gaza going forward?

Determining the role of Arab states in the subsequent stages of Trump’s peace plan is challenging, given the plan’s lack of a comprehensive framework beyond phase one. Arab nations, as well as Turkey, are anticipated to contribute to an international stabilization force focused on monitoring cease-fires, ensuring security, training a new Palestinian police force, and establishing local law and order. While these states have expressed support for such a force, most have not publicly committed troops yet, likely opting for financial and diplomatic assistance instead.

In addition to security efforts, Arab states are expected to play a crucial diplomatic role in overseeing Gaza’s new governance structure. Their economic contributions will also be vital. But substantial financial support is unlikely without guarantees regarding Israel’s future actions, its illegal settlements, and the establishment of Palestinian statehood. Addressing these issues is essential to resolving the root causes of the conflict. At this stage, it is important to remain cautious and maintain modest optimism. The effectiveness of Arab states in this process, their level of involvement and influence in shaping Gaza’s future, will largely depend on the outcomes of negotiations in the next phase, which will determine their level of involvement and influence in shaping Gaza’s future.

—Ali Bakir, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

14. What role will Turkey play in Gaza going forward?

Ankara has been a key supporter of Trump’s drive for a lasting cease-fire in Gaza, the return of Israeli hostages, an Israeli military withdrawal, and a path toward Hamas’s demilitarization and removal from power in the strip. Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın has been a central player in multilateral negotiations, and Turkish observers are set to join those from Egypt, Qatar, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates in a cease-fire monitoring organization, the Civil-Military Coordination Center. Deep mistrust and antagonism between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Netanyahu may limit the scope of Turkey’s role in what comes next, but for stabilization to succeed in Gaza, Turkish assets—including construction capabilities, working relationships with the Palestinians and Arab states, and experience in aid and relief operations—must play a role.

There have been previous instances of Erdoğan and Netanyahu setting aside their mutual antagonism to pursue a modus vivendi, and the current trade and diplomatic cutoff between Jerusalem and Ankara could unwind if both sides move pragmatically. This will require Trump to make good on his April 7 offer to help “work it out” between the two countries. The ruling parties in both countries see one another as threats and competitors in the region, but there is no path or profit for either in sustained confrontation. In Gaza, as in Syria, the elements are present for a constructive if wary coexistence that contributes to peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.

—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian.

15. How is Iran viewing these developments—and will it try to intervene?

The official response to the Gaza cease-fire and peace plan was given on social media by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s foreign policy advisor, Ali Akbar Velayati: “The beginning of the ceasefire in #Gaza may be behind the scenes the end of a ceasefire elsewhere. #Iraq_Yemen_Lebanon.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also mentioned the cease-fire as a positive step, while explaining that Iran could not accept Egypt’s invitation to the peace summit chaired by Trump in Sharm el-Sheikh. He said it was not possible for Iran to engage with the United States while it threatened to strike Iran again. Clearly, the US decision to refuse visas for the Iranian delegation to attend the United Nations General Assembly last month and the snapback of UN sanctions promoted by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany also factored into the decision.

More broadly, the regime and its supporters have presented the peace agreement as a victory for Hamas and the resistance network of Iran’s allies and proxies.

Among the Iranian population, there is a wide range of views, including calls from the reformist camp to engage with the United States and accept the Egyptian invitation. Some suggest that there is an opportunity to restart negotiations with Washington around the nuclear program and the lifting of sanctions. In fact, that also seems to be in Trump’s mind as he has started to look beyond the present cease-fire for a wider regional settlement.

Some Iranians are also critical of Hamas, questioning why Iran ever supported the terrorist group. Hamas has been described as ungrateful and blamed for bringing death and destruction to Iran, and the region, through the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks. It is noteworthy that Hamas did not thank Iran in its statement on the cease-fire, while mentioning Arab countries that helped mediate.

At this point, it seems likely the Iranian regime will focus on rebuilding its own facilities destroyed by Israeli attacks and its posture against Israel. This could include the rebuilding of Tehran’s air defense systems, cracking down on internal dissent, seeking out so-called Israeli spies, and gradually looking for ways to reinforce allies in Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere. The wiser voices in Tehran may also call for relaunched negotiations with the United States and look to capitalize on Iran’s newfound integration into the wider Arab and Islamic community facilitated by Israel’s Gaza campaign, as well as its attacks on Qatar, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran.

—Nicholas Hopton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as British ambassador to Libya (2019–2021), Iran (2015–2018), Qatar (2013–2015), and Yemen (2012–2013).

16. How is Hezbollah in Lebanon reacting?

Hezbollah has yet to explicitly comment on Hamas’s decision to accept the Gaza cease-fire terms. However, Hezbollah’s general statements on the end of the Gaza war tend to validate the necessity of ongoing resistance narratives against Israel, which fits into its efforts to retain its weapons as the Lebanese government moves to disarm Hezbollah and bring all arms under the control of the state.

Hezbollah has generally abided by the November 2024 cease-fire that ended thirteen months of conflict in Lebanon, although Israel continues to stage near-daily air strikes mainly against Hezbollah personnel and facilities. There is much speculation in Lebanon that if the cease-fire holds in Gaza, it could allow Israel to pay more attention to its northern front in Lebanon, possibly expanding and escalating its attacks against Hezbollah. The end of the conflict in Gaza may also refocus international attention on the goal of disarming Hezbollah, which could place further pressure on the Lebanese government and raise tensions in the country in the weeks and months ahead.

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria.

17. How are the Houthis in Yemen reacting?

The current Israel–Hamas truce is not regarded by the Houthis as an optimal outcome, as they see it merely as a tactical maneuver by Israel. At a deeper level, the truce undermines their broader ambitions, eroding the regional relevance and political momentum they gained through Red Sea hostilities and attacks on Israel. Not to mention, the Houthis have become the strongest member of the Iran-linked “Axis of Resistance.”

Ideologically, the Houthis are unlikely to refrain from their war against Israel in the future. Their cause is deeply rooted in a doctrine encapsulated by their slogan: “Death to Israel.” It is also a political necessity. The Palestinian cause is the Houthis’ key entry into this fight as part of the Axis of Resistance. Consequently, they will seek to monitor and exploit any loophole in the current cease-fire or future events as justification to resume hostilities. So, what happens next is still an open case.

From Israel’s perspective, the Houthis continue to be a long-term threat that transcends the Gaza conflict. Israel, thus, intends to eliminate that threat. Expect their confrontation to persist, at least for the foreseeable future.

—Osamah Al Rawhani is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

18. How do Iraqi militias view the cease-fire and what is the impact on Iraq?

Iraq’s Iran-aligned militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah, have issued statements welcoming the cease-fire and condemning Israel. But the groups had already taken steps to divorce their own actions from the fighting in Gaza, largely halting strikes against the United States and Israel long before the end of the Gaza conflict and release of the hostages. October 7 and Israel’s war in Gaza prompted nearly two hundred strikes by Iraqi militias against US bases in Iraq and Syria, as well as repeated efforts by the militias to strike Israel.

For many of these militias, Israel’s war in Gaza was an opportunity to put pressure on the US military presence in Iraq, but launching kinetic strikes was also necessary to demonstrate their solidarity with the Axis of Resistance. However, none of these groups—unlike the Houthis in Yemen—have a strong ideological commitment to the Palestinian cause, and so the combination of US strikes, the threat of Israeli retaliation, pressure from the Iraqi government, and Iranian guidance effectively halted militia strikes in 2024.

While Iraq’s militias remain linked to and are supported by Tehran, many of the groups are increasingly becoming political and economic actors with their own domestic interests. Right now, that means a focus on Iraq’s November 11 parliamentary election rather than the next phase of the Israel-Hamas cease-fire agreement. For the Iraqi government, the cease-fire is a welcome development that eliminates one potential source of instability. The post-October 7 period has shown that Iraq’s stability is highly vulnerable to regional developments—whether from the war in Gaza or any escalation between Israel and Iran.

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

19. Does an end to hostilities affect cases at the International Criminal Court?

The end of attacks on Gaza does not change the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) jurisdiction over the situation in the State of Palestine, nor the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP’s) mandate to investigate—but it may impact the OTP’s investigation. If investigators can access Gaza, or if victims and witnesses are able to leave Gaza, then they may be able to access more evidence. However, the OTP has reportedly declined to apply for new arrest warrants for Israeli officials over fear of additional US sanctions. Such concerns may continue to delay progress.

That said, the OTP’s investigation is not just into Israeli officials. The OTP applied for arrest warrants for three Hamas leaders in May 2024. Israeli forces killed two before the Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants in November 2024 and killed one after. Increased access to evidence in Gaza and a more stable situation may allow the OTP to more swiftly build cases against surviving Hamas perpetrators.

Regardless, ending attacks on Gaza better allows states and international bodies to document the harms committed there, to hold both Israeli and Hamas leaders accountable, and to support Palestinians as they build transitional justice processes.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

20. How will Israel’s military campaigns over the past two years impact a potential new Memorandum of Understanding with the US?

With the current US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding set to expire in 2028, Israel’s military campaigns over the past two years will inform a new agreement, requiring an alignment between operational realities and strategic commitments. US policymakers will insist the assistance strengthens Israel’s legitimate sovereign security needs while reducing risks of unintended civilian harm. The US Congress will likely press the statutory mandate to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge, but it will also likely attach enhanced civilian protection protocols and cooperative training.

Operational lessons—counter–unmanned aerial systems, missile defense integration, subterranean countermeasures, precision strike coordination, and intelligence fusion—will drive joint investment priorities and industrial cooperation, creating opportunities to engender accelerated technology transfer and co-development. Similar to the transfers associated with the Abraham Accords in 2020, diplomatic sensitivity will require calibrating public messaging and managing allied concerns, ensuring that the capabilities provided do not exacerbate regional escalation. Success will rest on candid US‑Israeli dialogue bolstered by the ongoing senior bilateral Joint Political Military Group, and a forward‑looking commitment to interoperability and innovation, producing an agreement that supports an Israel at peace with its neighbors. The new Memorandum of Understanding should signal to regional partners and adversaries that deterrence is durable and cooperation remains central to shared security.

—R. Clarke Cooper is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.

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Tomahawk missiles are Russia’s latest red line. Will Trump call Putin’s bluff?

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 14 Oct 2025 21:44:05 +0000

As the United States moves closer to a decision on supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles, the Kremlin is cranking up the rhetoric in a bid to deter US President Donald Trump. Commenting on Sunday, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that the issue of Tomahawks was causing “extreme concern” in Moscow and said the war was now entering a “dramatic moment” with tensions escalating on all sides.

Others were even more outspoken. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev led the way with a thinly-veiled nuclear threat directed personally at Trump. “It’s been said a hundred times, in a manner understandable even to the star-spangled man, that it’s impossible to distinguish a nuclear Tomahawk missile from a conventional one in flight,” Medvedev noted. “The delivery of these missiles could end badly for everyone. And most of all, for Trump himself.”

Medvedev’s nuclear saber-rattling has been echoed by Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Long seen as Putin’s closest international ally and a junior partner in the Kremlin’s Ukraine invasion, Lukashenka warned this week that any decision to provide Kyiv with the US-made long-range missiles could have disastrous ramifications for international security. “Tomahawks will not solve the problem. They will escalate the situation to a nuclear war,” he told colleagues in Minsk.

It is easy to understand why Moscow so adamantly opposes the idea of sending Tomahawks to Ukraine. With a potential range of up to 2500 kilometers, these powerful missiles would make it possible for the Ukrainian army to radical expand their current campaign of long-range strikes against military and industrial targets deep inside Russia. Kyiv has already been able to significantly damage Putin’s war machine using domestically produced drones and missiles. There is now clearly a growing sense of alarm in Moscow that the additional firepower provided by American Tomahawks could tip the balance further in Ukraine’s favor.

The real question is whether Russia’s latest threats deserve to be taken seriously. After all, Kremlin officials have frequently used similarly apocalyptic language throughout the past three and a half years of full-scale war, but have consistently failed to back their words up with actions. Time and again, Moscow has declared a new red line while warning the West of potential Russian reprisals, only to then do nothing when these red lines are subsequently crossed.

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Russia’s attempts to impose red lines on Ukraine’s Western allies are a key part of the intimidation tactics employed by Putin since the start of the war. During his address announcing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin threatened the West with “such consequences that you have never faced in your history” if they dared to intervene. This rather obvious reference to nuclear war set the tone for the relentless nuclear blackmail that has followed. When it became apparent last year that Putin’s nuclear bluster was losing its potency, he ostentatiously revised Russia’s nuclear doctrine to lower the threshold for nuclear strikes and heighten the fear factor throughout the democratic world.

Russia’s nuclear threats have certainly not been subtle, but they have proved surprisingly effective against risk-averse Western leaders. From the eve of the invasion onward, every single debate over the delivery of new weapons to Ukraine has been dragged out and delayed by overblown fears of possible escalation and craven talk of the need to avoid provoking Putin.

The timidity of the West has only served to embolden the Kremlin dictator and prolong the war, enabling Russia to punch well above its geopolitical weight against far wealthier and better armed opponents. Indeed, while his armies have struggled to advance on the battlefields of Ukraine, Putin’s ability to intimidate the West has been arguably his single biggest success of the entire invasion.

This success is all the more remarkable given how many times Putin’s threats have been exposed as empty. Russia’s unilaterally declared red lines over the supply of everything from Javelin anti-tank weapons and Patriot air defense systems to F-16 fighter jets and Leopard tanks have all eventually been violated without consequence. Likewise, the Ukrainian army has repeatedly demonstrated its complete disregard for Putin’s red lines by liberating large swathes of the country from Russian occupation, chasing the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea, and invading Russia itself.

None of this has sparked World War III. On the contrary, Putin has responded to each fresh military setback by attempting to downplay the significance of his latest humiliation. Russian retreats have been rebranded in Orwellian fashion as “goodwill gestures,” while earlier protests over the planned delivery of new weapons systems have been replaced by expressions of defiant indifference.

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Based on the wartime experience of the past three and a half years, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that Russia’s red lines are credible. Instead, the only logical conclusion is that Putin has been bluffing all along. Trump must now decide whether he will call Putin’s bluff and arm Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.

There are mounting indications that he may be inclined to do so. Since the end of summer, the US leader’s rhetoric toward Russia and Ukraine has changed markedly, with Trump mocking the Russian army as a “paper tiger” and stating that Ukraine is now in a position to win the war. Meanwhile, reports have emerged in recent days that the US is already providing vital intelligence support for Ukraine’s long-range strikes against Russia’s oil and gas industries.

Trump’s apparent change of heart can be partially explained by his loss of patience with Putin, who has rejected the US leader’s generous peace terms and has proven himself to be completely untrustworthy during the past eight months of faltering negotiations. The new US stance is also due to Trump’s evolving understanding of the war in Ukraine. Knowledge of Russia’s failed summer offensive and the country’s escalating economic woes appear to have helped persuade Trump that the time has come to rethink his earlier assumptions regarding the inevitability of Russian victory.

There is some speculation, based in part on Trump’s own comments, that the current US strategy is to raise the prospect of arming Ukraine with Tomahawks without actually supplying them in order to bring Putin to the negotiating table. Even if the missiles are delivered, they are not wonder weapons and will not win the war for Ukraine overnight. Nevertheless, the current debate over Tomahawks represents a potentially important turning point in the biggest European war since World War II.

From the onset of the invasion, Putin has managed to limit support for Ukraine by skillfully exploiting the West’s collective fear of escalation. Trump now has an opportunity to convince his Russian counterpart that he is not as easily intimidated as other Western leaders and is more than ready to increase the pressure on Moscow until Putin agrees to pursue peace. Many of Trump’s detractors will no doubt scoff at the idea of the US president adopting such a uncompromising stance toward Putin, but few objective observers would question that this approach is the only way to end the war.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Amir Asmar — Fri, 10 Oct 2025 16:06:52 +0000

The 1994 peace treaty between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Israel is facing a reckoning—with longstanding public anger increasing into pressure on Amman to revoke the landmark agreement.

The moment is coming as—despite Amman’s defense of the treaty through many public statements—the government grapples with its concerns about Israel’s conduct during the Gaza war, and its plans for the future of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Now, with the announcement of a phase one cease-fire deal agreement for Gaza, significant questions remain about post-war governance and strategy in Gaza, and what that means for Israel’s neighbors.

Absent a strategic pivot from Jerusalem—which may be coming imminently if the parties can implement US President Donald Trump’s twenty-point proposal to end the war—there is a chance that Israel may be approaching a point at which it can do real damage to its pre-Gaza war relationships, particularly with Jordan.

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In this initial phase, Hamas will return living hostages, while Israel will begin to pull back its forces in the Gaza Strip.

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A spike in public anger

Protesters gather during a rally in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, in Amman, Jordan, October 10, 2025. REUTERS/Jehad Shalbak

A consistent majority of Jordanians oppose the treaty and any relations with Israel or business with Israeli companies.

Apart from over 400,000 Palestinians who reside in refugee camps within Jordan, a majority of people in Jordan are of Palestinian origin—tracing their lineage to Palestinians who escaped the 1948 to 1949 Nakba (catastrophe), or Israel’s independence war. Others were expelled by Israel during the same conflict. Yet more Palestinians fled to Jordan when Israel captured the West Bank in 1967. Daily violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is an obvious reminder of what many Palestinian-Jordanians endured in conflicts with Israel.

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A 2023 public opinion survey in Jordan indicated that a plurality of Jordanians perceive Israel to be “the entity that poses the greatest threat to the security of the Arab world.” And there have been significant anti-Israel demonstrations in Jordan in response to the ongoing Gaza conflict that demonstrate such sentiments.

Moreover, there has been a significant increase in pro-Hamas sentiment in the country—from 44 percent in 2020 to 85 percent in 2023, shortly after the Gaza war had started—which has triggered concern in Amman about possible security incidents.

In April of this year, Jordanians gathered after Friday prayers in Amman in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. Participants, including some covering their faces as Hamas leaders usually do, expressed strong opposition to Israeli military action. In May 2024, pro-Palestine demonstrators descended on downtown Amman multiple times to protest Israel’s conduct of the Gaza war. The May 24 demonstration was one of the largest in Jordan, according to research published by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, showcasing the depth and intensity of public rage. Previously, in March 2024, authorities had to break up a demonstration near the Israeli Embassy in Amman using batons.

There are no reliable estimates on the exact sizes of demonstrations—Jordanian authorities have no incentives to publish any numbers. On the other hand, demonstration organizers may tend to exaggerate the numbers to exert pressure on the government. My review of English and Arabic language media articles suggests that demonstration turnout could span anywhere from two thousand to ten thousand people.

Amman’s response through the war

The war’s displacement of most Gazans within the strip, its near-total destruction of the strip’s infrastructure, and Israeli leaders’ advocacy of transferring Palestinians to other countries have put Amman in a difficult situation. Jordan’s leaders are characterizing forced displacement of Palestinians as destabilizing and a war crime. Shortly after the start of the war, then Jordanian Prime Minister Bisher Khasawneh indicated Amman’s belief that displacement of Palestinians would “threaten Jordan’s national security.” Moreover, in September 2025, the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the displacement of Palestinians to other countries as a “flagrant violation” of international law and principles.

But Jordanian leaders’ public statements frame the treaty as not only a legal obligation, but also as an agreement and an overall relationship that provides Amman with certain benefits. Those benefits are substantial, including custody of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, sovereignty over previously disputed land, water sharing rights in the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers, a formal role in discussions on Palestinian refugees, and Israeli provision of natural gas. These would be at risk if the treaty were abandoned.

Jordanian soldiers celebrate by chanting and waving their national flag following a border ceremony at Ar Risha January 30. The ceremony marked Israel’s pullout from occupied territories under a peace treaty with Jordan. REUTERS.

Jordanian officials are concerned that Israeli government rhetoric and policies—settlement expansion, annexation plans, displacement of 90 percent of Gaza’s Palestinians, and persistent settler violence in the West Bank—might boost popular Jordanian opposition and threaten the treaty’s viability.

As early as November 2023, Khasawneh called the expulsion of Palestinians from the Occupied Palestinian Territories a “red line” that constitutes a fundamental violation of the treaty. He highlighted the treaty’s provision prohibiting forced population movements, arguing that such displacement would threaten Jordan’s national security. All of Jordan’s top leaders, including King Abdullah II and senior government ministers, have spoken publicly against forced displacement.

It is likely that the Jordanian government is concerned about the public reaction if Israel expelled Palestinians out of the Occupied Palestinian Territories into Jordan; such a step could endanger the monarchy or force Amman to take more direct anti-Israel steps, such as suspending the treaty. Separately, Jordan lacks the resources, particularly water, to host even more refugees, and the resultant stress Palestinian refugees would place on the country’s economy could be dangerous for Amman, aside from the obvious political considerations.

That said, the Jordanian government has restricted protests in support of Gaza, including the flying of the Palestinian flag, according to Amnesty International. Foiling a plot to commit armed attacks in the country, Jordanian security forces arrested sixteen suspects, some of whom confessed to being members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the transnational organization from which Hamas is descended. Officials did not publicly name specific buildings or locations the suspects planned to hit. They said the cell was preparing rockets and drones for attacks “inside the kingdom.”

Amnesty International has also documented Jordanian authorities arresting and jailing protestors simply for demonstrating against the Gaza war, and for peacefully opposing Amman’s policies vis-à-vis Israel. Since October 7, 2023—when Hamas rampaged through southern Israel, killing over 1,200 mostly civilian Israelis—Jordanian authorities have arrested at least 1,500 people, with about five hundred detained since the March 2024 protests outside the Israeli Embassy in Amman.

Relationships on the world stage

Citing the king’s longstanding support for a two-state resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Khasawneh backed-up Cairo’s recent rejection of displacing Palestinians from the Gaza Strip into Egypt, fearing a precedent for a similar expulsion from the West Bank into Jordan. There have been a few Israeli proposals discussed through the war that concerned the Jordanians: Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz’s “humanitarian city,” which opponents characterize as an internment camp, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “voluntary migration,” and the forced migration proposed by other Israeli officials.

It is noteworthy that Jordan is the only Arab state with a peace agreement with Israel that has recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv and expelled Israel’s ambassador since the Gaza war began. Moreover, Jordan indicated that it would not accept any Israeli attempt to return an ambassador to Amman.

Well-publicized Israeli admissions of potential impropriety, such as former chief of staff Herzi Halevi’s assertion that Israeli military units “took the gloves off” and ignored legal advice in conducting their Gaza operations, are likely to further stoke popular anger in Jordan and across the wider Arab world.

Although it is unlikely to yield any decisive action, Jordan participated in a recent Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation discussion in Doha that was called after Israel’s September strike on Qatar’s capital. The gathering explored the idea of applying diplomatic consequences on Israel, and Article 15 of the final communiqué calls on all Arab and Muslim states to sanction Israel and review “diplomatic and economic relations” with it—something that would have been unimaginable prior to the Gaza war.

Halevi’s estimate that casualties in Gaza—killed and wounded—amount to more than 10 percent of the strip’s population (over 200,000) tracks closely with the Palestinian Ministry of Health’s ongoing count of casualties, which Israel had previously dismissed as Hamas propaganda. This should further anger opponents of the Gaza war in Jordan.

Israeli activities elsewhere in the region also serve to amplify Jordanian anger. Israel justifiably retaliated when attacked by the Houthis from Yemen and Hezbollah from Lebanon. But the Israeli military continues to hold positions and conduct attacks in Lebanon even after a cease-fire was negotiated and implemented.

Jordanians, although divided about Hezbollah, opposed Israeli actions in Lebanon.

The Israelis also conducted attacks against Syrian military targets as soon as Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell last year. Over the summer, they also carried out attacks against forces and installations of Syria’s new government, on claims of defending of the Druze minority. The skirmishes prompted the Jordanian foreign ministry to issue condemnatory statements.

In the aftermath of Jerusalem’s failed attempt to assassinate Hamas senior political leaders in Doha last month, Amman’s Foreign Ministry joined in popular condemnation, affirming the kingdom’s “absolute” rejection of the attack, adding that the strike constituted a violation of the sovereignty of an Arab state and a “dangerous and unacceptable provocative escalation.”

What’s next

In short, expulsion of Palestinians from the Israeli-occupied territories has emerged for Amman as an inflection point, potentially altering Amman’s relationship with Israel. As questions still loom about post-war Gaza strategy, it is highly unlikely Jordan’s leaders would be able to contain domestic anger should Palestinians be forced onto Jordanian or Egyptian territory.

Much like the United Arab Emirates’ warning that Israel’s annexation of the West Bank would prompt a reversal of Jerusalem’s integration into the region, Amman likely would be forced to reverse at least some elements of its own relationship with Israel, if it perceived Jerusalem had violated the treaty clause related to forced displacement.

Given the extreme destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure, including religious, educational, and medical facilities, it is highly unlikely Jordanian leaders—or their public—would see any sizable number of “voluntary” departures as, in fact, voluntary. Aid groups have argued that Israel’s continued war has made the strip dangerous and uninhabitable. It would not be a leap to argue the war is intended to incentivize many Palestinians to leave and to convince Arab states to accept them. Even US leaders—including chief among them, Trump and his Secretary of State Marco Rubio—have questioned why anyone would want to remain in Gaza.

The decisions made in coming days will help determine the extent to which Israel’s conduct during the Gaza war and its other military operations in the region have pushed important alliances to the brink.

Amir Asmar is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He is also an adjunct instructor of Middle East strategic issues at the National Intelligence University.

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Putin rejected Trump’s generous deal. Time to try peace through strength.

Sergiy Solodkyy — Mon, 06 Oct 2025 20:39:26 +0000

Many Ukrainians agree with US President Donald Trump’s criticism of the Russia policies adopted by his predecessors. Like Trump, they believe that the excessive caution displayed by both Barack Obama and Joe Biden only served to embolden Vladimir Putin. This shared sentiment led to a surprising degree of optimism in Ukraine when Trump returned to the White House, despite his perceived ambivalence toward the country.

Much has happened since then to dampen any initial Ukrainian enthusiasm. Rather than getting tough with Putin, Trump has spent much of 2025 trying to win the Kremlin dictator over by offering generous peace terms while pressing Kyiv to make painful concessions. Putin has responded by intensifying his invasion. This has included major new offensives on the front lines of the war and a sharp escalation in the bombardment of Ukrainian cities.

With Trump’s patience now apparently wearing thin, there has recently been a striking change in United States rhetoric toward the Kremlin. The US leader has even taken to mocking Russia as a “paper tiger.” In order to pressure Putin into accepting a peace deal, however, Trump will have to match his increasingly harsh statements with decisive actions.

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While Ukrainians are grateful for all the international support their country has received since the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, there is also a strong sense that the democratic world has been far too slow and uncertain in its efforts to deter the Kremlin. For over a decade, the West’s underwhelming sanctions, limited military support for Ukraine, and obvious reluctance to risk escalation have been interpreted in Moscow as a tacit green light to go further.

The feeble reaction to the Russian seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in early 2014 set the tone for all that was to follow. Rather than uniting to oppose the first major European land grab of the twenty first century, Western leaders urged Ukraine not to respond to Russia’s unprecedented attack and even praised Kyiv for showing “restraint.” This appeasement led directly to Russia’s covert invasion of eastern Ukraine and ultimately set the stage for the full-scale invasion of 2022.

Trump is correct when he claims that Putin invaded Ukraine because he believed he would not face a strong response from the United States and its European allies. However, this has not yet led to a more decisive stance from the White House to match the current administration’s talk of “peace through strength.” Trump’s recent change in tone and his unprecedented criticism of Russia certainly send the right signal, but Putin will not be moved by words alone.

While Trump’s somewhat unconventional approach to diplomacy has left many frustrated, he can take credit for a number of encouraging developments. Most significantly, he has obliged Europe to take its own security more seriously and pressed European leaders to accept greater responsibility for supporting the Ukrainian war effort. By agreeing to sell US weapons to Ukraine via Europe, he has also established a potentially long-term format for stable and reliable arms deliveries to Kyiv.

Efforts to improve relations with Russia have proved far less successful. While Moscow has been careful to voice its theoretical support for US-led peace efforts, Putin has repeatedly attempted to stall the process and play for time. Meanwhile, he has continued to escalate the invasion. During Trump’s time in office, Russia has dramatically increased drone and missile attacks targeting Ukraine’s civilian population, setting a new daily record in early September. By his actions, Putin has rejected Trump’s calls for peace and made it abundantly clear that he has no interest in ending the war.

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There are now indications that Putin’s unwillingness to compromise has finally forced Trump’s hand. His recent statement that Kyiv can “win all of Ukraine back in its original form” was widely seen as a major shift in the United States stance. There have also been reports of more tangible changes in Washington such as a growing readiness to expand intelligence sharing with Ukraine to enable deep strikes inside Russia, along with the possible delivery of Tomahawk missiles. Kyiv and Moscow will both be watching closely to see whether these developments signal the start of a more fundamental change in the Trump administration’s efforts to broker a peace agreement.

One key sign would be Trump’s willingness to provide Ukraine with longer term indications of his support. This relates to US arms deliveries and also to the provision of security guarantees. So far, the mixed messages coming from the White House on these crucial issues have encouraged Putin to believe he can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

The US leader can also turn up the pressure on Russia’s allies and enablers via secondary sanctions and other economic measures. Since 2022, Russia has found a large number of willing international partners ready to help the country bypass Western sanctions. The obvious answer is to target the authoritarian alliance that supports Putin and helps fund his war machine.

In order to make any progress, Trump must convince Russia to take his talk of peace through strength seriously. Moscow is currently betting that the United States will eventually grow tired of Ukraine and scale back its diplomatic efforts to end the war. That assumption reduces Russia’s readiness to accept a compromise peace, as Putin is confident that Ukraine will be too weak to resist without US support. However, if Russia can be persuaded that Trump will not abandon Ukraine and is committed to securing the country’s long-term survival as an independent state, Putin will be more likely to engage in serious negotiations.

For more than half a year, Trump has tried to entice Russia to the negotiating table with offers of advantageous peace terms and attractive cooperation opportunities. So far, he has been met with nothing but empty promises and deadly escalations. It is now time to speak to Putin in the language of strength, the only language he truly understands and respects.

Sergiy Solodkyy is director of the New Europe Center in Ukraine.

Jennifer Gavito: Nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US acting principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs
Jonathan Panikoff (@jpanikoff): Director of the Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East
Ahmed F. Alkhatib (@afalkhatib): Director of the Atlantic Council’s Realign For Palestine project and native of Gaza City

What has Hamas agreed to?

Hamas’s statement is “no question a positive development,” says Jen, “albeit one that is likely to expose all sides’ intentions and constraints going forward.”
Jonathan called the Hamas announcement, “a play out of Iran’s playbook.” That’s because instead of a simple yes or no, Hamas is trying “to buy time through a muddled response that seeks to redirect the pressure” to the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Ahmed expected a “yes, but” response from Hamas. But he said it is “surprising” that the Hamas “has defied the US president’s take-it-or-leave-it offer” in “foundational areas.” Hamas, Ahmed notes, essentially divided the deal in two: first, a “cease-fire and hostage deal,” then “security and political arrangements.”
“Trump’s statement welcoming Hamas’s agreement reaffirms a positive vision for the end of the conflict, but likely unrealistically so,” Jen tells us, laying responsibility at the feet of Israel and Hamas to carry that vision forward.
Ahmed, however, was surprised by Trump’s positive response, saying that the US president’s social media post reflects either “a desperate desire to end this war at all costs or a grave misunderstanding” of what Hamas has agreed to.

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What is Netanyahu thinking?

Netanyahu will “almost certainly” be “disappointed” with Trump’s post, Jonathan tells us, since it could signal US support for reopening negotiations on the peace proposal. But he adds that the proposal’s “insistence that Hamas be disarmed,” among other conditions, “were never going to be accepted by the group.”
For Hamas’s announcement to develop into a cease-fire, it will require “immediate and politically painful reciprocation” from the Netanyahu government, Jen says.
But, as Jonathan tells us, Netanyahu’s “domestic politics have not been this flexible since the beginning of the war.” That’s because even if “ultranationalist” members of Netanyahu’s coalition were to withdraw in opposition to the agreement, members of the opposition “would almost certainly fill the void to secure a hostage deal that ends the war,” he says. And if a coalition collapse triggers an early election, Israel must hold legislative elections by October 2026 anyway.

What’s next?

Whether these developments will lead to an end of the war in Gaza in the coming days “will ultimately turn on the question of Hamas’s disarmament, as well as on the sequencing of Israeli hostages being released and Israel Defense Forces’ withdrawal from Gaza,” says Jonathan.
Another aspect of peace negotiations that “will be fraught,” says Jen, is the nature of a proposed postwar international security force and who would participate.
“Some Arab countries have already made clear their participation is contingent on a clear Israeli commitment to Palestinian sovereignty and a return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza,” Jen notes, conditions that right-wing members of Netanyahu’s coalition are likely to block.
Ahmed finds it “concerning” that “Hamas wants to have influence and a role in how the Strip is governed” in a postwar settlement. This demand, he says, “presents a very serious risk of Hamas realizing one of its long-sought goals, which is to reign but not directly rule” over Gaza, which he says is a “cheaper and more palatable option” to Hamas.
Even given the uncertainty around the future of peace negotiations, says Ahmed, “there is hope that any end to the fighting will still bring a desperately needed reprieve for a population that has suffered so horrendously over the past two years.”

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How a UN Security Council resolution could help end the war in Gaza

Thomas S. Warrick — Tue, 30 Sep 2025 18:54:31 +0000

Can the United Nations (UN) Security Council play a useful role in ending the war in Gaza? It would be easy to conclude that it will not. After all, Israel strongly objects to any major UN role in postwar Gaza—unsurprisingly, given the UN’s previous hostility toward Israel, the failure of UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon, the ways Hamas benefited for decades from UN aid to Gaza, and the delays for renewals for existing UN mandates caused by Security Council politics. And while earlier versions of a postwar plan by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair called for the UN Security Council to oversee the process, the twenty-part plan for Gaza that the Trump administration unveiled this week makes no mention of a role for the UN. At Monday’s White House press conference, led by US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the UN received only criticism. Both leaders appeared content with no role for the Security Council in Gaza.

However, there is one way the Security Council could help Gaza achieve a lasting peace: a one-time-only, nonrenewable resolution authorizing an international transitional governing authority and security force—modeled on Security Council Resolution 1031 (1995) for Bosnia.

Why a resolution

Since the July 29 New York Declaration, which brought Arab and European states on board with requiring Hamas’s disarmament, a broad international consensus that includes Israel and the United States has emerged. This consensus holds that the Gaza war needs to end in a way that protects Israel’s security, frees the hostages, disarms Hamas, increases humanitarian aid, and begins Gaza’s physical and social reconstruction. Divisions remain over a future Palestinian state and the role of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, but paragraph 19 of the Trump peace plan recognizes that those issues will take years to resolve whereas ending the war in Gaza cannot wait.

Supporters of the UN would like to see it play a role. But even the UN’s strongest supporters must acknowledge that the UN has problems with peacekeeping when great powers and major blocs disagree on fundamentals. The UN has other major problems as well: weak mandates, insufficient funding (often caused by the United States), UN staffing rules, and annual renewals of Security Council mandates held hostage to permanent members’ vetoes. Most critically, UN bodies tend to compromise on issues when decisive action is needed. Postwar Gaza will need decisive action, especially to prevent Hamas from undermining Gaza’s physical and social reconstruction.

A well-crafted Security Council resolution could help give legitimacy to the Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA) in ways that Israel, the United States, and other countries should welcome. First, a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would have the force of international law, which would strengthen GITA’s authority in dealing with Hamas, Iran, and anyone else who would try to obstruct Trump’s peace plan.

Second, for many governments, a resolution will unlock financial and other support for GITA and its mission. This funding is vitally important, as one of the most important lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan is that fast and cheap reconstruction always fails.

Third, the resolution could require—not just call for—Hamas’s disarmament, and it could authorize GITA, its International Security Force (ISF), and ISF-contributing states to use what Chapter VII refers to as “all necessary means” to enforce Hamas’s disarmament. Instead of Hamas being the so-called resistance to Israel, Hamas would be exposed as the obstacle to Gaza’s reconstruction and to a better life for Gaza’s 2.1 million people. This could create a fundamentally different political dynamic in Gaza. Opinion polling shows that hundreds of thousands of Gazans would prefer to rebuild their lives without Hamas and under the security of international protection. If successful, GITA would lead eventually to civilian rule by non-Hamas Palestinians—even Israel’s August 8 principles call for this outcome. But the resolution must give GITA and the ISF the strength and authority they will need.

To make a Security Council resolution workable, the United States should take the lead, working with Israel and other allies, to draft a one-time-only authorization for GITA. I was part of a group of former senior US officials who drafted the Plan for Postwar Gaza, released in May 2024 and updated in September 2025, which explains how this should work. The model is Security Council Resolution 1031, adopted on December 15, 1995, after US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke brokered the Dayton peace agreement to end wars in the Balkans that had killed more than 100,000 people. The resolution established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and an international stabilization force (dubbed “IFOR” then “SFOR”) but did not put them under any further UN oversight. The authorization did not expire or need reauthorization or renewal, hence it is “one-time only.” There were some initial missteps, but OHR and SFOR hit their stride, particularly under the leadership of Paddy Ashdown, high representative for Bosnia from 2002 to 2006. The Balkans today are far from perfect, but they have not been at war for more than twenty years. Security Council Resolution 1031 helped make that possible.

If Russia, China, or other countries block a strong, well-crafted resolution, there are alternatives, as we described in Plan for Postwar Gaza. Another option—which the United Arab Emirates used in its postwar plan—is for the Palestinian Authority to agree in writing that GITA should administer Gaza. A third option is for Israel to take responsibility for Gaza as an Occupying Power under international law (as the United States did for Iraq in 2003) and then transfer its authority to GITA pursuant to a memorandum of understanding. A fourth option is for a group of nations, including the United States, Israel, Arab states, European nations, and others, to draft a charter for an International Contact Group to which GITA would report. This would qualify as a regional security arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The charter would be deposited with the United Nations. While not as powerful as a Chapter VII resolution, regional security arrangements have been recognized as legitimate since the end of World War II.

How to secure Gaza from Hamas

Hamas has previously claimed that it would turn Gaza’s governance over to Palestinian technocrats, but the real obstacle to peace is Hamas’s refusal to give up its weapons in the face of international insistence from Arab and Western governments that the group be permanently disarmed. But Hamas today is no longer the force it was before its attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. Today it is reduced to hit-and-run raids on Israeli patrols. Most of Hamas’s experienced military leaders have been killed and its weapons factories destroyed. Hamas replaced seasoned cadres with inexperienced young men, many of whom fight now so they and their families will be fed and cared for by Hamas while most Gazans suffer.

In Gaza, as in Bosnia in the 1990s, security and reconstruction must be linked. GITA’s mandate needs to stipulate that in neighborhoods where Hamas keeps its weapons, there will be no reconstruction and no security. Hamas remnants will continue to hold out in pockets of Gaza, and Israeli forces will continue to go after them in those pockets. There will be no reconstruction where GITA and the ISF are not in control. In other neighborhoods, people are exhausted and want peace with a political path forward that GITA can bring. A significant percentage of Gaza is, or soon will be, secure enough for GITA and the ISF to take over governance, security, aid, and reconstruction.

If an international security force does materialize, then Hamas may try to test the international community’s will to see if this governing force is as weak as the Palestinian Authority was in 2007. When Hamas found weakness at that time, it forcibly seized power in Gaza, threw opponents off buildings, and took over Gaza’s economy and institutions. Do address the current situation, the civilian and military leaders of GITA and its security component will need to have the determination, as OHR and IFOR had in Bosnia twenty-nine years ago, not to be driven away by armed thugs with Kalashnikovs and improvised explosive devices. Securing Gaza from Hamas is the key to building a lasting peace.

A critical mass of world leaders have said how important it is to end the war in Gaza, protect Israel’s security, and provide for Gaza’s physical and social reconstruction. To see this happen, these leader should back a well-crafted, one-time-only Security Council resolution to help end the cycle of wars between Israel and Hamas.

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1997 to 2007, he served in the US Department of State on Middle East and international justice issues, including heading postwar planning on Iraq in 2002-2003.

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Charai in The National Interest: The Last Chance for Peace in the Middle

Atlantic Council — Sat, 27 Sep 2025 20:00:38 +0000

Original Text

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Ukrainians believe there can be no lasting peace without security

Yaroslava Shvechykova-Plavska — Thu, 25 Sep 2025 13:35:56 +0000

Ever since US President Donald Trump initiated peace talks with Moscow in early 2025 in a bid to end the war in Ukraine, there has been much debate over the peace terms Russian President Vladimir Putin may be prepared to accept. In order to reach a lasting settlement, however, it is also vital to understand Ukraine’s expectations for any potential agreement.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian perceptions of victory have evolved in line with the country’s changing fortunes on the battlefield. During the initial weeks of the war, any notions of victory were primarily associated with national survival. The immediate objective was to stop the Russian advance on Kyiv and save the Ukrainian capital, thereby thwarting the central objective of Putin’s invasion and safeguarding Ukrainian statehood.

Ukraine’s spring 2022 victory in the Battle of Kyiv was followed by a series of further military successes later that year, including a stunning counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region and the liberation of Kherson. This led to growing public confidence that Ukraine’s territorial integrity could be fully restored within the country’s internationally recognized borders. As the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion approached, a consensus began to take shape across Ukraine that victory meant the complete end of Russian occupation and the return of all territory to Ukrainian control.

One year later, the costly failure of Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive led to a noticeable lowering of expectations. With the terrible human cost of the war continuing to mount and little progress to report on the battlefield, perceptions of victory began to shift once more. While the desire to liberate the entire country remained strong, many Ukrainians began to acknowledge that temporary territorial concessions may prove necessary in order to end hostilities. This helped to refocus attention on the need to establish a lasting peace.

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For the past year, Ukraine’s main demand has been for credible security guarantees to remove the threat of future Russian aggression. This is widely recognized as essential for the country’s continued viability as an independent state. While Ukraine’s eventual objective remains NATO membership, the current goal is to secure commitments from the country’s partners that confirm Kyiv’s irreversible Euro-Atlantic integration and convince the Kremlin to abandon its imperial agenda. Only then will genuine peace be possible.

In addition to expectations regarding security guarantees, Ukrainians also seek accountability for war crimes committed during Russia’s invasion. Many in today’s Ukraine feel that justice should be central to any postwar settlement. They argue that the immense sacrifices of the war must not be in vain, and believe Russia needs to pay for the devastation it has caused in Ukraine.

Calls for a just peace settlement create significant challenges for Ukraine’s political leadership. If the Ukrainian authorities fail to address demands for accountability, this could fuel political divisions and lead to social tensions, especially among veterans, military families, and communities most directly affected by the invasion. Any peace deal that feels like a betrayal could destabilize the entire country and radicalize Ukrainian public opinion, with unpredictable and potentially dangerous consequences for Ukraine.

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As Ukraine prepares for a fourth wartime winter, Ukrainians continue to debate what would represent acceptable peace terms. It is currently possible to identify some key trends. While there has been a clear move away from the optimistic interpretations of victory that dominated the debate during the first year of the war, relatively few Ukrainians appear ready to accept peace on Russian terms. Instead, there is a sense that Ukraine must find ways to fight on if necessary until it can reach a settlement that safeguards the country’s future freedom and security.

Ukrainians are acutely aware that Russia remains determined to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. They understand that the war will not truly be over until the Kremlin has been decisively deterred from pursuing its imperial ambitions.

While any progress toward a ceasefire would likely receive widespread support from the Ukrainian public, this would not satisfy their demands for a longer term solution to the threat posed by Russia. Indeed, some believe a pause in hostilities that did not lead to a more permanent settlement could create new risks and undermine the sense of common purpose that has played such an important part in maintaining Ukrainian public support for the war effort.

With the recent US-led peace initiative now running out of steam and Europe deeply reluctant to risk direct military confrontation with Russia, there is a growing realization among Ukrainians that no external actor can fully guarantee Ukraine’s security. International support has been absolutely vital since 2022 and remains indispensable, but there can ultimately be no substitute for a strong and self-sufficient Ukrainian military backed by a resilient and united population.

Ukrainians recognize that they cannot allow their national survival to hinge on the ever-changing political and geopolitical dynamics in Western capitals. Instead, Kyiv must look to strike a balance between long-term international security partnerships and powerful domestic deterrence. Peace with Putin’s Russia is possible, but it must be peace through strength.

Yaroslava Shvechykova-Plavska is a lecturer at the Educational and Scientific Institute of International Relations at Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. This article is based on the Security Guarantees for Ukraine project, undertaken with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. It represents the views of the author and does not reflect the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.

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Kroenig quoted in Associated Press on President Trump’s peace efforts

swallace — Sat, 20 Sep 2025 12:00:00 +0000

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On September 20, Matthew Kroenig, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director, was quoted in an article in Associated Press. He argues that the president’s brashness can get results.

[When it comes to making peace in Ukraine and Gaza] At what point does he say, “This is too hard, let’s move on to other issues.”

Matthew Kroenig

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Libya’s stalled transition: When domestic spoilers meet foreign interests

Luis Aleman and Karim Mezran — Thu, 18 Sep 2025 18:14:58 +0000

On 16 August 2025, Libya held municipal elections in twenty-six municipalities, with turnout reaching 71 per cent—the highest rate since 2014. For a population scarred by war and weary of manipulation, this was an unmistakable demand for governance through the ballot box. Yet the same day, the House of Representatives in the East suspended elections in sixteen municipalities, while armed groups in the West torched electoral offices.

These were not random incidents—but deliberate acts of obstruction by actors who know that real democracy threatens their hold on power.

Libya’s stalled transition has not happened by chance; it has been deliberately engineered into paralysis by both domestic spoilers and foreign powers. The Libyan people, who turned out in large numbers despite threats and violence, have already shown their desire for accountable governance. The challenge now is whether the international community can move beyond token gestures and finally address the forces maintaining Libya’s ongoing limbo. Until that occurs, each new roadmap risks becoming yet another step on the path to nowhere.

Libya’s security stalemate

Libya’s conflict has shifted from open warfare to a frozen stalemate where no side can unify the country, but each has enough coercive strength to hinder progress. In Tripoli, the Government of National Unity (GNU) is at odds with the Deterrence Apparatus (RADA), a militia-turned-security force supported by foreign backers. Their clashes in July 2025 highlighted the fragile security situation in the capital.

In the East, the House of Representatives, backed by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), has strengthened its control but continues to block national elections. The suspension of municipal contests in August revealed its reliance on coercion rather than legitimacy. Meanwhile, the South remains a governance vacuum. In Kufra, Sudan ese refugees now outnumber Libyan residents, escalating tensions that armed groups exploit through smuggling and trafficking.

This is not a lack of war but a controlled fragmentation, where division itself has become the most stable outcome.

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Domestic spoilers: Entrenched in the status quo

Eleven years without national elections have led to a ruling class that thrives on paralysis. The House of Representatives in Tobruk and the High State Council in Tripoli exemplify this. Aguila Saleh, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, has repeatedly blocked electoral frameworks that could diminish his influence, while figures in the High State Council have exploited their veto power to delay compromise until their interests are secured. Militias further reinforce this deadlock. In Tripoli, armed factions aligned with the GNU control ports, airports, and ministries, using them for rents and intimidation. In the East, Haftar’s LAAF dominates militarily but is tied to the war economy—relying on smuggling, taxation, and foreign aid. In the South, tribal militias benefit from human trafficking and illicit fuel trade. The human toll is severe. Between March 2024 and August 2025, twenty detainees died in custody, including activist Abdel Munim Al-Maremi, whose death following a release order symbolized detention as a tool of repression. These outcomes are not bureaucratic failures but deliberate acts of intimidation.

Yet domestic spoilers persist not only on their own but also with the belief that powerful foreign patrons will shield them from consequences. This is the link between Libya’s internal obstruction and its international entanglement.

Foreign Interference: Managed instability as strategy

Libya today is not abandoned but actively contested. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt have long supported Haftar’s LAAF, aiming to block Islamist influence and secure energy access. Turkey has entrenched itself in western Libya with troops, drones, and contractors under a binding security agreement, leveraging its position in Mediterranean maritime disputes. Russia has positioned Wagner fighters in oilfields and bases, using Libya as a logistics hub for African operations and leverage with Europe.

Among allies, competition also persists. Italy prioritizes migration management and ENI—an Italian multinational company—energy concessions, while France often leans toward Haftar for counterterrorism partnerships in the Sahel. The United States officially supports the United Nations’ (UN) track, but has deprioritized Libya, focusing on counterterrorism over political settlement. The European Union (EU) has limited its Libya policy to migration containment, funding detention centers often run by militias—effectively outsourcing abuses in exchange for fewer departures across the Mediterranean.

The outcome is managed instability. Foreign powers ensure that no faction dominates, maintaining Libya as the most convenient equilibrium.

The UN’s roadmap: Process without consequence

The UN continues to develop roadmaps, most recently outlined by SRSG Hanna Tetteh in her August 2025 Security Council briefing. Her twelve-to eighteen-month electoral plan assumes spoilers will eventually cooperate. Yet those who benefit from chaos have no incentive to embrace unity.

The Berlin Process, launched in 2020, exemplifies this contradiction. Designed to enforce the arms embargo and pave the way for elections, it quickly became a façade. The second Berlin Conference in June 2021 reaffirmed commitments, but states doubled down on their proxies: Turkey expanded its military footprint, the UAE and Egypt reinforced Haftar, and Russia deepened Wagner’s role. UN experts documented repeated arms embargo violations, none of which were punished.

Berlin institutionalized interference rather than restraining it, providing a stage for states to claim support for UN mediation while undermining it in practice. By 2025, references to Berlin persist in UN briefings as a ritual rather than a reality.

Policy recommendations: Breaking the cycle of obstruction

Libya’s deadlock needs a shift from symbolic gestures to practical confidence-building. Greater transparency in UN reporting and clearer communication of objectives would reassure Libyans that external actors are dedicated to peace. Financial governance should be improved through joint East–West oversight of oil revenues, with international technical support to ensure fair distribution. On security, the focus should be on capacity-building, not external peacekeeping. Advisory teams, election protection training, and rapid-response support for Libyan institutions would empower local forces while safeguarding electoral processes. International recognition and aid should be used as incentives linked to measurable progress on elections, unification, and rights protection. Civil society, youth, and women must be recognized as genuine stakeholders through mechanisms that ensure their recommendations influence policy, not just reports.

These measures, taken together, would help shift the focus from obstruction to cooperation, making unity more rewarding than division.

Luis Aleman is a global strategist and CEO of LFA Consulting, where he focuses on international economic development, trade policy, and strategic advisory. His work spans Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe, helping governments and institutions navigate complex political and economic landscapes.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and a resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, focusing on the processes of change in North Africa.

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Charai in National Interest: Courage, Not Extremism, Must Define the Middle East’s Future

Atlantic Council — Tue, 16 Sep 2025 14:02:42 +0000

Original source

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What is the Coalition of the Willing actually willing to do in Ukraine?

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 09 Sep 2025 20:24:11 +0000

French President Emmanuel Macron announced last week that 26 nations have now committed to participating in a so-called “reassurance force” to help guarantee Ukraine’s security following the end of hostilities with Russia. Macron was speaking in Paris after hosting European colleagues from the Coalition of the Willing, a grouping of countries led by Britain and France that is attempting to spearhead efforts to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Work on the Coalition of the Willing has been underway since early 2025, as Europe seeks to convince the Trump administration that it is prepared to take the lead in efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The initiative received a boost in recent weeks when US President Donald Trump offered to provide crucial backup support for a European reassurance force in Ukraine. However, the exact nature of this American role has not yet been specified.

Crucially, there is also a lack of clarity over exactly what form a European military presence in Ukraine could take and what functions participating troops would be expected to serve. This has given rise to some fundamental questions over the nature and goals of any future reassurance force. In the final analysis, what is the Coalition of the Willing actually willing to do in Ukraine?

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The biggest question of all is whether European troops in Ukraine would be permitted to fight back if attacked by Russia. Russian opposition to a Western military presence in Ukraine is well known, with Putin recently stating that any European troops would be regarded by the Russians as legitimate targets.

A clash between Russian and European troops in Ukraine would not be inevitable. While the Kremlin would certainly be eager to test Western resolve by targeting European troops in Ukraine, this would be balanced by fears in Moscow that any acts of Russian aggression could end up backfiring and strengthening Europe’s commitment to stand with Ukraine. Nevertheless, the obvious potential for unpredictable escalations means that any Western soldiers deployed to postwar Ukraine would almost certainly be limited to areas far away from the front lines.

Europe’s collective desire to avoid a direct military confrontation with the Kremlin places serious limits on the potential scope of any reassurance force. However, this cautious approach does not mean that a European military presence in Ukraine would be entirely useless.

As long ago as spring 2024, France’s President Macron was already raising the prospect of deploying Western troops to rear areas as a way of establishing red lines for the Kremlin. More recently, US Special Envoy Keith Kellogg has suggested a European military presence on the right bank of the Dnipro River to safeguard central and western Ukraine. This could help create the security and confidence necessary for Ukraine’s revival.

European soldiers on the ground inside Ukraine could make a meaningful contribution to a possible air shield over the country. This is widely regarded as the most realistic form of Western military support for Ukraine, with air force squadrons from participating countries and enhanced air defenses combining to guard Ukrainian airspace against Russian missile and drone attacks. Western troops based in Ukraine could potentially operate air defense systems and provide ground support for the growing fleet of foreign jets in service with the Ukrainian Air Force.

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In addition to these more direct contributions to Ukrainian security, a European reassurance force could also help train the Ukrainian military. At present, most of the specialized training that Ukrainian soldiers and commanders receive takes place outside the country. This is expensive and inefficient. Establishing a comprehensive training program inside Ukraine would save lots of time and money. It would also have the added benefit of improving knowledge exchange between Ukrainian troops and their European colleagues.

European forces could make a very significant contribution to Ukraine’s security by taking on responsibility for repairing and maintaining the huge amounts of Western weaponry donated to Ukraine since 2022. Kyiv’s partners have provided a vast array of military kit ranging from hand-held anti-tank weapons and air defense systems to mobile artillery and armored personnel carriers. Keeping all of this in working condition is a herculean task that requires thousands of Ukrainians who could theoretically be replaced by their European counterparts. In some instances, it may even make sense for partner countries to take responsibility for the equipment delivered by their respective governments.

There are no illusions in Ukraine over the potential role of foreign soldiers. Nobody believes that the presence of a reassurance force would in itself be enough to deter further Russian aggression. On the contrary, Ukrainians are well aware that their country’s only truly credible security guarantee is the Ukrainian army. At the same time, troops from the Coalition of the Willing could boost the Ukrainian military in meaningful ways. European soldiers could play a supporting role in areas such as logistics, maintenance, and air defense, and could contribute to the training of Ukrainian troops.

Ukrainians do not expect anyone to fight for them. They would welcome the presence of European soldiers on the ground in Ukraine, but recognize that they must defend themselves and their nation. A reassurance force could serve as a meaningful element within a broader deterrence package, but the Coalition of the Willing would be well advised to focus its energies primarily on the practical goal of creating a Ukrainian military strong enough to deter the Kremlin.

John E Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Léonie Allard (@AllardLeonie): Visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, currently in residence from the French Ministry of Armed Forces
Jörn Fleck (@JornFleck): Senior director of the Europe Center and former European Parliament staffer

What will this commitment look like in practice?

John points to Macron’s announcement that a security force “will deploy once a cease-fire is reached,” with France “one of several countries that has declared its willingness to supply troops.”
“Macron has definitely been a leader on this effort,” says Léonie, both in organizing the coalition along with the United Kingdom and in talking about putting boots on the ground, which the French president first put forward in February 2024 by saying “nothing is ruled out.” Since then, more countries have come on board.
However, important specifics are still unclear, such as “in what capacity, in what numbers, and for what specific guarantees” each country would contribute to Ukraine’s postwar defense, says Jörn. It is likely, he adds, that “not all those who are part of the Coalition of the Willing are going to be willing to put troops in Ukraine,” noting that Germany has been “hedging” on its level of involvement in security guarantees for Kyiv.

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What does this mean for Ukraine?

“That over two dozen countries are willing to contribute to security guarantees in some capacity is a good sign” for Ukraine, says Jörn. But the war is still ongoing.
Until a cease-fire is established, Jörn tells us, Europe must focus on “providing Ukraine with the adequate capabilities to defend itself” and “sending a message” to Russian President Vladimir Putin “that Europe is united and ready to act for Ukraine.”
European leaders’ “end goal,” adds Léonie, “is a strategic victory for a Ukraine integrated in the Western security order.”

What should the United States do next?

“Today’s meeting is an achievement for US President Donald Trump,” John argues, as Trump has long viewed European troops as “key to keeping the peace in Ukraine.” Now, he says, European leaders “have taken this idea and are making it a working proposition.”
Today’s announcement was “arguably as much about convincing Putin of Europe’s seriousness as it is about convincing the White House,” says Jörn. Now, he adds, “Europe’s leaders must keep up the level of effort, agency, and ambition they displayed at the White House on August 18” when they joined Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Next, says John, the Trump administration should “actively assist” European efforts. While Trump has said he will not deploy US troops in Ukraine, other options for US assistance remain on the table, including using US contract soldiers and supporting European troops with US airpower. “A visible, robust US role is essential to the deterrent power of the force and therefore to achieve the administration’s goal of a stable peace.”

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Dispatch from Basra: Glimpses of hope in Iraq’s forgotten south

Jon Wilks — Thu, 04 Sep 2025 20:24:12 +0000

BASRA, Iraq—There is perhaps nowhere else where the high hopes of the new Iraq were so dashed as in its second city, Basra.

In 2003, the United States and United Kingdom aspired towards a renaissance for Basra that would restore it as a major economic hub of the region—a gateway to Iraq, and an equal to the other great trading cities of the Gulf. Instead, its strategic location close to Iraq’s oil resources and maritime outlets to the Gulf and the Iranian border is exactly what condemned the city as the main source of wealth extraction for Iraq’s new Shia political elite, a murky morass of corruption and gangsterism, and a vital part of Iran’s network of foreign allies and proxies.

In July, I made a return visit to the city as a private sector consultant (my last visit was on my farewell tour as British Ambassador in 2019).

Happily, there were positive signs of stabilization and reconstruction. Old friends reported security had improved, and the center of the city was visibly better: new roads, commercial and residential developments, an excellent five-star hotel, and good restaurants. Downtown overall looked cleaner and busier, with people going about their business freely and easily. Arriving at the airport, immigration and customs procedures were welcoming and orderly, if a little overwhelmed by the numbers arriving. Rows of Chinese workers were sitting waiting for their clearances, a sign of the times as China is now a major and growing player in the hydrocarbon and infrastructure sectors in Iraq.

Basra is sharing in a wider positive picture in Iraq of improved security and visible reconstruction, although the picture remains heavily tainted by corruption and dysfunctional governance as powerful political parties and militias opaquely siphon off revenues, hydrocarbon resources, and kickbacks on contracts.

The source of these big negatives is a complex interplay of elite bargains at local, national, and international levels.

All the big Shia political parties and militias have a presence and share control over rent-seeking in the hydrocarbon sector, the ports, borders and customs, public sector jobs, and the smuggling of arms, oil, and drugs. Local armed tribes also assert their claims to some of these sources of revenue. Additionally, Iran sees Basra as strategically vital for its security and prosperity. Tehran wields influence commensurate with its interests here. It will always be the big, closely-connected neighbor. But its power should not be overstated.

Basra’s governor, Asaad al-Eidani, has been in the post for eight years. It is not an easy job to deliver any progress in Basra against such a difficult political and economic environment. Still, only his bitterest opponents would deny him any credit for doing so. The population of Basra remains dissatisfied with the state of the city and the province, given the amount of wealth that is generated locally, of which they see only little. They regularly protest, particularly in the summer, about shortages of water, electricity, and jobs, as well as weak health and education services.

The chronic crisis of shortage of clean, potable water in Basra is the biggest scandal where political dysfunction and environmental crisis intersect to expose one of the worst failures of governance in post-2003 Iraq. As usual, it is the poorer and marginalized who suffer most.

Basra has traditionally relied on freshwater delivered by the main rivers of Iraq, the Tigris and Euphrates, whose confluence is forty miles north of Basra, and tributaries from Iran.

Upriver dams in Turkey and Iran have markedly reduced those flows, and salinization of the water around Basra from the Gulf along the Shatt al-Arab has increased. Old infrastructure is collapsing, and major new water purification projects have been proposed many times in recent decades, but have fallen foul of political infighting and corruption over who gets a share of the spoils and budget shortfalls when the oil price is low. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani visited Basra when I was there. General elections are due in November 2025, and the Prime Minister was launching and announcing progress on various big projects in and around Basra—including the latest attempt to do something decisive about the water crisis with the help of a major Chinese contractor, PowerChina. While the people of Basra hope for delivery this time, there is much skepticism about whether a unified political will would overcome the obstacles that have prevented progress for so long.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani attends a ceremony to launch the construction of a major seawater desalination plant, a project carried out by China’s PowerChina in partnership with an Iraqi company, in Basra, Iraq, July 24, 2025. REUTERS/Mohammed Aty

Another major program that has been debated for over a decade is the capturing of flared gas from the major oilfields near Basra, which is not just wasteful but also damaging to local health and the environment. On this, progress has slowly been made. As I travelled around the oil fields on my July trip, I could see much less flaring than there used to be. The oil ministry and Iraq’s partners among international oil companies are promising more progress in the coming years.

During his own visit to Basra at the end of July, al-Sudani associated himself with projects on new roads, bridges, gas, electricity, water, and solar power. This is not all pre-election talk. Al-Sudani is a competent technocrat and engineer by training. In the last three years since taking office, he has overseen new heights of reconstruction across Iraq, particularly big, new residential and commercial complexes in the capital Baghdad. He is a symbol of what Iraq is starting to achieve.

Iraqi and Basrawi politics have settled into something insufficient for what the public demand and deserve— but at least there is enough security and governance to allow widespread reconstruction. Basra is no longer missing out on this. Growing Iraqi capacity at both the state and governorate level, as well as the pressure of public opinion through elections and protests, should allow further progress in the coming years. Iraq was not involved militarily in the recent regional conflict between Israel and Iran, in part because Tehran did not want to risk its powerful network of allies and proxies in Iraq. Additionally, Iraq’s political elite is pursuing its interests, including growing business empires, in a way that sometimes challenges external influence from neighboring countries, including Iran.

Iraq is far from where its people and its friends would wish it to be in terms of sovereignty, stability, and prosperity. But looking back across the twenty-two years of my personal knowledge and connection with Iraq, I see that time, across the decades, has been a healer. Iraqis are learning to build the internal relations and trust between major political parties and leaders, including across ethno-sectarian lines. This is key to overcoming ethno-sectarianism, weak institutions, and vulnerability to external intervention. We saw this after the last national elections with the attempt to form an ethnically diverse, cross-sectarian coalition. That attempt did not succeed, but such attempts are not going to go away.

The pathway to enduring stability cannot be rushed, and foreign support can only go as far as Iraqis themselves permit.

Overall, the security and prosperity trends are positive: growth in the economy, the non-oil economy backed-up by visible evidence of reconstruction, and what people expressed to me on the ground—even if widespread corruption continues to act as a brake on progress.

Internationally, Iraqis do not want to put all their eggs in one basket. They want strong political and economic relations with all their neighbors, the major powers, and the advanced economies of the world. China has developed a much bigger presence in recent years, but reputable Western businesses are far from frozen out. Iraqi leaders recognize their economic development will require a greater role for the local private sector and international business partners from across the world. Particularly with oil prices at current levels, the government budget is dominated by public sector salaries. The government cannot afford to finance reconstruction without the support of the private sector and implementing partners. Ministers freely admit this.

Despite its many challenges, I left Basra with more hope than I had six years ago that this part of Iraq, and those who do business with it, will enjoy more of their fair share of these positive trends in the years to come.

Ambassador Jon Wilks is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and leads the Rafik Hariri Center’s Transatlantic Program. He was the UK ambassador to Qatar, Iraq, Oman, and Yemen, as well as its special envoy to Syria. Wilks is also a senior advisor to the Iraq Britain Business Council.

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Europe’s best security guarantee against Russia is the Ukrainian army

Elena Davlikanova, Yevhen Malik — Thu, 04 Sep 2025 01:16:17 +0000

The issue of security guarantees for Ukraine has emerged in recent weeks as a key focus of diplomatic efforts to end Russia’s invasion and achieve a lasting peace in Eastern Europe. But while almost everyone appears to agree that security guarantees are an essential element of any peace deal, there is currently no consensus over what these guarantees should actually involve.

At present, the emerging picture of future security guarantees appears to have four key components. These include a sustained allied military presence in or near Ukraine, robust air defense support, long-term weapons supplies, and mechanisms to monitor any potential ceasefire.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said he wants NATO-style commitments that would bind guarantor states to defend Ukraine, and insists any guarantees should be ratified by participating governments. European nations are expected to take the lead in providing security guarantees, with the United States playing a crucial but as yet undefined supporting role.

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Much of the discussion over security guarantees has focused on the deployment of a military contingent to Ukraine in order to help enforce and monitor any ceasefire agreement. However, the potential composition and exact role of such a force remain unclear. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently told the Financial Times that Europe has a “pretty precise” plan in place to send troops to Ukraine, but other senior European officials have since suggested that her comments were premature.

Europe appears to be divided over the issue of sending troops to Ukraine. France and Britain have committed to leading what is being called a reassurance force, with others including Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and Lithuania signalling their readiness to also contribute soldiers. In contrast, Poland, Italy, Spain, and the Czech Republic have rejected the idea of deploying troops to Ukraine, while Germany has so far adopted a skeptical stance.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump has ruled out the presence of American soldiers in Ukraine. Instead, discussions are reportedly underway over the possible participation of private US military companies as part of a long-term peace plan for Ukraine. American contractors could potentially perform a number of functions including the strengthening of Ukraine’s air defenses.

The key question regarding the presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian soil is whether they would be given a mandate to engage in combat operations. In other words, would European soldiers be allowed to fight back if attacked by Russia? Critics have noted that this is unlikely. Instead, they argue, any foreign troop contingent deployed to Ukraine would be largely symbolic with no meaningful military role.

International military involvement of some kind in the air and maritime domains may be more realistic. Ukrainian officials are hopeful that the country’s European partners will participate in air patrols to defend Ukraine against Russian drone and missile attacks. Allied countries may also contribute to the strengthening of Ukraine’s existing network of air defense systems. This could lead to significantly enhanced security over at least a portion of Ukraine’s skies, creating opportunities for the resumption of commercial flights and providing a safer environment for the civilian population.

Similar support in the Black Sea is also under discussion, with the Turkish navy expected to play a prominent role. With Russia’s Black Sea Fleet already weakened by Ukrainian drone and missile strikes, allied involvement could help safeguard maritime supply corridors and secure uninterrupted trade flows from Ukrainian ports. This would provide the country with an important economic boost and help ease the pressure on congested land routes via Poland and Romania.

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While Ukrainian officials will certainly welcome further talk of troops on the ground, air shields, and naval missions, any serious discussion of security guarantees must acknowledge that Western leaders are deeply reluctant to risk direct military confrontation with the Kremlin. With this in mind, Ukraine’s most realistic security strategy lies not in empty promises or symbolic deployments of foreign soldiers, but in strengthening the country’s own defense capabilities.

Kyiv’s top priorities in this context include securing the continued supply of US and European weapons, ongoing intelligence support, and increased international investment in the rapidly expanding Ukrainian defense industry. Integration into existing European security structures will be crucial, including full coordination of the Ukrainian military with foreign partners providing the aviation and naval components of any future security guarantees.

Greater cooperation between Ukrainian defense tech companies and their Western counterparts can also contribute to the process of strengthening security ties between Ukraine and the rest of Europe. Today’s Ukraine has unrivalled experience in drone warfare and numerous other aspects of the contemporary battlefield. This makes the country a strategic partner with much to offer its European neighbors.

At present, a strong Ukraine looks to be by far the most realistic deterrent against further Russian aggression. This will require extensive material support and binding long-term political commitments from Kyiv’s allies, but is unlikely to involve a major foreign military presence in Ukraine.

The benefits of backing Ukraine will be potentially far-reaching for Europe as a whole. A strengthened and integrated Ukrainian military can serve as a bastion of European security for years to come as the continent seeks to modernize its military and adapt to the new geopolitical realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia.

Elena Davlikanova is a senior fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis and Sahaidachny Security Center. Yevhen Malik is a veteran of the Ukrainian Army’s 36th Marine Brigade.

Less than a week after the Alaska summit, an August 21 Russian strike destroyed a US electronics and consumer goods factory near the Hungarian border in western Ukraine. That was no misfire. It was contempt. The next day, Trump said that he was “not happy about it,” and that he had threatened sanctions if peace didn’t advance within two weeks. Those two weeks are nearly over.

Still, Putin has not paid a price—even as he has shrugged off an apparent commitment to Trump that he would meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and continue to explore peace. Last week, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said that it’s clear the meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian leaders won’t take place.

On the Monday following the Alaska summit, seven European leaders visited the White House, accompanying Zelenskyy. The aftermath of that meeting is still playing out, but the visit provided a clarifying pathway for common cause to stop Putin’s killing and expansionist ambition.

In an interview over the weekend, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told the Financial Times that European defense chiefs from the British- and French-led “Coalition of the Willing” have worked up “pretty precise plans” for potential military deployments to Ukraine as part of post-conflict security guarantees, in which Trump had committed the United States to participate.

“Security guarantees are paramount and absolutely crucial,” she said. “We have a clear road map and we had an agreement in the White House . . . and this work is going forward very well.” Those European leaders who met with Trump will meet again in Paris on Thursday to flesh out their plans, with von der Leyen telling the Financial Times that “the sense of urgency is very high.”

For his part, Trump needs to feel the same sense of urgency, as he faces a stark and immediate choice. He can accept Putin’s repeated insults and invite more, or he can answer with the one thing the Russian leader understands: maximum pressure. The world witnessed this approach in Trump’s actions regarding Iran, where he bombed three nuclear installations after Tehran ignored his sixty-day deadline for peace talks.

To face down Putin, Trump won’t have to risk a US military action within Russian territory. He merely needs to apply the leverage of the US and European economies, which with a combined gross domestic product of around $50 trillion are nearly twenty-five times larger than the Russian economy. Last year, the combined military spending of the United States, Canada, and European NATO countries was roughly $1.5 trillion, while Russia’s was $149 billion. The United States and Europe have the means to dictate the future, if they can show the political will and common cause.

For Trump, the building blocks for maximum pressure are already in place.

First, Trump should give a quick green light to the US Senate’s sanctions bill. The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 (S. 1241), with more than eighty co-sponsors, proposes significant sanctions on Russia, including a 500 percent tariff on Russian-origin goods and imports from countries buying Russian energy, prohibitions on US investment in and exports to the Russian energy sector, and asset freezes for Russian financial institutions.

The bill targets Russian energy and financial sectors and gives the US president leverage to impose more sanctions if Russia continues its aggression or refuses to negotiate peace in good faith. It’s time for Trump to ask Congress to pass the bill, sign it, enforce it, and strengthen it. Thus far, the Trump administration has only gone after India with tariffs to punish it for buying Russian oil. That alienates India, doesn’t hurt the Russians enough, and doesn’t touch China—the country without which Putin wouldn’t be able to continue his war.

“Energy exports, especially oil, remain a lifeline for Russia even though they are declining,” Kimberly Donovan, the director of the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative, wrote recently in arguing for the Trump administration to impose secondary sanctions on Russian oil. “Putin, quite literally, cannot afford to lose his remaining oil revenue.”

Next, Trump needs to lock in US security guarantees to support Ukraine alongside European allies. “When it comes to security, there’s going to be a lot of help” from the United States, Trump told reporters during his White House visit with European leaders. “They are the first line of defense, because they are there,” he said of the Europeans. “But we’re going to help them out also. We’ll be involved.”

It’s time to make those words real—to move from vague pledges to operational commitments: ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), munitions pipelines, and a European air-defense shield with US enablers.

Behind NATO’s new defense-spending pledge at this year’s NATO summit was a clear division of labor: Europe supplies mass, while the United States provides powerful enablers. It’s time to put that thinking into operation in Ukraine. (There are also reports in the media suggesting that US contract soldiers could deploy to Ukraine.)

Finally, it’s time for Trump to lift restrictions on letting Ukraine use longer-range US weapons to hit targets deep in Russia. Britain and France have freed Ukraine’s hand to hit such military and military-related targets—launch sites, airfields, logistics hubs—on the simple logic that doing otherwise provides sanctuary to Ukraine’s killers. Trump even recently criticized former US President Joe Biden because he “would not let Ukraine FIGHT BACK, only DEFEND.” Yet the Wall Street Journal recently reported that Trump’s own Pentagon continued the Biden approach by preventing Ukraine from using the US-made Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, for such strikes.

There are welcome signs that this approach is changing. On Friday, US Ambassador to NATO Matt Whitaker told Fox News, “We’re giving some deeper strike capabilities, and most likely the Ukrainians are going to use them.”

* * *

Trump wants history to remember him. The war in Ukraine presents him with an opportunity worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize. If a sovereign, secure Ukraine emerges from the conflict, it would echo far beyond Europe—to Beijing, Tehran, Pyongyang, and every adversary weighing US resolve. It will take maximum pressure—sanctions, European troop commitments, US security guarantees, and long-range strikes—to end this war on terms that secure peace and preserve Ukrainian freedom.

Following the Alaska summit, Trump can have no further doubt about who he’s dealing with in Putin. Following the historic European visit to the White House, there’s also little doubt about the parameters for success. It’s time for the Trump administration to make clear where the blame lies for this war.

“How much more evident can it be that Russia is the obstacle to peace?” wrote the Wall Street Journal in an editorial this past week. “At this point, Mr. Trump can certainly tell his voters that he tried mightily to talk Mr. Putin into peace. The effort failed. The next strategy, one that has worked for Mr. Trump in other parts of the world, is called maximum pressure. The way Mr. Trump can end the war is by getting Mr. Putin to conclude that the costs are too high for him to continue.”

It is too easy with the deluge of daily news reports—on everything from Jeffrey Epstein to Trump’s efforts to fire a Federal Reserve governor, from troop deployments in US cities to warships heading for Venezuela—to miss the generational significance of what’s unfolding in Ukraine.

For the US president and his legacy, there is no bigger geopolitical test than Ukraine. For Trump, who understands negotiating leverage and yearns to be seen as a peacemaker, it’s time to send a clear message through maximum pressure: The days of Putin playing him are over.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post It’s time for Trump to put maximum pressure on Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Twenty questions (and expert answers) about the negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 29 Aug 2025 16:32:18 +0000

Ukraine is still standing, more than eleven years after Russia seized Crimea and parts of the Donbas region, and more than three years after Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion. But what Ukraine will look like in the future remains the subject of intense negotiations—and continued bloodshed. As the United States pushes diplomatic efforts to end the war, we turned to experts across the Atlantic Council to answer twenty burning questions about what’s happening and what’s next.

1. What is the current state of the battlefield?

The battlefield needs to be understood broadly. Most of the commentary on “the battlefield” focuses on Moscow’s monthslong land offensive. The key point, well understood but incomplete, is that Moscow is making very slow, if painful, gains. There have been moments recently when Russian forces moved forward hundreds of meters, especially toward Pokrovsk, a key town in western Donetsk. Moscow has announced for weeks that it would “soon” take the town, but it has not, as Ukraine regained territory north of it and crack Ukrainian troops moved to the area to push the Russians back.

In the air, Moscow continues its savage war on Ukraine’s cities and civilians, which causes weekly casualties, but with little strategic impact. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s ever-growing drone capability—in both distance and explosive capacity—is wreaking havoc on Russian hydrocarbon installations, transportation hubs, bridges, railroads, weapons depots, and strategic industries. This is already having an impact on Russian oil supplies. Shortages are being felt throughout the country—even in the far eastern port city of Vladivostok—and are also magnifying the pressure on industrial production, which has been battered by high inflation and interest rates. Putin’s notion that he can inevitably take a good bit more territory—reflected in much Western media reporting—does not take into account Ukraine’s growing air campaign. Meanwhile, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is cowering in the eastern reaches of the Black Sea, far from its base in Sevastopol. Ukrainian drones have reduced the fleet’s role to shooting missiles from afar, and Ukraine’s ports remain open for commerce.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

2. What’s next for diplomatic negotiations?

It is no surprise that negotiations with Russia are going nowhere fast. Putin does not want to end the war. His goal is not to lock in his gains or to take the rest of the Donetsk Oblast, but to take effective political control of Ukraine; and he thinks that he can continue to grind forward on the ground. We have seen a flurry of diplomatic activity this month for one reason: Trump had set a hard deadline of August 8 for Putin to stop shooting or to face massive sanctions, including secondary sanctions on his principal trading partners. To evade this, Putin proposed a meeting with Trump and hinted to US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff that he could be flexible. This prospect persuaded Trump to let the August 8 deadline pass without new sanctions and to meet with Putin, which he did on August 15 in Anchorage.

While Trump and Witkoff said that Putin demonstrated a readiness to make concessions there, we have no public evidence of a new, more conciliatory Kremlin position. Moscow rejects Trump’s intermediate goal of a cease-fire and continues its intensive bombardment of Ukrainian cities and civilians. The attack the night of August 27 was one of the largest of the war, killing at least twenty-three people in Kyiv. It proved an embarrassment to the White House, which still insists Russia is now more flexible, even as it demands a solution to “the root causes” of the war. This means a peace deal that includes a commitment that a “neutral” Ukraine would never join NATO; would not host foreign troops; and would hand over to Russia the territories in Luhansk and Donetsk that Kyiv controls, including the easily defendable towns in the western Donbas (Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Pokrovsk) that Moscow has been trying to seize for years.

Following the visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and seven other European leaders to the White House for talks on August 18, the focus has turned to a potential Putin-Zelenskyy meeting. But Russian statements suggest that any such meeting is far off. This is no surprise. Putin has consistently rejected meetings with Zelenskyy for years and, with the sanctions pressure off, has had no reason to change his mind.

Trump has expressed his frustration with the difficulty of arranging a Putin-Zelenskyy meeting and mentioned the possibility of placing massive sanctions on Russia; but he has also floated suspending his efforts to achieve peace. He has threatened to walk away in the past and did not actually do it. While Trump still says that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is former President Joe Biden’s war, not his, he likely understands that as president of the United States, it is now his responsibility.

—John E. Herbst

3. What has the impact of this war been on Russian society?

The most visible impact of the war on Russian society has been a sharp escalation in repression, censorship, and the curtailment of all forms of dissent. In this sense, the fates of Yevgeniy Prigozhin and Alexei Navalny—two people with little in common—are illustrative. Prigozhin, the onetime Putin ally who led the Wagner Group, died in a highly suspicious plane crash in August 2023 after leading an armed rebellion against the Kremlin a month earlier. Navalny, an opposition leader and anti-corruption crusader, died in prison under very suspicious circumstances six months later. The message was clear: The Kremlin was prepared to use lethal force and extrajudicial executions to eliminate its opponents.

The Kremlin has also aggressively curtailed dissent using methods short of lethal force. New laws criminalizing criticism of the military and spreading what the regime considers disinformation about the war have resulted in more than twenty thousand arrests and more than one thousand criminally charged. Independent media outlets such as Novaya Gazeta and TV Rain (Dozhd) have been forced to relocate abroad.

Additionally, since February 2022, there have been numerous deaths of high-profile Russian officials and business leaders under mysterious circumstances, including defenestrations, suspicious “suicides,” sudden illnesses, and unexplained accidents. Among these are Andrei Badalov, vice president of pipeline giant Transneft, who fell to his death from a high-rise; Vadim Boyko, a colonel involved in troop mobilization, who was found dead from gunshot wounds in his office; and Roman Starovoyt, who was found dead with a gunshot wound shortly after being fired as transportation minister.

Russia’s intensified repression and the wave of mysterious deaths of high-ranking officials have instilled a climate of fear among both the elite and the public, eroded public trust, and effectively neutralized civic groups that are autonomous from the state. As many as 1.3 million Russians, many of them highly educated and highly skilled, have fled the country to escape military mobilization, repression, and diminishing opportunities.

Additionally, the war has accelerated the Kremlin’s efforts to indoctrinate the country’s youth. From early childhood, children are now exposed to militaristic curricula and patriotic propaganda in schools. Youth are also increasingly recruited into paramilitary-style training camps where they engage in drills, weapons exercises, and ideological indoctrination.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical podcast. He previously worked as a foreign correspondent in Moscow.

4. What is the real state of Russia’s economy?

The commonplace view on the Russian economy is that it has been remarkably resilient but that it will eventually face an uncomfortable reckoning.

After the initial shock of Western sanctions in February 2022, the Central Bank of Russia’s high interest rates and capital controls did enough to preserve trust in the financial system. Then, for the remainder of the year and some of the following, Russia benefited from the very uncertainty on the oil market that its war had caused. Record income from oil exports more than compensated for lower gas exports as Europe weaned itself off Russian gas.

Since 2022, the long-term liabilities of Russia’s economy have become more apparent. Every year, the government has been unable to cover its increased spending on the war and its domestic crackdown. Entire economic sectors and regions are now dependent on the war effort and would struggle to adapt if it were to stop.

With no recourse to borrowing from international markets, Russia has had to deplete liquid savings in the National Welfare Fund, albeit at a slower rate than is usually predicted. Intractably high inflation forces the central bank to keep interest rates high, which prevents firms from investing. Earlier this year, it became clear that a combination of government subsidies and political pressure was leading banks to lend to the military-industrial complex at preferential rates.

This year, the scant government data available suggests the government is heading for a fiscal deficit even higher than the 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) it has managed to sustain since 2022. But this will not be enough to help Ukraine. Regardless of medium-term consequences for inflation, Moscow can always sell nonliquid assets it controls and mobilize the more than $200 billion of its central bank reserves that aren’t blocked by Western sanctions.

—Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

5. How has the war impacted Ukraine’s economy?

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that Ukraine’s GDP growth will slow from 3.5 percent last year to about 2 percent this year. On the ground in Kyiv, though, you can see that this is a much harder year economically for everyone—and conditions in the outlying regions are worse.

With six million Ukrainians still abroad, another one million serving in the military, and daily attacks on factories and infrastructure, economic capacity is suffering. Consumers are feeling the effects of inflation, which is estimated at 12.6 percent, according to the IMF. The price of imported goods is rising as the hryvnia exchange rate continues to slide upward. Western aid helps, but much of it goes to defense and maintaining the status quo for social services. Unfortunately, until a cease-fire is reached, Ukraine is caught in an economic trajectory that does not give it much room for changing the paradigm to create dynamic growth.

—Brian Mefford is a nonresident senior fellow at the Eurasia Center and director and founder of Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental relations and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv.

6. Is Ukraine eager to end the war?

From the political leadership to the men and women on the front lines and ordinary folk across the country, almost everyone in Ukraine is utterly exhausted and desperate for peace. This is reflected in recent opinion polling, with the number of Ukrainians who want to fight on until victory now a fraction of what it was during the first year of the war. Ukraine’s hunger for peace is hardly surprising. Russia’s invasion has killed hundreds of thousands, forced more than ten million Ukrainians to flee their homes, and left dozens of towns and cities in rubble. As fighting continues to rage along a front line measuring hundreds of miles, the civilian population faces nightly air raids that target residential districts in a calculated bid to break Ukraine’s national resistance.

These grim realities are fueling widespread acceptance of the idea of a negotiated settlement that would allow Russia to continue occupying the approximately 20 percent of Ukraine that is currently under Kremlin control. However, Ukrainians overwhelmingly reject the idea of officially ceding land to Russia, as most believe this would legitimize Putin’s decision to invade and make further Russian aggression all but inevitable.

With a decisive Ukrainian military victory no longer looking attainable, the current priority for Ukrainians is to negotiate a settlement that includes security guarantees from the country’s Western partners. These guarantees must be credible enough to deter a new Russian invasion. Ukrainians regard the current war as an existential struggle for national survival. They believe Putin is intent on erasing Ukrainian statehood and national identity altogether, and they have no faith whatsoever in Russian promises of future peaceful coexistence. They are therefore focused on securing commitments from the international community to prevent the renewal of hostilities once Russia has had an opportunity to regroup and rearm.

—Peter Dickinson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert section and the publisher of Business Ukraine and Lviv Today magazines.

7. How much Ukrainian territory is Russia seeking in these talks, and what is it likely to get?

Moscow has set a very specific territorial condition for a peace deal. It wants all of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, including territory currently under the control of Kyiv. There are three reasons for this. The first is that these are the first two oblasts, aside from Crimea, that Moscow has tried to capture since the war began in 2014. The second is that there are critical minerals and rich farmland in the area. The third and most important reason is that the western slice of Donetsk has terrain that makes it difficult to conquer. It contains the three key cities of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Pokrovsk that Moscow has been trying to capture for years without success. The territory to the east is largely open ground, making it much harder to defend.

If Ukraine gave Russia this territory, it would be much easier for Putin to take the rest of Ukraine in the future. In exchange for this, Moscow is ready to offer bits of Ukrainian territory under its control. Zelenskyy has rejected this unusual Kremlin demand with the clear support of his European partners.

—John E. Herbst

8. Would that territory be recognized as part of Russia?

There is a world of difference between recognizing the reality that Russia is currently occupying Ukrainian territory and formally recognizing such territory as legally and legitimately part of Russia. The first would allow for a durable peace with an acknowledged demarcation line separating the two sides. The second would reward borders changed through aggression, a violation of over ninety years of US foreign policy. It is the job of diplomats to find the wording that gets us to the right outcome.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

9. What could security guarantees look like for Ukraine?

The most effective security guarantee for Ukraine would be membership in NATO, but Trump has ruled that out. Instead, Witkoff has suggested “Article 5-like protections” for Ukraine, a reference to the North Atlantic Treaty’s collective-defense provision. Trump has said that the United States would not put boots on the ground inside Ukraine but would back up European security guarantees for the country.

The language of the security guarantees from the United States, as well as Ukraine’s partners known as the “Coalition of the Willing,” should draw on Article 5 and should be either legally binding or, at least in the US case, backed up by Congress in some form. Anything short of Article 5’s language would be seen as a weaker guarantee, perhaps an invitation to Putin to resume the war.

The substance of security guarantees should start with a steady stream of Western and other military equipment plus defense industrial cooperation to enable the Ukrainians to defend themselves. To meet Trump’s promise not to rely on US grants, the United States could work out lend-lease arrangements for Ukraine or European countries to fund the US weapons flows.

Security guarantees should also include deployment inside Ukraine by Coalition of the Willing countries, including air defense, air patrolling, surveillance, intelligence, logistics, and training units. These could be backed up by US air units, including both reconnaissance and combat units stationed in Poland and Romania, plus US and European air and naval forces stationed in Romania and Bulgaria, with Turkey’s cooperation, to support security for the Black Sea. The United States would also provide intelligence, logistics, and other backup for the coalition forces and Ukraine itself. NATO could support this by providing intelligence and even command-and-control support. (Hungary’s predictable objections might be overcome by Trump’s personal intervention with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who is deeply invested in his political alliance with Trump.)

That’s a lot. But that’s what “Article 5-like,” invoked by Witkoff, means. This sketch of security for Ukraine could work if, but only if, the United States means it and is willing to commit the forces it takes and to stare down Putin when he objects.

—Daniel Fried

10. What are the potential shortcomings of a security guarantee for Ukraine?

The best-case scenario for Russia would be to allow the United States and its European partners to offer security guarantees to Kyiv. And then see them fall apart.

A spectacular failure to fulfill the pledge would prove Putin’s claim that the “collective West” is a bumazhneey zhuravlik, an origami bird, or—using a more familiar term—a paper tiger, unable to defend not only Ukraine but also itself.

Military guarantees, especially when provided to a non-allied state, always boil down to political decisions. The same principle applies to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which—contrary to conventional wisdom—doesn’t stipulate that all NATO members should respond automatically to a potential attack on one of them. Rather, it states that each member “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” In case of a hypothetical “minor incursion” of Russian forces in Lithuania, Estonia, or Poland, for that matter, the initial reaction of most leaders in Berlin, Paris, and Brussels wouldn’t be to assemble a bunch of generals and walk through military options. It would be to consult pollsters.

From the viewpoint of both Ukraine and NATO allies, the best we can do is to keep supplying Ukraine with state-of-the-art weaponry such as long-range missiles, investing in its industrial base, lifting all restrictions on strikes in Russian territory, and sharing as much intelligence as possible. This way, the Ukrainians will be able to take care of themselves.

—Marek Magierowski is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the director of strategy for the Poland program at the Freedom Institute in Warsaw. He previously served as Poland’s ambassador to the United States and to Israel.

11. How prepared are European countries to put boots on the ground in Ukraine?

The short answer is: not prepared enough. Of the thirty-one countries in the “Coalition of the Willing” (which includes both European nations and non-European countries such as Canada and Australia), only a few have publicly committed troops to enforce a peace in Ukraine.

Privately, there are many countries interested, but eyes are on Europe’s largest and leading countries to set the pace. So far, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has been the most articulate about his willingness to station British troops in the country. Others such as French President Emmanuel Macron are moving cautiously. In the past, Macron proposed a small “reassurance” force, but he has since stressed that moves “should not be rushed.” The Germans are equally cautious and have yet to commit to any moves. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has been skeptical about any NATO force in Ukraine. Poland, with Europe’s largest army, has already nixed the idea of contributing any Polish troops for a reassurance force.

The hesitation stems from two main sources: limited capacity and an uncertain US backstop. The sad reality is most European militaries are still in sorry states. Germany’s foreign minister warned that German participation would “overwhelm” its military. Even the most forward-leaning countries in the coalition have a very limited number of fully operational brigades to deploy and rotate boots on the ground. Any forces available would likely replace current reinforcements on NATO’s eastern flank.

Equally important, Europeans will remain non-committal in the absence of a credible US backstop for their deployment of a security force. Germans, Brits, Danes, and more don’t seem to be convinced yet that if the Russians start shooting, there will be US backup. That is a fair concern—one that must be a priority for European leaders to confront. With limited European capabilities and uncertain US policy, what remains is a collective action problem, with too few of the so-called Coalition of the Willing in Europe actually willing to act.

To cut the knot on this, Europeans should make offers now to leverage their successful White House summitry and the support they won from Trump for a US back-up role. Rather than losing momentum in working out every detail of specific capabilities needed, what Europeans should focus on now is announcing pledges of troops, generating mass, and as much participation as possible to make the reassurance force the political tool it is at this stage. Commitments for a significant force could lock in Trump and remind him of his own promises to empower the Europeans, and they would help put Putin on the spot about whether he actually wants to move forward with negotiations.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

12. What are the prospects for Ukraine joining NATO?

In the near term, the prospects for Ukraine becoming a NATO ally are slim to none. But Ukraine’s path toward NATO membership—a goal enshrined in Kyiv’s constitution—is central to both Ukraine and NATO’s future security and should not end as a part of the Trump administration’s ongoing efforts to bring the Russia-Ukraine war to a close.

Ukraine is officially an aspirant country for NATO membership, alongside Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the 2024 Washington summit, allies reaffirmed that Ukraine’s future is in NATO, that its path to membership is irreversible, and that allies would extend an invitation to Ukraine to join NATO when they agree to do so and the necessary conditions are met.

Decisions of NATO enlargement are driven by NATO’s open-door policy, which is based on Article 10 of the Alliance’s founding North Atlantic Treaty, which states that allies may, by unanimous agreement, “invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”

While Ukraine’s near-term prospects for joining NATO are slim, it is fundamental to the strength of the Alliance’s founding treaty, as well as the principle of self-determination enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter, that this decision remain one between Ukraine and NATO allies. If Putin can determine Ukraine’s security arrangements, then Ukraine has lost an essential element of its sovereignty and democracy, and the United States and its European allies have negotiated away a central tenet of the post-World War II international order.

—Torrey Taussig is the director of and a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, she was a director for European affairs on the National Security Council.

13. What are the prospects for Ukraine joining the EU?

Ukraine’s prospects for joining the European Union (EU) ultimately remain strong, but the path is long and full of roadblocks. The good news: Ukraine has made real progress on its reforms and aligning with EU standards since 2022, even while at war. The European Commission released another tranche of aid on August 21 after it concluded Ukraine satisfied over a dozen reform indicators. Support for Ukraine’s membership remains strong both in Ukraine and across the bloc, underpinning much-needed political will to keep up the pressure.

But there are real obstacles. The Ukrainian government’s attempt to subjugate Kyiv’s corruption watchdogs before it had to ultimately reverse course in the face of massive opposition both from its own people and the EU, is a lesson that Ukraine’s reforms are neither linear nor permanent. They will require constant vigilance and political pressure to make sure the country stays on track. Beyond Ukraine, the accession process provides ample opportunity for political spoilers to stall Ukraine’s progress, which Hungary is already doing, leaving the country in limbo. Here, Trump’s recent intervention confronting Orbán about his opposition to Kyiv’s path to membership will be an interesting space to watch.

Waiting in the wings are the real hard questions about what Ukraine’s eventual membership will mean for some of the foundational policies of the union. From the single market and already complex decision-making among twenty-seven member states to the myriad systems of agriculture subsidies and regional funds, the entry of a country of the size and economic structure of Ukraine would have wide-ranging impacts. The real challenge will be in sustaining the political will in Ukraine and around Europe to continue the necessary technocratic reforms and keep up the pressure on the likes of Hungary and others to move Ukraine closer to joining the bloc. At the same time, European leaders should not forget the opportunity Ukrainian membership could provide to a union plagued by a lack of economic dynamism, innovation, and technology leadership. On all of these fronts and more, the battle-tested potential member on its Eastern flank could provide a much-needed shot in arm for the EU.

—Jörn Fleck

14. What more sanctions could the US and its allies use against Russia?

Russia’s economy is struggling. Nearly four years of war expenses combined with Western sanctions have put Moscow’s economy on a wartime footing. Inflation and interest rates remain high at 8.8 percent and 18 percent, respectively. The government continues to draw down its National Welfare Fund to cover its fiscal deficit. Energy exports, especially oil, remain a lifeline for Russia even though they are declining. Last month, Russia brought in $9.8 billion from oil and gas exports, a 27 percent decrease from a year ago, further restricting Moscow’s budget. Putin, quite literally, cannot afford to lose his remaining oil revenue. This predicament creates the perfect target for sanctions—Russian oil.

Sanctioning Russia’s oil, similar to the approach the United States took against Iran, will immediately disrupt Moscow’s oil revenue. And with the dwindling safety net of the National Welfare Fund, Putin will have no choice but to negotiate with Western partners and meet Ukraine’s demands to end the war. In exchange for the peace deal and security guarantees, the United States and Group of Seven (G7) partners can offer to lift sanctions and other restrictive measures that would allow the return of Russian oil to the market and save Russia’s economy from ruin.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She is a former senior Treasury official and National Security Council director.

New Atlanticist

Aug 26, 2025

To end Putin’s war on Ukraine, Trump should sanction Russian oil

By Kimberly Donovan

The US president is well positioned to bring about peace for Ukraine, but his administration needs to arm him with the best tools and options to do so.

Conflict Financial Sanctions and Economic Coercion

15. How many Ukrainian children have been abducted by Russia, and what are the prospects for their return?

The Russian Federation’s forcible transfer of Ukrainian children began as early as 2014, but escalated into a coordinated, systematic state policy following Moscow’s full-scale invasion in 2022. As of now, the Ukrainian government has verified the identities of 19,456 children deported to Russia or Russian-occupied territories. Independent researchers estimate the number may exceed 35,000 children. Senior members of the US Congress have cited figures as high as 200,000 children. Russia’s mass deportation of Ukrainian children is among the most well-documented atrocity crimes of modern warfare. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Putin and Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova for their roles in these crimes. Evidence of the Russian state’s role in these crimes also includes fast-tracked legislation that facilitates the illegal adoption and naturalization of Ukrainian children, as well as documentation of forced relocation, militarized training, and ideological indoctrination that punishes children for expressing Ukrainian language, faith, or identity.

To date, only 1,366 children have been returned to Ukraine, according to Ukrainian organizations. Russia’s refusal to facilitate their repatriation—along with efforts to conceal their identities and locations—violates multiple international laws, with international actors most frequently naming the UN Genocide Convention and Convention on the Rights of the Child. Human rights experts warn that failing to secure Ukrainian children’s unconditional release sets a dangerous precedent for the global rights of children in conflict. The United States has many tools to secure their return, including targeted sanctions against individuals responsible and a refusal to formally acknowledge Russian occupation, which could complicate their repatriation. Moreover, framing this crisis as a humanitarian concern misses its strategic significance. The forced transfer of children is a core obstacle to any credible postwar security arrangement for Ukraine. Given Washington’s significant power and leverage, demonstrating it can influence Moscow’s behavior regarding vulnerable children is central to building a credible deterrence posture and securing lasting peace.

—Kristina Hook is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University. She previously served as a policy advisor at the US Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.

16. What are the prospects for accountability under international law for Putin and other Russian leaders?

There has already been tremendous work on seeking accountability for Russian leaders, soldiers, and other suspects accused of war crimes. As of March, more than five hundred indictments for war crimes were reportedly submitted to Ukrainian courts, with 141 sentences delivered. In addition, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is investigating and has issued six publicly confirmed arrest warrants for Russian leaders including Putin, complemented by the work of other domestic jurisdictions through civil and criminal cases. In June, the Council of Europe (COE) finalized the statute for the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (STCoA), opening up another mechanism for accountability.

That said, logistical hurdles have prevented all but a few Russian perpetrators from standing trial. Most notably, Russian perpetrators have not traveled to countries that are able and willing to arrest and either prosecute or extradite them. Of the 141 sentences in Ukrainian courts, all but nineteen were in absentia, meaning the suspects were not physically present and are not currently imprisoned. Further complicating matters, sitting heads of state and top leaders are granted personal immunities in domestic and non-international courts, meaning they cannot be held accountable at those venues until after they leave office. Because the COE has indicated that the STCoA is limited by these immunities, the ICC is the only currently available venue to criminally prosecute senior Russian leaders during their tenure. Resource shortages across mechanisms and US sanctions on ICC personnel also hinder accountability prospects.

There is always the possibility that peace talks will include provisions related to accountability, and human rights groups have called for Trump to demand justice. However, it is also possible that amnesty for certain leaders will be on the table; notably, Switzerland and Austria have both said they would grant Putin immunity from arrest should he travel to either country for peace negotiations. While amnesties would be a setback for justice efforts, they would not wholesale preclude any accountability. Depending on the details, alternative fora may still be able to prosecute suspects (especially, for leaders, after they have left office), and any future international crimes would generally not be covered. Finally, while holding Putin and his senior leaders accountable should be a main priority, complementary processes can address suspects not covered by amnesties, such as lower-level perpetrators, aiders and abettors, and other complicit parties.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

17. How is China viewing these efforts?

China’s position vis-à-vis the war remains the same: It does not want Russia to lose and is willing to endure sizable—but not unlimited—costs to achieve that end. While sensitive to potential risks arising from a highly unpredictable negotiating process, Beijing largely sees these talks as an opportunity to drive wedges between the United States, NATO, Taiwan, and other Indo-Pacific actors.

Beijing has not only rhetorically supported Moscow but also provided the Russian defense industrial base with significant, possibly decisive, material assistance. Beijing supplied crucial trench-digging equipment to Russia ahead of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in 2022 and continues to provision other critical dual-use items, such as batteries and fiber optic cables for first-person view drones. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has even reportedly told European officials that “China cannot afford for Russia to lose the war in Ukraine.”

Still, the Chinese Communist Party is quietly but perceptibly preparing for a post-Putin Russia—and hedging against major convulsions in Russian domestic politics in an uncertain post-war period—by institutionalizing ties with the Russian political elite.

—Joseph Webster is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and editor of the independent China-Russia Report.

18. How are the Baltic countries viewing these talks?

For the Baltic states, the Trump-Putin Alaska summit and the subsequent White House meetings involving Trump, Zelenskyy, and European leaders highlighted both the opportunities and potential setbacks of diplomacy. The Baltic states’ official support for Trump’s diplomatic efforts is rooted in a deep conviction that diplomacy without real pressure on Russia leads nowhere. From the Baltic viewpoint, real strength against Moscow is still lacking on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States should leverage its power to compel Putin to agree to an unconditional cease-fire, just as Ukraine did months ago. To achieve a just and lasting peace, US security guarantees for Ukraine, together with those from European nations, are crucial. Hesitation on this matter signals weakness, encourages further aggression, and risks a dangerous reshaping of Europe’s security order. Equally critical is for Europe to finally fully deploy its own leverage: accelerating arms deliveries to Ukraine, opening EU accession talks this September with a 2030 membership target, adopting the EU’s nineteenth sanctions package, and using frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction.

The Baltic states are clear-eyed about Putin’s approach: negotiations, for him, are not about compromise but about manipulation. His KGB-trained strategy relies on twisting reality—making mere participation in summits seem like a major concession, then using that supposed gesture to justify demands for land swaps or political concessions Ukraine cannot possibly accept. The main goal is not peace but time: to prolong the diplomatic process, secure territorial gains on the battlefield, and blame Kyiv for the deadlock. From the Baltic perspective, this is a familiar pattern Russia has used before, turning diplomacy into a cover for escalation. Therefore, the Baltics insist that diplomacy will only work when Putin faces a choice between retreat and unbearable costs, not when he is given another stage to legitimize aggression.

—Justina Budginaite-Froehly, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She previously worked at the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Lithuania in the Defense Policy Planning Department.

19. What should Congress do to help get Ukraine the security assistance it needs?

Last year, Congress took big, bold action and passed a substantial supplemental package that provided the Biden administration with sixty billion dollars’ worth of security assistance to help Ukraine get the weapons it needed to defend itself. Much of that money remains unused for many reasons, including both the Biden and Trump administrations’ hesitance to deplete US stockpiles and the existing backlog of the US defense industrial base. Congress should use its influence—as it has been doing on a bipartisan basis—to urge the administration to provide Ukraine with the tools it needs to win this war while still protecting American stockpiles.

But Congress also has a lot more tools in its belt that do not require additional US funds to ensure Ukraine gets the weapons it needs. For example, many senior members of Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, have longstanding relationships with European leaders. Europe has certainly stepped up in the wake of Russia’s illegal invasion by implementing crushing sanctions against Russia, sending critical weapons systems to Ukraine, pledging to significantly increasing military spending to create a strong and united Europe, and standing firmly with Ukraine. But Europe still lacks production capabilities and personnel to meet some of those goals in the short term. Many European countries do, however, have Patriot batteries that could be shared with Ukraine today. In addition, Europe is sitting on hundreds of billions of dollars in immobilized Russian assets. It’s time to give that money to Ukraine to buy the weapons they need to defend their people and start rebuilding their country.

Europe sending Patriots and Russian assets would not only be an effective way to help Ukraine get the security assistance it needs. They would also serve as a powerful message of deterrence to Putin—and a reminder to the world that Europe is a force to be reckoned with in its own right.

—Leslie Shedd is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, the founder of Rising Communications, and former communications director and senior advisor for the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

20. What are the prospects for new elections in Ukraine?

After the protests against the government’s attempt to remove the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau in late July, elections in Ukraine are a question of “when” rather than “if.” The size, speed, and sheer intensity of the protests were a sign of public frustration with the perceived unaccountability of elected officials. Everyone understands the need for unity during wartime and the martial law prohibitions on holding elections in Ukraine. However, elections are the best outlet for public anger, lest protests spill over into violence, vigilantism, and division.

Ukraine’s last elections were held in 2020, meaning this is already the longest period in Ukraine’s democratic history without elections. After three-and-a-half years, the Russian invasion shows no real signs of ending. What if the war lasts another three-and-a-half years? That would mark nine years without elections in Ukraine. What if the war lasts five or ten years more? Ruling out elections entirely is a formula for fomenting internal revolution. That would inevitably lead to a loss of international support for Ukraine and give Russia a chance to achieve what it cannot achieve on the battlefield.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States adapted to make use of mail-in ballots. Similarly, through digitalization, Ukraine can adapt to hold elections during wartime. Refugees abroad already can vote at embassies, and with some adaptions to the Diia application, which most Ukrainians use, it’s not a stretch to allow for online voting. The change to a party list system for parliamentary and local elections beginning in 2020 has largely eliminated the issue of geographic districts, which previously would have been a bigger complication. Some will argue that digital voting will allow fraud, but the fact is, whatever fraud done digitally will still be far less than the fraud by paper ballot that sparked the Orange Revolution and was a hallmark of elections in Ukraine’s east and south for decades. The inspiring ingenuity of Ukrainians who adapt on the battlefield each day to resist the Russian advance can surely be applied to the sphere of elections. It’s only a question of political will.

—Brian Mefford

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Putin wants to capture Ukraine’s crucial fortress belt without a fight

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 28 Aug 2025 21:16:11 +0000

As US-led efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine struggle to gain momentum, Vladimir Putin’s latest territorial demands include the surrender of strategically vital and heavily fortified Ukrainian land in the east of the country. Moscow is calling on Kyiv to unilaterally withdraw from the approximately one-third of Donetsk province that remains in Ukrainian hands as part of any peace deal. In other words, Putin aims to secure territory at the negotiating table that his army has been unable to conquer in more that three and a half years of full-scale war.

The northern third of the Donetsk province is the last remaining part of eastern Ukraine’s industrial Donbas region that is still under Kyiv control. It has been at the epicenter of Putin’s invasion ever since the onset of Russian aggression more than a decade ago in 2014, and is home to Ukraine’s most extensive network of fortifications. Putin’s proposed peace terms pose a series of grave political and military threats for the Ukrainian authorities.

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Gifting Russia large swathes of unconquered territory that thousands of Ukrainians have died defending would be an extremely bitter pill for the Ukrainian population to swallow, to put it mildly. It would also be widely seen as rewarding Russia for launching the largest European war since World War II. This would legitimize Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine and set the stage for further Russian aggression.

Even if Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was personally inclined to appease Putin, he does not constitutionally have the authority to cede land. Instead, changes to Ukraine’s borders must be agreed via a national referendum. Any indication that Zelenskyy favored accepting Putin’s territorial demands would likely provoke strong domestic opposition. This would potentially destabilize Ukraine, creating a range of opportunities for Russia to exploit. A weakened and divided Ukraine would be far more vulnerable on the battlefield and in the diplomatic arena.

Alternatively, if Zelenskyy maintains his current position and continues to rule out Putin’s Donbas land grab, the Kremlin will likely use this rejection to poison the Ukrainian leader’s relations with US President Donald Trump by portraying Ukraine as the main obstacle to peace. Putin would no doubt welcome the opportunity to drive a wedge between Kyiv and Washington as Moscow seeks to isolate Ukraine and reduce international support for the Ukrainian war effort.

Militarily, the surrender of the northern Donetsk region would place large parts of eastern Ukraine at risk of being overrun by the advancing Russians. The region currently serves as a bastion against Russia’s invasion. While there is no guarantee that fortified areas will be able to hold out indefinitely against Russian attacks, Putin would almost certainly be forced to sacrifice huge numbers of troops before achieving his goal. In this sense, the Donbas fortress belt is one of Ukraine’s trump cards in its war of attrition against Russia.

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Over the past eleven years, Ukraine has constructed a range of defensive fortifications in the northern Donetsk region centered around the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The area has served as a logistical hub for the Ukrainian war effort and has been a focus of efforts to develop defense in depth. If Ukraine retreats from this stronghold, Russia would be able to secure a vital staging post for further advances while avoiding hundreds of thousands of casualties. The Ukrainian military would then be forced to hastily construct new fortifications in significantly less favorable terrain.

With current military technologies favoring defensive operations, Ukraine’s fortress belt in the northern Donetsk region represents a formidable obstacle for Putin’s invading army. The ubiquity of drones above the battlefield makes large-scale mechanized breakthroughs extremely challenging to accomplish, leaving Russia to rely on small groups of infantry to infiltrate Ukrainian forward positions. This approach can be successful against thinly defended and hastily constructed defensive positions, but is unlikely to prove effective against the most heavily fortified sector of the Ukrainian front lines.

Ukrainians recognize the need for concessions, with a majority acknowledging that areas of the country currently occupied by Russia will likely remain under Kremlin control as part of any peace settlement. Crucially, however, almost nobody in Ukraine believes that handing over additional unconquered territory in the Donbas would satisfy Putin’s imperial ambitions or remove the threat of future Russian invasions. On the contrary, most Ukrainians agree that this would only encourage the Kremlin and embolden Putin to go further. He would be able to do so from a position of strength, having secured Ukraine’s fortress belt without the prolonged fighting that has proved necessary in order to secure far smaller territorial gains elsewhere in eastern Ukraine.

From both a military and political perspective, it would make little sense for Ukraine to accept Russia’s territorial demands and voluntarily surrender the northern Donetsk region as part of a peace deal. As long as Kyiv continues to control the Donbas fortress belt, there is a good chance that the Ukrainian military can turn the entire region into a graveyard for Putin’s invading army. Meanwhile, a withdrawal would leave large parts of Ukraine dangerously undefended and dramatically undermine faith in the country’s leadership.

Even if Putin concentrates his best military units in a bid to complete the conquest of the Donbas region, he would almost certainly be forced to pay a very high price for any significant advances. Indeed, the Russian army may become bogged down for years in bitter fighting that would dwarf earlier battles of attrition and could conceivably change the entire course of the war. This is exactly why Putin is pushing for Ukraine to surrender the region without a fight, and helps explain why Ukraine is reluctant to do so.

On the other hand, the White House hosted a meeting this month between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, two recently warring states, where a peace pledge was signed in Trump’s presence. The administration may be looking to repeat this formula with other long-running disputes. If so, then it might naturally look to the Balkans, where the United States retains important assets and investments through NATO, and where some senior US officials have recently made inroads.

During a visit to Kosovo this month by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David A. Baker, Kosovo’s leaders noted that there were discussions on a joint US-Kosovo arms production program. The State Department has also reportedly confirmed that a $200 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) energy program in Kosovo will continue, even as the MCC was cut back substantially elsewhere. Also this month, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Djuric, launching a strategic bilateral dialogue and calling for de-escalation in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There are clear reasons for continued US engagement in a region that it has helped shape for the past thirty-five years. Ongoing disputes in the Balkans provide Russia with opportunities to play spoiler in NATO’s neighborhood and fragment markets and trade routes that affect US investments. And importantly, demand for US involvement remains strong in the region—especially in Kosovo, where mistrust in the EU’s ability to manage major security challenges, such as Kosovo-Serbia relations, runs deep.

EU-led dialogue is at an impasse

Launched in 2011 with strong US backing, the EU-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has been stalled for more than a year. The problem is not a lack of agreements, but rather an abundance of unimplemented ones.

In February 2023, the two sides agreed on a “path to normalizing relations.” The agreement implied Serbia’s de facto recognition of Kosovo by committing Belgrade to refraining from blocking Kosovo’s membership in international organizations and by accepting its documents, symbols, and institutions. In return, Kosovo pledged to establish an Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities to provide greater rights and autonomy for Kosovo Serbs. A month later, the sides endorsed an “implementation plan,” but a lack of agreement on the plan’s sequencing likely doomed the deal.

Distrust in each other’s intentions, skepticism toward Western guarantees, and the political rewards of ethnic brinkmanship pushed both sides toward unilateral moves in northern Kosovo. As Pristina dismantled Serbia’s illegal parallel governing structures, Serbian insurgents staged a failed armed incursion in late 2023, while most Kosovo Serbs abandoned Kosovo’s legal institutions. The outcome has been greater central government control over Kosovo’s north, but also greater ethnic segregation in the country and growing international isolation. The EU imposed restrictive economic measures on Kosovo in 2023, most of which remain in place. Serbia’s EU accession process has likewise been frozen.

Domestic politics have compounded the stalemate. Six months after inconclusive elections, Kosovo still lacks a new government with a mandate to negotiate. Meanwhile, Serbia has faced successive waves of student-led anti-corruption protests that have put its president, Aleksandar Vučić, on the defensive. Leadership changes in Washington and Europe have further limited Western attention.

The Trump administration could kickstart talks

In January, the EU appointed Danish diplomat Peter Sørensen as its new mediator in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, but he appears to lack the political backing needed for a fresh start. Brussels insists there is no alternative to the 2023 agreements, which it considers legally binding and has embedded into both countries’ EU accession frameworks. Yet the past two years have shown that accession—the EU’s main point of leverage—no longer carries weight in getting either side to comply.

Doubts appear to be growing in Kosovo, which is unrecognized by five EU member states, that the country has a realistic path to EU accession. Given this distrust, Kosovo leaders are unwilling to concede anything to Serbia for what it sees as an unattainable goal. In Serbia, the public and political elites alike appear to be growing increasingly disillusioned with the EU. Belgrade has effectively abandoned the accession process and has become largely unresponsive to EU pressure.

This deadlock may only be broken by an external jolt. Washington still holds decisive leverage over both parties. And the White House may have greater convening power than the EU, as demonstrated by this month’s Azerbaijan-Armenia talks. While the second Trump administration hasn’t demonstrated an interest in mediating Kosovo-Serbia talks thus far, it has proven unpredictable in its diplomatic initiatives. The Trump administration may, for example, eventually engage on this issue to seek a foreign policy “win” if progress on peace initiatives elsewhere prove elusive.

The challenge, however, is to avoid repeating past mistakes. If the United States renews its engagement on Kosovo-Serbia talks, it must aim for durable solutions rather than quick photo-ops. That requires complementing rather than competing with EU engagements, as well as pushing toward a final, legally binding agreement centered on mutual recognition—one that would allow Kosovo to fully consolidate its statehood and join (at least) Western multilateral institutions. Agreements that settle on anything less have proven to be fragile and unsustainable, merely pushing the can down the road to the next US administration.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

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Chemali interviewed on MSNBC to discuss the state of play following the White House Ukraine summit

oakinolugbade — Thu, 21 Aug 2025 21:09:23 +0000

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Sorry, Trump, but Putin will not pursue peace until he is facing military defeat

Elena Davlikanova, Yevhen Malik — Thu, 21 Aug 2025 19:59:00 +0000

Recent summits in Alaska and Washington DC succeeded in thrusting the Russian invasion of Ukraine back into the global headlines. However, this flurry of diplomatic activity failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs in the faltering US-led peace effort to end Europe’s largest war since World War II.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy both achieved a number of specific goals during their meetings with US President Donald Trump. The red carpet treatment Putin received in Anchorage was a symbolic victory that ended the Kremlin dictator’s international isolation in some style, while the subsequent summit allowed him to sidestep the threat of new US sanctions and deflect calls for an immediate ceasefire.

Zelenskyy, meanwhile, secured Trump’s tentative commitment to participate in security guarantees for Ukraine and managed to avoid making any dangerous territorial concessions. Crucially, the White House meeting also provided the Ukrainian leader with an opportunity to demonstrate that his relationship with Trump has improved considerably since their infamous Oval Office spat six months ago.

These limited gains were welcomed in Moscow and Kyiv, but they could not mask the overall lack of progress toward peace. White House officials initially indicated that Trump had reached preliminary agreement with Putin over security guarantees for Ukraine and a bilateral meeting with Zelenskyy, but the Kremlin has since contradicted these claims.

Speaking on August 20, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov downplayed the prospect of any direct talks between Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart, while demanding that Russia play a key role in any security guarantees for Ukraine. Lavrov’s absurd insistence on a Russian veto over Ukraine’s future security speaks volumes about Moscow’s lack of interest in a lasting settlement. Russia then underlined its uncompromising stance by launching a massive bombardment of Ukraine early on August 21 that included a targeted missile strike on an American-owned electrons plant in the west of the country.

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It should now be abundantly clear that Russia will continue to reject Trump’s peace overtures until Putin faces significantly more pressure to end the war. At present, the Russian ruler believes he can stall for time and ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine while slowly but steadily pummeling the Ukrainians into submission. Economic measures including increased sanctions and secondary tariffs can certainly impact his thinking, but Putin’s position is unlikely to undergo any fundamental changes unless he loses the battlefield initiative and is forced to confront the possibility of military defeat.

While others put their faith in diplomacy, Ukraine appears to be well aware that the key to success remains stopping Putin’s army. With this in mind, Kyiv is working hard to counter misleading perceptions among the country’s allies that Russian military victory is somehow inevitable. During Monday’s White House meeting with Trump, Zelenskyy made a point of stressing that in the last one thousand days of full-scale war, Russia has managed to occupy less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory. This information was news to Trump and helped swing his mood, according to the BBC.

The ongoing Battle of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine offers important insights into the Russian army’s diminishing offensive potential. Since the summer of 2024, Putin has sacrificed tens of thousands of soldiers and thousands of armored vehicles in an attempt to seize the small but strategically significant city of Pokrovsk in the Donbas region. Despite these heavy Russian losses, the city remains under Ukrainian control.

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Beyond Pokrovsk lies Ukraine’s most heavily fortified zone, a fortress belt of industrial towns and cities that many see as the key to the defense of eastern Ukraine. Unlike the largely rural terrain close to Pokrovsk, the northern Donbas area around the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk is dotted with networks of concrete fortifications and layered defensive lines that have been under construction since the start of Russia’s invasion more than a decade ago in 2014.

If Russian commanders attempt to replicate their meat grinder tactics against Ukraine’s sophisticated defenses in the northern Donbas, the outcome will likely be catastrophic for Moscow. Indeed, many Ukrainian analysts believe a Russian offensive to seize the region would lead to the bloodiest battles of the entire war and result in hundreds of thousands of Russian casualties. This helps to explain why Putin is now calling for Ukraine to hand over the region without a fight as part of any peace settlement.

Russia remains understandably eager to present the invasion of Ukraine as a resounding military success, with Kremlin officials including Putin himself frequently boasting of relentless advances and battlefield victories. However, these triumphant depictions are increasingly at odds with reality. A recent intelligence update from Britain’s Ministry of Defense estimated that at the current pace, it would take Russia almost four and a half years to completely seize the four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces claimed by the Kremlin.

Russia’s inability to achieve a decisive battlefield breakthrough should encourage Kyiv’s partners to become more ambitious in their military support for Ukraine. Putin may currently have no interest in ending the war, but his army has already been exposed as anything but invincible and is far more vulnerable than he would like us to believe.

The United States and Europe can now make a decisive intervention of their own by dramatically strengthening the Ukrainian military. If Ukraine is provided with the tools it needs in order to prevent further Russian advances and expand attacks on the Kremlin war machine inside Russia, Putin may be forced to rethink his invasion and seek a lasting settlement. Unless that happens, the war will continue indefinitely against a backdrop of further futile summits and diplomatic distractions.

Elena Davlikanova is a senior fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis and Sahaidachny Security Center. Yevhenii Malik is a veteran of the Ukrainian Army’s 36th Marine Brigade.

Trump has unique influence with the prime minister, and scarcely any of the political constraints that have affected his predecessors in dealing with Israel.

Israel’s own confusion about the actual purpose, strategy, duration, and end state of the expanded operation should raise alarm bells. The Israeli cabinet’s decision, initially advertised as a plan for full occupation of the Gaza Strip, in the end only applies to Gaza City, not the Hamas strongholds of central Gaza, where Israeli hostages are likely held. Even with this limitation, the IDF opposed the plan, arguing that it would endanger hostages, cost many soldiers’ lives, and strain Israel’s exhausted reserve forces. But there is no logic to a campaign stopping in Gaza City, and even that would require the evacuation of several hundred thousand Palestinian civilians and likely cause significant casualties. The clear implication is that, twenty-two months in, the cabinet has signed Israel up for many more months of war.

The actual goal of this operation is murky. Is it to free hostages? The IDF expects them to be killed. Is it to destroy Hamas? Many experts expect a long-term Israeli occupation, fighting a perpetual insurgency. Is it to hand over control of Gaza to Arab states and non-Hamas Palestinians? Netanyahu has ruled out a role for the Palestinian Authority, the very condition Arab states set for their participation. Is it to return Israel to permanent control of Gaza, expelling or exiling the Palestinian population? Netanyahu says no to the first, and that Palestinians should leave voluntarily. Smotrich’s answers to both run the other way.

Only the United States is capable of pressing Israel—in the spirit of friendship, support for its security, and shared loathing of Hamas—to carefully think through the merits of its operations. There is no sign such conversations are taking place.

Even a narrow focus on US interests should raise significant questions for the Trump administration. Is it in the US interest for Israel to become increasingly isolated, as Western allies impose arms transfer limitations and line up to recognize a Palestinian state? Is it in the US interest for the exhausted IDF, after military successes on multiple fronts, but with the danger that some of the fronts could reignite, to be bogged down in an endless occupation and counterinsurgency in Gaza? Is it in the US interest for Arab states to withdraw from willingness to play any role in their shared interest in removing Hamas from power in Gaza, because they won’t be seen as abetting this Israeli operation? Is it in the US interest to see the promise of expanded regional integration and Saudi normalization with Israel slip away?

Netanyahu does leave open the slim possibility of a negotiated end to the war. His conditions are the release of all hostages, the disarmament of Hamas, the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, the maintenance of Israeli security control over Gaza, and the establishment of a governing entity that is neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority that is prepared to live in peace with Israel. But now, with a two-stage deal to release hostages and end the war—which has long been Netanyahu’s preference—seemingly available, he is insisting on a deal that meets all of these conditions up front.

It is absolutely righteous to seek the return of all hostages, the removal of Hamas from power, and the prevention of further threats from Gaza. But Netanyahu links those claims to other, unattainable goals, and in the process sets up his own people and Palestinians in Gaza for significantly prolonged suffering.

Wars end messily. There is rarely a perfect outcome. Since at least 1973, virtually no Arab-Israeli war has ended without a US-scripted off-ramp. It is almost a requirement for an Israeli prime minister to be able say to his or her citizens, “I was forced to accept these less-than-perfect terms by the president of the United States.” Netanyahu himself has often relied on this tool.

Judging by his diplomacy on Ukraine, Trump understands that wars end in less-than-perfect outcomes. But the United States and Israel are also able to work together to script the end state as a victory. The dismantling of Hamas as a military force; the return of the remaining hostages; the commitment of Arab states to work to exile remaining Hamas leaders and fighters and assist in a peaceful reconstruction of Gaza; a US recognition of Israel’s right to continue to strike Hamas in Gaza as it does Hezbollah in Lebanon. These are the makings of a messy win, which is far preferable to an endless, bloody stalemate, with Israel reviled in much of the world. As he has in the past, Netanyahu may end up missing the moment to get the best available terms, and he may be forced to scramble to recover worse terms later.

How can Trump change the dynamic?

It starts with direct talks with Netanyahu. Trump has unique influence with the prime minister and scarcely any of the political constraints that have affected his predecessors in dealing with Israel. Little more than a clear statement that he expects the war to end would shift Netanyahu’s strategy.

Also needed are frank military-to-military conversations between the IDF and US Central Command. Now under the command of Admiral Brad Cooper, US Central Command is known to be a friendly and sympathetic partner to Israel. But it can also provide a professional reality check on the wisdom of the planned operation and suggest alternatives that avoid risks to hostages, civilians, and soldiers, while still imposing pressure on Hamas.

The United States should join efforts to intensify negotiations on a final hostage deal to end the war. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, also carrying Iran and Ukraine duties, is spread too thin. There needs to be a full-time senior US envoy on the case.

News that Turkey has joined Qatar and Egypt in trying to reenergize negotiations holds potential. Trump should immediately engage Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose sympathy for Hamas, long a source of frustration, could now be leveraged to pressure the terrorist group to release all hostages and accept exile. These requirements must be communicated as essential US interests, conveyed to a NATO ally, and an opportunity to upgrade US-Turkish ties. Simultaneously, it may be time to strip Qatar of its lead role in the talks, with Egypt or Turkey in the lead, and call for the expulsion of Hamas leaders from Qatar.

Negotiations will take time, and even a final deal will be implemented in phases. Meanwhile, the United States and Israel should agree on facilitating a sustained surge of humanitarian aid into Gaza, which could include an expansion of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation’s efforts, sustained provision of aid by international organizations, and the resumption of the flow of commercial goods.

Finally, Trump should demand clarity from Arab states on the steps that they are prepared to take now and in the day-after phase. These steps should include demanding and facilitating the exile of remaining Hamas leaders and fighters and participation in a post-conflict security force. They should also include support for Palestinian Authority-affiliated governing and security personnel to return to Gaza. Arab states should also help finance Gaza’s reconstruction while ensuring disarmament and preventing the diversion of building materials for non-civilian use.

A narrow opportunity exists to avoid stretching the Gaza tragedy into 2026. Trump needs to seize it.

Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy. He also previously served as the director of the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative.

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Ullman in The Hill on the Alaska Summit

swallace — Tue, 19 Aug 2025 12:00:00 +0000

On August 19, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed in The Hill on President Trump and Russian President Putin’s meeting in Alaska. He argues that the meeting was a disaster and Trump conceded to Putin.

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Harlan Ullman

Senior Advisor

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Ukrainians left dismayed as Trump gives Putin the red carpet treatment

Peter Dickinson — Sat, 16 Aug 2025 21:05:13 +0000

Friday’s summit between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska ended in anticlimax without achieving a breakthrough toward peace in Ukraine. While both leaders sought to put a positive spin on the bilateral talks, they were unable to offer anything of substance to suggest meaningful progress. Instead, clues including a canceled lunch and a strikingly short press conference left the impression that the much anticipated meeting had in fact fallen well short of expectations.

With specific details of the discussion between Putin and Trump still in short supply, it is not currently possible to deliver a definitive verdict on the summit. Things should become clearer in the coming days, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy set to visit the White House on Monday. Looking ahead to his Washington trip, Zelenskyy underlined his readiness to meet Putin, while also stressing the importance of European involvement in the peace process and the need for reliable security guarantees.

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While the prospects for peace in Ukraine remain murkier than ever, the Alaska summit was unquestionably a major personal victory for Vladimir Putin. On a practical level, he was able to stall for time yet again and sidestep Trump’s latest ceasefire deadline without offering to significantly soften his own position. Indeed, initial reports indicate that Putin continues to insist Ukraine hand over large swathes of unconquered and heavily fortified territory in the east of the country as a condition for pausing the war.

Crucially, the meeting was also a symbolic triumph for the Kremlin dictator that allowed him to end his international isolation in spectacular fashion and demonstrate that he is no longer a pariah. From the moment Trump personally greeted Putin on the red carpet and ushered him into the presidential limo, the entire event was one long photo opportunity that appeared tailor-made for the Kremlin propaganda machine.

Unsurprisingly, it did not take long before Russian officials began gloating. “Western media are on the verge of completely losing it,” commented Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova as images of Putin’s warm welcome to the United States were beamed around the world. “They spent three years telling everyone Russia was isolated, and today they saw the beautiful red carpet laid out for the Russian president in the US.”

The sight of Putin being treated with such apparent deference by the President of the United States of America was indeed shocking for many. In Ukraine, the Alaska summit made for particularly painful viewing. Most Ukrainians hold Putin personally responsible for unleashing a devastating war that has killed hundreds of thousands, displaced millions, and traumatized the entire nation. In their eyes, Putin is a war criminal on a par with the most notorious figures in history.

This damning Ukrainian verdict is backed by an overwhelming amount of evident compiled by the international community. The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest on war crimes charges in connection with his role in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Meanwhile, a series of recent investigations by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine have concluded that Russia is guilty of committing crimes against humanity in Ukraine.

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Ukrainians responded to coverage of the bilateral meeting in Anchorage with a mix of anger, disbelief, and distress. Some voiced their frustration that Trump had presented Putin with a stunning success without securing anything in exchange. “Looking at the red carpet, I was thinking of all the friends and loved ones we lost in this war. I hoped this was a necessary means to get Putin to agree to a ceasefire, but it did not work,” commented Golos Party leader and member of the Ukrainian Parliament Kira Rudik.

Others noted the striking difference between the respectful tone of Friday’s summit and Trump’s earlier treatment of Zelenskyy during their infamous Oval Office meeting in February. “Trump greeted Putin with a red carpet, warm handshakes, a flyover of US bombers, and a backseat limo ride. The chummy display stood in stark contrast to Trump’s hostile reception of Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office six months ago,” commented the Kyiv Independent in a post-summit editorial. “Ukraine’s president endured a public shaming. Russia’s was pampered. Both episodes were disgraceful.”

Many Ukrainians expressed alarm that Trump’s approach risked legitimizing Putin despite the Russian ruler’s refusal to compromise on the maximalist goals of his invasion. “The Alaska summit didn’t produce anything even worthy of a footnote in the history books. The only thing that will be remembered is that a red carpet was rolled out for a war criminal on American soil,” commented Ukrainian Institute London director Olesya Khromeychuk. “The Ukrainians, like a broken record, keep reminding everyone that Putin’s war aims haven’t changed. He still intends to destroy Ukraine entirely. But it seems they’re listening to different records in the White House.”

While Friday’s summit clearly did little to improve Ukrainian morale, there was guarded optimism in some quarters that once the dust has settled and Putin’s continued intransigence becomes impossible to ignore, the United States may finally move forward with long threatened measures to increase the pressure on the Kremlin. “Trump should take one lesson from the Alaska fiasco. The red carpet doesn’t work, but an iron fist will work,” commented member of the Ukrainian Parliament with the European Solidarity party Oleksiy Goncharenko. “The US leader sincerely tried to give Putin a chance, but it is now time to change his approach to dealing with the Russian dictator.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Daniel Fried: No deal, no cease-fire, and not much sign of progress

Oleh Shamshur: Putin was intransigent on the most important issue of the talks

Philippe Dickinson: Putin’s tactic is to stall and stall some more

Edward Verona: Don’t be fooled by Putin’s talk of US-Russia business prospects

Melinda Haring: Trump should remember that the United States holds the cards, not Russia

Brian Whitmore: Russia’s goals remain maximalist and eliminationist

If Putin offered no real concessions, then Trump’s response should be quick and comprehensive

Putin will be returning to Moscow with a smile on his face. For the second time in two weeks, Putin achieved his tactical objective of avoiding “severe consequences” from the United States for his refusal to end the shooting in Ukraine. Trump had set a hard deadline of August 8 for Putin to accept a ceasefire. But playing off Putin’s meeting with Special Envoy Steve Witkoff on August 6, Trump pushed for a meeting instead, and the deadline lapsed.

In recent days, Trump promised major steps against Russia if Putin did not indicate a willingness to make peace in Alaska. While both Putin and Trump referred to a positive meeting, Trump noted that they had not “gotten there” on the big issue—peace in Ukraine—although he added that he was optimistic they would reach that goal. It is notable that Trump said he would get on the phone quickly with NATO leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, while Putin hoped that those leaders would not “throw a wrench” into this nascent diplomatic process. Putin is anticipating that the Europeans will be underwhelmed by Trump’s report and will try, as they did before this summit meeting, to persuade him to take a stronger position.

At this point, there are few details on the meeting. What precisely did Putin offer that prompted Trump to speak positively of the meeting? It is likely that some details will leak out after Trump briefs Zelenskyy and NATO. That will put us in a position to judge whether Putin, finally, has offered some steps forward. If so, maybe a summit with Zelenskyy would be merited. But before that, Trump should send a private message to Putin to stop the bombardment of Ukrainian cities and civilians—or face new sanctions. And if it turns out that Putin offered no concessions in Anchorage, very quick and comprehensive steps are needed: massive sanctions on Russia and the dispatch of a major US arms package, paid for by Europe, to Ukraine.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Trump wants the killing to stop—and he’s put his own political capital on the line to try

It appears the talks were positive but, unfortunately, not conclusive. This isn’t too surprising—the White House said before the meeting this was a preliminary step. Trump did say in a Fox News interview after the meeting that there would be a follow-up meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy. If that happens, it would be an incredibly positive step forward. Importantly, Trump sounded hopeful, which is a good sign.

Trump has made it clear there will be severe consequences if Putin walks away from the negotiations. It looks like he is willing to give him a little bit of leeway in the hopes that peace talks will move forward. But if Putin tries to jerk him around and slow roll progress, I would expect those severe consequences to kick in very quickly.

The underlying problem that makes this so difficult is that the Biden administration slow-rolled the weapons Ukraine needed to win for two and a half years. This created a perfect environment for Putin’s forces to entrench themselves inside Ukraine. That has given Putin a battlefield advantage—emboldening him and giving him leverage.

Whatever comes of this, I commend Trump for his efforts. He wants peace and wants the killing to stop—and he is willing to put his own political capital on the line and roll up his sleeves and try.

—Leslie Shedd is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the president of Rising Communications.

No deal, no cease-fire, and not much sign of progress

It could have been worse. Trump and Putin could have made a dirty deal at Ukraine’s expense—surrendering Ukrainian land to Russia, for example—and Trump could have tried to pressure Zelenskyy into accepting it. Instead, there was no deal, no cease-fire, and not much sign of progress in ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. (During his press statement, Trump referred vaguely to having made some progress, but unless later administration readouts show more detail, skepticism is in order.)

Trump raced to this meeting on the assumption, mistaken it appears, that Putin was ready to make progress in ending the war on Ukraine on terms other than Ukraine’s surrender. That was based on Witkoff’s August 6 meeting with Putin in Moscow. When that appeared wrong, due either to Witkoff’s misunderstanding or Putin’s deception, Trump started speaking again of putting pressure on Russia. Trump even remarked to the press while flying to Anchorage that pressure would come if there were no progress, including a cease-fire. But faced with what appears to be Putin’s stonewalling, lectures on history, or other dodges, Trump backed away again.

Therefore, advantage Putin: He got a meeting and slipped away without offering anything other than bromides about US-Russian friendship. Trump could respond to being stiffed by Putin. He could do what he threatened and agree, at last, to put pressure on Russia’s economy, especially its revenue from oil sales. There are viable options for doing so. Trump could make clear that the United States will work with Europe to back Ukraine, including with more weapons. Here too, there are viable options for doing so without crossing Trump’s line of no direct US assistance—for example, lend lease arrangements.

Trump risks looking weak and may, and hopefully will, respond by pushing Putin to end the war. In that case, Putin’s arrogance could yet prove the Russian leader’s downfall. But that’s merely a hope. Unless evidence emerges to the contrary, the Trump administration has let its advantages sit idle while an aggressive adversary gets away with taunting the United States.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Putin was intransigent on the most important issue of the talks

The meeting looks like a win for Putin. There was high ceremony and a warm reception (painful for Ukrainians to watch), a breaking out of diplomatic isolation, and a delaying again of a round of harsher direct and secondary sanctions. There was, in other words, quite a bit to sell his new “victory” to the Russian public and to an international audience of both friends and foes.

As might have been expected, Putin was intransigent on the most important issue of the talks—Russia’s war in Ukraine. He was cynical and hypocritical (even speaking of security for Ukraine) in his remarks, and at the same time not flinching from his usual justification of the war and his intention to carry on with aggression. The summit did not prevent Putin from hitting scores of civilian targets in Ukraine and continuing his summer offensive.

It is still unclear what will happen after the meeting.

The answer depends on knowing what the “many points of agreement” are that Trump was referring to during the briefing. Was it window dressing on his part, or did he and Putin really find common ground on some relevant issues? Will we hear from Trump anytime soon even muted criticism of Putin, or see “severe consequences” for the absence of a cease-fire deal he was craving for?

For the time being, Trump was ostensibly relishing in Putin’s flattery and did not seem to relinquish his desire of dealing with the Russian dictator as a valued partner, including by realizing business opportunities Putin talked about and revamping bilateral relations.

—Oleh Shamshur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former Ukrainian ambassador to the United States.

Putin’s tactic is to stall and stall some more

This was the treading water summit. At least, that’s as much as we can glean from the short press conference with no media questions, and a curtailed bilateral agenda. With little seemingly achieved, this was nobody’s worst-case scenario. There will be sighs of relief in Kyiv and European capitals that the feared Munich 1938–style capitulation didn’t materialize.

For Putin, he got to share the stage with the president of the United States and proffer enough flattery and meaningless talk of respecting Ukrainian security to stave off further immediate sanctions and economic pressure. In the context, his reference to good neighborliness was a window into the limitlessness of his cynicism. The stalling and the stringing-this-out allows Putin to continue to throw human beings into the meat grinder, and eke out more Ukrainian territory, inch by inch. He will consider that a win.

So, what next for the United States and its allies? It’s an insight so blindingly obvious it hardly counts as such, but Putin will only respond to strength and pressure. Now is the time for the Europeans to press on Trump that Putin is the only obstacle to peace, and that Trump should finally apply his “peace through strength” approach to this conflict: to dial up the collective military, diplomatic, and economic pressure on Russia, both directly and indirectly through the countries that continue to enable Putin’s war machine. Absent that, Putin will continue to happily tread water in the bloody lake he has created.

—Philippe Dickinson is a deputy director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Prior to joining the Council, he was a career diplomat with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.

Don’t be fooled by Putin’s talk of US-Russia business prospects

Putin was keen to achieve an outcome from the Anchorage summit that he could cast as a victory for Russia. The optimal result for him would have been the acceptance by his US counterpart of Russia’s demand for territorial concessions by Ukraine. True to his training as a KGB operative, Putin likely calculated that he could appeal to Trump’s predilection for announcing business deals by bringing along some key economic and business figures in his entourage.

Undoubtedly to Putin’s disappointment, and fortunately for Ukraine, it seems that the bait failed to attract the quarry. “There’s no deal until there’s a deal,” Trump stated during the press conference, which might have applied as much to business prospects as to a broader peace agreement. However, it is hard to imagine that, had some slapdash investment framework been announced, any serious US companies would be tempted back to Russia. Even if US sanctions were softened, European sanctions would remain in effect, posing legal and financial risks in the world’s largest trading block. The reputational harm of doing business in a country committing war crimes would be unacceptable. Moreover, nothing has changed in Russia itself. Corruption is endemic and foreign companies would be at the mercy of a rapacious business elite that would have little to fear from going after American companies once evanescent goodwill from a summit meeting evaporates.

—Edward Verona is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center covering Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.

Trump should remember that the United States holds the cards, not Russia

There was nothing but fool’s gold to be found in Anchorage. Good on Trump for trying to bring peace to Ukraine, but diplomacy is slow and boring and requires more than performative public relations stunts held at the last minute with little planning. Let’s hope that Trump sees through Putin’s endless appetite to talk and tires of the Russian dictator’s pseudo-historical lectures. Trump can squeeze the Russians; he seems to forget that the United States holds the cards, not Moscow. The most telling statement came from Putin, who said the root causes behind the war remain the same. This means that Putin’s position is unchanged. To him, Ukrainians aren’t real people, the Ukrainian language is fake, and he’s still intent on destroying a sovereign and democratic nation that deserves US sympathy and support.

—Melinda Haring is nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Russia’s goals remain maximalist and eliminationist

The Alaska summit did not change the fundamentals of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russia’s goals remain maximalist and eliminationist. This was evident in Putin’s repeated calls to address the “root causes” of the war, a euphemism for Ukraine existing as a fully sovereign state free of Russian domination. This is not surprising. Putin’s goals in Ukraine have always been ideological, and there is simply no grand bargain that will satisfy him shy of Ukraine’s total capitulation, which will not happen. This war will be decided on the battlefield. And the most effective way to assure that it ends on the battlefield sooner rather than later and in Ukraine’s favor is for the United States and its allies to continue arming Ukraine. In addition, they can increase economic pressure on Russia through the secondary sanctions included in legislation sponsored by US senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal.

The only clear winner, at least in the short term, was Putin, who saw his international isolation ended. Putin did not get the sanctions relief he sought, and he seems to have fallen short of decoupling Ukraine from normalizing economic relations with the United States. But he got the optics of a red-carpet welcome from the US president on US soil without making a single concession.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow with the Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

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When he meets Putin in Alaska, ‘heterodox’ Trump will face his biggest geopolitical test yet

Frederick Kempe — Thu, 14 Aug 2025 15:56:07 +0000

The most important square foot in geopolitics is the space between Donald Trump’s ears.

That’s the way a Trump administration insider put it to me a few days ago, betraying pride by association, just as the White House announced the US president’s decision to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

A second Trump administration official told me he believes that what gives Trump such outsized geopolitical influence, some seven months into his administration, starts with his “heterodox” approach to foreign policy. That’s a fancy way of describing his out-of-the-box thinking on issues that have long defied conventional diplomacy. Trump is so confident in his own negotiating skills and in his country’s negotiating leverage that “he doesn’t mind who is on the other side of the table,” whether US friend or foe, the official explained.

When Trump and Putin gather for their summit in Alaska on Friday, it will mark the most significant test yet of Trump’s vaunted heterodoxy. He will sit opposite a Russian leader who has murdered domestic opponents and sent a quarter of a million Russians to their deaths fighting a largely stalemated war in Ukraine for three-and-a-half years. Views on whether Trump should be meeting with Putin at all are roughly divided along the lines of how much faith one has in this “most important square foot in geopolitics.”

Critics such as the Financial Times’ Edward Luce summon the “ghosts of Munich, Yalta and other sordid bargains” ahead of the summit. Luce worries that Trump, who he believes lacks Putin’s grasp of history, could fulfill Ukraine’s worst fears and “give away land in the negotiating chamber that Russia could not win by force of arms.” In the meantime, Putin has escalated his summer assault on Ukraine’s Donetsk region to take as much land as possible before the meeting in Alaska.

What administration officials say should influence Putin and other US negotiating partners most is Trump’s offer to talk directly with Iranian leaders.

Trump’s allies have greater faith in the president’s ability to sniff out when he is being hoodwinked. They point to his willingness to walk away from talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his first administration, the low expectations he has set for the Alaska meeting, his reassurances to European leaders on Wednesday that he wouldn’t make land deals without Ukraine’s involvement, and his warning thereafter of “very severe consequences” if Putin refuses in Alaska to agree to a cease-fire.

As Marc Thiessen wrote in the Washington Post, “It might help anyone with their hair on fire about Donald Trump’s Alaska summit with Vladimir Putin to look at what the U.S. president has actually said about his negotiating plans.”

Indeed, Trump has set a low bar for what he has called a “feel-out meeting” in Alaska, saying he’ll probably know in the first two minutes whether a deal can get done. “It’s not up to me to make a deal,” he’s said, while at other times unsettling Ukrainians by talking about “land swaps” for peace. They recognize that Russia is occupying their land.

On Wednesday, Trump spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders in a virtual meeting co-chaired by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Trump described the call as “a ten.” The Europeans, who are calling themselves the “Coalition of the Willing,” have made a concerted and sustained effort to influence Trump’s thinking and actions, understanding the generational stakes. In a statement after the meeting, they welcomed Trump’s efforts “to stop the killing in Ukraine, end Russia’s war of aggression, and achieve just and lasting peace.” They added, “A diplomatic solution must protect Ukraine’s and Europe’s vital security interests.”

Though Trump doesn’t claim for himself any Kissingerian strategic approach to the world, what he tells his aides is that he’s focused on forcing countries to make a choice: Do they want to work with the United States or not? This question extends to a range of issues, from trade wars to peacemaking. “He’s fundamentally demanding that countries make tough choices to get to the right place,” the administration insider told me, citing most recently Trump’s tough 50 percent tariff threats on India over its support for Russia’s war effort through oil purchases.

What administration officials say should influence Putin and other US negotiating partners most is Trump’s offer to talk directly with Iranian leaders. Only after Tehran shrugged off Trump’s sixty-day deadline for talks did the United States conduct a series of airstrikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities. Operation Midnight Hammer, launched on June 21, involved B-2 stealth bombers and submarines, utilized bunker-buster bombers and Tomahawk missiles, and seriously damaged Iran’s nuclear program. “But it only followed President Trump’s sincere offer of finding a better path forward together,” the administration official underscored, adding, “On Iran, the offer is still on the table. Door still open.”

US officials I spoke with, all of whom shared their thoughts not for attribution, list other examples of Trump’s heterodoxy that extend beyond the military realm. As recently as this past week, for instance, Trump brought Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders to the White House and presided over their signing of a peace framework designed to normalize their relations after nearly four decades of conflict.

“It’s a long time, thirty-five years, they fought, and now they’re friends, and they’re going to be friends for a long time,” Trump said at the White House, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev seated next to him. “Many tried to find a resolution, including the European Union,” the US president added. “The Russians worked very hard on it; it never happened. Sleepy Joe Biden tried, but you know what happened there.”

The two countries’ leaders said last Friday that they will advocate for Trump to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. “I don’t want to go into the history of some very strange decisions of the Nobel Prize committee to award the prize for somebody who didn’t do anything at all,” Aliyev said. “But President Trump in six months did a miracle.”

That’s the overriding message that Trump is taking to Alaska. It’s that he is succeeding where others have not, often regarding conflicts that have festered for years. He takes some credit for defusing an India-Pakistan crisis in May, for brokering peace between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda (signed in the Oval Office in June), and for bringing Cambodia and Thailand to the negotiating table in July. Should the Armenia-Azerbaijan deal hold, it would be a slap to Putin’s face in his own backyard, potentially leading to a greater US role in the region as well as the creation of a transit corridor connecting China and Central Asian countries to Turkey via Azerbaijan.

What sets apart Putin from other world leaders Trump has dealt with is the US president’s far greater patience for the Russian leader’s recalcitrance in negotiations. That has been the case even as Trump has grown increasingly upset with Putin’s continued killing of Ukrainian civilians, which often occurs immediately after the two men have spoken. In Putin, Trump is facing the most profound test yet for his unorthodox approach to foreign policy, and the one that’s likely to have the longest-lasting impact on geopolitics, Trump’s legacy, and his Nobel Peace Prize aspirations.

Back in December, I argued that it would be the outcome in Ukraine that would determine Trump’s worthiness for the Nobel Peace Prize. “It’s hard to overestimate how great a difference his Ukraine-related decisions in the coming weeks will make to the trajectory of his second term,” I wrote at the time. “Trump can either assert or undermine US global leadership for an emerging era of great-power competition that will stretch far beyond his four years in office.” If Trumpian heterodoxy is the key to demonstrating such leadership, the US president will have an opportunity to prove it in Alaska.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Trump should insist on the return of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 14 Aug 2025 12:25:41 +0000

As the leaders of the United States and Russia prepare to meet in Alaska on Friday to discuss ending the war in Ukraine, the White House has stated that Russia’s abduction of over 20,000 Ukrainian children “remains a concern” for President Trump. Unless the fate of these abducted children is addressed during the summit, it is difficult to imagine any meaningful progress toward a lasting peace.

Moscow’s mass abduction of Ukrainian children hit the headlines once again in early August amid reports that the Russian authorities had published an online catalog of Ukrainian children available for adoption. The database, which features photos, names, and descriptions of almost three hundred Ukrainian minors, was condemned as further evidence of the Kremlin’s state-sponsored campaign to kidnap young Ukrainians and send them to Russia.

“These children are presented like products in an e-commerce store, searchable by age, gender, eye and hair color, health status, and even personality traits,” commented Mykola Kuleba, the CEO of Save Ukraine, an organization engaged in efforts to rescue Ukrainian victims of Russia’s abduction campaign. “Russia isn’t even trying to hide it anymore. It’s openly trafficking Ukrainian children.”

Russia stands accused of kidnapping tens of thousands of Ukrainian children since the onset of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Victims have typically been taken from orphanages in occupied regions of Ukraine or removed from the care of relatives. In some instances, Ukrainian children were enticed by the promise of free vacations at summer camps before disappearing.

Once they have been taken to Russia, many abducted Ukrainian children have recounted their experience of ideological indoctrination at “reeducation camps” as part of a process designed to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian identity. Thousands are also reportedly being forced to join Russian paramilitary youth organizations with the aim of turning them into future soldiers for Putin’s war against Ukraine and the wider Western world.

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The mass abduction of Ukrainian children is recognized internationally as one of the gravest Russian war crimes committed during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Some analysts believe it may qualify as genocide in line with the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention, which identifies “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as one of five recognized acts of genocide.

In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for his personal role in the mass abductions. While there is little chance of Putin being prosecuted for war crimes in The Hague, the arrest warrant has proved hugely embarrassing for Russia and has made it difficult for the Kremlin dictator to travel internationally, as ICC member countries are now technically obliged to arrest him. This has prevented Putin from attending annual BRICS summits in South Africa and Brazil in recent years.

Putin’s fears of possible arrest for his involvement in the mass kidnapping of Ukrainian children may have influenced the choice of Alaska as the location for this week’s summit. The United States has not signed up to the ICC and is therefore under no obligation to detain the Russian leader. Alaska borders Russia itself and can be reached without crossing the airspace of ICC member states, making it a particularly suitable venue from Putin’s perspective. It is crucial that the issue of child abductions now remains on the agenda when the two leaders sit down for talks on Friday.

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The international community has been outspoken in its condemnation of the Kremlin’s kidnapping campaign. In early August, representatives from a coalition of 38 countries issued a joint statement calling for the immediate return of abducted Ukrainian children while demanding that the Russian authorities “cease to alter the identity of children, including changes to their citizenship, placement in Russian families or institutions, ideological indoctrination, and exposure to militarization.”

In the United States, Senator Richard Durbin introduced a Senate resolution in spring 2025 condemning Russia’s illegal abduction of Ukrainian children. Meanwhile, Republican Senator Chuck Grassley and Democratic Senator Amy Klobuchar have recently cosponsored the Abducted Ukrainian Children Recovery and Accountability Act to potentially provide enhanced US support for Ukraine as it seeks to identify and rescue kidnapped children.

President Trump has indicated that he will work to support the return of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia, and has said he believes he can influence Putin on the issue. However, the Trump Administration has also cut funding to a key initiative tracking young Ukrainian victims of Russia’s deportations. Friday’s summit now presents Trump with the ideal opportunity to show that he remains committed to ending the abduction of Ukrainian children.

Rescuing Ukraine’s kidnapped kids would be a meaningful step toward a lasting settlement to end Europe’s largest war since World War II. It is also a relatively realistic objective at a time when there appears to be very little prospect of Putin or any other Russians facing justice for war crimes committed in Ukraine. By pressing Putin to return the thousands of Ukrainian children abducted since 2022, Trump can demonstrate that Russia will face a degree of accountability for the crimes of the invasion. Until Ukraine’s stolen children come home, Russia’s sense of impunity will only grow.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Alaska Summit: Trump must press Putin over future Ukrainian security

John E. Herbst — Mon, 11 Aug 2025 12:56:30 +0000

The biggest news on the international scene is that US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin have agreed to meet on August 15 in Alaska to discuss peace in Ukraine, and that Russia has in fact described its conditions for ending military operations.

According to a Bloomberg report, the terms proposed by the Kremlin “would lock in Russia’s occupation of territory seized during its military invasion” in exchange for an end to the fighting. This would also require Ukraine to withdraw its troops from areas in the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces that it currently controls, ceding them to Russia.

The exact nature of the territorial settlement being discussed by Russia and the United States is still in question. “We’re going to get some back, and we’re going to get some switched,” Trump commented August 8. “There’ll be some swapping of territories to the betterment of both.”

The Trump Administration has also been in touch with Ukrainian and other European leaders to review what Russia is offering. Of course, Ukraine must agree to any deal. There is some concern in Kyiv that Trump might try to compel Ukraine to accept conditions he settles on with Putin. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has pushed back indirectly by noting that the Ukrainian Constitution requires that any territorial changes must be approved by a plebiscite authorized by the country’s parliament.

How did Trump reach this point? Over the past two months, the US president set the stage by steadily increasing pressure on the Kremlin. He achieved this by persuading NATO members to increase defense and defense-related expenditures to 5 percent of gross domestic product over the next decade and, crucially, by confirming that military aid to Ukraine would be part of this.

Additionally, Trump agreed to sell US weapons, including advanced arms, to NATO members for transfer to Ukraine. He also set a deadline for Russia to back a ceasefire, first giving Putin fifty days to comply, and then reducing it to ten days ending August 8.

Following US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s August 6 meeting with Putin, where the Russian leader handed over terms for a ceasefire, Trump imposed tariffs on India for purchasing Russian oil, further increasing the pressure on Moscow. But given the ongoing talks with the Kremlin, Trump chose not to introduce more sanctions when the August 8 deadline passed without a ceasefire.

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The Trump Administration is understandably pleased that the Kremlin now seems to be negotiating seriously. The leverage Trump assembled since June has certainly created the conditions for this. At the same time, it is also true that in reaching this moment, the US appears to have given up a great deal without achieving any concessions from Moscow beyond a willingness to stop hostilities as part of a ceasefire, not a peace settlement.

Put another way, territorial concessions to Russia are front-loaded, but critical issues that Moscow must accept will only be handled in subsequent peace negotiations. These issues are related to legitimate Ukrainian security concerns. They are presumably very important to the White House because Trump’s objective is to achieve a durable peace that ensures a stable, secure Ukraine. This includes Russian acceptance of the ongoing arming of Ukraine by the United States and other NATO nations, and the stationing of European peacekeepers in Ukraine.

There are also important tactical considerations. In the discussions with Russia about a ceasefire, the Administration made two critical concessions. They allowed the Kremlin, after the August 7 sanctions on India, to escape the August 8 deadline; and they accommodated Putin’s insistence that Zelenskyy not participate in this week’s Putin-Trump talks about the future of Ukraine. That has the smell of the 1945 Yalta Summit, where the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain decided the fate of half of Europe over the heads of those nations.

These US concessions only encourage Putin to demand more and give less. His goal remains to achieve effective political control of Ukraine. The terms he is currently discussing with Trump reflect what Putin is willing to accept and do now. It says nothing about what he will do in the future.

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The Trump team seems to have recognized that it may have gotten ahead of itself and responded too enthusiastically to Special Envoy Witkoff’s initial report on his meeting in Moscow. This has been underscored by the revelation that Witkoff misinterpreted what Putin said, thinking that the Russian dictator was prepared to withdraw Russian forces from Ukraine’s Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces.

In any case, US Vice President JD Vance spent the past weekend in the UK consulting with the Brits, the Ukrainians, and other Europeans, who have called for a full ceasefire, no territorial concessions before a ceasefire, and strong security support for Ukraine.

It is notable that the White House is now once again talking about potentially inviting Zelenskyy to Alaska, but only in soft way, saying that it is “open” to the idea. They are likely trying to persuade the Kremlin to accept this. The question is if they will insist. The answer to that question will be an indicator of whether Trump is ready to do what is necessary to make the upcoming summit a step toward a stable peace.

It is understandable why Putin does not want either Europe or Ukraine represented in the exchange. He wants a deal with Trump that will be presented to Kyiv and other European capitals as a fait accompli. But since Trump wants a durable peace, adding Ukraine and Europe to the talks makes it easier to achieve that objective.

At a minimum, the White House should demand strict reciprocity in the negotiations. If Moscow insists on the acceptance of Russian control over Ukrainian land for a ceasefire, it must accept strong measures to bolster Ukrainian security as well.

Trump can underscore this by using the negotiating period to announce another large weapons sale to NATO countries for transfer to Ukraine, and by letting Putin know that if the bombing of Ukrainian civilians and cities continues beyond the Alaskan meeting, more secondary sanctions will be enacted. This is the path to a stable peace.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Ullman in The Hill on President Trump and President Putin’s meeting in Alaska

swallace — Mon, 11 Aug 2025 12:00:00 +0000

On August 11, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed in The Hill on President Trump and President Putin’s meeting in Alaska. He argues that China and Russia have the leverage to disrupt Trump’s dealmaking.

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After Swaida: How Syria’s periphery is shaping its future

Ibrahim Al-Assil — Wed, 30 Jul 2025 17:32:36 +0000

DAMASCUS—The sectarian bloodshed that has erupted in Swaida is not just a local conflict, but a disruption of the geopolitical logic of a post-Bashar al-Assad regime Syria.

The clashes between Druze groups and government-aligned militias mark a deeper shift in both internal power dynamics and regional alignments. In mid-July, violence erupted across the Swaida province after armed groups linked to the Syrian government—many composed of Bedouin and tribal fighters—launched coordinated attacks on Druze areas. Some attackers reportedly filmed themselves as they opened fire on civilians, turning the assault into a display of impunity and provocation. What followed was the deadliest outbreak of violence the province has witnessed in years, leaving dozens dead and entire neighborhoods bearing the scars of conflict—bullet-ridden walls, burned-out villages and homes, and families mourning their losses in silence.

As Druze fighters pushed back, thousands of Bedouin civilians were displaced to nearby villages, and a fragile truce was eventually brokered. Yet beneath the fragile truce, the strategic calculations and social contract that once kept Swaida insulated from Syria’s wider conflict have begun to unravel, raising new questions about the province’s future role in the country’s fractured landscape.

Yet Swaida’s unraveling is not only a symptom of Syria’s internal disintegration, it is also a reflection of shifting regional strategies. Regional actors have not merely responded to the Swaida events; they have helped shape them. Israel’s expanding role in the south, Turkey’s strategic alignment with Damascus, and Saudi and Jordanian backing for centralized control reflect evolving geopolitical calculations. Swaida has crystallized the country’s fragmentation into zones of political and military autonomy, pushing Syria further toward a model of disconnected governance centers, shaped as much by foreign alliances as by local legitimacy, or the absence of it.

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Internally, Swaida’s unfolding crisis underscores how local power vacuums are reshaping Syria’s political geography. Unlike the coast—where President Ahmed al-Sharaa has, at least for now, maintained formal authority and prevented further unrest after a wave of sectarian massacres that targeted Alawites in March, after an anti-government ambush on government forces—Swaida has bucked the trend. Following Israeli airstrikes on Syrian forces in and around Swaida in defense of the Druze, alongside a direct strike on the Syrian army’s headquarters in central Damascus, the United States, Turkey, and several Arab countries brokered a truce between factions. It announced last week a halt to most of the fighting.

A view of the heavily damaged building of the Syrian General Staff Headquarters, after Israeli airstrikes on Damascus. Moawia Atrash/dpa via Reuters Connect.

The cease-fire, along with the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian government forces and widespread public outrage over recent killings, has elevated Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri, the spiritual leader of Syria’s Druze community. Though previously a controversial figure who competed with other Druze religious authorities and led a politically divided community, al-Hajri has now emerged as its most popular voice. He is increasingly seen as the figure who secured Israeli protection and helped prevent the continuation of what many feared would become a massacre at the hands of tribal and government-aligned fighters, earning him hero status among large segments of the Druze population. In a dramatic departure from past caution, broad elements of the Syrian Druze community are now openly signaling a willingness to accept security guarantees from external actors, including Israel, underscoring the depth of the local shift in perception toward Damascus.

This new dynamic has lowered the likelihood of a Syrian-Israeli understanding that, until recently, many believed was within reach. At the same time, the shifting Druze perception of Israel has raised the prospect of a buffer zone emerging inside Syria between Israel and Damascus—further complicating the regime’s strategic calculus. Yet outside of Swaida, Syrian perceptions of Israel have also hardened. Many Syrians I spoke with now view Israel as a force seeking to dismantle the country and extinguish any hope for peace, reconciliation, or a path out of Syria’s long war.

The Swaida crisis has also laid bare the diverging interests of regional actors, each recalibrating their approach to Syria’s future. Israel, more than any other player, has directly shaped the dynamics on the ground. By targeting Syrian heavy weaponry in the south, warning Damascus against introducing new equipment, and siding with Druze armed groups, Israel is turning the notion of a buffer zone inside Syrian territory into a strategic reality. This approach reflects a broader Israeli strategy: keeping power in Syria contested, deterring centralization by actors it cannot control, and countering Iranian resurgence.

Jordan, by contrast, views Swaida’s potential autonomy as a serious security threat. Although the province borders Jordan, there is no formal crossing between the two. Amman remains alarmed by the emergence of an enclave it cannot trust, influence, or regulate—especially one that may align with Israel. Drug and weapons smuggling, already a source of tension, has further escalated concerns, particularly as tribal networks inside Jordan intersect with the conflict dynamics in southern Syria. Jordan has long preferred working with centralized states and has consistently opposed non-state actors and autonomous aspirations near its borders.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has backed Damascus’s efforts to reassert control in Swaida, seeing the preservation of Syria’s territorial integrity as essential to regional stability by preventing Iran’s return to Syria and further chaos in the Levant. Like Turkey and Jordan, Riyadh opposes fragmentation—and has expressed frustration over Israel’s expanding role in the south, a rare moment of convergence between Saudi Arabia and its regional competitor, Turkey.

However, Saudi Arabia remains skeptical of Turkish influence over Damascus, a concern that has motivated Riyadh to increase its support for al-Sharaa in an effort to keep him anchored in the Arab fold. Riyadh certainly recognizes that intensified Israeli attacks on Damascus could drive the Syrian government closer to Ankara, potentially resulting in a growing Turkish military presence across Syria as a counterweight to Israeli pressure—an outcome Riyadh is eager to avoid. Their concern is not only about Syria falling further under Turkish influence, but also about the potential for a Turkish-Israeli confrontation that could further destabilize an already fragile regional landscape.

Nowhere is the strategic divergence in Syria more apparent than between Israel and Turkey. While both states remain deeply invested in shaping outcomes on the ground, their visions for Syria’s future are increasingly at odds.

Israel is working to keep power fragmented, viewing decentralization as a safeguard against centralization by Islamist groups or the rise of an unpredictable coalition that may renege on its commitments in the future. Israel’s approach in Swaida mirrors its broader strategy: empowering localized actors and containing nearby threats through military interventions.

Turkey, by contrast, has thrown its weight behind the central government in Damascus, offering diplomatic support and expanding economic cooperation. Ankara sees al‑Sharaa’s leadership as a bulwark against the US-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Turkey views as an extension of the recently dismantled Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a group it designates as a terrorist organization. Ankara believes that a reinvigorated Syrian state—especially one it can influence—is the most effective way to suppress momentum for Kurdish autonomy, and reduce US support for Kurdish forces near its southern border. Turkey also fears that Kurdish factions in Syria may exploit the unrest in the south to mobilize politically and militarily, using the distraction to further their aspirations for self-rule.

While Israel and Turkey have cautiously reopened diplomatic channels with each other, Syria remains a core point of friction. The two sides differ not only on the legitimacy of al‑Sharaa’s rule but also on what political system is required in Syria to maintain stability and regional security. In effect, Israel is fostering fragmentation as a form of security, while Turkey seeks centralization as a path to a stable Syria that does not export Kurdish security challenges. This divergence is likely to deepen as both countries seek to shape the post-conflict order on their own terms.

For the Syrian government under al‑Sharaa, the Swaida crisis has both exposed its limitations and clarified its regional alignment. Control over Swaida remains, for now, a remote possibility. The regime lacks both the legitimacy and the military capacity to reassert itself in the south without triggering broader resistance. Instead, al‑Sharaa is leaning diplomatically on regional backers—particularly Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—to reinforce his claim to authority and present the state as the only viable guarantor of territorial integrity. His strategy avoids direct negotiation with emerging local leaders like al-Hajri, signaling a refusal to legitimize any actor operating outside formal institutions.

The sole exception remains the SDF, whose US backing necessitates special engagement. But even there, the government resists treating the SDF as a political equal, preferring to limit dialogue to matters of security coordination rather than constitutional or territorial reform. More broadly, al‑Sharaa’s diplomatic playbook prioritizes foreign capitals over domestic consensus—engaging Washington, Ankara, and Tel Aviv, while avoiding any internal conversation about Syria’s future governance. It is a strategy designed to preserve the façade of statehood, even as the state’s internal cohesion continues to erode.

What comes next in Syria will not be determined by battlefield victories or summit declarations, but by the evolving realities on the ground—and the willingness of regional and international actors to adapt to them. The Swaida crisis has marked the formal end of the binary conflict that once defined Syria and shaped events on the coast: regime versus opposition. In its place is a layered, decentralized reality shaped by shifting alliances, overlapping spheres of influence, and competing claims to legitimacy. Syria has emerged from Assad’s decades-long rule not as a single, governable entity, but as a fragmented landscape of semi-autonomous zones, foreign-brokered arrangements, and disconnected governance centers.

For the United States and others, the challenge now is to move beyond outdated frameworks that prioritize state cohesion over political viability. Legitimacy, local consent, and regional coordination—not force or formal recognition alone—will define the next phase of Syria’s transition. Stabilizing Syria will require a broader regional understanding, one that acknowledges the role of neighboring states in shaping outcomes and prevents escalation between them. With Israel increasingly asserting itself militarily inside Syria, the risk of a re-regionalized conflict is growing—a scenario that must be avoided. Whether the goal is stability, reconstruction, or conflict prevention, any serious policy must begin with the recognition that Syria’s center will not hold—and that its peripheries are where the country’s future is being decided.

Ibrahim Al-Assil is a resident senior fellow for the Syria Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is also a professorial lecturer at George Washington University’s Department of Political Science, where he teaches courses on comparative politics and great-power competition.

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Trump offered Putin victory in Ukraine. Why did Putin refuse?

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 29 Jul 2025 21:22:26 +0000

US President Donald Trump is “very disappointed” with Vladimir Putin and is giving his Russian counterpart just ten more days to agree to a ceasefire or face new economic measures, he announced on Tuesday. Earlier in July, Trump had set a fifty-day deadline for the Kremlin dictator. This new time frame is the latest indication that the US leader’s patience is now running out, and comes following Trump’s recent decision to arm Ukraine by selling American weapons to European allies.

The Trump administration’s recent moves represent a striking departure from the diplomatic efforts of the previous six months, which had seen the United States offer Russia concession after concession while pressuring Ukraine to accept an overtly Kremlin-friendly settlement. During US-led negotiations that began in February 2025, Trump repeatedly signaled that he was ready to accept most of the Kremlin’s demands. This included allowing Russia to maintain control over occupied regions of Ukraine, ruling out Ukrainian NATO membership, and easing sanctions pressure on Moscow.

Trump was so eager to appease Putin that at one point he even reportedly explored the possibility of granting official US recognition for the 2014 Russian seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. Meanwhile, White House officials further underlined the new administration’s accommodating stance by ceasing public criticism of Russia’s invasion and withdrawing from international efforts to hold the Putin regime accountable for war crimes committed in Ukraine.

Any settlement based on Trump’s proposals would have been easy to sell as a Russian success story. Indeed, many would have regarded it as an unprecedented triumph for the Kremlin. Despite these positive optics, Putin has remained unmoved. While the Russian ruler has consistently voiced his theoretical support for America’s efforts to end the war, he has in practice derailed any hope of meaningful progress toward peace by engaging in endless stalling tactics and insisting on maximalist demands that would mean the effective end of Ukrainian statehood.

This uncompromising Russian stance has placed Trump in an increasingly awkward position. After months of talking up the prospects of peace, he has now been forced to acknowledge that Putin has no intention of ending the war. This has set the stage for the recent change of tone from the White House, which has led to the renewal of US arms deliveries to Ukraine along with this week’s fresh ultimatum.

There is now much speculation over what Trump will do if, as expected, Putin ignores the latest US deadline and continues his invasion. There is also considerable debate over the potential implications of the US decision to provide Ukraine with weapons via Europe, with many questioning whether this military support will be on a sufficient scale to impact the future course of the war.

The real question, however, is why Putin chose to reject America’s generous peace terms. After all, Trump was offering his Kremlin counterpart an honorable exit from an enormously costly war that has undermined Russia’s global standing and has often threatened to spiral completely out of control. Why did Putin refuse to accept victory in Ukraine?

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Putin’s most immediate reason for refusing to end the war in Ukraine is because he thinks he is winning. The Russian army is advancing at various points along the front lines, while Ukraine’s military is being methodically worn down. Although progress is proving exceptionally slow, there is no question that Putin currently holds the battlefield initiative and can reasonably expect to prevail in a war of attrition against a far smaller opponent.

Putin has also been encouraged by the limitations of international support for Ukraine. While Kyiv’s partners have provided substantial military and financial backing, this aid has consistently been subject to delays or restrictions due to domestic political considerations and widespread Western fears of possible Russian escalation. With his army seizing more territory and his opponents so easily intimidated, it not difficult to understand why the Russian leader might prefer to continue his invasion while awaiting what he sees as the inevitable Ukrainian collapse.

On the domestic front, Putin has a number of further practical reasons for preferring the harsh realities of war to the unpredictability of peace. Since 2022, he has succeeded in moving the Russian economy onto a war footing, with massive hikes in military spending and payouts to soldiers helping to offset the damage caused by international sanctions. Russian factories now work around the clock and are pumping out more armaments that all NATO member countries combined.

As a result of this shift to a wartime economy, millions of ordinary Russian families are far wealthier today than in 2022. At the same time, the results are highly uneven: Flooding the Russian economy with state subsidies has spiked inflation and forced the Kremlin to sharply raise interest rates, hurting many of the non-military companies that make up much of the real Russian economy.

Beyond the defense sector, Russian oil and gas exports have been redirected to new markets across the Global South. Meanwhile, Western companies that exited Russia in response to the war have been replaced by local alternatives, creating extensive enrichment opportunities for many within Putin’s inner circle. A ceasefire would place this entire economic model in jeopardy, with potentially destabilizing consequences for the country as a whole.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has produced similar dividends for the Putin regime politically. Since 2022, the Kremlin has exploited wartime conditions to complete Russia’s long post-Soviet journey from flawed democracy to dictatorship. Virtually all potential opponents of the regime are now exiled, jailed, or dead. The last vestiges of an independent media have been extinguished, while civil liberties have been further curtailed. There is no meaningful anti-war movement in today’s Russia. Nor is there any serious doubt that Putin will remain in power until the end of his current term in 2036, if he lives that long.

In the event of a peace deal, the Kremlin would also face the challenge of dealing with hundreds of thousands of demobilized Russian soldiers brutalized by the savagery of the war in Ukraine. Crucially, these men have grown accustomed to exceptionally large salaries and bonus payments that dwarf anything they can expect to receive if they head back to their provincial homes across Russia. The return of so many military veterans to civilian life would have potentially explosive consequences for Russian society, with significant numbers likely to engage in violent crime or other forms of destructive behavior. Putin is acutely aware that Red Army soldiers returning from the Soviet war in Afghanistan played a key role in the spiraling banditry of the 1990s. He will be in no hurry to risk a repeat.

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Putin’s refusal to accept Trump’s favorable peace terms is in part explained by his heightened expectations of victory and his sense of trepidation over the unpredictable implications of any negotiated deal to end hostilities. The decisive factor fueling Putin’s determination to continue the war, however, is his conviction that Ukrainian statehood poses an existential threat to Russia and must be extinguished altogether. This has always been the primary motive behind the invasion and reflects deep-rooted fears shared by Putin and other Kremlin leaders over the potential breakup of the Russian Federation.

Putin views Ukraine as an indivisible part of Russia’s historical heartlands and regards the modern Ukrainian state’s separation from Russia as a “geopolitical catastrophe” that symbolizes the injustice of the Soviet collapse. Like many from his generation, Putin is haunted by the grassroots pro-democracy campaigns and independence movements that fueled the fall of the USSR. This has helped to convince him that the consolidation of an independent and democratic Ukraine could spark the next stage in a Russian imperial retreat that began with the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall.

Putin’s obsession with Ukraine as a potential catalyst for Russian imperial collapse has been increasingly evident throughout his reign. For much of the past two decades, he has insisted that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). In more recent years, he began attacking Ukraine more explicitly as an artificial “anti-Russia” that could no longer be tolerated. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, Putin took the highly unusual step of publishing an entire 5000-word essay detailing his rejection of Ukraine’s right to exist.

The actions of the Russian army in Ukraine have mirrored this genocidal rhetoric. In Ukrainian regions currently under Russian occupation, thousands of community leaders and patriots have been detained and dispatched into a vast network of prison camps. Those who remain are being forced to accept Russian passports and subjected to ruthless Russification, with all traces of Ukrainian statehood, culture, and history systematically erased.

The Kremlin’s carefully coordinated campaign to eradicate Ukrainian national identity reveals the central truth behind Russia’s invasion. The war that Putin first unleashed in 2014 and escalated in 2022 aims to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. This helps to explain why Putin has shown such little interest in the terms offered by Trump. While the US proposal may have appeared attractive to outsiders, Putin knows he cannot risk a settlement that stops short of Ukraine’s complete capitulation. He is painfully aware that any peace deal guaranteeing Ukraine’s continued existence as an independent state would represent an historic Russian defeat. In other words, if Ukraine survives, Russia loses.

If Trump and other leaders wish to change the calculus in the Kremlin and convince Putin to end the war, they must learn the lessons of the past six months. Clearly, it is essential to transform the military realities on the ground and force Putin to question his current confidence in Russian victory. This means providing Ukraine with the weapons to defend its cities from bombardment, regain the initiative on the battlefield, and bring the war home to Russia. The West has the tools to do so. All that is missing is the requisite political will. Anything less will prolong the war and embolden Putin to escalate further.

Additional sanctions are also evidently required in order to upset Russia’s robust wartime economy and persuade Putin that continuing the invasion will eventually bankrupt his country. This will require far tougher measures against Russia’s energy exports, along with secondary sanctions targeting countries involved in helping Moscow bypass present measures. In parallel, the numerous European nations that continue to trade with the Kremlin should be unambiguously informed that this will no longer be tolerated.

Most of all, Western leaders must force Putin to abandon his imperial ambitions and finally accept the irreversible historical reality of an independent Ukraine. This will require far greater resolve than anything the West has demonstrated since 2022, but it is the only way to secure a sustainable peace.

Putin’s anti-Ukrainian crusade has come to define his entire reign, reflecting his burning ambition to reverse the verdict of 1991 and revive the Russian Empire. He has gambled everything on his ability to extinguish Ukrainian independence, and is prepared to go to almost any lengths in pursuit of this criminal goal. From Putin’s perspective, therefore, the stakes could hardly be higher and the benefits of continuing the war currently far outweigh the costs. This will only change if he finds himself confronted with the threat of military defeat in Ukraine and the very real prospect of a new Russian national collapse.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The huge opportunity flows from the steady progress in the region toward greater integration from 2020 to 2023, then the tragedy of Hamas’ vicious terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, and then the response of various actors in the war that followed.

In the nearly 21 months since the attacks, a combination of Israeli and U.S. military power has dealt blow after to blow to the Iranian-aligned Axis of Resistance: Hamas, which began the war; Hezbollah, which entered the war on October 8; the Houthis in Yemen; Shia militia groups in Iraq and Syria; and, ultimately Iran itself. Along the way, Iran’s key regional partner, the Assad regime in Syria, crumbled when neither its Iranian, Russian, nor Hezbollah allies were able to rescue it. All told, Iran is at its weakest point in decades.

The scale of the Iranian miscalculation is immense. First, Iran encouraged their chief proxy, Hezbollah, to engage in a war of attrition with Israel. At a moment of Israel’s choosing, in a series of dramatic attacks, Israel decimated Hezbollah’s strategic weapons, leadership, and fighters, which left the organization unable to carry out the mission for which it was built — to serve as a deterrent or second strike capability to protect Iran from Israeli or American attack. Hezbollah’s collapse also produced a dramatic change in the policy of the Lebanese government, which may result in the terror group’s disarmament and marginalization.

Second, Iran twice abandoned its longstanding caution, wherein it sought to avoid direct confrontation with Israel or the United States and to fight asymetrically and via proxies. On April 13 and October 1 of last year, Iran launched two massive, overt, state-on-state acts of war against Israel — hundreds of ballistic missiles, cruse missiles, and drones. Israel’s air and missile defense, buttressed by U.S. support, and in April, by an international coalition, largely defeated these attacks. But these events are critical context to the events last month when Israel and the United States conducted strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. That war did not begin on June 13, 2025. It began 14 months earlier.

I believe the military confrontation with Iran that unfolded over 12 days in June was necessary and inevitable. President Trump was right to seek a diplomatic deal with Iran, and right to demand that Iran give up its uranium enrichment capability — which enables them to produce the material needed to produce nuclear weapons. It was never likely that Iran would agree to those terms, and certainly not without a credible military threat.

I supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action when it was signed in 2015 as the best available way to buy the most time on the Iranian nuclear program. I opposed the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA without a better plan in 2018, which cost us some of that time. But those positions ten and seven years ago were not relevant to the situation we faced in 2025. The fact is that Iran was far too close for comfort to producing a nuclear weapon, and it had to be stopped.

Three things had changed. First, the IAEA documented that Iran possessed over 400 kg of 60 percent enriched uranium, enough for 10 bombs, with the ability to enrich it to 90 percent (weapons grade) within days. Second, Iranian nuclear scientists over the previous year had engaged in various activities and research that would significantly shorten the time for them to build a weapon — a separate process from enrichment — if and when they got the order from their leadership to do so. And third, Iran’s decision to attack Israel directly twice last year fundamentally changed the calculus of what they were willing to do and what they could do. If any one of the ballistic missiles that reached Israel were tipped with a nuclear warhead, we would be in a different world. The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has long called for Israel’s destruction, was dangerously close to having the ability to carry it out.

The Israeli campaign, fueled by deep intelligence penetration of the Iranian system, did significant damage to Iranian nuclear facilities, air defenses, its ballistic missile production and launching capabilities, and high value targets in the Iranian military, IRGC, and nuclear program. Operation Midnight Hammer ordered by President Trump against Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, using unique U.S. capabilities, caused additional grave damage to those sites. President Trump’s initial comment that their nuclear sites were “totally obliterated” preceded the technical collection of a battle damage assessment, which takes weeks, and implied, probably inaccurately, that their nuclear program is completely out of business. But based on my understanding of the munitions used and the success of their deployment, those sites will not be usable for enrichment or uranium conversion for a significant period of time — time we can perhaps extend through a range of means.

None of this means the threats posed by Iran and its proxies are eliminated. They may be down but not out. Iran likely retains its highly enriched uranium stockpile, although it may or may not have current access to it, and it could have the ability and motivation to try to sprint to enrich it to weapons grade and build a crude nuclear device. A much-degraded Hamas continues to fight Israel in Gaza, and Hezbollah has not given up hopes of rearming. The Houthis — which the Biden Administration struck in a series of deliberate and self-defense engagements over months, and the Trump Administration struck in an intense campaign over weeks — retain capability to attack Israel and to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea, which they have recently resumed doing with deadly results.

But the gains produced by military power over the last 21 months are significant. Now we need to use all the tools at our disposal, not just military tools, to consolidate those gains.

In a moment, I will pivot to the main focus of this hearing, which is the diplomatic path forward. But, following my service at the Department of Defense in the last year of the Biden Administration, I would be remiss if I did not emphasize that there will remain a critical need to maintain a robust U.S. military capability in the region in the period ahead, and that doing so enhances our ability to seize diplomatic opportunities.

Briefly, Israel’s military dominance in the region is undisputed, with air superiority from the Mediterranean to Tehran. Not every problem in the region is a nail that should be addressed with a military hammer. But that capability can work in tandem with a steady U.S. posture to deter our adversaries, who, as mentioned, continue to pose threats — whether Iran’s reconstitution of its nuclear program, its threat to shut down shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, or Houthi aggression. A sustained U.S. presence also provides reassurance to our friends that we will not abandon the field. These friends include Egypt and Jordan, in whom we invest with military assistance, and Gulf states, which host many of our forces and which President Trump visited and secured further investments in our military partnerships. Our partnerships also help ensure these countries will not turn to Russia or China as security partners.

Perhaps most important is the role of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). With Israel’s integration into CENTCOM in 2021, and the deep trust and interoperability built up by CENTCOM and the Israel Defense Forces over these past 21 months, we have an extraordinary combined ability to deter and respond to threats. Beyond cooperation with Israel, CENTCOM serves as the convener and integrator of U.S. military partners across the region. Thanks to our unique capabilities, enduring presence, and CENTCOM’s exceptional leadership, U.S. partners in the Middle East look to us to shape the security environment and coordinate responses to key threats, strengthen their capabilities, conduct bilateral and multilateral exercises, convene high-level strategic exchanges, improve interoperability, and continue to build out an Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture.

Turning to the diplomatic opportunities, we should keep our eyes on these mutually reinforcing strategic objectives of: 1) bringing this period of regional conflict to a close and transitioning to a period of sustained stability; 2) expanding the circle of regional integration that was broadened by the Abraham Accords; 3) deterring and defanging the threats to the United States and our allies and partners posed by Iran, and preventing a resurgence of Iran’s regional influence through its terrorist proxies; and, 4) building a more sustainable regional order led by a network of U.S. partners including Israel and Arab states, with the United States as an active participant but at a scale that also enables adequate attention to critical interests in other regions.

With the remainder of my time, I would like to propose a number of key initiatives in support of these objectives.

First, help achieve a permanent end to the war in Gaza, with a fully developed day-after plan that releases all hostages, protects Israel’s security, removes Hamas from power, provides relief for Palestinian civilians, and enables regionally-supported reconstruction for Palestinians who want to live in peace with Israel.

Our other goals of expanding regional integration cannot get off the ground until the Gaza war ends. A 60-day ceasefire would bring much-needed relief, but it must transition into the end of the war without a return to fighting. That will require Israel agreeing to certain terms, but also intense pressure on Hamas brought by Qatar and other international actors. That is the first key to getting Arab states involved with the next phase of reconstruction.

At the moment, the risk is that we will a slide into the only alternative: a full-scale Israeli occupation of Gaza, with more dead hostages, more dead Palestinian civilians, more dead Israeli soldiers, no positive involvement by Arab states, and deepening isolation of Israel. In the immediate period, which we all hope will soon see a ceasefire, the United States should:

Withdraw President Trump’s misguided Gaza Riviera proposal, which has emboldened the most extreme members of the Israeli cabinet to press for full occupation, the massing of Palestinian civilians in a camp along the Egyptian border, and the removal of much of the Palestinian population from Gaza. Those Gazans who wish to leave should, of course, have the freedom to do so, and many countries should be encouraged to receive them. But the mass evacuation of hundreds of thousands or more to a handful of receiving states is not going to happen. If it were done involuntarily, it would be a violation of international humanitarian law and constitute ethnic cleansing. These ideas are widely rejected across the region, will discourage Arab states from helping stabilize Gaza, and even delegitimize more reasonable efforts to help individual Palestinians who wish to relocate to do so.

Enable a vastly improved mechanism to provide humanitarian aid to Palestinian civilians in Gaza. There is a legitimate problem of Hamas hijacking aid provided through international organizations and using it for themselves and for political power. Hamas bears much responsibility for the hunger crisis in Gaza. But the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) alternative is vastly insufficient, and has been deeply flawed and dangerous in its design, leading to far too many deaths of civilians attempting to access it, many caused by IDF fire. Getting aid directly into the hands of Palestinian civilians and prevent its hijacking to Hamas’s benefit is a worthy goal, and the only solution is to flood the zone with so much aid that it is easy to access and loses its market value. With hunger becoming more widespread across Gaza, Israel should be enabling international organizations and GHF to distribute aid across the entirety of Gaza, not limited to a handful of distribution points.

Press Israel to revise their targeting protocols to minimize civilian casualties. Hamas leaders and fighters remain legitimate targets, and the challenge of their using civilians as human shields remains. But the civilian toll of many recent strikes has been too high, and Israel has admitted to numerous recent mistakes.

Regarding day-after planning, the United States should:

Make clear that the terms for the permanent end of the war require the release of all Israeli hostages and the departure from Gaza of a critical mass of Hamas leaders and fighters, with the support of Arab states, for exile in distant locations, sufficient to ensure Hamas is completely removed from power. Arab states should be encouraged to speak in unison and join Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ call for Hamas to leave Gaza. A U.N. Security Council resolution could follow. The United States should organize plans for this departure, drawing on the 1982 evacuation of the PLO from Beirut.

Organize an Interim Security Mission for Gaza (ISMG), with U.S. leadership based outside Gaza, enabling troops from Arab states such as Egypt, the UAE, and Morocco, and possibly non-Arab states such as Indonesia, to secure humanitarian aid delivery, border crossings, and basic law and order. The ISMG would enable the gradual introduction of Palestinian Authority Security Forces, which should be trained for this mission under the supervision of the Office of the Security Coordinator in Jerusalem under the continued leadership of a U.S. 3-star general or flag officer.

Work with Arab states on the installation of improved leadership of the Palestinian Authority and the establishment of Gaza leadership linked to the PA and supported by Arab states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with help in governance, training, and education, and reconstruction funded by a range of Arab and international states. Arab states will only play this role, however, if they see it linked to the establishment of a future Palestinian state. So it will be necessary to find the proper expression of this vision, even if the timelines will be longer and the dimensions different than those envisioned in previous peace efforts.

Articulate strong opposition to any Israeli moves toward annexation in the West Bank, and urge Israeli and Palestinian security forces to act to prevent violence by their own sides, as instability in the West Bank could damage prospects for stability in Gaza and harm prospects for regional integration. I commend U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee for his recent highlighting of the importance of Israel holding extremist Israelis who commit violent acts to account.

Second, work toward the continuation and expansion of the normalization and integration process marked by the Abraham Accords, which has stalled but not receded during the war. Specifically, the United States should:

Prioritize discussions with Saudi Arabia on the timing, conditions, and mechanism of normalization with Israel. Nothing would do more to reshape the politics of the region that normalized relations between the most influential Arab and Muslim state and Israel. The Saudis seek expanded security cooperation with the United States, which we should be prepared to grant, provided the Kingdom meets U.S. needs that protect our interests in the region and regarding competition with China, including strict limits on Saudi-Chinese military cooperation. We should be mindful that Saudi officials have consistently made clear that a requirement for them to normalize relations with Israel is the establishment of a pathway to a Palestinian state — a bar that may be impossible for the current Israeli government to clear — and they are sensitive to extensive Israeli operations and holding of territory in Syria and Lebanon. Continued work on the framework of this triangular deal can take place even if its ultimate fulfillment may be more likely in 2027 than this year.

Prepare to resume the work of the Negev Forum as soon as possible after the war ends. This standing group of Israel, the United States, and four Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco) includes six working groups and a structure for multilateral projects aimed at bringing the benefits of regional integration to their citizens. As early as possible, a Negev Forum ministerial should be held, with additional invitees such as Jordan, Mauritania, and Indonesia, and activity should resume in the working groups. The Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative, which I led in 2022-2023, is poised to support the Negev Forum as it has in the past.

Appoint and confirm the Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords that Congress created in the NDAA for FY2024. The appointment of a high-profile envoy in this role will communicate the United States’ seriousness about expanding these agreements, and provide important buttressing to the work of Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff.

Elevate the work of the House and Senate Abraham Accords Caucuses, which is essential to add the expertise and jurisdictional focus of their diverse members and to convey the bipartisan commitment to expanding regional integration.

Continue work toward a non-belligerency agreement between Israel and Syria that reaffirms the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, supports connections between Israeli and Syrian Druze communities, and allows for limited economic, environmental, water, and health cooperation, without the need to address the final status of the Golan Heights. A return of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), enhanced by visits and supervision from CENTCOM representatives, can help stabilize the border region. President Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria is a gamble, but the right gamble, to give the greatest possibility for stabilization of Syria after years of brutal rule and civil war and preventing Iran from exploiting chaos to reestablish a foothold. But the government in Damascus must be held accountable, including for its treatment of minorities and establishment of inclusive governance. Israeli strikes on central government facilities in Damascus are destabilizing and have already become a dangerous factor in Syrian domestic politics; they must be avoided. Finally, it is critical that the United States not withdraw all its forces from Northeast Syria until adequate preparations are in place for proper sustainment of counter-ISIS operations, supervision of ISIS detention centers, and peaceful integration of Syrian Kurdish factions into national institutions.

Third, capitalize on the severe damage to the Iranian nuclear program and the weakening of the Iranian-led axis to secure a long-term improvement in the regional security environment. The United States should:

Seek renewed negotiations with Iran to sustain the gains of the military strikes on its nuclear program and prevent the program’s reconstitution.

Insist on full access for IAEA inspectors, the location and removal of Iran’s HEU stockpile, and an assurance of zero enrichment going forward. Separate negotiations will also need to commence on meaningful limits on Iran’s ballistic missile inventory

Maintain pressure on Iran toward those ends, by coordinating with UK, French, German, and EU officials on the leverage of, and if necessary the implementation of, JCPOA snapback sanctions, and by devoting additional attention and resources to scaling back Iranian oil exports to China.

Make clear that additional military strikes by Israel or the United States are possible if Iran seeks to move, hide, or reconstitute elements of its nuclear program, or if it refuses to give access to IAEA inspectors or exits the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Congress should be properly consulted before any such strikes. While the United States maintains escalation dominance, we must nevertheless remain vigilant to deter and defend against potential Iranian or Iranian-sponsored attacks on U.S. bases and personnel or asymmetric attacks on American, Israeli, or Jewish targets anywhere. Iran should be on notice that any attempt to harm current or former U.S. officials will bring an automatic kinetic response, and the United States should coordinate with allies on a common set of diplomatic and economic penalties that would be triggered by hostage taking.

Prepare for the possibility of internally-driven regime change. It should not be a policy goal of the United States, nor a project to be achieved by military means. But we must recognize that the regime and its ideology remain the main fuel of destabilization across the region, and are deeply unpopular among the Iranian people due to the regime’s brutality and corruption. We should provide appropriate support to the Iranian people, much as we did for anti-Communist movements in countries under Soviet domination during the Cold War. Our efforts should include enhancing Iranian citizens’ ability to communicate via internet access and to receive accurate information, publicly condemning repression by the regime, sanctioning regime officials responsible for abuses, and highlighting regime corruption that harms the Iranian people. We should develop now a plan to support a transition so we are not caught flat-footed if the Iranian people take matters into their hands, including organizing reconstruction funding from international donors, preparing to unwind U.S. and international sanctions with targets and incentives for the new authorities, planning to provide support for post-conflict transition and institution-building, and coordination with responsible elements of the Iranian diaspora.

Continue to support and pressure the Lebanese government and Lebanese Armed Forces in the disarmament of Hezbollah and establishing state institutions as the sole legitimate possessors of the means of force.

Develop a whole-of-government approach to combatting and weakening the Houthis, drawing on diplomatic, political, economic, public messaging, intelligence, and military tools, in coordination with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others.

Negotiate with Iraqi authorities to secure a sustained, limited U.S. military posture to support counter-ISIS missions, with full self-defense authorities and capabilities. Our presence in Iraq helps the Iraqi Security Forces succeed in this ongoing effort, provides reassurance to our Kurdish partners, and enables us to balance Iranian influence in Iraq.

Finally, as the war winds down, work should begin now on negotiating the next U.S.-Israel military assistance MOU.

The current MOU expires in 2028, which means it would be best to have a new MOU in place within a year or so, to ensure no delay in necessary acquisitions. A new MOU should ensure that the United States upholds its legal obligation and national interest to ensure Israel’s qualitative military edge, be grounded in planning for the threats of the next two decades, and provide sufficient funds to rebuild, sustain, and upgrade Israel’s air defense inventory, which has been stretched in multiple defensive engagements. I should note that it is entirely legitimate and appropriate in the context of MOU negotiations and our enduring close security partnership with Israel for the United States to raise questions and concerns about the need for Israel to minimize civilian casualties in its operations and the obligation to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need.

This is a hefty list of objectives and priorities to pursue to advance U.S. interests in the Middle East. It takes significant resources to carry out foreign policy initiatives at this scale: personnel with a range of diplomatic experience and expertise; functional and adequately resourced foreign assistance programs in key countries; international broadcasting; and more. If it is left to just a few high-level officials with access to the president, much of the implementation work will not get done. Meanwhile, China is deepening its activity and influence in all these areas everywhere the United States pulls back.

I am deeply concerned that the Trump Administration’s drastic cuts to personnel at the Department of State, including experts in nuclear diplomacy, sanctions enforcement, and counterterrorism, the elimination of the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the decimation of our international broadcasting capabilities, are leaving us ill-prepared and under-resourced to properly seize the opportunities before us. It will be a terrible own-goal if our own lack of preparation and denial of tools in our own toolkit prevent us from being effective in executing on the long list of priorities we must pursue, thereby providing an advantage to our competitors.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions.

Through our Middle East Programs, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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An open wound, a fading light: Marking eleven years since the Yezidi genocide

Pari Ibrahim and Murad Ismael — Thu, 24 Jul 2025 14:40:25 +0000

The Yezidi community remains shattered eleven years since the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) launched its genocidal assault against our community in Iraq. As the Middle East continues to experience shockwaves from ongoing conflict and an evolving geopolitical landscape, the priorities of the United Nations (UN), Western states, and Iraq have shifted.

One consequence of this shifting landscape has been an erosion of international attention on Yezidi issues, despite the enduring failure to achieve a successful resolution to Yezidi suffering in the aftermath of the Yezidi Genocide. More than 2500 Yezidis remain missing, according to assessments from the Free Yezidi Foundation, and many are believed to be in Syria. While Yezidis had hoped that regime change might lead to the return of many of our missing, this has not been the case. There is still no coordinated, systematic effort to identify and rescue the missing; rather, only sporadic rescues. The window of opportunity to save the missing may be closing. Absence of justice, poor living conditions in Sinjar, lack of employment opportunities, political marginalization, and protracted displacement all continue to plague the Yezidi community.

Last year, as we marked ten years since the Yezidi Genocide, we published a comprehensive report reviewing key challenges and policy priorities. One year later, little progress has been achieved.

Sinjar

Yezidis were driven from their homeland in Sinjar by ISIS in 2014, and while a significant number of Yezidis have returned home, many have not. As of 2024, approximately 150,000 Yezidis remain in displaced persons camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, according to the Hague-based International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. While the Iraqi Government has publicly pushed for the closure of internally displaced people (IDP) camps by July 2024, it seems to have reached an accommodation with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to pause the closures and slow the return process generally. Authorization letters for return do not seem to be issued, and only individuals returning through a US funded International Organization for Migration (IOM) program seem able to go back home. With limited support in Baghdad or Erbil, dwindling foreign aid, and spiking regional instability, a comprehensive voluntary, dignified return of Yezidis to Sinjar appears unlikely.

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The so-called Sinjar Agreement, widely promoted in Iraq and by international actors ostensibly to address instability, rebuild Sinjar, ensure security, and facilitate the return of those displaced by ISIS, has proved highly problematic due to the exclusion of the Yezidi community in shaping the agreement and its implementation. If implemented according to the current arrangement, many of the Yezidis affiliated with militias from Sinjar who joined just to defend their homeland, would be expelled, as outlined in the Sinjar Agreement. A just and logical political resolution to the current situation is required, including the demobilization and integration of Sinjar’s militia members into Iraq’s formal security architecture and empowering an elected mayor of Sinjar with meaningful decision-making authority, which would be more likely to encourage reconstruction, development, security, and ultimately, return.

Instead, Sinjar remains unstable. Its economy has collapsed, services are lacking, and most of those who returned are jobless and uncertain about the future. Despite calls for reconstruction, the Iraqi government pledged only $38 million for Sinjar and the Nineveh Plains. The Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement has ceased supporting returnees, citing the lack of funds to cover the meager stipend it was providing to Sinjar returnees.

As the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (or PKK) moves to disarm, further geopolitical shifts may affect the security situation in Sinjar. Fundamentally, the Iraqi state must establish and maintain stable, predictable, legal police and security forces, ideally drawing from Yezidi and other residents of Sinjar.

National & regional geopolitics

Perhaps most importantly, Yezidis lack political weight and influence. Like other communities, Yezidis depend on a minimum level of political representation to ensure that our voices and needs are not made invisible.

Previously, Yezidis had one quota seat in Iraq’s parliament, reserved for the Yezidi electorate. In the election upcoming in November, that quota seat can be voted upon by citizens throughout Iraq, not only Yezidi voters. This means that powerful political blocs can influence the seat. We and many in the Yezidi community expect that the seat will go to a Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) backed group. The PMF has its own political agenda and has steadily expanded its influence over Sinjar’s politics.

While Baghdad has approved mayoral appointments across most of the Nineveh governorate’s districts and subdistricts, approvals for mayorships in Yezidi-majority areas have largely stalled. While Baghdad and Erbil have continued negotiations aimed at resolving other issues like budgetary or oil and gas disputes, in Sinjar, positions remain frozen.

Further, Iraq’s parliament in January passed an Amnesty Law that may result in the release of thousands of convicted ISIS members. While Iraqi judicial proceedings are highly problematic, amnesty of ISIS members responsible for atrocity crimes is not a reasonable solution and undermines any sense of justice or fairness in Iraq from the perspective of genocide survivors.

Yezidis are also affected by Baghdad’s declining relationship with the UN. The Iraqi government’s decision to shutter the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Daesh/ISIS (UNITAD) has left ISIS-related evidence in a basement at UN Headquarters in New York, without a clear path toward evidence-sharing and case building against ISIS perpetrators.

Iraq seeks to wind down the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) by the end of 2025, effectively ending meaningful UN engagement in Iraq. While we have been disappointed with the UN in some respects, it was at least a regular presence ostensibly designed to promote international norms, the rule of law and accountability, and protection of all citizens, including minorities like Yezidis.

In Syria, President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former leader of al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, now leads the state—with relative support, including in the form of sanctions relief, from the United States and Europe, despite his extremist roots. The future of this new government with a Jihadist history is uncertain, but at the time of writing, the atrocities already committed against Syria’s Druze and Alawite communities are alarming for any ethnic or religious minority. Given the crimes perpetrated by ISIS, which grew strong in Syria, an extreme Islamist government in Damascus poses an existential threat to Yezidis in both Syria and Iraq.

Taken together, the developments in Iraq and the wider Middle East currently portend an ominous future for Yezidis. In our conversations with Yezidis living in IDP camps or in Sinjar, it is rare to find optimism among our people in Iraq. Almost everyone would prefer to leave Iraq and live abroad.

Policy changes in both Iraq and the wider international community, as recommended in our report last year, could help to reverse this trend. But without political strength or the active support of the international community, this is extremely difficult to envisage.

Changing US priorities

The United States has, in previous years, played a unique and irreplaceable role in Iraq. Attention to human rights, including of minority communities, the rule of law, the pursuit of justice, and combating extremism have helped Yezidis in the path to recovery, even if in small ways. The absence of a US foreign policy that prioritizes these issues presents serious threats to our communities and many others, and the US policy position regarding Yezidis is currently uncertain. Over the last decades, promotion of religious freedom and protection of religious minorities was a bipartisan US priority supported by most of the world. While the United States has the right to promote its own interests, we believe advancing fair and just societies around the world increases everyone’s security and prosperity.

Conversely, the spread of sectarian violence, Islamist extremism, and corrupt governance makes the region dramatically less safe and more difficult—resulting in costly military intervention and reducing the prospect of regional economic growth and stability.

We call on US, international, and domestic Iraqi actors to reaffirm their commitment to Yezidi recovery, to common principles of justice and fairness, and to help our community achieve dignity, safety, and a future in the Yezidi homeland.

Pari Ibrahim is the founder and executive director of the Free Yezidi Foundation. She has led efforts to amplify the voices of Yezidi survivors, promote accountability for ISIS crimes, and advance women’s empowerment.

Murad Ismael is the co-founder and president of Sinjar Academy and a co-founder of the Sinjar Crisis Management Team.

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Collective security in the Indo-Pacific: Rethinking the United Nations Command

Richard D. Butler, Shawn P. Creamer — Thu, 17 Jul 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The Indo-Pacific theater is too large and complex to be managed by a single US command without a collective security counterpart.
The US-led UN Command in South Korea and Japan provides the means to create a NATO-like structure in the Indo-Pacific.
Complementary US command-and-control reforms in the Indo-Pacific will provide the necessary focus to deter and, if necessary, fight the three regional adversaries threatening international peace and security.

The international system forged after 1945 is being tested by an increasingly aligned confederation of authoritarian states. For decades, rules and norms upheld global order, but inaction, complacency, and institutional stagnation now threaten their collapse. Authoritarian aggression cannot be appeased—only deterred through credible military power, strong economies, and united diplomacy. The United States cannot shoulder this responsibility alone. The broader free world must strengthen regional defenses and support global collective security. Yet current mechanisms face two flaws: widespread disarmament among free world nations and outdated collective security institutional structures.

The next National Defense Strategy needs to address the seriousness of the situation by resourcing a multi-theater war strategy centered on the Indo-Pacific. This strategy must set the goal of completing the pivot to the Indo-Pacific by the end of the current US administration’s term. Key to completing the pivot will come through implementing a reverse of the Guam doctrine, which will require America’s European allies to take the lead in their own defense. The next defense strategy should avoid the mistake of focusing the pivot only to the west of the international date line.

For the pivot to be successful, the Western Hemisphere must be made more secure—politically, economically, and militarily—by rebooting the Monroe Doctrine to reenable the Organization of American States as an economic security bloc and the reshoring of supply chains to the hemisphere, and to revitalize the Rio Pact to defend the Americas against twenty-first century imperialist coercion and aggression.

Lastly, the next National Defense Strategy must squarely take on the topic of global unified command and implement a winning command and control architecture to ensure the United States military is organized to fight a multi-theater, large-scale war.

The state of collective security

Europe relies on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for its security. NATO, a once-capable alliance, has lapsed, and presently suffers from a diminished martial culture and a state of unpreparedness. NATO relies on Russian weakness rather than allied strength, underscoring its vulnerabilities. More must be done in Europe to strengthen NATO, and, while the United States has a role, most of the heavy lifting must be carried out by Europe because the Indo-Pacific requires much more attention by the United States.

At present, the Indo-Pacific lacks a security system—even one as fragile as NATO. The nexus of China, North Korea, and Russian Far East power poses an increased risk to peace and security across East Asia and the Indian Ocean region and beyond the second island chain of the Western Pacific. American bilateral alliances, along with multilateral security partnerships like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) team, provide cooperative frameworks, strategic alignment, and some deterrence, but they remain fragmented and inadequate against aligned authoritarian strategies.

Historically, the free world attempted collective defense in Asia through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the United Nations Command (UNC). SEATO failed due to its weak regional foundations and colonial baggage. The UNC, however, successfully coordinated international resistance against North Korean aggression and Chinese intervention. Though still operational, UNC was relegated to a diminished support role in 1978 when warfighting responsibilities transitioned to the Republic of Korea—United States Combined Forces Command (CFC).

What the UN Command is, and what it is not

On June 25, 1950, Communist North Korea invaded the United Nations (UN) recognized democratic South Korea. In response, the US president authorized the US Far East Command (FECOM), under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, to provide material support to the beleaguered South Korean government. The president then directed US forces to intervene in the conflict to repel the invasion. Other nations (the United Kingdom and Australia) also provided forces to assist the Korean government alongside the United States before the UN acted.

The UNC emerged from four key United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR)—82 through 85—adopted in 1950. These resolutions authorized a US-led unified command to repel North Korean forces and coordinate humanitarian efforts. While the Security Council requested that the United States lead the international response and authorized the unified command to fly the UN flag, the resolutions did not establish UN oversight. The US government retains full executive control, with the UNC still led by a senior US general.

The UNC was established to separate and compartmentalize the aforementioned UNSCR actions in support of the defense of South Korea from unilateral US government actions in East Asia being exercised by FECOM.

The UNC is not a neutral party nor a peacekeeper. It is a belligerent in the Korean conflict, formed to repel North Korean forces, later joined by Chinese forces, that were both being supported by the Soviets.

In 1953, the UNC became a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement with the opposing side’s belligerents, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) of North Korea and the thinly veiled Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a party to the armistice, the UNC is responsible only for friendly force compliance. The UNC is not responsible for keeping North Korean forces compliant, nor is it a referee between the two Koreas.

The confusion surrounding the UNC stems from its name and authorization to fly the UN flag. Originally embraced as a symbol of global unity, the naming convention reflects post-WWII idealism. In military doctrinal terms, the UNC is a lead nation multinational command. Once dominated exclusively by a US staff, the UNC headquarters expanded to include international staff contributions from the contributing nations—the “sending states”—and maintains an active political apparatus through the resident ambassadors in South Korea.

The UNC also maintains a rear command in Japan, managing designated UN bases under a multinational Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the government of Japan. These bases are critical to future multinational deployments, granting strategic depth and legal protections to non-US UNC forces. Since 2010, the rear command has been led by a multinational officer, reinforcing the UNC’s international character.

While the CFC is now the responsible command for the defense of Korea, the UNC’s role has evolved toward armistice maintenance and multinational integration. Since 2015, revitalization efforts have improved staff capacity and multinational coordination, though more is needed to address the expanding regional threat.

UN Command’s ‘credible legacy’ complements other forces in the region

Given the fractured state of Indo-Pacific security architecture, the region lacks a robust collective defense mechanism. Bilateral alliances and multilateral partnerships like AUKUS and the Quad are insufficient. A future war would be difficult to organize amid crisis. Thus, enhancing an existing structure like the UNC, with its historical legitimacy and multinational foundation, is the pragmatic choice.

The UNC already boasts a credible legacy, a seventeen-nation multilateral presence in Korea and Japan, access to bases, and international agreements to permit military support. These assets make it uniquely positioned to transform the command back into a multinational warfighting headquarters.

The Korean Peninsula has historically served as the competition space and battleground of the great powers. Korea remains the strategic high ground of Northeast Asia, and Northeast Asia is the decisive security and economic terrain for East Asia and the greater Indo-Pacific. Northeast Asia is a position of strength for the free world in the Indo-Pacific, and it should be reinforced as such to maintain it as a strong point—with strategic, operational, and tactical implications for both China and Russia.

Skeptics will argue that the 1950 UNSCRs limit the UNC to the defense of South Korea. Yet UNSCRs 83 and 84 both emphasize the objective to “restore international peace and security to the area.” Korean security is inseparable from broader East Asian stability. With China and North Korea both supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine, the linkages between regional and global conflicts are becoming clearer.

A resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula can be expected to draw in regional powers, including China and Russia—both security treaty allies of North Korea. Moreover, any war in East Asia is likely to involve the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s strategic location and hosting of sizable US forces make it an unavoidable, even if reluctant, actor in future conflicts.

The UNC’s transformation back into a multinational warfighter does not alter the CFC’s mission and role as the designated alliance warfighter for the defense of South Korea. The UNC would be positioned to martial and organize free world military and humanitarian contributions, ready to intervene and reinforce the CFC to repel authoritarian aggression and return peace and security to the area. A militarily capable UNC would relieve the CFC from managing a wide range of sending-state contributions, allowing each command to focus on specific missions and improve overall 360-degree combat readiness.

Restoring the UNC to its collective security roots would also push necessary reforms in Northeast Asia’s security posture. South Korea and the United States must conclude additional foundational agreements, such as a SOFA (or visiting force agreement), for non-US sending-state forces. Past agreements granting SOFA-like privileges and immunities—such as the 1952 Meyer agreement—must be updated or reaffirmed to ensure legal clarity for free world powers contributing military forces. The UN SOFA with Japan should also be expanded from the nine current signatories to include all seventeen non-US sending states.

In parallel, South Korea needs to continue developing its military’s operational capabilities, completing its obligations under the bilaterally agreed Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP). Doing so best protects South Korean sovereignty in a very dangerous neighborhood, and paves the way for greater Korean leadership within its alliance with the United States and across the region. A more militarily capable and operationally focused UNC would help facilitate this transition by reducing administrative and operations burdens on the CFC.

Returning the UN Command to ‘warfighter status’

One option to seriously consider is to move the UNC’s main headquarters back to Japan (where it resided from 1950-1957), with a small residual forward headquarters in Korea to provide day-to-day oversight over the command’s armistice functions. Stationing the UNC in Japan would better position the command to exercise the designated UN bases and reinvigorate the reception, staging, and onward movement planning and preparations at and through the designated UN bases.

Having the UNC in Japan would catalyze the deployment of free world military forces to the region for training and exercises, a critical function for testing the validity of operational plans and for deterrence. Doing so positions the UNC to become the multinational offshore balancer for the Korean Peninsula, serving as a threat in the strategic calculus of the North Korean regime—and its Chinese and Russian patrons.

Beyond warfighting, the UNC can serve as a framework for broader international cooperation. Nations with limited military capabilities can contribute to non-combat roles, such as humanitarian relief or logistics. Germany’s recent joining of the UNC speaks to the command’s potential to expand beyond countries that were involved in the Korean War.

Returning the UNC to warfighter status and positioning the command in Japan would necessitate internal US force posture reforms. The hard truth is the Indo-Pacific is too large a theater for a single unified command—United States Indo-Pacific Command—to manage in time in space. If the Indo-Pacific was too large a theater for the likes of Nimitz, MacArthur, Slim, and Stilwell to singly manage during World War II, what makes the United States think its current crop of flag officers can handle it from Hawaii? Furthermore, the US force posture in Northeast Asia is divided, duplicative, and too narrowly focused, leaving immense gaps and seams for the authoritarians to exploit.

A consolidated command for Northeast Asia should be considered, merging US Forces Korea and US Forces Japan under a single commander. The consolidated command could be a unified or a sub-unified command. Headquarters consolidation in Northeast Asia would force further conversations within the US Department of Defense to establish additional unified/sub-unified commands to cover the operational flanks in the Southwest Pacific area, South Asia, and the communication zone between the West Coast and the second island chain, similar to how the US military organized itself in WWII.

Finally, a restored, combat-capable UNC would provide strategic flexibility to the free world to meet aggression across the breadth and depth of the Indo-Pacific by serving as a standing multinational unified command. During an East Asian crisis that does not immediately involve the Korean Peninsula—beyond the scope of UNSCR 83-85—the command could reflag under a new multinational banner, exercising collective defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In such a situation, the UNC main headquarters in Japan could temporarily transfer its UNSCR 83-85 and armistice responsibilities to the UNC forward headquarters in Korea for the duration of the crisis. In this way, the reflagged UNC staff—already trained and functioning as an operational warfighter—could once again be committed to defeat aggression, if required.

Conclusion

The authoritarians are growing in strength, aligning, and collectively placing increasing pressure on the rules-based international system. The free world must stand up to coercion and aggression. Collective security works but is most effective when it is put in place pre-war. Europe, despite NATO’s major shortcomings, has a reasonably effective collective security mechanism in place. Much work is required to return European military power and NATO to its Cold War status. The Indo-Pacific—the decisive region for the twenty-first century—does not have a multilateral collective security mechanism in place, at least not one that is militarily capable. The next National Defense Strategy must address global unified command and put in place a winning command and control architecture for the Indo-Pacific.

The UNC offers the free world a standing collective security mechanism that can be combat credible, providing peace and security for the free world’s northern flank in the Indo-Pacific. The sobering truth is life is not fair, but it is just. What one sows, one will reap. Those who sow carelessly end up paying the price for wishing away reality. Now is the time to move out on collective security in the Indo-Pacific. The UNC is one option available and returning it to a multinational warfighter should be seriously considered. For those who disagree, forward a better alternative so the free world can realize collective security in the Indo-Pacific and protect the rules-based international system.

About the authors

Richard D. Butler is a retired US Army colonel. His last active duty posting was as the inaugural director for the China Landpower Studies Center, which conducts research, analysis, and education on the rise of China from a military perspective. Originally commissioned in 1995 as a surface warfare officer in the United States Navy, Butler deployed worldwide on multiple destroyers and commanded USS Firebolt (PC 10) during two tours early in the Iraq War. During a joint assignment with III Corps, US Army, he deployed two more times to Iraq as a lead planner. In 2010, he changed his commission to the United States Army, where he performs duties as a strategist. He served in Jerusalem working the two-state solution and has over twelve years of experience in the Indo-Pacific, serving in various capacities as plans chief, strategy chief, and senior strategist at US Army, Pacific; Indo-Pacific Command; and Combined Forces Command.

Shawn P. Creamer is a retired US Army colonel. He served as an infantry officer for thirty years, with more than fourteen years assigned to or directly working on Indo-Pacific security issues, including assignments to US Forces Korea, the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, the United Nations Command, commanding a battalion in Korea and a brigade in Hawaii. He was a US Army War College Fellow with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program. In retirement, Creamer is serving as a fellow with the Institute for Corean-American Studies and as a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

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Cautious optimism in Ukraine as Trump vows to send more weapons

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 08 Jul 2025 19:47:45 +0000

Ukrainians have welcomed US President Donald Trump’s July 7 announcement that he intends to provide their country with more weapons. However, it remains unclear exactly what the US leader has in mind or whether this latest statement represents a major policy shift away from his longstanding reluctance to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s ongoing invasion.

Trump’s comments came one week after news broke of a partial pause in US military aid to Ukraine, a decision that sparked considerable alarm in Kyiv and among Ukraine’s European allies. White House officials framed the pause on shipments of crucial weapons categories as an attempt to “put America’s interests first” following a Pentagon review of military stockpiles that reportedly revealed potential shortfalls.

Trump unveiled his apparent U-turn over military aid for Ukraine in Washington DC on Monday evening. “We are going to send some more weapons. We have to. They have to be able to defend themselves. They’re getting hit very hard now,” he commented. According to Trump, the new military deliveries will primarily focus on defensive weapons.

This abrupt change in Trump’s position followed on from two very different phone calls with the leaders of Russia and Ukraine. Last Thursday, Trump came away from a long conversation with Vladimir Putin voicing his disappointment and expressing frustration at the Kremlin dictator’s evident determination to continue the war. One day later, The American and Ukrainian leaders held what both sides praised as a friendly and productive call that raised hopes of continued US support for Ukraine in crucial areas such as air defense.

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Efforts to end the bloodshed in Ukraine have dominated US foreign policy during the first six months of the Trump presidency. Critics have accused the US leader of being too eager to offer Russia concessions while maintaining an uncompromising stance toward Ukraine.

Following Trump’s inauguration in January 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy initially struggled to find common ground with the new US administration. The relationship got off to a disastrous start, with Trump branding Zelenskyy a dictator and blaming him for starting the war with Russia. The nadir came in late February, when an Oval Office meeting degenerated into a shouting match that saw Trump accuse Zelenskyy of “gambling with World War III.”

Zelenskyy has since taken a number of steps to improve bilateral ties. He has repeatedly praised Trump in public, has backed a US proposal for an unconditional thirty-day ceasefire, and has signed off on a minerals deal that grants American businesses preferential access to Ukraine’s natural resources. Meanwhile, Putin has shown no interest in peace. Instead, he has engaged in transparent stalling tactics and issued a series of maximalist demands while dramatically escalating the bombardment of Ukrainian civilians.

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There was a degree of guarded optimism in Ukraine on Tuesday morning following Trump’s talk of new weapons deliveries. While the rollercoaster experience of the past half year has left many deeply cynical about the likelihood of further US support, some Ukrainians also saw a certain logic behind Trump’s sudden change in tone. After all, it is now painfully obvious that Putin does not intend to end the war and has been stringing his American counterpart along for months.

Golos Party leader and member of the Ukrainian Parliament Kira Rudik was one of numerous Ukrainian public figures to suggest that Trump may have finally run out of patience with Putin. “President Trump said the US will send more weapons to Ukraine,” she stated. “This is good news for us, but bad news for Russia. No one will endure Putin’s games forever. It is time to strike back.”

Others underlined that US support for Ukraine remains very much in America’s national interests. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak noted that by denying Russia victory in Ukraine, the United States could prevent a more general European war in the coming years. “The most significant benefit comes from reducing the likelihood of Russian aggression against other European nations,” he commented. “By stopping Putin in Ukraine today, the White House avoids the astronomical future costs of defending NATO allies tomorrow.”

The initial response from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense was somewhat more cautious. While expressing appreciation for continued US support, ministry officials stressed the need for greater clarity. It was “critically important” for Ukraine to maintain “stability, continuity, and predictability” in the delivery of military aid, especially air defense systems, a statement from the ministry read.

More details are likely to emerge in the coming days as senior Ukrainian and US officials meet on the sidelines of this week’s Ukraine Recovery Conference, which is taking place in Rome. Any additional military support from the United States will certainly be welcome, but many in Kyiv will also be looking for further signals that Trump now recognizes the need to get tough with Russia.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Since the Russian takeover of Crimea, the peninsula’s sizable Crimean Tatar population has been collectively and systematically persecuted for their perceived opposition to the occupation. For the Crimean Tatars, this mirrors the pain of past experiences with Russian imperialism. Following the Russian conquest of Crimea in the late eighteenth century, the native Crimean Tatar population was subjected to decades of harsh policies by the Russian imperial authorities, leading to a mass exodus.

Worse was to follow. In February 1944, the Soviet authorities carried out the deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar population to Central Asia. More than 200,000 people were forced to abandon their ancestral homeland overnight, with tens of thousands dying in a brutal deportation process and during the initial years of exile.

The deportation of the Crimean Tatars is one of the Soviet Union’s most notorious crimes against humanity. Ukrainian parliamentarians recently appealed to the international community to recognize the deportation as an act of genocide.

In the twilight years of the Soviet era, the Crimean Tatars were finally allowed to begin returning to their homeland. This process gained momentum following Ukrainian independence, with Crimean Tatars accounting for around 15 percent of the peninsula’s more than two million population on the eve of the 2014 Russian invasion.

The current wave of persecution targeting the Crimean Tatar population of Crimea began during the early days of the Russian occupation, with reports soon emerging of Crimean Tatars being threatened, kidnapped, and killed. The body of Crimean Tatar activist Reshat Ametov was discovered on March 15, 2014. He is widely seen as the first victim of the Russian occupation.

Since 2014, hundreds of Crimean Tatars have been arrested on what human rights activists say are falsified charges. Members of the community are currently thought to represent more than half of Crimea’s political prisoners. In 2016, the self-governing body of the Crimean Tatar community, the Mejlis, was officially outlawed and branded an “extremist organization.” Russian raids and detentions in Crimean Tatar districts have become a grim feature of everyday life during more than a decade of occupation.

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In addition to facing restrictions on their human rights and political freedoms, Crimean Tatars living under Russian occupation are also currently limited in their ability to honor their culture or express their identity. Indeed, they are not even permitted to stage public memorial events commemorating the victims of the Soviet era deportation. Meanwhile, Crimean Tatar heritage is being erased across the peninsula.

Crimean Mufti Ayder Rustemov is one of many from the Crimean Tatar community who view the current policies of the Putin regime as a continuation of earlier attempts to suppress the indigenous population and russify Crimea. “The goal of Russia has not changed, only the form has changed,” he commented in May 2025.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has dominated the international headlines in recent years and drawn attention away from the ongoing human rights abuses being committed by the Russian authorities in occupied Crimea. However, the situation remains dire. In Freedom House’s 2025 Freedom in the World report, political rights and civil liberties in Crimea received a score of just one out of a possible 100.

As discussion continues over possible deals to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Crimean Tatars have been alarmed by reports that the United States may be prepared to recognize Russia’s occupation of Crimea in order to secure peace. US recognition of Russia’s claim to Crimea would represent a major blow to the inviolability of borders, which has served as a core principle of international law for decades. It would also legitimize the further persecution of the Crimean Tatar population.

Any lasting peace must guarantee the security and human rights of Ukraine’s Crimean Tatar population and allow them to live freely in their own homeland. This should include the release of all political prisoners, an end to infringements on political and religious freedoms, and full legal protections for Crimean Tatar heritage and identity.

Russia’s war against Ukraine began in February 2014 with the seizure of Crimea. The persecution of the Crimean Tatars is a constant reminder of this crime and must be addressed before the war can be brought to an end.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Jonathan Panikoff (@jpanikoff): Director of the Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East
Daniel B. Shapiro (@DanielBShapiro): Distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US ambassador to Israel
Kirsten Fontenrose: Nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former senior director for the Gulf at the US National Security Council

Iran

“The balance of power in the region has been fundamentally altered,” Jonathan tells us. “For years, Iran’s power projections were predicated on a triad of capabilities: its proxy network, ballistic missiles, and nuclear program. All three have been severely diminished.”
The war has demonstrated Iran’s “devastating weakness and vulnerability to penetration,” Dan argues, adding that Iran’s nuclear program has been “significantly disrupted and set back.” However, this is “probably not the end of the program, and certainly not the end” of Iran’s aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons.
Now, Dan says, the United States should work with Gulf and European countries to “try to return to negotiations” on a deal that would prevent Iran from enriching any uranium, “offering some degree of sanctions relief that Iranian leaders, intent on stabilizing their regime, can offer as a win to their people.”

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Israel

“Israel emerges from this conflict with its reputation as a fearsome military enhanced,” says Dan, as Jerusalem has demonstrated “its ability to project power and harm its enemies across the Middle East,” as well as its unwillingness after Hamas’s October 7 attack to “live in the shadow of existential threats.”
Israel achieved its two main objectives in the war, argues Jonathan, which were to “significantly set back” Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear program. “Regardless of whether Israel had to act when it did,” Jonathan says, “Iran’s nuclear program is clearly no longer an immediate existential threat to Israel” in being, by Israeli estimates, only weeks away from producing nuclear weapons.
But Dan warns that Israel must “guard against hubris” given that it sustained “significant hits and casualties” from Iran’s ballistic missiles, which strained Israeli air defenses. “Israel’s leaders should try to capitalize on this moment,” says Dan, “to reach a final cease-fire and hostage deal that ends the war in Gaza, brings all hostages home, and removes Hamas from power.” This could help “get the region back on the path of greater integration.”
The conflict revealed a rift in US and Israeli objectives in striking Iran, notes Kirsten. While both the United States and Israel targeted Iran’s nuclear program, some Israeli leaders described a broader objective: “to prevent Iran from posing an existential threat, which many interpret as requiring the takedown of a regime committed to the destruction of Israel.”

The United States

“The US military demonstrated its unique capabilities,” Dan tells us, “executing the strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, deterring Iran from a meaningful response, and protecting US assets and personnel with skill and precision.” However, he notes that “vigilance will be required” if Iran or its proxies attempt to “settle scores down the line.”
The operation to evacuate US and Qatari forces from the Al Udeid base before it was struck by Iran was “a feat of bilateral logistics coordination,” Kirsten notes. The Iranian attack could bring Qatar, which strikes a diplomatic balance between Washington and Tehran, “firmly in the US camp.”
Even after the successful US strike against Fordow, says Jonathan, the question remains whether Iran removed a significant amount of highly enriched uranium from the nuclear facility before it was struck. If it did so, it would only require a few hundred advanced centrifuges plus an Iranian stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent at a small facility to get to weapons-grade material, he estimates.
Answering that question likely will require deploying International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to Iran to assess the damage, Jonathan adds, so “a diplomatic long-term solution that addresses any future Iranian nuclear program is still required.” Otherwise, in several months “US or Israeli strikes could be once more required” to prevent the scenario that prompted this war in the first place: Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.

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‘All of Ukraine is ours’: Putin’s Russian imperialism is now on full display

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 23 Jun 2025 17:05:46 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin believes “all of Ukraine is ours,” he declared last week. The Kremlin leader’s revealing statement is an indication of the increasingly confident mood in Moscow as Russia continues to make slow but steady progress on the Ukrainian battlefield against a backdrop of deepening Western disunity. It also serves as a timely reminder of the unapologetic Russian imperialism that is driving Europe’s largest invasion since World War II.

Putin’s comments came on June 20 during his headliner appearance at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, a flagship annual event that is often referred to as Russia’s Davos. “I have said many times that I consider the Russian and Ukrainian peoples to be one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours,” Putin told forum guests. “We have an old rule. Wherever a Russian soldier sets foot is ours.”

Tellingly, Putin’s claim that “all of Ukraine” belongs to Russia was met with what appeared to be spontaneous laughter and applause from many of those attending the St. Petersburg event. This strikingly enthusiastic audience reaction says much about the normalization of imperialistic sentiment in today’s Russia after more than eleven years of the country’s colonial war against neighboring Ukraine.

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Kyiv was quick to condemn the Russian leader’s statements. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Putin’s “performance” was confirmation of his expansionist imperial ambitions, and warned that the threat posed by resurgent Russian imperialism extended to “Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, the Caucasus, countries like Kazakhstan, and every place on Earth that Russian killers can reach.”

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha accused Putin of demonstrating “complete disdain” for ongoing peace efforts initiated by US President Donald Trump. “While the United States and the rest of the world have called for an immediate end to the killing, Russia’s top war criminal discusses plans to seize more Ukrainian territory and kill more Ukrainians,” commented Sybiha.

Others were considerably less diplomatic, with many Ukrainians taking to social media to vent their anger over this very public embrace of Russian imperialism. “Putin says Russians and Ukrainians are one people while Russians are bombing, raping, and killing us,” commented Ukrainian security analyst Maria Avdeeva. “We’re not your brothers. We’re your survivors.”

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None of this is entirely new, of course. The contempt for Ukrainian statehood and national identity that was on display at the St. Petersburg forum is deeply rooted in Russian imperial tradition and has become an increasingly prominent feature of Putin’s reign over the past twenty five years. As Putin himself acknowledged last week, he has consistently claimed that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”). As long ago as 2008, he was already telling US President George W. Bush that in his opinion Ukraine was “not even a country.”

Ever since Russia’s war against Ukraine began in 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, Putin has been weaponizing history to undermine Ukraine’s legitimacy and justify his own escalating campaign of imperial aggression. On the eve of the February 2022 full-scale invasion, he took the unusual step of publishing an entire 5000-word history essay that read like a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. Once the attack was underway, he likened his invasion of Ukraine to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great, while arguing that he was “returning historically Russian lands.”

Many of Putin’s historical distortions border on the absurd. He makes no mention of the entire centuries-long struggle for Ukrainian statehood, while conveniently ignoring countless examples of Russian imperial policies designed to silence Ukrainians and erase Ukrainian identity. Instead, he argues that Ukraine is an artificial entity created by Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks in the early twentieth century. Putin is clearly not a fan of Voltaire, who observed almost three hundred years ago in 1731 that “Ukraine has always aspired to be free.”

Putin’s obsessive Ukraine denial has set the tone for the whole Russian establishment and given rise to similarly eliminationist language from numerous other Kremlin officials. In early 2024, former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev stated that “the existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians.” More recently, close Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev announced that Ukraine may soon “cease to exist.” Vicious anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become so commonplace in the Kremlin-controlled Russian media that UN officials believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.”

The actions of the Russian army in Ukraine closely mirror this genocidal rhetoric. In areas of Ukraine seized by the Kremlin, thousands of people have been arrested based on their pro-Ukrainian stance and have since disappeared into a vast network of prisons. A UN probe has determined that these mass detentions are a crime against humanity. Remaining residents in occupied regions of Ukraine are forced to accept Russian citizenship and subjected to relentless russification in every sphere of public life, with all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity systematically removed or suppressed.

Meanwhile, Trump’s efforts to broker a peace deal have proved fruitless in large part due to Putin’s uncompromising position. While Ukraine has backed a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire, Russia has refused to do likewise. Instead, Moscow has sought to derail ceasefire talks while making maximalist demands that would leave Ukraine internationally isolated, partitioned, disarmed, and forced to reject an independent identity in favor of an imperial Russian ideology. Such terms would be fatal for Ukrainian statehood.

The widespread Russian belief that Ukraine has no right to exist helps to explain the brutality of the current invasion and makes a complete mockery of US-led efforts to broker a compromise peace. Putin’s latest comments now provide further proof that he has no real interest in a negotiated settlement and is determined to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. This extreme brand of Russian imperialism is the root cause of the invasion.

Until Russia is forced to abandon its imperial ambitions and accept the inevitability of an independent Ukraine, the war will continue. This long overdue shift in Russian perceptions can be achieved by dramatically increasing Western military aid to Ukraine, strengthening support for Ukraine’s domestic defense industry, and making the kind of long-term commitments that remove any doubt over the West’s collective resolve to safeguard Ukrainian security. A lasting peace is possible, but it will only come once Russia recognizes that Ukraine is too strong to be subjugated.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The massive bombardment of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities during this week’s G7 summit is the latest example of Putin’s penchant for sending messages with missiles. On this occasion his message could hardly have been clearer: Russia does not want peace. On the contrary, Moscow feels increasingly emboldened by growing signs of Western weakness and is more confident than ever of securing victory in Ukraine.

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Russia’s rejection of US-led peace efforts is equally evident in the diplomatic arena. While Ukraine agreed to US President Donald Trump’s call for an unconditional ceasefire more than three months ago, Russia still refuses to follow suit. Instead, the Kremlin has engaged in obvious stalling tactics while creating a series of obstacles aimed at derailing any meaningful progress toward peace. At one point, Putin even claimed the Ukrainian authorities lacked the legitimacy to negotiate a settlement and suggested the country be placed under temporary UN administration.

The recent resumption of bilateral talks between Moscow and Kyiv has provided further confirmation of Russia’s commitment to continuing the war. Putin personally initiated these talks but then chose not to attend and sent a low-level delegation instead. In the two meetings that have since taken place, Russian officials have presented a list of ceasefire conditions that read like a call for Kyiv’s complete capitulation.

The Kremlin’s demands include Ukraine’s withdrawal from four partially occupied Ukrainian regions that the Russian army has so far been unable to fully occupy. This would mean handing over dozens and towns and cities while condemning millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of indefinite Russian occupation.

Moscow also wants to ban Ukraine from any international alliances or bilateral security partnerships, while imposing strict limits on the size of the Ukrainian army and the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess. In recent days, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko has underlined Moscow’s insistence on Ukraine’s total disarmament by calling on the country to destroy all Western weaponry provided since 2022.

Putin’s punitive peace terms are not limited to sweeping territorial concessions and harsh military restrictions. The Kremlin also expects Ukraine to grant the Russian language official status, reinstate the Russian Orthodox Church’s legal privileges, rewrite Ukrainian history in line with Russian imperial propaganda, and ban any Ukrainian political parties that Moscow deems to be “nationalist.”

The Kremlin’s negotiating position envisions a postwar Ukraine that is partitioned, disarmed, internationally isolated, and heavily russified. If imposed, these terms would allow Russia to reestablish its dominance over Ukraine and would deal a fatal blow to Ukrainian statehood. In other words, Putin wants a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

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Donald Trump’s talk of peace through strength succeeded in generating considerable optimism during the early months of 2025, but it is now time to acknowledge that this was largely based on wishful thinking. Since Trump returned to the White House, the Russians have significantly escalated their air war against Ukraine’s civilian population. On the battlefield, Putin’s troops are now engaged in the early stages of what promises to be a major summer offensive. Meanwhile, Kremlin officials continue make maximalist demands at the negotiating table that no Ukrainian government could accept. These are not the actions of a country seeking a pathway to peace.

In both words and deeds, Putin is sending unambiguous signals that he has no interest whatsoever in ending his invasion and remains determined to achieve the complete subjugation of Ukraine. This uncompromising stance will not change unless Western leaders can convince Putin that the most likely alternative to a negotiated peace is not an historic Russian triumph but a disastrous Russian defeat.

The steps needed to bring about this change and create the conditions to end the war are no secret. Sanctions measures against Russia must be tightened and expanded to starve the Kremlin war machine of funding and weaken the domestic foundations of Putin’s regime. Countries that currently help Moscow bypass international sanctions must be targeted with far greater vigor. In parallel, Western military aid to Ukraine must be dramatically increased, with an emphasis on providing long-range weapons and financing Ukraine’s rapidly growing domestic defense industry.

All this will require a degree of political will that is currently lacking. It would also be expensive. Indeed, during this week’s G7 summit, Trump balked at the idea of imposing new sanctions, saying they would “cost us a lot of money.” This is dangerously shortsighted. Trump and other G7 leaders need to urgently recognize that if Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, the cost of stopping him will skyrocket.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Territorial concessions are only one part of Russia’s comprehensive plan to undermine Ukrainian statehood. The memorandum presented in Istanbul calls for strict limits to be imposed on the size of Ukraine’s military along with restrictions on the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess. Ukraine would also be banned from joining any military alliances or concluding bilateral security agreements with other nations. This would transform Ukraine into a disarmed and internationally isolated buffer state with no means to defend itself, leaving it entirely at Putin’s mercy.

Beyond the battlefield, Russia’s memorandum proposes a series of sweeping changes to Ukraine’s internal political and cultural landscape that would allow Moscow to reestablish its dominance over the country. Key demands include official status for the Russian language, the reinstatement of the Russian Orthodox Church’s legal privileges, and a wholesale rewriting of Ukrainian history in line with Kremlin narratives.

One of the most sinister aspects of the Russian peace proposal is the call for a complete ban on all so-called “nationalist” Ukrainian political parties. This rather vague wording is open to interpretation and could easily be used to silence Ukrainian politicians opposed to Russian influence. Given the Kremlin’s long record of labeling anything that contracts Russian imperial orthodoxies as “extremist” or “fascist,” the idea of outlawing “nationalist” political parties represents an obvious threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty and the country’s democratic political system.

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Moscow’s memorandum was presented at a time when Russia is escalating its invasion of Ukraine. In recent months, Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities have increased significantly, leading to a sharp rise in the number of killed and wounded civilians. Along the front lines of the war, the Russian military is currently engaged in what most analysts believe are the early stages of a major summer offensive that seeks to break Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops are advancing in the east and have recently crossed the border in northern Ukraine to open a new front in the Sumy region.

The Ukrainian authorities cannot accept the punishing terms being proposed by Russia. Indeed, no sovereign state could do so and expect to survive. The real question is how the international community will respond. Russia’s memorandum is a blueprint for the end of Ukrainian statehood and the return of the country to Kremlin control. It makes a complete mockery of recent US-led calls for a compromise peace, and demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that Russia has no interest in ending the invasion.

This should be enough to persuade Western leaders that progress toward peace will only be possible if they increase the pressure on Putin. At present, the Russian leader clearly believes he is winning and is confident of outlasting the West in Ukraine. In order to change this calculus and force a rethink in Moscow, Kyiv’s partners must impose tougher sanctions on Russia while boosting military support for Ukraine. In other words, they must speak to Putin in the language of strength, which remains the only language he truly understands.

Russia’s recent memorandum sends an unambiguous signal that Moscow is undeterred by the current Western stance and remains fully committed to its maximalist goal of erasing Ukraine as a state and as a nation. If Western leaders wish to avoid this catastrophic outcome, they must convince Putin that the alternative to a negotiated peace is a Russian defeat.

Tetiana Kotelnykova is a graduate student at Yale University specializing in European and Russian Studies with a focus on conflict, postwar recovery, and regional geopolitics. She is the founder of Brave Generation, a New York-based nonprofit organization that supports young Ukrainians affected by war and invests in the next generation of Ukrainian leadership. She also leads the Ukrainian Recovery Youth Global Initiative.

Alawites: From army to militia

The Alawite community—the Syrian minority group to which the Assad family belonged— formed the backbone of the military and security apparatus under the former regime. With its collapse, hundreds of thousands of soldiers—most of them Alawite—were demobilized without being offered alternative pathways, particularly amid a deteriorating economic situation and the near-total absence of employment opportunities.

The transitional government limited its response to conducting settlement processes and disarming light and medium weapons, leaving the heavy ones on the battlefields, without establishing a comprehensive institutional framework capable of absorbing the large number of demobilized personnel, or providing them with viable alternatives to prevent their descent into armed violence—an undertaking that, even if politically desired, currently lies beyond the government’s capacity.

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Moreover, some former Alawite officers and commanders established armed militias that launched violent operations in early March 2025. These actions triggered retaliatory violence, resulting in the deaths of numerous civilians—including Alawites, Sunnis, and others from Syria’s coastal communities—as well as hundreds of security and military personnel. The clashes have entrenched a persistent state of insecurity that continues to this day.

While the regime’s remnant leaders may be driven by their own motives—such as evading transitional justice and exploiting sectarian rhetoric to portray themselves as protectors of the Alawite community against the transitional government—the absence of DDR programs continues to fuel these militias with new recruits. This dynamic has turned the situation into a pattern of intermittent rebellion and has opened the door for regional actors like Iran to intervene and exacerbate instability. Lasting stability in Alawite-majority areas—and elsewhere—will remain out of reach unless sustainable solutions are introduced to economically and socially reintegrate these individuals into the fabric of the new state.

DDR programs as a pathway to stability

Amid growing international openness and willingness to support Syria’s stabilization, DDR programs stand out as essential pillars for building lasting peace. Their value lies in their capacity to curb the proliferation of weapons and reduce the risk of internal conflict, particularly in areas that have experienced sectarian or tribal tensions. They help address the root causes of conflict by offering former combatants viable alternative pathways.

Similar programs were backed by the UN’s Development Program (UNDP) in Liberia and Colombia based on United Nations (UN)- integrated DDR standards (IDDRS). Implemented in parallel with a transitional justice process, these programs serve as a foundational mechanism. For example, in Colombia and Liberia, DDR served as a structured mechanism to transition combatants to civilian life. Comparable DDR programs in Liberia, Colombia, and South Sudan have demonstrated the importance of linking disarmament with social reintegration in reducing long-term conflict risks.

In line with these existing international standards, DDR programs follow a clear sequence: voluntary or mandatory disarmament, vocational and social rehabilitation, and eventual reintegration into civilian life or institutional structures. Their importance lies in their ability to reduce the likelihood of renewed violence, particularly in areas that have experienced sectarian tensions, such as Syria’s coastal region.

In the Syrian context, the issue of demobilized fighters from the Alawite community and others within a unified national framework helps foster trust among Syria’s diverse components, ensuring that no group feels targeted based on its political or sectarian background. These programs would also demonstrate the transitional government’s seriousness in addressing security and humanitarian concerns, laying the groundwork for attracting international support and securing the funding necessary to implement development and reconstruction plans.

The impact of DDR extends beyond internal stabilization; it also serves as a gateway to creating a secure environment that can rebuild refugee confidence in the safety of return. In doing so, it helps reposition Syria as a safe country, capable of reintegrating its citizens, both inside and abroad, under dignified and voluntary conditions.

A new opportunity, and and an urgent task

With the end of Western sanctions on Syria and the return of external support to the state-building process, the transitional government now faces a rare opportunity to address the imbalances of the post-conflict period. However, this international opening does not automatically guarantee stability unless accompanied by serious domestic measures, chief among them, the launch of DDR programs.

The current challenge is not only the lack of funding but also the absence of operational structures capable of absorbing such programs, weak institutional coordination, and growing security risks posed by uncontrollable local forces from the remnants of the regime or civil groups with a revolutionary background. In this context, DDR programs become a central tool not only for restoring security but also for rebuilding trust between the state and society and paving the way for genuine national reintegration.

Although the Western-led international community continues to stress the importance of protecting minority communities in Syria, particularly the Alawites, the core challenge now lies not only in the lifting of international restrictions but in the transitional government’s ability to translate that commitment into effective policy. Without creating institutional and economic environments capable of absorbing demobilized fighters and reintegrating them into society, protection efforts will remain vulnerable to failure, and stability will remain fragile, regardless of available resources or declared intentions. In this space, the government’s seriousness about rebuilding the state will be truly tested.

A “collaborative fund” as a practical solution

With international willingness to support Syria’s stabilization now in place, the need arises for establishing a “Collaborative Support Fund” dedicated to financing DDR programs, similar to models implemented in Iraq, Sudan, Gaza, and others. This fund would operate under the direct supervision of the Syrian government and in partnership with neutral third parties. It would aim to manage financial resources for DDR programs transparently and efficiently, ensuring their use in the rehabilitation and economic and social reintegration of former combatants, including marginalized groups such as demobilized Alawite fighters who may fall outside the scope of transitional justice mechanisms.

A portion of the fund could also be allocated to support other conflict-affected groups, such as wounded opposition fighters, thereby promoting balanced justice and contributing to repairing Syria’s social fabric. This mechanism would also create a broader space for partnership, allowing both Arab and Western countries to contribute within an integrated framework subject to international oversight, thus minimizing the risk of political manipulation or misuse of funds.

In this context, Arab states—particularly those in the Gulf—could be crucial in filling key funding and technical gaps, especially as many have adopted more open positions toward the new Syrian administration. The Gulf states have previously contributed to stabilization funds in Yemen and Iraq, offering a precedent for such involvement in Syria’s DDR efforts. With their considerable financial capabilities and accumulated experience, Arab countries are well-positioned to serve as active partners in funding DDR programs. However, the success of this role will remain contingent on close coordination with the wider international community.

Stability hanging in the balance

Syria cannot fully turn the page on its conflict unless realistic guarantees are put in place to prevent the resurgence of violence or the drift of demobilized fighters toward rebellion. As such, the post-Assad reconstruction process cannot be completed without fundamentally addressing a set of sensitive issues, chief among them the sanctions regime and the critical role of DDR programs in laying the foundations for stability and ensuring the protection of minority groups, both as a domestic imperative and an international responsibility.

However, DDR programs are not a silver bullet despite their strategic importance. Their success depends on a supportive political, economic, and social environment, ensuring sustainability. This requires an integrated framework of transitional justice, economic revitalization, and inclusive participation by all societal components in shaping the country’s future. Without such coherence, DDR initiatives risk failure, co-optation, or losing their intended role as tools for building trust and long-term stability.

The current opportunity—bolstered by broad international support—must not be wasted. Failure to activate these pathways would represent a serious setback for Syria’s future, potentially reopening the door to renewed conflict and the resurgence of extremism. Conversely, if the transitional government succeeds in operationalizing DDR programs and mobilizing international support to rehabilitate society and kickstart development, it could mark a pivotal turning point in Syria’s modern history. In doing so, the country would be able to protect and advance minority rights within a new state that exercises its authority fairly and equitably under the principles of citizenship, just like for all other Syrians. This would pave the way for a renewed social contract through which Syrians can once again believe in their homeland and a shared, hopeful future.

Muhsen al-Mustafa is a researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies. He can be found on X @MuhsenAlmustafa.

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Armenia’s ‘crossroads’ offers the US and Israel a rare opportunity

Sheila Paylan — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 12:00:00 +0000

For decades, Armenia and Azerbaijan’s conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has kept the South Caucasus in a gridlock of historic animosities, closed borders, and economic stagnation. But with the conflict now effectively over, Armenia has launched its “Crossroads of Peace” initiative, envisioning itself as a central Eurasian transit hub.

The project aims to revive long-defunct transport routes—once important arteries of Soviet-era trade—that were severed after Azerbaijan and Turkey closed their borders with Armenia in 1991 and 1993, respectively, thereby isolating it. Restoring these routes would reconnect Armenia with its neighbors and link broader corridors from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea and from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean, facilitating trade between major economies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. For both the United States and Israel, supporting this initiative offers a strategic opportunity to enhance regional stability, expand economic influence, and counterbalance adversarial powers like Iran, Russia, and China.

Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev attend a meeting of heads of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on October 11, 2019. Sputnik/Alexei Druzhinin/Kremlin via REUTERS

This vision, however, ultimately depends on the successful conclusion of the peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which remains stalled largely due to Azerbaijan’s shifting and escalating demands—including calls for constitutional amendments and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group—despite diplomatic consensus over the treaty text and Armenia’s expressed readiness to sign it. Another major underlying issue is Azerbaijan’s insistence on an extraterritorial so-called “Zangezur Corridor”, which would connect it to its exclave Nakhchivan through southern Armenia, but bypassing all Armenian oversight, customs, and security. Armenia, while supportive of connectivity, unequivocally rejects any surrender of sovereignty over its territory.

Nevertheless, Crossroads of Peace still offers Baku significant economic and geopolitical benefits. By reconnecting regional transport networks, including access to Turkey through Armenian territory under Armenian jurisdiction, Azerbaijan could achieve many of its logistical objectives without the contentious demand for a sovereign corridor. This cooperative model would provide Baku with more trade routes to Nakhchivan and beyond, while also gaining international legitimacy and investment through a mutually beneficial and multilateral framework.

Why engagement serves US interests

The entry of US President Donald Trump’s second administration offers an opportune moment for the United States, and potentially Israel, to play an active role in securing a high-profile peace agreement by pushing Azerbaijan to sign the treaty with Armenia. While brokering such a deal would be a diplomatic win in itself, its real payoff lies in unlocking the Crossroads of Peace and thereby delivering meaningful strategic and commercial gains.

By facilitating new trade routes through a Western-friendly, post-conflict South Caucasus, the United States could establish a firmer presence in a region it has long neglected, challenge the dominance of rival powers, and generate economic returns through infrastructure partnerships and transit revenue.

For Washington, the Eurasian transport network represents a unique opportunity to establish a foothold in a region vital to global trade and geopolitics. It offers a Western-aligned alternative to transport networks increasingly dominated by Russia and China while opening the door to US commercial participation in logistics, infrastructure, and technology.

The Eurasian transport network, comprising mainly the Northern Corridor, Middle Corridor, and International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), moves millions of tons of freight worth billions of dollars each year. These corridors, which cut across Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Eastern Europe, are economic battlegrounds where Moscow and Beijing seek to maintain influence, and the West attempts to create alternatives to Russian and Chinese-controlled infrastructure. In this fiercely contested region, controlling trade routes means shaping the future balance of economic and geopolitical power.

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Despite the strategic importance of these corridors, the United States currently has a very limited regional presence and lacks an integrated strategy or infrastructure footprint, offering only modest support limited to diplomatic engagement and technical assistance for the Middle Corridor, led by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. However, this corridor faces significant challenges, including limited infrastructure capacity, high costs, and a lack of integration, which undermine its efficiency and deter large-scale, reliable trade flows. It is also partially aligned with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with parts of the Middle Corridor physically overlapping with and increasingly integrated into the BRI, drawing it into Beijing’s sphere of influence.

China’s growing interest and investment in the Middle Corridor thus further complicates its appeal for Western stakeholders. Chinese influence is now poised to grow even further with the Anaklia Port—a deep-sea project in Georgia—having been awarded to a Chinese-led consortium. Meanwhile, most freight still flows through Russia via the Northern Corridor, maintaining Moscow’s dominance over Eurasian transport. The INSTC—connecting India, Iran, Russia, and Europe—offers some diversification, but it presents “double trouble” for Washington’s involvement by relying heavily on both Iranian and Russian networks, two countries under sweeping US sanctions.

From a purely economic standpoint, the potential of Crossroads of Peace is substantial. Much of Eurasia’s overland trade currently bypasses Armenia, relying instead on Georgia’s politically sensitive routes and the broader Middle Corridor. Diversifying transit through Armenia would strengthen regional connectivity and unlock new channels for investment, trade, and employment. By investing early in Crossroads of Peace, the United States can counterbalance Moscow and Beijing’s regional footprints while creating entry points for American firms in sectors such as construction, energy, digital infrastructure, and logistics. While comprehensive feasibility studies have yet to be publicly released, the Armenian government has indicated that the project could generate significant economic returns by restoring dormant transit infrastructure and linking key regional corridors. Institutions like the Asian Development Bank have expressed support, and the US-Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter highlights the initiative as a priority area for cooperation.

Moreover, given the Trump administration’s emphasis on economic partnerships and tangible returns, Armenia’s proposal aligns well as a concrete opportunity to advance US financial interests. Infrastructure projects, particularly railways and highways, could generate significant returns through tolls, tariffs, and transit fees, benefiting US investors, US-backed development institutions, and potentially the US federal government if linked to initiatives like an External Revenue Service.

However, the precise mechanisms through which the United States would realize these returns—such as specific investment structures, revenue-sharing agreements, or operational roles—require further elaboration. Detailed financial modeling and bilateral agreements would be necessary to quantify and actualize these benefits. The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) could help drive this effort by providing early-stage support and risk mitigation for targeted investments in Crossroads of Peace that lay the groundwork for a sustainable US economic footprint across the South Caucasus. This approach would also dovetail with Trump’s broader ambitions to fund government expenditures through foreign-derived revenue rather than domestic taxation. Investing in Crossroads of Peace could therefore fit neatly into this vision, turning geopolitics into a profitable enterprise benefiting the American taxpayer.

The potential for this initiative to succeed under US sponsorship could redefine Washington’s legacy in the South Caucasus and position the Trump administration as the indispensable peace broker in a region historically dominated by rival powers. Given Trump’s record of bold diplomatic efforts, from Ukraine-Russia negotiations to mediation between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo—conflicts still far from resolution—brokering peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be a comparatively easy win. It would take little more than a decisive push from Trump to “close the deal” and get Azerbaijan to sign onto terms it has already effectively agreed to, delivering a swift and tangible diplomatic victory.

Why engagement serves Israeli interests

Israel, too, has strong incentives to support the finalization of peace and the development of Armenia’s transit ambitions. Azerbaijan is a close Israeli ally, particularly in terms of energy and security cooperation. Helping to solidify peace with Armenia could deepen these ties while promoting broader regional stability. With trade between Israel and Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, growing rapidly under the Abraham Accords, Israel could benefit from overland corridors like Crossroads of Peace that improve access to Persian Gulf markets, bypass Iran, and create new logistics, infrastructure, and technology cooperation opportunities. This would enhance Israel’s economic outreach and reduce its exposure to Tehran’s influence in regional supply chains.

Additionally, Israel has historic and cultural ties with Armenia, notably through the Armenian Quarter in Jerusalem, home to one of the oldest continuous Armenian diasporas in the world. A peaceful, economically integrated South Caucasus could open new avenues for Israeli trade, diplomacy, and investment across the region.

Furthermore, a secure peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan would significantly reduce Armenia’s dependence on Iran, which has become one of its few trade and energy lifelines due to closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia’s pragmatic relationship with Iran stems more from necessity than ideological alignment. Opening new trade routes through Azerbaijan and Turkey would enable Armenia to break this dependence and accelerate its Westward pivot.

This shift would directly serve Israel’s interests by further isolating Iran economically while allowing Israel to maintain its foothold in Azerbaijan as a counterweight to Iranian threats. Armenia remains one of Iran’s few accessible and expanding trade partners, with Iranian exports to Armenia reaching nearly 600 million dollars in 2023, including petroleum gas, iron, and other industrial goods. The two countries also maintain strategic energy exchanges—notably under a “Gas for Electricity” agreement—and Armenia is Iran’s only direct link to the Eurasian Economic Union. Reducing Armenia’s dependence on Iran through regional normalization would therefore help close a critical commercial and geopolitical corridor for Tehran. At the same time, a more connected and less Iran-dependent Armenia—at peace with its neighbors and increasingly aligned on common regional security concerns—could adopt a more collaborative stance toward Israel’s interests. Turkish officials have made clear, however, that normalization with Azerbaijan is a necessary precondition for reopening the Turkey-Armenia border.

To this end, leveraging Azerbaijan’s growing interest in joining the Abraham Accords could be instrumental. Although Baku has long maintained strong security and energy relations with Israel, formalizing those relations within the Abraham Accords would significantly elevate its international standing. US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff recently indicated that Armenia, too, could be a candidate for future accession—a development that would further reinforce a regional climate of normalization, mutual recognition, and cooperation. Building on this momentum, US-Israeli joint mediation could help encourage Azerbaijan to soften its stance toward Armenia, facilitating the conclusion of a peace agreement that respects Armenia’s sovereignty while satisfying Azerbaijan’s strategic objectives.

Seizing the opportunity

Finalizing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan offers Washington and Jerusalem a rare chance to tilt the balance of power in one of the world’s most critical yet contested regions. Investing in this moment and helping to overcome the last obstacles to a peace deal—through targeted diplomacy, infrastructure support, and principled mediation—can help secure new trade corridors, weaken adversaries, and build lasting influence at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace is not merely a reconstruction project but a strategic gateway to a more stable, prosperous, and Western-aligned South Caucasus.

That said, a Westward pivot is not without geopolitical risks. Armenia’s deep historical ties with Russia and Iran could make this realignment contentious, especially if viewed as a zero-sum loss by Moscow or Tehran. To mitigate this, the United States and its allies should pair their investment and mediation efforts with clear security and economic guarantees to Armenia, ranging from energy diversification and trade facilitation to defense cooperation and institutional integration. Framing Crossroads of Peace as a shared regional gain, rather than a Western encroachment, will be essential to ensuring its sustainability.

But this opportunity will not remain open for long. It must be seized now.

Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and senior legal consultant with the United Nations.

* The views expressed herein are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

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Trump’s Russia policy must be rooted in realism

Agnia Grigas — Thu, 05 Jun 2025 20:50:06 +0000

US President Donald Trump has recently changed his tone toward Russian president Vladimir Putin, suggesting that he has “gone crazy” and is “playing with fire.” This highlights the ongoing difficulties of negotiating with the Kremlin. While the Trump administration broadly favors a realist approach to international relations, a more pragmatic assessment of Russia’s capabilities and objectives could better equip the US to achieve its stated goal of bringing the war in Ukraine to an end.

Almost three months ago, Ukraine accepted a US proposal for a thirty-day unconditional ceasefire. So far, Russia has refused to do likewise. Instead, the Kremlin continues to demand a series of preconditions. Meanwhile, Russia has intensified its missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets. When Trump recently backed Putin’s proposal for direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, the Russian leader then boycotted the subsequent Istanbul talks, sending only a lower-level delegation.

Within the Trump administration, key figures such as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have all articulated their support for a realist view of international relations. This implies sidestepping abstract ideological objectives and focusing on tangible power factors such as economic size, population, geography, and military strength.

The realist viewpoint is reflected in Hegseth’s assertion that Ukraine returning to its pre-2014 borders is “unrealistic.” It can also be seen in Trump’s statements that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “does not have the cards” in negotiations with Russia, an assertion that seems far less certain in the wake of Ukraine’s successful recent strikes on Russia’s long-distance bombers.

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Some advocates of foreign policy realism argue that the US should seek to accommodate Russia, even at Ukraine’s expense. However, this approach tends to exaggerate Russia’s strengths, while underestimating the importance of the Kremlin’s imperial objectives and the relevant fact that Russian national security doctrine identifies the US as its principal adversary. A more comprehensive realist analysis of Russia reveals that, despite its assertiveness, Moscow’s power is in fact often overstated, while its appetite for compromise is limited.

Compared to the United States, Europe, and NATO, Russia simply does not “hold the cards,” to use Trump’s phrase. Its $2 trillion economy ranks outside the world’s top ten, trailing behind the US, China, Germany, Japan, India, and others. Although Russia has weathered sanctions, the prolonged war since 2022 has left its economy overextended and vulnerable.

The Russian population of 145 million is shrinking and ranks ninth globally, far behind the US and the collective European Union. Militarily, Russia’s large conventional forces have under-performed during the invasion of Ukraine while sustaining heavy losses. Russia’s $146 billion military budget, though substantial relative to neighboring states, pales in comparison to the $968 billion US budget in 2023, or even the collective defense spending of EU member states.

Russia remains a formidable nuclear power and frequently reminds the international community of this fact. Since the very first days of the Ukraine invasion in February 2022, Putin and other Kremlin officials have engaged in regular nuclear saber-rattling. But while Russia is the only nuclear power to make such threats, Putin has repeatedly failed to act when his red lines have been crossed by the Ukrainians, and has been publicly warned by his Chinese allies not to cross the nuclear threshold.

Since 2022, Russia has lost much of its energy leverage and is no longer Europe’s key energy supplier. Meanwhile, the United States has consolidated its position as a leading global energy exporter, particularly in liquefied natural gas (LNG). This is enabling Europe to diversify away from Russia while starving the Kremlin of vital revenue and geopolitical influence.

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In realist terms, Russia’s power surpasses that of its immediate smaller neighbors but falls well short of the US or the European Union as a whole. Countries in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe view Putin’s ambitions through a realist lens based on centuries of painful experience with Russian imperialism. They understand that Putin’s current goal of reasserting Moscow’s dominance over the territories of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire is deeply rooted in the Kremlin’s perception of Russian national interests.

President Trump should not fall into the same trap as his predecessors. Past US administrations, from George W. Bush onward, have sought to normalize relations with Moscow but have consistently underestimated Russia’s enduring imperialist objectives. In 2001, Bush famously called Putin “trustworthy” and said he has been able to “get a sense of his soul.” And yet before the end of Bush’s second term, Putin had become increasingly hostile to the West and had invaded Georgia. US President Barack Obama then pursued a “reset” in relations with Russia, only for Putin to invade Ukraine in 2014.

US President Joe Biden initially adopted a similarly optimistic stance toward Moscow, emphasizing the importance of predictable relations with Russia. In May 2021, Biden canceled sanctions on the Kremlin’s Nord Stream II gas pipeline. The following month, he met Putin in Geneva for a bilateral summit that was widely viewed as a further concession to the Russian leader. Less than a year later, Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Looking back, it is clear that US policy toward Russia has often been shaped by the optimism of incoming administrations rather than a sober, realist understanding of Moscow’s longstanding ambitions. A deeper grasp of Russia’s objectives and capabilities could help the Trump administration, alongside European leaders, to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine and achieve a durable peace. Approaching the Kremlin from a position of strength, through the implementation of new sanctions on Russia and sustained military support for Ukraine, would be essential tools in securing that peace.

Agnia Grigas is senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.”

Putin’s punitive peace terms are a call for Ukraine’s complete capitulation

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 03 Jun 2025 21:42:17 +0000

Russian and Ukrainian delegations failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs when they met for peace talks in Istanbul on Monday. The event was not a complete waste of time, however. Aside from agreeing on another welcome round of prisoner swaps, the two sides also exchanged peace proposals that confirmed the complete lack of middle ground for any kind of meaningful compromise to end the fighting.

While Ukraine’s proposal laid out a fairly pragmatic vision based on battlefield realities and security concerns, Russia presented punitive peace terms that would reestablish Kremlin control over Kyiv and doom the postwar Ukrainian state to a slow but inevitable death. This uncompromising Russian position should serve as a wake-call for anyone who still believes Putin is negotiating in good faith. In reality, the Russian dictator is more determined than ever to destroy Ukraine, and is merely exploiting US-led peace talks in order to strengthen his hand and divide the West.

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The demands unveiled by the Russian delegation this week in Istanbul came as no surprise and closely mirrored the conditions outlined on numerous prior occasions by Putin and other Kremlin leaders. Nevertheless, at a time when US President Donald Trump is publicly pressing for progress toward peace, the Russian decision to deliver such a maximalist memorandum sent a clear message of defiance to Washington DC.

As expected, Moscow reiterated its call for Ukraine to withdraw completely from four Ukrainian provinces that Russia currently claims as its own but has been unable to fully occupy. This would oblige the Ukrainian authorities to hand over a number of major cities and condemn millions of their compatriots to indefinite Russian occupation. Kyiv would also be expected to officially cede these regions together with Crimea, paving the way for international recognition of Russia’s conquests.

This crushing territorial settlement is only one aspect of Russia’s vision for the comprehensive dismantling of Ukrainian statehood. In line with Putin’s peace terms, Ukraine would be forced to accept limitations on the size of its army and on the categories of weapons it is allowed to possess. The country would be also be barred from joining any military blocs or concluding alliances with foreign nations. It does not take much imagination to guess what Putin has in mind for Ukraine once it has been successfully disarmed and internationally isolated.

Nor is that all. The Kremlin’s conditions actually go much further and aim to transform Ukraine from within in ways that would erase Ukrainian identity along with the country’s political independence. Moscow’s memorandum called on Ukraine to grant Russian the status of official state language, reinstate the privileges of the Russian Orthodox Church, and adopt a Kremlin-friendly version of Ukrainian history. Meanwhile, all so-called “nationalist” Ukrainian political parties would be banned, paving the way for the installation of a puppet regime in Kyiv.

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On the morning after this week’s bilateral meeting, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev confirmed the true objective of Russia’s participation in peace talks. “The Istanbul talks are not for striking a compromise peace on someone else’s delusional terms,” commented Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s powerful National Security Council. Instead, Medvedev stated that Russia’s goal was to secure victory and ensure “the complete destruction of the neo-Nazi regime,” which is widely recognized as Kremlin code for the Ukrainian state. “That’s what the Russian memorandum published yesterday is about,” he noted.

Medvedev’s frank appraisal of the Russian position won him sarcastic praise from US Senator Lindsey Graham. “Congratulations to Mr. Medvedev for a rare moment of honesty coming from the Russian propaganda machine,” commented Trump ally Graham. “I appreciate you making it clear to the world that Putin and Russia are not remotely interested in peace.”

It is hard to argue with Graham’s assessment. For the past few months, Putin has gone out of his way to demonstrate that he has absolutely no intention of ending the war. While Ukraine has accepted a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire, Putin has repeatedly refused to do so. Instead, he has engaged in transparent stalling tactics that make a mockery of the entire peace process.

Away from the negotiating table, Putin has dramatically increased drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, killing and wounding hundreds of civilians. On the battlefield, his armies are currently engaged in the early stages what is shaping up to be one of the biggest Russian offensives of the entire war. These are not the actions of a man who seeks peace.

After this week’s fresh confirmation of Moscow’s undiminished imperial ambitions in Ukraine, it is now surely time to abandon any lingering delusions and accept that the Russian dictator will not stop until he is stopped. Putin believes he is on a messianic mission to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and revive the Russian Empire. He currently thinks he is winning this historic struggle and will not be swayed by Trump’s comparatively trivial talk of tariffs and trade deals.

The only thing that can change Putin’s mind is Western strength. As long as Putin is confident of eventual victory, he will continue. But if the alternative to a peace deal is a potentially crushing defeat, he may reconsider. To achieve this change, Western leaders must demonstrate a degree of collective resolve that has often been absent over the past three years. They must sanction Russia to the max and arm Ukraine to the teeth. This will require considerable political will and good old-fashioned courage in Western capitals. Ukraine will do the rest.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Welcome to the long war: Why a Ukraine deal was never realistic

Brian Whitmore — Thu, 29 May 2025 19:10:44 +0000

This war will be decided on the battlefield.

Four months of chaotic shuttle diplomacy aimed at reaching a cease-fire in Ukraine, multiple phone calls between US President Donald Trump and Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin, repeated US attempts to pressure, browbeat, and bully Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy into concessions, have all yielded exactly nothing.

Which is not in the least bit surprising. Because there is no deal to be had with Russia on Ukraine. There never has been, and there never will be.

There is simply no magic formula, no concession, and no grand bargain that would satisfy the Kremlin’s maximalist and eliminationist goals. Moscow wants to end Ukraine’s sovereignty, nationhood, and statehood. Ukraine wants to continue to exist as an independent sovereign state. Given this, no compromise is possible. Any Kabuki negotiations or Potemkin cease-fire would be meaningless and treated by the Kremlin as nothing more than a strategic pause and an opportunity for sanctions relief.

“Russian imperialism will not be neutralized by negotiations, compromises, or concessions,” Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies and an associate professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, wrote on May 22.

Following his latest call with Trump, Putin said he wanted any settlement to address what he called the “root causes of the crisis.” That choice of phrase was no accident. The Kremlin leader used a similar formulation when addressing the issue of ending the war during a joint press conference with Belarusian strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka in March.

Putin’s repeated use of the term “root cause” is a tell. For the Kremlin leader, the root cause of the war is the very existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state, which he has long seen as anathema. At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Putin made this clear when he told then US President George W. Bush that “Ukraine is not even a state.” Putin has also repeatedly referred to Ukraine as “little Russia,” a Tsarist-era term to describe Ukrainian lands.

For Putin and the Kremlin elite, Russian colonial dominance of Ukraine is an ideological issue that is not subject to negotiation. The Kremlin cannot be persuaded, it can only be defeated.

Russia’s game: decouple the war from relations with Washington

If anyone doubts Russia’s intentions, then recent remarks by Vladimir Medinsky, one of Putin’s court ideologists and the Kremlin’s chief representative at recent talks in Istanbul, should put them to rest. “Russia,” Medinsky told the Ukrainian delegation, “is prepared to fight forever.” He added, in reference to the Northern War of 1700-1721, which elevated Russia to the status of an empire, “we fought Sweden for twenty-one years. How long are you ready to fight?”

But with the front line largely static and Russia making miniscule gains with high casualties, forever may turn out to be a very long time and have a very steep cost.

According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in the first four months of 2025, Russia advanced just 1,627 square kilometers on the front in eastern Ukraine while suffering 160,600 casualties. That’s a staggeringly high ninety-nine casualties for every square kilometer of territory. ISW also estimates that “at this rate of advance, it would take Russian forces approximately 3.9 years to seize the remainder of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts,” the four regions Putin has claimed to have annexed. Moreover, according to ISW, it would take nearly a century to seize all of Ukraine save its Western border regions at a cost of nearly fifty million casualties—which is roughly one third Russia’s current population.

The economics of the war are also not trending in Moscow’s favor. As Charles Lichfield, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center wrote in February, “while Moscow has found ways to mitigate the impact of [Western sanctions], growing deficits, unsustainable subsidies, and the rising cost of debt servicing” are putting severe strain on the Russian economy.

Additionally, a widely circulated report by Craig Kennedy of Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies suggests that the “surprising resilience” that the media and analysts have been seeing in the Russian economy is largely a mirage. According to Kennedy’s research, published earlier this year, the war is largely being financed by concessionary off-the-books loans to defense contractors at well below market interest rates. Simply put, this is not sustainable over the long term.

Given this, the Kremlin’s goal vis-à-vis the United States is to decouple the war from Russia-US relations, normalize relations between Moscow and Washington, and get sanctions relief. In a speech in late February, Putin said that Moscow “would be happy to cooperate with any foreign partners, including American companies” to secure rare-earth-minerals deals. Putin added that lifting sanctions could lead to a profitable new economic relationship between the United States and Russia, particularly in the energy sector.

Putin, of course, wants an economic rapprochement without ending his quest to conquer Ukraine. Russia has continued to pound Ukrainian cities with aerial assaults, resulting in mass civilian casualties even as he seeks to entice Washington economically.

And for his part, Trump appears open to the idea. Following his most recent call with Putin, the US president indicated a desire to establish normal economic relations with Moscow. This would be a grave error, as it would throw Putin a lifeline to continue his war of aggression.

Fortunately, there does appear to be pushback in Washington. The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025, which would expand existing penalties on Russia, was introduced in the US Senate by South Carolina Republican Lindsey Graham and Connecticut Democrat Richard Blumenthal and has more than eighty cosponsors.

Europe’s moment and Ukraine’s resolve

For its part, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom have already moved ahead with their own new package of sanctions enacted on May 20, a day after the latest Trump-Putin call. Brussels and London are also pledging to increase military assistance to Ukraine to make up for any shortfall resulting from a US cutoff.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and the EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, all seem to understand that this could be Europe’s moment. But one of the biggest wildcards going forward is whether Europe can overcome its internal divisions—mainly opposition from Hungary and Slovakia—and surge arms to Ukraine.

Which brings us to Ukraine itself—and here the calculations are simple. As the Ukrainian political scientist Anton Shekhovtsov wrote earlier this week, “Ukraine’s choices are to fight back and risk being killed, or to surrender and be killed. By fighting back, Ukraine has a chance; by surrendering, it has none—making surrender not a viable option.”

And for Ukraine, as always, necessity has become the mother of invention. Faced with a potential shortfall in weapons, Kyiv has created a vibrant domestic arms industry focusing on drone warfare.

“In just three years, Ukraine’s military has evolved from defending itself with leftover Soviet weapons to pioneering a new kind of warfare,” the Ukrainian war correspondent Nataliya Gumenyuk writes in the Atlantic.

“Fortunately for Ukraine, American weapons are not the only factor that has rebalanced the battlefield in the past three years. Starting in 2024, Ukrainian-made drones definitively changed the way both sides waged war. For Ukraine, the adjustment was not just tactical, but a broader, doctrinal evolution in how its military fights.”

Gumenyuk concludes by noting that “as Ukraine’s partners speak of peace deals and security guarantees, Ukraine’s armed forces are adapting in every way they can to continue carrying out their mission . . . They cannot afford the luxury of counting on American commitments or Russian concessions, because for most Ukrainians, what matters above all is physical safety. And the only force protecting human lives in Ukraine is the Ukrainian military.”

So here we are, after three years of war and four months of failed diplomacy to end it. This war will be decided on the battlefield. It is for the United States and Europe to decide whether they are prepared to help Ukraine win it.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

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Dispatch from Dayton: What Trump can learn about ending war

Frederick Kempe — Wed, 28 May 2025 22:30:00 +0000

DAYTON, Ohio—US President Donald Trump could learn a lot about how to best end Russia’s murderous war on Ukraine, now into its fourth year, from the US experience here thirty years ago in negotiating what became known as the Dayton Peace Accords.

If Trump wants to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war, and he has made that an administration priority, then he should reflect on what it took to finally stop Serbian President Slobodan Milošević in 1995—after nearly four years of killing and more than 100,000 dead, including the massacre at Srebrenica, Europe’s worst genocide since the Holocaust.

A deal required relentless US diplomatic engagement backed by a demonstrated military threat and carried out alongside unified European allies. It also took twenty-one days of intensive negotiations in Dayton—not involving then US President Bill Clinton until the end—while all parties were cloistered from media and outside influences at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

Marking the Dayton anniversary, Ohio Congressman Mike Turner brought the NATO Parliamentary Assembly here last week, gathering delegates from the thirty-two allies as well as from partner countries. They joined leaders from the Western Balkans, assorted experts, and even the Sarajevo Philharmonic, which performed for participants in a giant hangar stocked with presidential aircraft in the National Museum of the US Air Force.

Though I came to commemorate history, I left having interrogated its architects. My aim was to gain clues that might help the Trump administration in its still-fruitless quest for an end to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

It would be easy to discount the lessons for Ukraine and Russia now, where the stakes are so much higher, from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia then. Nuclear-armed Russia has two hundred times the land mass of Serbia and more than twenty times its population. And Ukraine, with its pre-war population of forty million and France-sized territory, is more than ten times larger in geographic size and population than Bosnia-Herzegovina. In my view, that makes the lessons only more compelling.

The first lesson? “Peace agreements are extremely rare,” former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, the European Union’s special representative at the talks thirty years ago, said in a session of former officials that I moderated. “In modern European history, there are only two really: Dayton and the Good Friday Agreement,” which in 1998 ended a thirty-year conflict in Northern Ireland known as “the Troubles.”

Both were forged in the aftermath of horrific violence, which is also the case in Ukraine. Yet both also required something that is still lacking today: determined, focused, and creative US leadership in lockstep with European partners. Both also succeeded through disciplined diplomacy, military leverage, and the unglamorous work of compromise.

Beyond that, winning peace in Dayton demanded US credibility but not neutrality. At Dayton, the United States was not an impartial mediator but rather a focused powerbroker, using whatever muscle was necessary to shape the outcome. No lasting deal can reward Putin’s aggression, just as Dayton didn’t knuckle under to reward Milošević.

Another lesson is that building peace is as crucial as ending war. Dayton and Belfast were both followed by years of international engagement, economic aid, and security commitments. Peace might have collapsed had those efforts not continued.

Most importantly, the United States led but did not go it alone. Peace that endures requires multilateral support. Dayton hasn’t worked perfectly, but without the European Union and NATO it wouldn’t have worked at all. “Only when the international actors can get together with a uniform message and policy can results be achieved,” said Bildt, who is also an Atlantic Council International Advisory Board member. “There was success in Dayton, yes. But it should also be said that there was massive failure prior to Dayton due to disagreements across the Atlantic, disagreements in Europe, and disagreements in the United States.”

US General Wesley Clark, who at the time was the military right hand to Richard Holbrooke, the chief US negotiator, took away a different lesson: “Don’t be timid,” Clark, a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors, said to the NATO parliamentarians. “We are going to have to be unified. And we are going to have to be forceful enough to convince Putin he will not win. Right now, he thinks he’s winning.”

In a slap across the face of Trump’s efforts to broker peace, Putin from last Friday to Sunday launched what Ukrainian officials called the largest combined aerial assault of the conflict, including some nine hundred drones and dozens of missiles of various types. That prompted a frustrated Trump to write on Truth Social about Putin that “something has happened to him. He has gone absolutely CRAZY!” The US president added that “missiles and drones are being shot into Cities in Ukraine, for no reason whatsoever.”

The problem is that there’s nothing crazy about Putin’s calculations, and his reasons are obvious. He’s trying to wear down Ukraine and its partners, and he’s betting that he has more staying power. He sees US military and diplomatic support in retreat, European efforts as insufficient, and Ukraine as weary. Trump has belatedly acknowledged that Putin has been “tapping” him along.

With all that in mind, Washington will have to try far harder now than it did then to change a murderous despot’s mind—or resign itself to accepting Putin’s ongoing war and its ambition to redraw the European map.

Until Washington stood up to Milošević in 1995, Clark said, the Serb leader thought he could pull the wool over Europe’s eyes with his small army overrunning Bosnia. When he bid farewell to Milošević at the end of the talks, Clark remembers the Balkan leader saying, “We Serbs never had a chance against your NATO, your airplanes, your missiles.”

Speaking with me at the same NATO session, Christopher R. Hill, who was part of the Holbrooke delegation in Dayton, added another important lesson—that the parties must be ready to end the war. “I am not sure Russia is ready for peace,” he said. “They should be, but they don’t seem to be. I think until they are, we have got to help Ukraine because a hundred years from now . . . our grandchildren, our great-grandchildren, will be thinking about what we did to deal with this crisis.”

The Dayton Accords were not perfect, but they were proof of what US leadership can achieve when properly applied. Speaking in Bosnia-Herzegovina shortly after the agreement was finalized, the then US president explained why the United States had chosen to lead, rather than cut and run from the European conflict.

“Around the world, people look to America not just because of our size and strength but because of what we stand for and what we’re willing to stand against,” Clinton said. “And though it imposes extra burdens on us, people trust us to help them share in the blessings of peace. We can’t be everywhere . . . But where we can make a difference, where our values and our interests are at stake, we must act.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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A remarkable week for a rising Turkey

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 17 May 2025 12:00:00 +0000

Geography is destiny.

The quote is sometimes attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, but it might as well also be the working motto of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

This past week, Erdoğan strung together a trio of geopolitical wins that underscored his success in leveraging his country’s size, military capability, and—perhaps most of all—geographic position to achieve outsize influence.

Erdoğan did this despite facing some of the biggest political protests he has weathered in years following the imprisonment of his political rival, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. It’s no wonder Erdoğan is harnessing international gains to shore up his domestic position.

The first victory was US President Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria’s new government. Turkey played a catalytic role in the December ouster of Bashar al-Assad, Erdoğan’s nemesis who had ruled Syria since 2000, when he succeeded his father. It was fitting that Trump included Erdoğan by phone in his meeting this week in Riyadh with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Second, the Kurdish militant group known as the PKK announced this week that it will disband and end its armed struggle after months of Turkish backchannel diplomacy. There’s still a risk that the PKK could fragment into smaller groups that attack Turkey, but for now, the development is a win for the country’s security.

Third, Istanbul played host to the first direct peace talks between Ukrainian and Russian officials since March 2022, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also flying in from a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in the Turkish town of Antalya. Russian President Vladimir Putin was a no-show, which kept Trump from traveling to Turkey as well, and the two-hour meeting appears to have been fruitless. Yet it underscored Erdoğan’s ability to navigate both Moscow and Kyiv even while providing Ukraine with armed drones.

For years, some Western officials and analysts have dismissed Erdoğan as a populist authoritarian whose inflation-ridden economy was troubled and whose geopolitical ambitions were fantasy. But it now rings truer when Erdoğan says, as he did in December, “Turkey is bigger than Turkey. As a nation, we cannot limit our horizon to 782,000 square kilometers.”

None of this week’s wins are permanent. The jury is out on whether Syria’s new leadership can hold the country together. The PKK peace is fragile. Ukraine-Russia talks still don’t seem to be going anywhere. And other pressing questions remain unresolved, such as whether Erdoğan will be able to successfully manage relations with Israel given Israeli security concerns about the expanded Turkish military presence in Syria. However all that turns out, Erdoğan’s focus remains on protecting both his legacy and longevity after more than twenty years as prime minister and then president.

We might be a long way from a Pax Turcica. For now, however, Erdoğan and Turkey have gained relevance as an indispensable player from the Black Sea to the Levant, and from Central Asia to Europe, where the Turkish military will play a crucial role if Europe is to have the wherewithal to provide for Ukraine’s security—and its own.

What I’m reading

With doubts growing within NATO about the US nuclear umbrella, French President Emmanuel Macron specified three conditions for extending the protection of France’s nuclear weapons to European allies. We’ll keep monitoring the Trump transatlantic fallout.

“How do you know the day that you become old?” legendary investor Warren Buffett this week asked the Wall Street Journal as he announced he was stepping back at age ninety-four (for him, it was at age ninety).

We interrupt this report for an inflection point in US baseball, my non-geopolitical passion. Call me old-fashioned, but I hope the Hall of Fame won’t ever induct baseball’s all-time hits leader Pete Rose, who passed away last September, given his gambling on baseball. That said, I wish he’d lived to see Major League Baseball lift its banishment of “Charlie Hustle” from the game.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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To achieve his goal of a durable peace, Trump must turn up the pressure on Putin

John E. Herbst — Fri, 16 May 2025 22:29:48 +0000

This is the first in a series of regular assessments of the efforts, spearheaded by the Trump administration, to achieve a negotiated end to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The results are now in from the first direct talks between Russia and Ukraine since the revelations of Russian atrocities in the Ukrainian cities of Bucha and Irpin three years ago. And one thing is clear: It remains Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aim to seize more territory so that he can achieve effective political control over Ukraine.

The talks were productive in the important but limited sense that the sides agreed to each exchange one thousand prisoners of war. But the parties took no steps toward an eventual end to the hostilities, as the Kremlin negotiators insisted that Ukrainian troops withdraw from areas of Ukraine that Moscow has “annexed.”

This is just the latest twist on the roller coaster that is the negotiating process to end Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Trump administration’s approach to a negotiated peace has required compromise from both Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine was asked to accept de facto Kremlin control of Ukrainian territory that Russia currently occupies and to put its aspirations for NATO membership on hold. Washington has asked Russia to accept the presence of European troops in Ukraine as a peacekeeping force and ongoing Western arms supplies to Kyiv to deter future Russian aggression. Ukraine has largely accepted these terms; Russia has not. Ukraine agreed without objection to the mid-March general cease-fire that the United States proposed, as well as the naval cease-fire in late March. Russia rejected both. Each side agreed to a cease-fire involving energy installations that same month, but Moscow violated it within hours.

The Trump administration’s approach through late April was hobbled by its unwillingness to put pressure on Moscow for rejecting the general and naval cease-fires, which contrasted with the severe pressure the US administration put on Ukraine after the difficult Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on February 28. When Moscow refused the United States’ proposal for a naval cease-fire, the White House’s approach was to offer Russia more carrots, which prompted substantial criticism from Trump-friendly newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Post, as well as from some Republicans on Capitol Hill. This tendency continued in late April as the White House proposed the truly damaging concession of recognizing Russian control of Crimea.

All of this changed—at least for the moment—when the United States and Ukraine inked the critical minerals deal on April 30. The deal included a paragraph in which, for the first time, the Trump administration mentioned the possibility of new US weapons going to Ukraine. It was no coincidence that at the same time, the White House separately approved two modest shipments of weapons to Ukraine. While the Trump administration did not stress this point publicly, the approval of the weapons shipments clearly complicated Putin’s efforts to take more Ukrainian land. It is worth noting that in response to criticism of its weak approach toward the Kremlin, the Trump administration has been talking for weeks about putting new sanctions on Russia. So far, however, it has not acted on these threats.

At the same time, Zelenskyy has been continuing to leverage his relationships with key European allies. He hit paydirt last weekend when the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland joined him in Kyiv to demand that Russia agree to a general cease-fire by May 12, threatening new sanctions if the Kremlin did not agree. Those leaders also called US President Donald Trump during their meeting and sought his support. He did not discourage them.

As circumstances grew unfavorable for him, Putin parried with a proposal for direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul—a bid to delay progress on a cease-fire, avoid sanctions, and split Trump from the Europeans. At first, the gamble seemed to pay off. Zelenskyy immediately denounced the idea as a Russian stalling tactic and said Ukraine would not participate. But Trump reacted quickly as well; while skeptical that Russia wanted peace, he called on Zelenskyy to engage. Demonstrating his diplomatic nimbleness, Zelenskyy swiftly changed his mind and announced his intention to got to Istanbul.

This prompted a change of position in Moscow, with Putin announcing that he would not participate in the talks and Russian media criticizing the very concept of these talks—without mentioning that they were Putin’s idea. While Putin did not split off the Trump administration from Europe, his gambit did block the plans of Ukraine, Poland, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to impose sanctions against Russia this week. And the instincts of the Trump team made that possible. After encouraging Zelenskyy to go to Turkey to negotiate, Trump provided cover for Putin’s cynical decision not to attend the talks. Trump said it was natural for Putin not to attend since, he, Trump, would not be there.

On Thursday, Trump declared that there will be no real progress toward peace until he and Putin sit down together. Trump may well be right about that—but only if he makes clear that if the Kremlin continues to reject reasonable compromises, the United States will send major new arms supplies to Ukraine and levy additional economic sanctions against Russia.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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How much longer will Putin be allowed to continue stalling for time?

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 13 May 2025 21:59:27 +0000

The leaders of Britain, France, Germany, and Poland arrived in Kyiv last weekend amid much fanfare to deliver an unprecedented ultimatum to the Kremlin. The time for talk was over, they announced. If Russian President Vladimir Putin did not agree to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire by Monday, he would face tough new sanctions and increased weapons transfers to Ukraine. “All of us here, together with the US, are calling Putin out. If he’s serious about peace, then he has a chance to show it now,” declared British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

For a brief moment, it seemed possible that this bold move could revive faltering peace efforts. After all, if Putin agreed to a ceasefire, the way would be open for more substantive negotiations. If he refused, the West would now be obliged to turn up the pressure on Moscow and force Russia to rethink its position. Putin, however, had other ideas. At a hastily arranged midnight press conference in the Kremlin, he chose not to directly address the West’s ultimatum, and instead proposed bilateral talks with Ukraine.

Putin’s announcement that he was ready to resume negotiations with the Ukrainian authorities for the first time since the initial months of the war succeeded in overshadowing Saturday’s ultimatum. It also undermined any fleeting sense of Western unity and decisiveness. Predictably, US President Donald Trump was the first to break ranks, posting a statement urging Ukraine to “immediately” accept Putin’s offer in order to determine whether a peace deal is actually possible.

Elsewhere, confusion reigned. Was the original ultimatum still in place? There seemed to be no clear answer. In Berlin, German officials stated on Monday that “the clock is ticking,” but then took no action when their subsequent midnight deadline came and went. Meanwhile, according to Bloomberg, the Kyiv quartet quietly decided to wait until after a potential Russia-Ukraine meeting on Thursday in Istanbul before taking any action. This was the exact opposite of US President Theodore Roosevelt’s famous foreign policy advice to “speak softly and carry a big stick.” European leaders had instead opted to speak very loudly while carrying no stick at all.

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Putin’s evasive response to last weekend’s ceasefire ultimatum was wholly in line with his elusive approach to the entire US-led peace process. Since tentative talks first began in February, Putin has consistently voiced his support for peace. At the same time, he has offered endless excuses and presented a long list of additional demands that make genuine progress toward a peaceful settlement of the war virtually impossible. At one point, he even questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities and suggested the country should be placed under United Nations administration.

In contrast, Ukraine has demonstrated a readiness to make compromises in the interests of peace. Kyiv has acknowledged that any negotiated settlement will likely leave Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine under de facto Kremlin control, and has backed a US proposal for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire. It came as no surprise on Sunday when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy promptly agreed with Trump’s call to accept the Russian offer of bilateral talks. In the current climate, even the most obtuse of observers cannot help but conclude that Putin is now the main obstacle to peace.

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It remains theoretically possible that this week’s proposed bilateral talks will lead to some kind of breakthrough, but past experience suggests there is very little prospect of any real progress. On the contrary, negotiations are far more likely to end inconclusively, with the Russian delegation offering up just enough false hope to justify yet another round of time-consuming meetings. The real question is how long Putin will be allowed to continue engaging in stalling tactics before Western patience finally runs out.

It should be obvious by now that Putin has no genuine interest in ending the war. He refuses to offer any meaningful concessions and continues to insist on maximalist peace terms that would leave postwar Ukraine partitioned, disarmed, isolated, and defenseless in the face of future Russian aggression. It does not require much imagination to anticipate exactly what Putin has planned for Ukraine if his conditions are met.

Anyone who thinks Putin is willing to compromise over Ukraine clearly does not understand his profoundly revisionist worldview or his imperial ambitions. While Western leaders speak about the need for diplomatic dialogue and mutual concessions, Putin himself views the current invasion in far more existential terms as an historic mission to reverse the Soviet collapse and revive the Russian Empire.

The Russian leader is perfectly happy to entertain the idea of negotiations in order to buy time and weaken Western resolve, but in reality he has no intention of stopping until Ukrainian statehood has been extinguished. Trump has made a legitimate effort to broker a generous peace, but the time has now come to acknowledge that Putin is not negotiating in good faith and will only respond to the language of strength.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

This rapid shift from Vance’s isolationist rhetoric to high-stakes diplomacy demonstrates the global stakes of nuclear crises and the impossibility of dismissing them as regional concerns. A nuclear exchange would devastate any region, disrupt trade routes, spike energy prices, and generate millions of refugees, overwhelming international systems. Radioactive fallout would pose environmental risks far beyond the countries involved, directly impacting US economic and security interests.

Those stakes are why the United States must prevent Iran’s regime from retaining the technological capability to develop nuclear weapons. Allowing Tehran such capabilities risks replicating the perilous dynamics of the South Asian nuclear standoff, with profound global consequences.

Vance’s initial claim that the conflict was “none of our business” ignored these consequences, but the crisis’s rapid escalation forced US action. The Iran nuclear negotiations must internalize this lesson.

Tehran’s regime, with its history of supporting proxy groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, has demonstrated a propensity for destabilization, as seen in the 2019 Aramco attack. If Iran retains the technological infrastructure for nuclear weapons, it could leverage the threat of weaponization to escalate regional aggression or actively work clandestinely to develop a weapon, creating a crisis that, like India and Pakistan’s, becomes a global liability.

The South Asian crisis also illustrates how nuclear technology can embolden provocative behavior under the guise of deterrence. India’s retaliation for the April 22 attack, which it blamed on Pakistan, and Pakistan’s counterstrikes reflect a cycle of escalation enabled by mutual nuclear capabilities. Despite Vance’s hope that the conflict would not “spiral into a broader regional war or, God forbid, a nuclear conflict,” the rapid deterioration necessitated US intervention.

Iran poses an even greater risk. With nuclear technology, Tehran could intensify proxy operations—Hezbollah targeting Israel or the Houthis disrupting Red Sea shipping—confident that its potential nuclear arsenal deters retaliation. This could spark a regional arms race, with Saudi Arabia and others pursuing nuclear capabilities, heightening the risk of miscalculation.

The India-Pakistan experience highlights the challenges of managing nuclear-armed states. Decades of diplomacy have failed to resolve their tensions, as mutual distrust and nuclear arsenals perpetuate a fragile stalemate. Iran’s history of evading International Atomic Energy Agency oversight and prolonging negotiations, as seen with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, suggests similar challenges. The United States must pursue a stringent approach in the negotiations that lie ahead, demanding that Iran dismantle its nuclear weaponization infrastructure, backed by robust verification, sustained sanctions, and a credible military deterrent.

The latest India-Pakistan crisis, triggered by a terrorist attack and propelled to the brink of nuclear conflict, forced Vance to abandon his “none of our business” posture and engage urgently to avert catastrophe. Like it or not, Washington carries a heavy burden in these crises, and that’s why it must ensure Iran cannot develop nuclear weapons—before it’s too late.

Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He leads the initiative’s Counterterrorism Project. He is currently a principal and industry director at Providence Consulting Group for aerospace, defense, and high-tech electronics.

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Russia’s coming summer offensive could be deadliest of the entire war

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 08 May 2025 15:08:20 +0000

As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war. In the coming months, Russia is hoping to build on more than a year of gradual advances to achieve breakthroughs on the eastern front, while Ukraine aims to demonstrate to the country’s partners that it is capable of stopping Putin’s war machine and holding the line.

While the Kremlin insists it is ready for peace, developments on the battlefield tell a different story. According to Britain’s Ministry of Defense, Russia is intensifying its offensive operations and sustained approximately 160,000 casualties during the first four months of the current year, the highest total for this period since the start of the full-scale invasion. If this trend continues during the coming fighting season, 2025 will be the deadliest year of the war in terms of Russian losses.

Russia’s strategy continues to rely on costly frontal assaults, but the nature of these attacks is steadily evolving. Russian troops now increasingly employ motorbikes and other improvised vehicles to advance in small groups and infiltrate Ukraine’s defensive lines. These assaults are backed by strike drones, glide bombs, and artillery, making it difficult for Ukraine to direct reinforcements to hot spots or provide medical and engineering support. The end goal is to force Ukrainian tactical withdrawals and inch further forward.

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Ukraine’s defensive strategy is focused primarily on attrition. This includes remote mining to channel advancing Russian troops into kill zones, along with the extensive use of traditional artillery. Ukraine’s expanding drone army is also playing a crucial role, making it possible to target Russian units at depths of up to 15 kilometers behind the line of contact.

By increasing drone coverage along the front lines, Ukrainian commanders aim to hamper the logistics of Putin’s invasion force and significantly reduce the potential for future Russian advances. This approach is being dubbed the “drone wall,” and may well come to play a far biggest role in efforts to freeze the front lines. However, Russia is also rapidly innovating to address Ukraine’s growing drone capabilities, leading to a relentless technological contest that runs in parallel to the fighting on the battlefield.

As the Russian army currently holds the initiative and is advancing at various points along the front lines of the war, Putin’s commanders can choose from a range of potential locations as they look to identify geographical priorities for their summer offensive.

At present, Russia is expanding a foothold in northeastern Ukraine’s Sumy region after largely pushing Ukrainian formations out of Russia’s Kursk region. There have also been recent localized Russian advances in the Kharkiv region. However, the main thrust over the next few months is expected to come in eastern Ukraine, where Russia has concentrated forces in the Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka sectors. Success in these sectors could create the conditions for the occupation of the entire Donetsk region, which remains Russia’s most immediate political objective.

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While Putin is under no pressure on the home front, he will be keen to achieve some kind of meaningful breakthrough in the coming months in order to demonstrate to domestic and international audiences that the Russian army is capable to achieving victory in Ukraine. He recently stated that Russia has “sufficient strength and resources to take the war in Ukraine to its logical conclusion,” but the fact remains that his army has failed to capture and hold a single Ukrainian regional capital in more than three years of brutal warfare.

For war-weary Ukraine, the coming summer campaign will be a major test of endurance. If Ukrainian forces are able to prevent any significant Russian advances despite dwindling supplies of US military aid, it would serve as a powerful argument for pro-Ukrainian politicians in Europe and the United States. This would likely lead to strengthened support for the Ukrainian war effort, and could help convince skeptics in the Trump White House to adopt a firmer stance toward Russia.

The Ukrainian authorities have already accepted a US proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire and remain ready to pursue a sustainable peace settlement. But with Russia showing little sign of following suit, Ukraine faces another long summer of brutal fighting.

The Kremlin’s current negotiating position would leave postwar Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and defenseless. Any peace on such terms would almost certainly mean the end of Ukrainian statehood. Instead, Ukraine must continue to defend itself while hoping that Russia’s ability to sustain heavy losses declines faster than the West’s collective commitment to stopping Putin.

Putin is escalating the war in Ukraine. He will not stop until he is stopped.

Alyona Nevmerzhytska — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:37:12 +0000

Almost two months ago, Ukraine agreed to a United States proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire. Russia still refuses to do likewise. Instead, Putin continues to engage in stalling tactics while escalating the war.

Since US-led peace talks began in February, Russia has carried out some of the deadliest attacks of the entire invasion targeting Ukrainian civilians. These have included a ballistic missile strike on a playground in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, Kryvyi Rih, that killed 18 people including 9 children. On Palm Sunday, Russia launched targeted strike on Sumy city center as civilians made their way to church, leaving 35 dead.

Some of these attacks have made international headlines. Many more have not. Every single day, the population in front line Ukrainian cities like Kharkiv in the east and Kherson in the south face relentless Russian bombardment. At night, millions of Ukrainians are forced to seek shelter as Russia launches wave after wave of missiles and drones at targets across the country.

As Russia intensifies its air offensive against Ukraine’s civilian population, the death toll is rising. According to UN officials, the number of Ukrainian casualties has spiked recently. During the first 24 days of April, 848 civilians were killed or wounded, representing a 46 percent increase on the same period one year ago.

Meanwhile, Russia is also escalating its offensive operations on the battlefield as Putin’s commanders seek to wear down Ukrainian resistance and achieve a breakthrough. This is leading to mounting Russian losses. The UK Ministry of Defense reports that in the first four months of 2025, Russia suffered approximately 160,000 casualties. If the current rate of attrition persists, this will become the costliest year of the war for Putin’s invading army.

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Despite extensive evidence of Russia’s intention to escalate the invasion, the United States continues to pursue a vision of peace through compromise. Since talks began, the Trump administration has offered the Kremlin a range of concessions while pressuring Ukraine to back down on key issues such as the country’s NATO ambitions. A recent US peace proposal indicated that President Trump may even be prepared to officially recognize Russia’s 2014 seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula.

The tone of American diplomacy has shifted noticeably since Trump returned to the White House, with US officials now seeking to avoid any direct condemnation of Russia. In line with this new strategy, the United States has sided with Moscow on a number of occasions to vote against UN resolutions critical of the Kremlin. The US has also stepped back from international efforts to hold Russia accountable for alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine, defunding one flagship program and exiting another.

The Trump administration’s conciliatory approach toward Russia does not appear to be working. Far from offering concessions of his own, Putin has responded to the new US administration’s peace initiative by doubling down on his maximalist war aims. The Kremlin dictator insists on international recognition for Russia’s claims to Ukrainian territory, and demands that any peace deal must leave Ukraine disarmed and internationally isolated.

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The current lack of progress toward peace should come as no surprise. After all, the experience of the past two decades has demonstrated that there is nothing more likely to provoke Putin than weakness. When the West chose not to punish Russia for the 2008 invasion of Georgia, this paved the way for the 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The underwhelming Western response to Putin’s initial assault on Ukrainian sovereignty then set the stage for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Russian’s sense of impunity is now a crucial factor fueling the largest European invasion since World War II. While Putin is always ready to engage in diplomatic maneuvers, his evasive actions in recent months confirm that he has no real interest in a compromise peace. Instead, he is more confident than ever that he can outlast the West in Ukraine and achieve his objectives.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a watershed event in world history that will define the future of international security for decades to come. If Western leaders allow Russia to continue bombing civilians and destroying the foundations of international law without consequence, a ruthless new world order will emerge and will be defined by the principle that might makes right. Putin and his authoritarian colleagues in China, Iran, and North Korea will dominate the global stage and will rewrite the rules to suit their expansionist agendas. No country will be secure.

Today, Ukrainians are paying the price for the West’s reluctance to confront Russia. If Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, many other countries will also count the cost of this failure.

Alyona Nevmerzhytska is CEO of hromadske.ua.

Putin’s demands include the comprehensive disarmament of the Ukrainian military and the reestablishment of Russian dominance in all spheres of Ukrainian public life (euphemistically called “denazification” by the Kremlin), along with official international recognition for Russia’s territorial gains and an end to all military support for Kyiv. If implemented, Putin’s terms would leave Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and defenseless. This is not a negotiating position; it is a call for Kyiv’s capitulation.

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While Russia’s ultimate objectives remain unchanged, there is a very real danger that Putin may seek to exploit Trump’s evident ambition to settle the Ukraine issue as soon as possible. He could do so by agreeing to a temporary ceasefire that would lead to a pause in hostilities, while creating the conditions to complete the conquest of Ukraine following the end of Trump’s presidency. This would allow Putin to lift sanctions, rebuild the Russian army, and destabilize Ukraine from within.

In order to secure Kremlin backing, a ceasefire deal would need to hand Putin the semblance of victory while denying Ukraine any genuine and reliable security guarantees. Alarmingly, reports indicate that current US peace proposals go a long way toward meeting these conditions.

Crucially, the United States is reportedly prepared to officially recognize the Russian seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. This has led to inevitable comparisons with the 1938 Munich Agreement, which saw Britain and France hand Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland over to Nazi Germany in the hope that this would satisfy Adolf Hitler. Instead, the shameful deal struck in Munich encouraged the Nazi dictator to escalate his territorial demands. Less than a year later, World War II began.

The appeasement policies of the 1930s have long been condemned for enabling the rise of Hitler. Attempts to appease Putin have produced strikingly similar results. After Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Western efforts to downplay the war and resume “business as usual” only served to embolden the Kremlin. When Russia’s 2014 invasions of Crimea and eastern Ukraine again failed to produce a resolute Western response, Putin interpreted this as a tactic green light to go further. This paved the way for the full-scale invasion of 2022.

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