• Executive summary
• Introduction
• Part one: Military AI tech trends
• Part two: The specter of algorithmic warfare
• Part three: Future scenarios
• Part four: Policy recommendations
• Conclusion

Executive summary

Military artificial intelligence (AI) is moving from the margins of experimentation into the core of how NATO will fight, make critical decisions, and deter competitors over the next decade. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept identifies the technological edge to be critical for the Alliance to fulfil its core tasks. Both contemporary warfare and renewed strategic competition suggest that data-driven AI decision-support systems and autonomous battlefield capabilities augmented with AI will define the character of future conflicts. There is a justified focus on evaluating strategic risks associated with such systems.

This report argues that integrating AI into military systems does not generate vulnerabilities that are fundamentally new in kind compared to existing cyber risks. But the difference lies in consequences. Once AI-enabled decision-support systems and autonomous platforms become critical to Alliance operations, interference with data, models, and computing infrastructure may have implications for NATO’s ability to see, decide, and act under pressure. Similarly, the offensive use of AI-enabled capabilities does not, on its own, raise or lower the nuclear threshold. Escalation thresholds in algorithmic warfare will continue to be driven by effects on the ground rather than by whether a system is AI-enabled. Yet the characteristics of AI—the speed, system opacity, and physical infrastructure—create more room for human error, misperception, and miscalculation.

To explore such possibilities, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, in partnership with the NATO Office of the Chief Scientist, conducted a foresight study to clarify how adversaries might counter AI-enabled capabilities and to examine what this means for NATO doctrine, strategy, and deterrence. The research combined horizon scanning and expert interviews, an off-the-record workshop held in Washington, under Chatham House rules, and scenario modeling. The project mapped AI technology trends across decision-support systems and autonomous platforms, identified likely AI vulnerabilities and vectors of attack, and explored escalation dynamics through structured discussion and scenario-based exercises.

This project brought a new perspective into the debate on the impacts of transformative military AI on future warfare for two reasons. First, it is innovative in its comprehensive scope that encompasses both physical and cyber dimensions of algorithmic warfare. Indeed, it foregrounds the AI triad of data, algorithms, and computing power and shows how each can be attacked through cyber, kinetic, and electromagnetic (EM) means. And second, it examines the intersection of AI and nuclear weapons from a different angle: Tailored nuclear weapons are treated as a potential countermeasure against military AI for their electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects.

There are two key findings.

While military AI does not generate “shock and awe” in and of itself, AI can exacerbate existing risk conditions for accidents and inadvertent escalations.

The report finds that the employment of military AI does not make the use of tailored nuclear weapons more likely. Instead, the choice of target, physical damage, and casualties are what matter. Workshop participants ranked responses to a notional AI-enabled drone saturation attack in the Baltic region by their perceived escalatory potential. Diplomatic action and electronic warfare were the most preferred responses, followed by kinetic strikes, cyber operations, and directed-energy weapons (DEW). Tailored nuclear EMP attacks were viewed as highly escalatory and politically unacceptable for NATO to use to repel an attack over NATO territory, even when framed as a tool of “information warfare.”

At the same time, military AI is expected to make the difference in terms of increasing speed, autonomy, scale, and uncertainty. This research, however, revealed that in comparison with all three components of the AI triad, the human remains the most vulnerable element of AI. Humans are routinely exposed to phishing, social engineering, cognitive bias, and already run the risk of deskilling as more tasks are delegated to machines.

Integrating AI into military operations therefore creates dangers along two pathways. First, speed and data are working against their user. Such compressed timelines can create cognitive problems in decision-making. Without safety and quality protocols in place, flooding decision-support systems with noisy or nonpatternable data can further thicken the fog of war for commanders. Second, AI-enabled military systems become increasingly complex and can lead to normal accidents, making foreign interference detection and exposure difficult to distinguish from system failures.

Algorithmic warfare highlights the importance of electromagnetic spectrum dominance.

Digital modernization of defense—the data-centric approach and software-defined capabilities—will make electromagnetic threats more salient. Russia’s war in Ukraine already highlights how GPS jamming, communications blackouts, and electronic warfare shape combat operations. This trend will intensify as NATO begins to lean on AI-enabled and multidomain command and control.

Advances in military applications of AI further strengthen the convergence between the cyber domain of operations (digital code) and the electromagnetic environment (electrons). In a crowded and contested spectrum, where software-defined radios, commercial satellites, and cloud-linked data centers underpin military networks, the distinction between “cyber” and “conventional” attack begins to blur. Further fielding of directed-energy weapons also indicates shifting the center of gravity to energy supplies.

Attacks on AI systems can use several vectors. The adversary can target model weights through espionage and hacking; poison training datasets; blind or spoof sensors on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; disable data relays; or physically damage hardware in data centers, cables, satellites, or uncrewed systems. Cyber operators, electronic warfare units, special forces, and conventional reconnaissance-strike systems may all participate in degrading AI-enabled capabilities. In contrast, the ongoing trend of lowering the cost of warfare will make any requirements for new protection measures, such as shielding or hardening, difficult to implement due to the trade-offs in terms of cost, weight, and endurance.

The report develops three future scenarios, including a fourth baseline case, to identify likely implications of future algorithmic warfare for NATO’s doctrine and strategy: guarded opportunism, brave new world, and minority report.

• Guarded opportunism outlines a future in which military AI, despite its transformative impacts, does not require the military to dramatically alter the rules of engagement. Instead of introducing qualitatively new risks or vulnerabilities, the challenges related to military AI remain manageable with disciplined cyber hygiene and resilient power supply. On the risk side, this scenario points to heightened dangers of AI-fueled hybrid warfare below the threshold of armed conflict.
• Brave new world is a less likely but more dangerous scenario detailing the conditions for escalation spirals. Transformative effects of AI lead to conventionalizing nuclear weapons. Fielding of AI-enabled military capabilities provokes the adversary to use new nuclear-powered EM weapons. Nuclear EMP attacks are viewed as a legitimate use of nuclear weapons that belong to the specter of algorithmic warfare.
• Minority report presents a different take on the possible algorithmic future in which AI technology hype drives strategy. This scenario focuses on cognitive challenges for political and military decision-makers, who tend to overestimate near‑term benefits and discount the long-term risks and compound challenges of AI integration. Instead of improving AI operational implementation processes, countries race to achieve phantom AI advantages that destabilize the international security environment.

For NATO to leverage and maintain the advantage from transformative AI technologies, this report makes seven recommendations for NATO leaders that can contribute to NATO’s future strategy and doctrine adaptation.

1. Master AI literacy. NATO needs to develop standards for continuous AI skill development for commanders, operators, and policymakers. AI literacy is not just a strategic competency but also an instrument of restraint.
2. Engineer redundancy. Instead of creating a digital copy of all existing procedures, NATO should prioritize maintaining the ability to transmit information on rehearsed secondary systems.
3. Coordinate approach to AI tech industry. NATO should develop a code of conduct for AI tech company engagements that addresses the formation of an exclusive suppliers’ group, the knowledge gap in the private sector, and the rules for civilian software engineers in war zones.
4. Maintain information dominance. NATO should develop a functional framework for operationalizing AI in support of algorithmic warfare that prioritizes military objectives over abstract benchmarks and diversify its early warning systems.
5. Clarify escalation thresholds. NATO should develop a shared understanding of escalation thresholds for algorithmic warfare, decide on response triggers, and predelegate command authority in time-compressed scenarios to avoid escalation risks and decision paralysis.
6. Assess the electromagnetic layer with accuracy. Future algorithmic warfare will require NATO to treat electromagnetic spectrum operations as a distinct layer of multidomain operations to protect its strategic initiative and command-and-control superiority. NATO should also update its standards to reflect the changing scope of critical infrastructure as AI becomes a strategic asset to avoid underestimating the EM layer.
7. Deter by ambiguity. NATO should project resilience while cloaking its sensitive AI assets in a black box unexplainable by adversaries. However, such deterrence by ambiguity should not erode internal accountability of NATO-run AI systems.

Introduction

The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept emphasizes the importance of the Alliance maintaining its technological edge to achieve mission success.¹ But NATO’s ability to ensure military effectiveness and uphold a credible deterrence and defense posture faces challenges in the era of emerging and disruptive technologies. In the context of rapidly evolving warfare tactics and renewed strategic competition, AI-powered decision-support systems (DSS) and autonomous battlefield capabilities are expected to shape future conflicts. NATO’s 2022 Digital Transformation Vision therefore intended to accelerate the adoption of data and AI analytics to unlock new advantages for the Alliance.²

Accordingly, NATO’s AI Strategy encourages strategic foresight activities to help allies achieve a reasonable level of AI readiness.³ It also focuses on anticipating new challenges and risks related to algorithmic warfare from adversarial use of AI. While the military potential of AI is versatile and uncertain, it has nonetheless become difficult to overlook its importance to strategic competition. Countries are racing to develop and deploy AI across their civilian economies and militaries. Russia, the most significant and direct threat to NATO allies, and the People’s Republic of China, a strategic competitor seeking to control key technologies, have widely communicated their intentions to field AI for military purposes.⁴

Research objective

The Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, in partnership with the NATO Office of the Chief Scientist, has conducted a foresight study addressing this crucial topic. This effort seeks to gain more clarity on AI’s transformative military effects over the next decade. This report assesses the vulnerabilities entailed in AI integration into NATO military capabilities in the context of the digital transformation of defense and the growing importance of electromagnetic spectrum operations. Importantly, it identifies ways in which adversaries might counter future AI-enabled capabilities on and off the battlefield. The objective is thus to understand how these developments may affect NATO’s doctrine and strategy moving forward.

This report’s focus on the transformative effects of military AI is highly relevant given NATO’s ambition to conduct multidomain operations.⁵ As outlined in the Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy, NATO political and military leaders intend to use advanced analytics in combination with multimodal data from sensor networks for a consolidated multidomain situational awareness in real time.⁶ While the “digital backbone” is intended to enable command and control across all domains, a broader digital interoperability framework with a secured data-sharing ecosystem will enhance political consultation and decision-making processes.  

This report therefore seeks to address the complex question of the likely implications of future military AI countermeasures on NATO’s doctrine and strategy. This means identifying the risks from integrating transformative AI into military systems, examining the vulnerabilities the adoption of AI will create, assessing the severity and probability of corresponding adversarial attacks, and formulating recommendations. Importantly, to limit the dangers of technological determinism, this project examined how political and military leaders and policy planners (at the state level of decision-making) perceive new technologies appearing on the battlefield and craft their responses to escalate or not.⁷

Methodology

In terms of methodology, this report used several data collection and analysis tools. The first phase of the project consisted of horizon scanning and road mapping. Through a structured evidence-gathering process based on desk research of relevant open-source documents and background expert interviews, this report identified the most important drivers of change, as well as the likely future developments at the intersection of AI and the defense sector that are at the margins of current thinking and planning.

In the second phase, the Atlantic Council hosted an off-the-record closed workshop held on an unclassified level in Washington. Through two prescripted discussions, conducted under Chatham House rules, policy and scholarly experts were asked to stress test the assumptions from the first phase. This informed the project on the likelihood of AI countermeasures and conditions for escalation in future algorithmic warfare, as well as to validate recommendations.

The third and last phase of the project centered on future scenario development. This is a useful policy analysis tool that visualizes a set of possible future conditions to help NATO decision-makers to anticipate challenges as they define capability requirements for NATO’s success in future algorithmic warfare.

Structure

This report proceeds as follows. Part One maps AI technology trends and their military applications over the next decade, from the battlefield to the war room. Part Two then proceeds to anticipate the vulnerabilities of AI-enabled systems and to assess the possible vectors of attack to explore escalation pathways in algorithmic warfare; it covers both digital and physical dimensions across the so-called “AI triad” of algorithms, data, and computing power—and adds a human factor.

Part Three outlines three algorithmic futures—guarded opportunism, brave new world, and minority report—based on the likely transformative effects of military AI and their impact on international security. This line of scientific inquiry is highly relevant given ongoing research concerned with the impact of roboticized autonomous systems operating with minimal human supervision on future conflicts.⁸

Part Four discusses recommendations for NATO leaders. Based on the project’s findings, this report raises seven main action points that are categorized into three areas: AI readiness and resilience; military AI doctrine; and deterrence.

Part one: Military AI tech trends

AI is becoming a general-purpose military technology that will sit inside almost every digital system that NATO uses.⁹ Its transformative effects will likely concentrate in two areas. First, decision-support systems will expand the scale of information analytics military commanders can process to make better decisions fast. Second, autonomous and semiautonomous platforms will shift how militaries sense, move, and strike on the battlefield. Together, these developments are driving an AI era of algorithmic warfare.¹⁰

AI can, in principle, be implemented in everything that uses a computer. As defense establishments digitize, AI has never been a single-purpose capability in itself. Rather, AI architecture underpins modern command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, and weapons systems. NATO’s own definitions reflect this evolution. In 1995, NATO described AI as the capability of a functional unit to perform tasks generally associated with human intelligence, such as reasoning and learning. By 2005, it was also seen as “the branch of computer science” focused on building systems that reason, learn, and improve themselves.¹¹ These definitions now apply across a much broader digital ecosystem. Software has become a defining component of many weapon systems and AI is increasingly embedded in sensors, networks, and command-and-control tools.

The overall expectations about AI’s impact on future warfare can be captured in three concepts: speed, scale, and autonomy. Speed refers to faster sensing, processing, and engagement cycles. Scale refers to the ability to handle vast volumes of data and to coordinate large numbers of distributed assets, including swarms of UASs. Autonomy refers to the degree to which AI systems can operate with minimal human supervision. NATO’s challenge will be to harness these three dimensions without sacrificing control, accountability, or interoperability.

From general-purpose enabler to algorithmic warfare

The military applications of AI span relatively low-stakes use cases such as administrative automation and training, operational functions like logistics and cybersecurity, and high-stakes roles in targeting, electronic warfare, and human-machine teaming in combat.¹² From a functional standpoint, experts in defense and military affairs expect AI to matter depending on the AI model type, broadly divided in four categories: generative AI, classification, prediction, and autonomy.¹³ This includes tasks in which large volumes of data must be processed quickly, where patterns are too complex for human perception, where actions need to follow real-time operational intelligence fast, and where simulated environments can meet high training requirements.

Generative AI: Content, coaching, and cognitive effects

Generative AI models create novel content that mimics the statistical properties of the data on which they are trained in response to human prompts. In the military context, these systems are likely to be used as “agents” or virtual advisers that support commanders and staff in alleviating their daily administrative burdens and automating less critical processes, such as drafting routine reports, summarizing long documents, and translating technical information.¹⁴ In training and simulation, generative AI models can serve as simulation tools in war games and exercises. They populate synthetic environments with plausible adversarial actors and behaviors. This role improves scenario realism and generates alternative courses of action.

At the same time, these features can also be weaponized for offensive information operations. Adversaries can use generative AI to run large-scale, low-cost disinformation campaigns. This may involve producing tailored propaganda or impersonating Alliance leaders, journalists, and civil society voices. Generative AI will therefore be a powerful tool in the hands of adversaries seeking to manipulate perceptions and erode NATO’s cohesion.¹⁵

Classification: Noise and signal in a sensor-saturated battlespace

Classification models excel at recognizing patterns in labeled data and assigning new inputs to categories they have learned. Militaries already use such models for computer vision, facial and object recognition, and behavior detection. Computer vision models can identify vehicles, aircraft, ships, and infrastructure in imagery from satellites, aircraft, and UASs against their regularly updated data libraries. Classification tools can become crucial for early warning systems, from detecting stealthy cyber intrusions to flagging irregular troop movements. In sum, over the next decade, these systems are well-suited to sit at the core of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting architectures.

Much is expected from AI-enabled electronic warfare too. In a battlespace saturated with sensors, classification tools can automate filtering of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as distinguishing signal from noise and highlighting anomalous signals that warrant human attention. Furthermore, signal processing algorithms can suggest waveforms to counter hostile signals and thus help overcome adversarial jamming in real time.¹⁶ As the electromagnetic spectrum becomes more contested, the ability to recognize and respond to subtle patterns faster than an adversary will be a critical advantage.

Prediction and data fusion: Scaling decision support

Prediction models analyze historical and real-time data to identify trends and forecast likely future events. In military settings, they underpin decision-support systems (DSS) designed to help commanders cope with complexity and information overload. The transition to multidomain operations underscores the importance of such multimodal data fusion and analytics.¹⁷

This type of AI model is therefore suitable to support battle management, as they fuse information from multiple sources and data streams from land, air, maritime, cyber, and space assets, and integrate them into a single operating picture that is updatable in real time.¹⁸ However, this also means that such data-centric decision-making processes can narrow commanders’ perceptions and constrain their choices.¹⁹

They can also highlight early warning indicators, propose likely adversary courses of action, and flag emerging risks in logistics and supply chains. In logistics, in particular, AI can support predictive maintenance of critical stockpiles; forecast demand for ammunition, fuel, and spare parts; and anticipate bottlenecks in transportation networks.²⁰ Predictive systems can also assist with medical support by estimating casualties and optimizing the positioning of medical resources.²¹

Autonomy: From perception to action

Autonomy involves AI systems that perceive their environment, process real-time data from sensors, and make decisions in pursuit of a mission objective without constant human intervention. In this case, AI models can cause kinetic effects, as they can direct hardware and/or software to react within the physical realm based on the input from the immediate environment.

Onboard AI enables uncrewed aircraft, ground vehicles, and maritime platforms to filter and fuse sensor inputs, navigate in contested environments, and pass the most relevant information back to human controllers. Advances in machine vision, for example, allow drones to compare real-time imagery from downward-facing cameras with stored satellite images and inertial data to determine their position without reliance on global navigation satellite systems. This is particularly important in GPS-denied or heavily jammed environments.²²

Autonomy is also extending to terminal guidance and target recognition. Today, many drones operate on autopilot for parts of their mission, with humans in- or on-the-loop for final engagement decisions. Over time, fully autonomous solutions that combine visual navigation, target recognition, and terminal guidance are likely to proliferate. Seamless data flows, however, are crucial. The Ukrainian forces use a practice that resembles “Uber targeting,” where one unit identifies a target, shares the observation on an encrypted network, and the targeting assignment goes to whichever unit is available, even facilitating joint-strike capability from multiple vectors.²³ AI-enabled systems that can collect, process, and act on information in real time will make such dynamic targeting more common, especially when communications with higher headquarters are degraded.

From incremental adoption to algorithmic warfare

Together, developments in these functional areas point toward the algorithmic future of warfare. Broadly speaking, algorithmic warfare refers to integrating automated, autonomous, and AI technologies into the conduct of war, while decreasing the role of human elements.²⁴ In algorithmic warfare, the military conducts operations through AI-enabled capabilities that collect, analyze, and act on data at speeds and scales beyond human capacity. Artificially intelligent means operate when human warfighters cannot and reduce their exposure to danger. Such AI-enabled autonomous capabilities will especially be assigned tasks at the edge of the battlespace to handle time-critical sensing and response functions without human supervision and with minimum guidance.²⁵

Yet the most transformative effects of military AI are likely to appear in two use cases. First, AI in DSS will expand the scale and speed of information processing, giving commanders a richer but more mediated view of the operating environment. Decision-support tools will not only help humans make better-informed choices but also shape the decision space by highlighting some options and obscuring others. Second, AI embedded in weapons platforms will use speed and autonomy to compress the kill chain, shrinking the time between detection, identification, decision, and engagement.²⁶ This has implications for escalation control, the rules of engagement (ROE), and the role of commanders in supervising rapid, machine-driven engagements.

Drivers of change

Several structural drivers are signaling greater reliance on AI and algorithmic approaches to warfare. These drivers are particularly important for NATO as it implements its Digital Transformation Vision and prepares for multidomain operations.

Digital modernization of defense

First, the broader digital modernization of defense is creating the conditions in which AI can thrive. Modern militaries are upgrading their IT infrastructure and moving to software-defined capabilities that deliver new functionality to existing platforms.²⁷ This also means adopting data-centric approaches to capability development through collaborative digital spaces.

As militaries continue implementing digital modernization of their forces, their dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum is crucial for their new dependencies on sensors, satellites, and networked systems. Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of EM warfare, including GPS jamming and communications blackouts.²⁸ These developments push militaries to design more resilient, autonomous, and decentralized command-and-control structures with better cybersecurity measures. At the same time, electromagnetic warfare in the West has not gotten the attention it needs and is still seen as largely subservient to or stovepiped from cyber.²⁹

Interconnected domains

Second, the move toward multidomain operations (MDO) requires integrating effects across land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace, as well as in the virtual and cognitive dimensions. MDO aims to “[orchestrate] military activities, synchronize non-military instruments of power, and deliver converging effects at the speed of relevance.”³⁰ To make this possible, allies are building a digital backbone that can enable command and control across all domains. However, the effectiveness of this backbone depends on interoperable data sharing, secure and reliable communications, and advanced analytics capable of fusing data into a real-time consolidated multidomain picture. Turning well-integrated AI models into C4ISR systems that enhance situational awareness and support decision-making becomes part of the key conditions for conducting multidomain operations.

Autonomy pursuits

Third, recent and ongoing conflicts are accelerating experimentation with AI-enabled autonomous and decision-support systems. In Ukraine, AI-driven platforms already analyze extensive sensor and signal data to generate real-time targeting suggestions and logistical predictions.³¹ In Gaza, reports indicate that machine-learning systems such as “Gospel” and “Lavender” have been used to support dynamic targeting and terminal navigation by combining multi-source imagery with other intelligence inputs.³² These cases illustrate a shift from isolated, weapon-centric AI applications toward more comprehensive systems that inform planning, targeting, and force deployment at all command levels.

Drones are no longer only agents of remote warfare but are fast becoming agents of algorithmic warfare as well. Demand has surged for battlefield drone footage. Thousands of drone-camera videos depicting successful strikes are used to train computer-vision models, while engineers race to design uncrewed systems that can navigate and coordinate in GPS- and communications-denied environments using on-board processing and limited power.

Two motivations stand out: building “mass for precision” and supplementing shrinking human force structures. Swarm tactics and swarm command seek to saturate defenses and compress reaction times through the coordinated use of large numbers of low-cost platforms. At the same time, demographic trends and recruitment challenges will incentivize greater robotic integration and human-machine teaming. Forward-deployed, uninhabited platforms on standby will increasingly redefine how militaries think about force projection and readiness.³³ For instance, large drone formations can provide the aggressor with an edge in the invasion of foreign territory, highlighting the challenge to the capacity of air defenses.³⁴ Across these trends, AI is fast becoming more than just a technological tool; it is a vital strategic competency,³⁵ and will likely determine which militaries can exploit AI—at scale and under stress. For NATO, understanding where AI is most likely to transform operations, and how adversaries might target the vulnerabilities of AI-enabled systems, is a prerequisite for credible deterrence and effective defense in the emerging era of algorithmic warfare.

Part two: The specter of algorithmic warfare

Militaries have not yet realized the full potential of AI technologies, but it is not difficult to see how AI will shape the strategic environment and wartime paradigms. As the AI race intensifies, potent AI-enabled capabilities will be deployed as part of NATO’s digital transformation and decision-support ambitions.³⁶ This section translates interview insights and workshop discussions into a structured analysis of AI’s core components and their vulnerabilities and the likely vectors of adversarial attack. Two case studies used in the workshop—AI applications in autonomous weapons platforms and in a decision-support system—further informed the analysis of the limits of main AI countermeasures and the conditions under which escalation in algorithmic warfare may occur. This is because the likelihood of an adversary attacking NATO for using AI models for predictive maintenance is comparatively low.

AI triad

Military AI rests on three interlocking components often described as the AI triad: data, algorithms, and computing power.³⁷ Each component has a specific implication for offense-defense parameters. For instance, algorithms imply attacks on model architecture, computing power involves disrupting semiconductors and supply chains, while data concern cyberattacks to poison datasets.

Data refers to information about the focus area of the machine-learning system, collected from sensors and other sources, organized, stored, and made accessible. Algorithms are the series of instructions used to process information; machine-learning algorithms derive insights from datasets and the learnable parameters that encode the core capabilities of an AI model in model weights. Computing power provides the speed and capacity to execute algorithms at scale, train models to determine weights, and run inference offline on deployed systems.³⁸ In practice, computing power includes processors and graphics cards, advanced semiconductors, content delivery networks, power supplies, and cooling. Defense applications often need to run offline on edge devices under strict size, weight, and power constraints, or on government cloud resources with limited GPU availability. Data, sometimes dubbed the new “munition” due to their importance for modern warfare, encompasses issues such as volume, quality, salience, and labeling. The amount of training data strongly influences effectiveness, though collecting the right operational data and labeling it correctly are important for accuracy and alignment. Algorithms feed data into model weights through training, and their resulting internal architecture determines future data analysis in real-time operations.

AI vulnerabilities and vectors of attack

Integrating AI introduces several challenges along the entire triad. Core datasets are massive, models can be opaque, and natural-language prompting expands input surfaces. These characteristics create multiple entry points for adversaries and raise the importance of disciplined processes and safeguards. Adversaries will attempt to degrade NATO’s AI-enabled capabilities by targeting the triad across cyber, electromagnetic, and conventional kinetic dimensions. This section outlines how such attacks would prevent the Alliance from enjoying advantages from AI.

Computing power

Vulnerabilities associated with computing power reflect the physicality of AI infrastructure. This is because advanced semiconductors and specialized chips must be sourced, supplied, and integrated into systems that also require stable energy and cooling. The performance of inference-heavy applications may depend on AI-optimized hardware. These dependencies create risks during material shortages, expose weak points in data centers, and constrain performance at the tactical edge.

Adversaries can exploit material attributes of semiconductors. They can disrupt the supply of specialized AI chips, seed vendor-supplied Trojan backdoors, or manipulate cloud architectures built with commercial technology. They can target the electricity supply of data centers and sabotage their water-cooling systems to cause outages, or damage undersea cables and content-delivery networks to disrupt data flows.

Data

Data is vulnerable across the lifecycle of AI models. Adversaries can poison training datasets through cyber operations that mislabel data or introduce hidden triggers that cause the model to misbehave. Poorly labeled or biased datasets degrade performance, making certain classes of objects invisible to the system or misclassifying them at critical ranges. If the wrong data is collected, or if the right data is corrupted, the entire decision-support chain can lead a model to malfunction and reduce its reliability in the long term.

Adversaries can also interfere with real-life data collection. Because drones and other autonomous systems rely on environmental input, adversaries can tamper with surroundings to impact sensory input and cause abnormal behavior. For instance, blinding sensors on ISR platforms with optical illusions, or adjusting the sensors themselves, and generating spoofing signals can mislead the model into inappropriate responses.³⁹ In addition to onboard perception and planning modules, adversaries can target control interfaces, power management, data relays, and user interfaces used to coordinate connected autonomous systems. Alternatively, disabling low-orbit satellites can also stop real-time input and data sharing.

Algorithms

Incorporating AI into the digital architecture makes the existing systems susceptible to attacks that target the AI model itself. Because model parameters encode internal configuration variables crucial for its operation, compromising weights and biases gives an attacker significant leverage. Adversaries can also try to steal model weights through espionage or proxy hackers, gaining access to the core capabilities of the model for manipulation.⁴⁰
Adversaries can thicken the fog of war for algorithms by flooding AI-enabled DSS with inputs that are inaccurate, uncategorizable, or nonpatternable. They can exploit the rare and unpredictable features of the battlefield, since AI models are mostly trained on either synthetic data or on datasets from previous conflicts that may not quite fit the type and circumstances of the current war zone.

Interviewed experts and workshop participants indicated that the most likely adversarial action against military AI architecture would include:

1. Blinding sensors on ISR platforms to stop the real-time input of new data.
2. Spreading misinformation to confuse the algorithms with nonpatternable data.
3. Physically damaging undersea cables to disrupt data sharing.
4. Conducting espionage in the suppliers’ private lab facilities.

Surprisingly, however, the most vulnerable component of AI seems to be the human; data and algorithms follow, with the computing power being the least vulnerable of AI components. Such human-related vulnerabilities include personalized phishing, social engineering, cognitive bias, and deskilling.

Countering military AI

Having discussed the vectors of adversarial attacks on AI-enabled military systems and capabilities, this section now briefly comments on the means of such attacks. These AI countermeasures include cyber operations, conventional kinetic attack, electronic warfare, directed energy weapons (DEW), and tailored nuclear weapons with enhanced electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Each has distinct advantages and limitations.

Cyber operations

Cyber operations can interfere with how AI models learn and operate by manipulating ones and zeros. Cyberattacks can degrade the model’s performance or integrity, limit its availability by delaying responses or rendering command-and-control systems inoperative at crucial moments.⁴¹ Integrating AI into military systems increases their vulnerability simply by creating more targets for computer hacking.⁴² These AI vulnerabilities include compromising software libraries, poisoning training data, hijacking AI infrastructure, or stealing sensitive AI properties. Such cyberattacks, however, require prior intelligence to target the right datasets and processing centers. Their effects can be difficult to assess and attribute in real time, which increases the potential for miscalculation.

Conventional kinetic action

Conventional kinetic attacks can target ISR assets including space-based systems, airborne warning and control system aircraft, and other hardware components integral in critical AI infrastructure. Traditional air defenses can target offensive AI onboard small autonomous vehicles with low-cost interceptors, nets, and guns. Kinetic action is tangible but can be escalatory depending on target and context, and it may be expensive or resource-intensive if used at scale against saturation attacks.

Electronic warfare

Electronic warfare uses electromagnetic energy to degrade hostile systems by jamming or spoofing. EW can produce reversible, nonlethal effects, but it is constrained by range, power, antennas, and by the need for detailed knowledge of enemy waveforms and code. Focused jamming and signal spoofing in case of multisensor platforms can confuse AI into analytical errors and lead to wrong reactions. Jamming, however, is possible only in the case of collaborative autonomous platforms that communicate among themselves the adaptive course of their action.

Directed-energy weapons

High-power microwaves and high-energy lasers widen the range of electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO). They can disable or destroy electronics on autonomous platforms using concentrated electromagnetic energy.⁴³ While microwaves are suitable for area defenses and perimeter denial against swarms of drones, lasers with their energy beams perform point defense similar to short-range air defense and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar missions. They have low logistics tails and low cost per shot, but they are power hungry and range-limited. Atmospheric conditions, such as rain and fog, can reduce beam quality and effectiveness, as well as increase fratricide risks. Their applications for space missions look promising given their reusability and the potential to degrade or destroy a satellite.⁴⁴

Tailored nuclear weapons with enhanced electromagnetic pulse

Nuclear explosions of all types—from underground to high altitudes—are accompanied by an electromagnetic pulse. The strength and area coverage of this intense time varying electromagnetic radiation depends on the warhead type and yield, and the altitude of the detonation.⁴⁵ This means that while high-altitude airbursts can have a continent-wide deposition region, for explosions in the atmosphere at altitudes below 30 kilometers, the radius ranges from 5 to 16 kilometers.⁴⁶

Since the 1960s, EMPs, either man-made or natural, have been known to have a potential to disrupt, damage, or destroy a wide array of electrical and electronic systems.⁴⁷ Degradation of electrical and electronic system performance as a result of exposure to the EMP may cause either permanent functional damage or a temporary operational impairment, lasting from seconds to hours.⁴⁸ Computers used in data processing systems, communications systems, and semiconductors belong to the category of devices most susceptible to failure.⁴⁹

While airbursts have little or no fallout and no residual radiation, it is difficult to predict their effects and impact on today’s sensitive electronics, as well as avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties. Together with the difficulty to signal limited nuclear use, since the adversary cannot distinguish low-yield from high-yield weapons, such employment of nuclear EMP weapons remains highly problematic and inherently escalatory.⁵⁰ Experimental exercises over the past decades have identified no assurance that a nuclear strike would remain limited.⁵¹

Escalation and algorithmic warfare

The workshop assessed the salience of AI-enabled lethal operations along an escalatory pathway from minor cyber operations to DEW and nuclear EMP. The following paragraphs summarize the expert participants’ discussion on the conditions under which the use of military AI could increase the risk of escalation.

Escalation is defined as “an increase in the intensity or scope of conflict that crosses threshold(s) considered significant by one or more of the participants.”⁵² Escalation thresholds then depend on retaliation in response to some form of attack. The workshop discussion highlighted the distinction between effects-based and means-based escalation logics. While effects-based logic identifies thresholds depending on the impact that is irrespective of the weapons type, means-based logic emphasizes the qualitative difference between nuclear, conventional, and cyber domains. Some means are regarded as less escalatory than others. For instance, cyberattacks have proven capable of restraining the escalation dynamic and even de-escalating geopolitical crises.⁵³ Similarly, attacks on large drones are less likely to lead to escalation than attacks on inhabited aircraft.⁵⁴

Most researchers studying the AI-nuclear intersection focus on AI amplifying existing risks in nuclear command, control, and communications that can spark accidental nuclear confrontation,⁵⁵ undermining deterrence with AI-enabled conventional systems,⁵⁶ incentivizing first strike,⁵⁷ or exacerbating the proliferation/verification dilemma.⁵⁸ This workshop addressed the concern of a possible deliberate use of nuclear weapons as a warfighting tool designed to produce electromagnetic pulse effects to counter military AI. Previous experimental war-gaming showed that although low-yield nuclear weapons do indeed destabilize international security since they are seen as a substitute for high-yield nuclear use, they do not seem to increase the likelihood of crossing the nuclear threshold.⁵⁹

The workshop scenario described an AI-enabled fast and lethal drone saturation attack into the Baltic region. The scenario listed a number of possible responses:

1. Diplomatic action.
2. Economic sanctions.
3. Cyberattack.
4. Conventional kinetic response.
5. Electronic warfare measures.
6. Directed energy weapons.
7. Tailored nuclear weapons with enhanced electromagnetic pulse.

The workshop participants ranked responses by their perceived escalatory potential. Diplomatic action and electronic warfare tended to come first and often in parallel. Kinetic action, cyber operations, and DEW followed as second-ring responses. Economic sanctions were seen as medium-term tools, not immediate response levers. Tailored nuclear EMP was considered least probable but most escalatory, with a consensus that its use over NATO territory would be unacceptable. Among the most prevalent concerns against the nuclear EMP use, the participants noted: lowering the threshold for strategic nuclear weapon use; observing the nuclear “taboo,” the response’s proportionality, proliferation of nuclear weapons following nuclear use, and setting a negative precedent.

The follow-on discussion highlighted that adversaries may exploit AI structural risks. Complex AI systems can make attribution and intent assessment harder as AI and autonomy create conditions for plausible deniability. In addition, increased speed and data volumes can work against the user, since time-pressured scenarios increase the risk that decision-makers may rely more heavily on potentially compromised AI outputs, without even understanding the source of unanticipated inputs or system failures.⁶⁰

The workshop confirmed that military AI is not escalatory because offensive AI-enabled capabilities do not meaningfully increase the nature or intensity of a conflict. What matters is the choice of target, the physical damage, and the presence of casualties. At the same time, the properties of AI—speed, autonomy, and opacity—can increase the risk of inadvertent escalation. Despite the fight for EM spectrum dominance, the AI status of an attack does not lower nuclear thresholds—effects on the ground determine response. Ultimately, the vicinity of the adversary’s troops continues to be perceived as more escalatory than an AI-powered swarm attack.

Part three: Future scenarios

Juxtaposing the possible transformative effects of military AI against the threat perception (table A), this foresight study outlines three military AI future scenarios: Guarded opportunism, brave new world, and minority report. The goal is to anticipate long‑haul innovation in countering adversarial attacks on NATO’s AI systems and to inform military research and development decisions.⁶¹

The scenarios are modeled after two variables with a graduated level of likelihood. The first variable concerns the transformative impact of AI: whether countries achieve any strategic advantage from integrating AI into their militaries. And the second variable addresses an adversary’s threat perception: whether integrating AI provokes the development of new countermeasures and/or changes on the escalation ladder.

The fourth quadrant—AI fatigue—represents the most unlikely scenario with no decisive AI advantage and no heightened threat perception. It is less policy‑salient but remains useful as a control for future policy planning.

Scenario I. Guarded opportunism

This is the most plausible future scenario. AI meaningfully transforms military affairs and confers comparative advantage on states that integrate it well, yet it does not worsen adversary threat perceptions. Business continues largely as usual. AI‑enabled decision support and autonomy systems transform the character of warfare through expanded scale and increased operational speed yet without changing the nature of war.

NATO’s digital transformation and integrated AI-enabled military capabilities do not introduce qualitatively new risks or vulnerabilities. These remain familiar to cyberspace and can be managed with disciplined cyber hygiene and resilient power-supply architectures. However, AI may heighten some of the existing threat pathways and security risks. As AI becomes integral to the ability to operate and respond, degraded situational awareness and power outages, for instance, could become more consequential—and a new center of gravity—in digitalized, software-defined defense. Decision‑support systems help commanders filter the noise and frame choices faster, but they do not demand new categories of resilience beyond what Part Two already identified for the AI triad.

Hybrid pressure intensifies below the threshold of armed conflict. Cable cuts, data center intrusions, and information operations become routine. Russia continues sabotaging critical AI infrastructure to disrupt supply chains and cyber and drone intimidation campaigns across Europe.⁶² Yet technology knowledge and investments into resilient computer systems limit these escalation attempts. Better engineering and AI literacy shorten detection and attribution loops and make recovery faster.

Two challenges stand out. The first is the intergovernmental character of the Alliance. NATO relies on its member countries for certain types of cyber operations. This dependence on capitals to act creates latency in time‑sensitive crises and may result in inefficient responses that may not prevent further escalation of hybrid warfare. The second is information warfare targeting the Alliance’s reputation. NATO publics in left‑leaning governments are targeted with disinformation campaigns that frame AI‑enabled capabilities as unethical “killer robots,” arguing that NATO violates its own principles of responsible use of AI. Adversaries are further fueling domestic opposition to reduce tech-sector cooperation.

Still, guarded opportunism is defined by low escalation risks. Algorithmic warfare remains bounded by existing ROE and proportional responses. The only time AI and nuclear fields cross their paths with real-world consequences is in the widespread adoption of small nuclear reactors across the military to power demanding computations of AI models.

Scenario II. Brave new world

In the second scenario, AI is transformative and threat perception worsens. The AI triad delivers a real strategic and operational edge. However, AI-related risks grow with it over time due to insufficient literacy, lack of regular training, lagging skill development, and sloppy implementation of zero‑trust policy across armed forces. Furthermore, rapid and widespread integration of AI models creates new vulnerabilities, stemming from limited human agency, which complicate the cognitive aspects of decision-making.⁶³ The result is an increased probability of flash wars among autonomous robotic systems, in which algorithms interact at such a fast pace that humans would not be involved.⁶⁴

Such a degraded security environment sees multiple escalation spirals. Compressed decision-making times and fully autonomous systems contribute to perceptions of asymmetric disadvantage between Russia and NATO. Russia’s doctrine and force structure amplify the problem. Russia’s revision of its nuclear doctrine in 2024—with its greater emphasis on “aerospace attacks,” explicitly including drones, as one of the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be used—seems to lower the threshold for nuclear use.⁶⁵ This demonstrates that Russia became more reliant on its nonstrategic nuclear weapons after its conventional forces degraded in the war on Ukraine.⁶⁶ This seems to strengthen the Russian leadership’s belief that nonstrategic nuclear weapons are Russia’s “competitive advantage” over NATO.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Russia’s vision of new generation warfare builds upon weapons based on new physical principles, including radio frequency, laser, infrasonic, and electromagnetic. Russia has indeed been developing a precision-strike system built on integration of EW, uncrewed strike and reconnaissance systems, hypersonic weapons, and low-yield nuclear warheads.

In contrast, as NATO’s deterrent power derives from advanced conventional capabilities, this scenario portrays a deeper blurring of conventional and nuclear domains.⁶⁸ Yet NATO struggles to attain superiority in strategic command and control, while avoiding dependencies on commercial clouds and satellites. Large‑scale outages and cascading failures are more frequent. Allies hold regular war-gaming exercises to make sure that the Alliance’s responses remain proportionate even when attacks are AI‑generated. Yet Russia’s asymmetric countermeasures to the multidomain concept keep causing electronic damage to NATO command posts and communications centers.⁶⁹

In high tension, states embrace capabilities that manipulate the spectrum—microwaves, lasers, tailored EMP—seeking to blunt swarms and blind sensors. While EW once seemed unbeatable, jamming lost its teeth against uncrewed vehicles that do not use communication and navigation links. And if autonomy was an antidote to EW, then degrading the electromagnetic environment has become the antidote to AI-enabled military capabilities.

Some governments resume nuclear explosive testing of airburst effects, which contributes to further entangling AI with the nuclear domain. The line between conventional and nuclear war will get more fragile with the proliferation of new classes of EMP weapons. Nuclear proliferation gets out of control as more countries strive to develop their own low-yield nuclear EMP deterrent to counter AI-enabled adversaries. Worse, numerous experts inside and outside Russia believe that a nuclear EMP attack does not need to be governed by the same set of considerations as strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrine.⁷⁰ Nuclear EMP weapons are understood within the category of electronic warfare or information warfare, not nuclear warfare. In this increasingly popular interpretation, an EMP attack is regarded as a legitimate use of nuclear weapons within the specter of algorithmic warfare. Even if nuclear EMP is conceptualized as a form of information warfare in some circles, its use would be profoundly escalatory.

Scenario III. Minority report

In the third scenario, technology hype drives strategy. AI does not deliver decisive comparative advantage for the military, yet threat perceptions grow worse. Exaggerated expectations about the game-changing, transformative, and inevitable impact of AI fuel anxiety about falling behind. The fear of missing out, rather than tangible advantages from AI models, pushes countries deep into the AI race. Such alarmism about phantom AI advantages has a destabilizing effect on strategic balance.

Information asymmetries deepen the problem. NATO militaries and Russian officials tout milestones and “breakthroughs,” while major AI firms speak of revolutionary models. The strategic conversation fixates on what might be developed tomorrow rather than what is fielded today. Decision‑makers overestimate near‑term effects and discount the risks and challenges of AI integration work highlighted in Parts One and Two. As a result, nuclear-armed great powers interpret routine military exercises as cover for preemptive strikes at machine‑speeds and tend to see AI-enabled ISR improvements as a direct threat to their second-strike capabilities.

Escalation pathways in this scenario are cognitive. On the one hand, leaders race to push fully autonomous prototypes forward before safety case evaluations are completed. Miscalculation risk rises not because AI-enabled autonomous weapons systems are unstoppable, but because the decision-makers believe they are. On the other, the adversaries deploy cognitive warfare tactics of “algorithmic amplification” to influence how decision-makers reason, degrade critical decision-making processes, and undermine their sense of security.⁷¹

The Alliance faces the challenge of lowering expectations while preserving its technological edge. However, while allies agreed to coordinate their political objectives of developing AI-enabled armed forces, the lack of national resources and ineffectiveness of their national AI strategies to achieve them weakened NATO’s cohesion.⁷² Leading AI countries are reluctant to institutionalize transparent metrics for AI readiness that separate laboratory promise from operational proof.

This scenario points to the need to move beyond the polarizing hopes-vs-fears dichotomy of AI in order to translate technological potential into military advantage through a sound implementation strategy.⁷³ This scenario reminds policymakers and defense planners to budget for the cognitive dimension of technological competition. Publics and markets react to hyped narratives faster than to scientific results. Adversaries will try to exploit this gap with rhetoric about their AI leapfrogging, announcing the winner of the AI race.

Across all three futures, NATO faces distinct challenges posed by future algorithmic warfare. NATO’s advantage from AI models rests on speed, scale, and autonomy delivered by a resilient AI triad under close human oversight. Guarded opportunism is the most likely scenario and highlights AI vulnerabilities in the light of hybrid and information warfare. Brave new world is less likely but the more dangerous of the three futures. In this algorithmic future, NATO is constantly on the cusp of spirals of escalation and de-escalation and points to the dangers from rapid and widespread integration of AI models without correspondingly fast doctrinal adaptation. Minority report, meanwhile, outlines the destabilizing effects of AI hype in the context of lacking safety and transparency standards.

Part four: Policy recommendations

NATO’s advantage in algorithmic warfare will depend on converting AI’s speed, scale, and autonomy into reliable military capabilities while avoiding inadvertent escalation. This report suggests that the Alliance should focus on three lines of effort. First, it must build AI readiness and resilience across the Alliance. Second, it must refine military AI doctrine to preserve information dominance and to clarify response triggers under compressed timelines. Third, it must develop a deterrence strategy for its strategic AI-enabled DSS. These policy recommendations address the AI vulnerabilities and attack vectors identified in the report’s earlier sections, providing practical steps for NATO leaders implementing the Digital Transformation Vision and preparing for multidomain operations. Each recommendation is intended for near‑term adoption to set conditions for long‑term advantages from AI.

I. AI readiness and resilience

NATO should anchor its AI strategy in two core principles—literacy and redundancy—and reinforce those principles through a coordinated approach to the AI tech industry. Such an approach will help NATO avoid the risks of stale knowledge and deskilling.

Recommendation 1: Master AI literacy

AI literacy should be treated as a strategic competency for commanders, operators, and policymakers rather than as a niche topic confined to chief information officers. NATO should integrate AI education into professional military education, operational exercises, and staff development programs so that leaders understand both the promise and the limits of current AI models. AI-literate armed forces are less likely to succumb to tech-centric thinking and automation bias in future strategy and doctrine development.

NATO should also educate wider publics and political elites so that strategy debates do not become hostage to hype. Clear explanations of how models are evaluated, how data shape military performance, and how human judgment remains central are key for preparing policymakers at all levels to make informed AI-related decisions.⁷⁴

Recommendation 2: Engineer redundancy

Maintaining the ability to transmit information is essential for coordinated actions. NATO should assume that outages and system failures will occur. The Alliance needs to exercise capabilities in communications‑degraded electromagnetic environments and design robust and rehearsed secondary systems. This involves mapping cyber and physical dependencies to avoid single points of failure.

The Alliance should pursue controlled geographic decentralization of data centers to improve resilience of its AI architecture. This will require lawmakers to align national legislative requirements on strict data standards and protocols for insider-outsider threat detection. Vetting the data that goes into AI-enabled DSS, together with delineating clear boundaries between training periods and operational deployment of AI models, will improve the ability to isolate “poisoned” data and contain their spread. Training a team of experts to ensure human oversight of AI workings can limit the consequences of system malfunctions, while limiting the number of people with authorized access to base model parameters, can reduce the risk of sabotage and espionage.

Investment priorities should include research programs that work on future novel materials for shielding and protection of high-speed digital computers against EM interference. Given that the adversaries are likely to invest heavily in spoofing and dazzling hardware capabilities, the Allies should consider hardened interfaces against exfiltration. Lastly, NATO should invest in resources for continuous active defenses that constantly look for evidence of deception and run malfunction diagnostics.

Recommendation 3: Coordinate approach to AI tech industry

NATO should develop a code of conduct for private-sector engagements. The code would require AI companies developing products for decision-support systems and autonomous platforms to adhere to safety and ethical standards. The Alliance should create a trusted group of commercial suppliers and establish clear rules for civilian software engineers and technicians deployed in war zones. To prevent adversaries from achieving tech superiority, the Allies should examine their technology dependencies, “friend-shore” supply chains, and tighten export controls of critical components.

The Alliance should try to address the knowledge gap that exists in the private sector on how EMPs affect computer-based systems. NATO should partner with space tech organizations that have experience with the most advanced research into electromagnetic disturbances. As part of coordinating government–industry unclassified information sharing, NATO could also facilitate partnerships between traditional military hardware providers with software developers so that commercial capabilities can be deployed on military‑grade platforms. Lastly, NATO should encourage forward thinking. Routine, joint red‑teaming and data‑poisoning drills with industry will expose weaknesses. Regular brainstorming on risks from new EMP weapons and postquantum cryptography should feed into the life-cycle design of current systems.

II. Military AI doctrine

Doctrine must convert technical possibility into operational advantage while reducing the pathways to inadvertent escalation. Three recommendations on doctrinal adaptation can contribute to preserving NATO’s advantage from AI.

Recommendation 4: Maintain information dominance

NATO should develop a functional framework for operationalizing AI in support of algorithmic warfare that prioritizes military objectives over abstract benchmarks. Commanders should measure success in terms of effects—such as optimized asset‑to‑target allocation on defense—rather than in terms of statistical thresholds.

Investments should focus on early warning systems, electromagnetic warfare capabilities, and a layered counter‑UAS architecture that combines continuous passive radars, electronic warfare, DEW, and point defenses.

Maintaining information dominance also requires the ability to distinguish routine probing in the form of hybrid air denial operations from preparations for larger operations using drone saturation attacks. Exercises should therefore include ambiguous data, degraded sensors, and adversarial attempts to manipulate inputs so that the troops learn to question AI outputs without losing their operational tempo.

Recommendation 5: Clarify escalation thresholds

Compressed timelines will produce decision paralysis unless allies agree on response triggers and predelegate command authority to avoid escalation risks. NATO allies should develop a shared understanding of escalation thresholds for algorithmic warfare, including thresholds defining the strategic effects of adversarial AI-enabled attacks, as well as of attacks on NATO’s own AI architecture.

NATO also should have clear protocols in place for attribution and proportionality regarding the Alliance’s responses. For instance, would poisoning an adversary’s data count as an offensive cyber operation? NATO allies also need to make sure there are clear rules of engagement for autonomous and semiautonomous response systems. In anticipating the adversary’s deniability claims in the event of AI-enabled attacks, such as “accident” or “loss of control,” NATO should not be adjusting its red lines between subthreshold manipulation and armed attack.

Recommendation 6: Assess the electromagnetic layer with accuracy

The electromagnetic spectrum should not be an afterthought. NATO defense planners need to take the electromagnetic spectrum into consideration at the beginning of warfare planning and develop a spectrum plan with assigned frequencies. Future algorithmic warfare may require NATO to update its standards for survivability (STANAG 4145) to reflect the reality that modern critical infrastructure includes data centers and commercial satellites in addition to traditional command facilities.
In planning for EM-contested environments, NATO allies should preposition shielded assets—power, fuel, generators, and communications equipment—in forward locations to avoid logistical shortages during compressed timelines. They could also invest in software‑defined or reconfigurable radios and optical/laser communications. They should also explore the use of UAS or balloon‑based repeaters to restore the ability to transmit information when ground infrastructure is compromised. Treating the spectrum as a distinct layer of multidomain operations will protect the strategic initiative and the superiority in command and control that NATO seeks to maintain.

III. Deterrence

As AI‑enabled systems underpin strategic command‑and‑control functions, NATO must develop a deterrence strategy based on black box ambiguity without locking itself into a rigid declaratory policy.

Recommendation 7: Deter by ambiguity

NATO should project resilience while keeping the internal architecture of sensitive AI systems opaque to adversaries. Black box AI would also deprive adversaries of the ability to assess the real costs of potential attack. At the same time, the Alliance must maintain the diagnostic capacity to distinguish foreign interference from technical failure in case of system malfunctions, so that ambiguity does not erode internal accountability.

Building and demonstrating resilience—technical, organizational, and informational—will enable NATO to signal confidence and control. Its strategic communication should make clear that deliberate interference with decision‑support systems could carry serious consequences, even if precise thresholds and responses remain undisclosed. Taken together, these seven recommendations translate the analytical sections into concrete actionable items. Literacy keeps humans in charge under compressed timelines. Redundancy and industry coordination make the AI triad more trustworthy. Doctrine secures the informational high ground and clarifies action in crisis. Finally, deterrence by ambiguity protects the Alliance’s AI advantage without inspiring its adversaries into building new countermeasures. Implemented in parallel, these steps position NATO to enjoy its AI advantage in algorithmic warfare on terms that contribute to a stable security environment.

Conclusion

NATO’s competitive edge in the era of emerging and disruptive technologies will come from treating AI as a general-purpose enabler embedded across the Alliance’s digital backbone, rather than as a stand-alone “wonder weapon.” AI-enabled decision support and autonomy do not create vulnerabilities that are different in kind from cyber risks, but they raise the stakes by tying mission-critical effects—speed, scale, and autonomy—to software-defined systems that adversaries will target. Escalation will continue to be governed by effects and targets, not labels, while cognitive factors complicate judgment under time pressure. The practical implication for NATO is clear: invest in literacy, engineer redundancy, clarify doctrine, and project resilience with measured ambiguity.

This report addresses NATO’s ambition to protect its AI technological edge while digitalizing defense. Part One showed how AI will matter most in two intertwined areas: decision-support systems that compress time and expand the scale of information processing, and autonomous or semiautonomous platforms that accelerate sensing, movement, and strike. These advantages rely on the secured AI triad of algorithms, data, and computing power. Part Two mapped where adversaries will try to turn those strengths into liabilities—poisoning data, spoofing sensors, stealing model weights, interrupting cloud access and cable backhaul, and attacking the AI physical infrastructure. The analysis emphasized that while attempts to degrade AI-enabled military capabilities will resemble cyberspace operations, the consequences of failure are amplified when AI is made responsible for situational awareness at the core of command-and-control decision-making.

Parts Three and Four translated those findings into future forecasting and recommendations. The foresight scenario exercise underscored that the most likely near-term pathway is one of guarded opportunism—AI improves productivity and tempo without changing the nature of war—while the most dangerous pathway blends real AI advantage with worsening threat perception, making EMSO and directed-energy tools more salient in crisis. The most deceptive pathway is driven by hype: Threat perceptions rise even when fielded capabilities do not correspond to exaggerated predictions. Across all futures, effects, targets, and collateral risk determine algorithmic warfare dynamics.

Crucially, military AI systems do not introduce vulnerabilities that are categorically new, yet the consequences of foreign interference can be greater. If AI-enabled systems are integral to a unit’s ability to operate and respond, then successful attacks on those systems may warrant responses that are more escalatory than tit-for-tat cyber exchanges. Timing matters as well. Loss of real-time situational awareness in a crisis reduces clarity about what happened and who is responsible, raising the probability of misperception and inadvertent escalation. In practice, this report calls for disciplined deployment of decision-support systems that can only rely on rehearsed secondary systems.

The study also clarified the relationship between EMSO and nuclear restraint in the context of tailored, nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Means-based analysis sheds light on how emerging technologies shape modern escalation dynamics. Rather than making technology-centric estimates, this report highlights systemic risks related to AI: How leaders perceive risk under pressure remains decisive.

Literacy is therefore more than a training agenda; it is an instrument of restraint. Educated policymakers, commanders, and publics are less likely to treat AI as “cyber pixie dust” or to confuse reversible electronic effects with strategic attack. They will be better able to choose the right mission for the AI-enabled capability. In parallel, designating data centers, cables, AI labs, and commercial satellites as critical infrastructure and strategic assets will help align strategy and doctrine with the realities of a software-defined force.

This study contributes to AI literacy by stripping away hype and clarifying where algorithmic warfare introduces new challenges. For NATO leaders implementing the Digital Transformation Vision, the immediate tasks are practical: align skill development programs, harden the AI triad, codify response triggers, and show resilience without over-specifying red lines. Doing so reduces the risk that exaggerated expectations about new technology will drive strategy.

The report’s findings point to a future research agenda that looks into how tactical actions can engage strategic effects. AI-enabled autonomy and speed can magnify the psychological impact of hybrid campaigns, especially where the cost of interceptors is high and the pace of exchange is machine-driven. Routine “gray zone” activities are already redefining the baseline of normalcy across Europe.⁷⁵ Such threshold uncertainty permits plausible deniability, keeping the adversarial action away from Article 5 territory.

Open questions remain. How robust is the “firebreak” in escalation theory when algorithmic systems increasingly shape perception and timing? Can allies maintain recognizable qualitative distinctions between domains when effects propagate across them in multidomain operations? And where, precisely, do we draw escalation thresholds when nonkinetic actions in the electromagnetic spectrum generate strategic consequences? Answering these questions will require continued red teaming, transparent metrics for AI readiness, and joint experimentation that links tactical vignettes to strategic decision-making fora.

The Alliance has long excelled at military hardware. In a data-centric, software-defined approach to defense, advantage will come from systems engineering and smart innovation adoption choices. If NATO invests in AI literacy and redundancy, elevates the EM spectrum within the multidomain operations concept, and projects resilience with measured ambiguity, it can protect its AI edge and defend against adversarial attacks. That is the path to credible deterrence and effective defense in the emerging AI era of algorithmic warfare.

The author would like to thank the interviewed experts and workshop participants for their generosity in sharing their time and knowledge, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative staff for making a home for this project, and the NATO Office of the Chief Scientist for choosing to fund this project as part of its 2025 grants program.

Fellow

Dominika Kunertova

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

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Estonia’s Internal Security Service, which has earned considerable respect in recent years for a string of high-profile counterintelligence successes, has dismissed the “Narva People’s Republic” initiative as an information operation. Meanwhile, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service doubts any direct Russian government involvement.

A journalist from the Estonian newspaper Postimees recently managed to infiltrate a Telegram chat group and expose the “Narva People’s Republic” as a tiny operation being run by someone likely outside Estonia with apparent ties to St. Petersburg. Given the small scale of the campaign, there is a lively debate in Estonia and across social media over whether highlighting it is a sensible precautionary measure or counterproductive.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Many have inevitably drawn comparisons with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the role played by fake separatist movements created by the Kremlin to justify Moscow’s expansionist agenda in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. When separatist propaganda about “People’s Republics” first began appearing in Ukraine in the years prior to the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, it was not initially taken seriously.

Recent references to a “Narva People’s Republic” appear to refer to the entire Ida-Viru County in northeastern Estonia rather than the city of Narva alone. Like Ukraine’s Donbas, Ida-Viru County was subject to an extended period of russification. During the Soviet occupation following World War II, large numbers of Russian-speakers from various parts of the Soviet Union were settled in Narva and in newly built Soviet industrial cities in the region.

With a current population that remains dominated by Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians, this would seem to make Ida-Viru County ripe for the Kremlin’s influence operations and grievance politics. However, the Estonian government has invested significantly in the region’s economic development and cultural integration.

Also, the fact that many residents of Estonia’s northeast have family links to Russia means they are well aware that they currently enjoy a far better standard of living than most people across the Narva River in the Russian Federation. With Estonia, like Ukraine, one must avoid the fallacy of conflating language with loyalty.

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The fact that a grassroots separatist movement is unlikely to develop in Ida-Viru County will not necessarily prevent Russia from using the separatist narrative to advance its agenda. When efforts to cultivate a local separatist movement in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine proved insufficient in 2014, the Kremlin sent in Russian citizens and military personnel without insignia. Soon after, they were followed by an undeclared invasion force.

Russia’s goal in Estonia might not be military conquest. It is often suggested that Moscow could aim to test NATO’s collective security commitments and discredit the alliance by launching a relatively minor incursion and claiming a small chunk of Estonian territory on the pretext of protecting compatriots. This would be much easier said than done, however, given Estonia’s heavily monitored border, where even the smallest infraction is noticed quickly. In such a case, Estonia would not wait for NATO to respond.

Estonian officials can be prickly about any portrayal of their country as particularly vulnerable or overly reliant on others for security. Since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, there have been endless articles asking “is Narva next?” This framing has been met with strong push back from Estonian security experts.

Similarly, war games exercises resulting in a quick Russian takeover of the Baltic region have been criticized by Estonian officials as lacking understanding of the Baltic states’ own security posture to the point of being insulting. In common with nearby Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania, Estonia employs a whole of society “total defense” concept that should not be underestimated.

Due to the enormous losses it is sustaining in Ukraine, Russia’s military is currently thought to be in no position to launch an invasion of Estonia. In its annual report for 2026, Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, while clear-eyed about the Kremlin’s expansionist ambitions, assessed that Russia has no intention of militarily attacking Estonia or any other NATO member state in the present year, or likely the next.

It is no wonder that Estonia’s foreign and defense policy has been focused on marshaling support for Ukraine as it confronts Russian aggression. It is also easy to understand why elements in Russia would like to create the impression of a looming threat to Estonia. So far, Estonia’s reaction to social media chatter about a supposed separatist movement has been typically phlegmatic. As this narrative has drawn media attention, we can expect to see it pushed further and recycled. Estonia’s NATO allies should follow Tallinn’s lead and react by remaining alert but calm.

James Rice is a doctoral student at the Institute of World Politics and former legislative director for US Senator Chuck Grassley.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Bottom lines up front

• Romania has approved the deployment of additional US military capabilities on its territory amid the Iran war.
• In doing so, Romania is demonstrating its commitment to both US bilateral ties and NATO in the face of Iranian threats.
• As the war continues, Romania must adopt a balance between the United States and its European allies at a time of tense and evolving transatlantic relations.

BUCHAREST and WASHINGTON—Recent diplomatic tensions involving Iran and Romania reveal more than a temporary geopolitical episode. They illustrate the increasingly complex strategic environment facing NATO allies on Europe’s eastern flank. Romania’s decision to authorize additional US military capabilities on its territory reflects a long-standing commitment to the transatlantic alliance. But it also highlights the delicate balancing act Bucharest must perform: reinforcing its strategic partnership with Washington while maintaining cohesion with European partners that are navigating a more uncertain transatlantic relationship.

The developments began when the United States requested temporary access to Romanian military infrastructure to support operations in the Middle East. Romania’s Supreme Council of National Defense approved the US request to deploy several capabilities, including aerial refueling aircraft and satellite communication systems serving a defensive role. Romania’s Parliament then endorsed the decision, reaffirming the legal framework that governs US access to Romanian bases under bilateral agreements and NATO commitments.

Soon after the approval, the first visible signs of this deployment appeared. According to Romanian media reports, three US Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft landed at the 90th Air Base near Otopeni. While these aircraft are not combat platforms, they are among the most critical enablers of modern air operations. By allowing fighter jets and surveillance aircraft to refuel midair, tanker aircraft extend operational range and endurance, effectively expanding the geographic reach of allied airpower. Their presence in Romania strengthens the logistical backbone supporting US and NATO operations across multiple theaters.

Iran’s reaction followed quickly. A spokesperson for the Iranian foreign ministry warned that allowing US forces to operate from Romanian territory could be interpreted as participation in military aggression. Bucharest responded to Tehran’s threats with notable restraint. Romanian officials emphasized that the country is not involved in any conflict with Iran and reiterated that the deployment of US assets is defensive and conducted under existing bilateral agreements. The Romanian foreign ministry also stressed that the missile defense infrastructure hosted by Romania serves purely defensive purposes and operates within NATO’s collective security framework.

When Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei warned that hosting US aerial refueling tankers would make Romania a participant in military aggression, he was not making a legal argument so much as a threat intended to deter US partners. Tehran’s objective is to ensure that each US partner—including Romania, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom—concludes that the risk is not worth bearing alone and quietly declines. If enough partners hesitate, then the coalition Washington is trying to consolidate never fully materializes, improving Iran’s strategic position without requiring direct military confrontation.

Iran has pressed Gulf states and European partners separately, issuing warnings calibrated to each country—threatening Gulf states with strikes on energy infrastructure while warning European governments of legal consequences and damage to bilateral ties. The logic is consistent: Make the cost of cooperation feel personal and isolating, in the hope that no partner feels confident enough in collective backing to hold firm. The approach works when partners deliberate alone; it is far less effective when they coordinate openly and signal unity.

Romania has strong grounds to hold firm on its position. The 2005 US-Romania Defense Cooperation Agreement established the framework for US military access to multiple joint-use facilities, including the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base. Together with the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and the 2011 Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century, this creates a comprehensive legal basis for US operations on Romanian soil—one that has been ratified by the Parliament and upheld consistently for two decades. Iran’s invocation of potential damage to bilateral relations underscores the limits of its leverage. Romania-Iran ties are sufficiently limited that their deterioration carries minimal strategic cost for Bucharest.

The energy dimension reinforces this asymmetry. Iran does not export natural gas to Romania and has no infrastructure or contractual mechanism through which it could exert pressure. Meanwhile, Romania’s energy sector is expanding, positioning it to become a major European gas producer. Tehran therefore lacks meaningful economic leverage over Bucharest in the energy domain.

On the military side, Romania has approved the deployment of support assets rather than strike capabilities. After weeks of sustained military pressure on Iranian infrastructure, Tehran’s ability to project force into southeastern Europe is constrained, though not eliminated. More importantly, US forces are present on Romanian territory. Any direct attack on facilities such as the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base would involve US personnel, raising the stakes significantly and triggering a bilateral response that would not depend on full NATO consensus.

However, Iran has a documented history of covert operations across Europe, and Romania’s role as a host for US forces increases its exposure to malign activities. While real, this threat remains limited by Iran’s current operational constraints and the escalation risks associated with targeting a NATO member hosting US troops.

That said, Romania’s position also brings into focus one of NATO’s most sensitive strategic assets: the ballistic missile defense installation at Deveselu. Operational since 2016, the Aegis Ashore system forms part of NATO’s broader missile defense architecture designed to intercept ballistic threats originating outside the Euro-Atlantic area. While the system is purely defensive, its presence places Romania at the center of ongoing geopolitical debates and makes it a frequent target of criticism from both Russia and Iran.

Asked about Iran’s warnings on March 19, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte emphasized Alliance unity, stating that “Romania is safe; we will defend every centimeter of allied territory,” while highlighting Romania’s key role in strengthening security on the eastern flank. This reassurance reflects the broader strategic importance of Romania within NATO’s deterrence posture, particularly in the Black Sea region.

Even more recent developments—including Iran firing missiles toward the Diego Garcia military base and threatening to attack power generation across the Gulf—point to the regime’s willingness and capability to strike beyond its immediate neighborhood. In recent days, several European countries have put their security services on heightened alert. Reports by the Romanian news site HotNews that Iran may be activating operational networks in Europe have increased the relevance of NATO’s missile defense shield. The Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu increasingly represents not only a defensive buffer but a front line in the protection of major European capitals against evolving ballistic threats.

At the same time, the episode highlights a broader debate within the Alliance. While Romania continues to rely heavily on the United States as the cornerstone of its security guarantees, discussions in Europe increasingly emphasize strategic autonomy. Proposals such as expanding France’s nuclear deterrence to cover European allies reflect concerns about the long-term reliability of US security commitments. Romania’s response has been cautious: open to deeper European cooperation but firmly committed to NATO as the central pillar of deterrence.

Meanwhile, the current tensions among NATO allies over the Iran war may ultimately strengthen allied cohesion despite short-term turbulence. As Iulian Chifu, a former advisor to the president of Romania on strategic affairs, put it, the war has “exposed the limits of unilateral action, forcing the United States to rediscover the strategic necessity of allied coordination and reinforcing NATO as the central framework for collective security.”

Navigating this environment requires careful diplomacy. Romania’s challenge is not to choose between Washington and its European partners, but to reinforce both pillars simultaneously. Clear coordination and collective messaging among allies will be essential to counter efforts to fragment the coalition. In an era of intensifying geopolitical competition and evolving transatlantic dynamics, Romania’s ability to maintain that balance may prove to be one of its most important strategic contributions to the Alliance.

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Last updated: 5:30 p.m. (ET), 03/27/2026

Operation Epic Fury is stressing military capabilities—aircraft carriers, bombers, missile defense systems—in ways that will have an impact in other theaters around the world. That includes US efforts to credibly deter Chinese aggression and prevail against China in a future conflict. Monitoring the military assets that are relevant to US strategy in the Indo-Pacific and currently deployed to Iran offers insight into how the war might affect the US military’s readiness to meet the threat posed by Beijing—the most consequential challenge the United States faces.

Actual numbers of US inventory and deployment data are classified. This tracker, developed by the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense team, provides estimates for a subset of assets where open-source information is most reliable. It will be regularly updated and expanded with new data and expert context.

Key takeaways as of March 27, 2026:

• Aircraft carriers: One of four available US aircraft carriers—the USS Abraham Lincoln—is deployed to support Operation Epic Fury. The second carrier deployed to the war, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), arrived March 23 at Naval Support Activity Souda Bay in Greece for repairs after an internal fire.
  • The USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) is certified to deploy and is reportedly being considered to join Operation Epic Fury. It is still in the Atlantic. Two destroyers assigned to the George H.W. Bush carrier strike group, the USS Mason (DDG-87) and USS Ross (DDG-71), left their homeport this week to join the USS Bush, indicating that the group is getting closer to deployment. The Navy has not yet announced where the strike group will be deployed.
  • The USS Nimitz (CVN-68) was set to be decommissioned in May 2026, decreasing total US inventory to ten. However, in March 2026, the US Navy decided to extend the Nimitz’s service life to March 2027, with unclear impacts on its readiness.
  • The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) has finished maintenance, is training off the coast of San Diego, and is preparing for imminent deployment to a location not yet publicly disclosed.
• Mine countermeasures: It is unclear if there are any ships with mine countermeasure capability involved in Operation Epic Fury.
  • The US Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Manama, Bahrain, has three littoral combat ships (LCS) outfitted with mine countermeasures mission packages. In the week of March 15, the Navy confirmed that two are currently in Singapore for a “scheduled maintenance and logistics stop,” with the third reportedly in the Indian Ocean—presumably to avoid Iranian attacks.
  • LCS are modular and can be outfitted with a variety of mission packages. Only four of the twenty-eight LCS have been equipped with the mine countermeasures mission package, according to the Navy. 
  • The Navy decommissioned four of its eight Avenger Mine Countermeasure ships assigned to the US Fifth Fleet, in September 2025. The four remaining Avengers are homeported in Sasebo, Japan.

• Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) and Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD): One of the three ships available from the LHA and LHD classes—the USS Tripoli (LHA-7)—is committed to Operation Epic Fury as part of the deployment of an amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit (ARG/MEU), with another one, the USS Boxer, reportedly on the way to relieve the Tripoli.
  • The USS Tripoli, previously stationed in Japan, was in port at Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, en route to the Middle East, on March 23.
  • The USS Boxer (LHD-4) amphibious ready group reportedly deployed to the Middle East from San Diego on March 18. It is unclear if it completed all its deployment certifications before deploying, or if sailors were recalled from leave. A premature deployment could negatively impact sailor readiness and disrupt the ARG/MEU deployment cycle.
  • The only other known deployed LHD is the USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7) in the Caribbean.
  • A 2024 GAO report noted that LHDs suffer from a high rate of maintenance issues.
  • Following the July 2020 fire and the eventual decommissioning of the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), LHA and LHDs are not able to meet the Navy and Marine Corps’ goal of having 80 percent of the force ready to deploy.

• Amphibious transport dock (LPD) and dock landing ships (LSD): The USS New Orleans (LPD-19) arrived with the USS Tripoli ARG/MEU at Diego Garcia. The USS San Diego, which was previously operating with the group, is in port in Sasebo, Japan.
  • The lack of a second LPD/LSD reduces the group’s operational effectiveness.
  • The USS Boxer ARG contains the USS Portland (LPD-27) and USS Comstock (LSD-45).
  • The Government Accountability Office assessed in 2024 that nine out of ten LSDs were in “poor material condition.”

Analysis: Amphibious ready group deployments

The USS Boxer amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit (ARG/MEU) reportedly deployed to the Middle East from San Diego on March 18, joining the USS Tripoli amphibious ready group currently at Diego Garcia, and the USS Iwo Jima amphibious ready group currently in the Caribbean. The deployment of a third ARG/MEU—typically comprising an LHA/LHD and a combination of two LPD/LSD—matches Marine Corps Commandant General Eric Smith’s plan for three forward-postured ARG/MEUs. However, under current maintenance and training realities, deploying the USS Boxer ARG/MEU now is a surge of US capabilities and does not signify a true achievement of the commandant’s goal. Deploying the USS Boxer early could limit the availability of ARG/MEUs in the future and prevent the United States from achieving a sustainable and ready three-forward-postured ARG/MEU plan. Unless the United States builds more ships for ARG/MEUs, the overextension of this limited capability will have significant long-term readiness implications.

• Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: An estimated 24 percent of the entire available destroyer class is deployed in Operation Epic Fury.
  • Arleigh Burke-class destroyers spend an average of nine years, 27 percent of their thirty-five-year service life, in maintenance.

• B-1 bombers: Nearly half of the mission-capable B-1 fleet is conducting strikes as part of Operation Epic Fury, with all operating from RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom.

• B-2 bombers: B-2 deployments are highly classified. An estimated 26 percent of the entire available fleet could be deployed for Operation Epic Fury.
  • B-2 bombers take an average of 119 maintenance hours per flight hour following a bombing mission. This indicates that at least the four B-2s used in the early phases of Operation Epic Fury might be currently unavailable, along with an unknown number of the seven B-2s that flew in the June 2025 strikes the United States and Israel conducted against Iran (Operation Midnight Hammer) and an unknown number currently under programmed depot maintenance.

• E-3 AWACS aircraft: An estimated 66 to 75 percent of the total available E-3 AWACS are deployed in Operation Epic Fury.
  • In 2024, slightly more than half of the Air Force’s AWACS fleet was assessed to be “mission capable”—able to carry out at least one of the platform’s key missions, which includes air surveillance—and the aircraft is in the process of being retired.
• MQ-9 Reaper: The total number of MQ-9s used in Operation Epic Fury is not known.
  • The United States rotates MQ-9s in “orbits,” in which several of the airwing are loitering over enemy airspace at a given time. MQ-9s are capable of sustained day-long loitering missions.
  • Open-source reporting indicates that the United States has lost twelve MQ-9s since the start of Epic Fury, building on an estimated loss of ten percent of the fleet since 2023.
  • MQ-9 losses in Epic Fury could cost the United States from $192 million to $678 million.

• KC-135 Stratotankers and KC-46 Pegasus: An estimated 33 percent of mission capable KC-135s and KC-46s are involved in refueling missions in Operation Epic Fury. These planes are critical to supporting sustained air missions.

• Patriot missile batteries: An estimated 7 to 11 percent of available Patriot batteries are in the Middle East.
  • Open-source reporting indicates that there is at least one Patriot battery in Saudi Arabia and one in Qatar, and four batteries were transferred to the region in spring 2025.

• THAAD systems: An estimated 29 to 43 percent of available US THAAD systems are committed to Operation Epic Fury.
  • Out of an estimated five operational THAAD systems that are outside the continental United States, two to three of them are in the Middle East. One is in Jordan and one is in Israel. It’s unclear if the second THAAD battery deployed to Israel in spring 2025 remains in place. The other two are permanently deployed in Guam and South Korea.
  • In March, the United States also reportedly moved up to 48 THAAD interceptors from the THAAD launchers in Korea to the Middle East.

Joe Costa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Initiative.

Theresa Luetkefend is an associate director with the Forward Defense Initiative.

Moss Gillespie is a young global professional with the Forward Defense Initiative.

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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The hours are long and the pace rarely eases, including shifts of twelve to fourteen hours that inevitably erode family and social life. In theory, there are guardrails. In practice, the approval processes meant to limit overwork can become a formality: the reality of excessive hours reduced to a signature on a page, without changing the workload or capturing the extent of the time burden. The culture reinforces it. Leadership may say the right things, but the cycle doesn’t break, and in some corners of the institution, burnout is even treated as a point of pride. The quiet signal that this has become normal: the organization celebrates the 2 a.m. email. People are mentally drained, but stepping back to recover can feel professionally risky because there’s a persistent sense that if you can’t do it, someone else will, and asking for help can damage your credibility.

The above vignette is a composite scenario, drawing on multiple examples raised by participants—national security practitioners, psychiatry and health experts, and think tank experts on individual resilience—across a series of roundtables conducted by Atlantic Council researchers in 2025 and held under the Chatham House rule.

The roundtables focused on an underappreciated problem: The institutions charged with keeping the United States secure—including US military services and combatant commands, the intelligence community (e.g., CIA, National Security Agency), the Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department—operate under chronic strain that can make them dangerously prone to failure in moments of crisis. Many of the “resilience” efforts created to address this problem—wellness training and mindset workshops—focus on helping individuals operate within flawed systems.

Only by adapting those systems can the US government deliver long-term readiness enabling reliable performance under stress that US national security requires. Other key takeaways included:

• Individual resilience is not the solution to chronic strain in national security institutions. It is a signal that reveals where systems, incentives, and workload assumptions are misaligned with human limits.
• In national security roles, moments of surge, uncertainty, and high-consequence decision-making are frequent. When these moments arise, systems need more than just extraordinary individual effort; they need built-in buffers and redundancies.
• Many resilience initiatives are designed to expand coping tools and wellness support programs yet leave the stressors themselves—tempo, staffing, and decision bottlenecks—unchanged. While certainly well-intentioned, these initiatives unintentionally shift the responsibility to overcome the stressors back on the individual. Other incentives then reinforce this overextension as the operating model. A credible systems approach requires measurable leadership accountability, usable leading-indicator data, and explicit trade-offs about tempo, mission scope, redundancy, and availability norms. The goal is sustained readiness and reliable performance under stress.
• Leadership behavior is key. Ideally, leaders would express their own vulnerabilities by openly expressing uncertainty, acknowledging moments of strain, and modeling both recovery and the soundness of seeking help. This could increase trust among team members, as well as the likelihood that risks are addressed early.

Resilience is an attribute of systems

Building individual resilience has become a default response to strain across national security institutions. As organizations confront sustained operational tempo, recurring crises, and prolonged uncertainty, resilience is routinely invoked as a way to preserve individual performance under pressure. In practice, however, the term is often used in ways that misidentify both the source of strain and the locus of responsibility.

This issue brief argues that resilience—which the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative defines as “the ability of individuals, societies, and systems to anticipate, withstand, recover from, adapt to, and bounce forward from shocks and disruptions”—is not primarily an individual attribute. It is a property of systems that shape, support, and sustain individual resilience over time. Individual resilience matters, but not because it can be strengthened indefinitely or relied upon to compensate for structural misalignment. Human adaptation and resilience do have limitations, and through insights from research and roundtable discussions with national security leaders, practitioners, and subject-matter experts, we have underscored the need for a more deliberate systems design in national security institutions.

People do not enter national security roles with identical baselines, nor do they experience or recover from stress in the same way. Those differences are important, because prolonged exposure to ambiguity, moral complexity, and high-stakes decisions can be a relentless strain on attention and judgment. These demands cannot be carried indefinitely, regardless of an individual’s motivation or commitment. It is simply a matter of human limits.

Many institutions appear resilient, often because of highly committed individuals whose extended availability and personal sacrifice can compensate for system strain in the short term. Over time, however, that compensatory model becomes unsustainable, and the earliest cracks often show up in decision-making. Attention narrows, teams become less flexible in how they think through options, and risk judgment becomes less calibrated. Those effects can accumulate quietly over time, until an organization is less adaptive precisely when adaptation is most needed.

The strategic costs of system strain are significant. In national security work, one frequently sees surge conditions, leadership transitions, and external shocks as recurring features of the operating environment. Systems that depend primarily on individual efforts and resilience often lack the buffers needed to respond effectively when those stressful moments arrive. When an individual starts to feel that inevitable burnout, their performance falters precisely when resilience is most needed. The appropriate response is not to ask people to absorb more. Rather, it is to relocate responsibility from individuals to institutions themselves; to overhaul systems so that they operate within human constraints, protect sound judgment, retain expertise, and remain effective over time.

Where current “resilience models” fall short

The concept of resilience is now embedded in the language of national security institutions. Here, “national security” refers to the interconnected ecosystem of defense and security organizations that plan and execute operations, generate intelligence, manage crises, and sustain readiness, as well as the enabling systems that support that work (including the military health system and other readiness services). In these settings, the day-to-day reality is high-consequence decision-making under uncertainty, persistent time pressure, constrained staffing pipelines, and recurring exposure to morally complex and emotionally salient material—including, increasingly, remote operations such as unmanned aircraft systems.

Faced with persistent crises, extended operational tempo, and mounting uncertainty, leaders routinely invoke resilience as a way to sustain performance. In many cases, however, resilience functions less as a strategy than as an expectation: that individuals will adapt to conditions the system itself does not adequately address.

Most contemporary resilience efforts rest on a quiet assumption that personnel are broadly interchangeable and capable of absorbing increasing demands if given the right tools or training. From this perspective, resilience becomes a personal skill set, something that can be strengthened through workshops, coaching, wellness programming, or mindset interventions. These efforts are often well-intentioned. They are also insufficient in environments where strain is chronic and the stakes remain high.

The predictable result is compensation, where highly motivated people bridge structural gaps through personal sacrifice. They devote longer hours, defer recovery, and suppress their own distress, all in service of the mission. For a time, this preserves output and the system appears functional. But the apparent stability is misleading. It requires extraordinary effort from a finite group of people, while quietly depleting the attention, judgment, and recovery that sustained performance depends on.

The evidence increasingly reflects this pattern. Burnout is a recurring occupational risk among military personnel, with documented links to work environment factors (e.g., workload and shift work), psychological strain, and downstream consequences that matter for readiness and mission effectiveness. Within the Military Health System, burnout has also been associated with adverse health outcomes and reduced retention—exactly the kind of expertise loss that “individual resilience” programming cannot offset on its own. And concern about chronic psychological risk is not limited to traditional deployment patterns: Recent defense policy has directed the Department of Defense to study mental health impacts among military drone pilots, underscoring the growing recognition that remote and high-tempo operational roles can carry meaningful mental health burden.

When depletion shows up, it often does not look like a dramatic failure. It can appear first as degraded decision quality, with narrower thinking, reduced creativity, lower tolerance for ambiguity, and less willingness to challenge assumptions. It can also surface as interpersonal strain, reduced patience, and a diminished ability to adapt quickly when new information changes the picture. These shifts are consequential in national security contexts because the central work of these institutions is making sound judgments in real time, under uncertainty, with high consequences.

Many resilience initiatives inadvertently reinforce the conditions that require resilience in the first place. When the organizational answer to overload is “be more resilient,” the system signals that overload is expected and adaptation is the solution. This normalizes strain and diverts attention away from the real drivers of chronic demand, including sustained operational tempo, understaffing, unclear priorities, and incentives that reward constant responsiveness. It can also create a double bind: The system continues to demand extraordinary individual effort, while the individual is expected to treat strain as a personal shortcoming to be managed privately.

This brief takes a different view of individual resilience. It is not irrelevant, nor is it the solution. Instead, it should be treated as an important signal. Properly understood, levels of individual resilience give leaders a clearer read on how the system is functioning, where strain is coming from, and what needs to be redesigned. Used this way, resilience does not justify asking individuals to absorb more. It clarifies where institutions are demanding too much and why.

This is the point where individual resilience becomes a critical tool, not as a mandate for people to adapt indefinitely, but as a way to see how systems’ choices interact with human limits and where redesign is most urgent.

Why individual resilience should force system overhaul

Resilience is ever evolving: It is shaped long before individuals enter national security roles and continues to be influenced by the environments in which they operate. Biology, early development, and cumulative stress exposure contribute to how individuals tolerate and recover from pressure. The point is not to pathologize normal human responses to sustained strain. The point is to be honest about variability and limits.

Institutions typically treat individual variability in one of two ways. Either they ignore it, designing for an “average” person who does not exist, or they attempt to manage it primarily through individual interventions. Both approaches miss the core insight. Individual resilience is not primarily something systems can manufacture. It is something systems must account for and nurture within people. Thinking seriously about individual resilience makes the system’s assumptions visible, including the ones baked into missions, tempos, staffing models, career pathways, and leadership expectations.

People bring vastly different resilience profiles into roles that demand sustained judgment, adaptability, and high-quality decision-making. Some tolerate prolonged stress with fewer immediate effects. Others experience faster depletion of cognitive reserves. These differences are not moral failures or character defects. They are simply predictable variations in human functioning. The systems that assume each person has the same capacity is, in essence, baking inequality into its performance expectations, and then treating individual differences as deficits.

The more consequential issue, however, is not baseline variability. It is the cumulative effect of depletion and what it does to decision-making over time. National security environments place sustained demands on attention and judgment. Under chronic load, the first changes are often subtle: Thinking narrows. People rely more heavily on familiar patterns. Uncertainty becomes harder to sit with. Teams may lock in on a conclusion too early or simplify complex choices. They may default to routine when adaptive thinking is required. Over time, judgment can become more rigid and less reliable, with people either narrowing or widening their threat interpretation in ways that are not well matched to the situation. The work still gets done, but the quality of analysis and the ability to adjust course can quietly erode, leaving the system less adaptable precisely when conditions shift.

This is why the individual resilience conversation matters, but only if it is used correctly. Individual resilience research does not tell institutions to teach more coping skills and declare success. On the contrary, it tells institutions that the operating environment is placing sustained demands on people in predictable ways, and that these effects compound. If leadership does not manage cumulative demand, decision quality will degrade regardless of how committed individuals are.

Some institutional responses can become counterproductive. Institutions often try to “select for resilience” by screening, hiring, and promoting those who appear to handle stress well, but that does not eliminate human limits. Even the most capable people struggle under sustained load; the difference is the timing and visibility of their strain, not immunity to it. Similarly, short recovery windows do not solve the problem if baseline demand remains high. Recovery is not only about time off. It is about whether systems allow genuine disengagement and whether demand is paced in a way that permits replenishment.

The implication is straightforward: Systems that rely on constant availability, chronic overload, and surge-as-normal operation are not built for long-term effectiveness. They not only put decision-making at risk, but they also erode readiness, retention, trust, and institutional memory over time. Individual resilience should be treated partially as a signal about how the system is functioning and where strain is being generated. Taken seriously, it should drive a rethinking of what “systems approaches” to resilience actually mean in practice. In addition to programs that train individuals to cope, it means redesigning the conditions of work (workload, staffing, priorities, and decision processes) so sustained performance is built into the institution. It also means clarifying decision rights and escalation pathways, and protecting recovery time, so the system is not dependent on extraordinary individual sacrifice.

If individual resilience helps identify where strain accumulates, the next question is why many systems approaches fail to correct it. Participants at the three Atlantic Council roundtables pointed repeatedly to a familiar pattern: Even when supports are added, the underlying drivers and incentives remain unchanged.

How systems approaches often fail

Many systems approaches to resilience fail because they stop short of redesign. They add support without changing assumptions. They layer resources without recalibrating expectations. In practice, they still rely on individual adaptation to keep the system running.

This is the central weakness of many resilience initiatives: They look like systems interventions but function as burden-shifting by making chronic demand more tolerable rather than making demand sustainable. Too often, they treat coping as the solution by expanding training, wellness resources, and self-management expectations, while the structural drivers of overload, including tempo, staffing, and decision bottlenecks, remain unchanged. Roundtable participants described this dynamic directly: The organization “puts resources forward,” but the underlying cycle doesn’t change, and resilience becomes a required module to complete rather than a redesign of how the work is structured.

Incentives then reinforce the underlying dysfunction. Leaders may endorse sustainability while still rewarding constant responsiveness, and organizations may speak about boundaries while promoting those who violate them. In practice, incentives foster behavior or action more quickly than policies, and they can lock in a model of success that depends on continual overextension.

The result is a system that appears robust but is structurally fragile. It performs because individuals compensate, stretching time, attention, and availability to keep the mission moving. Over time, the costs show up in quieter but consequential ways: Decision-making becomes less reliable, teams lose range, and experienced personnel disengage or leave, taking hard-won knowledge with them. When surge conditions, leadership transitions, or external shocks hit, there is often little remaining slack to absorb the shock, and systems without real buffers struggle to adapt quickly enough.

True systems resilience is not achieved by adding more support to an unchanged structure. It requires making deliberate choices about how demand is created, prioritized, and resourced, including how tempo is set, how work is handed off, where redundancy is built in, and what leaders are rewarded for. The goal is not comfort. The goal is sustained readiness and reliable performance under stress.

What an overhaul requires

If resilience is to be treated seriously in national security contexts, then systems approaches must be overhauled, not layered. This begins with acknowledging that many current efforts focus on helping individuals operate effectively within flawed systems rather than redesigning those systems.

First, institutions must address cumulative demand directly by treating operational tempo as a design choice, not a fact of life. That means defining what qualifies as a true surge, setting guardrails so that surge mode does not become the baseline, and building real slack into staffing and schedules. High-tempo periods should then be absorbed by the system rather than by individual overextension. Leaders can put this into practice through workload triage and explicit lists of things employees should stop doing during a period of high demand. They can set clearer thresholds for what gets paused during surges and lead routine after-action reviews that examine not only operational outcomes but the cost in capacity. The goal is straightforward: Create pacing, redundancy, and decision space so readiness is protected even when the environment remains demanding.

Second, leadership accountability must extend beyond crisis performance to include sustainability, which must be measurable. Leaders should be evaluated on whether they manage workload and tempo responsibly, protect decision space, and retain and develop talent over time. That means making incentives explicit: rewarding leaders who build redundancy, delegate authority, and normalize handing off work and scheduling time for recovery. Alternatively, it is essential to correct leaders who rely on constant responsiveness and chronic overextension as their operating model.

In addition, leadership behavior matters in a more human, immediate way than institutions often acknowledge. Roundtable participants emphasized that when leaders are willing to show up as humans, including naming uncertainty, acknowledging strain, and modeling both the action of seeking help and recovery without stigma, it can reset the temperature of an entire team. That kind of credible vulnerability builds trust, widens the space for honest upward feedback, and makes it more likely that problems are surfaced early rather than managed privately until they become crises. In practice, it is one of the fastest ways leaders can shift culture without launching a new program.

Third, training should be used to reinforce sound system design, not to compensate for its absence. Institutions can keep resilience training, but they should pair it with concrete changes that reduce avoidable strain. Training should focus on the skills that improve team and mission performance under stress. Examples of these skills include communication under pressure, decision-making in uncertainty, escalation and delegation norms, and how leaders recognize early signs of overload (aided by data, as discussed below) and make appropriate changes. Most importantly, training should come with a feedback loop. What trainees report about friction points and recurring strain should be treated as operational data that informs redesign, not as an individual coping gap.

Fourth, measurement needs to shift from documenting damage to preventing it, and the roundtables made it clear that good data is one of the few levers that reliably alters behavior. Attrition and burnout rates are lagging indicators. By the time they move, the system has already been drawing down its people and its capacity for a while. A more serious approach is to track leading indicators of strain that leaders can act on, including workload distribution, surge frequency and duration, after-hours expectations, backlogs, approval bottlenecks, vacancy and coverage gaps, and the amount of time teams are operating in “urgent” mode.

Equally important, though, is the usability of data. Leaders need a small set of metrics that can be reviewed routinely, not an elaborate dashboard that no one trusts or uses. The goal is to make strain visible early and tie it to decision points. When surge becomes the baseline, something needs to be paused, rescoped, or resourced. When bottlenecks appear, authority and process need to be adjusted. When certain roles show chronic after-hours load, something needs to be redesigned such as staffing, handoffs, and coverage.

In addition, measurement should be paired with accountability and action. Teams should be able to surface what the data means in plain language, and leaders should be expected to respond with a corrective plan, not a wellness reminder. Over time, this creates an institutional habit of using data to manage tempo and protect readiness, rather than using data only to explain why people are leaving.

Finally, institutions should make trade-offs explicit and operationalize them, rather than leaving them implicit and pushing the costs down to individuals. A genuine overhaul requires leaders to define what “sustainable tempo” means for their mission sets, establish thresholds for when work is rescoped or paused, and build redundancy as a deliberate design feature in critical functions. It also requires resetting norms around constant availability by clarifying what truly constitutes an emergency, creating predictable coverage and handoff models, and rewarding teams that protect continuity without relying on chronic overextension.

The practical question is not whether the work is important. It is how the institution will prioritize, resource, and pace the work so that readiness is preserved when conditions tighten. When those choices are made openly, organizations can align expectations with capacity and reduce the hidden risk created by always-on operating models.

Conclusion

National security institutions will always operate in environments defined by uncertainty, periodic surge, and high stakes. The question is whether those institutions treat resilience as a personal expectation or as a systems responsibility. The next step is to choose a small set of measurable indicators, align accountability to them, and redesign the points of highest friction, where chronic strain is generated. Done well, this shifts resilience from a story we tell people to a capability that institutions strengthen.

Caitlin Thompson spent over a decade at the Department of Veterans Affairs, where she served as the executive director’s Office of Suicide Prevention. She holds a PhD in clinical psychology from the University of Virginia and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative.

This issue brief draws on a series of three Atlantic Council roundtables with national security practitioners, experts in psychiatry and health, and think tank experts on individual resilience to identify what national security institutions must redesign to sustain readiness under chronic strain.

Fellow

Caitlin Thompson

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Entrepreneurship Resilience

Dispatches Feb 18, 2026

National preparedness starts at the state level with governors and the National Guard

By Jeanne Thorpe and Sarah Wallace

US state governors must retain meaningful access to the National Guard as a critical, time-sensitive resource for their own populations.

Resilience Resilience & Society

Report Jul 8, 2025

For the US and the free world, security demands a resilience-first approach

By Elizabeth Sizeland

This report is the foundational document of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative and outlines a bold vision to embed resilience as a core pillar of US and allied security. As crises compound, this report calls for investing across individual, institutional, and international levels of resilience to withstand, adapt, and thrive amid disruption. 

Crisis Management Cybersecurity

The Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, works to advance resilience as a core tenet of US and allied national security policy and practice.

Learn more

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The post Charai for The National Interest: Why Iran Was Always a Threat to the US appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 13, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on CNN on US action in Iran, arguing that President Trump is weakening the axis of aggressors and has clear strategic vision.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig interviewed on CNN on US action in Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Adapting RAND scholar Gordon McCormick’s Magic Diamond model of counterinsurgency to US-China competition can provide insights into how the United States can counter China’s attempts to exert global influence.
• Using this model, China emerges as an insurgent power on the global stage, adapting strategies from Mao’s concept of a “people’s war” to displace the US-led order.
• To counter China’s strategy, the United States must both deter PRC aggression and convince allies and partners of the legitimacy of the US-led order.

WASHINGTON—Increasing competition among global powers has blurred the traditional boundaries of statecraft and war, challenging established international norms. This is demonstrated by the rise of so-called “gray zone” activities, which are often described as “competition below the threshold of conflict.” By design, the phrase evokes ambiguity; the action is neither clearly black nor white, neither war nor peace, but somewhere in the uncertain middle.

Even more unhelpfully, the phrase “gray zone” offers insufficient clarity about what is unfolding on the world stage: a struggle for influence, legitimacy, and control of the world order that has not yet escalated to military conflict to achieve it. It also does not explain the character of the revisionist efforts by US adversaries, which in many ways parallel an insurgency—protracted, subversive, and aimed at reshaping governance. But instead of traditional non-state actors, this contest involves nation-states, the population is global, and the governance they seek to alter, or outright replace, is the rules-based international order.

A better, more precise framework for understanding these pressing challenges to the liberal world order comes from adapting RAND scholar Gordon McCormick’s Magic Diamond from its familiar counterinsurgency origin to the political warfare domain. Applied to the increasing competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), this model draws from Mao Zedong’s theory of protracted war to interpret the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) long-game strategy for global influence.

What is the Magic Diamond?

The Magic Diamond is a conceptual model that simplifies the understanding of complex asymmetric conflict. Originally designed in the 1980s to analyze insurgent–state dynamics in internal wars, such as Peru’s communist Sendero Luminoso movement, the model establishes four interconnected actors—the insurgent, the counterinsurgent, the population, and the external supporters—and illustrates the dynamics of their interaction.

The insurgents erode the government’s legitimacy and mobilize the population against its rule, while the counterinsurgents strive to maintain control and legitimacy, including by attempting to negate support for the insurgents’ cause. This juxtaposition creates a mirrored system of tension and highlights the symmetry of competing efforts: Both are vying for the same population’s trust, external backing, and the ability to define “normal.” Here, McCormick illuminates the broader reality that legitimacy, rather than firepower, is the true center of gravity. The struggle is fundamentally cognitive and political.

Transposing today’s global gray-zone competition onto the Magic Diamond reveals striking parallels. Legitimacy, influence, and control remain the central objectives, but the arena now spans the interconnected global system. Applied to US-China competition, the CCP seeks “discursive power” to define norms, narratives, and “truths,” all of which are aimed at molding the global population and governing institutions to favor its political model and interests. At the same time, the United States seeks to preserve its global power standing and the free and open liberal order.

Although they employ different methods of exerting domestic and external influence, the reciprocal dynamics of this struggle for legitimacy underscore the importance of understanding how the rest of the world views these sides. Success in this irregular domain means shaping global perceptions sufficiently to minimize the need for military conflict—or ideally render it irrelevant.

Seeing China more clearly through the diamond

In this refreshed model, the PRC emerges as a revisionist global insurgent power: patient, legitimacy-driven, and methodically subverting the dominant international order. This view is reinforced by the continued reverence in China for Mao Zedong’s On Protracted War, which is a foundational text of the CCP’s strategic revolutionary culture. In the work, Mao envisioned a phased campaign: establish strategic defense, force a protracted stalemate, and then launch a counteroffensive. In many ways, the CCP’s global strategy today echoes this logic and translates Maoist insurgent theory into instruments of global statecraft under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s leadership. The CCP fuses political mobilization, cognitive and legal warfare, and economic coercion in a modern global “people’s war.” In recent years, Xi has operationalized a strategy of endurance and incrementalism to “displace the American-led order,” creating a persistent gray zone of ambiguity that clouds the bounds of soft power statecraft and avoids clear escalatory tripwires that would provoke outright conflict.

Whereas Mao mobilized peasants, Xi mobilizes state power through state-owned enterprises, diaspora networks, party-controlled media, and technology champions such as Huawei. Instead of rural battlefields, Xi’s campaign plays out in digital infrastructure, trade regimes, and global governance institutions. Domestically, the CCP cultivates legitimacy through economic growth, nationalism, and narratives of Western decline underpinned by strict censorship and control of information. Externally, international engagements, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, reshape the political and economic landscapes to embed influence and dependence. These projects cultivate global political and societal leverage, effectively creating a network of “safe havens.” Those zones of influence then serve as positional advantages, particularly in developing Global South countries, that strengthen the PRC’s position in the international system—allowing it to encircle the opposition and put in place its strategic defense.

The PRC’s “Three Warfares” strategy—public opinion, psychological warfare, and legal warfare—further supports a protracted competition. Like Mao, Xi aims to “win without fighting” by exhausting opponents over time, gradually eroding cohesion and political will. As regional security expert Kerry Gershaneck aptly described it, this is “political warfare in slow motion.” Control of technology nodes, such as undersea cables, TikTok algorithms, and 5G networks, gives the CCP powerful tools for shaping the flow of information and political sentiment—the modern-day equivalent of controlling the villages in contested provinces. Mis- and disinformation campaigns exploit these networks to amplify doubt in democratic governance and fracture coalitions. Coupled with volumes of international legal challenges—from maritime claims to trade disputes—the PRC creates a web of entanglements that impose a strategic delay, fixing the international community in a political and legal stalemate.

Like Mao’s guerrilla army, today’s PRC simultaneously builds military strength during the stalemate to gain parity with—or overmatch of—its opposition. Attributing China’s historic decline to its relative technological and military inferiority, Xi frequently invokes the “century of humiliation” narrative to justify the “great rejuvenation” modernization effort, vowing that “China will never be bullied again.” While the CCP pursues compellence without fighting, these efforts shape a deterrence signal and build a credible option to use military force if necessary. The PRC has studied its opposition’s military operations for decades, tailoring modernization to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and create dilemmas, especially in the space, cyber, and maritime domains. As Mao once wrote, “an increase in China’s own strength, an increase in (opposition) difficulties, and an increase in international support; it is the combination of all these forces that will bring about China’s superiority and the completion of her preparations for the counter-offensive.” The development of layered anti-access/area denial networks, precision strike capabilities, and assertive military posturing reflect preparation for high-end conflict, and Taiwan represents the clearest test case. Evoking a Maoist counteroffensive to recover China’s lost territories, a military campaign for “reunification” would validate the PRC’s modernization and demonstrate its readiness to project power for broader CCP ambitions.

How the United States fits in

Within this adapted Magic Diamond, the United States (and more broadly, the West) assumes the role of the counterinsurgent: the defender of the existing order and global norms. The challenge is not only to deter PRC coercion, but also to outcompete its legitimacy narrative by demonstrating that the liberal world model delivers security, prosperity, and political freedom. Much like the counterinsurgent’s role of winning hearts and minds, the United States must present a system and social contract more attractive than the insurgent—one that reinforces the internal cohesion and political equilibrium within the existing liberal system and also cultivates international confidence and credibility in open democratic governance. This is especially true when it comes to influencing middle-power nations in the Indo-Pacific and Global South, whose alignment could tip the scales to either system.

Alliances and international partnerships convey legitimacy. NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners, the Australia–United Kingdom–United States security pact known as AUKUS, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework are globally visible examples of multinational resolve and alignment. Expanding partnerships beyond mutual security and defense interests to include equitable trade, developmental growth, and shared values strengthens their appeal, deepens ties, and counters the PRC’s transactional and coercive influence.

Perhaps most important, the United States cannot solely focus on isolating revisionist malign global influence; it must wield its soft and hard powers together to reinforce the foundations of the liberal order faster than the PRC can undermine them. At the same time, it must avoid the trap of solely reacting to the PRC’s initiatives; proactive leadership is essential for sustaining legitimacy. Just as in counterinsurgency, one wins by proactively engaging and integrating with the population, not by isolating within defensive bases.

Although the battlefield has expanded, the logic remains the same. For scholars and policymakers, this adaptation offers fresh insight into a familiar framework, helping to translate gray zone competition into understandable lines of effort across all levels of government. It underscores that the next world order will not merely rely on military deterrence or dominance, but on persuasion, resilience, and partnership. Legitimacy is the key to victory.

Caution against the model’s literal application is warranted—while there are similarities, global political and international relations dynamics differ significantly from internal insurgencies. Changes to global political power and priorities, the high-end strategic military force capabilities, the leverage of nongovernmental organizations and corporations, the complex lattices of bi- and multilateral agreements, and the influence of nonaligned middle powers each diffuse power in a multipolar environment. These factors could tilt decisive advantages to either side, unlike the balance depicted in the model. As such, this adaptation should serve as a heuristic—a conceptual tool for framing the CCP’s strategy as a global insurgency and understanding the reciprocal global competition between liberal and authoritarian systems.

The post The US and China are in ‘gray zone’ competition. A counterinsurgency model can help explain what that means. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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China: A restrained response borne of a bind

Russia: Not riding to the rescue—again

United Kingdom: Trying to stay out of it

European Union: Caught between defending the rules-based order and aligning with Washington

Ukraine: A sense of schadenfreude—but also new risks

Canada: Calibrated, cautious, and aligned with allies

Argentina: A supportive response colored by a history of terror

Spain: Defiance against the US driven by domestic politics

China: A restrained response borne of a bind

While the war with Iran is not all about China, any analysis that neglects Beijing’s role in the war, or dismisses the great-power competition underlying it, is either incomplete or a deliberate red herring.

China’s own decisions have tied it to Middle Eastern geopolitics. In 2018, it proposed a new regional security architecture. In 2023, it brokered the Iran–Saudi rapprochement and hosted Hamas for mediation talks with its rival Palestinian faction Fatah. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative is presented explicitly as an alternative to the US-led order. Iran has received an economic lifeline from Beijing, secured a berth in the bloc of emerging economies knows as BRICS, and had the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operate within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Today China is the largest trading partner, the largest importer, and one of the largest foreign investors across much of the Middle East and North Africa. There are over 400,000 Chinese nationals in the United Arab Emirates alone. Now that population is subjected to attacks from Iranian drones and missiles that are most likely made with China-sourced precursor chemicals and components.

Yet China’s public response to the war has been characteristically limp: evacuation advisories for citizens near conflict zones and formulaic condemnations of Israel and the United States.

Beneath that restraint lies an impossible bind. Iran is at its weakest, detested by its population at home and an exporter of radicalism abroad, yet it is also Beijing’s most reliable anti-Western bulwark and a source of deeply discounted oil. Meanwhile, China lacks the means to counterbalance US and Israeli military dominance. Oil prices rose by more than 5 percent on Monday and could spike toward one hundred dollars a barrel with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf states, which absorb much of China’s Belt and Road Initiative investment and supply roughly a third of China’s crude, are now coming under attack from Iranian missiles and drones.

The irony is acute. It was US military supremacy in the Iraq war and the shockwaves of the Arab Spring that first pushed Beijing toward a more proactive Middle East policy. Now it has gotten a possible regime change and another war in the region, and it is none the wiser.

The pivot point lies with the Gulf monarchies. If they enter the fight, China would face a situation it cannot finesse. But it would also present an opportunity that neither the United States nor Israel could generate alone: to make China a credible offer to stop propping up Tehran and allow for the development of a more stable and prosperous region in which to do business. Whether China is too blinkered by great-power ideology to recognize that opportunity remains the defining question.

—Tuvia Gering is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a researcher at the Diane & Guilford Glazer Foundation Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

Russia: Not riding to the rescue—again

WASHINGTON, DC—One of the knock-on effects of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran is that they have exposed—yet again—that Russia is an unreliable ally. 

Iran’s rulers are now absorbing the same bitter lesson learned by the autocrats of Syria and Venezuela before them. For all its talk of establishing a multipolar world, for all of its bluster about leading an anti-Western bloc of states, Moscow lacks the will and the capacity to come to the aid of its alleged partners.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the third Kremlin-backed autocrat to fall in the past fifteen months. When Syrian rebels ousted Kremlin ally Bashar al-Assad from power in 2024, the Kremlin could only grant the deposed dictator asylum in Russia. Likewise, Moscow was helpless to aid Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro when the United States apprehended him in January.

And as Politico reports, when US and Israeli bombs were pounding Iran on Saturday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov “offered his Iranian counterpart sympathy and promised his—verbal—support.” And after Khamenei was killed, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered Tehran little more than condolences.

Beyond Latin America and the Middle East, the trend of the Kremlin abandoning allies and partners is also evident in the former Soviet space. When Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, launched a military campaign to take Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and 2023, Moscow failed to support its erstwhile ally Armenia.

The cold, hard reality is that the Putin regime is so consumed by its war of aggression against Ukraine that it lacks the bandwidth to defend its geopolitical interests elsewhere.

But while the Kremlin has yet again suffered reputational damage, Moscow still hopes to salvage some benefits from the war in Iran. The resulting higher oil prices will benefit Russia’s depleted war chest. Unrest in the Middle East will distract attention and media oxygen from Ukraine. And should the US-Israeli war against Iran turn into a quagmire, Moscow certainly hopes to be a beneficiary of the chaos. As Chatham House’s Grégoire Roos notes: “Until the situation in Iran is clarified, the keywords for Moscow will be ‘strategic hedging.’”

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

United Kingdom: Trying to stay out of it

LONDON—The overwhelming view here is that military action taken by the United States and Israel on Saturday was not the right thing to do while negotiations were edging forward toward a deal. Comparisons are being made to US President George W. Bush’s catastrophic Iraq invasion and the lasting consequences for the region and interests of the United States and its closest ally, the United Kingdom.

In the United Kingdom, the stock of the Trump and Netanyahu administrations’ foreign policy in the Middle East is not high. The apparently premature abandonment of diplomacy for the military option will not have surprised many and has likely reinforced the view that both leaders are acting more for domestic political reasons and their own narrow interests. Military action does not—at least to British eyes—seem to have followed sufficient careful analysis of the US national interest and the broader interests of US allies.

The British political establishment, media, and public are highly critical and unsympathetic to the Islamic Republic of Iran. There was widespread outrage following the massacre of protesters in January. Nevertheless, what is likely to dominate public discourse in the coming days is the United States’ lack of clear, realizable objectives, a legal basis under international law, or new evidence to justify the rush to war and immediate regional destabilization. Those themes will overwhelm any attempt to justify action as a response to what happened in January and the despotic and brutal Islamic regime.

Some commentators, including former Conservative members of parliament and Reform leader Nigel Farage, have argued that the United Kingdom should prioritize supporting its closest ally, the United States, over debate on the legality of military action or how things reached this point. So far, that argument does not seem to have resonated widely.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer and the Labour government are between a rock and a hard place given their championing of the primacy of international law. The lack of clarity from them on what the United Kingdom should do next adds to the general sense that this is not the United Kingdom’s conflict, and that the country would be wise to stay out of it. Of course, events on the ground (for example, Iran striking UK military assets defending allies in the region) may rapidly overtake this position. How Starmer and his government align over the coming days is likely to be highly significant for UK domestic politics.

—Nicholas Hopton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former British ambassador to Iran.

European Union: Caught between defending the rules-based order and aligning with Washington

BRUSSELS—Europe finds itself in a structurally uncomfortable position, partly because of events and partly because of its own past choices. For years, European Union (EU) policy toward Iran was centered on Tehran’s nuclear program and anchored in diplomacy backed by incremental pressure. The priority was containment through negotiation and de-escalation. That approach has long run its course. A coherent new strategy has yet to emerge.

The current crisis exposes both this strategic vacuum and the EU’s internal divisions. Competing logics are at play throughout the bloc.

Some leaders are prioritizing international law, condemning the US-Israeli strikes as a war of choice. Failing to mention international law risks eroding Europe’s credibility as a defender of the rules-based order, particularly in the Global South where accusations of double standards resonate. 

Another logic prioritizes transatlantic cohesion. Openly confronting Washington could carry risks at a moment of geopolitical volatility. Europe was just able to avoid US President Donald Trump’s grab for Greenland. Restraint on the Iran issue therefore seems prudent for some. 

A third logic concerns Iran itself. Many quietly hope that the strikes weaken a repressive regime, reduce nuclear-proliferation risks, and curb proxy warfare. At the same time, there is concern that escalation or spillover could produce something worse.

Europe is trying hard to reconcile these three concerns, but finding common ground is difficult. Some, such as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, have attempted to bridge the divide by shifting the debate toward the “day after,” urging coordination with Washington and European partners on what follows. This forward-looking framing may paper over intra-European tensions. But it also risks bypassing the unresolved question of principle at the heart of the debate.

—Roderick Kefferpütz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. The views expressed in this article are his own.

Ukraine: A sense of schadenfreude—but also new risks

KYIV—Iran’s Shahed drones have menaced Ukrainians for more than four years, striking our homes and murdering civilians far from the battlefield. So there was a certain amount of schadenfreude across Ukraine as the United States and Israel hobbled the Iranian regime with airstrikes of their own over the weekend. The display of decisive US force against a key Russian ally may have also applied some psychological pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was once again reminded how devastating US military power can be and may be reflecting on potential scenarios for how that could play out if his own regime came under direct attack. Iran’s response—drone and missile attacks across the Middle East—may also provide an opportunity to showcase Ukrainian anti-drone technology, which may be even more effective than some air defenses currently in the region.

The Iran strikes do pose some risks to Ukraine, too. Russian propagandists will likely have no problem warping the attacks on Iran into a justification for Moscow’s so-called “special military operation” against Ukraine. And retaliatory strikes by Iran place a premium on air-defense interceptors, which are already in short supply and which Ukraine desperately needs for its own defense. Finally, any increase in global oil prices means more revenue for the Kremlin to use to continue its war on Ukraine.

 —Major General (ret.) Volodymyr Havrylov is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former Ukrainian deputy minister of defense.

Canada: Calibrated, cautious, and aligned with allies

CALGARY—Ottawa’s response to the US–Israeli strikes on Iran and escalating regional tensions has been cautious, calibrated, and aligned with allies.

Speaking to media from a trade mission to India over the weekend, Prime Minister Mark Carney stated that “Canada supports the United States acting to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to prevent its regime from further threatening international peace and security,” while emphasizing that Canada is not militarily engaged. He coupled that support with a call for civilian protection and renewed diplomacy, signaling continuity in Canada’s position that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are destabilizing.

The Canadian Armed Forces are not participating in combat operations but maintain a regional footprint through liaison and intelligence roles under Operation FOUNDATION in Qatar, Bahrain, and Jordan. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has heightened vigilance amid concerns about potential Iranian cyber or proxy activity, though no specific domestic threat has been identified.

Domestically, the conflict resonates deeply. Canada is home to approximately 280,000 Iranian-Canadians, ranking fifth globally among Iranian diaspora populations after the United States, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany. The community’s response reflects both fear for relatives abroad and apprehension about regional spillover. For Ottawa, the challenge is strategic balance: uphold alliance commitments, safeguard domestic cohesion, and preserve diplomatic space in a volatile Middle East.

—Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, and a former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

Argentina: A supportive response colored by a history of terror

WASHINGTON, DC—It’s no surprise that Argentinian President Javier Milei has been the most vocal supporter in Latin America of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran. Since the attacks began, his foreign ministry has voiced strong support for the actions, calling Iran a “threat” to “long-term international stability and security.” After the killing of Khamenei, Milei put out a presidential statement commending the operation, calling the ruthless Iranian leader “one of the most evil, violent, and cruel individuals that human history has ever seen.”

Much of the rest of the region called for restraint or respect for international law (Brazil and Mexico, for example) or outright condemned the US and Israeli airstrikes (Colombia). Paraguay (whose foreign minister spoke with his Israeli counterpart on Sunday) stands out for joining Argentina in explicitly being supportive of this past weekend’s actions. There has been wider agreement, however, on condemning Iran’s retaliatory attacks on Gulf countries, from Argentina and Brazil to Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama.

Argentina’s firm stance in support of the US and Israeli actions is due not only to Milei’s strong support of Israel but also to the fact that Argentina has experienced the scourge of the Iranian regime firsthand. In the early 1990s, Argentina fell victim to two Iran-linked terror attacks that shook the country. In 1992, Hezbollah detonated a truck packed with explosives at the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing twenty-nine people and wounding more than two hundred others. Two years later, a car bomb detonated at the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association Jewish Community Center building in Buenos Aires. That day marked the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentine history, with eighty-five people killed and over three hundred wounded.

Thirty years later, Argentina’s highest criminal court found Iran responsible for this latter bombing. For Argentina, these heinous attacks will never be forgotten and are a constant reminder of the need to prevent Iran from continuing to pose threats to the world. Many of the people accused by the Argentine justice system of serving as the architects of the attacks have since risen through the ranks of Iran’s security and military services with impunity.

Since taking office, Milei has also made a point of aligning his foreign policy with Israel and the United States, marking them as Argentina’s twin examples to follow. Given Argentina’s increasing economic alignment with the United States, and the sentiments of many in Argentina when it comes to Iran, expect Milei to continue to lead the region in supporting actions to dismantle the Iranian regime. 

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Spain: Defiance against the US driven by domestic politics

After the US-Israeli strikes on Iran began, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez denied the United States the use of jointly operated Spanish airbases and Trump responded by threatening to cut trade ties with Madrid. Sánchez’s decision to pick another fight with the Trump administration should be seen through the lens of Spain’s domestic politics and the prime minister’s attempt to placate the extreme left of his base. As his popularity wanes, Sánchez knows well that standing up to the United States and Israel will resonate with certain sectors of the electorate, as did his decision last year to make Spain the sole NATO member not to commit to increase defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product. This all plays well with Sánchez’s base as his Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party looks ahead to regional parliamentary elections this year and the 2027 national elections. By citing international law and the legacy of the 2003 Iraq war, Sánchez can prey on lingering passions of the Spanish left to solidify his own weak position.

But Sánchez will also open himself up to political attacks that question the coherence of these actions. Alberto Feijoó, leader of the center-right Popular Party, has already accused Sánchez of sacrificing Spain’s foreign policy credibility to partisan politics. The European Commission released a statement expressing its solidarity with Spain over Trump’s trade threat. But this issue will nevertheless add to a growing suspicion in European capitals about Spain’s reliability as a strategic partner as Europe prepares to act more independently. As calls for a “two-speed” Europe become louder, Sánchez’s decision to self-isolate Spain may give ammunition to those who prefer to leave Madrid in the second tier of any future multi-tier EU architecture.

—Andrew Bernard is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Israel: Echoes of Purim in a diminishing threat

The United Arab Emirates: Closer to the US-Israeli position than it wants to be

The Gulf: Iran is losing credibility with its attacks

The Gulf: Mediation has become unappealing

Iraq: An opportunity to reestablish its sovereignty

Lebanon: Hezbollah’s aims remain uncertain

Turkey: Bracing for impact in security, the economy, and diplomacy

Palestinian territories: Losing the world’s attention yet again

Israel: Echoes of Purim in a diminishing threat 

JERUSALEM—Purim, which will be celebrated later this week, is figuring prominently in Israeli renditions of Operation Roaring Lion. The annual festival—which commemorates the deliverance of the Jewish people from annihilation in fifth century BCE Persia—has been invoked by both Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir as a backdrop to the contemporary US-Israeli campaign to precipitate the downfall of Iran’s Islamic regime. Now, as then, hope springs for a happy ending to the story.

All sides to this conflict were witness to an abundance of signals that a reprisal of the June 2025 twelve-day war was brewing. But a fundamental misreading of that landscape by an over-confident Iranian leadership—notorious for its “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” refrains—played directly into the hands of skeptics who believed that no deal would be forthcoming and that Iran’s malign influence could be extinguished only by force of arms. 

Having been around this exact same block countless times before, Iranian negotiators approached their discussions with US presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner as a familiar dance with Washington that would unfold, as in the past, through multiple rounds of talks in various international capitals over the minutiae of a bargain. That strategy was ill-suited to US President Donald Trump, however, who, after promising Iranian anti-regime protesters on January 13 that “help is on its way” and also assembling a “beautiful armada” to challenge Iran, could not fathom “why they haven’t capitulated.” Time ran out finally after the administration determined that its genuine offers were “met with games, tricks, [and] stall tactics.”

That same miscalculation led Iranian decision-makers to position their most senior echelon and deploy their resources with apparent complacency, effectively exposing them to a joint Israeli and US attack that had been planned meticulously in advance. (Israeli media reported that the Israel Air Force “eliminated 30 high-level officials in [the first] 30 seconds.”) Since the start of the fighting, Iran has expanded the circle of combatants, targeting infrastructure in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman—thus committing another blunder by antagonizing neighboring countries that otherwise may have been inclined to remain on the fence.

From Israel’s perspective, the stars have never been better aligned for impactful change in Iran. And yet, ultimately, as US and Israeli principals have asserted repeatedly, it will fall to the Iranian public to step up and chart their own future. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take,” Trump said on Saturday. That process, however, could prove tortuous as the regime struggles to retain control and uncertainly prevails concerning the existence of viable (non-Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated) candidates who might mobilize to seize the reins of power. Despite the casualties that Iran is inflicting now on Israel’s home front, Israelis are hopeful, tentatively, that the demise of a belligerent Shia axis—and the ascent of a peaceful, collaborative Middle East—might be within reach. 

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administrations of seven consecutive Israeli premiers. 

The United Arab Emirates: Closer to the US-Israeli position than it wants to be 

ABU DHABI—Following the joint US and Israeli strikes on Iran, Iran launched retaliatory missile and drone attacks against US military bases hosted in the UAE such as Al Dhafra Air Base, resulting in direct impacts on UAE territory. The attacks soon expanded to civilian sites in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, with hotels, airports, and free zones (Jebel Ali) suffering attacks or damage from intercepted strikes. 

The UAE’s air defense systems successfully intercepted several Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. However, debris from these intercepts and potential misses resulted in damage and casualties. At least one individual was killed in Abu Dhabi due to falling missile debris, and several others sustained injuries in locations like Dubai’s Palm Jumeirah.  

The UAE has strongly condemned Iran’s missile strikes, calling them a direct violation of sovereignty and international law. The UAE also has condemned Iran’s efforts to regionalize the conflict and reiterated its stance against using regional countries’ territories to settle disputes or expand conflicts. Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, called Iran’s approach irrational and said that, in its unresponsiveness to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) diplomacy, Iran was isolating itself. 

The confrontation is forcing the UAE much closer to the US and Israeli position than it wants to be. On the one hand, the UAE remains a security partner of the United States. It quietly aligns with Israel on many regional concerns, especially regarding Iran’s missile program and its network of regional militias. On the other hand, the UAE has heavily invested in building a more stable relationship with Tehran. Trade has grown, diplomatic ties have been renewed, and both sides have been working to prevent escalation in the Gulf. 

The recent strikes are undoing these advances. UAE officials asserted the country’s “full right to respond” and take all necessary measures to protect its territory, people, and interests. This includes potential actions to deter further aggression, though no specific retaliatory steps have been announced. 

UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan spoke with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman following the events, and both expressed solidarity, warned against further escalation, and called for restraint and diplomacy. This aligns with broader Gulf reactions; countries like Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait issued similar condemnations of Iran’s actions. 

But with ongoing strikes on Sunday morning in the UAE, tensions remain elevated. 

—Eric Alter is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and the dean of the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi. 

The Gulf: Iran is losing credibility with its attacks

DOHA—Iran has made a serious strategic miscalculation by widening its confrontation to include the GCC states, despite their clear and consistent rejection of war. These countries stated unequivocally that they would not allow their territory, airspace, or military bases to be used for operations against Tehran. They chose restraint and diplomacy over escalation, yet they still found themselves directly targeted. 

In the recent escalation linked to US-Israeli strikes on Iran, Iranian missiles or projectiles hit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. None of these states launched attacks against Iran from their territory. Their involvement in the broader conflict was neither offensive nor direct. Nevertheless, they became part of a widening cycle of retaliation that they actively sought to avoid.  

For Qatar, there is no indication that it has directly joined offensive actions against Iran so far, but by stating that it has the “right to respond,” Doha is leaving its options open—whether that involves diplomacy, defensive actions, or strikes coordinated with allies. 

What makes this escalation particularly alarming is that the Iranian strikes were not limited to military installations, despite Tehran’s claims. They affected airports, critical infrastructure, hotels, and residential areas—spaces where civilians live, work, and travel. Such actions extend beyond conventional battlefield engagement. They amount to a serious violation of sovereignty and pose a direct threat to regional stability. The approach disregards international law and undermines the fundamental principles that govern peaceful relations between neighboring states. 

Regardless of how the broader conflict unfolds, the impact on Iran’s regional credibility is already significant. Trust, once damaged, is difficult to restore. Gulf states have long supported mediation efforts, particularly those led by Oman and Qatar, to reduce tensions and sustain dialogue. Targeting countries that backed de-escalation weakens those initiatives. 

If Tehran believes such actions create leverage, that assessment is flawed. Instead of acquiring more influence, Iran risks deeper isolation and stronger regional alignment against it. The international community must clearly condemn these attacks and affirm the right of affected states to defend their sovereignty and protect their people.

—Khalid Al-Jaber is the executive director of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. He is a distinguished scholar and practitioner specializing in political communication and Middle East and North Africa affairs. 

The Gulf: Mediation has become unappealing

RIYADH—Causalities are a tragic inevitability of war, and diplomacy in the region is now one of them. Despite the immense investment in rapprochement over the past years, this war and the unfolding events associated with it indicate that the region has entered a post-rapprochement era and is heading toward calculated militarization.

The Arab Gulf states have been restructuring their respective economies in the hopes of making them more diversified and attractive for tourism and investment. These states knew this could not happen in a turbulent region. Given US reluctance to provide security guarantees for Arab Gulf states, Gulf-Iran rapprochement was necessary. 

This rapprochement was a laborious and taxing psychological approach, akin to a psychologist dealing with a traumatized patient with violent outbursts. But there was a genuine conviction that dialogue was the best way of achieving Gulf security. That approach is now upended.

What compounds this dilemma is that both Iran and Arab Gulf states, especially the mediators (Oman and Qatar), believe that mediation has caused more insecurity for them, whether in the form of Israeli strikes on Doha in September 2025 or the strikes on Oman on Sunday or Iran being struck twice as negotiations were taking place. Mediation—particularly involving Iran and Israel—has become unappealing.

A post-Khamenei Iran that will most likely be confrontational is emerging in tandem with the Arab Gulf states recalculating their approach toward Iran. As a result, the mode of diplomacy in Arab Gulf states will be far more proactive in building their deterrence via capabilities rather than alliances. 

— Aziz Alghashian is a senior nonresident fellow at the Gulf International Forum.

Iraq: An opportunity to reestablish its sovereignty

A weakened Iran or the fall of the regime provides a dramatic opportunity to alter the course of Iraq, binding it more closely to the West and the region and reducing Iran’s influence. Iraq and Iran remain inextricably linked, with close political coordination between elites, significant economic linkages, and the continued presence of Iraqi militias supported and directed by Iran. An Iran that is less focused on meddling in Iraqi affairs could allow the Iraqi state to reestablish its sovereignty. But this will not necessarily mean that the Iraqi government will take decisions that align with US interests.

Iraq remains a venue for confrontation between the United States and Iran, with Iraq frequently pulled into conflict between the two rivals despite its attempts to navigate a foreign policy that maintains relations with both. In the short term, militia strikes against US or Israeli targets could start a cycle of retaliation that could lead to US strikes against senior Iraqi militia leaders. Thus far, there have been threats from hardline militias like Kataib Hezballah and several militia attacks by a Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhida-affiliated militia on the US base in Erbil. These attacks could increase in coming days following several US strikes in Iraq that killed militia members. At the same time, many Iraqi militias will decide to sit this out, protecting their political and economic interests in Iraq. Under pressure from the United States, a number of prominent militias, such as Asa’ib ahl al-Haq (AAH), have already announced their readiness to disarm—demonstrating the extent to which certain militias have become focused on their interests in Iraq rather than acting as a tool of Iran. 

With the strikes on Iran as the new backdrop, Iraq’s Shia Coordination Framework is still paralyzed by the process to select the next prime minister after Trump’s sharp public message opposing former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s third term. US statements suggested that Iran’s support for Maliki’s candidacy was the overwhelming reason to oppose him. The deaths of the supreme leader and other senior Iranian leaders might break the gridlock. However, Maliki will remain a formidable force within Iraqi politics with or without Iranian backing.   

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and a former deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran in the US State Department. 

Lebanon: Hezbollah’s aims remain uncertain

BEIRUT—By killing Khamenei and launching a massive air campaign against Iran, with the explicit goal of effecting regime change, the United States and Israel have smashed Hezbollah’s “red line.” However, there was no knee-jerk military retaliation by Hezbollah to the assassination of Khamenei, and even the statements released by Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem mourning the loss of the group’s spiritual leader contained no threats of revenge. 

Hezbollah is facing the biggest dilemma of its forty-five-year existence. If Hezbollah attacks Israel, on Iranian instructions, the Israelis would respond with overwhelming force, not only targeting the organization but also potentially striking Lebanese infrastructure such as Beirut airport, power stations, and bridges. In the aftermath, no Lebanese, including Shias, will thank Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into another ruinous war for the sake of a country lying more than five hundred miles to the east for which few Lebanese have much sympathy.  

The loss of Khamenei is significant, but theoretically a new supreme leader will eventually be elected—if the regime survives the current onslaught—and the chain of command will continue. The death in September 2024 of former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah carried far more emotional impact for Lebanese Shias than Khamenei’s demise. Therefore, Khamenei’s death alone may not require an overt military response from Hezbollah given that such a response could end up destroying the organization. 

On the other hand, if Hezbollah’s leadership chooses to ignore an Iranian instruction to attack, the decision would risk rupturing the material and ideological linkage that binds the party to Iran’s clerical leadership. Qassem appears to be a pragmatist and has been restructuring Hezbollah with an eye on survival in the Lebanese domestic context, while his organization is under enormous pressure to disarm. To that end, he has focused on centralizing control, tightening security, reducing the size of the Islamic Resistance military wing, and promoting figures with more of a political background than religious or military one.

At this stage, it does not appear that Iran has asked for Hezbollah’s overt intervention. But if the order is given, it can no longer be assumed that Qassem would automatically comply. There are, however, many variables. There appears to be some dissatisfaction among military elements within the Islamic Resistance toward the current political leadership. While this scenario is unlikely, it cannot be ruled out that some commanders could conclude that loyalty to the slain Khamenei and the “Islamic revolution,” as well as frustration at not retaliating against Israel’s year-long, near-daily airstrikes against Hezbollah targets, requires action even without formal leadership approval. Furthermore, Iran itself could seek to pre-empt hesitation in Beirut by asserting more direct operational control and deploying the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force to directly command the Islamic Resistance, effectively sidelining party leaders from the decision-making cycle. 

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria. 

Turkey: Bracing for impact in security, the economy, and diplomacy 

Given its 330-mile shared border with Iran and its role as a regional mediator and NATO member, Ankara is currently navigating a high-stakes crisis. The following areas are where Turkey will feel the most impact: 

1. Security and border control 

• Refugee influx: Turkey’s primary fear is a mass migration wave. With over 3.5 million Syrian refugees already in the country, the prospect of hundreds of thousands of Iranians (and Afghans currently residing in Iran) fleeing toward the Turkish border is viewed as an existential threat to social stability. 
• The Kurdish factor: Ankara is deeply concerned that a power vacuum in Tehran could embolden Kurdish separatist groups. Specifically, Turkish officials worry that the Kurdistan Free Life Party, or PJAK (the Iranian wing of the terrorist-designated Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK) could gain autonomy in northwestern Iran, creating a new security vacuum similar to that in northern Syria. 
• NATO positioning: As a NATO member hosting the Küreçik radar station and İncirlik Air Base, Turkey is in a delicate position. While it provides critical infrastructure for the Alliance, it has historically refused to allow its territory to be used for offensive strikes against its neighbors. The presidential office announced that Turkey is not allowing the bases to be utilized for the attacks. 

2. Economic disruption 

• Energy security: Iran currently provides approximately 15 percent of Turkey’s natural gas. Any damage to the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline or a halt in exports would cause immediate energy shortages, and spike heating and electricity prices during the remaining winter weeks. 
• Inflationary pressure: Turkey is already battling significant inflation (roughly 31 percent as of early 2026). A regional war typically drives up global oil prices; as an energy importer, Turkey’s current account deficit could widen and the Lira could face further downward pressure. 

3. Diplomatic standing 

• The “non-aligned” stance: Turkish diplomatic sources have already stated that Ankara is not taking sides in this conflict. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan is reportedly leading a “diplomatic push” to secure a cease-fire and prevent the total collapse of the Iranian state. 
• Mediator role: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who spoke with Trump on Saturday, has previously proposed a trilateral mediation framework between the United States and Iran. The escalation makes such a role nearly impossible in the short term, but Turkey will likely remain a back channel for any future de-escalation talks. 

—Defne Arslan is the senior director and founder of Atlantic Council Turkey Program, leading the Council’s global work and programming on Turkey. 

Palestinian territories: Losing the world’s attention yet again

Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank have long had to live on symbolic support. Especially since the Abraham Accords, many Palestinians have seen their cause weakened or abandoned even rhetorically by regional actors. Although many nations criticized Israel’s conduct of the war in the Gaza Strip after Hamas’s horrific assault on October 7, 2023, nothing stopped the killing of over seventy thousand Palestinians and the total destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure. Few effectively came to their defense in the face of US-backed Israeli military power during a war that lasted more than two years. From the perspective of Gazans, Iran and its proxies were the few actors who tried an armed response before meeting superior Israeli and US force and reaching cease-fires with Israel.  

This current war represents further loss for Palestinians. They lose momentum for rebuilding their lives. They lose the world’s attention to their plight within the Gaza Strip and land confiscations in the West Bank. Iran may no longer be the vocal supporter of Palestinian self-determination that it has been.  

Shortly after the attacks on Iran started, Israel closed all crossings into Gaza. While the Israeli government asserts that Gaza has provisions to last for an “extended period,” both the United Nations and Human Rights Watch flagged in mid-February that aid, medicine, and reconstruction materials were in short supply. Wounded and sick Palestinians are trapped as well. Now that the world’s attention is focused on the Iran war, improvements on any of these fronts is unlikely. 

There’s an old saying popularized by blues singers: “If they didn’t have bad luck, they wouldn’t have any at all.” 

—Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley is a distinguished fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Malta and as special assistant for the Middle East and Africa to the secretary of state. Her Middle East assignments included election monitoring in the Gaza Strip. 

The post Experts react: How the US war with Iran is playing out around the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Operation Epic Fury has begun. This morning, US President Donald Trump announced a “massive and ongoing” attack on Iran, jointly conducted with Israel and designed to exert enough pressure on the regime that it will crumble. Iran quickly retaliated against US bases in the region and Israel. With the goals, duration, and outcome of this emerging war still unclear, we deployed our experts to make sense of the conflict’s early hours.

• Nate Swanson: Resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, and former Iran policy adviser to the Trump and Biden administrations  
• Jennifer Gavito (@fsjen): Nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former deputy assistant secretary of state for Iraq and Iran 
• Jonathan Panikoff (@jpanikoff): Director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former deputy US national intelligence officer for the Near East 

What the US is thinking 

• By going with this sweeping campaign, “Trump is gambling that he can inflict enough damage on the Islamic Republic’s core security and political institutions that the regime will fall,” Nate tells us. 
• For the US president, it’s a break “from his past pattern of decisive actions with immediate and pain-free off-ramps,” such as the surgical strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities last summer and the capture of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro in January, Nate says. 
• The pain may be accumulating, with Iranian counterstrikes killing at least one civilian in the United Arab Emirates and causing an economic impact. “Already, air traffic in the region has ground to a halt and shipping flows through the Strait of Hormuz are slowing,” Jen notes. 
• How much pain will Trump tolerate? Nate points out that polling consistently shows that the American public is opposed to war with Iran: “If there are significant US casualties or impacts on global energy prices, will Trump stay committed to this campaign?”  
• The close US-Israeli coordination on the attack, Jonathan says, reveals that “whatever tensions might exist” between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, they agree on one important thing: “achieving peace—or at least long-term stability—in the Middle East requires a fundamental change in Iran, and diplomacy was not going to achieve that end.” 

What Iran is thinking 

• “The regime believes this to be an existential crisis,” Jen tells us. While the region has become accustomed to “de-escalatory responses” in Iran-Israel conflicts over the past couple years, those “are at least for now off the table.” 
• One of the big questions of the moment, says Jen, is “the intent and preparedness of Iran’s proxies to join the fray.” She notes that Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah has said it will attack US forces, and Yemen’s Houthi rebels are expected to target Red Sea shipping lanes, while it’s unclear how Lebanon’s Hezbollah will respond. 
• Meanwhile on the ground, the swelling protests of recent months indicate that “something fundamental has changed in Iran,” Jonathan tells us, noting that the 1979 revolution that birthed the Islamic Republic took a year to play out. “This iteration of protests, therefore, should be viewed as the start of a new era, not another failure to bring change to the country.” 

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What could happen next 

• As Iran targets US bases in the region, Jen is watching “whether Middle Eastern countries lift their restrictions on US use of their airspaces” to carry out the war “or offer even more direct support.” 
• If the regime were to fall, Jonathan says the most likely outcome is not liberal democracy but “what some are calling ‘IRGCistan’—a military-controlled state that might offer a new supreme leader as a symbolic token to millions of conservative Iranians, but with power firmly vested in the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).”  
• An IRGCistan outcome will require whatever leaders that emerge to consolidate power. This could play out in three ways, Jonathan surmises:
  • 1. an even more hardline regime that poses “a bigger regional and domestic threat”;
  • 2. a group that prioritizes getting the Iranian people’s support and thus shows “greater flexibility for a deal with the United States to reduce sanctions”;
  • 3. “a period of confusion and jockeying for power in which Western states will have to decide how much to try to jump into the fray and influence the outcome.” 

The post What Trump’s ‘Epic Fury’ means for Iran and the Middle East  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On the main stage, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte underscored that bringing an end to the war in Ukraine will require sending more arms support to Ukraine and also placing sustained economic pressure on Russia. He highlighted the need to address China’s evasion of Western sanctions and its role in sustaining Russia’s wartime economy. The message was clear: Military resilience and economic pressure are two sides of the same coin.

The leaders gathering at MSC also discussed trade, highlighting how trade deals and tariffs have become geopolitical instruments. US Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC) argued that trade policy and national security are deeply intertwined, warning that if the United States creates an untenable trade environment for smaller economies, it risks driving them toward malign actors such as China and Russia. Economic policy, in other words, can either reinforce alliances or fracture them.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz echoed this concern, pointing to the erosion of multilateralism. He warned that the world has entered an era defined by great-power politics above all else, and that in such an environment, some countries are increasingly deploying natural resources, technologies, and supply chains as bargaining tools. Smaller economies, he argued, must coordinate more closely to avoid being squeezed in the crossfire. In a world in which some weaponize economic interdependence, economic unity becomes a form of defense.

This convergence of economics and security was on display not only in Munich but also weeks earlier in Davos. The World Economic Forum has traditionally been a platform to discuss markets, business, and the state of the global economy, and while this continues to be the case, these conversations now require more consideration for geopolitical issues, which increasingly play a role in shaping markets. For example, US President Donald Trump’s remarks about Greenland, and the tariffs he placed on Europe, stole much of the spotlight, as did Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney when he called on middle powers to band together in the face of coercive economic practices.

Geopolitical challenges are increasingly being tackled in the economic domain. Governments are deploying instruments of economic power and coercion such as sanctions, export controls, investment screening, tariffs, and control over critical mineral supply chains to confront adversaries. Governments are also using economic tools on allies and partners to create leverage in negotiating favorable trade agreements. The use of these tools has required governments to reflect on their longstanding geopolitical relationships and consider how and with whom they will need to work to defend their economic sovereignty and security.

In this moment, smaller trade-dependent economies will need to build coalitions among like-minded partners to preserve the multilateral institutions that maximize their agency. To avoid any vulnerability to coercion by larger powers, these smaller trade-dependent economies will need to invest in their collective resilience by diversifying their supply chains, coordinating sanctions, codifying shared standards, and forming trusted technology partnerships.

Additionally, countries will need to address persistent trade imbalances and perceived inequities in burden-sharing within alliances. If left unaddressed, these imbalances and inequities will continue to drive decision-making that prioritizes short-term economic leverage instead of long-term economic security strategies. Such strategies require sustained alignment between economic and security objectives, not episodic reactions to crisis.

Governments cannot meet the challenge of building economic resilience alone, since it is built in markets, supply chains, capital flows, and innovation ecosystems. As economic tools become central to foreign policy, the private sector increasingly sits at the tip of the spear of national security, implementing export controls, monitoring sanctions compliance, reconfiguring supply chains, and making investment decisions.

Our team at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative, in partnership with the United Kingdom House of Commons’ Business and Trade Committee, convened policymakers and business leaders in Munich in a discussion that illuminated the need to redesign globalization in this age of strategic competition, where the line between boardroom decisions and national security outcomes is increasingly blurring.

Economic security will depend on the private sector’s ability to implement governments’ foreign policy decisions, making a new level of public-private partnership essential. Governments must clearly communicate the rationale behind deploying economic tools and provide the private sector with consistent, clear, and sustainable guidance and signals through enhanced public-private partnerships and dialogue. Information sharing related to national security risks will also be vital. Furthermore, governments should seek out and incorporate private sector feedback into their foreign policy decisions to mitigate against unintended consequences in the economic domain.

The MSC has long been the premier forum for confronting hard security questions. This year’s convening made clear that economic security belongs squarely in that category. Thus, at future MSCs, expect to see more and more finance ministers, trade negotiators, sanctions envoys, and business leaders roaming the streets of Munich.

Kimberly Donovan is director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She is a former senior Treasury official and National Security Council director.

Lize de Kruijf is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative within the GeoEconomics Center.

Housed within the GeoEconomics Center, the Economic Statecraft Initiative (ESI) publishes leading-edge research and analysis on sanctions and the use of economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives and protect national security interests.

Learn More

The post In Munich, a reminder that economic security is national security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s political and military leaders recognize that they currently lack the military strength for the kind of large-scale offensive operations necessary to liberate the entire country. Instead, the strategic priority for 2026 is to inflict maximum Russian casualties as part of efforts to make Putin’s invasion unsustainable. Newly appointed Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated recently that the goal is to eliminate up to 50,000 Russian troops per month.

Ukraine’s emphasis on increasing the cost of the invasion makes sense. Russia has held the battlefield initiative since late 2023 but has failed to achieve any significant breakthroughs during that time. Instead, the Russian military has paid a very high price for extremely limited gains. Most assessments indicate that Putin’s army has seized less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory over the past two years, while suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties.

The battlefield itself has also changed, with the clearly defined front lines of the early years giving way to a shifting grey zone dominated by ubiquitous drone coverage. As a result, major offensives featuring armored units and massed infantry are now extremely difficult to conduct. Russia has refined its tactics in response to these changes, shifting away from a reliance on human wave assaults toward the use of small infiltration groups that probe Ukrainian defenses while seeking to establish footholds.

With Putin’s commanders under intense political pressure to capture more ground, the impetus is on Russia to continue offensive operations. As the defending force, this places Ukraine in a strong position. According to Ukrainian officials, Russian casualties have recently reached record highs of more than 30,000 per month. For the first time in the war, this means Russia’s losses are now higher than monthly recruitment levels.

The Russian army in Ukraine has recently experienced disruptions to Starlink connectivity, creating further challenges for the coordination of offensive operations. Without stable links between front line units and commanders, Russian forces are likely to become even more vulnerable and easier to eliminate. This has already led to a number of successful Ukrainian counteroffensives and could create the conditions for additional increases in Russian casualty rates.

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Since the onset of the invasion, the Kremlin has been careful to reduce the risk of any backlash over heavy losses in Ukraine. Recruitment has concentrated on Russia’s ethnic minorities and the country’s poorest communities, with prisoners offered amnesties in exchange for military service. For the past few years, the emphasis has increasingly turned to attracting volunteers via large enlistment bonuses and generous salaries. Nevertheless, Russia’s ability to absorb casualties is not limitless. The longer the war drags on, the harder it will be for Moscow to maintain the current tempo, especially if Russian casualties continue to climb.

As part of efforts to maximize Russian losses, Ukraine has established a digital infrastructure to turn drone warfare into a systematic campaign of attrition. Through mechanisms such as the ePoints system, all Russian personnel and equipment losses are logged, verified, and analyzed. Ukrainian commanders can identify which units are most effective and adjust tactics as needed.

Ukraine’s strategy is producing striking results. In December 2025 alone, Ukrainian drone units claim to have hit over one hundred thousand Russian targets, a 31 percent increase compared to the previous month. Russian war blogger Dmitry Rogozin is one of many on the opposing side to acknowledge the effectiveness of this approach, noting that Ukraine is “building a model for the conflict as a long-term project designed to exhaust and exert systematic pressure.”

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The Russian army in Ukraine is already beginning to show signs of strain. According to UK Defense Secretary John Healey, Moscow is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign recruits as Russian commanders lose men faster than they can replace them. “Putin likes to give the impression that they’re making relentless and inevitable progress,” Healey noted recently. “But he’s weaker than he’s been and more reliant than he’s been on foreign fighters.”

Russia’s efforts to attract foreign mercenaries are a clear indication of the country’s mounting manpower challenges. Putin remains deeply reluctant to order a new mobilization due to concerns that this could destabilize the home front and spark a repeat of the exodus of fighting age Russian men that took place in 2022. However, with the Russian economy struggling, paying for new volunteers may become more challenging and lead to budget cuts elsewhere that could also fuel discontent.

If Russian losses continue to outpace recruitment, Putin may find himself with no good options. He could be forced to choose between mobilization, diverting state funds to sustain recruitment incentives, or scaling back offensive operations. All of these choices have the potential to fuel domestic instability. In recent days, there has been widespread speculation that Russian efforts to block the Telegram app may reflect growing Kremlin concerns over the possibility of unrest.

For much of the war, the Russian public has experienced the invasion of Ukraine as a distant conflict. Mounting casualties, particularly if paired with growing economic hardship, may gradually erode this sense of detachment and increase the pressure on the Kremlin. As the war enters a fifth year, Ukraine is hoping escalating Russian losses can finally force Putin to rethink his invasion and seek a meaningful settlement.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 17, 2026

A bad Ukraine peace could ignite new wars in Russia’s former empire

By Joseph Epstein

If a settlement in Ukraine frees up Russian military resources without establishing credible deterrents against further Kremlin aggression, Moscow will have the means and the motive to reassert dominance elsewhere in its former empire, writes Joseph Epstein.

Central Asia European Union

UkraineAlert Feb 12, 2026

Vladimir Putin is trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end

By Peter Dickinson

As the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale Ukraine invasion approaches, Vladimir Putin finds himself trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end for fear of entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Feb 7, 2026

Death by cold: Russia is attempting to freeze millions of Ukrainian civilians

By Kristina Hook

Russia is methodically bombing Ukraine’s power and heating infrastructure amid arctic weather conditions in a bid to freeze millions of Ukrainian civilians and make much of the country unlivable, writes Kristina Hook.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine hopes escalating Russian losses will push Putin toward peace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

US space access and cooperation in Africa was once comprehensive. Now it’s virtually nil. From 1980 to 1991, Somaliland was an alternate landing site for the NASA space shuttle. NASA and the US Air Force maintained telemetry, tracking, Earth station, and data networks across Eritrea, Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco, Gabon, and South Africa through the 1990s. However, through a series of state-backed investments and following a concerted, yearslong strategy, Beijing is gaining control over the entire value chain for critical minerals that are essential for space technologies. This places China in the driver’s seat on prices, timelines, and deployments of its space systems—and US and allied space systems—in the coming years. China’s space-economic diplomacy in Africa is doubly threatening to the United States: It provides China with sharper and nearer offensive capabilities, and it gives Beijing unmatched leverage over US and allied advanced defense and space supply chains.

There is still hope for the United States to regain some of its strategic advantage in space, but it will require rewriting the rules of the game in ways that benefit African states. The US commercial space sector might offer a hidden advantage that could start to reroute critical minerals supply chains from China’s dominance. US companies—with government financing—could start to restructure critical technology supply chains in Africa by growing talent, building equity, and providing end-use of that technology. This would help generate significant political buy-in and start to slowly tilt the space diplomacy playing field back in Washington’s favor.

China’s Africa space strategy is mature and comprehensive. Since China built a telemetry, tracking and command (TT&C) station in Swakopmund, Namibia in 2001, Beijing has been expanding its space diplomacy footprint across the continent. It now accesses a ground station in Windhoek, Namibia’s capital, as well as another TT&C station in Malindi, Kenya. Agreements with Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa provide China up/down-link capability for space data. Algeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan use Chinese satellite buses and launch to reach orbit. In 2024, Senegal joined Egypt and South Africa in cooperating on China’s International Lunar Research Station. China is also eying a spaceport in Djibouti just a few miles from a People’s Liberation Army Navy base—and Camp Lemonnier, a US naval expeditionary base.

These sites enable global tracking and safe operation of China’s satellites and manned space operations. But China’s view into space from Africa’s soil is just a small part of the problem. Africa is not only crucial to China’s civilian space program and diplomacy, it’s also part of a global space/military puzzle. China’s space investments in Africa are integral to its advanced missile program and deterrence against the United States. Its space ventures in Africa, combined with infrastructure in South America and Beijing’s efforts in the Arctic, China has almost global coverage on approaches to and from the United States.

China’s dual-use access in Africa restricts US space and defense supply chains

China has been systematically acquiring and building assets that expand its global military readiness and economic advantage. Africa is at the center of this dual-use strategy. Ports, bases, and naval visits in places such as Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola provide China both maritime domain awareness and access to minerals critical to its domes tech and defense industries. Coupled with billion-dollar Chinese investments in rail corridors, roads, and mines, China controls a massive proportion of the upstream critical minerals supply chain.

China has also cornered the downstream market. China’s near-90 percent control of global rare-earth processing allows it to score broader economic wins and advance its domestic technological sovereignty goals. The United States relies on China for 70 percent of its rare earths, according to a 2024 US Geological Survey report. China’s export controls over germanium and gallium refining caused prices for the minerals—vital for space solar cells and advanced radars—to more than double in 2024. The samarium cobalt and neodymium magnets for which China currently dominates production are vital to advanced air systems such as the F-35, as well as ship propulsion and air/space actuators.

According to China’s 11th Five-Year Plan for High-Tech Industrialization, control over these supply chains is both an explicit goal and a means toward pursuing technological sovereignty through indigenous innovation. China uses these supply chains to close gaps for its own advanced systems. Hypersonic missiles such as the Dong Feng 17, advanced fighters such as the J-20, cutting-edge aircraft carriers, and BeiDou satellites rely on minerals sourced primarily from Africa, such as bauxite, tantalum, and niobium.

Put another way, China can mine raw minerals in Zambia, transport them on Chinese trucks and rail, load them in Chinese berths onto Chinese state-owned vessels, and ship them to Chinese ports. On the mainland, China refines these minerals. US companies then source these materials or components made by Chinese technology companies, providing China potential backdoor access on top of market controls.

China benefits from and perpetuates this system, including by engaging with corrupt officials who are willing to reward Chinese businesses with access in exchange for bribes. While this is not a new phenomenon, it poses greater national security risks when tied to mineral access. China has also taken advantage of lacking US engagement in the Sahel to expand its commercial relationships. These include not only security assistance and cooperation, but also data access agreements in places such as Gabon. Although Guinea has canceled a series of Chinese mining concessions due to contract compliance challenges, Guinea alone accounts for around 70 percent of China’s bauxite imports, a mineral needed to produce alumina essential for advanced propulsion systems. Guinea’s stability is therefore critical to China’s supply chains.

Space matters to African countries

African states are acting in their own self-interest in partnering with willing space powers, including China. With rapidly growing populations, African countries have immense internet, telecommunications, and data needs. However, with limited budgets and at times large, ungoverned territories, many African governments struggle to meet these needs. Overhead satellite capabilities could provide African states with the overwatch they need and their mineral wealth provides the means to pay for them.

As Space in Africa founder Temidayo Oniosun wrote in September 2025, African states have viable sovereign uses of their own for space data. In addition to tracking security threats afflicting states such as Burkina Faso, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), many other states seek to use space assets to tackle issues such as deforestation, water management and hydrology, climate forecasting, migration, and poaching.

The US commercial space sector needs Africa and can offer a new kind of diplomacy

Experts have long proposed expanding space cooperation with African countries as a win-win for the United States, and the continent’s rapidly growing, tech-savvy population has a burgeoning interest in working with space-based capabilities. A long-standing bipartisan consensus holds that the United States needs more options for sourcing critical minerals for the national industrial base. Yet, there are fewer diplomatic and development tools available after last year’s cuts in the US federal service, tools that once positioned the United States to support Africa’s space economy ambitions.

China still trails the United States in commercial space launch and coverage. Despite feverish investment by state-backed venture capital, Chinese companies such as Galactic Energy and LandSpace are still getting off the ground. While Galactic’s reusable Pallas rocket has not yet successfully launched, SpaceX has completed more than five hundred reusable rocket missions, and Blue Origin has recorded dozens of reusable launches.

The US commercial satellite sector is also dominant, often paired with commercial lift providers. Companies such as Maxar, Umbra, Hawkeye360, CapellaSpace, and PlanetLabs are leading the way in advanced overhead imagery. US companies are also exploring in-space manufacturing, autonomy, and communications, as well as expanding opportunities for the cislunar economy—commercial activities between Earth and the moon. SpaceX has already expanded access to its StarLink network across two dozen African states. Chinese commercial satellite companies still rely on China’s state research apparatus, funding, and launch to reach orbit, though that gap is closing.

A playbook for US government-backed commercial space diplomacy in Africa

US space companies should structure deals with mineral extractors and value chain providers directly with African states to address both US and African needs. US and allied consortia can negotiate provisions with African governments and companies that guarantee access to and/or use of finished technology that African minerals produce. They can also create equity arrangements, such as education and training for African students, a pipeline to advanced technological employment, and agreements for regionally based refining and beneficiation. Such arrangements would give African nations greater control of and access to the benefits of their resources, while US companies would gain an advantage over Chinese competitors to expand markets with secure supply chains.

While it’s unrealistic to expect a strategic realignment of US priorities toward Africa, slowly increasing commercial engagement would give both US and African policymakers more options. Both of the past two US administrations have expanded legislative, diplomatic, and economic frameworks to provide access to friendly overseas mineral sources, while investing in longer-term US mining and refining operations. The Trump administration is working on implementing policies that would help US companies enter African markets and enter into agreements that play to Washington’s strengths. The administration’s willingness to back Department of Defense, Department of Energy, or other agency offtake agreements and leverage the Defense Production Act in support of critical minerals supply chains are key tools that space companies could wield to enhance their access.

The US government can further ease commercial space entry into Africa with a few targeted actions, all achievable in the current government budget climate. The United States should:

• Expand International Development Finance Corporation and Export-Import Bank guarantees to include projects that focus on African nations’ beneficiation, transparency, and data sovereignty needs.
• Conduct targeted engagement via the African Space Agency, US Department of State, and an expanded pool of US Foreign Commercial Service representatives in countries such as the DRC, Angola, Djibouti, Kenya, and Namibia that demonstrate commitment to expanding their space capacity.
• Refocus US State Department training and exchange programs toward space cooperation in Africa, and build on the best practices of programs previously funded by the US Agency for International Development.
• Transform defunct State Department environmental, science, technology, and health positions into science and technology roles that include a focus on space.
• Expand the role of the Office of Space Commerce at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in diplomatic exchanges to work alongside an empowered Foreign Commercial Service.
• Leverage the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital to invest more in US and partner ground and space infrastructure to ease access to these markets.
• Sponsor exchanges that build local space talent via US Africa Command’s Space Force Component, SPACEFOREUR-AF, in key partner states to cultivate space expertise in military channels that can help support the commercial space industry and vice versa.

US space companies also don’t need to wait. To secure greater access to essential upstream minerals, they can also help finance in-kind agreements with African countries—either ahead of or instead of US financing. Space companies can also serve as commercial diplomats, both increasing access and expanding their talent pool among Africa’s rising scientific community.

China is already running this playbook. On November 20, China signed over its use of the ground monitoring station outside Windhoek to the Namibian government. African media heralded the transfer as a milestone in China-Africa space cooperation; Namibian officials praised the deal, noting that it would enable the country to better track agricultural growth, climate impacts, and population movements.

China’s dominance in space and over critical mineral supply chains in Africa is a direct threat to US national defense and commercial interests globally. There’s still time to secure US leadership in space with the help of African partners. But not much.

Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also vice president for Valar, a US company based in Nairobi, where she drives global partner engagement on security, counterterrorism, critical minerals, and a range of related issues. 

Matt Petit is a mission lead for economic security at Vannevar. He joined the company after seventeen years as a foreign service officer with the US Department of State, working primarily on Africa and strategic competition issues.

Farell and Petit served together as directors for Africa at the US National Security Council.

The GeoTech Center champions positive paths forward that societies can pursue to ensure new technologies and data empower people, prosperity, and peace.

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Report Jun 20, 2025

A guide to national security space trends in the GCC

By AzurX and Graham Brookie

AzurX provides a comprehensive picture of the innovative strategies, ambitious missions, and inspiring visions propelling GCC nation space programs to new heights.

Space Space Security

New Atlanticist May 30, 2025

NASA needs a twenty-first-century approach to space exploration

By Dan Hart, Emily Sespico

The US space program must forge a future in which intelligent machines and humans work together seamlessly and the strengths of each are maximized.

Space Technology & Innovation

The post To compete with China in space, the US must form more equitable commercial partnerships with African nations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• US President Donald Trump and Colombian President Gustavo Petro had a surprisingly cordial Oval Office meeting on Tuesday following a year of antagonistic relations. 
• The meeting highlighted the issues most important for constructive US-Colombia relations: combating transnational criminal organizations and aiding Venezuela’s economic recovery. 
• The meeting also clarified Washington’s priorities, which all of Colombia's presidential candidates will need to address.

“I thought he was terrific.” This was US President Donald Trump’s take on Colombian President Gustavo Petro after a two-hour meeting at the Oval Office on Tuesday. Petro left the White House with an autographed MAGA hat and a copy of Trump: The Art of the Deal with a handwritten note reading “you are great.” The positive tone from both leaders coming out of the meeting, which seemed impossible just weeks ago, carries important implications for both a bilateral relationship that has gone through one of its lowest points in decades and for Colombia’s domestic political landscape ahead of the May 31 presidential election.

The meeting came after a year of public clashes between the two leaders, driven by diverging views on counternarcotics policy and broader geopolitical issues. It also took place only a month after the Trump administration removed former Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from power—a move that came alongside Trump’s comments that Colombia, and Petro himself, could face similar consequences after Trump accused Petro of drug trafficking allegations.

The dramatic shift in the two presidents’ relations reflects Petro’s gradual adjustment from his confrontational posture with the United States that led to the Trump administration revoking his visa in September and leveling Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions against him in October. In the days leading up to the meeting, Petro’s government resumed US deportation flights to Colombia, and just hours before the delegation arrived at the White House, Bogotá extradited the criminal leader known as “Pipe Tuluá,” who was indicted in Texas for moving narcotics into the United States in cooperation with Mexican cartels.

Through sustained backchannel diplomacy and these public actions, Petro signaled a clear willingness to cooperate and act pragmatically on issues Washington considers important, even as ideological differences between the two leaders remain.  

Steps toward cooperation on security and regional challenges

While no formal agreements have yet been announced, both sides described the encounter as constructive. Petro told the press that the discussion covered Colombia’s potential role in supporting Venezuela’s economic recovery, including by providing infrastructure for crude oil refining and the transport of energy.

On the security front, they explored options for enhanced cooperation against transnational criminal organizations. Petro said he shared the names of high-value targets, whom he describes as “the main kingpins behind drug trade.” He also suggested the possibility of joint Colombia-Venezuela military actions against transnational criminal groups with US support.

Petro also raised his ongoing dispute with Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, who announced a plan last month to impose a 30 percent “security tariff” on Colombia over its failure to curb illegal mining and cocaine trafficking. Petro asked Trump to serve as a mediator and explore a trilateral counternarcotics effort. If it moves forward, it will mark the first instance of multilateral cooperation involving two regional governments and the Trump administration. Success here could provide a model for similar initiatives across the region.

Whether any of these initiatives will materialize remains uncertain, especially with Petro entering the last six months of his presidency. Still, reopening dialogue at the highest level of the bilateral relationship represents a critical step after months of antagonism. More importantly, it signals a shared willingness to prioritize progress on mutual priorities over ideological alignment.

Now, Washington is likely to expect tangible results, including the capture of high-value criminal targets discussed during the meeting. Acting on these expectations would undoubtedly complicate Petro’s broader peace agenda, forcing him to decide which priorities to pursue, especially after the Gulf Clan suspended peace talks on Wednesday in response to his engagement with Trump.

What the meeting means for the upcoming election

Beyond bilateral dynamics in the coming months, Petro’s shift toward engagement with Trump is likely to influence Colombia’s electoral landscape.

First, stabilizing tensions with Washington and demonstrating willingness to cooperate on security priorities could ease some of Petro’s unpopularity at home, which has been fueled by deteriorating security conditions. In theory, this could help him leave office with a stronger legacy and could also benefit the presidential candidacy of Senator Iván Cepeda, a member of Petro’s Pacto Histórico party. However, these effects are not guaranteed. Other factors, including the National Electoral Council’s decision to bar Cepeda from participating in a left-wing interparty coalition’s primary elections and exclude several Pacto Histórico lists from the legislative race could limit any gains for the party.

Second, the newly cordial tone between Petro and Trump limits the opposition’s ability to campaign on claims that Petro caused irreparable damage to the relationship with Colombia’s most important strategic partner. Going forward, candidates will need to move beyond criticism of Petro and build concrete agendas for strengthening the relationship with the United States.

Third, and most importantly, the meeting clarified the priorities Washington sees as most relevant for engagement for all candidates, regardless of where they fall on the political spectrum. These include increased pressure on armed groups, enhanced counternarcotics enforcement, and sustained support for Venezuela’s economic recovery—whether through critical resources, infrastructure, or logistical support for the country’s oil industry. Learning from what works and what falls short in the remaining months of Petro’s term will be key for the next Colombian president to shape a pragmatic strategy for managing bilateral ties with the United States upon taking office on August 7.

The post How the Trump-Petro meeting could reshape Colombia’s electoral landscape appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia is also facing serious problems. Unsustainable Russian military spending constitutes an economic time bomb for the Putin regime. Meanwhile, the Russian military continues to suffer heavy losses in Ukraine while making very limited territorial gains. Despite enjoying the initiative throughout 2025, Russia managed to capture less than one percent of Ukraine.

In order for Russia’s emerging weaknesses to prove decisive, Ukraine may need to sustain the war for longer than some believe is realistic. With this in mind, an increasing number of voices now argue that Ukraine’s allies should compel Kyiv to accept a Kremlin-friendly peace agreement. However, the idea that Kyiv has little choice but to end the war on Russian terms overlooks the importance of Ukraine’s role at the epicenter of a revolution in military affairs that is currently taking place.

After almost four years of full-scale war, Ukraine now leads in the development of inexpensive and highly accurate drones and cruise missiles. By fully embracing this revolution, Ukraine and its allies stand a good chance of regaining the battlefield initiative and obliging Russia to compromise on its objectives.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Historians have long known that the development of warfare is not linear. For long periods of time, weaponry and tactics tend to develop only incrementally. European armies in 1780, for example, looked almost identical to those of 1680. Likewise, little distinguished the medieval forces of 1300 from the armies that fought two centuries earlier.

At specific junctures, however, a confluence of new weapons, tactics, and forms of organization can fundamentally transform how wars are waged. In the late medieval period, a military revolution saw disciplined, salaried infantry displace mounted knights. Then came the early modern military revolution characterized by cannons, star-shaped forts, and oceanic warships. Centuries later, the industrial revolution empowered those states able to master the new technologies of railways, steel artillery, and mass conscription.

Not all military revolutions are the same. Some have led to the introduction of new technologies that only the wealthiest states can afford, while others have seen new military capabilities become more readily available to a wider range of states.

These two trends can clearly be seen in the military history of early modern Europe. In the late fifteenth century, the emergence of bronze artillery and star-shaped fortresses fundamentally changed the nature of war. Bronze cannon meant that armies could demolish castles and city walls in a matter of days rather than mounting lengthy sieges. To counter these new cannons, defenders developed star-shaped fortresses. Both technologies were exceedingly costly and were initially only accessible to a handful of leading powers such as France, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire.

It was a small state that kicked off the next wave of military revolution. This began in 1568 when the Dutch revolted against Imperial Spain. By almost any measure, the rebellious Dutch provinces should have lost. Spain was flush with silver from the Americas and had a far larger population base. Spain was also the indisputable military superpower of the period, having humbled France in the 1551-59 Italian War and crushed the Ottoman navy in 1571.

Initially, the war went as expected, with the Spanish conquering key cities such as Antwerp. However, the Dutch then began innovating. They discovered that the expensive and complex masonry employed in the construction of star-shaped fortresses was superfluous in wartime. Once they realized this, they started mass producing star-shaped fortifications out of earth and timber. Paid laborers or conscripted peasants could now build fortresses, so long as a trained engineer was present to supervise.

Likewise, the Dutch also pioneered casting cannon from iron. In many respects, these iron cannon were inferior to bronze; they weighed more and were prone to bursting. Iron guns, however, cost only one-tenth as much to manufacture. The Dutch used these cheaper cannons to equip larger fleets than the Spanish and to supply their many earthen fortifications with plentiful guns.

Dutch innovation in the late sixteenth century enabled the Netherlands to record one of the greatest military upsets in history. By 1609, they had obliged Spain to sign a truce. In 1648, The Spanish granted the Netherlands full independence. This military revolution did not introduce intrinsically different technologies. Instead, the Dutch developed ways of accessing capabilities that had hitherto only be available to great powers. What we are seeing in Ukraine today is a modern iteration of this dynamic.

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In the modern era, the United States has led the way in another military revolution by pioneering the development and deployment of precision-guided long-range strike weapons. Once again, the cost and complexity of these new weapons meant that only the world’s wealthiest and most technologically capable states could initially embrace this revolution.

Ukraine now stands on the brink of replicating the success of the Dutch more than four centuries ago. As the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion approaches, Ukraine is manufacturing large quantities of attack drones and developing its own cruise missiles, with plans to expand domestic production further. This ambitious objective is realistic, particularly if Ukraine’s allies provide sufficient support.

The conditions that have enabled Ukraine to achieve such innovations are unique in modern history. The existential nature of the war for Ukraine has meant that a vast talent pool of individuals hitherto uninvolved in the arms industry such as software engineers, tech entrepreneurs, and physicists have all embraced the task of developing novel solutions for Ukraine’s defense.

The funding of Ukraine’s war effort, with multiple Ukrainian ministries and foreign partners all financing projects, has created a remarkably pluralistic environment. In other words, entrepreneurs with promising products and potential backers are perpetually in search of one another. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s wartime circumstances have swept away many of the bureaucratic barriers and regulations that typically impede the testing and evaluation of weapons. The upshot is an innovation ecosystem more akin to Silicon Valley that typical military-industrial complexes.

Ukraine’s unique defense sector ecosystem has made it possible to produce an extraordinary number of long-range strike systems with unprecedented cost effectiveness. This is democratizing the long-range weapons technologies first pioneered by the United States in the final decades of the twentieth century. Ukraine’s progress is reminiscent of Dutch achievements in the sixteenth century, when they developed cheaper versions of existing technologies that had shaped Renaissance Europe’s earlier military revolution.

By leaning into this progress, Ukraine’s allies can help the country regain the initiative in the war against Russia. Ukraine currently lacks the resources to fund the production of cruise missiles and drones at the necessary scale, but Ukrainian defense sector companies do have spare capacity to produce more. By financing additional output of drones and missiles in Ukraine, partner countries can help transform the military situation.

Increased volumes of long-range strike weapons can enable a strategically successful campaign with an operational depth stretching hundreds of kilometers behind the front lines. In conditions of modern warfare, infantry and armored units are comparatively brittle and ineffective if they are denied supplies and long-range fire support. Ukraine’s expanding arsenal of deep strike assets provides a plausible means of achieving this, especially if supported with real-time intelligence from the country’s partners.

Ukraine’s long-range strike systems can also be used effectively in tandem with Western sanctions measures to increase the pressure on Russia’s overstretched wartime economy. A combined policy of tightening sanctions on Russian energy exports and escalating Ukrainian strikes on refineries and pipelines can seriously damage the strategically crucial Russian oil and gas industry.

The military revolution that Ukraine is currently leading has already succeeded in democratizing the production of long-range strike systems. With sufficient support from Kyiv’s partners, this revolution offers a viable pathway to Russia’s battlefield defeat and can set the stage for an acceptable peace agreement.

Dr Marc De Vore is a senior lecturer at the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 29, 2026

Ukraine’s defense tech sector can play a key role in economic security

By Eric K. Hontz

Ukraine’s defense tech and dual-use sector is a rare wartime success story, with over six hundred innovative and combat‑tested firms becoming increasingly attractive to international investors, writes Eric K. Hontz.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jan 27, 2026

Unable to win on the battlefield, Putin escalates war on Ukrainian civilians

By Peter Dickinson

A war crime of staggering proportions is currently unfolding in full public view across Ukraine as Russia methodically bombs the country’s utilities in a calculated bid to freeze millions of civilians in their own homes and spark a humanitarian catastrophe, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Jan 30, 2026

Drone superpower Ukraine can teach Europe how to defend itself

By Lesia Orobets

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion four years ago, Ukraine has emerged as a drone superpower and is now recognized as indispensable for the future defense of Europe, writes Lesia Orobets.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine is leading a military revolution but needs more Western support appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 29, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Paul Amato published an article in RealClearDefense on the Trump administration’s ambiguity on nuclear deterrence in the Korean peninsula. In the article, Amato argues that silence on the regime ending policy risks emboldening North Korea and unsettling South Korea and Japan.

Fellow

Paul Amato

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Missile Defense Nuclear Deterrence

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

Learn more

The post Amato in RealClearDefense on the 2025 National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard:
Grading Trump’s second National Defense Strategy

On January 23, the Pentagon released the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), a document that builds on the previously released National Security Strategy. The NDS gives the Trump administration a chance to define the military threats facing the United States and how it plans to counter them. Read on to see how our experts grade the latest strategy.

Matthew Kroenig

Vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

This strategy marks a shift from past National Defense Strategies, with a distinctive focus on the Western Hemisphere. It correctly recognizes the risk of a simultaneous conflict, but would have benefited from more clearly defined goals.  

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

Prioritizing the homeland and the Western Hemisphere is distinctive and marks a shift from the past two National Defense Strategies, which both prioritized great power competition with China. The strong focus on both the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific, however, raises the question of whether hard decisions were taken about prioritization, or does this document instead reflect compromises between different factions within the administration focused on different theaters. 

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Yes, this strategy contains a dedicated section on the current security environment that outlines the challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and importantly recognizes the challenge of strategic simultaneity, the risk of multiple conflicts occurring in overlapping time frames. This section risks downplaying the threat from Russia and Iran. Several past administrations, going back to at least President Barack Obama, had also hoped to do less in Europe and the Middle East in order to pivot towards Asia, only to have serious security crises erupt and thwart their plans.  

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The strategy would have benefited from a dedicated goals section. Past NDSs have laid out broader, global defense goals, such as deterring attacks against the United States and its allies, defeating adversaries if deterrence fails, and assuring allies. This strategy does not articulate such overarching goals. To be sure, it mentions more specific goals in the sections on lines of effort, such as deterring conflict in the First Island Chain, but would have benefited from providing a clearer vision of success.     

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

The strategy very clearly identifies four important lines of effort: defend the US homeland; deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation; increase burden-sharing with US allies and partners; and supercharge the US defense industrial base. The section on China seems to incorrectly imply that a confrontational US stance raises the risk of conflict, when in fact the problem is the Chinese Communist Party’s stated revisionist goals.  

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

For more than four years, I have argued that the United States needs to do three things to resource the strategic simultaneity problem: revitalize the US defense industrial base, strengthen nuclear deterrence, and get allies to step up and do more. This strategy recognizes and affirms all three of these steps, with a heavy emphasis on revitalizing the US defense industrial base, which will be supported by US President Donald Trump’s promised $1.5 trillion 2027 defense budget, and increased allied burden sharing. 

Joe Costa

Director, Forward Defense Initative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The strategy reaffirms longstanding US principles, such as nuclear deterrence, preventing adversary dominance in key regions, increasing burden-sharing, and reinvigorating the defense industrial base. It rightfully articulates the perennial problem that global requirements consistently outpace the demand of military forces, and therefore ruthless prioritization is required. The biggest risk is the reward and punishment approach toward allies and partners. Unquantifiable factors such as unity of purpose, trust, cohesion, and reliability are the essential elements for creating these durable military alliances. By largely ignoring the core values that hold US military alliances together, and explicitly stating that the Department of Defense (DOD) will prioritize cooperating with “model allies,” this strategy could create long-term structural risks that significantly limit the DOD’s ability to deter and prevail against adversaries. 

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

Yes. Homeland defense is explicitly tied to border security and US “military dominance” in the Western Hemisphere. Allies and partners are implicitly rewarded or punished to take primary responsibility for their own defense. Economic interests prevail over core values that underpin military cooperation, and the threats posed by the United States’ adversaries are deemphasized in favor of the main message, which is: keep your “demands reasonable and cabined,” and we can maintain a “sustainable balance of power.” 

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Persistent threats posed by the United States’ adversaries are deemphasized in favor of the larger message on deconfliction and deescalation. The strategy makes three key assumptions that deserve serious examination:  

1. the DOD can achieve NDS objectives absent a coherent approach to allies and partners across the US government (e.g., if allied economies are hurt by tariffs, will they still spend more on defense?);  
2. allies and partners will respond to US rewards and punishments in a way that aligns with NDS objectives; and
3. US adversaries will adjust their longstanding goals and accept the DOD’s “gracious offer” in favor of a “sustainable balance of power.”   

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

Yes. The four priorities are clearly stated throughout the document. 

1. Defend the US homeland 
2. Deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation  
3. Increase burden-sharing with US allies and partners  
4. Supercharge the US defense industrial base

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

Lines of effort are defined with varying degrees of specificity. Tradeoffs exist between the four priorities. For example, forces off the coast of Venezuela, and the naval “armada” recently redeployed from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, limit what’s available now and potentially degrade future readiness to deter China in the First Island Chain. If this new strategic approach erodes trust with allies and partners, it could adversely impact their collaboration in areas that are essential to achieving the strategy’s end states. How the DOD manages and balances the risks that come with these tradeoffs will determine the success of the overall strategy.  

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

Further analysis is required, but aspects of the strategy likely will have to be modified. For example, the Congressional Budget Office estimates the Golden Dome could cost more than $800 billion over twenty years, with other estimates going even higher. In addition, the full impact of the DOD’s personnel actions is still unclear—including reported reductions to the cyber workforce, which could adversely impact homeland defense. Lastly, it remains an open question how allies and partners will react to this shift in US defense strategy.  

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident senior fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The NDS builds usefully upon the National Security Strategy (NSS) by carefully reflecting on the primary security threats to the United States and prioritizing those threats alongside the regional areas of greatest importance to core US interests. This exercise, while contrary to nearly four decades of US strategy, is both overdue and salutary in an era of rising great power threats and diminishing domestic resources. The NDS’s call for a wartime-level mobilization of the defense industrial base (DIB) reflects the seriousness of the challenge and the DIB’s criticality in meeting even the whittled-down priorities found in the NSS and NDS. Taken together, the NSS and NDS are an epochal shift in US strategy and represent a decisive break with post-Cold War conceptions of the United States’ limitless strategic bandwidth. 

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

As with the National Security Strategy, the NDS represents an abrupt break from the strategic documents from previous administrations of both political parties. The NDS rejects explicitly the need to uphold the “liberal international order” and instead prioritizes the capabilities and requirements needed to implement the core US interests outlined in the NSS: defense of the homeland, the Western Hemisphere, and a “free and open” Indo-Pacific.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Building upon the NSS, the NDS captures both the greatest challenges facing the United States, beginning with China and its threat to the three core regions of US concern (the homeland, the hemisphere, and the Indo-Pacific), and the need to prioritize in a world of limited resources and domestic political constraints. By understanding the threats but also the limitations facing Washington, the NDS captures the unique environment at this moment in US security policy.  

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The NDS forces clear priorities and largely explains how the administration envisions converting those priorities, whether regions of focus or a renewed emphasis on a revitalized defense industrial base, into actionable policy. In its ruthless focus on avoiding previous periods of strategic overstretch, the NDS (like the NSS) succeeds in a goal-oriented approach to strategy.  

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

The NDS is anything but a laundry list, and the prioritization exercise it represents will have a cathartic effect on both resource allocation and the time and attention of government officials across the chain of command. For each priority, the NDS explains broadly how the administration will define success, which will be useful in holding officials to account for execution.  

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The strategy can be implemented but will face fierce congressional and institutional resistance by forcing prioritization on a bureaucracy and larger national security apparatus that has become accustomed to avoiding hard choices and doing everything, everywhere, simultaneously. The NDS is appropriate to available resources but must be advocated for consistently to avoid the inevitable mission creep that will be encouraged in many parts of Washington.  

Imran Bayoumi

Associate director, GeoStrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The National Defense Strategy makes clear the priorities of the Department of Defense. It has clear goals and lines of effort but lacks detail in how it plans to achieve these stated outcomes. The strategy overlooks key regions and allies, such as Taiwan and Australia, and risks underestimating the threat posed by China. Failure to account for the strategic reality and the nature of the threats that the United States finds itself facing will make it harder to achieve the goals set out within the strategy.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The 2026 National Defense Strategy builds on the 2025 National Security Strategy with its clear focus on defending the homeland, with the claim that “for decades, America’s foreign policy establishment neglected our nation’s Homeland defenses.” But past NDSs have also prioritized the homeland, including the 2022 NDS, which listed “Defending the homeland” as its top priority, albeit while recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a pacing threat. The strategy is distinct through its continued promotion of the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, but this concept is not expanded on throughout the document.  

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The strategy rightly recognizes that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea all pose threats to the United States, but it does not mention China’s position towards Taiwan and seemingly downplays the global threat posed by Russia in Africa, the Arctic, and elsewhere. In Africa, the focus only on the threat from “Islamic terrorists” ignores the support provided by China and Russia to governments across the continent. At the same time, the strategy overstates some threats, saying that in the past “U.S. access to key terrain like the Panama Canal and Greenland was increasingly in doubt,” which is not true.  

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The strategy has four clearly defined goals that build on the priorities set forth in the National Security Strategy.  

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

The strategy clearly lays out four lines of effort that build on the defined goals, but some are more detailed than others. More clarity on how the DOD seeks to deter China or supercharge the defense industrial base would be helpful.  

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The strategy calls for having allies in Europe, in the Middle East, and on the Korean Peninsula take on more of a role in their own defense but does not detail changes in US force posture or presence that would likely be expected with such an announcement. The lack of details makes it difficult to understand how exactly the strategy will be implemented and how challenging it will be to do so.  

Nate Freier 

Nonresident senior fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

An ideal defense strategy includes: 1) focused and measurable ends (and why they are most important); 2) the hazards —purposeful and contextual —that pose the greatest menace to ends (and why they are the most compelling); 3) the relevant means available to pursue ends in light of hazards; 4) the courses of action or ways that combine means most effectively consistent with ends; 5) the risk of unacceptable outcomes given adopted courses of action (with, of course, a sense of planned risk mitigation); and, finally, 6) a clear vision for adaptation given inevitable changes in conditions. The 2026 National Defense Strategy is light on the first count (ends). It is unsophisticated on the second (hazards). It is thin on the third (means). It is inadequate on the fourth (ways). And, finally, it is silent on the fifth (risk) and sixth (adaptation). On the latter two, a meaningful risk assessment would expose the strategy’s overall high risk stemming from the sum of its tenuous assumptions. However, its silence on risk suggests the near inevitability that adaptation in extremis will follow as the NDS runs headlong into a disruptive reordering of international security as US defense policy becomes at once more overtly self-interested, bellicose, and activist.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The NDS is distinct. But distinct doesn’t imply thoughtful, prudent, or responsible. And its distinctiveness is the root of its high risk. It signals a disruptive worldwide US defense reset. It doubles down on the NSS’s revisionist themes by indicting prior post-Cold War US administrations as largely rash and irresponsible. It scraps a favorable US-inspired geopolitical orthodoxy by rejecting in its words “cloud-castle abstractions like the rules-based international order.” It is personalistic in the extreme, as it seems to invoke the name of the current president more than it does American values, the United States, or the US presidency as foundational institutions. And these, in combination, increase the odds of the United States overall becoming more isolated, unpredictable, and prone to transactional military action without the benefit of structure, convention, or the governing influence of collaborative international partnerships. 

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Prior American defense strategies have long perceived the United States as engaged in a dynamic rivalry with multiple opponents on multiple physical, virtual, and ideological fronts. They assumed rivals harbored counter-US intent and acted on that intent to neutralize and invalidate American power and influence wherever US interests collided with their own. The collective wisdom of those prior strategies still holds. Threats transcend geography—especially when as it is true now—rival interest in the United States isn’t focused solely on where it is physically but instead on who it is and what it represents in the international system. Therefore, rivals will continue to seek to isolate, nullify, and subordinate the United States regardless of its global defense disposition. This NDS misses this point. There is a high-risk assumption that strength at range is enough to blunt hostile intent and action. Recent history suggests that the kind of transformed American stance suggested in the NDS will instead invite and accelerate hostile counter-US maneuver and expose vacuums of exploitable gray space worldwide.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The NDS suggests that the United States can find safe harbor in the abstract invocation of “peace through strength,” an implied withdrawal into a more expansive conception of hemispheric defense, and new age offshore balancing. In this regard, there are echoes of both former President’s Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “New Look,” as well as the philosophical foundations of former President George W. Bush’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 01) in it. Yet, on the latter specifically, the NDS misses QDR 01’s declaration of the United States’ “unique” place in the world as “the basis for a network of alliances and friendships,” as well as its being a guarantor of “a general sense of stability and confidence.” Despite this nod to American leadership and partners, however, the Bush team too wanted to adhere to what this NDS would call “practical, concrete interests first,” offload responsibility to partners through “burden sharing,” and call the shots without excessive partner constraint. But narrowly defining interests did not then yield restraint in practice. Interests were reinterpreted by international dynamics and the kind of unachievable ends and interminable wars that the NDS decries followed. There is a cautionary tale here. If the current team got the context wrong—as is suggested above—rival encroachment will follow and “practical realism” will defer to what’s expedient in the moment, creating a high-risk imperative for in extremis adaptation absent deliberate prior consideration.

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

The NDS does have clear lines of effort (LOEs) and priorities. However, that doesn’t mean they are optimal for strategic conditions. Goals, context, and LOEs should render a coherent and appropriate theory of the case for defense. Here the NDS falls short. To its credit, the NDS does largely get China right via “deterrence by denial”; note that the strategy’s parent 2025 National Security Strategy tells a more cogent and strategic story in this regard. But, given the reality of persistent rival resistance to US influence, it seems more appropriate to prioritize China within a broader strategic design that is intended to persistently and actively outmaneuver all our “most important, dangerous, and consequential” threats. China and Russia are top of mind here. Further, reimagining, re-energizing, and transforming the defense industrial base is spot on in theory. However, the NDS’s details are thin on exactly what constitutes the base—in light of the strategy and how the DOD plans to revive the base given concerted rival action against the United States. 

Justifying the NDS’s rebalance to the hemisphere—in large measure based on the top three issues of migration, narcotics trafficking, and securing key terrain—is not compelling. In the first two cases, it embroils finite military capability over an indefinite period against problems of social science and law enforcement. And, with respect to the third, it creates pacing military demands against phantom threats where the combined application of non-military instruments of power in collaboration with partners would do the trick. With reference to mistakes of the War on Terrorism, the current course also hazards the kind of mission creep into “lesser included” demands that eroded the United States’ military edge in the first place.

Strong collaborative international partnerships, under US strategic leadership, allows the United States to set agendas and influence outcomes consistent with its interests. But “burden sharing” is admittedly an important strategic LOE. It promises to create economies of force and enable greater US freedom of action. However, sub-letting important responsibilities to partners—guided solely by “their own interests” vice common interests and values—is a recipe for potential disorder. As presented in this NDS, “burden sharing” seems to offer current and future partners three choices, with two yielding highly unfavorable outcomes for the United States. Some may pursue policies that are wholly consistent with US intent. Some with the requisite will and means will chart their own independent and potentially destabilizing courses, putting the United States in a thorny strategic bind. And finally, still others will be incentivized to accommodate rivals as a matter of interest, undermining their own and the United States’ strategic position. The latter two harbor the potential for unintentional and potentially irreparable harm to areas of enormous concern to US security and prosperity. 

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The NDS lacks a clearly articulated implementation roadmap. Experience suggests guidance to the DOD on that subject is forthcoming. As it describes more aspiration and theory than substance, the NDS is feasible in spirit. However, judgement on its practical implementation requires more detail. Can the United States picket the Western Hemisphere and the First Island Chain, offload rivalry with Russia to Europe, and keep lesser included North Korea, Iran, and foreign terrorists in check? Perhaps. Can it do it so alone without close coordination with and substantial help from treaty and non-treaty partners? That’s highly unlikely. To be fair, the NDS doesn’t suggest it can. However, it does state plainly that the global framework of norms and conventions that allowed for and incentivized others to cooperate with the United States is no longer operative, creating meaningful fault lines in even this circumspect US defense outlook. 

A second and perhaps more important issue lies in whether this strategy is suitable to the contemporary environment and acceptable given the hazards that the environment entails.  Taking cues from military planning, feasibility, acceptability, and suitability are not the same. Prudent risk assessment of the NDS against the world we already have indicates that it would likely fail these two tests. And, in execution, it will expose high risk in these two dimensions and trigger an imperative for substantial strategic adaptation. 

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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The post Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: Grading Trump’s second National Defense Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Ukrainian government has an obvious interest in supporting the growth of the defense tech sector, but many officials believe the top priority remains preventing strategic vulnerabilities. The list of potential threats includes infiltration by corrosive capital, a loss of sensitive technologies, and systemic risks arising from insufficiently regulated markets. Experts emphasize the need for new policy instruments, clearer definitions, monitoring systems, and alignment with G7‑style economic security practices. So far, discussion of these issues remains mostly conceptual, leaving businesses uncertain about rules, timelines, and risks.

Ukraine’s economic security debate is currently being shaped by three overlapping realities. First, the global economy has shifted away from maximum trade liberalization toward a more security-based paradigm, particularly in strategic sectors such as defense, energy, critical minerals, and advanced technology. Second, Ukraine is fighting a full‑scale war, making economic resilience and industrial capacity existential concerns rather than abstract policy goals. Lastly, Ukraine’s defense and dual‑use sectors have undergone an unprecedented transformation since 2022, emerging from a prewar model dominated by state enterprises to become one of the most dynamic segments of the Ukrainian economy.

The core question now is not whether the state should intervene, but how to design intervention that protects national interests without suffocating private initiative or driving away international investors. This means finding the middle ground between security and economic freedom. Democratic Ukraine must seek to strike a better balance than its authoritarian adversary in order to enable the kind of continued defense tech innovation necessary to prevail on the battlefield and increase deterrence.

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There are currently concerns that Ukraine’s fast‑growing defense tech sector risks inheriting longstanding governance problems including opaque procedures, slow decision‑making, and uneven enforcement. Recent corruption scandals in Kyiv have already damaged trust, creating what some businesses have described as “negative expectations.”

From the Ukrainian government’s side, there is recognition that institutions are still adapting, with many of the available economic security tools still fragmented or not yet fully operational. This represents an opportunity for Ukraine if the country is able to build governance structures tailored to strategic sectors rather than retrofitting existing and outdated bureaucratic models. Creating a new generation of transparent institutions to address defense sector exports, investment screening, and procurement could become a competitive advantage for Ukraine if designed with private sector input from the outset.

Export licensing is one of the most acute potential bottlenecks. Ukraine’s defense tech businesses currently face a process requiring excessive approvals from multiple institutions, with little accountability or predictability. There is also a perception of unequal treatment, undermining confidence in the system. Ukrainian officials, meanwhile, tend to stress the necessity of strict controls to prevent leakage of sensitive technologies.

A risk‑based and tiered export control regime could address these concerns. By clearly defining a narrow list of highly sensitive technologies requiring strict oversight, the Ukrainian authorities could create faster and more predictable export pathways for less sensitive defense and dual‑use products. This would support economic growth while preserving core security interests.

Wartime currency controls and capital movement restrictions severely limit the ability of Ukrainian defense sector companies to expand internationally. Multiple investors have noted the paradox of profitable Ukrainian firms being unable to deploy their own capital abroad, forcing them to raise funds outside the country simply to operate globally.

From the perspective of Ukrainian policymakers, currency restrictions are viewed as necessary to preserve macro‑financial stability and to prevent capital flight. Targeted exemptions for vetted defense and dual‑use companies, particularly those pursuing foreign acquisitions or joint ventures aligned with national priorities, could unlock growth without undermining financial stability. Such a mechanism would signal trust in compliant firms and reward transparency.

Another key issue is intellectual property (IP). Standard IP processes are too slow for wartime innovation cycles. In the dynamic current environment, Ukrainian companies rely on trade secrets and know‑how rather than formal patents, but this increases risks when partnering internationally.

Ukrainian officials acknowledge the importance of innovation but have so far only been able to offer limited concrete solutions. Accelerated IP pathways for defense and dual‑use technologies, combined with support for joint research and development frameworks with trusted foreign partners, could help Ukrainian firms secure protection in allied jurisdictions while strengthening international integration.

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There is a degree of uncertainty in Ukraine’s expanding defense tech sector that can be seen in inconsistent terminology, unclear boundaries, and undefined red lines. A shared vocabulary and published strategic framework, co‑developed by the public and private sectors, could help reduce this uncertainty.

Different priorities lead to diverging visions. Defense tech industry executives and investors tend to view the issue of economic security primarily through the lens of scalability, competitiveness, and speed. Their key assumptions include the notion that innovation thrives in predictable, transparent environments.

Many also argue that Ukraine’s combat‑tested technologies represent a unique global opportunity, while cautioning that excessive controls risk pushing talent, capital, and IP abroad. With this in mind, industry representatives and investors generally support targeted security measures but fear blanket restrictions that treat all technologies and companies as equally sensitive.

Ukrainian officials tend to frame economic security primarily as a defensive necessity. They warn that adversaries actively use markets, investment, and technology transfer as weapons. Many are also concerned that under‑regulation could result in irreversible strategic losses. Naturally, their perspective prioritizes caution, monitoring, and alignment with allied security frameworks, even at the cost of slower growth.

The central tension here is time-based and risk‑based. Businesses operate on market timelines and accept calculated risk, while governments operate on security timelines and seek to minimize worst‑case scenarios. Without structured dialogue, these differences manifest as mistrust rather than complementary roles.

If managed effectively, wartime Ukraine’s approach to economic security in the defense tech and dual-use sectors could become a model for the country’s broader postwar reconstruction. Ukraine has the opportunity to redesign institutions in a strategic sector that already commands global attention. Success may depend on whether government policy is seen by businesses as a partnership or as an obstacle.

Constructive cooperation grounded in transparency, risk‑based policy, and continuous dialogue can transform economic security from a constraint into a catalyst for Ukraine’s long‑term strength and sovereignty, providing significant security benefits for allies and partners along the way. This is a realistic objective. After all, industry, investors, and government all ultimately seek the common goal of a resilient, innovative Ukrainian economy integrated with democratic allies and protected from adversarial exploitation.

Bridging the gap between perspectives is less a matter of ideology than of process, trust, and execution. Ukraine is currently in a period of transition that is marked by many significant challenges but no irreconcilable obstacles. Industry and investors are ready to scale globally while the government is racing to build safeguards against unprecedented threats. The task now is to synchronize these efforts.

Eric K. Hontz is director of the Accountable Investment Practice Area at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 20, 2026

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With Kyiv’s Western allies unlikely to risk war with Russia, Ukraine’s most realistic security guarantee remains a strong military coupled with the ability to strike targets deep inside Russia, writes Serhii Kuzan.

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A war crime of staggering proportions is currently unfolding in full public view across Ukraine as Russia methodically bombs the country’s utilities in a calculated bid to freeze millions of civilians in their own homes and spark a humanitarian catastrophe, writes Peter Dickinson.

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The participation of military veterans in Ukraine’s political life has the potential to dramatically strengthen Ukrainian democracy and safeguard the country’s historic transition from centuries of Russian autocracy, writes Vasyl Sehin.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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The post Ukraine’s defense tech sector can play a key role in economic security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At the same time, Trump’s current NSS is more explicit than its 2017 predecessor in delineating a hierarchy of regions and interests. Whereas earlier versions still treated the Middle East as a central theater of policy execution, the new strategy bluntly states that not all regions matter equally at all times—and that the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific should receive the lion’s share of strategic attention. The NSS also reinforces the notion that economic security, energy dominance, and revival of the defense industrial base are fundamental to national security, not peripheral to it. Although the NSS is a statutory planning document and therefore binding on departments for implementation, Trump’s foreign policy style has always been adaptive, personalized, and operationally flexible. Thus, the NSS should be treated as a reliable directional guide, one that shapes expectations, alliances, budgeting, and bureaucratic activity, while leaving room for Trump’s preference for personal diplomacy and transactional deal-making where needed.

It is in this context that the Middle East—and particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—emerges not as a downgraded region, but as a strategically redefined one: less central to day-to-day US force planning, yet still pivotal to the administration’s concepts of burden-sharing, deterrence, and regional stabilization.

The Middle East: Enduring interest, but no longer central

Among the most striking elements of the new NSS is its recalibration of the Middle East’s place in US foreign policy. For decades, the region consumed disproportionate diplomatic attention, military deployments, and crisis-management resources because it supplied vital energy, served as a Cold War battleground, and generated conflicts with global spillover potential. Today, those foundations have weakened: the United States is a net energy exporter with greater resilience to supply shocks, and great-power competition now plays out far more in the Indo-Pacific and in technological and economic domains than through Middle Eastern proxy wars.

However, the fact that the Middle East no longer dominates US strategic planning does not imply disengagement or irrelevance. The NSS is careful to define the Middle East as a region of enduring interests that must not be relegated to instability or hostile domination. The United States retains core objectives: preventing any adversarial power from controlling Gulf hydrocarbons or the chokepoints through which they transit, ensuring freedom of navigation of waterways such as the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, countering terrorism and radical movements, supporting Israel’s security, and expanding the normalization dynamic of the Abraham Accords.

The regional focus is therefore shifting from militarized management toward political stabilization, strategic deterrence, investment collaborations, and cost-efficient conflict management. The NSS frames the Middle East increasingly as a zone of partnership, innovation, and capital exchange rather than as the site of long, resource-intensive wars. The NDS adds an important nuance: while confirming that the Middle East is no longer the central theater for US force planning, it explicitly commits to retaining the capability for “focused, decisive action” in the region, illustrated by operations such as Midnight Hammer against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and Rough Rider against the Houthis, while expecting regional actors to manage most of the security workload between such interventions.

Burden-shifting: The GCC as regional security providers

One of the clearest implications for GCC states is the NSS’s burden-shifting logic. Washington does not intend to underwrite regional security in the same way it once did. Instead, the White House expects capable regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and to a lesser extent Qatar, to assume leadership in securing maritime routes, deterring hostile adventurism, stabilizing proximate conflict zones, and countering terrorist networks. The United States will remain a strategic backstop, especially at the high end of military power, but the NSS encourages a division of labor where Washington leverages diplomatic influence, advanced deterrent capabilities, and intelligence, while expecting Gulf capitals to provide financial, logistical, and regional operational support. The NDS makes this division of labor more explicit by directing the Department of Defense to “empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies,” while the United States concentrates on high-end enablers, surge operations, and global priorities such as homeland defense and the Indo-Pacific.

This is not a sudden change, but rather a deeper institutionalization of trends that have been emerging for a decade. The GCC has long demonstrated an increased appetite for autonomous security roles, whether through counter-piracy patrols, Yemen interventions, Red Sea stabilization efforts, or investments in Central African and Horn of Africa equilibria. Trump’s NSS validates these ambitions and situates them within a US strategic architecture, rather than treating them as ad hoc regional experiments. For Gulf capitals, this recognition is beneficial: their regional activism is not only tolerated, it is encouraged as a core element of maintaining regional stability in lieu of direct US military domination.

From conflict theater to economic and technological platform

Another significant shift in the NSS narrative is the re-casting of the Middle East as an economic, technological, and financial platform, rather than a theater for perpetual conflict. The NSS recognizes that regional leaders have embraced diversification, industrial development, and sovereign wealth strategies that expand beyond hydrocarbons. It also emphasizes US opportunities in nuclear energy, artificial intelligence (AI), defense industrial cooperation, logistics networks, and supply chain localization. The Middle East is treated as an increasingly strategic geography for future economic corridors, especially those linking Africa, South Asia, and the Mediterranean.

This framing aligns neatly with GCC trajectories. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have long sought to position themselves as global logistics hubs, aviation nodes, sovereign wealth investors, and technology accelerators. With the NSS emphasizing US economic security, energy dominance, and domestic manufacturing revival, Gulf states can leverage bilateral partnerships to show how investment projects, whether in nuclear energy, AI, aerospace, or critical minerals, support American jobs, reindustrialization needs, and technological gains. If packaged correctly, a Gulf-US economic deal now has political value in Washington that goes far beyond foreign direct investment: it can be framed as contributing to domestic industrial revival and strategic supply chain safety. The NDS reinforces this economic-security linkage by treating arms sales and defense industrial cooperation with GCC states as part of a broader effort to “supercharge” the US defense industrial base, making Gulf procurement and potential co-production not only a regional stabilizer but also a mechanism for sustaining US military capacity.

From deterrence to decisive operations: The NSS–NDS approach to Iran

The NSS conveys a strong view that Iran’s disruptive influence has weakened due to Israeli military pressure and to targeted US actions designed to degrade Iran’s nuclear potential. However, the situation has shifted dramatically in recent weeks. Widespread protests across Iran, triggered by deep socioeconomic grievances and political repression, have created an atmosphere of internal volatility not fully captured in the NSS released in late 2025. The Trump administration has responded with forceful rhetoric, warning Tehran that further repression or attempted regional escalation could trigger additional US military strikes. These warnings, coupled with reports that Washington is actively considering another limited, targeted strike on Iranian military infrastructure, have generated both reassurance and unease in GCC capitals. Here, the NDS adds two revealing elements: first, it publicly frames Operation Midnight Hammer as having “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program and weakened the regime and its Axis of Resistance. Second, it explicitly states that Gulf partners and Israel are now expected to carry primary responsibility for containing Iran’s conventional and proxy capabilities, with the United States stepping in episodically when decisive force is required.

The ongoing instability in Iran introduces a new variable into the regional equation. While the NSS presents Iran as strategically weakened, current developments demonstrate that internal unrest can make the regime simultaneously vulnerable and unpredictable. The possibility of US kinetic action raises concerns about Iranian retaliation across the Gulf, whether through drones, cyberattacks, missile strikes, or activation of regional proxies. GCC leaders therefore view current tensions through a dual lens: understanding that US pressure aligns with long-standing Gulf concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, yet also wary of the escalation risks that accompany any US–Iran confrontation.

The NSS balances deterrence with an emphasis on pursuing peace deals and post-conflict stabilization, including in Gaza and Syria. Trump’s political style is highly confident about presidential diplomacy and conflict resolution, and the NSS treats mediation as a strategic tool to bring difficult bilateral environments into a more stable architecture. This dynamic underscores that while the NSS prioritizes stability and “realignment through peace,” the Trump administration remains fully prepared to use force when it believes core US and allied interests are threatened, a stance entirely consistent with the NSS’s emphasis on “peace through strength.”

Although this is broadly reassuring for the GCC, residual anxiety remains. If Washington chooses to secure regional stability through big-ticket diplomatic bargains, especially where Russia or Israel are involved, Gulf capitals will expect assurances that their security will not be traded for conflict de-escalation. However, many Gulf leaders now possess significant diplomatic capacity and mediation credibility of their own. The NSS creates an opening for GCC states to position themselves as mediators or stabilizers rather than as passive recipients of US decisions. The Gulf’s growing diplomatic centrality, from Gaza cease-fire talks to Sudan, Libya, or the Horn of Africa, fits well with an NSS that prefers localized responsibility and regional realignment rather than direct US intervention. Still, the current crisis underscores a critical reality: any US–Iran confrontation, even a limited one, will have immediate consequences for Gulf security, energy markets, and maritime stability, reinforcing the importance of GCC preparedness, joint air and missile defense integration, and sustained coordination with Washington as the situation continues to evolve. In this sense, the NDS largely confirms the NSS’s direction of travel but narrows the margin for ambiguity: it signals that future Iran-related crises will be handled through short, sharp US operations nested within a regional architecture in which the GCC and Israel shoulder greater routine responsibility.

Will GCC capitals be surprised or concerned?

Little in the NSS will shock senior decision-makers in the GCC. Most regional governments have already experienced Trump’s approach firsthand, benefitted from strong bilateral ties, and understand that Washington’s foreign policy has permanently moved away from nation-building, democracy promotion, and open-ended security commitments. The more consequential shift in recent weeks has been the intensification of US–Iran tensions, which has temporarily elevated the Gulf within Washington’s strategic focus despite the NSS’s assertion that the region is no longer central. GCC capitals now find themselves preparing for multiple scenarios, ranging from a calibrated US strike on Iran to potential Iranian retaliation, even as they recognize that none of this contradicts the NSS’s underlying logic of deterrence, burden-shifting, and threat-management rather than long-term occupation or nation-building.

Overall, the NSS is more likely to produce re-calibration than alarm. The strategy is consistent with Gulf countries’ expectations that they will be treated as indispensable pillars of regional stability and as partners in defense technology, energy investment, and maritime security. The NDS largely reinforces this assessment: it does not downgrade GCC importance, but instead clarifies the price of being central—greater spending, deeper integration with Israeli and US forces, and a willingness to absorb more day-to-day risk in managing Iran and regional crises.

How the NSS will guide GCC responses

The NSS will provide Gulf policymakers with an actionable framework for deepening relations with Washington. First, Gulf capitals can present themselves as regional security providers, offering maritime patrols, counter-terrorism support, Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab stabilization, and specialized capacity-building. Second, GCC countries can frame investment deals as US industrial wins, emphasizing how AI, aerospace, nuclear, and defense co-production create US jobs and secure American supply chains. Third, Gulf states can symbolically align with Washington on sovereignty narratives, emphasizing secure borders, state authority, and skepticism toward external ideological intervention, areas where their domestic priorities already converge.

Finally, GCC states will possibly manage their relationship with China more carefully, offering Washington assurances that high-sensitivity sectors will remain insulated from Chinese involvement while still leveraging Chinese trade and capital where appropriate. In doing so, Gulf leaders can demonstrate that multi-vectorism increases stability and economic growth without jeopardizing strategic trust.

A strategically manageable landscape

The Trump administration’s NSS is a sophisticated refinement of “America First.” It sets clear priorities, clarifies regional hierarchies, and emphasizes economic and technological competition as the foundation of power. For the GCC, the implications are significant, but manageable. Rather than being marginalized, Gulf partners are now expected to assume greater security responsibility, serve as stabilizers, and act as premium platforms for bilateral economic and technological exchange. The NSS ultimately positions GCC countries not as passive dependents of US security guarantees, but as mature strategic actors capable of shaping their region while deepening mutually beneficial ties to Washington.

Read together with the NDS, the picture becomes sharper: the GCC is central to a burden-sharing model in which the Middle East is no longer the main theater of US strategy, but remains a crucial test case for how America First can combine limited, decisive US force with empowered regional allies to deliver “peace through strength” without returning to the era of open-ended wars.

Kristian Alexander is a senior fellow and lead researcher at the Rabdan Security & Defense Institute (RSDI) in Abu Dhabi.

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An unusual stop in Jordan

Of the three countries on Wang’s itinerary, Jordan stands out as unusual. Chinese leaders frequently engage with countries in the Gulf, but Jordan isn’t a typical destination for Beijing’s officials. While in Amman, he met with King Abdullah II, Crown Prince Hussein, and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi.

At the bilateral level, the message was that China wants to enhance the strategic partnership signed during the king’s 2015 visit to Beijing. This elevated partnership would focus on increased economic and investment cooperation and deeper political trust. As Wang conveyed to Safadi, “China will remain Jordan’s most reliable strategic partner in its development and revitalization process.”

This is an odd description of the China-Jordan relationship, which is not especially strategic. There has been little in the way of political or security cooperation between the two; Jordan is deeply tethered to the United States, limiting opportunities for China to make serious inroads. The economic side of the relationship has also been modest. Data from the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker shows relatively insignificant engagement, with $1.96 billion in investments over the past twenty years and $5.54 billion in construction contracts for Chinese companies in Jordan since 2005. Trade has also been muted. Data from 2023 shows China exported $5.44 billion to Jordan, while Jordan exported $986 million to China.

Given the limited political and economic relations at the bilateral level, the likely reason for the Amman stop in Wang’s Middle East trip was to discuss diplomatic efforts on the Palestine issue. Beijing has been making efforts to be a more significant actor on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and with no influence with the Israelis, working with the Palestinians is China’s only access point. In July 2024, Beijing hosted a delegation of fourteen Palestinian political groups, releasing the Beijing Declaration in which these factions pledged to end their divisions and form an interim national unity government. Since then, Chinese diplomacy has been active but not particularly effective, although to their credit, they continue to advocate for Palestine, regularly voicing support in the United Nations and offering Beijing as a potential mediator.

In Wang’s talks with the king and crown prince, the focus was on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, “the need for cooperation between China and the Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization,” the cease-fire in Gaza, and the urgency of stopping attacks on West Bank Palestinians. 

The week before Wang’s trip, the third round of China-Saudi-Iran trilateral talks were held in Tehran, and discussions significantly focused on regional security issues—including on Israel-Palestine. Clearly, Chinese diplomats are working to enhance their profile on the issue. 

With the China-Arab States Summit scheduled for June 2026, regional analysts should expect more coordination between China and the Arab League on Palestine. And Wang’s visit to Jordan might indicate King Abdullah’s presence at the summit. If so, it would be his first trip to China since 2015, when the strategic partnership was announced.

Engagements with the Gulf

The Saudi visit was not at all surprising given the depth of relations between Beijing and Riyadh. Chinese capital has been flowing into the kingdom at a higher rate in recent years, with Saudi media noting a 29 percent gain in the stock of Chinese investment in Saudi Arabia from 2023 to 2024. Trade continues to surge, with China ranking as Saudi Arabia’s top trade partner. 

During the visit, Wang met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan. The foreign ministers jointly held the fifth High-Level Joint Committee (HLJC) meeting, a mechanism developed after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2016 state visit, which resulted in the China-Saudi comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. Since then, the HLJC has been used to chart the course for bilateral cooperation, with regular senior meetings that coordinate trade, investment, contracting, and diplomatic efforts.

Wang emphasized the increasing depth of the partnership while meeting with the Saudi crown prince, telling him that “China is ready to be the most trustworthy and reliable partner in Saudi Arabia’s national revitalization process.”

Contrasting the United States on trade

That Wang focused on trustworthiness and reliability in both Amman and Riyadh was clearly carefully chosen messaging. In his meeting with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary-General Jasem al-Budaiwi, Wang tried to position China’s reliability as a reason to jump back into talks for the long-negotiated China-GCC free trade agreement. Wang noted that “the talks have lasted for more than twenty years, and conditions for all aspects are basically mature, it is time to make a final decision.” Claiming that free trade is “under attack,” he described a China-GCC free trade agreement (FTA) as “a strong signal to the world about defending multilateralism.” All of this served as a not-particularly-subtle means of comparing China as a defender of trade in the face of US tariffs. 

The FTA was also a focus in Wang’s talks with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed. Wang expressed hope that the UAE could play a role in moving the FTA towards a conclusion, while his counterpart responded that he’s willing to play a positive role in the matter.

Despite Wang’s positioning of Beijing as a reliable trade partner, the China-GCC FTA talks have been stalled for nearly a decade. During Xi’s 2016 visit to Riyadh, he said he wanted a deal done within a year. Four rounds of talks that year didn’t get the FTA finished, and the GCC rupture from 2017 to 2021 put negotiations on hiatus. Since then, every meeting between senior Chinese and Gulf officials has included Chinese statements about the need to conclude the agreement as soon as possible. 

It’s worth pointing out that since 2023, the GCC initiated six anti-dumping investigations against China, while Saudi Arabia has launched four of its own and Oman recently launched one as well, citing the need to “safeguard the local market from price distortions caused by imported products sold at unfair prices that do not reflect actual production costs.” UAE Minister of Foreign Trade Thani al-Zayoudi said at the World Economic Forum in October that “we are seeing huge dumping coming from China to our local markets,” and “we must make sure we are protecting our industries.” 

As Gulf countries look to develop local manufacturing, free trade with China isn’t an easy sell. Yes, China is a global trading superpower, but it is very much a one-sided trader, pursuing a mercantilist growth model that floods other countries’ markets while decreasing its own imports. Unfettered Chinese imports look more like a threat than an opportunity for Gulf countries at this stage in their development.

In any case, Wang’s visit did highlight the many areas of cooperation between China, the Saudis, and Emiratis. Talks included cooperation on oil and natural gas, renewable energy, technology, research and science, education, tourism, and security. China may not have reached the status of most reliable and trustworthy, but it is clearly signaling its ambition to be a more serious partner. 

Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He also serves as an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. 

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As of January 13, the Human Rights News Agency, a US-based human rights group, estimated that the death toll has climbed above two thousand since the start of the protests on December 28 last year. This is while the Iranian government, as it has done previously, enacted a complete internet blackout, where the entire nation continues to remain under the world’s largest digital prison.

“I saw snipers in our neighborhood—in all these years I’ve never seen such scenes,” said Sahar, a doctoral student in the Saadat Abad neighborhood in Tehran, in a brief phone conversation via Starlink satellite connection.

Her voice was more distraught than in our previous conversations earlier in the week. She also explained how, since Saturday, fewer people have been going on the streets. “At first, there were families, old, young, but now everyone’s terrified, given the bloodbath.”

So far, Tehran’s crackdown on the demonstrations appears to have turned into a bloodbath, in which the only victims appear to be ordinary Iranian people—those who for long have been paying the price of the brutality of the Islamic regime, topped with the global isolation resulting from decades of sanctions and pressure imposed by the United States and its allies.

Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump may have a real opportunity to be an effective dealmaker with Iran. However, if he is serious about a durable, win-win outcome for both the United States and Iranians, there is only one asset worth betting on: the Iranian people.

Today, Iranian society is more unified against the Islamic Republic than at any point since 1979. Nearly three weeks into the latest nationwide protests, this time ignited not by a single spark but by the country’s wider economic freefall, Iranians have taken to the streets in extraordinary numbers.

Speaking shortly before the regime’s blackout began, Sepideh, an Iranian journalist who has been arrested multiple times and isn’t using her last name for security concerns, explained how she believes Iran is at one of the “most dangerous junctures” in its modern history.

“There is zero possibility of reform within this regime,” she told me. “But history also shows that the [United States], the UK, and Israel don’t prioritize the Iranian people either—only their own interests. This is what makes me afraid of what’s coming.”

Asked about Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last monarch, she says with a deep sigh that “he has some supporters because there is no strong domestic opposition, as those voices have been crushed domestically over the years. But I struggle to believe in someone backed by foreign powers, tied to monarchy, and unable to form a coalition.”

Some others express a more fatalistic openness, including Sahar, who—prior to the internet blackout—told me how many Iranians “believe anything after this regime will be better. We want a complete separation of religion and state. This deck of cards needs to be reshuffled.”

These voices capture the nuances within the Iranian society today—united in its rejection of the Islamic Republic, deeply wary of foreign agendas, and desperate to reclaim agency over their own future.

For the United States, meaningful support for the Iranian people requires resisting the impulse to frame their uprising through the language of takeover or intervention, and instead prioritizing concrete protections for civilians in light of the brutal repression inside Iran. This means keeping Iran connected to the world, shielding protesters and journalists from digital isolation, and ensuring that accountability efforts target perpetrators of violence rather than a population already trapped between domestic repression and coercion from abroad.

Furthermore, it means treating internet access as humanitarian aid—funding circumvention support, satellite connectivity where feasible, and protection for independent journalists. This can help to ensure that the regime cannot repeatedly convert blackouts into a weapon of mass impunity.

An open, empowered Iranian civil society would not be a liability to US interests; it would be one of Washington’s greatest assets.

If the goal is to empower Iranians rather than freeze them into permanent victimhood, economic engagement must run alongside pressure on the state. This does not mean enriching the regime or reopening a flood-gate of funds to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-backed entities. Rather, it means expanding lawful, carefully assessed, people-to-people commerce that bypasses state hijacking and manipulation.

This includes enabling small and medium-sized Iranian businesses, freelancers, and entrepreneurs to access global markets; lifting travel bans for Iranian students, artists, medics, scientists and civil society members while banning entry to government-affiliated individuals; widening licenses that allow US and European firms to provide cloud services, payment rails, logistics support, and professional tools directly to Iranian users; and supporting diaspora-led investment vehicles that fund Iranian startups, cooperatives, and cultural industries without routing capital through regime-controlled entities. Such engagement gives Iranians income, skills, and stake—converting isolation into leverage and dignity rather than dependency.

Despite decades of sanctions, Iran has cultivated one of the most educated populations in the region and a resilient tech ecosystem that mirrors Silicon Valley’s platforms under far harsher conditions. Iranian youth have built local equivalents of Amazon, Uber, YouTube, and DoorDash with little capital and almost no global access. With the right engagement, Iran could generate trillions in long-term value—benefiting not only Iranians but also US businesses and consumers. A reintegrated Iran, charged by its people, would open a new frontier in trade, education, technology, and culture.

Meanwhile, none of this negates Iran’s military capacity. After more than four decades of isolation, Iran recently went head-to-head with the world’s most powerful militaries. Even Israeli defense analysts were surprised by some of its capabilities—proof that such sophistication does not emerge from a broken society. Beneath the Islamic regime’s aggression lies decades of scientific and technological investment made by the Iranian people themselves, who—if empowered and allowed self-determination—could become Washington’s strongest allies in the region.

Trump’s rhetoric amplifies the contradictions Iranians already live with. His warnings to Tehran and expressions of solidarity have landed with equal parts validation and fear. For some protesters, his words signal that their struggle is finally seen as entwined with an uncertainty of what’s to come. For others, Washington’s bombast risks giving the regime a pretext to paint the Iranian people’s unified dissent as foreign-engineered. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s accusations that protesters act “to please Trump” reveal just how threatening even rhetorical pressure can be to a regime terrified of losing control—one that’s now at its weakest point than ever before.

Iranians understand the stakes. They have watched Russia and China extract economic leverage from their isolation, and they fear becoming yet another bargaining chip. As Behzad, an Iranian journalist who is going by his first name for security purposes, told me, “everyone wants a piece of Iran. Sometimes I wish we lived in a poorer, smaller country; so at least we could live freely—far from domestic corruption and foreign interference.”

Still, across class, gender, and belief, Iranians remain united in one demand: the dismantling of the current regime. They do not ask the United States for bombs or saviors. They ask for surgical, effective, and thought-through support that enables them to reclaim their own agency in the absence of the current regime.

If Trump is serious about peace, stability, and a lasting legacy, the path forward does not run through air strikes or transactional deals with a failing theocracy. It runs through the Iranian people who, if given the chance, could build one of the world’s most dynamic democracies and one of Washington’s most valuable partners.

Tara Kangarlou is an award-winning global affairs journalist, author, and humanitarian who has worked with news outlets such as NBC, CNN, CNN International, and Al Jazeera America. She is also the author of the bestselling book The Heartbeat of Iran, the founder of nonprofit Art of Hope, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, teaching on humanized storytelling and journalism.

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On January 7, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on DW News about the US seizure of a Russian flagged oil tanker carrying Venezuelan oil. He contends that the move signaled US resolve in quarantining the Venezuelan regime and adopting a firmer approach toward Russia in the Western hemisphere.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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On January 5, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in Politico’s “National Security Daily” on the Trump administration’s Venezuela policy. He explains that administration’s ambiguity is intentional and aimed at preventing fractures within the Republican party.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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Bottom lines up front

• The recent US capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro is consistent with the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy.
• While the new strategy is primarily about narrowing and prioritizing US objectives globally, it is also committed to an expansive vision of US interests in the Western Hemisphere.
• The White House should next expand its concept of “hemispheric defense” and increase its military presence, further reducing Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the hemisphere.

WASHINGTON—The daring US operation that captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and transported him to the United States to stand trial for his crimes signals a dramatic shift in US foreign policy, with implications far beyond Venezuela. The Trump administration’s decision to depose the Maduro regime is the embodiment of its recent National Security Strategy (NSS), which prioritized the defense of the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere.

While most National Security Strategies are quickly forgotten, both of Trump’s strategies have served as reliable guides to his approach to foreign affairs. His 2017 NSS announced a US focus on great-power competition, principally with China, and heralded an important shift of the United States’ attention after decades of Middle Eastern preoccupation. The president’s 2025 NSS, released in December, set about prioritizing US security interests globally and identified protection of US territory and the Western Hemisphere as the central tasks of US foreign policy. Importantly, the NSS also carved out a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, citing malign activity by “extra-hemispheric powers” as a serious threat to US national security.

As such, the recent Venezuela operation should be understood as of a piece with the president’s earlier focus on acquiring Greenland, his calls for resuming US control over the Panama Canal, and his interest in stemming the flow of narcotics trafficking and illegal migration in the hemisphere. In each instance, extra-hemispheric influence has played a significant role in galvanizing Washington’s concern: Chinese outfits own key facilities along the canal. Russia and China conduct military activity near Greenland and in the High North. And Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran hold long-standing influence in Caracas. With the Maduro capture, Washington is sending a powerful signal that it is taking the NSS seriously, and that it is prepared to act swiftly to enforce the Trump Corollary.

Beijing’s ambitions in the Western Hemisphere have long been a concern for Washington, but recent trends are particularly alarming. In late December, reports emerged that China’s People’s Liberation Army was conducting war games simulating combat in the Western Hemisphere. This news came shortly after Beijing published an official strategy for Latin America that takes an increasingly belligerent tone in asserting its regional interests there. China actively supports the destabilizing Cuban regime, including by maintaining a surveillance post on the island just ninety miles from US territory. With Beijing increasing its efforts to extend coercive economic diplomacy across the hemisphere and its public interest in West African naval access fronting the Atlantic Ocean, the Trump Corollary seems poised to clash with China’s strategic posture.

The sheer number of potential flashpoints between the United States and great-power rivals such as China under the rubric of the Trump Corollary demonstrates an important point about the administration’s strategy: While the new NSS is primarily a document about narrowing and prioritizing US objectives globally, with a lesser focus on Europe and the Middle East, it is wholly committed to an expansive vision of US interests in the Western Hemisphere. This is likely to lead to near-term adjustments to US policy, with the goal of better operationalizing the Trump Corollary to address the hemispheric challenges facing the United States.

Here are three areas to watch in the coming months.

First, under the rubric of “hemispheric defense” that guided US security strategy in the hemisphere for decades, the Trump administration should expand the geographic definition of the hemisphere for the purpose of applying the Monroe Doctrine and the Trump Corollary. By stating unambiguously that the hemisphere is broadly defined as the Aleutian Islands to Greenland and the North American Arctic to Antarctica—with Central and South America and the Caribbean in between and the Pacific and Atlantic approaches to the hemisphere included—the administration could effectively place the region in lockdown, preventing encroachment by China, Russia, and Iran.

Second, to operationalize hemispheric defense going forward, the administration should expand the rotational and permanent deployment of US land, naval, Coast Guard, and air assets in the hemisphere. As the Trump administration works to reposition US forces from legacy bases in Europe and the Middle East, it could simultaneously expand or reopen US facilities in Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. It could also seek to establish or expand rotational or permanent access agreements with US partners such as El Salvador, Ecuador, the Dutch Caribbean islands of Aruba and Curaçao, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and others.

Beyond these countries, Washington could seek a more expansive agreement with Costa Rica, which lacks a permanent military and currently allows the US military access on a case-by-case basis. A new agreement with Costa Rica could look like the comprehensive defense arrangements the United States enjoys with Pacific Island partners such as the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Micronesia. Similarly, as the administration explores its options for a broader political solution to the president’s desire to acquire Greenland, the United States could request expanded access to the island under the 1951 defense agreement and begin prepositioning anti-submarine warfare and Arctic training assets there to counter Chinese and Russian malign activity in the High North.

Third, the administration can begin leveraging such force posture changes to actively deter malign activity and advance US interests in the hemisphere. Greater US forward presence in the region would, among other outcomes, help deter Chinese and Russian collaboration with the Cuban regime, which has spread chaos and destabilization across Latin America for decades. Expanding the US presence in Costa Rica and the Dutch Caribbean would help ensure access to the Panama Canal while the administration seeks broader solutions to Chinese influence. A stronger US Coast Guard and naval presence in the Caribbean would help combat narcotics trafficking and illegal migration that pose a direct threat to the US homeland. Further north, increasing US assets in Greenland would contribute to Arctic security.

While the administration’s actions in Venezuela have shocked the world and sent a strong message to US rivals in Beijing, Moscow, Havana, and Tehran, they are likely only the starting point for a longer-term and more comprehensive reappraisal of US core interests in the hemisphere and the means to achieve them. The Trump administration has a unique opportunity, built around its NSS and its audacious Venezuela operation, to reimagine the contours of US hemispheric defense for years to come.

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On January 4, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Bloomberg article titled “Trump Snatches Maduro But Leaves His Regime in Charge for Now.” He explains that the Trump administration is attempting to influence the Venezuelan vice president to secure outcomes favorable to the US.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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On January 2, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on C-SPAN’s “Washington Journal” about foreign policy challenges for 2026. He analyzes threats from the People’s Republic of China, speaks about protests in Iran, and discusses the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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On January 4, Alexander B. Gray, a GeoStrategy Initiative nonresident senior fellow, was interviewed on Bloomberg about the decision to capture Nicolas Maduro. He explains that the Trump administration has redefined US core interests as inextricably linked to the Western hemisphere, and argues ousting Maduro eliminated a hostile regime and narrowed the strategic space for US adversaries.

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Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

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The current state of affairs is far from unprecedented. In early 1940, Polish officers tried to warn their French counterparts about Nazi Germany’s new blitzkrieg tactics but were ignored. France surrendered soon after. There is still time to adapt to the transformations that are now underway, but the clock is ticking.

One of the key lessons from the war in Ukraine is the evolving role of soldiers. People are now the most expensive, vulnerable, and difficult resource to replace on the battlefield. Meanwhile, many of the core weapons systems that dominated military doctrines in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are becoming less relevant. Tanks, artillery, and other traditional systems are simply too expensive and are unsuited to the challenges created by newer technologies.

Unmanned systems of all kinds have emerged since 2022 as a fundamental element of modern military doctrine. This is radically changing everything from the structure of armies to the role of the individual soldier. Remotely controlled equipment no longer needs a large crew to support it, while individual models are becoming more compact and maneuverable. As a result, the power of unmanned weapons systems is increasing exponentially, while production is expanding to industrial scale and becoming significantly cheaper.

More and more soldiers now serve as unmanned systems operators. Those who remain in more traditional roles perform tasks such as special operations, guard duties, or logistical functions. The war being waged by Ukraine has demonstrated that the modern battlefield features a kill zone up to 25 miles deep and spanning the entire front line. This zone is controlled by drones that destroy any infantry or equipment. Combat operations are increasingly conducted by drone operators located deep in the rear or in underground bunkers.

In these conditions of drone dominance over the battlefield, any attempts to stage major breakthroughs are doomed to failure. Instead of tank columns and artillery duels, offensive operations require maximum dispersal of forces and the greatest possible camouflage. The main task of troops is to gradually shift the kill zone deeper into the enemy’s rear.

Success depends upon the ability to rapidly produce large quantities of inexpensive combat drones and continually update their control systems. Initial tactics involving single drones and individual targets are already becoming a thing of a past. Instead, operators can now use artificial intelligence to control entire fleets featuring large numbers of drones deployed simultaneously. This approach allows a single soldier to manage kilometers of front line space rather than just a few hundred meters. The result is a reduction in the need for mass mobilization and an emphasis on the professionalism and technical skills of each operator manning the front.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Combat operations now boil down to two main scenarios: Either the collapse of an enemy who is not prepared for the new intensity of combat, or a positional struggle in the style of World War I. In a protracted positional war, it is crucial to ensure control over the kill zone and maintain sufficient supplies while depriving the enemy of similar capabilities. The protection of logistics networks and the infliction of maximum damage on the enemy’s rear areas is of decisive importance.

First and foremost, this means cutting off ground supply routes. To protect logistics, armies must develop fleets of maneuverable transport drones that are not dependent on road quality and can navigate minefields. Meanwhile, to ensure the steady supply of ammunition and spare parts to underground storage points along the front lines, a mobile air defense system featuring interceptor drones is necessary.

At the strategic level, key targets are now weapons factories, logistics centers, and command posts, which are often hidden deep in the rear or located inside underground bunkers close to the front lines. Destroying these high-value targets requires guided missiles or other air strike capabilities. Military planners are therefore faced with the challenge of moving away from expensive manned aircraft toward reusable strategic drones.

Testing of fully-fledged unmanned aircraft is already underway. The transition toward unmanned aviation will open up the mass deployment of guided aerial bombs, which are significantly cheaper than missiles. In addition, strategic drones will themselves be able to act as “aircraft carriers” for kamikaze drones.

The same principles apply equally to the maritime theater of operations. Ukrainian Sea Baby naval drones have already proven themselves by destroying numerous warships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and carrying out attacks on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers.

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To ensure their future national security, states must focus on the mass production of unmanned systems and their components. China currently accounts for the lion’s share of component parts. This is a challenge for any country that seeks to play a role in global affairs. China must be deprived of the strategic advantages it enjoys due to its status as the leading producer of components for unmanned systems.

Many NATO generals appear to think that recent technological advances are making war cheaper and creating a more level military playing field. This is a mistake. In reality, any reduction in the cost of weapons is more than offset by the need for increased quantities.

It is also important to stress that unmanned technologies alone are not enough. Another key factor is an army’s access to reliable digital communications similar to Starlink. Without this capability, it is impossible to coordinate combat operations, collect data, and maintain connections between individual units and command structures. It is no coincidence that China is already investing billions to address this issue.

The transformation currently underway in the military sphere also increases the role of cyber warfare. Disruption to logistics, power outages, and communications breakdowns can all provide the enemy with the opportunity to advance. A hacked cyber system can expose vital defenses or dramatically reduce the possibility of recovery.

Looking ahead, technological innovation in the military must be recognized as a national priority when allocating defense budgets. This applies to everything from unmanned systems to the development of artificial intelligence.

The most important revolution must take place within the minds of today’s military generals. A comprehensive rethink of existing military doctrines is currently needed. Armies must be completely re-equipped. It is time for the top brass to acknowledge that they should either change or give way to a new generation of military strategists.

Ukraine’s experience since 2022 has confirmed that in order to be successful in modern warfare, armies should model themselves on technological giants like Amazon and SpaceX. They must embrace flexible thinking and be capable of competing in terms of implementing new innovations.

In an era of accelerated military change, all countries face a simple choice of adapting or accepting the inevitability of defeat. The winners will be those who embrace the lessons from the technological revolution currently underway on the battlefields of Ukraine.

Oleg Dunda is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament from the Servant of the People party.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 16, 2025

The only winner from Ukrainian wartime elections would be Putin

By Yuriy Boyechko

Ukrainians are fighting to defend their democracy against Kremlin authoritarianism, but they are also in no rush to hold wartime elections amid relentless Russian bombardment and with millions of Ukrainians displaced, writes Yuriy Boyechko.

Conflict Elections

UkraineAlert Dec 23, 2025

Reclaiming Russia’s ‘historical lands’: How far do Putin’s imperial ambitions extend?

By Peter Dickinson

Putin has again vowed to “liberate Russia’s historical lands” via negotiations or military means. The list of countries that could qualify as “historically Russian” in Putin’s revisionist worldview is long and extends far beyond Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Central Europe Conflict

UkraineAlert Dec 10, 2025

Russian drones and blackouts test the resilience of Ukraine’s second city

By Maria Avdeeva

With Putin’s army now advancing to the east and the Russian bombardment of civilian targets intensifying, Kharkiv residents are now facing what may become the most difficult winter of the entire war, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Defense Technologies Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post The art of war is undergoing a technological revolution in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 19, Atlantic Council Vice President and Scowcroft Center Senior Director Matthew Kroenig published an opinion letter in the Wall Street Journal titled “What Trump’s Foreign-Policy Detractors Miss.” In the article, Kroenig argues that critics of the new NSS overlook the practical roadmap it lays out for addressing core strategic challenges.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in the Wall Street Journal on the US National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Zelenskyy’s commitment to democratic principles is commendable, but he should nevertheless resist international pressure to rush into wartime elections. Attempting to hold a national vote at a time when the country is under relentless Russian bombardment and while millions of Ukrainians remain displaced by the war would not be a demonstration of democracy; it would be a strategic blunder that could hand a propaganda victory to Moscow.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The issue of potential wartime elections in Ukraine has been raised on numerous occasions since spring 2024 when Zelenskyy’s presidential term officially ended, with Russia frequently referencing the absence of elections in Ukraine as part of efforts to undermine the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian authorities. These Kremlin claims of illegitimacy are inaccurate. The Ukrainian Constitution specifically forbids elections while martial law is in place, which has been the case in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

This constitutional barrier to wartime elections is not a mere legal loophole or a convenient excuse. It is a foundational safeguard designed to ensure the continuity of governance during times of national crisis. Of course, it is possible to argue that the relevant legislation could be revised. But any attempt to change the Ukrainian Constitution would risk a constitutional crisis in the middle of a major war. It would divert the attention of Ukraine’s parliament, the country’s judicial system, and the public away from the war effort, with obvious potential for political infighting and domestic instability.

The constitutional arguments against a wartime election are convincing, but the main reason why Ukraine cannot go to the polls while the Russian invasion continues is because any such vote would fall far short of recognized democratic standards in terms of freedom, fairness, and representation. A truly democratic election requires a level playing field, security for participants, and the ability for all eligible citizens to cast their ballots. None of these conditions can be met in today’s Ukraine.

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Security problems alone should be enough to rule out the idea of a wartime ballot. With Russia bombing civilian targets across Ukraine on a daily basis, candidates would be unable to stage any public campaign gatherings in safety. Likewise, polling stations would become high-value targets for Russian drones and missiles, creating unacceptable risks for thousands of election workers and millions of voters.

The logistical challenges of a wartime vote would be similarly overwhelming. Millions of Ukrainians are currently located abroad as refugees in the European Union and elsewhere. Millions more are internally displaced inside Ukraine. This creates huge issues for voter registries, which would need to be completely revised and updated. Furthermore, the voices of Ukrainian citizens living under Russian occupation would be silenced entirely, disenfranchising a large portion of the overall electorate and further undermining the credibility of any vote.

If Zelenskyy chooses to proceed with a wartime election, the potential for domestic political destabilization would be huge. An election held under wartime conditions would inevitably be a flawed process, with millions unable to vote and security restrictions placing limits on meaningful campaigning opportunities. Regardless of the outcome, Russia would seize on these flaws in order to declare the results illegitimate, sow internal discord, and undermine the credibility of the Ukrainian government in the eyes of the international community. The resulting instability could prove a far greater threat to Ukraine’s survival than any perceived democratic deficit.

According to his country’s constitution, Zelenskyy is the legally elected leader of Ukraine and will remain so until conditions in the country allow for the relaxation of martial law restrictions and the organization of genuinely free and fair elections. This will only become possible once a comprehensive and verifiable ceasefire is in place. Until the bombs stop falling, the Ukrainian government’s priority must remain the defense of the nation.

Ukrainians are fighting to defend their democracy against Russian authoritarianism, but they are also in no rush to hold a wartime vote. Instead, opinion polls consistently demonstrate that most Ukrainians oppose the idea of any elections while active hostilities continue. When the right moment arrives, Ukrainians will be the first to demand their democratic rights and will insist on new elections. However, they understand that the right moment has not yet arrived.

Yuriy Boyechko is CEO of Hope For Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 10, 2025

Russian drones and blackouts test the resilience of Ukraine’s second city

By Maria Avdeeva

With Putin’s army now advancing to the east and the Russian bombardment of civilian targets intensifying, Kharkiv residents are now facing what may become the most difficult winter of the entire war, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Defense Technologies Drones

UkraineAlert Dec 11, 2025

Russia’s insistence on a defenseless Ukraine betrays Putin’s true intentions

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s key demands during US-led peace talks all appear designed to leave Ukraine disarmed and defenseless. This is a clear indication of Vladimir Putin’s intention to continue his invasion and complete the conquest of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Dec 9, 2025

Europe’s choice: Fund Ukraine now or pay a far higher price if Russia wins

By Elena Davlikanova, Lesia Orobets

Europe’s reluctance to pay for Ukraine’s defense is shortsighted, write Elena Davlikanova and Lesia Orobets. If Russia’s invasion succeeds, Europe will soon have to boost defense spending to levels that would completely dwarf the current cost of backing Ukraine.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post The only winner from Ukrainian wartime elections would be Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Last week, the White House released its new National Security Strategy (NSS), representing the Trump administration’s view of the world’s greatest challenges—and how the United States can protect its interests. The strategy marks a significant departure in framing from the first Trump administration and has caused a stir in Washington and around the world. Experts at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security dove into the document and graded it based on five criteria.

Matthew Kroenig

Vice president and senior director at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The strategy earns a “B” grade from me. It explains what is new and different, with a new focus on the Western Hemisphere. It reaffirms longstanding principles of US grand strategy, like nuclear deterrence and preventing hostile countries from dominating important regions. It announces new policies for new problems, like how to maintain US technological leadership. On the negative side of the ledger, it dismisses longstanding principles that continue to work, such as promoting democracy and human rights. It also fails to adequately identify the threat posed by revisionist autocracies and a strategy for countering it. 

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

Yes. The strategy identifies the Western Hemisphere as a priority theater for US national security strategy through the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. This is a change from past strategy, and the promise of new economic engagement will be welcomed by countries in the region.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The strategy would have benefited from a dedicated strategic context section. The discussion of the national security threats facing the nation—especially from the “Axis of Aggressors” —are only thinly sketched.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

Yes. The strategy is remarkably clear in its articulation of the goals on page five. This includes defined goals to achieve US dominance in emerging technologies, support allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and counter adversaries in the Western Hemisphere.

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

The strategy lists many principles and activities, but it does not aggregate these up into major lines of effort.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

More so than its predecessors, this strategy does specify clear priorities and rules out activities (like intervention and democracy promotion) that had been part of past strategies. One can debate the wisdom of the prioritization, but the hard-nosed prioritization does make the strategy inherently sustainable. As with all strategic documents, resourcing will be a major challenge to enacting the vision laid out within it.

Nate Freier 

Nonresident senior fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS 25) appears to signal that the United States is no longer the broadly collaborative status quo power that the world has come to rely on since World War II. Instead, it suggests that the United States is now increasingly a more transactional revisionist power intent on altering its relationship with the rest of the world, often explicitly to its near-exclusive benefit. Since World War II, US strategy has generally exhibited an enlightened self-interest, recognizing the tangible and intangible benefits of its being a coalition-builder, a first-among-equals leader, and a reliable heavyweight international arbiter. The first has historically generated exploitable power via strength in numbers and the latter two have often preserved for the United States the right to set agendas and tilt outcomes in its favor. NSS 25 appears to mark a sharp departure from this traditional governing philosophy and, in doing so, engenders significant risk.  

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

In practical terms, NSS 25 is distinct in that it does articulate a clear, unambiguous, and circumspect set of vital interests and priorities. And specifically, for example in the Indo-Pacific, it does at times deliver clear strategic logic as to why continued US commitment is essential. Further, NSS 25 exhibits a novel predisposition to lead with US economic, commercial, and technological advantage as principal competitive instruments. However, there is real risk in its under-defined approach to the often-malign behavior of “larger, richer, and stronger” rival states (e.g., Russia) and their illegitimate employment of the cover of “sovereignty” to prey on vulnerable neighbors and third parties. The strategy also exhibits an explicit abandonment of some timeless US commitments to political liberalization, human rights, and human security as if these are not—even in the context of “flexible realism”—often prerequisites for the long-term security of US interests. 

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Strategic context is the environment against which strategy is applied, within which it unfolds and adapts, and because of which it succeeds or fails. NSS 25 is excessively inward-looking and offers little substance on what is a highly contested competitive environment between rival states. The United States faces ongoing resistance from a combination of its purposeful rivals (e.g.,  the People’s Republic of China and Russia), as well as the environment within which it and they compete for advantage (e.g., physical proximity, structural vulnerability, prolific connectivity, fragile alliances and economies, and domestic and foreign disharmony). US rivals want to weaken the US position, replace the United States as the world’s indispensable great power, and force onerous constraints on US influence where it counts most. NSS 25 harbors real risk in that it focuses on what the United States wants but does not adequately portray the degree to which rivals will exploit strategic conditions, their inherent capabilities, and US action and/or inaction to advance their interests at US expense.  

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

In combination and from a practical standpoint, an interpretation of NSS 25’s description of what the United States should want for itself and what it also wants “in and from the world” provides an adequate picture of this administration’s direction. However, it is critical that goals match context. Context should, after all, flag the kinds of hazards and opportunities that help define and realistically shape goals. Thus, NSS 25’s limited articulation of context and the lack of substance attending this gap makes it difficult to adequately assign value to the strategy’s goals in isolation. Nonetheless, as a practical matter—save for what might be called the strategy’s rebalance to the Western Hemisphere—NSS 25’s goals at home and abroad are by themselves clear and, for the most part, consistent with traditional US security objectives. But there are risks embedded in the goals. For example, the strategy’s explicit rebalance to the Western Hemisphere and its softer, more conditional commitment to European defense and security have the potential to trigger horizontal rival escalation in perceived vacuums of US interest and commitment, as well as unfavorable ally and third-party bargaining with rivals as US activism is perceived in retreat.  

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

In some combination of NSS 25’s “Priorities,” as well as the “how” embedded in its description of regional approaches, one can discern actionable lines of effort. The “Enlist” and “Expand” elements of Western Hemisphere strategy and the three elements described under Asia (“Leading from a Position of Strength,” “Economics,” and “Deterring Military Threats”) have within them testable hypotheses for success and broad approaches to achieving it. However, NSS 25 would benefit from a more coherent design that is animated by a thorough description of the context within which it is to be implemented. Context, goals, and lines of effort, after all, provide a singular theory of the case. As described earlier, the degree to which economics dominate the amended US approach to Asia is notable and novel. But success here would seem to rely on a distinctively US commercial line of effort lying substantially outside the traditional control of US decisionmakers. Novel can be a strength and weakness. At minimum, novel here suggests an area of risk that merits significant alignment in a coherent strategic design with other complementary lines of effort where the risk associated with underperformance is mitigated by the potential for acceleration in adjacent efforts more under US policymaker control.    

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

Overall, this is a high-risk strategy. At times, it is stripped down and minimalist. And, therefore, the prospects of the United States achieving its limited objectives are better than are the chances for success in pursuit of more expansive and ambiguous strategic ends. However, the real risk here is in the strategy’s broad thrust. As US decision makers implement a strategy that so explicitly rethinks and rescopes the United States’ global role, they should expect that those who have either relied on or resisted US influence will themselves recalculate their strategic choices in ways that ignite a disruptive and unfavorable realignment of actors and forces within the international system. Further still, there are troubling elements of values erosion, ethno-centrism, and cultural shaming throughout the strategy that—when operationalized—have the potential to change how the world sees the United States, as well as the degree to which the actors upon whom the United States relies are willing to cooperate with it. 

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident senior fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The Trump NSS is a powerful break from thirty-five years of US strategies that promise to prioritize everything and end up prioritizing nothing. With shrinking resources and public aversion to global entanglements, the NSS provides defined, manageable, and clear US national interests and places them in a strategic framework that can serve to advance US strategy.  

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The Trump administration’s NSS is a fundamental break with three decades of US strategy. The document is unlike anything put forward by a US administration since the end of the Cold War. Rather than assume that the United States has limitless global interests, the NSS seeks to undertake a difficult and needed referencing of “ways” and “means,” ultimately giving priority to those regions and tasks deemed most essential to core US interests. By seeking prioritization, and making the concomitant difficult choices, the NSS is truly unique and the most definitionally “strategic” document produced by the US government since 1991. 

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The NSS accurately reflects a more constrained strategic environment, with less material resources and public support for international engagement that is ancillary to core US interests. By focusing on the “basics,” and starting with defense of the homeland and working outward, the NSS refuses to accept that US strategy must ceaselessly expand to meet global challenges rather than picking and choosing which global challenges are most directly tied to US interests. The focus on the Western Hemisphere, and the unique threat posed by extra-hemispheric actors like China, is decades overdue; the NSS makes plain that protection of the homeland and the hemisphere and the pursuit of US interests in the Indo-Pacific are interwoven for the foreseeable future.  

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The NSS’s goals are clear: defend the homeland; defend the Western Hemisphere, particularly from extra-hemispheric actors; prevent the rise of a dominant hegemon in Eurasia; and secure a free and open Indo-Pacific. This is a crisp, thoughtful, and calibrated elucidation of the central challenges facing US policymakers, and it forces Washington to ask difficult questions about commitments and obligations outside of these core tasks.  

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of US foreign policy activities?

The NSS is the most prioritization-focused strategy produced by the US government since 1991. The challenge facing implementers of the NSS will come down to interpreting and crafting policy responses for the main lines of effort mentioned. For instance, when extra-hemispheric powers meddle in the Western Hemisphere, what should be the US response? What level of Chinese influence is acceptable, and how should it be addressed? These are the types of questions, below the level of grand strategy, that force policymakers to make difficult decisions in real time.  

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The most difficult part of any strategy, and particularly one as different from the recent past as this NSS, is implementation. Not only will there be extraordinary institutional resistance in Washington, and in allied and partner capitals, to this dramatic reorientation of US policy; there will also be the pressure of world events that frequently pull policymakers, even those dedicated to changing course, into unwanted entanglements. To execute this strategy, the Trump administration will require discipline to resist the “noise” of day-to-day news and focus with determination on prioritizing the core US interests named in the NSS.  

New Atlanticist Dec 5, 2025

Experts react: What Trump’s National Security Strategy means for US foreign policy

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts delve into the newly released document outlining the Trump administration’s principles and priorities for US foreign policy.

Defense Policy Politics & Diplomacy

Memo to… Sep 9, 2025

Memo to Congress: Capabilities matter more than numbers for US forces in Korea

By Adam Kozloski, Markus Garlauskas

When it comes to the US military presence in South Korea, what the US force is capable of doing matters more than exactly how many troops are stationed there. As the US Senate and House draft this year’s must-pass National Defense Authorization Act, they should focus on requirements, not setting a floor for USFK.

Scorecard Oct 14, 2022

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: What grade does Biden’s National Security Strategy get?

By Atlantic Council

Our strategy experts praised the document for being clear-eyed about the challenges posed by Russia and China, but downgraded it for a lack of focus as well as concerns about how to implement its ambitious aims.

National Security Politics & Diplomacy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: Grading Trump’s second National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Colleagues from the Atlantic Council and I spent two intense days in Warsaw this week, meeting with senior officials, former officials, entrepreneurs, executives, and experts from across Poland’s divided and contentious political spectrum. We also met with the newly arrived US Ambassador Tom Rose. This came after four days in Prague and meetings with Czech senior civilian and military officials, and with the new US Ambassador Nicholas Merrick.

News of the rail line sabotage broke the last day of our Warsaw visit. Russian sabotage and aggression against Europe—drone and fighter jet overflights; attacks against Baltic Sea cables; and various incidents in Germany, Czechia, Poland, and other countries—are not new. Everywhere we went, Poles spoke, quietly and earnestly, of the possibility of war returning to their country. Poland, like its neighbors in Central Europe, has enjoyed more than a generation of peace, democracy, and rapidly increasing prosperity. To many of the Poles we spoke with, these times may soon seem like the “before times” of wistful memory.

The Poles are neither alone nor “Russophobic” or alarmist. Senior German officials, burned and now wiser after their long and futile search for accommodation with Putin’s Russia, now speak in similar terms. The head of Germany’s intelligence service, Bruno Kahl, testified in October to the Bundestag about the possibility of a Russian attack on Europe. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has spoken of the possibility of open conflict with Russia as early as 2026.

What then should Europe and the United States do about this trend of actual and suspected Russian aggression? This was the question that formed the basis of many of our discussions in Warsaw and Prague.

First, Europe and the United States need to face the music. Putin is not interested in doing business with the United States or Europe except on his terms, terms that include a demand for tacit recognition of his empire acquired through war. He will not break with China; he will not do a “deal” for peace in Ukraine, except when faced with insurmountable strength. His aggression against Europe is intended to intimidate the West into stunned acquiescence while he seeks to reverse the fall of the Soviet and Russian empires.

The Trump administration has spent a lot of energy pushing for a sustainable settlement of the war in Ukraine. And rightly so. The core of the administration’s outline of a settlement could work: a cease-fire in place and security for Ukraine, with Europe in the lead but with strong US backup. But the US administration still sends mixed messages, seemingly reflecting different schools of thought within it. That won’t do. The Trump team needs to be as steady and internally united in its pushback against Putin’s aggression as it has been against Iran and other adversaries.

Second, Europe needs to get real, and fast, about doing more for its own defense. The Trump administration has often, and rightly, put that in terms of a push for greater European spending on its military. That push has met with success in the form of NATO’s agreement at its 2025 Hague summit to a target of 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense, broken down into 3.5 percent on “hard” military expenditures and 1.5 percent on associated defense spending.

But spending is an input, and the output in military capability is what matters. We spent much of our time meeting with business executives from the Czech and Polish defense sectors, talking about the rapidly changing technological challenge of new weapons such as drones and the need to move fast from a sluggish peacetime procurement cycle to rapid turnaround. That’s no abstract challenge but an immediate necessity.

Fortunately, there is good news coming from Central Europe. High-tech start-ups that move fast, working with Ukrainians to apply battlefield lessons to production, are springing up all over both countries. Some are small. Others are mid-sized and growing fast. Still others, such as one Czech company we met with, are already investing in large-scale military production, including in the United States. A Polish firm is building state-of-the art reconnaissance satellites and launching them on SpaceX rockets.

One big task for these companies is to scale up and work with their US and European counterparts to turn topline defense spending into frontline military capacity. The United States can help. The United States and Europe have been sparring over trade and risk looking at their respective defense industries on what sometimes seem like zero-sum terms. That won’t do, especially in the face of the near-term danger of Russian aggression. To use the vocabulary of the Trump administration, there are a lot of good deals to be done in the defense sector. By helping remove barriers to technology transfer, defense trade, and investment, the United States can do the right thing for common security and make good money along the way.

Third, the United States and Europe can tighten the screws on Russia’s economy. The Trump administration has finally introduced its first new Russia sanctions, on the energy giants Rosneft and Lukoil. Now the administration must enforce them. And if it turns out that Russia is behind the latest attack on Polish rail lines, the United States and Europe should scale up sanctions. A full financial embargo, with limited and defined exceptions, might be a good place to start.

Fourth, the United States and Europe should speed up provision to Ukraine of weapons to target Russian infrastructure. And they can consider asymmetrical measures to counter Russian physical sabotage. These can be covert, but Russia should not have the luxury of taking action against the West without fear of countermeasures.

Even a brief visit to Warsaw, with its history of wartime destruction, communist oppression, and present prosperity and vulnerable peace, can concentrate the mind. Poles, whatever their politics, look to the United States, whatever its politics. And the Poles are pulling their weight on defense, with other Europeans starting to do the same. Putin represents the latest incarnation of the old adversary of the twentieth century—an aggressive tyranny. He’s on the march. But countries of the free world have good options if they will take them.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

The post Dispatch from Warsaw: How to respond as Putin ratchets up the pressure appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Food, society, and politics
• Food security in the Americas
• Drivers of change in the Americas and beyond
• Toward a food-secure future
• Conclusion
• About the authors

Introduction

Food security is at the core of national, regional, and global security. When societies are food secure, they stand a much greater chance of social and political stability; when they are food insecure, the opposite is true. Fortunately, the Western Hemisphere—the Americas—is a food-secure region. Although access to food is an ongoing challenge deserving greater attention in every country (as there are hungry people across the hemisphere), food abundance generally characterizes the Americas. Historically, the hemisphere has owed its unique position to several factors: a favorable natural resource base; equally benign geopolitical conditions; and extensive public and private cooperation to improve production methods and support innovation.

However, the future is not guaranteed to look like the past. Several key drivers of change are afoot that could alter the trajectory of hemispheric food security. These drivers bring with them uncertain outcomes, alternatively threatening the stability and productivity of current agrifood systems or offering hope that they could become even stronger and more resilient in the years to come.

This report assesses the future of food in the Western Hemisphere. It focuses on the major uncertainties that are driving change in the agrifood systems within the hemisphere and the world. These drivers represent risks or opportunities, and sometimes both. They include the decline of healthy and stable ecosystems, rapidly changing geopolitics, the erosion of multilateral institutions, increasingly inflationary and volatile food prices, the promise of innovation and emerging technologies, and generational shifts in farming and agricultural production.

These forces are not siloed. Rather, they intersect. There might be an awareness that these individual drivers of change represent obstacles to (or opportunities for) achieving durable food-security solutions in the future, yet many leaders see them as isolated challenges rather than as intersecting ones, obscuring the bigger picture.

The drivers discussed in this report therefore are not just accumulating layers of risks and opportunities. Rather, their interaction multiplies the system’s dynamism. This emerging dynamism will require policymakers, business leaders, investors, and farmers to find innovative solutions in the face of a rapidly changing, and not entirely predictable, agrifood landscape. Yet such outlooks may not arise. Complacency is a big risk, if leaders believe that the status quo will continue to improve, requiring changes only at the margins. In such a situation, the hemisphere would become far more vulnerable to unexpected shocks because there would not be enough appreciation for how ecological, technological, geopolitical, and institutional changes are reshaping the future.

This concern is not hyperbolic. A very recent external shock—the COVID-19 pandemic—erased major progress that the hemisphere had made on reducing hunger, which should remind us that the foundations of food security remain shaky. Looking ahead, there is little margin for error, as even moderate shocks can have profound consequences.

Food, society, and politics

Food security is at the core of national, regional, hemispheric, and global security. When societies are food secure, they stand a much greater chance of social and political stability; when they are food insecure, the opposite is true.

This axiom, although a simple one, has been demonstrated time and again throughout history. High food prices occasioned by war, poor harvests, or high taxation of the peasantry (or all three) preceded the onset of the French Revolution in 1789 and the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, to name just a couple of famous examples from history.

Today, despite far greater agricultural production at national and global levels, such disturbances still recur with alarming frequency: The 2007–2008 food riots across Africa followed commodity price spikes for agricultural inputs (oil, principally) that inflated the price of food; the 2010–2011 Arab Spring was preceded by food-price spikes owing to multiple breadbasket harvest failures across several world regions; and Russia’s war in Ukraine, which disrupted wheat, fertilizer, and natural gas exports, blocked the flow of agricultural inputs and outputs and dramatically raised food prices globally. Millions of additional people became food insecure around the world.

No other good has such an impact on society and politics as food because people need to eat every day. “Food riots are as old as civilization itself,” as one food security analyst summarized the impact of food on social and political stability. Often, it will only take a single big food-price shock to change social and political dynamics within a country or even an entire region. Although high food prices have a disproportionately negative impact on vulnerable, poor, and fragile countries, they also can have an outsized impact on otherwise wealthy and stable ones. Japan offers a recent example. In July 2025, soaring rice prices in Japan directly contributed to the defeat of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party in parliamentary elections.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) adopted a definition of food security at the 1996 World Food Summit (see box 1 for the history of the concept), which has persisted with only slight revision:

• Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.

This definition contains four main dimensions, or pillars:

1. The physical, supply-side availability of food, typically assessed at the national level and consisting of domestic agricultural production plus food imports.
2. Household access to food, which is dependent on household incomes and food prices (set by a combination of market and nonmarket forces).
3. Nutritional intake by individuals, which is not the same thing as caloric intake; nutrition depends in part on dietary diversity.
4. Stability of the first three pillars over time.

A couple important pieces of the food security puzzle are missing from this formulation. One is ecological stability. Food security depends on the sustainability of the underlying Earth systems that are essential to food production. Maintaining the integrity of these Earth systems, including the integrity of the world’s soils, water, biodiversity, nutrients, and atmospheric conditions (precipitation and temperature, primarily), is critical. A second missing piece is the stability of the international systems, specifically stability of a rules-based trading order that ensures that food moves easily from food-surplus to food-deficit countries. Such a trading order improves food security through enhancing agriculture productivity and (under emergency conditions) enables swift distribution of humanitarian aid in the form of food. Such a system helps to avoid trade conflicts and establishes international norms for the notion that food security is in the collective interest and responsibility of all parties.

The capacity of the current international system to encourage global production and trade in food has increased over time, dramatically so over the past several decades: The FAO reported that in 2021, the world traded some 5,000 trillion kilocalories of food, more than double the amount that it did in 2000. A central piece of this equation has been the existence of key multilateral institutions that have had the credibility and authority to provide a forum for states to negotiate trade agreements, resolve trade disputes, and monitor and enforce commitments.

None of these conditions should be treated as a given. Looking ahead, the odds are high that the world will become more dynamic rather than less so, with no guarantee that dynamism will have more upside than downside. To adapt and thrive within changing conditions (with both positive and negative impacts), the world’s agrifood systems will need to become more resilient and adaptable. The good news is that humankind has the tools—or can develop the necessary tools—to ensure such outcomes.

Food security in the Americas

The Western Hemisphere is in a fortunate position regarding agriculture and food. Its natural endowment is significant, consisting of arable soils and plentiful rainfall distributed across numerous regions suitable for agriculture (temperate, subtropical, and tropical). The hemisphere’s highly productive agriculture benefits from relatively stable political and economic environments, medium-to-high income levels, and reasonably well-functioning domestic and international markets, all stimulated by public, private, and academic sector investments in agricultural research and development (R&D).

As a result, the hemisphere’s aggregate production capacity in both staple and specialized crops gives it an indispensable role in providing domestic food security but also meeting the world’s food needs.

There are several caveats to this picture, which this report endeavors to make clear. First, several driving forces are changing baseline conditions that will alter the hemisphere’s future, for better or worse. Second, the Americas might be fortunate in many respects, but it is not a single bloc of countries acting in unison. Trade disputes, unfortunately, are becoming a sharper and more common part of the hemisphere’s diplomatic landscape, for example. Finally, as this report also makes clear, food security is not just about supply-side agricultural production. Food insecurity remains a problem in the Americas as it does everywhere in the world.

Supply side: Agricultural production
in the Americas

The five largest primary crop producing countries (by tonnage) in the world are all in the Americas: Brazil, the United States, Argentina, Mexico, and Canada. As shown in table 1 and figure 1, the hemisphere also contains top exporters of all four primary crops: soybeans, corn, wheat, and rice. The largest producers of food in the Americas are, therefore, critical for ensuring global food security. What happens in the region matters greatly, because developments in the Americas have an outsized effect on global trade in food.

In addition to the largest primary crop producers, the Americas also lead in the production of a wide range of specialty crops, including coffee, avocados, lemons, limes, oranges, blueberries, cranberries, quinoa, almonds, and more. Numerous countries in the hemisphere are leading producers of these crops. For example, Peru is in the top three global producers of avocados, blueberries, and quinoa, while Colombia is a leading global producer of coffee, sugar cane, avocados, and agave fibers.

For many countries in the Americas, agriculture continues to be a critical piece of their national economies. As shown in figure 2, agriculture’s share of gross domestic product (GDP) is above five percent in most countries and is above ten percent in a handful of countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. Over the 2023–2024 period, agriculture’s share of Brazil’s GDP was 6.24 percent while its agricultural exports represented nearly half (49 percent, at $164 billion) of Brazil’s total exports by value. Both figures demonstrate the spectacular growth in Brazil’s intensive farming, especially of soybeans (see also box 2).

Demand side: calories and nutrition

The FAO’s definition of food security, which is broadly accepted among experts, emphasizes that food security is as much about access and affordability, especially by vulnerable populations, as it is about the aggregate production of food. If people cannot access a nutritious diet at affordable and stable prices, they will not be food secure.

In recent decades, the Western Hemisphere has gradually decreased its level of food insecurity. In comparative terms, it has done well. Between 1990 and 2015, for example, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) was the only region in the world to reduce hunger by half.

As shown in table 2, the FAO’s latest data indicates that the Western Hemisphere continues to be relatively food secure. Over 2022–2024, the two major subregions in the Americas, North America on the one hand and LAC on the other, performed better than the world average. This is reflected in several key metrics related to the reduction of caloric intake of food, in particular undernourishment (calorie deprivation over time), severe food insecurity (a measurement of households going without food for periods of time), and the prevalence of wasting in small children (an indicator of undernourishment). On metrics related to poor diets such as overweight and obesity (both of which are indicators of too many calories rather than too few), the Americas performed less well.

These outcomes are consistent with levels of wealth. Although an oversimplification, as national wealth increases, per capita consumption of food rises. Most countries in the Americas are classified by the World Bank as either high- or upper middle-income countries. (Note, however, that lower-income populations, including those within both lower- and higher income economies, are at increasing risk of obesity, in part due to easy availability of inexpensive processed foods with low nutritional value.)

There are several countries in the Americas that underperform. According to the FAO, over half (54.2 percent) of Haitians are undernourished, while just 10.7 percent of adults are obese (compared with over 40 percent of US citizens); Haiti is the most fragile state in the Americas. Although undernourishment is much lower across the hemisphere now than in previous decades, it nonetheless remains high in several countries including Bolivia (21.8 percent), Honduras (14.8 percent), Ecuador (12.1 percent), and Guatemala (11.8 percent).

There is a gendered dimension to deprivation, with women being more likely to be food insecure than men. This difference worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic, increasing to a 3.3 percent gap between the genders in Latin America in 2021, before reducing again by 2024. In North America, the gap has worsened every year since 2020, from 0.1 percent in 2020 to 0.5 percent in 2024.

Drivers of change in the Americas and beyond

Strategic foresight asserts that the future likely will not conform to our expectations. It is risky to assume that the future will consist of a simple linear extrapolation of one or two current trends. Hence, the discipline focuses as much on the intersections of the drivers that together will drive multiple possible futures. Food security in the Americas is no different, as there are several significant intersecting drivers of change that will
shape the hemisphere’s future.

Changing ecology

Ecological risks are among the greatest threats to food security in the Americas. A rapidly changing climate creates the primary set of risks, from rising heat and worsening drought and flooding. Other ecological risks exist as well in specific subregions, for example deforestation, biodiversity loss, and soil erosion and degradation.

Of these changing ecological conditions, perhaps the worst for agricultural production is the combination of drought and heat, or “dry-hot” conditions. Trend data show that such conditions are becoming more frequent and intense. An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study of drought patterns, released in July 2025, found that the share of land globally exposed to drought has doubled since 1900.

Dry-hot conditions threaten to become more frequent across the Americas. In North America, for example, scientists estimate that the now decades-long megadrought that has impacted northern Mexico and the southwestern United States might be the worst in 1,200 years. In South America, the frequency of dry, hot, and flammable weather has increased across much of the continent since the early 1970s. Such changes are highly consequential for agriculture. A 2021 study, for instance, showed that increases in Brazil’s dry-hot conditions, combined with the impacts of deforestation on temperature and rainfall, have already pushed 28 percent of the country’s agricultural land beyond its optimum productive range, with further projections of 51 percent by 2030 and 74 percent by 2060.

One of the more discouraging climate-driven outcomes is the possibility, even probability, of future multiple breadbasket failures (i.e., “simultaneous harvest failures across major crop-producing regions” around the world). Climate change likely will make such failures more common in the future. A 2021 study projected that the probability of multiple harvest failures globally was “as much as 4.5 times higher by 2030 and up to 25 times higher by 2050.”21 Another, focusing on the impacts that oscillations such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) might have under future warming, concluded that shifting ENSO and NAO patterns might “expose an additional 5.1–12% of global croplands” to such oscillations, with strong ENSO/NAO negative phases “likely to cause simultaneous yield losses across multiple key food-producing regions.”

The Americas, home to several of the world’s major producers of staple crops including soybeans, corn, and wheat, faces the possibility of multiple breadbasket failures. It is entirely possible that in the years to come, severe dry-hot conditions could strike simultaneously in the United States, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. The consequences for agricultural production and global food security would be enormous.

A changing climate also will negatively impact most—perhaps all—of the other crops grown across the Americas. Coffee and banana production, to name just two examples, likely will be severely affected by increased heat and altered precipitation patterns. A recent scientific study conducted by the University of Exeter forecasts that 60 percent of the regions currently producing bananas—including regions in Central America—will be unable to do so before the end of this century, owing principally to increased temperature. The world will not have to wait nearly that long to see such effects because climate-driven impacts are already occurring. In 2024, the FAO reported a 38.8 percent annual increase in global coffee prices “primarily driven by supply-side disruptions, stemming from adverse weather conditions” including drought, heat, and flooding in major coffee-producing countries including Brazil, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

Because farmers are on the receiving end of changing ecological conditions, it is critical to understand how they are impacted by such change and how they process those changes.

Doing so will assist in defining the policy and investment options with the greatest likelihood of mass adoption on farms and in farming communities. Farmers will be impacted differently depending on where in the hemisphere they farm, their farm sizes and resources (financial and otherwise), whether they are subsistence farmers or integrated into national, regional, and global markets, and the types of crops they grow. Taken together, farmers do not experience changing ecological conditions in the same way at the same time. Smallholder farmers in poorer settings, for example, will be at greatest risk from climate-driven impacts given the small size of their landholdings and a lack of access to insurance and other sources of resilience. It follows that farmers’ perceptions of ecological impacts on their farming operations will not follow a straight line. Farmers will parse the impacts of environmental hazards such as drought, heat, or flooding differently.

In sum, ecological change dramatically increases the risk of declining crop yields while shifting the locations where crops can be grown. Potentially, ecological change with impacts at scale could generate significant shortfalls in global food supply, causing market panics, high prices, hoarding, and a breakdown of trade. Food insecurity would spike.

Geopolitical and geoeconomic turbulence

A second set of risks stems from rising geopolitical and geoeconomic competition and uncertainty. An open, rules-based trading system has been essential to improving hemispheric and global food security. Trade in that system has precipitated more economic integration of the region—more bilateral trade and investment agreements, greater investment flows, and exchange of technical know-how—which benefits food security via higher economic growth, greater employment opportunities and rising incomes, poverty reduction, and general economic dynamism. It also has allowed governments to see that a set of policies, including more focus on innovation and competitiveness and less on trade distortions and protectionism, is the best path forward.

Yet this trajectory is now subject to geopolitical risk. Over the past two decades, the global food trading system has been disrupted by several significant events including wars and related phenomena (e.g., civil strife, terrorism). Such events generate (largely) unanticipated shocks to agricultural inputs, supply chains, and agrifood exports, resulting in higher production prices and, therefore, consumer prices. The most well-known and significant of these events is the full-scale war in Ukraine, which upon its onset in 2022 immediately resulted in higher global prices for key commodities including natural gas and nitrogen fertilizers (because Russia is the world’s third ranking natural gas exporter and natural gas is a critical input for nitrogen fertilizers); potash fertilizers (primarily from Russia and Belarus) and wheat (before the war, Ukraine was the world’s seventh-largest wheat exporter).

Although global input markets, for example for fertilizers, are broadly resilient, at the same time they also clearly are affected by geopolitical turbulence arising from trade policies, sanctions, shocks such as wars, and other phenomena. While the war in Ukraine is an important case, it hardly exhausts the list of current examples. In July 2025, the World Bank said that sanctions and restrictive trade policies “are playing an increasingly significant role in reshaping global fertilizer markets,” citing China’s discretionary export restrictions on nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers to protect its domestic agriculture, and the European Union’s (EU) June 2025 tariffs against Belarusian and Russian fertilizers to reduce EU dependence on these countries.

An even more difficult problem is the risk that the hemispheric and global agrifood trading system is returning to a protectionist order, which risks the benefits that have accrued since the emergence of a rules-based trading model in the 1990s for agriculture established under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 1994 Agreement on Agriculture. Under that model, countries tended to place high tariffs only on a few politically sensitive crops (such as sugar or cotton). Yet today’s rising protectionism is much broader, affecting a larger number of crops, including staple crops, and implemented by an ever-longer list of countries. The result is likely to undermine food security by increasing food prices—with impacts falling most harshly on poor households—and reducing profitability by raising both producers’ and exporters’ costs, lowering investment and decreasing productivity.

Over the past several decades, the largest agricultural producers in the Americas, including the United States and Brazil, have become the world’s largest agrifood exporting nations. Southern Cone states have pushed agricultural exports as key pieces of their export-led growth strategies, especially to China given its rapidly growing demand for commodities. With such a high dependence on global agricultural exports, the biggest agricultural producers in the Western Hemisphere ought to be the most heavily invested in a global agrifood free-trading regime. Tariff and nontariff barrier uncertainty negatively impacts agrifood producers, processors, distributors, and consumers.

These disruptions have other distorting effects. Trade patterns within the Americas, and between the Americas and the rest of the world, are shifting because of trade tensions. China’s behavior in international agricultural markets is a significant example, with direct relevance to the Western Hemisphere. A decade ago, China imported more agricultural goods from the United States than from Brazil; today, China imports almost twice as much from Brazil as from the United States, including in soybeans and corn. China’s shift toward non-US sources (including but not limited to Brazil) began even before the 2018 trade dispute with the United States. In addition to supply diversification, China also has dramatically increased its stockpiling of food (grains, soybeans, and frozen meat), which it defines as a strategic good.

Further, China’s decoupling from the US agricultural market has had major consequences for trade patterns in that it has helped Brazil become the world’s largest exporter of soybeans. Since the 2018 Sino-American trade dispute, Brazil’s global soybean exports have increased by 40 percent, while those from the US have remained flat.

Geopolitical and geoeconomic turbulence has distorting effects on global trade in food. The biggest concern for global food security is the impact on food prices, both in terms of inflation but also price variability. Such turbulence also can generate trade disputes and, therefore, contribute to fractured relations among states. After the United States levied tariffs in August 2025 of up to 50 percent against certain Brazilian agricultural goods including coffee, beef, and sugar, Brazil immediately asked the WTO for consultation, arguing that the tariffs violate international trade rules. A likely immediate effect of the tariffs is to hasten Brazil’s interest in developing alternative markets for its agricultural products, including with China. A second and (often) underappreciated concern is that unstable trade rules and fluctuating market access make it more difficult for farmers to plan and make production and investment decisions, increasing their economic uncertainty.

Geopolitical tensions and rising trade protectionism are also likely to lead to slower economic growth. This is important because in the Americas, as everywhere, economic growth coupled with rising incomes are keys to increased food security. If slower economic growth combines with higher food prices owing to increasing trade friction, then there is a greater risk of more food insecurity in the future. International food trade is being shaped increasingly by geopolitical considerations rather than market signals, thereby realigning trade patterns in unpredictable ways.

Institutional uncertainty

Multilateral institutions are a hallmark of the current international order. Most of the world’s biggest and most important institutions that exist today were created after 1945. Although not without criticism, much of it deserved, these institutions have been central to building a global order which has delivered unprecedented—if also uneven—prosperity. When it comes to trade, the data say as much: Today’s global trade is 45 times by volume and 382 times by value greater than it was in 1950. Moreover, since the mid-1990s, global trade growth has accelerated, averaging 4 percent growth by volume annually and 5 percent by value.

However, the multilateral institutions that have facilitated this growth in trade now are under enormous pressure from all sides. One reason is that the world’s largest trading powers as well as many smaller ones have been willing to bend or even break established norms and international trade law. China, for example, has taken advantage of its status as a developing country under the WTO to engage in unfair practices, including massive subsidies, heavy use of state-owned enterprises, forced technology transfer, and protection of its domestic market (for example, limiting foreign companies’ and investors’ access to its technology and financial markets).36 Further, the United States is preventing the WTO’s Appellate Body from functioning as designed, preventing the organization from enforcing its own rules.

Such developments are important because they create uncertainty surrounding trading rules and thereby increase friction among countries when it comes to trade. Even worse, these developments create space wherein the breaking of rules by some countries prompts others to believe they can as well. Both India and Indonesia, for example, recently have taken advantage of the lack of a functioning Appellate Body to
implement policies that likely are in violation; Indonesia instituted a ban on nickel exports (to induce nickel processors to relocate to Indonesia) while India heavily subsidized steel and pharmaceuticals. By some estimates, two-thirds of initial WTO rulings made about trade disputes have been appealed, but the Appellate Body cannot convene itself.

The decline of multilateral institutions is significant because the Americas benefit more than other regions from an open global trading system in agricultural goods, per table 1 above. Agriculture always has been a controversial topic in trade negotiations, extending back to the origins of the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the 1940s. Despite this fact, functional multilateral institutions are valuable because
they create a stable, rules-based global marketplace that in turn enables trade in food at scale.

In sum, a breakdown of multilateral institutions and rising protectionism portend headwinds for agriculture in the years to come, increasing risks and possibly disincentivizing investments by farmers. Such developments erode the open agrifood trading system that globalization made possible. The Americas have utilized open trade to expand agriculture production and exports and, therefore, is most at risk from the unraveling of that system

Price inflation and variability

The price of food is a core metric for food security: For the world’s consumers, the most desirable food prices are both low and stable over time. Food insecurity is made worse when the opposite applies: rapid price inflation combined with high price variability. Unfortunately, as shown in figure 3, the latter situation has characterized global food prices for much of the past quarter century.

Since the 2000s, shocks have occurred with such frequency that prices settle on a new higher baseline rather than returning to previous levels. The FAO noted this trend as early as 2009: Prior to the 2006–2008 global food-price shock, “real prices [in food had] shown a steady long-run downward trend punctuated by typically short-lived price spikes.” But by the mid-2000s, the FAO observed, this trend no longer held. As of 2008, its own food-price index “still averaged 24 percent above 2007 and 57 percent above 2006.” Indeed, as shown in figure 3, since the mid-2000s, global food prices have risen to a new and higher level after each exogenous shock. The most recent global shocks—the COVID-19 pandemic followed by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine—has had the greatest impact on sustained high food prices.

The upward trend in the price of food has important implications for food security around the world. Food is less affordable; households have more difficulty consuming a healthy diet, and they are forced to switch to less nutritious foods and/or reduce their total consumption of food. This cost-of-living crisis erodes food security gains and threatens to make societies less stable.

Food-price inflation and volatility is as problematic in the Americas as elsewhere in the world, increasing food insecurity and becoming a key social and political issue. In Latin America, rising food prices have been a major driver of inflation across the region. In some cases, such as Argentina, food prices have contributed to extreme inflation rates. In North America, food prices also continue to rise and are a major cause of the cost-of-living crisis experienced by many households.

Investment: Innovation, technology, and infrastructure

Public- and private-sector investments in on- and off-farm innovation and productivity have been critical enablers of modern agrifood systems. A question to be answered in the years to come is whether such investments will increase agricultural productivity and sustainability enough to match or exceed demand-side pressures for more food (from population and income growth), even as baseline conditions from other drivers—ecological, institutional, geopolitical—become more challenging.

Historically, on- and off-farm innovation and productivity increases, which stem from process and technological developments plus infrastructural improvements, have been fundamental to increasing the supply of food to meet rising demand. Since the 1990s, global efficiency gains have been the largest contributors to global growth in agricultural output. Efficiency gains have far outstripped the other contributors, including the use of more inputs per hectare of land, greater extension of irrigation to cropland, and expansion of new agricultural land (e.g., expansion of agriculture into previously forested lands).

In agriculture, efficiency is gauged using total factor productivity (TFP), a metric of inputs relative to outputs. If total on-farm output (e.g., volume of crops produced) is growing faster than inputs (defined as labor, capital, and material resources), then TFP is increasing.

That is the good news. The bad news is that global TFP growth is now slowing. After steadily increasing from a 0.55 percent annual growth rate during the 1970s to a peak of 1.97 percent annual growth rate in the 2000s, TFP has since fallen back to 1.1 percent annually (figure 4). Within the Americas, the picture is even more dire. Between 2011 and 2020, TFP increased by only 0.9 percent annually in Latin America and the Caribbean. In North America, typically at the global forefront in productivity and efficiency gains, TFP grew over the same period by just 0.2 percent annually. The Americas significantly lagged the global average (figure 5).

The decline in TFP over the past fifteen years is a worrisome development, as it threatens to undermine progress toward an elusive goal, which is to produce enough food to meet growing global demand while simultaneously retaining on-farm profitability and reducing environmental impact. Analysts at the US Department of Agriculture recently made this argument. “At the global level,” they wrote, “improvements in agricultural productivity have not been rapid or universal enough to make a significant dent in the effect of agriculture on the environment.” If TFP were to continue to slow down in the future, the impact “could [negatively] affect food prices, [lead to] the expansion of agriculture into more natural lands, and [threaten] global food security.”

Nor is underinvestment in innovation the only form of investment risk. Despite the hemisphere’s reliance on trade in agriculture and food, infrastructure across much of the Americas remains underdeveloped. The so-called infrastructure gap in the Americas refers to how the hemisphere’s ports, railways, bridges and roads, telecommunications, and other forms of infrastructure are insufficiently robust in kind, quality, and/or maintenance. In 2021, for example, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimated that countries in Latin America and the Caribbean alone would need to invest $2.2 trillion in “water and sanitation, energy, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure” to meet the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. The IDB’s estimate included not just funds for new infrastructural investment but for maintenance and replacement as well (at some 41 percent of the total).

North America is not exempt from this problem, as both Canada and the United States face large infrastructure deficits. As is well-known, for decades the United States has largely underinvested in infrastructure. Despite passage of the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which directed the federal government to spend some $1.2 trillion over five years on infrastructure, investment levels in the United States will remain insufficient absent systematic changes in how funds are raised by local, state, and federal governments.

Likewise, in Canada, the infrastructure deficit, which is estimated at $196 billion, is of particular importance to that country’s globally important agricultural exports, which include foodstuffs such as grains (wheat, principally) and key agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, largely produced in the country’s vast interior. Getting bulky grains and inputs to external markets more cheaply and efficiently will require Canada to upgrade its transport infrastructure, including railway lines, bridges, and ports, which are key in all circumstances but especially so during periods when unexpected disruptive factors, such as recent port labor strikes or extreme weather events, create choke points that necessitate rerouting. The recent announcements by the government of Canada to expand the Port of Montreal is a step in the right direction. However, significantly greater ambition will be required to push Canada’s infrastructure investments to levels comparable to other leading OECD countries.

Policymakers, the private sector, farmers, investors, and the scientific and technological communities will need to find solutions to these challenges. Doing so will require some combination of enhanced public and private investment in on- and off-farm infrastructure, R&D, improved piloting and scaling of new technologies, and implementation of policies to encourage farmers to become more innovative, productive, and efficient.

Demographic shifts

Agricultural employment as a share of global GDP has been trending downward for decades, owing to the ongoing mechanization of farmwork, increasing urbanization and industrialization, and other factors. According to the World Bank, in 1991, 43 percent of the world’s population was employed in agriculture. By 2023, that figure had fallen by almost half, to 26 percent.

The Western Hemisphere has followed this trendline. In Latin America and the Caribbean, agricultural employment fell over the same 1991–2023 period from 21 percent to 13 percent and in North America from 2.8 percent to 1.6 percent. As can be expected, given differences in income levels, structure of national economies, and crop specialization, there are widespread differences in agricultural employment across the hemisphere. In 2023, several countries still had employment levels in agriculture above 20 percent: Haiti (by far the most, at 45 percent), Ecuador, Guatemala, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru, and Honduras. In contrast, the hemisphere’s biggest producers of staple crops—the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina—are all well below the global average of 26 percent, in most cases in low single digits.

This demographic transition underscores how agriculture is becoming more capital-intensive and productive: more food is being produced per person employed in the sector. The largest food producers also typically have the lowest share of farmers and agricultural workers employed in the national economy, as the United States, Canada, and Argentina all show (each is at less than 2 percent of their populations employed
in agriculture).

However, there is a generational downside to this demographic trend: farmers worldwide are aging in part because on-farm employment opportunities are declining. The trend appears to be worse in the wealthiest regions having the smallest share of employment in agriculture. In the EU, for example, only 11.9 percent of farmers were under forty years old in 2020.52 In the United States, only 9 percent were under thirty-five years of age in 2022.

Toward a food-secure future

The world needs a bold new way of thinking about food security, one that incorporates a comprehensive understanding of how divergent forces, including those identified in this report, are creating a dynamic and unsettled agrifood landscape that will shape the future in unpredictable ways. To avoid negative future scenarios and increase the odds of positive ones, what is needed is a shift in the prevailing debate about food security that incorporates all these driving forces. That debate should stress that these forces combine in important and not entirely predictable ways to disrupt agrifood systems.

Such an outlook recognizes, for example, that geopolitical tensions add risk to other phenomena such as climate change to make an already perilous situation more difficult.

Policymakers and other leaders across the Americas should recognize that these drivers intersect and combine, in turn reshaping the hemisphere’s agrifood outlook. The challenge is clear: They will need to develop strategies and design policies that will lead to resilient and sustainable food systems that minimize the impact of shocks—both natural and human-made—on the production, distribution, and access to food.

Ecology

As stated above in the introduction, a central challenge will be to ensure that food production can remain profitable and resilient in the face of disruptive change. Ecological changes and the environmental resources that the world relies upon for productive and healthy agriculture systems are critical pieces of this equation.

A key task concerns how best to frame this problem for policymakers, business leaders, and farmers, to relay that ecological changes threaten to undermine progress toward a food-secure future. How these stakeholders act through policies, investments, and practices to mitigate and adapt to ecological changes will go a long way to determining whether the hemisphere’s future is food secure or insecure.

Farming is inherently uncertain because of the vagaries of weather and disease, so efforts to minimize the instability caused by ecological changes, including climate change, extreme weather, disasters, and other phenomena, will help farmers to manage this complex set of risks. Integration across risks is an important way to frame the problem, not only because the problem itself is multifaceted but so too are the solutions. Synergies among healthy ecosystem services, robust agricultural production, and profitability can be found with the right application of imagination, creativity, policymaking, investment, and on-the-ground application by utilizing input and knowledge from farmers and farming communities.

Agriculture is a major driver of ecological change, including land-use patterns and carbon emissions. Yet at the same time, agriculture also holds enormous potential, under the right domestic and international conditions, to provide robust and lasting solutions. Doing so would require that policymakers, investors, farmers, scientists, and technologists and society writ large coordinate efforts toward effecting scalable change.

Synergistic approaches include a range of alternative farming techniques and practices as well as novel technologies that collectively hold great potential not only to perform at a high level of output but at the same time go some way toward repairing the natural world. These strategies, which overlap in practice, include regenerative agriculture, no-till farming, agroforestry, climate-smart agriculture, and 4R nutrient stewardship practices (referring to nutrient-management practices focusing on the right sources, right rates, right times, and right places for nutrients). Such approaches aim to improve resource efficiency, reduce waste, protect ecosystems and ecosystem services including freshwater sources, soils, and biodiversity, while retaining profitability. Through the more efficient use of resources, carbon sequestration in soils, land and forest conservation, and improved management (for example, of water and waste processes), these strategies also can mitigate the agricultural sector’s significant greenhouse gas emissions.

Although many of these approaches once were considered experimental, novel, and unproven, that is far less the case today. Regenerative farming, for example, now has more adherents (including farmers) who believe that the diverse methods falling under it deliver tangible environmental benefits without sacrificing on-farm yields—a claim that is also drawing greater financial-sector interest and investment. A global survey of farmers, conducted in 2024 by McKinsey and Company found that over three-quarters of farmers in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and the United States were adopting no-till or reduced tillage practices. Farmers’ willingness to adopt these and other regenerative practices were “underpinned by economics,” according to McKinsey, with respondents in the Americas ranking increased yields as their primary motive for adoption, followed by lower production costs and additional revenue streams.

There is an enormous amount of land worldwide and in the Americas that could be revitalized through such approaches. Land degradation, which by extension means the degradation of the world’s soils, is a massive problem. The world is losing at least one hundred million hectares of productive land each year, with some forecasts suggesting up to 95 percent of the world’s arable land could be in some kind of degraded state
by 2050.

In the Americas, degradation is a serious problem but also a big opportunity for soil and land regeneration. Brazil alone has enormous swathes of degraded pastureland. Embrapa, Brazil’s agricultural research agency, estimated in 2024 that the country has approximately twenty-eight million hectares of degraded pastureland (classified as intermediately or severely degraded). Bringing this land back into production using regenerative methods would help alleviate forest conversion pressures in Brazil’s Cerrado and Amazon regions.

One important consideration for policymakers is that if trade in agriculture and food becomes more costly, there is a risk that the fiscal capacity to invest in policies to make agrifood systems more productive and resilient in the face of ecological change will be reduced. Hence, this report focuses on understanding how these issues are linked and addressing them through greater international cooperation to promote more sustainable and resilient agrifood systems.

Trade, geopolitics, and institutions

Rising protectionism and geopolitical competition undermine the incentives for states to cooperate. Trade tensions risk spilling over into diplomatic tension, eroding international trust. In such conditions, states will be less likely to collaborate, which can sour international relations. If the world’s biggest economies are becoming more protectionist and eschewing a rules-based trading system, a zero-sum world returns, with many states, concerned by protectionist measures placed on them from elsewhere, believing they must adopt such policies. More dialogue among states, not less, is an antidote.

An increasing number of governments around the world appear to no longer see the equation in these terms. China, for example, is seeking greater self-reliance in food through stockpiling and other measures. It also has weaponized tariffs for its own purposes, imposing large tariffs on grain imports from Australia and more recently on Canada. These are not isolated incidents but part of how China exercises its power, given its outsized impact on world markets.

As articulated in this report, global trade in food depends on the strength of multilateral institutions and international agreements. These institutions are often underappreciated contributors to global food security. Today these institutions are being eroded by rising geopolitical and diplomatic conflict and other forces. The rapid rate of their erosion is worrisome.

Despite the WTO’s flaws—of which there are many—it remains valuable because it has the reach and standing to create and enforce global trading rules. Yet the organization is failing at doing so, in large part because of its own rules (decisions are made by consensus) and even more so because the largest trading countries no longer want to abide by a rules-based system. The risk is a collapse of the entire multilateral trading system. “The reversal of global economic integration [if the multilateral trading system were to fail] would bring with it growing lawlessness, conflict, and disorder in the global economy,” one scholar writes, and with it “the international system at large.”

One aim should be to build alternative institutions within the hemisphere consisting of states having the critical mass to achieve desired outcomes. One such solution would be to mimic the Group of Seven and Group of Twenty, two examples of institutions that bring leaders from the world’s largest economies together to attempt to coordinate solutions to various global challenges. One possibility would be to start with just the largest agricultural producers in the hemisphere—an “A5” consisting of the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina—to bring agriculture ministers together for systematized dialogue about hemispheric trade. Dialogue outcomes might include regional food-security compacts that generate commitments to invest in agricultural research leading to breakthrough technologies (“agtech”), to avoid the most trade distorting policies (export bans, for example), and more.

A related idea is to construct a standing (as opposed to episodic) hemispheric food security council to bring willing governments together for discussing responses to future shocks, identifying pathways for greater scientific and technological cooperation, and buttressing the norm regarding the hemisphere’s responsibility to the rest of the world as a major food supplier. Hemispheric institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and Inter-American Development Bank can be leveraged to convene this council, given their credibility in addressing hemispheric affairs, including in trade. Using the inter-American system to convene a hemispheric food security council consisting of foreign, environment, and agriculture ministers—alongside representatives from industry and producer groups—should appeal to a wide set of stakeholders.

Investment in innovation, technology, and infrastructure

The constant improvement of on- and off-farm activities, including innovative use of new technologies and processes, and capital investment in the phenomena that enable them (including infrastructure), are central to ensuring that the hemisphere and the world are food secure. Innovation and investment also are critical components of agrifood systems that not only are productive but also sustainable and resilient, given
the need to prepare for climate-driven shocks in the future. Innovative technologies and processes, and the infrastructure that undergirds them, can build redundancy and efficiency into the agrifood system in anticipation of such shocks.

Regenerative agriculture and other agrifood systems focused on sustainability can be enhanced through the application of advanced technologies. Examples include:

• Alternative energy sources can enhance on- and offfarm systems while reducing carbon footprints.
• Geospatial remote sensing tools for precision farming can identify and help safeguard ecological assets.
• Robotics and mobile digital technologies (including deeper integration of handheld devices into farming practices) can improve agricultural efficiencies while reducing environmental impact.
• AI-driven analytics can integrate and utilize data streams from numerous applications.

Such technologies will become more critical in the future, as ecological changes make farming more difficult. Rising heat, for example, will create harsher working conditions for farm labor, in turn requiring machines and other technologies to alleviate workers’ outdoor exposure during periods of extreme heat.

Biotechnologies should be added to this list, given their promise to improve on-farm productivity and nutrient use efficiency while protecting ecological assets such as soils and water. Biofertilizers, for example, aim to improve soil fertility and nutrient use efficiency through application of living organisms including bacteria, fungi, and algae, with crop yields increasing by an estimated 10 percent to 40 percent. They also help
plants withstand abiotic stressors, some brought on by climate change, including drought, salinity, and extreme temperatures.

How can governments, the private sector, and other actors together ensure that the right mix and scale of investments are being made that will lead to innovative technologies and processes across the hemisphere’s agrifood systems? Additionally, how can they ensure that innovative technologies and processes are transformative at all scales, including for the hemisphere’s millions of smallholder farmers in addition to its largest producers? Some technologies and processes are more suitable for large-scale applications because of high cost or other considerations, for example. Improving access to the benefits of such technologies will require improved pathways for dissemination of knowledge, practical know-how, access to capital, and other services (e.g., training).

Every year, researchers at Virginia Tech produce the Global Agricultural Productivity Report, which tracks and analyzes TFP trends. The 2025 version asserts that reversing the decline in TFP growth—including low growth in the Americas—will require five “policy, investment and research priorities,” which are:

• Invest more in strengthening and expanding multistakeholder dialogues, agriculture extension services, and incentive structures for technology transfer to smallholder farmers.
• Expand access to markets for all participants in the agrifood value chain, including smallholder farmers.
• Strengthen trade as it “enhances competitive prices” which incentivizes investment in improved inputs and technologies” while facilitating “the exchange of knowledge, innovations, and best practices across borders, driving productivity gains.”
• Reduce food loss and waste.
• Invest in public-private partnerships, joint ventures, knowledge sharing agreements and platforms, and interdisciplinary research.

These types of innovative practices have real impact on agrifood systems at every level, down to the farm itself. Innovation delivers new seeds and crop varieties, creates more efficient production methods, solves practical problems faced by farmers (pests and disease), and creates new markets for goods and services provided by farmers (such as using sugarcane to produce ethanol to reduce carbon emissions of transport
fuels).

Farmers are both users and creators of innovative technologies and processes, so their knowledge and experience should be included in robust feedback loops. Moreover, farmers must be able to adopt and utilize innovative technologies and processes to realize their full positive contributions. This is not an automatic process, as on-farm adoption is not the same thing as laboratory invention. When making investment decisions, farmers are businesspersons, concerned about the upfront costs and return on investment (ROI). Global surveys of farmers indicate they are hesitant to adopt new technologies and processes if the technologies and processes are unfamiliar or they face high initial investment costs or uncertain ROI.

Publicly funded agricultural extension programs, which connect researchers at universities and other institutions to farmers—in the process, enabling mutual learning and successful technology transfer—are critical to improving agtech adoption. Maintaining and strengthening extension services (including public funding) should be central to any country’s aspiration to build world-class agrifood systems based on widespread technology and process adoption by farmers.

Improving infrastructure to strengthen agrifood supply chains is also critical, especially as higher temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, more frequent and powerful disasters, and other problems will put more infrastructure—e.g., ports, bridges, roads, railroads, canals— at risk. Ports are especially at risk, with most food trade moving by cargo ships. The Panama Canal, which in recent years has had low water levels due to Central American drought, is a good example. (Chinese ownership of port facilities also has proven controversial in the United States.) Beyond adaptation measures designed to improve individual pieces of infrastructure, there is much need for strategies that will frame the challenge in terms of societal and even transboundary (international) resilience. Canada, for example, in 2023 released a whole-of-society National Adaptation Strategy that emphasizes the need to make physical infrastructure (and communities) more resilient to climate-driven impacts.

Farmers for the future

Ensuring a food-secure future in the Americas must place human beings at its center. This formula long has been the focus on the demand side of the food-security equation: The goal always is to ensure that all humans always have access to affordable and nutritious food.

Yet the same logic also holds on the supply side of the equation. To avoid the demographic decline of farming amid the chronic aging of the world’s farmers, it is imperative that farming be made financially, socially, and culturally attractive to younger generations. Unfortunately, such conditions are not prevalent in many countries (perhaps most) around the world. The reasons for this are many. To young people, particularly those without a family heritage in agriculture, farming can be perceived as backward, unprofitable, difficult, alien, or uncool—or all the above.

There is no single set of recognized solutions to assist in turning the demographic trendlines around. However, evidence from around the world suggests that a combination of interventions, some obvious and others not so much, might suffice. The obvious ones are to make it easier to gain access to farming in the first place by reducing barriers to entry (access to affordable financing or access to farmland through ownership or long-term contract), and closing knowledge and skills gaps through on-farm training programs, scholarships, and apprenticeships. There are less obvious interventions, too. One such intervention is to incentivize nontraditional candidates to enter farming, for example, young women, in addition to traditional candidates (typically men). Another is to stress the increasingly important role played by digital technologies, robotics, big data and remote sensing, artificial intelligence, and other technical applications that appeal to tech-savvy and ambitious young people.

Although none of these solutions will guarantee a demographic rebound in farming, there are examples of where the curve has been bent toward youth. Brazil’s farmers are getting younger rather than older. They appear to be attracted by the prospect of getting rich in Brazil’s booming, forward-facing, and tech-savvy industry.

Conclusion

The issues outlined in this report should be seen as a starting point for discussion. The challenges and the opportunities facing agrifood systems in the Americas in the coming decades will be profound. A central question is whether the hemisphere’s key actors—governments, farmers, the private sector, researchers, foundations, civil society groups, and the public—will be willing to invest in the transformative processes and approaches that will reduce risk while increasing prosperity, sustainability, and resilience.

This report has put great emphasis upon generating productive dialogues among key stakeholders. Promoting the diffusion of critical innovations for food security will be an important piece of this process. It is imperative that governments and multilateral institutions in the hemisphere find financing and pool technological know-how to support programs tailored to meet the needs of the region.

Beyond that, however, it is critical that nongovernmental stakeholders, including investors, the private sector, researchers, scientists, analysts, farmers, and farming communities, act in concert with one another. They must themselves build the transnational dialogues to assist in envisioning, creating, and strengthening the tools that will be needed to ensure a food-secure future.

This report was produced by the Atlantic Council with support from The Mosaic Company as part of the Food security: Strategic alignment in the Americas project.

Peter Engelke is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security as well as a senior fellow with its Global Energy Center. His diverse work portfolio spans strategic foresight; geopolitics, diplomacy, and international relations; climate change and Earth systems; food, water, and energy security; emerging and disruptive technologies and tech-based innovation ecosystems; and demographics and urbanization, among other subjects, and he is the creator of the Council’s most widely read long-form publication series, Global Foresight. Engelke’s previous affiliations have included the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the Robert Bosch Foundation, the World Economic Forum, and the Stimson Center.

Matias Margulis is associate professor of the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs and a faculty member of Land and Food Systems at the University of British Columbia. His research and teaching interests are in global governance, development, human rights, international law, and food policy. In addition to his academic research, Margulis has extensive professional experience in the field of international policymaking and is a former Canadian representative to the World Trade Organization, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.

The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

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Introducción

La seguridad alimentaria está en el núcleo de la seguridad nacional, regional y global. Cuando las sociedades tienen garantizado el acceso a los alimentos, poseen una probabilidad mucho mayor de mantener la estabilidad social y política; cuando carecen de ella, sucede lo contrario. Afortunadamente, el hemisferio occidental—las Américas—es una región con seguridad alimentaria. Aunque el acceso a los alimentos sigue siendo un desafío constante, la abundancia alimentaria caracteriza en general a las Américas, gracias a una base favorable de recursos naturales, condiciones geopolíticas benignas y una amplia cooperación pública y privada orientada a mejorar los métodos de producción y fomentar la innovación. 

Sin embargo, el futuro podría no parecerse al pasado. Varios factores clave de cambio podrían alterar la trayectoria de la seguridad alimentaria hemisférica, amenazando la estabilidad y productividad de los actuales sistemas agroalimentarios o, por el contrario, ofreciendo esperanza de que estos se vuelvan aún más sólidos y resilientes. Estos factores incluyen el deterioro de ecosistemas sanos y estables, la rápida transformación de la geopolítica, la erosión de las instituciones multilaterales, la creciente inflación y volatilidad de los precios de los alimentos, la promesa de la innovación y las tecnologías emergentes, y los cambios generacionales en la agricultura y la producción agropecuaria. 

Aunque estas fuerzas se cruzan, muchos líderes las perciben como desafíos aislados. Su interacción multiplica el dinamismo del sistema, lo que exigirá que los responsables de políticas públicas, líderes empresariales, inversionistas y agricultores encuentren soluciones innovadoras frente a un panorama agroalimentario que cambia rápidamente y cuyo futuro no es del todo predecible. 

Alimentación, sociedad y política 

Ningún otro bien tiene un impacto tan profundo en la sociedad y la política como los alimentos, porque las personas necesitan comer todos los días. A menudo, basta con un solo gran aumento en los precios de los alimentos para alterar las dinámicas sociales y políticas dentro de un país o incluso de toda una región. Aunque los precios altos de los alimentos afectan de manera desproporcionada a los países vulnerables, pobres y frágiles, también pueden tener un gran impacto en naciones que, en principio, son ricas y estables. 

La definición estándar de seguridad alimentaria, adoptada en 1996 por la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura (FAO) y solo ligeramente revisada desde entonces, establece que: 

La seguridad alimentaria existe cuando todas las personas, en todo momento, tienen acceso físico, social y económico a alimentos suficientes, inocuos y nutritivos que satisfacen sus necesidades dietéticas y preferencias alimentarias para llevar una vida activa y sana. 

Sin embargo, faltan algunos elementos importantes en esta formulación de la seguridad alimentaria. Uno de ellos es la estabilidad ecológica. La seguridad alimentaria depende de la sostenibilidad de los sistemas naturales de la Tierra que son esenciales para la producción de alimentos. Un segundo elemento es la estabilidad del sistema internacional, específicamente la estabilidad de un orden comercial basado en normas que garantice que los alimentos puedan desplazarse fácilmente desde los países con excedentes hacia aquellos con déficits alimentarios. 

Estas condiciones no deben darse por sentadas. Mirando hacia el futuro, es probable que el mundo se vuelva más dinámico y menos estable, con aspectos tanto positivos como negativos. Para prosperar, los sistemas agroalimentarios mundiales deberán volverse más resilientes y adaptables. 

Seguridad alimentaria en las Américas 

El hemisferio occidental desempeña un papel indispensable en la seguridad alimentaria global. 

Lado de la oferta: Producción agrícola en las Américas 

Los cinco países con mayor producción primaria de cultivos (por tonelaje) en el mundo se encuentran todos en las Américas: Brasil, Estados Unidos, Argentina, México y Canadá. El hemisferio también cuenta con los principales exportadores de los cuatro cultivos básicos: soya, maíz, trigo y arroz. Además, las Américas producen una amplia variedad de cultivos especializados, entre ellos café, aguacates, limones, limas, naranjas, arándanos, cranberries, quinua, almendras y muchos más. 

La agricultura continúa siendo un componente esencial de las economías nacionales en las Américas. La participación de la agricultura en el PIB supera el 5% en la mayoría de los países y llega a más del 10% en algunos de ellos. 

Lado de la demanda: Calorías y nutrición 

La definición de seguridad alimentaria de la FAO subraya que, si las personas no pueden acceder a una dieta nutritiva a precios estables y asequibles, no se puede hablar de seguridad alimentaria. 

En las últimas décadas, el hemisferio occidental ha reducido gradualmente su nivel de inseguridad alimentaria. En términos comparativos, ha tenido un buen desempeño. Entre 1990 y 2015, América Latina y el Caribe fue la única región del mundo que logró reducir el hambre a la mitad. Actualmente, el hemisferio presenta mejores resultados que el promedio mundial en cuanto a subalimentación, inseguridad alimentaria severa y prevalencia de emaciación infantil (niños pequeños con bajo peso). 
(Aunque varios países tienen un rendimiento inferior, como Haití, Bolivia, Honduras, Ecuador y Guatemala.) 

En los indicadores relacionados con dietas poco saludables, como el sobrepeso y la obesidad, las Américas muestran un desempeño menos favorable. 

Finalmente, las mujeres en las Américas son ligeramente más propensas que los hombres a sufrir inseguridad alimentaria. 

Factores de cambio en las Américas y más allá

La seguridad alimentaria en las Américas enfrenta varios factores de cambio significativos que se cruzan e interactúan entre sí. 

Cambio ecológico 

Los riesgos ecológicos se encuentran entre las mayores amenazas para la seguridad alimentaria. Los principales riesgos incluyen el cambio climático, la deforestación, la pérdida de biodiversidad y la erosión y degradación del suelo. Quizás la amenaza más grave para la producción agrícola sea la combinación de sequía y calor extremo, condiciones “secas-calientes” que se volverán más frecuentes tanto en el mundo como en las Américas. 

Una posibilidad desalentadora para el futuro es la aparición de fallas simultáneas en múltiples regiones productoras de granos básicos (“fallas en las canastas de pan” del mundo). Las Américas, hogar de varios de los principales productores mundiales de cultivos básicos, enfrentan esta posibilidad. El cambio climático también afectará negativamente a la mayoría de los cultivos especializados, incluidos el café y los plátanos. 

Los agricultores se verán afectados de manera diferente dependiendo de dónde trabajen dentro del hemisferio, el tamaño y los recursos de sus fincas (financieros y de otro tipo), si son agricultores de subsistencia o están integrados en los mercados nacionales, regionales y globales, y los tipos de cultivos que producen. Los pequeños agricultores en contextos más pobres estarán en mayor riesgo debido al tamaño reducido de sus parcelas y a la falta de acceso a seguros y otros recursos. 

Potencialmente, los cambios ecológicos con impactos a gran escala podrían generar importantes déficits en el suministro mundial de alimentos, provocando pánicos en los mercados, precios altos, acaparamiento y una ruptura del comercio internacional. La inseguridad alimentaria se dispararía. 

Turbulencia geopolítica y geoeconómica 

Un segundo conjunto de riesgos proviene de la incertidumbre geopolítica y geoeconómica creciente. Un sistema comercial abierto y basado en normas ha sido esencial para mejorar la seguridad alimentaria, al fomentar una mayor integración económica que, a su vez, contribuye a la seguridad alimentaria mediante mayor crecimiento económico, más empleo, aumento de ingresos, reducción de la pobreza y dinamismo económico. 

Sin embargo, el sistema mundial de comercio de alimentos ha sido perturbado por varios acontecimientos geopolíticos importantes, incluyendo guerras (como la de Ucrania), políticas comerciales y sanciones que generan choques imprevistos en los insumos agrícolas, las cadenas de suministro y las exportaciones agroalimentarias, lo que resulta en mayores costos de producción y precios de los alimentos. 

El sistema agroalimentario mundial podría estar regresando a un orden proteccionista previo a los años 1990, cuando los países solían aplicar aranceles elevados solo a unos pocos cultivos políticamente sensibles (como el azúcar o el algodón). Hoy, el proteccionismo emergente es mucho más amplio, afecta a un número mayor de cultivos y lo implementa una lista cada vez más larga de países. 

Los patrones comerciales también están cambiando debido a la geopolítica. El comportamiento de China es un ejemplo significativo. Hace una década, China importaba más productos agrícolas de Estados Unidos que de Brasil; hoy, importa casi el doble de Brasil que de EE. UU. La desvinculación de China del mercado agrícola estadounidense ha ayudado a que Brasil se convierta en el mayor exportador mundial de soya. 

Además, después de que Estados Unidos impusiera aranceles en agosto de 2025 a ciertos productos agrícolas brasileños, Brasil probablemente intensificará su interés en desarrollar mercados de exportación alternativos, incluidos los acuerdos con China. 

Incertidumbre institucional 

Las instituciones multilaterales han contribuido a generar una prosperidad sin precedentes—aunque desigual—al fomentar el comercio global y hemisférico. Sin embargo, hoy estas instituciones están bajo una enorme presión. Las principales potencias comerciales del mundo, junto con muchas naciones más pequeñas, han estado dispuestas a romper normas establecidas y leyes internacionales de comercio, creando una gran incertidumbre en torno a las reglas comerciales. 

Las Américas se benefician más que otras regiones de un sistema global de comercio agrícola abierto. La agricultura siempre ha sido un tema controvertido en las negociaciones comerciales, desde los orígenes del Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio (GATT) en la década de 1940. A pesar de ello, las instituciones multilaterales funcionales son de gran valor porque crean un mercado global estable y basado en normas, lo cual posibilita el comercio de alimentos a gran escala. 

Inflación y variabilidad de precios 

La inseguridad alimentaria se agrava con una inflación rápida de precios y una alta variabilidad de precios. Desde los años 2000, los sucesivos choques han generado nuevos niveles base de precios más altos. Los alimentos son menos asequibles, y los hogares enfrentan más dificultades para mantener una dieta saludable. 

La inflación y la volatilidad de los precios de los alimentos son tan problemáticas en las Américas como en otras partes del mundo, y se han convertido en un tema clave social y político. En América Latina, el aumento de los precios de los alimentos ha sido un principal impulsor de la inflación regional, mientras que en América del Norte, el alza de precios ha sido una de las principales causas de la crisis del costo de vida que afecta a muchos hogares. 

Inversión: Innovación, tecnología e infraestructura 

Las innovaciones y aumentos de productividad dentro y fuera del ámbito agrícola —derivadas de los avances tecnológicos, las mejoras en los procesos y las inversiones en infraestructura— han sido fundamentales para aumentar la oferta de alimentos y satisfacer la creciente demanda mundial. 

Desde la década de 1990, las ganancias globales en eficiencia han superado ampliamente otros factores, como el uso de más insumos por hectárea, la expansión del riego en tierras de cultivo o la apertura de nuevas áreas agrícolas (por ejemplo, la conversión de tierras forestales en agrícolas). 

Sin embargo, el crecimiento mundial de la Productividad Total de los Factores (PTF) —una medida de eficiencia que evalúa los insumos agrícolas en relación con los resultados— se está desacelerando. Después de aumentar de forma constante durante décadas, la PTF ha comenzado a caer, especialmente en las Américas. 

Las inversiones en infraestructura en gran parte del hemisferio también siguen siendo insuficientes, con trillones de dólares necesarios para mejorar las redes de transporte, energía y logística. 

Por ejemplo, en Canadá, el déficit de infraestructura, estimado en casi 200 mil millones de dólares, es particularmente relevante para las exportaciones agrícolas de ese país, que incluyen tanto productos alimenticios (como granos) como insumos agrícolas clave (como fertilizantes) producidos en su vasto interior. Reducir los costos y aumentar la eficiencia del transporte de estos bienes hacia los mercados internacionales exigirá modernizar la infraestructura de transporte. 

Cambios demográficos 

El empleo agrícola como proporción del PIB mundial lleva décadas en descenso. El hemisferio occidental ha seguido esta tendencia, lo que demuestra que la agricultura se está volviendo más intensiva en capital y más productiva. 
Hoy se produce más alimento por persona empleada en el sector. 

Sin embargo, existe un efecto generacional negativo asociado a esta tendencia. En todo el mundo, los agricultores están envejeciendo, en parte porque las oportunidades laborales en las fincas están disminuyendo. 
Esta tendencia es más pronunciada en las regiones más ricas, donde la proporción de empleo agrícola es menor, como en la Unión Europea y los Estados Unidos. 

Hacia un futuro con seguridad alimentaria 

El mundo necesita una nueva y audaz forma de pensar sobre la seguridad alimentaria, una que incorpore una comprensión integral de cómo fuerzas divergentes están creando un panorama agroalimentario dinámico e inestable, que moldeará el futuro de maneras impredecibles. 

Ecología 

Un desafío central será garantizar que la producción de alimentos siga siendo rentable y resiliente frente a los cambios ecológicos disruptivos. 
Las sinergias entre los servicios ecosistémicos saludables, una producción agrícola robusta y la rentabilidad pueden encontrarse mediante la aplicación adecuada de imaginación, creatividad, formulación de políticas, inversión y acción práctica, utilizando el conocimiento y la participación de los agricultores y sus comunidades. 

La agricultura es un importante impulsor del cambio ecológico, incluido el uso del suelo y las emisiones de carbono. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, la agricultura posee un enorme potencial —bajo las condiciones nacionales e internacionales adecuadas— para ofrecer soluciones sólidas y duraderas. 

Los enfoques sinérgicos incluyen una amplia gama de técnicas y prácticas agrícolas alternativas, así como tecnologías novedosas, entre ellas: 

• La agricultura regenerativa 
• La siembra directa (no-till farming)
• La agroforestería 
• La agricultura climáticamente inteligente 
• El Manejo 4R de Nutrientes (Right sources, Right rates, Right times, Right places: fuentes, dosis, momentos y lugares correctos para aplicar nutrientes). 

Aunque muchos de estos enfoques se consideraban antes experimentales o no comprobados, hoy eso es mucho menos cierto. Por ejemplo, la agricultura regenerativa cuenta con un número creciente de adeptos —incluidos agricultores— que creen que puede generar beneficios ambientales tangibles sin sacrificar los rendimientos en las fincas. Existe una enorme cantidad de tierras y suelos degradados que podrían revitalizarse mediante estas prácticas.

 
En las Américas, la degradación representa un problema serio, pero también una gran oportunidad. Brasil, por ejemplo, posee vastas extensiones de pastizales degradados que podrían volver a ser productivas utilizando métodos regenerativos, lo que ayudaría a reducir la presión sobre la conversión de bosques en las regiones del Cerrado y la Amazonía. 

Comercio, geopolítica e instituciones 

El aumento del proteccionismo y la competencia geopolítica socavan la cooperación entre Estados y erosionan la confianza internacional. El comercio mundial de alimentos depende de la fortaleza de las instituciones multilaterales y de los acuerdos internacionales, que suelen ser contribuyentes subestimados a la seguridad alimentaria global. Hoy, estas instituciones están siendo erosionadas, y el riesgo es la posible caída de todo el sistema multilateral de comercio. 

Una mayor cantidad de diálogo entre los Estados es un antídoto necesario. 
Un objetivo podría ser la creación de nuevas instituciones regionales, empezando, por ejemplo, con los principales productores agrícolas del hemisferio —un posible grupo “A5” compuesto por Estados Unidos, Brasil, México, Canadá y Argentina— para reunir a los ministros de agricultura en torno al diálogo comercial. 

Los resultados de dicho esfuerzo podrían incluir: 

• Pactos regionales de seguridad alimentaria 
• Compromisos de inversión en investigación agrícola
• Acuerdos para evitar políticas comerciales que distorsionen los mercados 

Una idea relacionada es la creación de un Consejo Hemisférico Permanente de Seguridad Alimentaria, que reúna a los gobiernos para coordinar respuestas a crisis y choques, identificar vías para una mayor cooperación científica y tecnológica, y reforzar la norma que reconoce la responsabilidad del hemisferio como principal proveedor de alimentos para el resto del mundo. Instituciones hemisféricas existentes, como la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA) y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), podrían desempeñar un papel clave en la convocatoria y apoyo de este consejo. 

Inversión en innovación, tecnología e infraestructura

La mejora constante de las actividades dentro y fuera de las fincas —incluyendo el uso innovador de nuevas tecnologías y procesos, así como la inversión de capital en los factores que las posibilitan (como la infraestructura)— es fundamental para garantizar que el hemisferio y el mundo sean seguros en materia alimentaria. 

La agricultura regenerativa y otros sistemas agroalimentarios sostenibles pueden potenciarse mediante la aplicación de tecnologías avanzadas. Algunos ejemplos incluyen: 

• Fuentes de energía alternativas que mejoran las operaciones dentro y fuera de la finca, reduciendo al mismo tiempo la huella de carbono. 
• Herramientas de teledetección geoespacial aplicadas a la agricultura de precisión, que permiten identificar y proteger los activos ecológicos. 
• Robótica y tecnologías digitales móviles (incluyendo una mayor integración de dispositivos portátiles en las prácticas agrícolas) que pueden mejorar la eficiencia y reducir el impacto ambiental. 
• Analítica impulsada por inteligencia artificial (IA), que puede integrar y utilizar flujos de datos provenientes de múltiples aplicaciones. 
• Biotecnologías que mejoran la productividad agrícola y la eficiencia en el uso de nutrientes, al tiempo que protegen activos ecológicos como el suelo y el agua. 

Los agricultores son tanto usuarios como creadores de tecnologías y procesos innovadores, y deben tener la capacidad de adoptar y aprovechar estos avances. Sin embargo, la adopción en el campo no es lo mismo que la invención en laboratorio. 

Las encuestas globales de agricultores muestran que muchos son reacios a adoptar nuevas tecnologías o procesos cuando enfrentan altos costos iniciales de inversión y rendimientos inciertos. 

Por ello, los programas públicos de extensión agrícola, que conectan a investigadores y agricultores para fomentar el aprendizaje mutuo y la transferencia tecnológica, son críticos. Fortalecer los servicios de extensión debe ser una prioridad central para lograr una adopción amplia de innovaciones agrícolas. 

Asimismo, mejorar la infraestructura para fortalecer las cadenas de suministro agroalimentarias es esencial. Se necesitan estrategias que aborden este desafío desde la perspectiva de la resiliencia social e incluso transfronteriza (internacional). 

Los agricultores del futuro 

Para evitar el declive demográfico del sector agrícola, es fundamental que la agricultura se vuelva financieramente, socialmente y culturalmente atractiva para las nuevas generaciones. 

Para muchos jóvenes —especialmente aquellos sin una herencia familiar agrícola—, dedicarse al campo puede parecer anticuado, poco rentable, difícil, ajeno o poco atractivo… o todo lo anterior. 

No existe un conjunto único de soluciones reconocidas para revertir esta tendencia demográfica. Sin embargo, la evidencia global sugiere que una combinación de intervenciones podría ser suficiente: 

• Facilitar el acceso a la agricultura, reduciendo las barreras de entrada, como el acceso limitado al financiamiento asequible y a la tierra cultivable. 
• Cerrar las brechas de conocimiento y habilidades mediante programas de capacitación en campo, becas y programas de aprendizaje. 
• Incentivar la participación de candidatos no tradicionales, como mujeres jóvenes, en la agricultura. 
• Resaltar el papel creciente de la tecnología digital, la robótica, los macrodatos (Big Data), la teledetección, la inteligencia artificial y otras aplicaciones técnicas que resultan atractivas para los jóvenes ambiciosos y con afinidad tecnológica. 

En resumen, el futuro de la agricultura dependerá de su capacidad para integrar la innovación con el atractivo social y económico, de modo que las nuevas generaciones vean en el campo una oportunidad de progreso y liderazgo, no una ocupación del pasado. 

Conclusión breve 

Una cuestión central es si los actores clave del hemisferio —gobiernos, agricultores, sector privado, investigadores, fundaciones, grupos de la sociedad civil y el público— estarán dispuestos a invertir en procesos y enfoques transformadores que reduzcan riesgos a la vez que incrementen la prosperidad, la sostenibilidad y la resiliencia. 

Promover la difusión de innovaciones críticas para la seguridad alimentaria será una parte importante de esta ecuación. Es imperativo que los países y las instituciones multilaterales del hemisferio encuentren financiamiento y compartan el conocimiento tecnológico necesario para apoyar programas adaptados a las necesidades de la región. 

Otros actores no gubernamentales, incluyendo inversores, sector privado, investigadores, científicos, analistas y comunidades agrícolas, también deben actuar de manera concertada para visualizar, crear y fortalecer las herramientas necesarias que aseguren un futuro con seguridad alimentaria. 

Este reporte fue elaborado por el Atlantic Council con el apoyo de The Mosaic Company como parte del proyecto Seguridad alimentaria: alineación estratégica en las Américas

Peter Engelke es experto sénior del Centro Scowcroft para Estrategia y Seguridad del Atlantic Council, y experto sénior del Centro Global de Energía. Su diverso portafolio de trabajo abarca previsión estratégica; geopolítica, diplomacia y relaciones internacionales; cambio climático y sistemas terrestres; seguridad alimentaria, hídrica y energética; tecnologías emergentes y disruptivas y ecosistemas de innovación basados en tecnología; y demografía y urbanización, entre otros temas. Es el creador de la serie de publicaciones extensas más leída del Consejo, Global Foresight. Las afiliaciones previas de Engelke han incluido el Centro de Política de Seguridad de Ginebra, la Fundación Robert Bosch, el Foro Económico Mundial y el Centro Stimson.

Matias Margulis es profesor asociado de la Escuela de Políticas Públicas y Asuntos Globales y miembro de la facultad de Tierras y Sistemas Alimentarios de la Universidad de Columbia Británica. Sus intereses de investigación y docencia se centran en la gobernanza global, el desarrollo, los derechos humanos, el derecho internacional y la política alimentaria. Además de su investigación académica, Margulis tiene una amplia experiencia profesional en el ámbito de la formulación de políticas internacionales y fue representante canadiense ante la Organización Mundial del Comercio, la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos y la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura.

La Iniciativa GeoStrategy, alojada dentro del Centro Scowcroft para Estrategia y Seguridad, utiliza el desarrollo estratégico y la previsión a largo plazo para servir como el principal referente y convocante de análisis y soluciones relevantes para las políticas públicas, con el fin de comprender un mundo complejo e impredecible. A través de su trabajo, la iniciativa se esfuerza por revitalizar, adaptar y defender un sistema internacional basado en normas para fomentar la paz, la prosperidad y la libertad durante las próximas décadas.

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The post El futuro de la alimentación en las Américas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introdução

A segurança alimentar está no núcleo da segurança nacional, regional e global. Quando as sociedades possuem segurança alimentar, elas têm muito mais chances de alcançar estabilidade social e política; quando não a possuem, ocorre o contrário. Felizmente, o hemisfério ocidental — as Américas — é uma região com segurança alimentar. Embora o acesso aos alimentos continue sendo um desafio constante, a abundância de alimentos geralmente caracteriza as Américas, graças a uma base favorável de recursos naturais, condições geopolíticas estáveis e ampla cooperação entre os setores público e privado para aprimorar os métodos de produção e promover a inovação.

Entretanto, o futuro pode não se parecer com o passado. Diversos fatores determinantes de mudança podem alterar a trajetória da segurança alimentar no hemisfério, ameaçando a estabilidade e a produtividade dos atuais sistemas agroalimentares ou, alternativamente, oferecendo a esperança de que esses sistemas se tornem ainda mais fortes e resilientes. Esses fatores incluem o declínio de ecossistemas saudáveis e estáveis, as rápidas transformações na geopolítica, a erosão das instituições multilaterais, o aumento da inflação e da volatilidade dos preços dos alimentos, o potencial da inovação e das tecnologias emergentes, bem como as mudanças geracionais na agricultura e na produção agropecuária.

Embora essas forças se interconectem, muitos líderes as veem como desafios isolados. A interação entre elas multiplica o dinamismo do sistema, o que exigirá que formuladores de políticas públicas, líderes empresariais, investidores e produtores rurais encontrem soluções inovadoras diante de um cenário agroalimentar em rápida transformação — e não totalmente previsível.

Alimentação, sociedade e política           

Nenhum outro bem exerce impacto tão significativo sobre a sociedade e a política quanto os alimentos, pois as pessoas precisam se alimentar todos os dias. Muitas vezes, basta um único grande choque nos preços dos alimentos para alterar as dinâmicas sociais e políticas dentro de um país ou até mesmo em toda uma região. Embora preços elevados de alimentos tenham um impacto desproporcionalmente negativo sobre países vulneráveis, pobres e frágeis, eles também podem afetar de maneira significativa países que, de outra forma, seriam ricos e estáveis.

A definição padrão de segurança alimentar, adotada em 1996 pela Organização das Nações Unidas para a Alimentação e a Agricultura (FAO/Food and Agriculture Organization) e apenas ligeiramente revisada desde então, é:

A segurança alimentar existe quando todas as pessoas, em todos os momentos, têm acesso físico, social e econômico a alimentos seguros, nutritivos e em quantidade suficiente para atender às suas necessidades dietéticas e preferências alimentares, permitindo uma vida ativa e saudável.  

Algumas peças importantes do quebra-cabeça da segurança alimentar estão ausentes nesta formulação. Uma delas é a estabilidade ecológica. A segurança alimentar depende da sustentabilidade dos sistemas terrestres subjacentes, essenciais à produção de alimentos. A segunda é a estabilidade do sistema internacional, especificamente a estabilidade de uma ordem comercial baseada em regras, que garante que os alimentos possam se mover com facilidade de países com excedentes para países com déficits alimentares.

Essas condições não devem ser tratadas como garantidas. Olhando para o futuro, é provável que o mundo se torne mais dinâmico — e não o contrário — com ganhos e perdas. Para prosperar, os sistemas agroalimentares globais precisarão se tornar mais resilientes e adaptáveis.

Segurança alimentar nas américas

O hemisfério ocidental desempenha um papel indispensável na segurança alimentar global.

Lado da oferta: Produção agrícola nas Américas

Os cinco maiores países produtores de culturas agrícolas primárias do mundo (em volume) estão todos nas Américas: Brasil, Estados Unidos, Argentina, México e Canadá. O hemisfério também abriga os principais exportadores das quatro principais culturas globais: soja, milho, trigo e arroz. Além disso, as Américas produzem uma ampla variedade de culturas especiais, incluindo café, abacate, limões, limas, laranjas, mirtilos, cerejas, quinoa, amêndoas e outras.

A agricultura continua sendo uma peça fundamental das economias nacionais nas Américas. Em grande parte dos países, sua participação no PIB é superior a 5%, e em alguns casos ultrapassa 10%.

Lado da demanda: Calorias e nutrição

A definição de segurança alimentar da FAO enfatiza que, se as pessoas não tiverem acesso a uma dieta nutritiva a preços acessíveis e estáveis, elas não estarão em situação de segurança alimentar.

Nas últimas décadas, o hemisfério ocidental reduziu gradualmente seu nível de insegurança alimentar. Comparativamente, teve um bom desempenho. Entre 1990 e 2015, a América Latina e o Caribe foram as únicas regiões do mundo a reduzir a fome pela metade. Atualmente, o hemisfério apresenta desempenho superior à média mundial em indicadores de desnutrição, insegurança alimentar grave e prevalência de emagrecimento em crianças pequenas, (embora vários países apresentem desempenho inferior, incluindo Haiti, Bolívia, Honduras, Equador e Guatemala). Em métricas relacionadas a dietas inadequadas, como sobrepeso e obesidade, as Américas tiveram desempenho menos favorável.

Por fim, as mulheres nas Américas têm uma probabilidade ligeiramente maior do que os homens de enfrentar insegurança alimentar.

Fatores de transformação nas américas, e além

A segurança alimentar nas Américas enfrenta diversos fatores significativos e interconectados de transformação.

Transformações ecológicas

Os riscos ecológicos estão entre as maiores ameaças à segurança alimentar. Os principais riscos incluem mudanças climáticas, desmatamento, perda de biodiversidade e erosão e degradação do solo. Talvez o mais preocupante para a produção agrícola seja a combinação de seca e calor — as chamadas condições “quentes e secas” — que ameaçam se tornar mais frequentes em todo o mundo e nas Américas. Um cenário desanimador para o futuro é a ocorrência de múltiplas falhas nas “breadbaskets” (quebras simultâneas de safra em regiões produtoras de grãos-chave). As Américas, que abrigam vários dos principais produtores mundiais de culturas alimentares básicas, enfrentam essa possibilidade. As mudanças climáticas também terão impacto negativo sobre a maioria das culturas especiais, incluindo café e bananas.

Os agricultores serão impactados de maneiras diferentes, dependendo de onde se localizam no hemisfério, do tamanho e dos recursos de suas propriedades (financeiros e de outra natureza), de serem agricultores de subsistência ou estarem integrados aos mercados nacionais, regionais e globais, e dos tipos de culturas que cultivam. Os pequenos produtores em contextos menos favorecidos estarão sob maior risco, devido ao tamanho reduzido de suas propriedades e à falta de acesso a seguros e a outros recursos.

Potencialmente, transformações ecológicas com impactos em larga escala podem gerar déficits significativos na oferta global de alimentos, provocando pânico nos mercados, elevação de preços, acúmulo de estoques e colapso do comércio. A insegurança alimentar aumentaria drasticamente

Turbulência geopolítica e geoeconômica

Um segundo conjunto de riscos decorre da crescente incerteza geopolítica e geoeconômica. Um sistema comercial aberto e baseado em regras tem sido essencial para o avanço da segurança alimentar, promovendo maior integração econômica — o que beneficia a segurança alimentar por meio de crescimento econômico mais elevado, maior geração de empregos, aumento de renda, redução da pobreza e dinamismo econômico.

Ainda assim, o sistema global de comércio de alimentos tem sido impactado por diversos eventos geopolíticos significativos, incluindo guerras (como a guerra na Ucrânia), políticas comerciais e sanções que geram choques inesperados sobre insumos agrícolas, cadeias de suprimentos e exportações agroalimentares — resultando em aumento dos custos de produção e dos preços dos alimentos.

O sistema de comércio agroalimentar pode estar retornando a uma ordem protecionista anterior aos anos 1990, quando os países costumavam aplicar tarifas elevadas apenas sobre algumas culturas politicamente sensíveis (como açúcar ou algodão). O protecionismo atual, no entanto, é significativamente mais amplo, afetando um número maior de culturas e sendo implementado por uma lista cada vez mais extensa de países.

Os padrões de comércio estão se transformando em função da geopolítica. O comportamento da China é um exemplo significativo. Há uma década, a China importava mais produtos agrícolas dos Estados Unidos do que do Brasil; atualmente, importa quase o dobro do Brasil em relação aos EUA. Esse processo de desacoplamento da China em relação ao mercado agrícola norte-americano contribuiu para que o Brasil se tornasse o maior exportador mundial de soja. Além disso, após a imposição de tarifas pelos Estados Unidos, em agosto de 2025, sobre determinados produtos agrícolas brasileiros, é provável que o Brasil intensifique seu interesse em desenvolver mercados de exportação alternativos para produtos agrícolas, incluindo a China.

Incerteza institucional

As instituições multilaterais têm contribuído para proporcionar uma prosperidade sem precedentes — embora desigual — ao impulsionar o comércio global e hemisférico. No entanto, essas instituições estão agora sob enorme pressão. As maiores potências comerciais do mundo, assim como muitos países menores, têm demonstrado disposição para romper normas estabelecidas e leis internacionais de comércio, gerando incertezas em torno das regras que regem o sistema comercial.

As Américas se beneficiam mais do que outras regiões de um sistema global de comércio aberto de produtos agrícolas. A agricultura sempre foi um tema controverso nas negociações comerciais, desde a origem, na década de 1940, do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio (GATT/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Apesar disso, instituições multilaterais funcionais são valiosas, pois criam um mercado global estável e baseado em regras, que, por sua vez, possibilita o comércio de alimentos em larga escala.

Inflação e volatilidade dos preços

A insegurança alimentar se agrava com a rápida inflação de preços e a elevada volatilidade dos preços. Desde os anos 2000, choques geraram novos patamares mais altos de preços. Os alimentos se tornaram menos acessíveis, e as famílias enfrentam maior dificuldade para consumir uma dieta saudável.

A inflação e a volatilidade dos preços dos alimentos são tão problemáticas nas Américas quanto em outras regiões do mundo, tornando-se uma questão social e política fundamental. Na América Latina, o aumento dos preços dos alimentos tem sido um dos principais impulsionadores da inflação em toda a região, enquanto na América do Norte, o aumento dos preços dos alimentos é uma das principais causas da crise do custo de vida enfrentada por muitas famílias.

Investimento: Inovação, tecnologia e infraestrutura

A inovação dentro e fora das propriedades rurais, aliada ao aumento da produtividade, decorrentes de avanços processuais e tecnológicos, além de melhorias na infraestrutura, têm sido fundamentais para aumentar a oferta de alimentos e atender à crescente demanda. Desde a década de 1990, os ganhos globais de eficiência superaram amplamente os demais fatores, incluindo o uso de mais insumos por hectare de terra, a extensão da irrigação em áreas cultivadas e a expansão de novas terras agrícolas (por exemplo, a expansão da agricultura em áreas anteriormente florestadas).

Infelizmente, o crescimento global da Produtividade Total dos Fatores (PTF — métrica de eficiência que relaciona os insumos agrícolas aos resultados obtidos) está desacelerando. Após décadas de crescimento contínuo, a PTF passou a registrar queda, especialmente nas Américas.

Os investimentos em infraestrutura em grande parte das Américas também permanecem subdesenvolvidos, sendo necessários trilhões de dólares para impulsionar a infraestrutura do hemisfério. No caso do Canadá, por exemplo, o déficit de infraestrutura — estimado em cerca de US$ 200 bilhões — é particularmente relevante para as exportações agrícolas do país, que têm importância global. Essas exportações incluem produtos alimentares como grãos e insumos agrícolas essenciais, como fertilizantes produzidos no vasto interior canadense. Para viabilizar o transporte desses produtos volumosos aos mercados externos de forma mais barata e eficiente, será necessário modernizar a infraestrutura logística do país.

Mudanças demográficas

A participação do emprego agrícola no PIB global vem diminuindo há décadas. O hemisfério ocidental tem seguido essa tendência, evidenciando que a agricultura está se tornando mais intensiva em capital e mais produtiva. Cada vez mais alimentos são produzidos por pessoa contratada no setor.

No entanto, há um efeito geracional negativo associado a essa tendência demográfica. Os agricultores em todo o mundo estão envelhecendo, em parte devido à redução das oportunidades de emprego no campo. Essa dinâmica é mais acentuada nas regiões mais ricas, que apresentam a menor participação relativa de empregos no setor agrícola, como a União Europeia e os Estados Unidos.

Construindo a segurança alimentar do futuro

O mundo precisa de uma nova e ousada forma de pensar sobre a segurança alimentar — uma abordagem que incorpore uma compreensão abrangente de como forças divergentes estão criando um cenário agroalimentar dinâmico e instável, que moldará o futuro de maneiras imprevisíveis.

Ecologia

Um dos principais desafios será garantir que a produção de alimentos continue sendo lucrativa e resiliente diante das mudanças ecológicas disruptivas. É possível encontrar sinergias entre serviços ecossistêmicos saudáveis, uma produção agrícola robusta e lucratividade, por meio da aplicação adequada de imaginação, criatividade, formulação de políticas públicas, investimentos e ações práticas, baseadas na contribuição e no conhecimento de agricultores e comunidades rurais.

A agricultura é um dos principais vetores das mudanças ecológicas, incluindo as relacionadas aos padrões de uso da terra e emissões de carbono. No entanto, ao mesmo tempo, a agricultura também possui um enorme potencial — sob as condições domésticas e internacionais adequadas — para oferecer soluções sólidas e duradouras.

Abordagens sinérgicas incluem uma variedade de técnicas e práticas agrícolas alternativas, bem como tecnologias emergentes, como agricultura regenerativa, cultivo sem revolvimento do solo (no-till farming), sistemas agroflorestais, agricultura inteligente para o clima (climate-smart agriculture) e o Manejo 4R de Nutrientes (4R Nutrient Stewardship) — um conjunto de práticas de gestão de nutrientes que prioriza o uso das fontes corretas, nas doses certas, nos momentos adequados e nos locais apropriados.

Embora muitas dessas abordagens tenham sido consideradas, no passado, experimentais, inovadoras e não comprovadas, hoje essa percepção mudou significativamente. A agricultura regenerativa, por exemplo, conta hoje com um número crescente de adeptos — incluindo produtores rurais — que acreditam em seu potencial para gerar benefícios ambientais concretos sem comprometer a produtividade das lavouras. Há uma quantidade expressiva de terras, incluindo solos, que poderiam ser revitalizadas por meio dessas práticas. Nas Américas, a degradação representa um problema grave, mas também uma grande oportunidade. O Brasil, por si só, possui extensas áreas de pastagens degradadas que poderiam ser reincorporadas à produção agrícola por meio de métodos regenerativos, contribuindo para reduzir a pressão por conversão de florestas nas regiões do Cerrado e da Amazônia. 

Comércio, geopolítica e instituições

O aumento do protecionismo e da competição geopolítica enfraquece a cooperação entre os Estados, desgastando a confiança internacional. O comércio global de alimentos depende da força das instituições multilaterais e dos acordos internacionais — instituições que, muitas vezes, não recebem o devido reconhecimento por sua contribuição à segurança alimentar mundial. Atualmente, essas instituições vêm sendo enfraquecidas, e o risco é o colapso de todo o sistema multilateral de comércio.

Mais diálogo entre os Estados é um antídoto para esse cenário. Um dos objetivos deve ser a construção de instituições alternativas — por exemplo, começando com os maiores produtores agrícolas do hemisfério, um grupo “A5” formado por Estados Unidos, Brasil, México, Canadá e Argentina — para reunir ministros da agricultura em torno de um diálogo sobre comércio. Os resultados potenciais incluem convenções regionais de segurança alimentar, compromissos de investimento em pesquisa agrícola e acordos para evitar as políticas que mais distorcem o comércio.

Uma ideia relacionada é a criação de um conselho hemisférico permanente de segurança alimentar, destinado a reunir governos para discutir respostas a choques, identificar caminhos para uma cooperação científica e tecnológica mais ampla e reforçar a norma que reconhece a responsabilidade do hemisfério perante o restante do mundo como um dos principais fornecedores de alimentos. Instituições hemisféricas, como a Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA) e o Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (BID), podem ser mobilizadas para convocar esse conselho.

Investimento em inovação, tecnologia e infraestrutura

A melhoria contínua das atividades dentro e fora das propriedades rurais — incluindo o uso inovador de novas tecnologias e processos, além do investimento de capital nos elementos que os viabilizam (como a infraestrutura) — é fundamental para garantir a segurança alimentar no hemisfério e no mundo.

A agricultura regenerativa e outros sistemas agroalimentares voltados à sustentabilidade podem ser aprimorados por meio da aplicação de tecnologias avançadas. Exemplos incluem:

• Fontes alternativas de energia podem aprimorar os sistemas dentro e fora das propriedades rurais, ao mesmo tempo em que reduzem as marcas das emissões de carbono.
• Ferramentas de sensoriamento remoto geoespacial aplicadas à agricultura de precisão podem identificar e contribuir para a preservação dos recursos ecológicos.
• Tecnologias robóticas e digitais móveis (incluindo a integração mais ampla de dispositivos portáteis às práticas agrícolas) podem aumentar a eficiência da produção agrícola, ao mesmo tempo em que reduzem o impacto ambiental.
• As análises orientadas por inteligência artificial podem integrar e utilizar fluxos de dados provenientes de diversas aplicações.
• As biotecnologias podem melhorar a produtividade no campo e a eficiência no uso de nutrientes, ao mesmo tempo em que protegem recursos ecológicos, como o solo e a água.

Os agricultores são tanto utilizadores quanto criadores de tecnologias e processos inovadores, e precisam ter condições de adotar e aplicar essas inovações. A adoção no campo não é o mesmo que a invenção em laboratório. Pesquisas globais indicam que os produtores rurais tendem a hesitar em adotar novas tecnologias e práticas quando os custos iniciais de investimento são elevados e os retornos financeiros são incertos.

Programas de extensão agrícola financiados com recursos públicos — que conectam pesquisadores a produtores, promovendo aprendizado mútuo e transferência de tecnologia — são fundamentais. O fortalecimento dos serviços de extensão deve estar no centro das estratégias para ampliar a adoção de inovações pelos agricultores.

Aprimorar a infraestrutura para fortalecer as cadeias de suprimento do sistema agroalimentar também é fundamental. Há uma necessidade premente de desenvolver estratégias que enquadrem esse desafio em termos de resiliência social e até mesmo transfronteiriça (internacional).

Agricultores para o futuro

Para evitar o declínio demográfico da agricultura, é fundamental tornar a atividade agrícola financeiramente, social e culturalmente atrativa para as novas gerações. Para os jovens — especialmente aqueles sem vínculo familiar com o setor —, a agricultura pode ser percebida como uma atividade ultrapassada, pouco lucrativa, difícil, distante da realidade ou “sem apelo” — ou todas essas coisas ao mesmo tempo.

Não existe um único conjunto de soluções reconhecidas para reverter as tendências demográficas no setor agrícola. No entanto, evidências de diversas partes do mundo indicam que uma combinação de intervenções pode ser eficaz: facilitar o acesso à atividade agrícola, por meio da redução de barreiras de entrada (como o acesso a financiamento acessível e a terras cultiváveis); reduzir lacunas de conhecimento e habilidades por meio de programas de capacitação prática nas propriedades rurais, bolsas de estudo e estágios supervisionados; incentivar a entrada de perfis não tradicionais na agricultura — como jovens mulheres — e destacar o papel cada vez mais relevante desempenhado pelas tecnologias digitais, pela robótica, pelo Big Data, pelo sensoriamento remoto, pela inteligência artificial e por outras aplicações técnicas que despertam o interesse de jovens ambiciosos e familiarizados com tecnologia.

Breve conclusão

Uma questão crucial é saber se os principais atores do hemisfério — governos, produtores rurais, setor privado, pesquisadores, fundações, organizações da sociedade civil e o público em geral — estarão dispostos a investir em processos e abordagens transformadoras capazes de reduzir riscos e, ao mesmo tempo, aumentar a prosperidade, a sustentabilidade e a resiliência.

Promover a difusão de inovações essenciais para a segurança alimentar será um elemento crucial dessa equação. É indispensável que os países e as instituições multilaterais do hemisfério encontrem fontes de financiamento e reúnam o conhecimento tecnológico necessário para apoiar programas adaptados às necessidades específicas da região.

Outras partes interessadas, não governamentais — incluindo investidores, o setor privado, pesquisadores, cientistas, analistas, além de agricultores e comunidades agrícolas — também deve agir em conjunto para conceber, criar e fortalecer as ferramentas que serão necessárias à garantia de um futuro com segurança alimentar.

Este relatório foi produzido pelo Atlantic Council com o apoio da The Mosaic Company como parte do projeto Segurança alimentar: Alinhamento estratégico nas Américas.

Peter Engelke é pesquisador sênior do Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security do Atlantic Council, bem como pesquisador sênior do seu Global Energy Center. Seu portfólio diversificado abrange prospecção estratégica; geopolítica, diplomacia e relações internacionais; mudanças climáticas e sistemas terrestres; segurança alimentar, hídrica e energética; tecnologias emergentes e disruptivas e ecossistemas de inovação baseados em tecnologia; e demografia e urbanização, entre outros temas, sendo o criador da série de publicações de formato longo mais lida do Atlantic Council, Global Foresight. As afiliações anteriores de Engelke incluem o Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Robert Bosch Foundation, o World Economic Forum e o Stimson Center.

Matias Margulis é professor associado da School of Public Policy and Global Affairs e membro do corpo docente de Sistemas Agrícolas e Alimentares da University of British Columbia. Seus interesses de pesquisa e ensino abrangem governança global, desenvolvimento, direitos humanos, direito internacional e política alimentar. Além de sua pesquisa acadêmica, Margulis possui vasta experiência profissional na área de formulação de políticas internacionais e foi representante canadense na Organização Mundial do Comércio, na Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico e na Organização das Nações Unidas para a Alimentação e a Agricultura.

A GeoStrategy Initiative, sediada no Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, utiliza o desenvolvimento de estratégias e a prospecção de longo prazo para servir como principal referência e articuladora de análises e soluções relevantes para políticas públicas, visando a compreensão de um mundo complexo e imprevisível. Por meio de seu trabalho, a iniciativa busca revitalizar, adaptar e defender um sistema internacional baseado em regras, a fim de promover a paz, a prosperidade e a liberdade nas próximas décadas.

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The post O futuro da alimentação nas Américas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Public Event Wed, November 5, 2025 • 3:00 pm ET

Representative Adam Smith on how Congress will shape US defense policy

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, shares his priorities for the upcoming National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and discusses how Congress can ensure the Pentagon meets today’s security challenges.

Security & Defense United States and Canada

“I don’t think simply committing this large number of assets—hundreds of millions, probably billions of dollars by the time it’s done—to blow up some drug boats in international waters in Latin America is going to make an appreciable difference” in the fight against drug trafficking, said Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Thursday. 

The event, part of the Atlantic Council’s Commanders Series, came amid uncertainty over whether the Trump administration’s campaign of attacks on boats that it claims are trafficking drugs will escalate into an effort to overthrow Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro.

Based on a briefing he received from the State Department and Department of Defense on Wednesday, Smith said he thinks that “the administration does not want to go to war with Venezuela.” But, Smith added, US President Donald Trump sometimes “very quickly” changes his mind. “So who knows?”

Thursday’s event also came amid the longest US government shutdown in history, with the House out of session even as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the next fiscal year has yet to be passed, a situation Smith called “unbelievably disruptive.”

Read below for more highlights from this conversation with Smith, which was moderated by Fox News Chief National Security Correspondent Jennifer Griffin. 

The NDAA

• “The NDAA itself is moving forward,” Smith said of the annual bill, noting that different versions have been passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and now the two versions need to be reconciled.
• One of Smith’s priorities for the bill is acquisition reform: “My position is we’ve had the risk wrong for a long time” on defense acquisition policy, said Smith. “We’ve been only focused” on the risk of corruption in the procurement process “as opposed to the risk of not moving fast enough,” he said. One way to speed up acquisition, he said, is “consolidating the decision makers” in the process “instead of having to go through nine or ten different layers.”
• Smith also said he wants to “have procurement people stay in their job longer.” Constant turnover in procurement roles, he said, “doesn’t really help with corruption. It just means that the person doesn’t know the system as well when they’re working on it.”

US strikes on boats in the Caribbean and Pacific

• Transnational drug-trafficking gangs in the Western Hemisphere are “a problem for our national security” and “a problem for Latin America,” Smith said. “You’ve got budding narco-states down there. They’re having a harder and harder time dealing with that. We need to be engaged and involved in that.”
• However, Smith was critical of the Trump administration’s campaign of attacks on alleged drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific. “It seems very problematic to me that we have decided that drug dealing will now have the death penalty attached to it,” with “no process whatsoever.”
• “They’re certainly bad policy in my view,” Smith said of the strikes.

US military presence abroad

• “I think one of the mistakes that we have made is to assume that our global presence is just a cost that isn’t benefiting us,” Smith said of US troop deployments abroad. 
• Citing threats posed by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorist organizations, Smith said that to pull US troops back from allied countries now and “ignore” these dangers “places us at risk.”
• Smith took issue with the Trump administration’s decision to draw down its forces in Romania and noted that there is “bipartisan, bicameral support” in the House and Senate armed services committees “to maintain our presence in Europe and defend them.”
• “If any of you have been to Romania, the Baltics, Poland,” said Smith, addressing the crowd, “they want a lot of things, but the one thing they want more than anything is us,” meaning a US military presence. “They don’t believe Russia wants to come in and kill a bunch of US troops. So a little bit of presence can give us a maximum amount of deterrence, and we’re going to fight that out in the defense bill.”

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the event

The post Representative Adam Smith on the NDAA, Venezuela, and the United States’ role in the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

China was already the biggest international player in Iraq’s upstream sector—operating several large oil fields across southern Iraq—before Chinese companies were awarded new oil and gas blocks under al-Sudani’s premiership. The only oil and gas contract auction held during al-Sudani’s administration—the May 2024 “Fifth+ and Sixth” licensing round—was dominated by a combination of Chinese national oil companies and privately held Chinese exploration and production (E&P) companies. Interest from large Western oil companies (supermajors) was tepid (only Shell placed a bid, and it was unsuccessful), and interest from US companies was virtually nonexistent. Beijing’s dominance of the bid round was so complete that the only non-Chinese company to land an asset was an Iraqi firm, KAR Group.

Chinese financing has also appeared to give Chinese companies an inside track to winning critical energy infrastructure projects. Under a program that was initiated well before al-Sudani’s government, in 2019, Iraq now directs about 150,000 barrels per day worth of oil revenues into an escrow account, which then functions as collateral to unlock loans via the state-owned firm Sinosure. In its early days, this vehicle was used to fund projects outside of the energy sector, but al-Sudani’s government has recently leveraged the Chinese financing program to push forward two pieces of critical energy-sector infrastructure:

• A $2.6 billion pipeline project to bring treated seawater to giant oil fields for water injection, awarded to the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation
• A one-billion-dollar gas pipeline project linking an Anbar province gas field to power generation facilities, some of which are also built by Chinese companies.

Chinese financing is also likely to make or break an $18 billion integrated project that was awarded earlier this year to China’s Geo-Jade Petroleum for the upstream development of the Tuba oil field in the Iraqi city of Basra and the construction of an oil refinery, two power plants, a petrochemical plant, and a fertilizer plant.

China’s appeal to Iraq is obvious. On the upstream side, Chinese companies will accept commercial terms that Western majors and US E&Ps simply will not. Indeed, China’s success in Iraq’s 2024 oil and gas contract auction was less a function of any deliberate Iraqi strategy to favor Chinese companies than it was a reflection of the structure of the auction, in which the sole criterion for deciding a winning bid was a company’s willingness to accept a narrow profit margin. This structure put Chinese companies at an advantage, because vertically integrated Chinese national oil companies can make money on projects by assigning major contracting opportunities to their subsidiary entities. At the same time, small Chinese E&Ps can operate at a lower cost than their Western counterparts. Chinese companies can also access state financing with relative ease since Beijing sees a strong presence in Iraq’s upstream sector as a strategic priority for securing long-term crude supply.

Supermajors and US E&Ps have also found al-Sudani’s government eager to do business, even as these companies cannot compete with Chinese firms in open bid rounds. Al-Sudani’s administration inked major contracts with both TotalEnergies and BP after bilateral negotiations, and it is holding ongoing talks with both Chevron and ExxonMobil. Sudani’s government has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the privately owned US E&P company HKN Energy.

Al-Sudani’s government appears to see significant strategic value in courting supermajors and US E&Ps, even if the terms these companies demand are less advantageous for Iraq than those accepted by Chinese companies. Successive Iraqi governments have long been wary of creeping Chinese consolidation over Iraq’s upstream sector. For example, Iraq’s former oil minister, Ihsan Ismaael, told the Iraq Oil Report in 2021 that he rejected an effort by Lukoil to pursue an asset sale at West Qurna-2 to a Chinese company, because, “we need to keep the same balance of market share in the south.”

Additionally, a range of oil officials have told the authors that Iraqi oil officials often voice a preference for the technology and approach of supermajors. Meanwhile, increased US investment in Iraq’s energy sector is perceived by policymakers in Baghdad—based on our research and conversations with key leaders speaking on background—as a tool for mitigating the risk of sanctions enforcement against Iraqi entities by the US Treasury Department.

With Iraqi parliamentary elections looming, US and Chinese companies alike will be engaging a new government at some point in 2026. Even if there is a new prime minister at the helm, the next Iraqi government’s policy toward international energy investment is likely to be shaped by the same forces that have informed al-Sudani’s approach. Regardless of the specific makeup of the next Iraqi government, it is likely that Chinese firms will continue to enjoy an advantage—stemming from Iraq’s desire for favorable commercial terms and the relative ease of access to Chinese financing. At the same time, Iraq is also likely to continue soliciting megaprojects with supermajors due to their technical capacity and potential geopolitical value.

Jared Levy is the director of the Iraq Oil Report‘s research services division. He oversees a team of data collectors and analysts that provide private sector and government clients with a range of subscription products and bespoke research and briefing services. He previously ran the Iraq office of a market entry advisory company.

Ben Van Heuvelen is the editor-in-chief of the Iraq Oil Report. His work has also been published in the Washington Post, Bloomberg, the Atlantic, and Foreign Policy. He regularly briefs investors, diplomats, governments, and nongovernmental organizations on Iraq’s political and business environment. He previously worked as a research fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, DC.

The post Why China is here to stay in Iraq’s energy sector appeared first on Atlantic Council.

South Korea and Australia have consistently built upon cooperation as two “middle powers” in a region of ever-growing global importance and dynamism. At the same time, the two countries have bolstered their respective alliances with the United States, building regional bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Ultimately, capitalizing on the potential for growing collaboration and cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Australia could be key to maintaining security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. However, when it comes to bringing several countries together in a collaborative environment, there are inherent challenges to reaching a consensus.

To meet that challenge, the Atlantic Council and the Korea Foundation gathered mid-career and junior experts from the United States, South Korea, and Australia in two private workshops. The group identified several obstacles to cooperation—namely, differing geostrategic circumstances, diverging threat perceptions, different strategies for engaging with China, and a lack of consistent engagement between the countries. Despite this, there are several key opportunities to bolster cooperation—namely, defense industrial cooperation, joint endeavors in science and technology, developing maritime security, and collaborating on engaging additional partner countries and multilaterals.

The rising generation of policymakers we spoke with zeroed in on four ways to improve the trilateral relationship:

• cultivate defense industry collaboration and public-private cooperation;
• institutionalize relationships and expand joint exercises;
• foster expanded R&D of critical technologies; and
• develop disaster-resilient infrastructure projects and early warning systems.

Lauren D. Gilbert is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In this role, she oversees research and programming focused on engaging with US, allied, and partner governments and other key stakeholders to shape strategies and policies to mitigate the most important rising security challenges facing the region.

Kester Abbott is a research associate at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and a non-resident James A. Kelly Korea fellow at the Pacific Forum. He works on US Indo-Pacific strategy, defense industry issues, and Northeast Asian security dynamics, with a focus on South Korean foreign relations.

Hannah Heewon Seo is the events administrator at The Australia Institute, with a background in international affairs organizations in Australia and South Korea. Her focus centers on foreign relations and diplomacy, particularly engagement with the Asia-Pacific, and the opinions expressed do not represent those of The Australia Institute.

New Atlanticist Aug 26, 2025

Five questions (and expert answers) about where the US-South Korea alliance goes from here

By Atlantic Council experts

The US and South Korean presidents met on Monday in Washington to discuss a range of bilateral issues, from security to shipbuilding.

Korea Nuclear Deterrence

Issue Brief Sep 11, 2024

A next-generation agenda: Bridging Indo-Pacific and European perspectives on security

By Lauren Gilbert, Malthe Munkøe, Hyunseung David Yu

This next generation agenda proposes policy recommendations designed to improve security cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and European NATO countries in the context of current global security threats, diverging national security perspectives, and imminent leadership changes.

Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia

Issue Brief Dec 20, 2022

A next-generation agenda for US-ROK-Japan cooperation

By Lauren D. Gilbert, Kyoko Imai

Trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea has proved challenging over the years, owing largely to historical tensions. As a result, this project has sought perspectives from next-generation leaders of the three countries to define areas where targeted, flexible, and informal cooperative arrangements can provide clear mutual benefit to all.

Coronavirus East Asia

The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

Learn more

The post A next-generation agenda: South Korea-US-Australia security cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This kind of access gives China options for coercion, deterrence, and signaling, pursued through temporary and targeted effects in a “gray zone” crisis, as well as for conducting larger-scale attacks in the event of a major conflict. With this in mind, it is essential that the private sector—not just the US government and military—better prepare for attacks on the US electrical grid resulting from a geopolitical crisis or conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Importantly, this preparation should include both assessing the geopolitical risks and practicing what to do in a crisis.

During a recent industry forum in California, we heard from senior utility executives, grid operators, market strategists, and other experts about the range of complex challenges that the energy sector faces. Utilities must, for example, keep costs in check, meet regulatory standards, manage load growth, and advance the energy transition. At the same time, we contend that they need to treat Chinese cyber and supply-chain exposure as a standing threat—part of the context of overall strategic planning and risk mitigation—given the geopolitical risks the United States faces. During the forum, we discussed a pressing question on a panel with an unusual focus for industry: how to protect the mission to deliver reliable, safe, and affordable power as geopolitical risks rise, particularly the threat China could pose to US electrical infrastructure in the context of a regional crisis or conflict. Based on our discussions, we came to three overall takeaways.

First, utilities should identify practical geopolitical crisis indicators to monitor that, when the indicators occur, should move utility leaders from watchful to active measures. One such indicator is Chinese military exercises that move beyond the routine and are on a scale indicative of invasion preparation and/or involve live-fire training that interferes with access to Taiwan. Other indicators could be narratives from Chinese official sources that aim to justify imminent “defensive” military action, sudden pressure on key vendors, or export controls that signal possible supply disruptions. None of these signposts require classified sources, as they are visible in publicly available information and sector channels.

Second, utility leaders need to take action now. Addressing cyber and supply chain infiltration risks to power infrastructure is not only a job for cybersecurity professionals and government officials, nor can it wait until a geopolitical crisis or attack. Grid operators, supply-chain leaders, control system engineers, and procurement officials each have roles in ensuring resilience.

A range of actions can help mitigate risk. For example, contract language can clarify product security and transparency requirements. Steps can be taken to harden control system equipment and network pathways, particularly for China-sourced devices. And utilities should regularly and thoroughly test controls on vendors’ remote access to operational technology. More broadly, utilities should seek to de-risk: diversify suppliers before a crisis, keep targeted spares for the most critical equipment, and engineer by focusing on addressing high consequence events so the most important grid functions have robust fail-safe controls.

The third—and clearest—takeaway from our conversations in California was about the need for preparation rather than prediction or reaction. Regular, realistic, leadership-level tabletop exercises are the single best way to build discipline for the first forty-eight hours of a fast-moving event, especially since misinformation is likely to surge.

Tabletop exercises, long used by the US military and government as a low-cost way to improve preparedness for a high-intensity crisis or conflict, can serve the same purpose for the private sector. Comprehensive exercises expose single points of failure, validate who decides what, test communications, and force hard choices on where to deploy resources. They also create a common picture of risk and available response options that hold under pressure.

These issues have important implications for a broader audience, given the potential implications of energy disruptions for all aspects of the United States’ national security and economy. This basic three-point approach is simple and practical, even if implementing it while balancing other considerations will be complex for the industry:

• Watch for indicators that geopolitical risks are rising;
• Keep sharing and implementing best practices within the energy sector and with its partners to strengthen resilience; and
• Run regular leadership-level tabletop exercises that simulate the key decisions that leaders in a vital sector will face in a geopolitical crisis.

Introducing this three-step approach into response systems and building on it will go a long way toward making sure that essential services stay running, even if a crisis erupts halfway around the world.

Victor Atkins is a nonresident fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he specializes in cyber intelligence, national security, and industrial cybersecurity issues. A former Department of Energy official, he served as deputy director for operations of its Cyber Intelligence Directorate, and after details to the National Security Council staff and US intelligence community. He is the director for critical infrastructure security consulting at 1898 & Co., part of Burns & McDonnell.

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is a former senior US government official with two decades of service as an intelligence officer and strategist, including twelve years stationed overseas in the region.

The Best Practices Forum that helped inform this analysis, and the authors’ participation in it, was hosted and sponsored by Burns & McDonnell. The event adhered to the Chatham House Rule to foster transparency, candor, and forward-thinking approaches. The views expressed here are the authors’ own.

The post US power utilities must prepare for a crisis in the Indo-Pacific. Here’s how they can start. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s mobilization challenges are no secret and have been steadily mounting for much of the war. During the initial days of the full-scale invasion in early 2022, an unprecedented flood of volunteers made it possible to dramatically expand the size of the Ukrainian armed forces to around one million troops. However, as the conflict has dragged on into a fourth year amid consistently high casualty rates and escalating problems with desertion, this initial flow has slowed to a relative trickle. Individual units have responded by launching their own slick advertising campaigns to attract fresh recruits, while military mobilization officials have become notorious for dragging eligible men off the streets straight to military bases.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The mobilization issue has been exacerbated by President Zelenskyy’s reluctance to lower the age for compulsory military service from twenty-five to eighteen. This has led to criticism from Ukraine’s Western partners, who have argued that it is unrealistic to wage a major war while exempting so many young Ukrainians from mobilization. Rather than take the politically dangerous decision to reduce the conscription age, Zelenskyy has backed an incentive scheme to attract volunteers in the eighteen to twenty-five age bracket. However, the initiative has so far failed to fill the gaps in Ukraine’s decimated front line units.

The recent decision to lift international travel restrictions on young Ukrainian men aged eighteen to twenty-two has further complicated Ukraine’s manpower problems. Around 100,000 Ukrainian males have left the country since restrictions were eased around two months ago, Britain’s Daily Telegraph reports. This exodus deprives the country of potential future army recruits and has created a range of more immediate personnel issues that are already reverberating throughout the Ukrainian economy. While some of these men may plan on returning to Ukraine, experience since 2022 suggests that many will seek to settle elsewhere in the European Union.

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Moscow is also facing difficulties replenishing its invasion force amid catastrophic losses in Ukraine that dwarf the death toll from every other Kremlin war since 1945. Putin initially sought to address this problem by launching a partial mobilization in September 2022, but the move proved hugely unpopular and led to around one million young Russians fleeing the country. Instead, the Kremlin has introduced a system a lavish financial incentives including huge enlistment bounties and generous monthly salaries in order to attract volunteers willing to join the invasion of Ukraine. While it has proved necessary to repeatedly increase the sums on offer, this approach has made it possible to secure around thirty thousand new recruits per month.

Based on the current trajectory of the war, Russia’s manpower advantage over Ukraine will only grow wider during the coming year. This is already making itself on the battlefield, with Russian forces exploiting gaps in Ukraine’s defenses along the more than one thousand kilometers of front line and edging forward at multiple points. While Putin’s troops have so far been unable to achieve any major breakthroughs, Russia’s territorial gains are slowly but surely adding up.

The most intensive fighting is currently taking place in the Donetsk region as Russia seeks to complete the capture of Pokrovsk. If Putin’s commanders succeed in taking the city, it will be seen by many as vindication of the Kremlin strategy to grind out victory by relying on the sheer size of the Russian army. Putin has long believed that he can win the war by outlasting the West and overwhelming Ukraine. He will view Kyiv’s increasingly evident infantry shortage as a strong indication that time is on his side.

For Zelenskyy, there are no easy options. Lowering the mobilization age would generate a new wave of recruits but could also pose a significant threat to Ukrainian national morale. Reforming the terms of military service to provide greater rotation guarantees while also adopting a more meritocratic approach to the appointment of army commanders may help restore flagging public confidence and attract more volunteers, but this would take time that Ukraine quite frankly no longer possesses.

For now, the battle-hardened but exhausted and outnumbered Ukrainian army has little choice but to remain in a defensive posture. Ukraine’s commanders must be prepared to cede ground when necessary in order to preserve precious fighting strength, while looking for opportunities to maximize enemy casualties. The goal should be to withstand the Russian onslaught until a combination of punishing front line losses, escalating long-range strikes inside Russia, and deepening economic woes finally forces Putin to the negotiating table.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 28, 2025

UN report: Russia targets civilians in systematic bid to depopulate Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Russia is deliberately targeting Ukrainian civilians in a deadly drone strike campaign that aims to depopulate large parts of the country and constitutes a crime against humanity, according to a new United Nations report, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Oct 16, 2025

Putin seeks more foreign fighters amid mounting Russian losses in Ukraine

By David Kirichenko

With fewer and fewer Russians ready to volunteer for the war in Ukraine, Putin is seeking to recruit more foreign fighters from across Africa, Asia, and beyond, writes David Kirichenko.

Africa Americas

UkraineAlert Oct 6, 2025

Putin rejected Trump’s generous deal. Time to try peace through strength.

By Sergiy Solodkyy

President Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine by offering Putin Kremlin-friendly peace terms have failed to convince the Russian dictator. It is now time to speak to Putin in the language of strength, the only language he truly understands, writes Sergiy Solodkyy.

Conflict Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Russia’s advance on Pokrovsk exposes Ukraine’s growing manpower crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Director for Northern Europe, Anna Wieslander, was interviewed October 27 in an Al Jazeera article on Russian hybrid warfare against European countries.

Wieslander warns that the goal of the hybrid warfare is to exhaust Europe towards being “more recipient towards the final goal that Russia has for Europe, which is a division again into spheres of interest”.

There is currently no coordinated policy for European countermeasures against Russian hybrid warfare, and Wieslander calls for tougher and more coordinated countermeasures against the shadow fleet and on a much lager scale.

The post Wieslander interviewed in Al Jazeera appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Key findings summary
• Methodology
• Part I: Russian intent
• Part II: Deterrence
• Part III: Response
• Recommendations and key findings
• Conclusion

Introduction

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Atlantic Council project, Sustaining Allied Responses to the Threat of Russian Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Escalation. The objective of the project was to analyze the prospects for Russian use of chemical or biological weapons specifically in Europe over the next five to ten years; identify how the United States and its European allies and partners could deter and prevent Russian use of these weapons in Europe; and, should deterrence fail, assess response options.

Background

Russia has a well-established and clearly demonstrated strategic objective of undermining stability in the Euro-Atlantic region to reverse its loss of status following the end of the Cold War.¹ This strategy is characterized by hostility toward the United States and its allies and partners in Europe.²

Over recent years, Russia has demonstrated its intent to provoke instability in Europe by acting with malign aggression that is both overt and hybrid in nature. The starkest example of Russia’s revanchist aggression is its full-scale illegal invasion of Ukraine, launched in 2022. Russia has also been conducting hybrid attacks—hostile activities using tools of statecraft below the threshold of conventional warfare to shift the balance of power in its favor—against the United States and its allies in Europe.³

A willingness to use chemical weapons has long been a feature of Russian aggression, both on the battlefield in Ukraine (specifically chloropicrin), and on the streets of Europe.⁴ As a result, Russia was described as “the most acute nuclear, biological, and chemical threat in the near-term” in the United States’ 2023 Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction.⁵ This parallels the same terminology used in the 2022 National Defense Strategy and 2022 National Security Strategy.⁶ Undermining the cohesion of the United States and its NATO allies is a core goal of Russia’s political and military strategy. The Kremlin has shown that it is willing to use, or threaten to use, whatever capabilities it possesses, including CBRN weapons, to achieve this goal.

Research question

Our primary research question was, “What are the prospects for Russian use of chemical or biological weapons in Europe over the next five to ten years, and how can the United States and its European allies and partners counter such threats?” To address this question, the project team examined the following:

• In what scenarios might Russia use its arsenal of chemical and biological capabilities to achieve its geopolitical goals in the five-to-ten-year time frame? What developments in European security more broadly over the same period would increase or decrease the risk of Russian use of chemical or biological weapons?
• How might the United States and its European allies and partners enhance their overall defense and deterrence posture to reduce the risk of potential chemical or biological weapons use in the next five to ten years?
• How can the United States work with European allies and partners to coordinate and standardize comprehensive responses to the potential deployment of Russian chemical and biological weapons?
• To what extent could Russian use of chemical or biological weapons in Europe escalate further to the use of nuclear weapons, and how can the United States work with its European allies and partners to reduce the risk of escalation?

Key findings summary

Our project illuminated several findings for US and European decision-makers:

• Russia will likely continue using chemical weapons in Europe in a range of scenarios over the next five to ten years, particularly if doing so undermines Alliance unity and disrupts Ukraine’s integration into the West. Based on its recent behavior, however, Russia appears less likely to use biological weapons. Furthermore, while Russia has threatened nuclear use, a large-scale nuclear attack appears unlikely.
• To credibly deter Russia from nuclear escalation, the United States and its European allies and partners must ensure that Russia understands that using—or threatening to use—chemical and biological weapons would both fail to achieve its intended outcome and incur intolerable costs.
• Since the end of the Cold War, CBRN defense has been deprioritized among NATO allies, including the United States. Amid calls for increased defense spending, CBRN defense capability development is an area primed for greater investment.
• The United States should leverage NATO to facilitate greater coordination between civilian and military entities to enhance whole-of-society resilience to CBRN threats.
• Information and intelligence sharing is critical to achieving a common threat perception among NATO allies and partners. Expanded information sharing and effective strategic communications can deter Russian use of chemical or biological weapons and ensure a coordinated response if deterrence fails.
• The United States and its European allies and partners should take steps to raise the public IQ related to CBRN threats, particularly as it pertains to chemical and biological threats.
• The governance of emerging and applied technologies is difficult within the bounds of existing treaty regimes. Sanctions and export controls can complement treaty organizations to monitor and contain potential CBRN threats from such technologies, including dual-use systems and components.

Methodology

The project team adopted two principal research methods for this project: a series of scenario-based workshops and interviews with subject matter experts and officials from the United States, Europe, and NATO. The team also conducted secondary research to develop the workshop methodology and to corroborate information and insights gleaned during the workshops and interviews.

Scenario-based workshops

In January 2025, the project team convened experts and officials to take part in two scenario-based exercises. The first group, which was convened virtually, consisted of subject matter experts and researchers from the United States and Europe, while the second group (convened in hybrid format) consisted of officials from the United States, NATO, and European governments. See Appendixes B and C for more information about the participants and the methodology, respectively.

The project team created a plausible exploratory scenario in which tensions between Russia and the United States and its European allies and partners (primarily Ukraine) had grown over a five-year time frame. The scenario provided a framework for participants to consider the key questions of Russian strategic intent, and implications for allied deterrence and responses to Russian aggression.

The workshops presented two scenarios in the year 2030: one in which Russia carried out a chemical attack against NATO allies based in Ukraine, and one in which Russia carried out targeted biological attacks against allied officials in Europe. These attacks concerned low-level use of chemical and biological agents, rather than major battlefield use of such weapons. Thus, the focus was on how Russia might use these capabilities to test escalatory dynamics, rather than to achieve major military objectives. The workshops divided participants into two groups; each group focused on either the chemical or biological scenario. The workshops primarily asked participants to analyze why Russia might consider the use of chemical or biological weapons strategically advantageous in these scenarios; propose how to deter Russia from further use of chemical and biological weapons; and recommend how the United States and Europe should respond to Russia’s use of such weapons. The two groups reconvened after the exercise to share key findings from their discussions.

Interviews with officials and experts

Informed by the insights from the workshops, the project team conducted interviews with US, European, and NATO officials and experts. The interviews provided direct perspectives on the potential for Russian CBRN escalation over the next five to ten years and how the alliance can deter and respond to possible Russian chemical and biological escalation. The interview stage also enabled the project team to explore the additional question of nuclear escalation following Russia’s potential use of chemical or biological weapons.

The following report presents our analysis of Russia’s intent to use CBRN weapons, possible deterrence considerations to be employed by the United States and its European allies and partners, and response options for the United States and Europe to respond should deterrence fail. The report concludes with our overall findings and recommendations.

Part I: Russian intent

Vladimir Putin described the breakup of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”⁷ NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept makes clear that Putin’s ambition to reverse the outcome of the Cold War is at the heart of Russia’s efforts to reestablish spheres of influence and direct control over its former Soviet empire, including NATO allies.⁸ Russia’s hostile actions seek to undermine the rules-based international order that defines the worldview of NATO and its members.⁹

At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin signaled clearly to the world that he believed undermining the international rules-based system was necessary to carry out his revanchist ambitions.¹⁰ Russia has since demonstrated repeatedly that it is willing to use violent and aggressive means to further this ambition. This includes conventional military aggression, as demonstrated by Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, 2014 annexation of Crimea, and 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.¹¹

Russia’s hybrid campaign of aggression

In addition to conventional military aggression, Russia’s campaign has included a well-documented and long-running “shadow war” of hybrid tactics against NATO and its allies.¹² This hybrid campaign has included critical infrastructure attacks, acts of violence, weaponized migration, election interference, and information campaigns, which have intensified in volume since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.¹³

The threat and the use of Russia’s CBRN capabilities has been a feature of Moscow’s hybrid campaign. In spite of the long-standing norms against using CBRN weapons, enshrined in international treaties and conventions, Russia has demonstrated that it is able and willing to deploy these weapons,¹⁴ including in NATO territory.¹⁵ Russia has also demonstrated a willingness to use chemical weapons during its illegal invasion of Ukraine and long supported the former Assad regime in Syria that used chemical weapons against civilians.¹⁶

The psychological value of chemical and biological weapons

For Russia, chemical and biological weapons have many potential uses and bring many advantages. At their most basic level, chemical and biological weapons, either in a battlefield scenario or a civilian context, are agents of terror. Several interviewees noted the Russian state employs these weapons—or threatens to—to instill fear in European populations and among Russian dissidents in exile.¹⁷ Russian willingness to use chemical weapons in this manner also sends a clear signal to the domestic Russian population about the Putin regime’s tolerance for any potential threats and challenges. A clear demonstration of this tactic was the 2020 Novichok poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, which took place in Russia.¹⁸ While untested, it can be safely assumed that Putin would resort to extreme measures, including using CBRN weapons as necessary, to ensure the survival of his regime.

Some participants described public awareness in much of Europe about how chemical or biological weapons are used and the effects they can have as generally low. Those participants suggested that Russian use of CBRN weapons would be a means of causing widespread panic and manipulating emotions and public actions. The confusion they could potentially sow could create fertile ground for disinformation campaigns designed to undermine public trust in their governments.¹⁹ Such an attack could also expose frailties in broader social resilience in the target community.

Challenging norms–and NATO

Many participants in both the workshops and interviews reflected that a significant incentive for the use of chemical or biological weapons is to further degrade the broadly accepted international norms and standards in place since World War II. Russia’s documented use of chemical weapons sends a signal that it does not consider itself to be constrained by rules, norms, or obligations like other countries. It is an assertion that, as a supposed great power with an extensive and sophisticated CBRN toolbox (a legacy maintained from the Soviet era), and a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Russia can act with relative impunity to flout and degrade the rules-based system that it opposes. Allies should continue to acknowledge and challenge this behavior, but more public reporting on Russian chemical and biological weapons and how they compare to restrictions outlined in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) could improve awareness of Russia’s possible intent.

In more general terms, the actions of the Russian regime demonstrate that Russia places lower value on human life than the United States and its allies, whether that is of Ukrainian civilians, unwitting bystanders to Russian crimes, or its own military personnel.²⁰ This cultural disregard for the suffering of even its own people affords Russia the space to conduct more reckless attacks and bear the subsequent consequences that the United States and its European allies and partners would not.

By their nature, different chemical and biological weapons have a broad range of properties, methods of delivery, rates of contagion, and lethality.²¹ While the CWC includes verification measures, the BWC does not. Participants noted that Russia could calibrate the nature, scale, and target of any chemical or biological weapon attack to create maximum uncertainty, exploit potential differences in threat perceptions and willingness to stand up against Russian aggression, and degrade international conventions. In many senses, the greater utility of chemical or biological weapons is not their lethality, but their impact on the adversary’s thinking. As one participant put it, “the intention isn’t to kill, but to complicate.”

This coercive element confers chemical and biological weapons and the range of effects they can create, with significant strategic value for Russia. Through the use (or threatened use) of different chemical or biological weapons in a range of scenarios, Russia might hope to influence allied decision-making and actions, such as potential Ukrainian integration into Western-oriented institutions. Participants observed that Russian use of chemical and biological weapons in these scenarios could be a means of Russia signaling that it considers the West has crossed its political red lines.

In a hypothetical battlefield context, the threat of chemical weapons use could limit the efficiency of allied military operations by imposing extra precautionary measures and influencing battlefield planning. In Iraq, the fear that Saddam Hussein could use chemical weapons degraded efficiency on the battlefield.²² After decades of underinvestment and neglect in the principles of operating in CBRN contaminated environments, Russia may be tempted to expose shortfalls in allied CBRN readiness on the battlefield.

For Russia, chemical and biological weapons serve an additional military function of making up for potential conventional military shortcomings. Where the Russians might be outmatched by NATO in conventional terms, unencumbered by moral or legal constraints, they might consider it a legitimate part of their doctrine to use asymmetric capabilities that can tilt the scales in their favor.²³ Participants in our exercises speculated that the likelihood of Russia resorting to chemical or biological weapons would increase should Russia face imminent conventional defeat on the battlefield, either against Ukraine or NATO. This assumption is supported by the 2024 change in Russian nuclear doctrine, which lowered the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons to a new, lower standard.²⁴

The escalatory dilemma

Russia’s recent changes to its military doctrine, and the potential use of chemical and biological weapons either in civilian or battlefield contexts, must be considered within the framework of political and military escalation.²⁵ Several interviewees noted that, because these are weapons that NATO allies do not and would not use, Russia’s previous use of chemical weapons and potential willingness to turn to biological weapons give the Kremlin an extra rung on the escalatory ladder.

Unlike nuclear escalation—which is well-studied, more clearly defined, and more widely considered taboo in the case of first-use of nuclear weapons—the escalatory dynamics of chemical and biological weapons use are more ambiguous and less certain. The scale and severity of chemical or biological weapon use could be calibrated to avoid crossing an obvious threshold that demands a military response, while at the same time clearly crossing a normative line that NATO allies would not cross, all the while posing a difficult conundrum about the appropriate and proportionate response.

Additionally, the dual-use nature of many of these chemical or biological agents (which may have legitimate and peaceful origins and uses) makes attribution challenging and presents sufficient deniability. This makes it difficult to establish clear lines of acceptable use and potentially hampers efforts to cohere a forceful and united response. At the same time, it allows Russia to simultaneously send a message of intent to allies and sow further confusion and distrust, while mostly avoiding (or limiting) punishment. In short, per one workshop participant, “it helps Russia to establish escalation dominance without committing to war.”

However, in many discussions throughout the project, there was considerable uncertainty over whether and how escalation to chemical and biological weapons use would increase the subsequent prospects of nuclear escalation. While many participants recognized that Russia’s willingness to disregard norms when it comes to chemical weapons in particular could logically lead to nuclear escalation and that Russia had invoked rhetoric around nuclear weapons use in recent years, participants agreed that taboos around nuclear weapons use exert more of a constraining force on Russia. Several participants noted the reported influence that China and India were able to wield against Russia in October 2022 to help de-escalate Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric at the time.²⁶

Participants noted that where chemical or biological weapons can be deployed in such a way as to sow confusion and inject escalatory ambiguity, the line that nuclear weapons use would cross is much more definitive. No participants envisaged these scenarios escalating to the use of nuclear weapons unless Putin felt it was the last and only option for his personal survival.

Part II: Deterrence

As outlined above, Russia has and could continue to use chemical or biological weapons depending on the state of its conventional capabilities. The United States and its European allies and partners play a crucial role in deterring Russia from using any CBRN weapon. It is therefore critical to consider the scenarios in which Russia might turn to such weapons. Russia might even assume that previous responses to chemical attacks give them scope to escalate to larger-scale strategic weapons.²⁷

For deterrence to be effective, like-minded nations must make clear that they are prepared to impose intolerable costs (economic, geopolitical, or military) on Russia should it use chemical or biological weapons, while also maintaining some ambiguity as to the exact nature of a response. Demonstrations of intelligence sharing among allies to present a unified threat assessment may clarify how the United States observes the Russian threat in the CBRN domain. Given how critical it is for civilian institutions to be integrated in the response to a potential CBRN attack, particularly related to chemical and biological threats, a whole-of-government approach to deterrence is essential for how the United States and its European allies and partners should position themselves vis-à-vis Russia. Outside-the-box thinking around potential partners and nontraditional allies may also aid in strengthening deterrence. The following takeaways emerged from our analysis, including discussions with key stakeholders in the United States and Europe.

Deterrence can yield powerful results

Deterrence by punishment would be harder to inflict if Russia were to use a chemical or biological weapon, given that there would not be a proportional response.²⁸ However, the United States and Europe still have options for precise, measured, and consequential actions. Workshop participants agreed that specific actions or escalation using CBRN threats from Russia would have severe consequences warranting a response, including stringent economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure campaigns, and, in some instances, retaliatory military strikes. With the nuclear deterrent as the foundation for any response from the United States (alongside that of the United Kingdom and France), any threat of retaliation against Russia will be stronger.²⁹ In addition, the United States and European countries could implement measures such as export controls, sanctions, international condemnation, or stationing NATO troops closer to Russia’s borders to deter Russian CBRN use.

Participants reflected that the most likely scenario in which Russia would turn to CBRN threats would include hybrid attacks on the United States and Europe. Deterrence of such threats remains a “riddle” as one interviewee put it, where more degrees of ambiguity are present that do not apply to conventional (or nuclear) escalation. When approaching the more tactical use of chemical or biological weapons, there is more opaqueness given the dual-purpose nature of substances, technologies, and delivery systems. Workshop participants did not come to consensus on how the United States and its European allies should view (or respond to) such threats within the hybrid domain or at the tactical applications of chemical or biological weapons.

The role of attribution in deterring CBRN use

During the workshops and interviews, participants continuously reiterated that attribution is critical to deterring Russian chemical and biological threats and holding Russia accountable for past use of chemical weapons. Intelligence and information sharing play an important role in attribution. One interviewee remarked that Russia may think twice about staging chemical and biological attacks if there is more publicly available information about their chemical and biological capabilities, facilities, and deployment means.

However, timely technical collection and forensic analysis capabilities are lacking among NATO allies, leading to questions about the accuracy and reliability of attributing attacks. Several existing capabilities—including detection, intelligence, and surveillance systems—could prevent escalation with chemical and biological weapons, but these systems are not well resourced across the Alliance. Many NATO member states lack adequate expertise in sample collection, robust laboratory infrastructure, and the requisite instruments to conduct analysis, all of which impede attribution.

Some participants we spoke to, particularly on NATO’s eastern flank, reflected on a need to strengthen intelligence, monitoring, and detection capabilities to improve their overall deterrence and response posture. Investment in capabilities to investigate and attribute attacks could prevent Russian escalation. For attribution to be effective, the United States and European allies and partners must also possess a shared understanding of indicators and warning signals ahead of an attack.

Preparedness and resilience are essential

Participants described the need for the United States and its European allies and partners to limit the consequences of Russian chemical and biological attacks. The notion of “deterrence by resilience” or “deterrence by preparedness” (a subcategory of the broader notion of “deterrence by denial”) is one paradigm for thinking of how the United States could successfully prevent Russia from turning to chemical or biological weapons. The following considerations came up most frequently as areas for investment.

Capability development and deployment

Allied military representatives broadly agreed that CBRN-related equipment—either related to attribution (including detection and surveillance systems) or response (such as decontamination or personal protective equipment [PPE])—is often overlooked in favor of high-caliber defense systems. Counter-CBRN capabilities are frequently considered too niche for broader collective defense.

Investment in CBRN defense capabilities, discussed further in the response section of this report, provides a deterrent signal in addition to preparing allies to fight through a chemical or biological attack. However, nearly everyone we interviewed recognized that these capabilities are often siloed to specialist forces and not broadly integrated within general purpose forces. Ministries of defense across the Alliance should set baselines for CBRN defense-capability targets, including PPE, gas masks, and treatment, across the total force and resource these priorities accordingly.

Exercises and training

Regular and comprehensive exercises that incorporate a variety of US and European military forces would underpin an effective deterrence strategy toward Russia. Some participants described the importance of joint training among special operations forces (SOF) that might be equipped to respond to chemical and biological weapons use. Components of these exercises should be incorporated into broader training, which can enable preparedness in times of crisis. Participants pointed to several preexisting multinational exercises as examples to demonstrate readiness to deter CBRN escalation.³⁰

Other training—including tabletop exercises and war-games—can be deployed to help decision-makers design more effective standards to aid and inform how the United States and its European allies and partners can deter potential Russian use of CBRN threats. Tabletop exercises and war-games leveraged by the Pentagon and DTRA with their European counterparts can be used to strengthen strategic and operational thinking about how to deter Russian escalation by providing opportunities to try new approaches under the guidance of expert facilitators.

Whole-of-society resilience

To be effective, deterrence by resilience must incorporate all facets of society to respond to instances of crisis or threats.³¹ To deter potential CBRN threats through preparedness, European allies and partners must warn the public, without fear-mongering, of the risk of escalation. Several participants noted the importance of preparing populations to withstand and defy threats from Russia, which includes activating and sustaining civilian institutions such as hospitals that would treat those affected by a chemical or biological attack. As part of a whole-of-society approach, greater awareness of chemical and biological threats is needed; public health personnel, first responders, law enforcement, teachers, and others ought to understand the effects of chemical and biological agents and how to respond appropriately. Similar to the military, civilian agencies should procure and maintain CBRN defense capabilities to protect and treat civilian populations in the event of a chemical or biological attack.

One phrase that is often repeated in expert circles is “raising the IQ” on nuclear threats. This concept applies to chemical and biological threats as well so that more individuals are cognizant of their scale and severity. Mental and emotional preparedness would enable the public to resist Russian efforts and contain the potential consequences associated with a Russian attack. Demonstrating societal resilience, in which wider social and civil functions can withstand CBRN escalation, could deter Russia from employing CBRN weapons.

Wielding the information space

Russia consistently utilizes the information space to instill fear, distrust, and confusion.³² In addition to responding to these types of stories with clear, fact-based information that demonstrates why Russian claims are false, the United States and its European allies and partners can also pre-bunk and dispel any false or misleading claims that Russia produces about CBRN-related threats. Participants pointed to the importance of sharing proactive messages about resistance to such narratives through a variety of means—including traditional media, official government communications, and social media—to dissuade Russian perpetrators from deploying attacks. Eye-catching social media posts and multimedia tools can extend reach to nontraditional communities to help dispel Russian claims. As one participant noted, winning the information war must be combined with the requisite military power and civilian capability to deter Russia.

Be cautious of setting red lines

While US and European officials must be clear about the consequences of escalation, interviewees resisted establishing so-called red lines that are overly specific. Many interviewees pointed to the infamous case of the Obama administration’s supposed red lines regarding Syria’s use of chemical weapons during its civil war in the 2010s. Such thresholds, which may be politically sensitive to apply, would leave the international community in a difficult position with respect to enforcement or punishment, which could undermine the credibility of deterrence.

Participants called instead for political rhetoric to be vague externally, where Russia and its allies would have difficulty determining the threshold for response, while being precise internally about the consequences of Russia’s actions. This distinction would provide space for the United States and its European allies and partners to determine the requisite response to CBRN threats stemming from Russia.

Diplomacy as a deterrent

Russia finds itself somewhat isolated in the current geopolitical environment. However, the Kremlin frequently looks to several nations—including China, Iran, and North Korea—to bolster Russia’s defense. These relationships could provide options to engage non-European nations to deter Russia from CBRN escalation. For example, China reportedly engaged Russia to discourage the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and the deployment of nuclear weapons in space.³³ Given the degree to which Russia depends on China to prop up its wartime economy, there may be an opportunity to leverage China to dissuade Russia from turning to CBRN escalation, particularly if China upholds international regimes regarding CBRN use.³⁴ India may also be able to influence Russia given its role in supporting Russia’s economic stability amid Western sanctions and may have sway in discouraging CBRN escalation.

Part III: Response

The results of our workshops, interviews, and secondary research illuminated opportunities to enhance US and European responses to a CBRN attack should deterrence fail. Given its role in coordinating allied planning, NATO will be a critical actor in any response effort. Our discussions with NATO and European officials revealed consistent, close cooperation among military elements at NATO, while understanding that support required from civilian entities is a more nascent effort. However, the mandate for responding to a CBRN incident typically falls within the civilian sectors of many European governments, so political-military coordination is essential to ensuring all facets of government are aware of their roles in the event of a CBRN attack. Enhancing cooperation to promote coordinated responses includes the following best practices.

Ensure broad awareness of CBRN threats

Allies we interviewed broadly agreed that awareness of Russian CBRN threats cannot only reside within the specialist communities at NATO or in national militaries. At the political level, there is general agreement at NATO and within European capitals that Russia’s CBRN threats are an immediate concern. However, it is less clear how much allies are willing to invest to counter these threats, both now and in the five-to-ten-year time frame. Those geographically closest to Russia were most acutely aware of the threats and adamant about engaging with NATO allies via training, exercises, and exchanges to ensure active cooperation.

Variations in threat perception also appeared to be generational, according to our discussions. For example, officers who have served since the end of the Cold War described a lack of investment in CBRN defense in the absence of acute Soviet chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. The perception of such threats was lower in the post-Cold War era, which led the United States and Europe to deprioritize investment in preparedness. Given Russia’s continued flouting of international norms against the use of chemical weapons, and the primacy of nuclear warfare in its military doctrine, US, NATO, and European leaders need to uphold what they have recognized in recent strategic guidance as a critical threat emanating from Russia and invest in their forces accordingly.

Expand CBRN training to the total force

Training is an area that appears ripe for further investment. European military leaders we interviewed agreed that expertise cannot reside in the CBRN specialist communities alone. General purpose forces must also be trained on CBRN threats and equipped to fight through contaminated environments. To ensure broader awareness of CBRN threats, NATO and national military exercises should include elements of chemical, biological, or limited nuclear use scenarios. Military and civilian leaders we interviewed recognized the drawbacks of having personnel exercise in restrictive protective gear, given how it can slow maneuver, but it also puts troops at a disadvantage if they need to operate wearing the gear in a real-time scenario without much experience. NATO’s CBRN-focused exercises, described in the previous section, are an important step toward ensuring interoperability among NATO forces, but these lessons can be expanded beyond CBRN defense units to include NATO SOF and other elements of NATO’s deployable forces.

Better integrate military and civilian components

Apart from military preparedness, it is critical for national military and NATO elements to understand the capacity of civilian institutions, as first responders will have the authority for coordinating a response to incidents that occur outside of military operations. During the workshops and the interviews, participants expressed the need for greater integration of civilian and military personnel on topics such as decontamination and training, which necessitates the ability to share information between sectors.

Civilian institutions also play a critical role in responding to chemical and biological incidents, which could include attacks. Preparedness within national, subnational, and local institutions—including, for example, hospitals, research laboratories, public health institutions, law enforcement agencies, manufacturing facilities, and entities managing critical infrastructure—are essential to ensuring readiness for potential chemical and biological attacks. Civilian institutions could be underprepared for the crisis operations that would be required in the event of a chemical or biological attack. Better coordination with military counterparts can bridge these gaps to ensure a whole-of-society response to potential attacks, which also has an important deterrent effect when highlighted via strategic communications campaigns.

The European Union can play a role in fostering greater access to critical resources, such as PPE and laboratory equipment, particularly in times of crisis where traditional processes are too slow. The European External Action Service, which is the EU’s diplomatic service, has long partnered with NATO to ensure mutual understanding of threats and how to best prepare NATO allies and EU member states for possible CBRN attacks with information and tangible assets.³⁵ This relationship is vital to ensure stronger political-military coordination and should be expanded to account for greater CBRN-related cooperation.

Leverage NATO for coordination and capabilities

NATO’s 2022 CBRN defense policy represented a shift from the focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism of the early 2000s to a state-based threat actor that more closely aligns with the modern security environment.³⁶ NATO’s International Staff is overseeing the implementation of this policy, which is critical to ensure guidance flows to capitals so national authorities can promote a consistent approach. A response aligned with NATO demonstrates unity, which in turn demonstrates alliance cohesion in the face of continued Russian threats. Several NATO allies, including the United States, UK, and Finland, have their own national policies, but for those that do not, the NATO policy provides a roadmap for driving national prioritization of CBRN threats and response options for these threats aligned with NATO’s priorities.³⁷

As NATO allies consider greater thresholds for defense spending, more investment is needed in CBRN defense equipment and capabilities. An essential aspect of capability development is deploying and positioning of attribution, detection, and surveillance systems. NATO is well poised to lead collaborative efforts and ensure that states without adequate CBRN defenses learn from leaders in the field. NATO’s High Visibility Projects (HVP) includes three initiatives to improve cooperation around facilities, equipment, and detection.³⁸ CBRN defense projects have also been part of NATO’s Smart Defence Initiative since 2014.³⁹

Consider the information domain

As noted in the deterrence section, proactive communication about military and civilian activities to safeguard the entire population from a CBRN attack serves an important deterrent function while bolstering societal resilience. Effective use of the information domain is equally critical to reassuring the public regarding CBRN responses.

States can disseminate proactive messages to get ahead of any false or misleading information that Russia may seek to inject within open societies. This includes emphasis on strategic communications, fact-checking initiatives, media literacy, and education campaigns for adults and children alike.

The health sector can offer lessons in disseminating information about emotionally sensitive topics in a way that recognizes the severity of a threat without stoking fear. For example, the UK Health Service launched a public health campaign in 2025 to counter fears of taking antibiotics, which has become a top issue among UK residents.⁴⁰ Similar approaches can be taken to inform the public about chloropicrin or other agents Russia has used. Such communications should focus on facts, and in the realm of CBRN weapons, be clear about the rare and limited nature of exposure to such threats so as not to provoke undue stress or fear.

Integrating deterrence and response

Through the course of our research, we identified two activities that served both deterrent and response functions. First, being clear and unafraid of imposing massive costs to Russia (including economic, geopolitical, or military actions) for its use of chemical weapons could deter it from continuing to deploy chemical weapons or prevent escalation. Accountability is also an important part of response. Since 2014, Russia has acted with impunity in the absence of credible deterrent threats to its use of chemical weapons. Although many countries and international organizations have condemned Russia’s use of chemical weapons and imposed sanctions on Moscow, these actions have not stopped Russia from using chemical agents to achieve geopolitical goals. The consensus during our workshops and interviews is that Russia has a long history of incorporating CBRN weapons into its strategy and planning, which makes them both a near-term threat and a long-term strategic threat. Bringing treaty violations forward has had limited impact on Russia’s behavior, but increasing economic sanctions could reduce Russian access to funding, equipment, facilities, and technologies that could advance their chemical and biological weapons ambitions.

Second, the United States and its European allies and partners should clearly communicate potential consequences to deter future actions and inflict damage on the sectors on which Russia relies on for the development of its chemical and biological capabilities. The apparent threat of what a potential CBRN escalation would entail, including the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic implications, is essential for deterring Russia from turning to these threats, but following through on these actions also serves to punish Russia in response to its illicit activities.

Recommendations and key findings

Recommendation: Allies should continuously assess and evaluate Russia’s strategic objectives. To better coordinate threat perceptions across the Alliance, the United States and its European allies and partners should consider opportunities to expand collaboration on joint threat assessments related to Russia’s CBRN capabilities. As the Office of the Director of National Intelligence crafts the annual joint threat assessment report, insights from European allies and partners will be critical to assemble the most comprehensive picture of Russian CBRN threats; integrating perspectives from the Office of the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security will be paramount in this effort.

Recommendation: Instead of publicizing red lines, the United States should champion the achievement of internal consensus regarding acceptable thresholds of Russian activity based on treaty obligations, while externally preserving ambiguity as a component of deterrence. NATO, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the United Nations are valuable forums for such deliberations and can play roles in imposing costs on Russia for CBRN use. However, internal debates within national governments are required to achieve consensus, which can take time. International investigations, such as those previously led in Syria by the OPCW (an intergovernmental body), are also time-consuming, and Russia politicizes the results to undermine effectiveness. Therefore, this recommendation could take years of sustained effort to carry out.

Recommendation: Within the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) should work with the relevant authorities within the Treasury and Commerce departments to inflict the requisite economic pain on Russia through, for example, sanctions and export controls, to undermine its ability to sustain its biological and chemical weapons programs. Unified public messaging campaigns from the United States and Europe that condemn Russian CBRN weapons deployment would reinforce activities conducted behind the scenes.

Recommendation: The United States and its European allies and partners should identify methods for cooperation with nontraditional partners to dissuade Russia from leveraging CBRN threats as part of their military doctrine. Through NATO or the UN, the United States should explore opportunities to engage China and India to dissuade Moscow from pursuing further CBRN weapons development and use.

Recommendation: As concerns about potential deployment of Russian CBRN weapons grow, the US DoD should emphasize and prioritize efforts to expand counter-CBRN capabilities. Specific needs include sufficient systems to detect, surveil, and attribute CBRN threats. The United States could leverage the OPCW (and vice versa) for its experience in investigations. As the United States and its European allies and partners update guidelines for defense spending, CBRN defense warrants renewed attention and investment. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should advocate for European counterparts to place greater emphasis on CBRN defense. The DoD and the relevant subagencies should emphasize these systems when outlining US defense policy and national security strategies as they pertain to CBRN threats. Such systems will aid in deterring Russian CBRN threats while expanding readiness, preparedness, and resilience within the United States and across the transatlantic community. Ministries of defense and crisis response agencies should set baselines for CBRN defense capabilities and stockpile accordingly, including PPE, gas masks, antibiotics, and laboratory equipment.

Recommendation: DTRA and the broader US defense community should expand training on CBRN threats by incorporating elements of chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare scenarios in tabletop exercises and war-games. Inclusion of these scenarios can complement crisis situations posited in Europe to identify deterrence strategies and response options. CBRN considerations are often perceived to be too niche and left to specialist communities to design strategy and crisis responses. However, it is critical for decision-makers within the entire chain of command to possess a broad awareness of CBRN threats and simulate planning. The Joint Staff should ensure that service-level training incorporates these considerations into doctrine and training. Then, DTRA’s liaison officers could support training at US military commands and within multilateral institutions, such as NATO.

Recommendation: The United States and its NATO allies should incorporate the NATO SOF Command more directly into operational planning, particularly when thinking through the requisite deterrence and response implications of Russia deploying a CBRN weapon. NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) could help drive this coordination with support from the United States. Given the hybrid nature of many CBRN threats from Russia, within SHAPE and NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO), the United States and its NATO allies could consider a greater role for responding to hybrid threats alongside preexisting military structures. The US should expand CBRN defense cooperation, particularly on training, exercising, and information sharing. Elsewhere in Europe, allies recognized the leading role the United States plays (as well as the UK) in sharing intelligence with NATO; for allies with limited intelligence capabilities of their own, US information might be the only source of CBRN-related intelligence. Some allies expressed uncertainty over the prioritization of CBRN-related cooperation as a new administration begins its work in Washington, but at the individual level, cooperation remains close. NATO leaders should leverage productive working relationships to ensure sustained, coordinated prioritization for CBRN defense across all echelons of NATO planning.

Recommendation: As the need for additional CBRN defense capabilities and equipment grows, so too does the need to strengthen the private-sector capacity to supply the requisite functionalities. The US government should expand relationships with the defense industry and bolster production capacity to sustain supply chains and replenish depleted stockpiles of PPE. The DoD can also leverage lessons learned for production capacity and procurement protocols from the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Pentagon supported the production of PPE through the Defense Production Act to increase production of critical supplies and equipment. The DoD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Defense Logistics Agency can both play an important role in facilitating these relationships while removing unnecessary barriers to procurement processes within the DoD. Similar efforts should be undertaken with European counterparts of these agencies and at NATO, though the implementation of this recommendation could require years of investment.

Recommendation: Demonstrating close cooperation between civilian and military entities can have a deterrent effect if communicated properly, while also ensuring military entities are aware of the resources that reside in civilian institutions. Key areas for investment include interoperability of CBRN defense equipment; standards and procedures for treating exposure to chemical or biological agents; availability of civilian infrastructure for military use; and protocols for military members seeking care in civilian hospitals. NATO is well poised to encourage cooperation between military forces and critical civilian institutions that are often on the front lines of such responses, including public health agencies, local hospitals, and law enforcement. European nations can leverage the examples of their peers to their advantage. In the United States, the DoD is well positioned to support interagency coordination among European allies and partners with respect to emergency preparedness mechanisms, capability development, and training. OSD should consider embedding highly skilled personnel within US military commands, diplomatic missions, and other frameworks to facilitate the exchange of information and expertise.

Recommendation: A whole-of-society approach to resilience—to include health institutions, law enforcement, critical infrastructure, business community, and other sectors—can help strengthen attribution systems for identifying and attributing chemical and biological attacks. The United States should coordinate with its European allies and partners to encourage greater resilience and preparedness within civilian institutions and foster information sharing across national borders.

Recommendation: Preemptive and frequent intelligence sharing, in classified and open-source settings, is critical to deterring Russia from using CBRN weapons; this practice presents a unified approach among the United States and its European allies and partners. All allies should aim to more regularly share relevant information. The US national security apparatus should conduct a complete review of potential barriers to information and intelligence sharing to identify areas for streamlined sharing with NATO allies. The Defense Intelligence Agency could lead such an initiative on behalf of the DoD, with a focus on greater use of open-source intelligence to draw further public attention to Russia’s CBRN capabilities, facilities, and development. The United States should encourage similar reviews across NATO member states to improve Alliance-wide access to intelligence and information and ensure that this subject is a standing agenda item for the relevant NATO committees, including the Defense Policy and Planning Committee and the Civilian Intelligence Committee.

Recommendation: To support NATO’s 2022 CBRN Defense Strategy’s effort to improve shared understanding across the Alliance, more consistent and comprehensive messaging is needed within the capitals of NATO allies, particularly around the policy planning process and the integration of civilian entities within a coordinated military response in the event of a CBRN-related contingency. The US Mission to NATO can champion efforts to expand knowledge and understanding of Russian CBRN threats within NATO while sharing lessons learned from European allies and partners throughout the US government.

Recommendation: The US Defense, State, and Homeland Security departments have produced public messaging campaigns related to Russian CBRN threats and methods to improve media literacy. These efforts should expand to include greater emphasis on debunking false and misleading claims related to CBRN threats. Additionally, the US government should incorporate European allies and partners in messaging efforts to counter Russian malign influence operations around CBRN threats.

Recommendation: The United States should work with European allies to identify best practices in crafting public awareness-raising campaigns for how to respond to suspected CBRN attacks. Public messaging should focus on practical steps individuals can take in an emergency, without prompting undue alarm among the wider population.

Recommendation: US and European governments should explore opportunities to partner with civil society organizations to craft prebunking, media literacy, and fact-checking initiatives that can successfully communicate proactive messaging to broader publics in the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly given the scientific and technical nature of CBRN threats. Proactive messages about resistance to Russian narratives should be disseminated through a combination of means, including traditional media, official government communications, and social media. The United States could also explore joint research initiatives with European institutions. EU member states can leverage the European Defense Fund, which provides research into common defense and security priorities, including in CBRN-related issues. Partnerships between universities, scientific foundations, and think tanks can facilitate greater knowledge and information sharing related to CBRN threats.

Recommendation: Technologies such as synthetic biology and additive manufacturing continue to evolve, and their applications will remain difficult to foresee. The international community must remain vigilant to how technologies can be exploited. To that end, the United States must continue and expand its restrictions for known suppliers of potential dual-use technologies to Russia. The DoD should coordinate with the Department of Commerce to expand the use of export controls to address instances where Russia is able to obtain capabilities and equipment, such as pharmaceutical components, biotechnologies, and chemical precursors. Critical to the success of these controls, however, is including like-minded European allies and partners into conversations about technologies of concern. The Department of Defense should work with the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to strengthen and expand the list of sanctioned entities that aid and abet Russia’s biological and chemical weapons development programs.

Conclusion

This project demonstrates that Russian chemical and biological threats are a concern now and will continue to pose challenges to European security in the next five to ten years. To enable European allies and partners to counter these threats, the United States can leverage its strong security and defense relationships with European allies and partners to improve capabilities and raise the profile of chemical and biological weapons issues within governments and among populations. The existing chemical and biological defense infrastructure in the United States, NATO, and in some European countries provides lessons for the broader Euro-Atlantic community. With greater investment comes greater confidence that deterring Russia is feasible, but if deterrence fails, attention now can ensure that the United States and Europe are prepared to effectively respond.

Please note that the appendixes are not included in the online version of this publication, but they can be accessed in the attached PDF file. The appendixes contain the following information: Appendix A – Acronym List; Appendix B – Workshop Participants; Appendix C – Exercise Methodology; Appendix D – Interview Participants; Appendix E – Biographies. These appendixes provide additional details and insights on the research methods and findings.

The research team thanks the US Department of Defense for sponsoring this work and for the guidance and support provided throughout the course of the project. Special thanks go to the wide range of experts and stakeholders, inside and outside of the US and European governments, who took part in the scenario-building exercises, contributed their perspectives during the interview process, spoke during roundtable discussions, and participated in other contexts to enrich the analysis.

We would also like to acknowledge Hans Binnendijk and John Watts for their support in conceptualizing the methodology and structure of the scenario workshop exercises. Hans and Katarzyna Zysk provided useful peer reviews to improve the quality of the report. In addition, we would like to thank Torrey Taussig and Matthew Kroenig, who offered strategic direction, peer review, and key perspectives throughout the project. Within the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative team, we recognize our current and recent colleagues Inga Samoškaitė, Zak Schneider, Kristen Taylor, Kimberly Talley, and Luka Ignac for their project management and research support. We would also like to thank the Atlantic Council’s Gretchen Ehle, Nicholas O’Connell, and Caroline Simpson, whose support for this project was invaluable.

This report is intended to live up to General Brent Scowcroft’s standard for rigorous, relevant, and nonpartisan analysis on national security issues. The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to continue his nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Department of Defense or the United States Government.

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Philippe Dickinson

Deputy Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Chinese East Asia

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Ryan Arick

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

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Natasha Lander Finch

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Arms Control Europe & Eurasia

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On September 30,  Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Elliot Ackerman authored an article in The Free Press entitled “Pete Hegseth Wants a ‘Warrior Culture.’ Does He Know What That Means?,” in which he discusses Secretary Hegseth’s changes to service member culture.

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Elliot Ackerman

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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On September 17, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Owen Daniels was featured on the Network 20/20 Virtual Briefing Series alongside Janet Egan and Sam Winter-Levy. The panelists discussed the ramifications and strategic implications of the US-China AI race and China’s rapid progress in AI development.

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Owen J. Daniels

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The post Daniels weighs the consequences of the US-China AI Race on Network 20/20 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“When the Chinese came, they bullied, they killed,” Choejor said of China’s invasion of Tibet in the 1950s. “There was no freedom, no religion. After so many brutal acts, there was no way to stay silent. We couldn’t stay living like that. We suffered. But there was no other choice. We had to fight back.”

When it comes to their culture, history, and geography, Tibet and Ukraine appear to have few things in common. But scratch beneath the surface and you’ll find many surprising similarities, including the fact that when neighboring empires invaded their homelands, the Tibetan and Ukrainian nations summoned a devotion to their freedom and an unbreakable will to fight for it.

Beginning in the mid-1950s, Tibetan irregulars fought a decades-long insurgency against China’s occupation. It wasn’t until 1974, and at the Dalai Lama’s request, that they finally laid down their arms. The legacy of this armed resistance continues to inspire generations of Tibetans, both inside Tibet and in exile, to resist Chinese oppression in other, non-violent ways.

Likewise, Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 spurred a nationwide resistance movement to take root, paving the way for Ukraine’s remarkable stand in February 2022. After more than three and a half years of full-scale war, Ukraine’s will to resist remains unbroken.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

I’ve spent the past thirteen years embedded in the Tibetan and Ukrainian freedom struggles, wanting to understand how these two nations summoned the will to defy the empires that meant to destroy them. This quest has taken me to the ends of the earth and to the extremes of the human experience. I dodged Russian snipers on Ukraine’s battlefields and crossed remote Himalayan passes that soar as high as jetliners fly.

Along the way, I met Ukrainian university students who adapted small commercial drones to kill their Russian enemies, and shared tea with Tibetan monks and nomads who had fought on horseback, armed with swords and World War I-era rifles, against China’s mechanized invasion. Throughout it all, I’ve been consistently surprised by all the similarities these two stories share.

Whether I was talking to a 20-year-old Ukrainian soldier or an 80-year-old Tibetan veteran, I kept hearing the same humble explanations for their actions, such as the shared sentiment that they had “no other choice.” For many of those I have met, going to war for their homeland’s freedom wasn’t really a decision at all. It was automatic and instinctual, like an immune system response. Their country was invaded and innocent people were dying, so they had to fight. Simple as that.

Ukrainian soldier Denys put it to me like this: “Wars aren’t won by surrendering. You have to fight. If you don’t fight, you won’t be supported by anyone. Because it’s your own freedom and you have to fight for it.”

Kelsang Tsering, a former Buddhist monk who served in the Tibetan resistance from 1955 to 1974, had a similarly matter-of-fact explanation for his decision to resist China’s occupation. “I saw what China was doing in Tibet and it made me so angry, I had to fight,” he said.

Tsering and I spoke over tea one evening at his home in a Nepalese refugee settlement. A flickering fluorescent lamp lit the room. A picture of the Dalai Lama hung on the wall. Tsering’s wife sat on the floor, legs folded, spinning a prayer wheel while she chanted a Buddhist mantra. I asked Tsering if it was difficult for him to take a life in combat, given that he was once a Buddhist monk who eschewed all violence, even the killing of an insect.

“In the beginning, I was thinking we were monks, and so we shouldn’t kill,” he answered. “But when I recalled all the abuses, all the terrible things the Chinese did, I forgot my hesitation. After seeing so many bad things, I forgot that killing was a sin.”

Such moral certitude echoes what I’ve heard from many Ukrainians. “The Russians came to our country and killed our people. It’s our country, our land, our families. For us, it’s very clear. We kill them, or they kill us,” a Ukrainian special operations soldier named Serhii told me.

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China and Russia are on the march against the US-led world order. Yet, the way I see it, America’s military might isn’t the only obstacle holding these aggressive, wannabe empires at bay.

By refusing to surrender their identities and submit to imperial rule, the Tibetan and Ukrainian nations defy the fantasies of civilizational greatness, detached from historical reality, that the Chinese and Russian regimes depend on for their domestic legitimacy. The authoritarians in Beijing and Moscow see such expressions of independence and self-determination as existential threats to their grip on power. Their retaliation has been brutal.

Russia launched its disastrous full-scale invasion in 2022 to destroy the Ukrainian state and extinguish Ukraine’s national identity entirely. China, for its part, has spent decades trying to erase Tibet’s culture and ethnicity. Today, after seventy-five years of occupation, Tibet is a nightmarish Gestapo state for the Tibetans living there, a chilling portent of what Ukrainians are fighting to prevent from happening in their homeland.

The irony, of course, is that the Ukrainian and Tibetan nations are more unified today than they ever were prior to being invaded. Rather than break Ukraine’s spirit, each new Russian atrocity reinforces the resolve of the Ukrainian population to resist. As for Tibetans, a people once divided by regional dialects and cultures, they’ve now coalesced around a single version of their language and national identity, at the heart of which is their universal devotion to the Dalai Lama.

The price of freedom is set by those who wish to destroy it. And yet, as the Dalai Lama said in a speech not long after the Soviet Union collapsed, “brute force, no matter how strongly applied, can never subdue the basic human desire for freedom.” In today’s troubled world, that’s a message worth remembering.

Nolan Peterson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US Air Force Special Operations pilot.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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On September 22, 2025, Andrew Michta, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was published in RealClearDefense. He argues that the next U.S. National Security Strategy risks misreading history again.

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Andrew A. Michta

Nonresident Senior Fellow

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The post Michta published in RealClearDefense on the next U.S. National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This unity was on display when the President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Mohammed bin Zayed, arrived in Doha one day after the attack, and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman condemned Israel’s “brutal aggression” against Qatar and vowed that Riyadh would stand with Doha “without limit.” Such solidarity speaks volumes about how much intra-GCC dynamics have changed since the Emirati and Saudi-led blockade of Qatar, which ended less than five years ago.

Beyond the GCC, leaders and representatives from across the Arab-Islamic world convened in Doha on September 15 for an emergency summit organized by the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Together, they issued a unified condemnation of Israel’s strike on Qatar. In his address, Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani warned of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s expansionist ambitions, calling the notion of turning the Arab world into “an Israeli sphere of influence” a “dangerous illusion.”

US security guarantees under scrutiny

For decades, Gulf governments have depended on the United States as their primary security guarantor, particularly against Iran and Ba’athist Iraq. However, a series of US foreign policy decisions in the twenty-first century—including Washington’s response to the 2010–11 Arab Spring, the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and its limited reaction to the 2019 attacks on Saudi Aramco and the 2022 Houthi strikes on Abu Dhabi—have, to varying degrees, gradually eroded Gulf states’ confidence in America’s commitment to their security. Israel’s recent military strike on Qatar, however, brought those concerns to the forefront, sharply intensifying doubts among Gulf monarchies about the reliability of the US security umbrella.

As CNN and Axios have reported, US and Israeli officials claim that Netanyahu notified the Trump administration prior to the launch of this operation. If true, this contradicts the White House’s claims that the notification only came after Israel’s military launched the missiles at Doha. Nonetheless, Trump responded to Israel’s bombing of Qatar by referring to the Gulf country as a “great ally” and warned Netanyahu’s government to be “very careful.”

Regardless of the timing and which version of events is accurate, Doha’s key lesson is that the American security umbrella failed to prevent this unprecedented attack from occurring. Given that Qatar has hosted the US Central Command’s forward headquarters at al-Udeid Air Base for over two decades and was designated a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2022, Doha is now questioning what these aspects of its defense partnership with Washington truly mean in practice if Washington permits (or at least fails to prevent) an Israeli strike on Qatari territory.

This incident has also prompted similar concerns among other GCC members, who are now asking what protections, if any, they have that Qatar did not. If Israel is willing to carry out such an operation with apparent impunity, what would stop it from targeting individuals deemed “terrorists” by its government elsewhere in the Gulf—such as a Houthi representative based in Muscat?

Against the backdrop of Israel’s increasingly assertive regional posture—including its strike on Doha, the June attack on Iran that launched the Twelve Day War, ongoing military operations against the Houthis in Yemen, and frequent airstrikes across Syria since last year’s fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime—the GCC states are finding themselves more closely aligned in their threat perceptions. As each of the six monarchies pursues ambitious economic development and diversification agendas, regional stability has become a shared strategic imperative. Attracting investors, business leaders, and tourists depends on maintaining a secure environment—not just within their own borders, but across the broader region. From the Gulf’s perspective, Israel’s actions are casting a long shadow over the viability of these visions for economic transformation.

In this context, it was unsurprising that Gulf leaders swiftly condemned Israel’s strike on Qatar and expressed unequivocal solidarity with Doha. For all six monarchies, the imperative is clear: to signal that such acts of aggression must not be normalized or allowed to become a precedent. While Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian territories, and Yemen have become routine, Gulf states are united in their determination to prevent any GCC member from being added to that list. There is a growing consensus across the Gulf that Israel must face consequences for its actions to deter any future attacks on Gulf monarchies.

Gulf options

Lacking the military capacity to respond directly to Israel, GCC states are compelled to explore alternative, non-military options. Chief among these is the strategic use of their close relationship with US President Donald Trump and key figures within his administration. Gulf leaders are likely to press Washington to exert its considerable leverage over Israel to prevent any future attacks on a GCC member. Aware of the Trump administration’s reliance on the Gulf monarchies for advancing US economic, geopolitical, and security objectives, these states possess diplomatic and economic levers that could be employed skillfully.

Given the UAE’s status as the Gulf state with the closest ties to Israel, Doha and possibly other GCC capitals are quietly encouraging Abu Dhabi to reassess its relations with Tel Aviv. Although a full abrogation of the Abraham Accords in response to the September 9 Israeli strike on Qatar remains unlikely at this point, Emirati officials may consider recalibrating bilateral ties to convey that aggression against any GCC member carries consequences. Even if short of abrogating the Abraham Accords, Abu Dhabi and Manama could expel ambassadors, downgrade diplomatic relations (as the UAE did with Iran in January 2016), or decrease their public engagement with Israel. Looking ahead, should Israel continue to act with impunity and Washington fail to restrain its behavior, Abu Dhabi could retain its option to withdraw from the Abraham Accords altogether as a form of leverage. Nonetheless, aside from strong rhetoric condemning the attack on Doha, so far the UAE’s only diplomatic action in response to Israel’s bombing of its fellow GCC state has been to summon the deputy Israeli ambassador to Abu Dhabi.

Ultimately, GCC members face an inflection point as they grapple with new regional realities. Israel’s willingness to strike a Gulf state and Washington’s tacit acquiescence have exposed a critical vulnerability in the Gulf’s longstanding reliance on the United States as its principal security guarantor. Should further Israeli attacks occur, Gulf leaders will be confronted with the challenge of managing a growing security threat absent the protective umbrella they have long depended on. With no alternative global or regional power both capable and willing to replace Washington in this role, the Gulf monarchies may be increasingly driven to deepen intra-GCC defense coordination and revive aspirations for a more autonomous, NATO-style security framework. Developing robust missile defense systems and credible deterrent capabilities will require time and sustained investment. Yet, this trajectory appears increasingly necessary.

In parallel, Gulf states are likely to expand strategic partnerships with Pakistan and Turkey. Both of these countries have their own vested interests in preserving Gulf security and sovereignty amid an increasingly assertive Israeli posture and perceived US disengagement. Just eight days after the Israeli attack on Doha, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a defense treaty, which puts the Kingdom under Islamabad’s security umbrella. This is particularly relevant given Pakistan’s increasingly grave concerns about an Israeli-Indian nexus within the context of the armed conflict between Islamabad and New Delhi earlier this year, as well as Turkey’s perception of a growing Israeli threat in Syria.

Iran can be counted on to opportunistically seize this moment to capitalize on its Arab neighbors’ growing distrust of Washington and try to bring Tehran closer to Doha and other GCC capitals. Although it is extremely doubtful that the fallout from this Israeli strike on Qatar will lead to any major GCC-wide pivot toward Iran as a security partner, Tehran will be positioned to gain in mostly symbolic ways while advancing its anti-Israeli rhetoric and narrative of standing with other Muslim-majority nations in opposing Israel.

In sum, while the precise trajectory of GCC responses remains uncertain, Israel’s strike has served as a shock, compelling all six members to re-examine long-standing assumptions about the reliability of their US security guarantor. In its wake, the Gulf monarchies have displayed strong unity at a time when rethinking twenty-first-century Gulf security is no longer optional. Whether through greater intra-GCC coordination, diversification of external partnerships, or renewed efforts toward strategic autonomy, the region now stands at a critical juncture—one that will shape the contours of Gulf security for years to come.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He is also an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University.

The post How Israel’s strike on Doha is forcing a Gulf security reckoning appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Director for Northern Europe Anna Wieslander has featured on Swedish radio September 10 & 11 following the news of NATO forces shooting down Russian drones over Poland and commented on the NATO response and reactions from world leaders.

September 10, Wieslander says that “it was about time NATO reacted in such a way” and continues to say that Russia is testing the responses and resolve of the alliance. The NATO response was “absolutely necessary” deems Wieslander.

September 11, Wieslander also comments on the absent US response to the incident, saying that it is “curious” that neither the President nor any secretary in the administration has condemned Russia’s actions.

Listen to the features here:

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As the drama swirled, Rubio’s visit was an opportunity to consolidate long-term trust, cooperation, and collaboration with the United States’ partners in Mexico City and Quito. This and earlier trips to the region by the US secretary of state are part of a larger effort by Trump administration, which seeks to tie shared security together with enhanced prosperity for the Western Hemisphere. While progress is being made, the months and years to come will reveal whether this approach can overcome the region’s entrenched challenges.

A new implementation group in Mexico

In Mexico, President Claudia Sheinbaum and her cabinet welcomed deeper security cooperation with the United States while her secretary for foreign affairs, Juan Ramón de la Fuente, emphasized Mexican sovereignty and respect for territorial integrity during the joint press conference. Mexican officials stated clearly that each country must act against targets within their own borders. This emphasis on sovereignty should be seen in part as an attempt to shut down speculation by some that the United States might take unilateral action, including strikes against US-listed foreign terrorist organizations or other groups in Mexico.

Perhaps the biggest, most tangible announcement that came out of Palacio Nacional was the creation of a high-level implementation group to follow up on security commitments between the United States and Mexico. These commitments include coordinating joint operations against drug, arms, and human trafficking; overseeing efforts to dismantle cross-border tunnels and illicit financial networks; and designing rapid-response protocols for emerging threats. The new group is designed to give structure and permanence to bilateral security cooperation, and it will bring together senior US and Mexican officials from security, foreign affairs, and intelligence agencies. With the ability to spin off specialized subcommittees on issues such as fentanyl, firearms, and border infrastructure, the group will in effect act as a secretariat for security cooperation, with clear accountability built in through periodic progress reports to both governments. This marks an important step forward for cooperation between the United States and Mexico.

New security funding for Ecuador

Ecuador was once touted as one of the safest countries the region, but violence has increased in recent years. With five thousand murders this year as of July, the country’s homicide rate has increased by 40 percent in 2025 compared to the previous year. Much of this violence stems from criminal organizations and cartels. Reflecting this, the United States on Thursday designated Los Choneros and Los Lobos as foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated global terrorists.

While US-Ecuador cooperation is not new, the rise in violence, despite President Daniel Noboa’s efforts to tackle crime, underscores the urgency of providing increased US muscle to back his administration’s mano dura, or firm hand, policies. During his visit, Rubio announced nearly twenty million dollars in support for Ecuador, including six million dollars for naval drones. Rubio also mentioned the possibility of US troops on Ecuadorian soil, and, with an invitation from the Ecuadorians, potentially reopening a US base that was closed in 2009 under former President Rafael Correa.

The geopolitical significance of these announcements should not go unnoticed. These positive developments represent a major shift for US relations with Ecuador, a strategic ally that was once estranged and now in many ways sees eye-to-eye with the Trump administration, despite how heavily indebted it is to China. This stands in sharp contrast to US relations with long-time allies in the region, such as Colombia, whose ties with Washington have recently become more strained.

Also during the visit, US and Ecuadorian officials sketched the outlines of a potential migrant deportation agreement, though the details are pending. Last but not least, Rubio mentioned progress toward a bilateral trade deal.

From security cooperation to economic prosperity

Rubio’s focus both on enhancing security cooperation and on deepening economic ties is important, and his trip points the way toward a broader strategic vision for the region.

The Atlantic Council’s February 2024 Redefining US Strategy with Latin America and the Caribbean for a New Era report argues that the future of US engagement with the region must center on mutual, inclusive growth rooted in secure ties rather than transactional outreach. Specifically, the report envisions a revamped partnership built on shared values and country-specific strategies.

In effect, Rubio’s trip is a step toward turning that blueprint into a reality. The US secretary of state’s visit presented security cooperation as the entry point, but prosperity as the true test of success. Security cooperation should be conceived as a means to an end—in Latin America, that end should be economic security.

As Rubio said in Ecuador: “You cannot have economic prosperity without stability, and you cannot have stability without security. For example, it’s nearly impossible to attract foreign investment into a country unless you have security.”

With so much discussion surrounding the US counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean, it’s worth remembering that those shows of force are only one piece of the puzzle, and they should not distract from broader US efforts to build trust and enhance security cooperation in the region.

María Fernanda Bozmoski is director, impact and operations, and lead for Central America at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Rubio’s visit to Mexico and Ecuador shows the need for US security cooperation runs deeper than warships in the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The northern third of the Donetsk province is the last remaining part of eastern Ukraine’s industrial Donbas region that is still under Kyiv control. It has been at the epicenter of Putin’s invasion ever since the onset of Russian aggression more than a decade ago in 2014, and is home to Ukraine’s most extensive network of fortifications. Putin’s proposed peace terms pose a series of grave political and military threats for the Ukrainian authorities.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Gifting Russia large swathes of unconquered territory that thousands of Ukrainians have died defending would be an extremely bitter pill for the Ukrainian population to swallow, to put it mildly. It would also be widely seen as rewarding Russia for launching the largest European war since World War II. This would legitimize Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine and set the stage for further Russian aggression.

Even if Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was personally inclined to appease Putin, he does not constitutionally have the authority to cede land. Instead, changes to Ukraine’s borders must be agreed via a national referendum. Any indication that Zelenskyy favored accepting Putin’s territorial demands would likely provoke strong domestic opposition. This would potentially destabilize Ukraine, creating a range of opportunities for Russia to exploit. A weakened and divided Ukraine would be far more vulnerable on the battlefield and in the diplomatic arena.

Alternatively, if Zelenskyy maintains his current position and continues to rule out Putin’s Donbas land grab, the Kremlin will likely use this rejection to poison the Ukrainian leader’s relations with US President Donald Trump by portraying Ukraine as the main obstacle to peace. Putin would no doubt welcome the opportunity to drive a wedge between Kyiv and Washington as Moscow seeks to isolate Ukraine and reduce international support for the Ukrainian war effort.

Militarily, the surrender of the northern Donetsk region would place large parts of eastern Ukraine at risk of being overrun by the advancing Russians. The region currently serves as a bastion against Russia’s invasion. While there is no guarantee that fortified areas will be able to hold out indefinitely against Russian attacks, Putin would almost certainly be forced to sacrifice huge numbers of troops before achieving his goal. In this sense, the Donbas fortress belt is one of Ukraine’s trump cards in its war of attrition against Russia.