Bottom lines up front

• Europe is entering a period of strategic indecision: some capitals are doubling down on deterrence and defense, while others are reviving calls for engagement with Moscow.
• Renewed appeals to re-engage Russia do not reflect improved strategic conditions but uncertainty over how to respond to Russian aggression and the breakdown of the rules-based order.
• Containment remains the only viable European approach to Russia, but it must be updated to reflect the changing US role on the continent.

VILNIUS and WASHINGTON—February 22, 2026, marked eighty years since US diplomat George Kennan sent the Long Telegram from Moscow, laying the intellectual foundations for a containment strategy against Russia. As Kennan described in a follow-up Foreign Affairs essay that presented his ideas to the public, “the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Two days after this anniversary marked four years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, starkly illustrating the consequences of abandoning Kennan’s core strategic insight in favor of illusions about convergence, dialogue, or historical inevitability.

Europe today faces a familiar temptation: to substitute process for power, engagement for strategy, and institutional continuity for genuine security. The question is no longer whether Russia can be accommodated into a cooperative European order—that experiment has already failed. The question now is whether Europe and its allies are prepared to organize their security around the reality that Russia cannot be accommodated and must be contained.

Europe’s strategic indecision: Why calls for engagement are back

So far this year, several European countries—France, Germany, and Italy among them—have revived calls for renewed engagement with Moscow. Just this month, the Belgian prime minister said that Europe must negotiate with Russia, adding: “In private, European leaders agree with me, but no one dares to say it out loud.” Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, Poland, and some Baltic leaders remain skeptical.

At the surface level, renewed engagement seems to be driven by fears of European marginalization in emerging diplomatic formats, particularly as the United States has engaged in limited talks about Russia’s war in Ukraine, which have now been paused due to the war in Iran. Europeans do not want to wait for a seat at the table in these talks—especially regarding peace in Ukraine and any future security architecture for the continent.

At a deeper structural level, engagement returns precisely when high-end deterrence and defense posture becomes politically costly, and institutional enforcement weakens. Dialogue appears less disruptive than sustained military modernization, sanctions, and forward deployments. But it is also less pertinent.

Limited but persistent European calls to re-engage with Moscow do not amount to a coherent plan to restore stability. They are reactions to the breakdown of the rules-based order—and to Europe’s inherent uncertainty about how to respond. The core fallacy here lies in conflating the existence of the rules-based order with the institutions that once embodied it. When those rules are violated, the question is not how to preserve institutions as they are, but whether they must be reformed, redesigned, or, in some cases, abandoned altogether.

The failure of stand-alone multilateralism

For decades, Euro-Atlantic security rested on the implicit assumption that institutions themselves generate stability by establishing expectations and enforcing adherence to norms. Multilateral diplomacy presumes rational actors and assumes that repeated interaction will gradually encourage restraint. Authoritarian regimes, nevertheless, have repeatedly exploited this logic by using engagement to gain time, acquire undeserved legitimacy, and garner asymmetric advantage. When enforcement erodes, institutions tend to maintain themselves through inertia rather than effectiveness. Processes replace outcomes, and participation becomes an end rather than a means for something more valuable.

Simply being at the table does not produce peace. When detached from military instruments of power, engagement consumes time while aggressors build strength. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) provides a cautionary example. Rather than confronting Russia’s systematic violations, the organization has increasingly prioritized procedural continuity over substance. Russia and Belarus remain formally engaged while openly dismantling every foundational principle of the OSCE. The result is a structure without content—an institution unable to defend itself, trapped in outdated working methods, and unwilling to adapt to strategic reality.

Multilateralism that cannot enforce its own norms ceases to be a safeguard and becomes a liability. But if a full-scale war in Europe has not forced an institutional transformation, what will?

Why neither engagement nor Cold War nostalgia works

Engagement is often framed as the alternative to escalation. History suggests otherwise. The United States did not pacify Europe during the Cold War through talks. Rather, Washington’s containment strategy deterred the Kremlin from aggression against the United States’ European allies. Kennan’s concept rested on sustained counterpressure—political, economic, and military—designed to shape adversary behavior over time.

At the same time, a nostalgic return to Cold War models is neither possible nor desirable. The Cold War–era strategies of “forward defense” and “flexible response” entailed a permanent, large-scale US military engagement in Europe. The era of such US engagement in Europe is ending. Washington has been explicit about this for years: Europe must develop its own capabilities, capacity, and strategic will. NATO’s ongoing command reforms reflect this shift toward greater European responsibility. The Alliance has begun moving toward a new agenda centered on credible deterrence and defense, resilience, scaling up industrial production, and burden-sharing.

Uncoordinated European initiatives to restart dialogue with Moscow risk undercutting this trajectory by weakening NATO deterrence and defense posture before it is fully restored. The real danger lies in drifting into an incoherent middle ground—where deterrence is insufficient to constrain Russia and engagement without the strength to back it up is insufficient to stabilize Europe’s relations with Moscow.

Updated containment: A functional Euro-Atlantic approach

Containment does not lead to escalation. Rather, it is a stabilizing approach that ensures any dialogue takes place within the framework of credible defense. Similarly, escalation and escalation dominance are different concepts. NATO does not seek to escalate conflicts, but it must retain the capacity to respond from a position of strength if escalation occurs. Securing such escalation dominance requires clear red lines, credible capabilities, political will, and courage.

An updated containment strategy for European countries should rest on five pillars:

First, deterrence before dialogue. Credible military posture is not optional—it is the precondition for engagement. Without the ability to deny cost-free aggression, dialogue risks becoming a channel for delay, leverage, and asymmetry rather than a tool for stability.

Second, institutions are judged by function, not sentiment. Structures that cannot enforce norms must be reformed, bypassed, or replaced. Preserving institutional continuity in the absence of enforcement does not uphold order—it obscures its erosion and delays necessary adaptation.

Third, favor regional and functional formats. Where consensus-bound forums fail, coalitions, primarily regional ones, need to come to the fore. Smaller, purpose-driven groupings can act where unanimity-based institutions are blocked, restoring effectiveness without waiting for unreachable consensus.

Fourth, European ownership. Defense industrial mobilization, infrastructure hardening, and sustained support for Ukraine must become permanent features of European security.

Fifth, strategic coherence. NATO must seize escalation management—through large-scale multidomain exercises, robust responses to hybrid attacks, and the explicit recognition that legacy arrangements with Russia no longer apply. Maintaining escalation dominance will also require breaking a long-standing taboo and integrating conventional and nuclear planning.

An updated containment strategy will require closing sanctions loopholes, integrating civil-military logistics, and expanding defense production through state-backed investment. The Kremlin’s allies and enablers will need to be constrained across multiple regions—from the Indo-Pacific to the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Europe’s renewed debate over engagement with Russia reflects a deeper reluctance to accept that the previous security order has already collapsed. Peace is preserved through strategic clarity, credible deterrence, and robust defense capabilities—not through nostalgia for processes that no longer deliver stability. Only a comprehensive policy grounded in strength, combined with a refusal to compromise on core principles, can alter Moscow’s calculus.

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Now that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty has expired, the debate begins over what the United States should do next regarding its nuclear posture. The recently released National Defense Strategy (NDS) sheds little light on the Trump administration’s plans; it does not even mention New START. Instead, the NDS largely eschews details on US nuclear policy and capabilities, noting only that the United States “will modernize and adapt our nuclear forces accordingly with focused attention on deterrence and escalation management.”¹ What this means for US force size and posture will play out over the coming months and years, likely beginning with submission of the president’s annual budget request later this spring.

In anticipation of this debate, many commentators urge caution, suggesting that any expansion in US force size (even in response to actions by China and Russia) could prompt an uncontrolled arms race.² Others argue that the United States has time to prepare for the emerging threats it faces so there is no need to panic, suggesting that adjustments can wait until the country gets closer to the end of the existing modernization program of record.³ Still others contend that the United States already has enough nuclear weapons and that force growth would be expensive and counterproductive.⁴One specific argument points to a 2013 Obama administration assessment that the US nuclear force could be reduced by up to one-third, claiming this extra one-third today provides sufficient headroom to manage China’s emergence as a nuclear peer.⁵

While much of this debate focuses on numbers alone, policymakers and military officials must also account for the attributes of the deployed force necessary for effective and credible deterrence. The question of “how much is enough” is not solely a matter of numbers, but of force size and the overall capabilities of the warheads and delivery systems the United States deploys. US force posture must be capable of deterring a diverse array of nuclear-armed adversaries and, if deterrence fails, must enable the achievement of national objectives against one or more of them. In general terms, national objectives include: restoring deterrence and managing escalation; limiting damage to the United States and its allies and partners; and imposing unacceptable damage on an adversary.⁶ The capabilities needed to achieve these objectives vary from adversary to adversary. They require not just an appropriately sized force, but one with the attributes needed for the array of objectives that US nuclear forces might need to achieve against each.

Given the evolving security environment and growing demands on US strategic deterrence, a force larger and more diverse from that fielded today is needed as a matter of priority—one that provides capabilities responsive to the deterrence challenges now confronting the United States.

New START’s expiration is good news for US security

Despite the New START treaty (NST) now being in the rearview mirror, it is worth revisiting why its expiration enhances US security. First, today’s security environment is significantly more dangerous than when NST was ratified—or even when it was extended in 2021—a conclusion repeatedly documented by the US government over the past decade. In 2010, Russia was viewed as a potential strategic partner of the United States and NATO, and great-power conflict was widely seen as unlikely.⁷ Since then, both Russia and China have demonstrated a willingness to use force to advance geopolitical aims—Russia in Ukraine and China by expanding its territorial sway in and around the South China Sea. And Russia continues to brandish its nuclear capabilities to coerce Ukraine and the West.⁸ Great-power conflict is no longer a remote possibility.

Second, in 2010 China’s nuclear posture was not central to US deterrence planning. China’s nuclear force was often treated as a “lesser included” component of the Russian threat, meaning a force sufficient to deter Russia would also suffice for China. This assumption no longer holds. As two senior Biden administration officials responsible for nuclear strategy observed in 2025, “After decades of maintaining only a minimal nuclear capability, China is on pace to nearly quintuple its 2019 stockpile of some 300 nuclear warheads by 2035, in a quest to attain an arsenal equivalent in strength to Russia’s and the United States.’”⁹ China’s growth places greater demands on the US nuclear force, due not only to the anticipated size of its future arsenal but also to the quandaries it presents for US military planners who must account for crisis or potential conflict with more than one nuclear adversary.

Third, in 2010 the Obama administration still harbored hopes of negotiating a denuclearization pathway with North Korea regarding its then nascent nuclear program. By the mid-2000s, however, North Korea was already pursuing a breakout capability intended to “directly hold the United States at risk.”¹⁰ Today, North Korea possesses a more robust nuclear arsenal capable of striking the United States and its regional allies.¹¹ In fact, to date, the second Trump administration has not restated the 2018 policy (later adopted by the Biden administration) that any North Korean nuclear use would lead to the end of the Kim Jong-Un regime. This omission might reflect a reassessment of that policy’s feasibility in light of North Korea’s expanding capabilities.¹²

Fourth, in 2010 there was little apparent evidence of cooperation among rogue or revisionist actors. Today, such cooperation, if not outright coordination, is evident.“¹³ Few in 2010 would have envisioned North Korean soldiers fighting in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf.¹⁴ It would be dangerously naïve to assume conflict with one adversary would not elicit support from one or more of the others, whether direct or indirect. Simply put, Russia, China, and North Korea all being armed with nuclear weapons means that any crisis or conflict with one risks a nuclear crisis or conflict with one or both of the others. Credibly deterring all three—even if engaged in conflict with only one—requires a force larger than NST permitted and that is tailored to the distinct deterrence and targeting requirements for each.

Fifth, while NST only addressed strategic systems, the urgent need for the United States to develop and field theater-focused capabilities (so-called non-strategic or theater nuclear weapons) was a reason to allow NST to expire. Russia possesses a far larger theater-focused arsenal than the United States, a disparity NST did nothing to mitigate.¹⁵ Other adversaries similarly see value in developing and fielding such capabilities.¹⁶ While the United States is beginning to address this gap by developing a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, that system remains a decade away and is likely insufficient by itself. Moving beyond NST allows the United States to field additional strategic capabilities to help offset this imbalance, even if imperfectly.

In short, NST was “the wrong treaty for the current time.” Getting out from under its constraints will enable the United States to prepare in earnest for contemporary deterrence challenges—focusing not only on numbers, but on the force attributes required for credible and effective deterrence against a diverse group of nuclear-armed adversaries.¹⁷

The current US strategic nuclear force is inadequate

The ability to deter an adversary from taking extreme actions is not simply a matter of having a nuclear weapon that can be delivered to a target. As a senior US Strategic Command deterrence thinker has observed, deterrence is “an intentional act or set of actions aimed to influence adversaries’ decision-making, so that [they] choose restraint over aggression.”¹⁸ Because deterrence is directed at a decision-maker’s perceptions, deterrence planners “must assess our capabilities relative to the doctrine, exercises, statements, threats and behavior of potential adversaries.”¹⁹ In other words, the United States must be able to influence different adversaries differently. This approach requires maintaining tailored and flexible strategies, plans, and capabilities that can be leveraged effectively across a spectrum of adversaries and contexts. Simply retaining a force structured and sized consistent with NST would limit this flexibility in important ways.

First, US nuclear forces must be able to support multiple objectives depending on circumstances presented. While there are different ways to articulate these requirements, they generally include:

• deterring an adversary from initiating a nuclear attack;
• deterring further use if nuclear weapons have already been employed;
• and rendering an adversary incapable of continuing large-scale nuclear strikes.²⁰

A force capable of achieving all this requires flexibility and options. This is not a new concept. As the secretary of defense’s fiscal year 1975 annual report noted, to be “credible and hence effective over the range of possible contingencies deterrence must rest on many options and on a spectrum of capabilities . . . to support these options.”²¹ This requires the ability to apply the right force at the right time against the right target or set of targets, consistent with policy guidance and the law of armed conflict.

Numerous factors go into determining how best to service a particular target with a nuclear weapon, factors that multiply with a large adversary target base.²² In a simpler two-party context, planners must carefully examine the resources at their disposal and the characteristics of the specific targets identified to develop specific approaches to meet national objectives.²³ But all US nuclear weapons are not interchangeable. Among other factors, planners must consider the types of weapons available, the phase of conflict for which they are needed, their flight characteristics, their yield, their range, their time to target, the desired effect on a particular target, and long-standing policy guidance to achieve objectives at the lowest level of damage possible and to minimize unintended effects. Today and in the coming years, moreover, they need to make such plans recognizing that other nuclear-armed adversaries might be poised to exploit US distraction to pursue their own geopolitical objectives.

A nuclear force constrained in size and composition by a 2010-era treaty does not provide sufficient flexibility to effectively manage these factors across all potential adversaries. As an example, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are viewed as the most prompt US capability. But the need for prompt options applies to each US nuclear-armed adversary, and the United States might need to retain such prompt options for other targeting priorities that might arise as a contingency unfolds. In this context, targets that require prompt options could exceed the number of ICBMs available. Similarly, efforts to avoid overflight of one nuclear-armed state while striking another can further restrict ICBM options, increasing escalation risk or undermining mission success.

Other examples include yield and range. Policy directs achieving objectives at the lowest level of damage possible. But if only higher-yield weapons are available to the president at a given stage of conflict, presidential options narrow and escalation risks rise. Simply uploading additional warheads onto existing or future delivery systems like Minuteman III or Sentinel, moreover, is not a panacea, as increased payloads can impose range restrictions that reduce flexibility and further constrain planners.²⁴

Given considerations such as these, force adequacy cannot be measured by aggregate numbers alone. Even if the total number of delivery systems and warheads is numerically sufficient on paper to service the required targets, a force constrained by the legacy NST structure would leave little ability to offer the president meaningful options for a force that must be postured to manage a multiple adversary environment. In practice, when facing such an expanded target base, there might be only one or two approaches to a given target set, especially when facing simultaneous or sequential crises or conflicts, sharply constraining presidential decision space.

Second, the US nuclear force must account for operational limitations. For example, analyses that cite bomber payload capacity often ignore attrition that is inevitable in a high-intensity conventional conflict.²⁵ Whether B-52s, B-2s, or B-21s, some will be destroyed while flying conventional missions, bringing into question how many will be available if and when strategic bomber strikes are needed.²⁶ Losses to bombers or critical enablers such as aerial refueling tankers could significantly reduce available nuclear options. Similarly, ballistic missile submarines must periodically return to port for replenishment, and strategic bombers cannot remain on alert indefinitely.²⁷ Moreover, emerging threats spanning from quantum sensing to unmanned systems could further affect availability of strategic platforms in unknown ways.²⁸ Advocates of a size-constrained force often overlook these risks.

Third, simultaneous or sequential crises dramatically increase complexity. Planners might be required to generate deterrence options across multiple theaters at distinct stages of conflict in support of different political and military objectives, and against adversaries that might be coordinating their actions.

Complexity grows as the number of strategic adversaries increases, their level of coordination deepens, and the range of their escalation options expands. In crisis or conflict, this complexity manifests as a high level of uncertainty regarding potential escalation pathways that the United States must consider and seek to influence.²⁹

Further, this complexity can evolve over multiple pathways. Deterrence requirements will differ markedly depending on whether a crisis or conflict originates with Russia, China, or North Korea. Where and against whom a crisis begins will impact the mix of capabilities upon which the United States will lean most heavily because US plans necessarily rely on different mixes of capabilities in each case to deter or to achieve objectives.

What should US strategic force posture look like?

The United States does not need a force equal to the combined arsenals of Russia and China. And China’s nuclear growth alone should not dictate US posture. Rather, a decision on the precise nuclear force mix “will depend largely on the choices adversaries make and on how much risk a president is willing to accept in both the most plausible and worst-case nuclear scenarios.”³⁰

So far, the Trump Administration has not directly addressed nuclear force size. The NDS signals an intent to “adapt [US] nuclear forces,”³¹ and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has similarly pledged to develop “additional options” to support deterrence and escalation management.³² While these statements suggest an openness to nuclear force expansion, it is impossible to divine the Trump administration’s intent at this time.

In the absence of more detail, the administration could be guided in future posture decisions by recommendations from the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission and other commentators, pursuing options in the short-term that include: uploading additional warheads on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); reopening SLBM tubes that were capped as part of NST; and restoring nuclear capability to the full B-52 fleet.³³ Retaining a number of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines as long as technically and operationally feasible could also help, as could potentially re-operationalizing and loading the 50 ICBM silos that were taken offline as part of NST. In the medium and longer-term, accelerating the nuclear modernization program of record where possible and, eventually, increasing the number of new systems fielded as part of the modernization program would also provide opportunities to increase flexibility.

Of these options, the precise mix will ultimately be determined by Trump administration and military officials based upon classified analysis.³⁴Still, the foregoing considerations indicate the need for a force exceeding that previously permitted by NST—an operationally relevant force that is large and flexible enough to influence adversary decision-making at all stages of crisis and conflict, and that is capable of achieving national objectives against more than one nuclear adversary if it becomes necessary.

Specific posture decisions regarding each triad leg bring with them multiple variables that make direct comparisons difficult.³⁵ Still, given the current trajectory of adversary nuclear force developments, a US strategic deterrent capable of delivering of roughly 2,400 operationally deployed warheads in the near term should be large and flexible enough to meet US strategy requirements.³⁶ These increases should be spread across all three triad legs, further diversifying the weapons and delivery platforms available to planners – and to the president – when confronting potential crisis or conflict in today’s multiple adversary environment.³⁷

This posture would ensure the United States retains a capability, if needed, to target either Russian or Chinese nuclear forces and have a credible capacity available to deter or if necessary achieve national objectives against the other; provide the president more options to deal with multiple adversaries in simultaneous or sequential contingencies, thereby expanding decision space and increasing his ability to manage escalation; account for potential attrition to US nuclear forces in conflict; and provide the capability to deal with North Korea should that threat manifest, either before or during a crisis or conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary.

This uptick would represent a reasonable increase over NST levels and would set the stage for a more comprehensive assessment of US nuclear capabilities in the longer-term—whether less capability is needed as Russia and China show interest in meaningful arms control engagement, or more is needed if the security environment fails to improve. But today, arbitrarily adhering to limits designed for a different time and a different security environment is not in the US national interest and would stand in the way of fielding the force necessary to maintain credible and effective deterrence.

It’s not 2010 anymore

US strategic nuclear force levels that made sense in 2010 no longer suffice in 2026. The challenges facing planners today are more diverse and complex—and will only grow more so. To maintain credible deterrence, the United States must be able to deter and must be more capable of achieving national objectives against each nuclear-armed adversary individually or in combination, in both simultaneous and sequential scenarios. A force constrained by legacy NST decisions risks undermining that capacity and inviting the very conflicts US nuclear forces are intended to deter. A larger, more diverse force than the United States fields today is needed to afford the nation the flexibility it needs to maintain credible and effective deterrence in the coming years.

This issue brief is part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Great nuclear debate series, a curated anthology of perspectives on arms control, force sizing, and missile defense from leading experts.

Fellow

Paul Amato

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Missile Defense Nuclear Deterrence

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

Learn more

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But it was hardly the first escalation. The day the United States and Israel attacked Iran, February 28, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and allied Shia militias launched the most sustained barrage of missiles and drones the Kurdistan Region has ever absorbed. In the first seventy-two hours, more than seventy projectiles struck or were intercepted over Erbil. Targets included Erbil International Airport, the newly opened US consulate general (the largest US consulate in the world), Peshmerga headquarters, and the Harir Air Base. On March 12, a Shahed drone killed French Chief Warrant Officer Arnaud Frion and wounded six soldiers at a coalition training base. A separate strike hit an Italian military installation, prompting Rome to temporarily pull its personnel. By late March, over four hundred separate strikes had hit the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The Khor Mor gas field preemptively shut down gas supplies, triggering electricity blackouts across multiple governorates.

These incidents are part of an established pattern that predate the current war. Throughout 2025, Iranian-backed militias conducted a sustained drone campaign targeting Kurdish energy infrastructure. In February, a kamikaze drone struck Khor Mor during critical energy negotiations with Baghdad. In July, drones targeted the Sarsang oil field shortly before its American operator was scheduled to finalize a new agreement, resulting in a halt of its production of 30,000 barrels per day. In November, another attack on Khor Mor destroyed a newly completed liquefied natural gas facility and reduced electricity generation by nearly 80 percent. The targeting is systematic and intentional, conveying that Tehran can jeopardize Kurdish economic stability, disrupt Western energy partnerships, and impose costs without facing significant consequences.

The sovereignty that isn’t

Baghdad typically responds to proposals for direct US air defense assistance by asserting that such measures would violate Iraqi sovereignty. However, sovereignty is meaningful only when a government can effectively protect its territory and population. Baghdad lacks sufficient control over its federal territory to prevent Iranian missile strikes on Erbil, ongoing proxy drone campaigns against Kurdish energy infrastructure, or attacks on coalition facilities. The government has not established a monopoly on the use of force, as Iran-aligned militias operate both within and outside formal state structures without restriction. Regardless of these distinctions, the outcome remains unchanged.

Following the February strikes, Kurdish leaders Masoud Barzani and Bafel Talabani urged Baghdad to implement substantive measures to halt militia attacks, emphasizing that their restraint was not unlimited. While Baghdad issued condemnations, it did not intercept any attacks. When a government repeatedly fails to fulfill its duty to protect its territory, the legitimacy of its sovereign veto over external defensive assistance is undermined. The primary violation of Iraqi sovereignty is not the potential deployment of a US-supplied shield in Erbil, but rather Tehran’s accurate assessment that it can strike Iraqi territory without consequence.

The Taiwan precedent

The United States has established a precedent for addressing similar challenges. The Taiwan Relations Act obligates Washington to provide Taiwan with defensive arms and to maintain the capacity to resist coercion. Since the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Taiwan has been treated as a de facto Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) for the transfer of defense articles and services. The KRI presents a direct parallel: It is a self-governing entity where the recognized sovereign claims exclusive control over defense, faces a hostile power employing both conventional and proxy tactics, and is unable to acquire necessary defense systems due to its lack of sovereign status. If the United States were to designate the KRI as an MNNA for air defense, it would provide the KRI priority access to foreign military sales, streamline the US review process for arms sales to KRI, and circumvent the bureaucratic obstacles imposed by Baghdad’s procedural veto. This approach would not alter Iraq’s borders but would acknowledge the existing reality.

What the shield looks like

The goal is not to duplicate Israel’s layered air defense architecture, but rather to develop a credible deterrence system tailored to the specific threats faced in northern Iraq: armed drones, loitering munitions, short- and medium-range rockets, and the ballistic missiles deployed by the IRGC in January 2024 and 2026. A US package should include counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar systems, counter-drone platforms, Shahed-type devices, integrated radar, hardened command-and-control infrastructure, and the selective deployment of Patriot batteries at critical locations.

The events of February demonstrated the effectiveness of existing US air defenses in Erbil, which intercepted most incoming projectiles and minimized damage to US facilities. However, these systems do not provide comprehensive coverage for the broader Kurdish population and infrastructure. The fatal March 24 attack highlighted this gap, as Peshmerga bases in Soran remain outside the US defense perimeter. Establishing a Kurdish air defense layer constitutes an extension of force protection, particularly as the KRI now hosts the majority of US forces in Iraq following withdrawals from other Iraqi bases.

How to get there

Legislative mechanisms are available to address these needs. Section 1266 of the fiscal year (FY) 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the Pentagon to develop a plan to equip and train Peshmerga forces, including air defense provisions, but both deadlines were missed. The FY2026 NDAA, enacted in December 2025, allocates $343 million to the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund for partner forces in Iraq and Syria, which could be adapted to support site defense, radar, and short-range intercept systems for the Peshmerga. The SPEED Act, included in the same legislation, reduces Pentagon acquisition timelines from eight hundred days to approximately five months and facilitates the deployment of commercial and military-off-the-shelf systems. Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act grants the president drawdown authority for unforeseen emergencies, a mechanism previously used for Ukraine and Taiwan. Congress should establish a KRI-specific air and missile defense line item in the next appropriations package, with notification to Baghdad but without granting Baghdad veto power.

Washington faces a choice: continue to defer to Baghdad’s procedural objections while Iran conducts unimpeded strikes on Kurdish territory or acknowledge the strategic reality and take decisive action. The former approach results in inaction, while the latter helps establish deterrence. The recent missile strike on the Peshmerga’s 7th Division has eliminated any remaining ambiguity. Washington should send a message to Tehran that Erbil is no longer a vulnerable target and to Baghdad that sovereignty entails responsibility rather than an unconditional veto. Where this responsibility has not been met, Washington should be prepared to act.

Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

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Bottom lines up front

• The recent public disagreements between an AI company and the US military speaks to a broader breakdown in trust among tech firms, the government, and the public.
• Americans’ skepticism of AI is high, driven by concerns over safety, job losses, environmental impact, and misuse.
• The White House has promoted AI development for economic and national security reasons, but it faces growing political resistance and public pushback over regulation and risks.

WASHINGTON—The recent standoff between Anthropic and the Pentagon over terms of use for the company’s artificial intelligence (AI) models has thrust the role of AI in military and intelligence operations into the national dialogue. As the Pentagon’s contract negotiations with Anthropic broke down and it designated the company a supply chain risk earlier this month, the episode exposed the fraying social contract among leading AI companies, the federal government, and the American public over responsible AI use. 

How Americans view AI

Anthropic’s red lines in the negotiations centered on two issues: the use of its models for the mass surveillance of US citizens and in autonomous weapons. Both topics resonate with an American public that remains deeply skeptical of the technology. A 2025 poll conducted by Gallup and the Special Competitive Studies Project found that 60 percent of Americans distrust AI somewhat or fully. This stands in contrast to much of the rest of the world. According to Stanford’s annual AI Index, large majorities in China, Indonesia, and Thailand (75-80 percent) believe AI-powered products offer more benefits than drawbacks. In the United States, that number is a meager 39 percent. 

Several factors drive this skepticism. Safety concerns, including fears related to AI-driven psychosis and AI-enabled teen suicides, feature prominently in public discourse, as do worries about the technology’s environmental footprint and its impact on jobs. Search “AI and water” on Instagram and you’ll be flooded with posts from influencers calling on followers to boycott AI over the energy and water demands of the data centers powering it. Recent mass layoffs, such as fintech company Block’s decision to cut 40 percent of its workforce due to the integration of AI into the company’s workflows, have amplified fears around broader workforce contractions. Some studies have extrapolated from initial data around AI adoption to suggest that the technology will create more jobs than it eliminates, but much of the public discussion has focused on the prospect of significant job losses on the horizon, raising anxiety among white-collar workers. 

This unease with AI is increasingly visible in politics. More than 1,500 AI-related bills have been introduced in state legislatures in 2026 alone, many focused on protecting consumers and minors from AI-related harms. AI skepticism has come from both sides of the aisle. Data centers have drawn criticism from left-leaning environmental advocates and from deep-red communities alike. A study found that twenty data center projects were blocked in the second quarter of 2025 due to local opposition, representing $98 billion in stalled investment. This year, Democratic and Republican lawmakers have begun backing away from data center investments that they recently championed. At least six Democratic governors used their state of the state addresses to announce plans to roll back incentives or impose new regulations on data centers. And Democratic lawmakers in New York and Maine, as well as Republican lawmakers in Oklahoma, are calling for temporary bans.   

The Trump administration’s approach to AI

The second Trump administration has made AI a national priority from the outset. Just three days after his inauguration, US President Donald Trump issued the first of seven executive orders related to AI released in 2025, which signaled the administration’s intent to “sustain and enhance America’s global AI dominance in order to promote human flourishing, economic competitiveness, and national security.” The order set the tone for the administration’s follow-on actions, including a foundational AI Action Plan that positioned the United States as going all-in on AI against the backdrop of a rising global competition with China. So far, the administration has expanded AI education opportunities, worked to harness AI for science, accelerated permitting for data center construction, and attempted to prevent states from passing laws regulating AI. 

Yet, even before the Anthropic-Pentagon controversy, tension between the administration’s position on AI and its own political base were surfacing. Upon the release of the AI Action Plan in July 2025, former US Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene issued a pointed rebuke. She warned that “competing with China does not mean become like China by threatening state rights, replacing human jobs on a mass scale, creating mass poverty, and resulting in potentially devastating effects on our environment and critical water supply.” The administration’s push to preempt and pause future state laws regulating AI was defeated twice in Congress prior to being advanced by executive order in December 2025. The original congressional campaigns incurred widespread pushback from across the political spectrum, including a request to remove the legislative provision, which was signed by seventeen Republican governors.

Recent announcements suggest the administration is beginning to recognize public resistance. In his State of the Union address, Trump introduced a ratepayer protection pledge that calls on technology companies to commit to covering the cost of increased energy production to support the build-out of data centers. This is intended to prevent those costs from being passed on to local communities. Seven of the largest players in AI have since signed on. A National Policy Framework on AI released at the end of last week reaffirms this push and lays out the administration’s legislative priorities for the technology, including enhanced safeguards for children, increased action to combat AI-enabled scams, and protections for individuals against unauthorized distribution of AI-generated voice or image likenesses.

Despite these moves, the administration’s handling of the Anthropic standoff has intensified debates in public and within the tech sector around the dangers of AI and the necessity of building guardrails for responsible use. The administration’s maximalist position that contracts with AI companies should provide flexibility for the government to employ AI for “all lawful uses” runs counter to US public opinion. Indeed, 80 percent of US adults believe the government should maintain rules for AI safety and data security, even if doing so slows development. 

Public distrust on display 

Following OpenAI CEO Sam Altman’s announcement on February 27 that the company had signed a deal with the Pentagon that it claimed contained the same provisions that Anthropic had been fighting for, public and private reactions were swift, with many skeptical of the company’s claims. Uninstalls of the ChatGPT app jumped 295 percent overnight and a #QuitGPT campaign gained steam on social media. Some OpenAI employees publicly criticized their company’s stance and OpenAI’s hardware lead resigned in protest. 

Anthropic, meanwhile, filed suit, contesting the Pentagon’s designation of the company as a supply chain risk following the inability of the company and the Pentagon to reach an agreement on contractual terms. The case has attracted amicus briefs from a wide range of groups, including tech sector workers, Catholic theologians and ethicists, and the American Civil Liberties Union. A brief signed by a group of almost forty employees from Google and OpenAI, including Google’s chief scientist, affirmed a shared belief in the risks underpinning Anthropic’s contractual red lines. Their brief noted the dangers to US democracy posed by AI-enabled surveillance and warned that today’s AI systems are too immature to be relied on for use in lethal autonomous weapons.

While the immediate controversy may be fading, the episode has already provided a revealing window into US sentiment around AI and the ongoing litigation will keep the issue in public focus. A poll conducted by NBC News this month after the standoff found that 57 percent of registered voters believe the risks of AI outweigh its benefits.

That number should command attention. For the administration’s and the tech sector’s AI ambitions to translate into the economic growth and national security gains that policymakers and CEOs envision, it will take a concerted effort to rebuild the social contract with the public on AI. Treating public skepticism as noise to be managed rather than a signal to be heeded risks causing rapid political polarization on AI. This, in turn, could cause a self-imposed slowdown in the United States’ ability to realize AI opportunities at home and compete effectively abroad, stifling government and industry AI initiatives alike. 

The post The Anthropic standoff reveals a larger crisis of trust over AI appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The strategic context: The rise of autocratic regimes worldwide poses an alarming challenge to the global community of democracies, leading to an international system marked by instability and increasing fragmentation. Debates over how to approach the threat have divided the community, with traditional alliances and coalitions under increasing strain. Further, the current US administration’s response to these challenges is strikingly different from those of past administrations. Over time, the US presence in Europe is likely to decline, and Europe must rapidly increase its defense capabilities in response.

The threat: Despite its losses in Ukraine, Russia is reconstituting its forces and continues to pose a formidable military threat. The Russian economy has rebounded from 2022’s historic sanctions and looks unlikely to collapse in the near term. Further, there are no political checks within Russia on Putin’s desire to re-establish dominance in Eurasia.

The risk: NATO isn’t ready— militarily, intellectually, diplomatically—to confront Moscow’s determined testing of the Alliance’s resolve. Should Moscow actually seek to enact one of these scenarios, the Alliance is at risk of fracturing–nothing short of a robust Article 5 response from the Alliance would be sufficient to credibly reset allied deterrence against any further provocations against NATO territories by Russia and thereby preserve the alliance itself.

Here are five potential Russian attack scenarios for which NATO must prepare, ordered from least to most risky from Moscow’s perspective.

Target 1: Svalbard archipelago

The Svalbard archipelago, a lightly populated Norwegian territory near the North Pole, could be a target of Russian occupation. Remote and militarily undefended, Svalbard is governed by a 1920 treaty, which stipulates that military installations cannot be placed there. Citizens of any treaty signatory can reside and pursue commercial opportunities on the islands, subject to Norwegian law, and all parties must respect and preserve the local environment. Russian nationals make up seventeen percent of the population on Svalbard, with their presence largely focused in the Barentsburg settlement (population of 343 in 2025) where Russia operates a mine and a research station.

The attack

A Russian occupation of Svalbard would likely begin with hybrid measures, cyber disruption, telecommunications sabotage, and disinformation about treaty violations, followed by a rapid insertion of Russian special forces or naval infantry to seize the airfield and key infrastructure before NATO can react.

The risks for Moscow

Given the archipelago’s lack of defenses and small population, occupying Svalbard would strengthen Moscow’s geostrategic position in the High North while presenting NATO with an immediate credibility dilemma under Article 5, making it a tempting opportunity for Russia to test Alliance resolve at relatively low risk. This target presents the lowest risk of the five presented.

What might prompt Moscow to act?

A perception of declining US engagement in Europe, visible NATO political divisions, or intelligence suggesting that the Alliance would struggle to generate a rapid and unified military response.

How to prevent it

To prevent occupation of Svalbard, Norway and NATO should

• strengthen deterrence through visible political signaling
• establish a small rotational military or paramilitary presence on the archipelago (which is allowed for under the 1920 treaty banning permanent military installations on Svalbard)
• enhance intelligence and surveillance focused on early warning
• regularly conduct exercises demonstrating rapid reinforcement capability, such as through the existing BALTOPS exercise

Target 2: Åland islands

The Åland islands, demilitarized, undefended, sovereign Finnish territory at the strategic entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, could also be targeted for Russian occupation. The Åland islands sit near three NATO capitals—Stockholm, Tallinn, and Helsinki—making the islands an attractive target. Their seizure would dramatically shift the balance of power in the Baltic Sea, strengthening Russia’s defensive depth around St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, and confront NATO with an immediate test of credibility.

The attack

The operation would likely begin with the covert insertion of Russian special operations forces to secure Mariehamn’s airfield and key infrastructure, followed by a rapid deployment of naval infantry or airborne units supported by Russia’s Baltic Fleet assets and air defense systems.

The risks for Moscow

This target presents a low to moderate risk for Russia. The risk is higher than with Svalbard, given Finland’s stronger military capacity and the islands’ proximity to NATO forces, but still potentially attractive if Moscow anticipates any hesitation or delay in Alliance response.

What might prompt Moscow to act?

Perceived NATO political fragmentation, a reduced or limited forward presence in the Baltic region, or signals that Finland would hesitate to remilitarize the islands could convince Moscow that a swift fait accompli would succeed before reinforcements arrive.

How to prevent it

Finland, together with Sweden and NATO, should end the islands’ effective military vacuum by

• forward deploying a credible mechanized defensive force
• strengthening air and maritime patrols
• pre-positioning supplies
• conducting regular exercises to ensure rapid reinforcement and deny Russia the possibility of an uncontested landing on the Åland Islands.

Target 3: Eastern Estonia

Eastern Estonia, particularly the region including and surrounding Narva near the Russian border, combines geographic proximity, a significant ethnic Russian population, and limited national military depth, making it a plausible target for calibrated aggression. A limited seizure or engineered separatist enclave would test NATO’s Article 5 credibility while exploiting hybrid tactics and ambiguity to divide the Alliance.

The attack

The scenario would likely begin with the covert insertion of Russian paramilitary units and special operations forces posing as “local self-defense groups,” backed by cyberattacks, disinformation, and unrest in Narva, with the intent of carving out a separatist enclave of “oppressed” Russian minorities. These actions would be followed by rapid reinforcement from nearby Russian airborne and ground units under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians.

The risks for Moscow

This target presents a low to moderate risk for Russian occupation. Such action would represent a higher escalation potential than Svalbard or Åland due to the likelihood of direct fighting and seizure of a contiguous region of a NATO territory. However, this target is still potentially attractive if Russia judges NATO’s likely response to be slow, divided, or limited.

What might prompt Moscow to act?

Perceived NATO hesitation, insufficient forward-deployed heavy forces in the Baltics, domestic unrest in Estonia, or signals of reduced US commitment to European defense could convince Moscow that a limited territorial grab would succeed before a robust Alliance response materializes.

How to prevent it

Estonia and NATO should strengthen deterrence by

• expanding Estonian force structure
• forward-deploying a full NATO brigade with enablers
• enhancing cyber and hybrid resilience
• preparing territorial defenses
• conducting frequent rapid-reinforcement exercises to deny Russia the possibility of a quick fait accompli.

Target 4: Gotland

Another potential target of Russian aggression is the Swedish island of Gotland, which sits at the center of the Baltic Sea. Its position confers decisive advantages in air and maritime control, making it strategically vital in any regional conflict. Its seizure would shift the Baltic balance toward Russia’s favor, secure access routes to Kaliningrad, and deliver a major strategic and symbolic blow to NATO.

The attack

A surprise coup de main by Russian naval infantry or airborne (VDV) forces, preceded by sabotage, cyber disruption, and covert special operations reconnaissance, could aim to overwhelm the island’s garrison before Swedish mainland reinforcements arrive.

The risks for Moscow

This target presents a moderate risk—higher than Svalbard, Åland, or eastern Estonia because Sweden has standing forces on the island. The direct conflict with armed forces mean NATO involvement would be more certain, increasing the likelihood of escalation.

What might prompt Moscow to act?

If Russian planners assess that NATO reinforcement timelines are slow, Swedish defenses remain limited to battalion strength, or Alliance unity is politically fractured during a wider crisis, the perceived opportunity for a rapid fait accompli could grow.

How to prevent it

Sweden, with NATO support, should

• expand Gotland’s defense from battalion to brigade strength
• reinforce it with artillery, air defense, and anti-ship systems,
• pre-position supplies
• rehearse rapid multinational reinforcement to ensure Russia cannot seize the island quickly or cheaply.

Target 5: Land bridge to Kaliningrad

Russian aggression through Lithuania to connect Belarus with Kaliningrad is a fifth potential attack scenario. Kaliningrad is a critical Russian exclave and home to the Baltic Fleet, whose overland access through Lithuania is vulnerable in a NATO-Russia conflict. A sudden Russian strike through Lithuania could link Russian forces to Kaliningrad, isolate the Baltic states, and achieve strategic depth, making rapid forward defense and NATO reinforcement essential.

The attack

Russia could initiate a sudden, large-scale invasion from Belarus and western Russia, preceded by airborne and special operations units, cyberattacks, and disinformation, advancing along the most direct roads to Vilnius and Kaunas to secure a land corridor to Kaliningrad.

The risks for Moscow

This is a high risk, high reward target for Russia. NATO and Polish forces, combined with the vulnerability of Russian supply lines and the potential for escalation, make such an operation costly and politically dangerous despite the operational advantage of surprise.

What might prompt Moscow to act?

Perceived NATO disengagement, diversion of US or EU resources elsewhere, internal pressures in Russia, or a belief that Baltic defenses are weak and NATO reinforcement delayed, encouraging Moscow to act before defenses harden.

How to prevent it

Lithuania, supported by NATO, should

• expand active and reserve forces to divisional strength
• establish a combined Baltic corps with NATO enablers
• fortify key terrain and infrastructure
• pre-position supplies
• rehearse rapid multinational reinforcement to deter or defeat a Russian push toward Kaliningrad.

By themselves, none of the Nordic or Baltic countries can deter or fend off Russian aggression in any of these five scenarios. At this time, NATO is not postured to do so either. To deter these scenarios, here are the first steps:

• Place NATO brigades in the Nordic-Baltic region, as promised at the Madrid summit in 2022.
• Create a comprehensive exercise schedule building on or similar to BALTOPS, specifically for Svalbard and Åland, to demonstrate capability to rapidly move in and defend the territory.
• Mobilize the NATO alliance and Europe writ large to provide the Baltic states with critical financial assistance beyond what already exists, to a level that has not been forthcoming to date.
• Accelerate the preparation of the populations of these countries for the reality of the risk of Russian aggression. While this is primarily a responsibility for the national governments, NATO can and should have a role to play.

Report

Feb 12, 2026

Putin’s next move? Five Russian attack scenarios Europe must prepare for

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Whether emboldened by victory in Ukraine or motivated by a loss to pursue success elsewhere, Russian president Vladimir Putin is likely to continue his campaign of aggression. The Nordic and Baltic region, already subject to a campaign of intimidation, is in the Kremlin’s crosshairs—with these five places at greatest risk.

Defense Policy Eastern Europe

Fellow

Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Europe & Eurasia National Security

Report Feb 12, 2026

Putin’s next move? Five Russian attack scenarios Europe must prepare for

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Whether emboldened by victory in Ukraine or motivated by a loss to pursue success elsewhere, Russian president Vladimir Putin is likely to continue his campaign of aggression. The Nordic and Baltic region, already subject to a campaign of intimidation, is in the Kremlin’s crosshairs—with these five places at greatest risk.

Defense Policy Eastern Europe

Issue Brief Nov 26, 2025

How the Baltic Sea nations have tackled suspicious cable cuts

By Elisabeth Braw

Two places in the world’s oceans see a lot of suspicious maritime behavior: the Baltic Sea, and the waters around Taiwan. Elisabeth Braw reports from the NATO task force charged with protecting the undersea cables and pipelines essential to daily life in Europe, with lessons for Baltic states and Taiwan, too.

Europe & Eurasia Maritime Security

New Atlanticist Aug 6, 2025

Dispatch from the Russian border: The Curonian Spit and the contest of the Baltic Sea

By Justina Budginaite-Froehly

A recent visit to Lithuania’s border with Kaliningrad reveals how the Baltic Sea has become one of Europe’s most contested maritime zones.

Eastern Europe NATO

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

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The post Toplines: Deterring Putin’s aggression against NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A closer look, however, reveals a shift in the battlefield dynamic over the past twenty years that often gives weaker militaries more tools to offset stronger adversaries. Cheap drones, open-source satellite imagery, and cyber tools give weaker states such as Iran new ways to hold superior militaries at risk, while forcing them to expend munitions and resources at far greater cost. And despite deep capital markets, a strong innovation base, and a growing defense tech sector in the United States, costs remain high and development timelines remain long due to an ornery requirements process, misaligned acquisition incentives, and bureaucratic inertia. The Pentagon’s challenge is to rapidly field innovative, lower-cost technologies alongside its exquisite capabilities, ensuring each is used where it delivers the greatest advantage.

Consider the overwhelming firepower with which the United States initiated combat operations in 2003. Joint Direct Attack Munitions, aircraft carrier strike groups, and stealth bombers remained out of reach for Iraqi defenders. US bases in the region were also largely untouchable; while Iraqi Scud missiles inflicted serious damage in the first Gulf War, US missile defense systems proved highly effective during Operation Iraqi Freedom, leading to a decisive end of initial combat operations after just a few weeks of fighting, the following insurgency notwithstanding. Much has changed since then, especially with the proliferation of low-cost drone technology, at which Iran has become adept. By producing and exporting the Shahed-136 drone to Russia for use in Ukraine, Iran has refined both the technology and doctrine behind these systems.

The result is a weapon that forces the United States to intercept $30,000 drones with $2-million defensive systems—while still inflicting casualties in the opening salvos of a conflict. Iran’s combination of ballistic missiles and low-cost drones threatens to swiftly deplete defensive systems, leaving US, Arab, and Israeli targets vulnerable to attack. Additionally, Iranian-aligned groups in the region, such as the Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq, or even the much-weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon, can employ much of the same low-cost weapons to stretch and harass American and Israeli troops, broadening the battlespace across the region and striking civilian traffic and infrastructure to impose global costs to a growing conflict.

While the United States will continue to enjoy unquestionable military overmatch, both the United States and Israel enjoy another advantage over the terrorist regime in Tehran and its regional proxies: a deep pool of innovation, capital markets, and industry ready to produce in support of national security and defense. While there will always be a place for exquisite weapons systems and precision munitions, cheaper and more attritable weapons systems must be part of the fight to both adequately and economically defend against some of the systems being employed by Iranian forces, as well as weapons the United States might encounter in a future Pacific conflict. The Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS) drone is one example of the United States leaning into more cost-effective weapons, a rare case of reverse-engineering the Iranian Shahed. Other novel and emerging technologies changing the battlefield today include autonomous ground systems, artificial intelligence-driven counter-drone weapons, and energetics (such as propellants and explosives) for artillery strikes.

For example, autonomous ground vehicles armed with counter-drone weapons or sensors could be cheaply and effectively deployed across the Middle East to defend US bases as well as civilian oil infrastructure, allowing soldiers and civilians to take cover while autonomous systems remain exposed and engage incoming drones. This would obviate the need for expensive missiles to take down low-cost drones, allowing the United States to keep its high-cost systems in reserve for bigger targets that may yet be on the way.

In addition to hardware, the United States has a strong advantage over Iran in big data, computing power, and software. US systems are far more networked than they were twenty years ago. Intelligence collection and analysis is now supported by artificial intelligence. Open-source imagery solutions provide the United States with more options to locate enemy capabilities and stockpiles.

Supported by deep capital markets and institutional investors, the United States dominates the defense tech landscape—and will continue to do so. That means it’s up to the Department of Defense and the services to send a strong demand signal. Unless leaders are willing to employ proven innovative systems at scale, the United States will continue to rely on older, slower, and far more expensive weapons systems both in this fight and in the next.

From Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine to Iran, drones and loitering munitions have repeatedly demonstrated how inexpensive systems can reshape the battlefield. Now the United States must adapt in order to remain the world’s premier fighting force. The technology is already here. The question is whether policymakers have the vision and the flexibility to deploy it.

Nic Adams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He also advises frontier technology firms on strategic communications, business development, and government relations. He previously served as a professional staff member on the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and as a commissioned US Army officer.

The post The Iran conflict exposes the new cost curve of war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Last updated: 5:30 p.m. (ET), 03/27/2026

Operation Epic Fury is stressing military capabilities—aircraft carriers, bombers, missile defense systems—in ways that will have an impact in other theaters around the world. That includes US efforts to credibly deter Chinese aggression and prevail against China in a future conflict. Monitoring the military assets that are relevant to US strategy in the Indo-Pacific and currently deployed to Iran offers insight into how the war might affect the US military’s readiness to meet the threat posed by Beijing—the most consequential challenge the United States faces.

Actual numbers of US inventory and deployment data are classified. This tracker, developed by the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense team, provides estimates for a subset of assets where open-source information is most reliable. It will be regularly updated and expanded with new data and expert context.

Key takeaways as of March 27, 2026:

• Aircraft carriers: One of four available US aircraft carriers—the USS Abraham Lincoln—is deployed to support Operation Epic Fury. The second carrier deployed to the war, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), arrived March 23 at Naval Support Activity Souda Bay in Greece for repairs after an internal fire.
  • The USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) is certified to deploy and is reportedly being considered to join Operation Epic Fury. It is still in the Atlantic. Two destroyers assigned to the George H.W. Bush carrier strike group, the USS Mason (DDG-87) and USS Ross (DDG-71), left their homeport this week to join the USS Bush, indicating that the group is getting closer to deployment. The Navy has not yet announced where the strike group will be deployed.
  • The USS Nimitz (CVN-68) was set to be decommissioned in May 2026, decreasing total US inventory to ten. However, in March 2026, the US Navy decided to extend the Nimitz’s service life to March 2027, with unclear impacts on its readiness.
  • The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) has finished maintenance, is training off the coast of San Diego, and is preparing for imminent deployment to a location not yet publicly disclosed.
• Mine countermeasures: It is unclear if there are any ships with mine countermeasure capability involved in Operation Epic Fury.
  • The US Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Manama, Bahrain, has three littoral combat ships (LCS) outfitted with mine countermeasures mission packages. In the week of March 15, the Navy confirmed that two are currently in Singapore for a “scheduled maintenance and logistics stop,” with the third reportedly in the Indian Ocean—presumably to avoid Iranian attacks.
  • LCS are modular and can be outfitted with a variety of mission packages. Only four of the twenty-eight LCS have been equipped with the mine countermeasures mission package, according to the Navy. 
  • The Navy decommissioned four of its eight Avenger Mine Countermeasure ships assigned to the US Fifth Fleet, in September 2025. The four remaining Avengers are homeported in Sasebo, Japan.

• Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) and Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD): One of the three ships available from the LHA and LHD classes—the USS Tripoli (LHA-7)—is committed to Operation Epic Fury as part of the deployment of an amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit (ARG/MEU), with another one, the USS Boxer, reportedly on the way to relieve the Tripoli.
  • The USS Tripoli, previously stationed in Japan, was in port at Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, en route to the Middle East, on March 23.
  • The USS Boxer (LHD-4) amphibious ready group reportedly deployed to the Middle East from San Diego on March 18. It is unclear if it completed all its deployment certifications before deploying, or if sailors were recalled from leave. A premature deployment could negatively impact sailor readiness and disrupt the ARG/MEU deployment cycle.
  • The only other known deployed LHD is the USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7) in the Caribbean.
  • A 2024 GAO report noted that LHDs suffer from a high rate of maintenance issues.
  • Following the July 2020 fire and the eventual decommissioning of the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), LHA and LHDs are not able to meet the Navy and Marine Corps’ goal of having 80 percent of the force ready to deploy.

• Amphibious transport dock (LPD) and dock landing ships (LSD): The USS New Orleans (LPD-19) arrived with the USS Tripoli ARG/MEU at Diego Garcia. The USS San Diego, which was previously operating with the group, is in port in Sasebo, Japan.
  • The lack of a second LPD/LSD reduces the group’s operational effectiveness.
  • The USS Boxer ARG contains the USS Portland (LPD-27) and USS Comstock (LSD-45).
  • The Government Accountability Office assessed in 2024 that nine out of ten LSDs were in “poor material condition.”

Analysis: Amphibious ready group deployments

The USS Boxer amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit (ARG/MEU) reportedly deployed to the Middle East from San Diego on March 18, joining the USS Tripoli amphibious ready group currently at Diego Garcia, and the USS Iwo Jima amphibious ready group currently in the Caribbean. The deployment of a third ARG/MEU—typically comprising an LHA/LHD and a combination of two LPD/LSD—matches Marine Corps Commandant General Eric Smith’s plan for three forward-postured ARG/MEUs. However, under current maintenance and training realities, deploying the USS Boxer ARG/MEU now is a surge of US capabilities and does not signify a true achievement of the commandant’s goal. Deploying the USS Boxer early could limit the availability of ARG/MEUs in the future and prevent the United States from achieving a sustainable and ready three-forward-postured ARG/MEU plan. Unless the United States builds more ships for ARG/MEUs, the overextension of this limited capability will have significant long-term readiness implications.

• Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: An estimated 24 percent of the entire available destroyer class is deployed in Operation Epic Fury.
  • Arleigh Burke-class destroyers spend an average of nine years, 27 percent of their thirty-five-year service life, in maintenance.

• B-1 bombers: Nearly half of the mission-capable B-1 fleet is conducting strikes as part of Operation Epic Fury, with all operating from RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom.

• B-2 bombers: B-2 deployments are highly classified. An estimated 26 percent of the entire available fleet could be deployed for Operation Epic Fury.
  • B-2 bombers take an average of 119 maintenance hours per flight hour following a bombing mission. This indicates that at least the four B-2s used in the early phases of Operation Epic Fury might be currently unavailable, along with an unknown number of the seven B-2s that flew in the June 2025 strikes the United States and Israel conducted against Iran (Operation Midnight Hammer) and an unknown number currently under programmed depot maintenance.

• E-3 AWACS aircraft: An estimated 66 to 75 percent of the total available E-3 AWACS are deployed in Operation Epic Fury.
  • In 2024, slightly more than half of the Air Force’s AWACS fleet was assessed to be “mission capable”—able to carry out at least one of the platform’s key missions, which includes air surveillance—and the aircraft is in the process of being retired.
• MQ-9 Reaper: The total number of MQ-9s used in Operation Epic Fury is not known.
  • The United States rotates MQ-9s in “orbits,” in which several of the airwing are loitering over enemy airspace at a given time. MQ-9s are capable of sustained day-long loitering missions.
  • Open-source reporting indicates that the United States has lost twelve MQ-9s since the start of Epic Fury, building on an estimated loss of ten percent of the fleet since 2023.
  • MQ-9 losses in Epic Fury could cost the United States from $192 million to $678 million.

• KC-135 Stratotankers and KC-46 Pegasus: An estimated 33 percent of mission capable KC-135s and KC-46s are involved in refueling missions in Operation Epic Fury. These planes are critical to supporting sustained air missions.

• Patriot missile batteries: An estimated 7 to 11 percent of available Patriot batteries are in the Middle East.
  • Open-source reporting indicates that there is at least one Patriot battery in Saudi Arabia and one in Qatar, and four batteries were transferred to the region in spring 2025.

• THAAD systems: An estimated 29 to 43 percent of available US THAAD systems are committed to Operation Epic Fury.
  • Out of an estimated five operational THAAD systems that are outside the continental United States, two to three of them are in the Middle East. One is in Jordan and one is in Israel. It’s unclear if the second THAAD battery deployed to Israel in spring 2025 remains in place. The other two are permanently deployed in Guam and South Korea.
  • In March, the United States also reportedly moved up to 48 THAAD interceptors from the THAAD launchers in Korea to the Middle East.

Joe Costa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Initiative.

Theresa Luetkefend is an associate director with the Forward Defense Initiative.

Moss Gillespie is a young global professional with the Forward Defense Initiative.

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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The post Shedd in the Washington Times: Baltic Security Initiative an investment in US defense appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 16, Forward Defense Director Joe Costa published an article in the Washington Post on the impacts of the war in Iran on US military readiness. Writing alongside Ely Ratner of the Marathon Initiative, Costa argues that the threat to readiness runs deeper than depleted stockpiles—deferred maintenance, equipment cannibalization, and broken dwell-to-deploy thresholds threaten US force projection and combat-credible readiness.

Staff

Joe Costa

Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

Learn more

The post Costa in the Washington Post on military readiness in Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 2, Forward Defense director Joe Costa was quoted in an AFP article on US air defense interceptor stocks. Costa cautioned that a sustained conflict with Iran could impact the availability of these capabilities for other global priorities.

Staff

Joe Costa

Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

Learn more

The post Costa quoted in AFP article on US interceptor stocks in the conflict with Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Mutually antagonistic narratives have served domestic political purposes in both countries and have become something of a staple in the age of populist democracy of the twenty-first century. Yet the two countries rely on each other extensively in matters of trade, diplomacy, and security. State-to-state relationships are sometimes smoothed over in public but fractious in practice; the US-Turkish dyad is the rarer obverse: disagreeable in public for domestic audiences while resting on a high degree of alignment and collaboration.

Where do bilateral relations go when trust is low, mutual perception negative, but operational collaboration frequent? The answer depends less on rhetoric or polemical discourse and more on alignment of practical interests: We therefore must clear away the smoke of domestically motivated rhetoric to instead focus on mutual benefit. If two states pursue compatible goals and interests, room remains to balance internal political benefits with geopolitical cooperation in a form of complex interdependence. Whether that is the case for the United States and Turkey is a matter of substantial interest, given the weight that both have in the international system and the substantial number of crises and international matters that affect them.

Rorschach test

Articulating interests is more of a political than an academic exercise. It also presents something of a Rorschach test: If you ascribe ideological frames as determinative of status for Ankara (e.g., neo-Ottomanism, Muslim Brotherhood Islamism, reckless aggression) it brings you to one implied set of Turkish interests. If you accept declarative policy as the whole story you get another implied set. It is similarly the case for the United States: If you assume hegemonic interests are the primary driver, it takes you down a certain path; however, that road shifts significantly between and sometimes within presidential administrations. American interests as viewed by Trump differ significantly from those of his predecessor. Yet pattern analysis over time—observed behaviors and statements toward particular goals—tell us how specific a US president and his Turkish counterpart actually perceive the degree to which their interests overlap.

As an imperfect but useful generality, we can ascribe the following traits to Turkish foreign policy: multiaxial engagement and balance-seeking, nationalistic, hard power/realpolitik, traditionally but conditionally attached to the status quo. For decades, Ankara has sought to maximize autonomy while pressing for positive coalitions, where possible. For most of the current century, the United States has focused on maintaining a privileged or primary position in the international system, leavened increasingly with a dose of parsimony and pragmatism, but resting on what might be called enduring counter-revisionism (still in the tradition of US naval strategist and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan).

Ankara and Washington have demonstrated a generally cooperative approach across numerous regional and global issues in recent decades because their top-line approaches are compatible: one a retrenching-but-potent leading power, the other a rising middle power, both disinclined to establish imperial arrangements or to allow others to do so. A brief review of these issues illustrates this general (if imperfect) alignment by assigning numeric values reflecting relative alignment of strategic and diplomatic approaches between the two. Any such numbers game comes with attendant risk of overgeneralizing and missing some context, but statecraft and policy analysis at the higher levels of abstraction unavoidably entail some risk in this regard. So the numbers below are presented as suggestive rather than determinative.

In the table below, full interest alignment equals 1, partial interest alignment 0.5, neither alignment nor friction 0, friction -0.5, counteralignment -1. Descriptions of the cases follow the table.

Table 1: Sizing up US-Turkish alignment and friction on sixteen issues

Black Sea/Ukraine: Both sides wish to see the war end with Ukrainian independence intact; neither recognizes Russian claims over Crimea or Donbass, though Washington has signaled willingness to negotiate the status of territories Russia partially or fully occupies at present. Some differences exist regarding Black Sea access: The United States might like to have access for its own ships and more broadly for a NATO presence and routine access, while Turkey has preferred littoral NATO states do the lifting and a strict interpretation of the Montreux Convention; but neither wants a Russian conquest of Ukraine’s coastline. For a Trump administration interested in some compromise deal with Moscow, the Turkish position is complementary.

Caucasus/Russia: While the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) offers wins for the region and the United States, the Armenian position is a wildcard with elections approaching. Should Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan get the boot in parliamentary elections (to be held no later than mid-June 2026), the United States may tack back to a position that pressures Azerbaijan and marginalizes Ankara. Russian and Iranian pushback on a deal that opens the region to trade on US-friendly terms can be expected. Interest alignment here between Ankara and Washington is solid, though the prospects for realized gain uncertain.

Central Asia: The TRIPP shows US interest in opening up more trade to Central Asia and balancing against outright domination of the region by Russia or China. The Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States both have value in this regard—and have generated more interest from the Trump administration than its predecessor. Central Asia has not traditionally been an area of high investment for the US government; however, energy companies are interested, so having an ally be more engaged is an advantage.  

Africa: US investment and engagement in Africa has lagged, but Washington has concerns about Chinese or Russian influence on the continent. Meanwhile, Turkey has dramatically increased its diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Africa over the past two decades. In countries like Somalia and Libya, Turkish presence has lent heft to US diplomatic and counterterror initiatives. Africa demonstrates the complementarity of having compatible goals but varying levels of commitment.

Syria: Trump has made clear his policy that Syria will be stabilized and maintained as a unitary state and that Ahmed al-Sharaa is an acceptable figure to lead. This comports with Turkish policy, despite Israel’s objections. The assignment of Trump confidant Thomas J. Barrack Jr. as special envoy and positive statements from the US-Turkish working group on Syria have shown close convergence on Syria policy, a remarkable turnaround from the previous decade. The January 2026 agreement to reintegrate northeast Syria with the Syrian Transitional Government was a sign that this alignment was proving determinative on the ground. 

Iraq: Washington wants a stable Iraq that is: not dominated by Iran; oriented to Western energy markets more than Iranian or Chinese; and working amicably with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Iraq may not fulfill all those interests, but Ankara shares them, and the Development Road project to foster Eastern trade with Europe provides a vehicle for all three countries to earn profits while tightening Baghdad’s ties to Western economies. The presence of PKK fighters in northern Iraq remains a point of friction, but ongoing negotiations to disarm the PKK – and US support for those talks – has taken helped reduce that friction.

Gaza: Washington and Ankara both pressed Israel and Hamas, respectively, to accept a ceasefire deal, return of hostages, and military withdrawal from Gaza in return for disarmament. While the truce remains shaky as of late 2025 and the end state Trump and Erdoğan have in mind may differ somewhat, the coordination on diplomatic efforts has been unambiguous.

Iran: There is divergence here between the hard line taken in Washington toward the Islamic Republic and the modus vivendi approach in Ankara. While Ankara may not want regime change in Tehran, and wants to protect trade with its neighbor, the Turkish government has no illusions about Tehran’s destabilizing regional behavior and shares an interest in deterring it. Ankara has tightened enforcement of multilateral sanctions on the Iranian nuclear program—partially redressing a long-standing US grievance with Ankara. The launch of Israel-U.S. Operation Epic Fury to destroy Iran’s power projection and nuclear capabilities has driven fears of instability and chaos along the Turkish border, turning this from an area of some overlap into an area of friction.

Energy: Ankara’s energy diplomacy has sought to position the country as a hub for multidirectional energy transit and major new gas, oil, and nuclear deals have been signed with Washington. US pressure to decrease oil purchases from Russia has created some strain, as Ankara cannot shift to alternate suppliers as quickly as it can with gas.

US global leadership: American leadership that cooperates with Ankara on key strategic objectives, praising in public and transacting in private, plays like music to the ears of Turks. This contrasts greatly with the constraining approach Turkish leaders called for regarding perceived American overreach in Iraq, Syria, and other regions over the past two decades, including demands to reform the United Nations to lessen the power of the five permanent members. Still, this middle power and the great power have imperfect but positive alignment at present.

Trade/defense trade: The relatively light 15 percent tariff levied on Turkish goods and the $100 billion shared goal for bilateral trade are clear indicators of positive intentions. But defense trade is thorny, with a congressional role and some competition between rising Turkish defense players and US prime defense contractors.

European Union: Ankara and Washington remain at odds with Brussels ideologically and stylistically, while maintaining strong strategic and trade ties with numerous members states. Yet the tensions stem from different sources: Turkish desire to enter the bloc and the American administration’s desire to end what it perceives as the EU’s exploitative trade and security practices.

Eastern Mediterranean: The continuing friction between Greece and Turkey redounds against US-Turkish bilateral relations—a problem that continues to play out in the region and in Congress.

Sanctions: The divergences are clear regarding imposition: Ankara supports multilateral but generally not unilateral sanctions and enforcement, whereas the Turkish track record looks spotty from Washington’s perspective.

Israel: Ankara and Jerusalem pursued a rapprochement in the months before October 7, 2023; since then, rancor, acrimony, and mutual suspicion have become the norm. While regional competition over Syria, the Palestinians, and other issues can be managed, related tensions spill over into US-Turkish bilateral relations in a major way—and that seems likely to persist.

Venezuela: Erdoğan’s quixotic friendship with President Maduro had its roots in terms of oil sales and multipolarity theory, but was a clear point of policy divergence as Trump upped the pressure level on Caracas. With the early 2026 arrest of Maduro and muted response from Ankara, this seems likely to be a decreasing source of tension in U.S.-Turkish relations.

A clear trend and policy takeaway

In conclusion, this assessment sketch of sixteen complicated cases of regional and global policy matters yields eleven that demonstrate substantial bilateral alignment, four with significant unalignment, and one somewhere in between. The aggregate score by the simple rubric of “words and deeds reflect alignment” was positive (+4.5 – with the caveat that these numbers are illustrative but rooted more in subjective alignment rather than formal quantitative criteria). An honest critic might quibble with individual ratings and the framing of the cases or argue for the salience of other matters. Yet sixteen is a reasonable sample size, the thought exercise is revealing, and the trend clear: more alignment than friction overall.  

The policy takeaway is equally clear: maintaining a working relationship is vital for both countries. Those arguing for punitive approaches (by the United States) or hedging (by Turkey) disregard potential mutual benefits as well as both opportunity costs and implementation costs. Managing differences and satisfying domestic sentiment require an adaptive response from policy elites in both countries, but the record of cooperation in 2025 indicates that the pragmatism of both presidents fits the moment—and the alignment.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.

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The post Foe or friend? US-Turkey bilateral relations seem set to improve as interests align appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For years, Turkey has backed the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, which is recognized by the United Nations as Libya’s legitimate authority. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, have long supported the eastern faction, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by warlord and former CIA asset Khalifa Haftar. Interestingly, Turkey and the Tobruk-based LNA have entered a chapter of significant engagement after being sworn enemies for much of the last decade.

Turkey, for its part, seeks to expand influence over the entirety of Libya for economic and geopolitical gains, wanting to gain access to Libya’s vast oils fields in the eastern zone and aiming to impose its stance in an ongoing maritime dispute with Greece and Egypt over the Eastern Mediterranean, where both countries claim maritime territory. Meanwhile, Haftar and his sons seek recognition from regional powers such as Turkey to legitimize the family’s rule and become the de facto leadership of Libya.

Why this matters

These developments represent a significant shift in domestic and regional dynamics. Domestically, it strengthens Haftar’s LNA as it vies for that prime governing role. The LNA is contending for greater international recognition than the GNU, and a buy-in from a powerful actor like Turkey would surely tip the scales, granting the LNA a level of international legitimacy that could surpass that of the GNU.

The international community (as expressed through the UN) sees the GNU as the legitimate force, but will have to come to terms with Dbeibah’s weakened political hand. Dbeibah himself is well aware of the stakes involved, and while publicly he has endorsed what he sees as Turkey’s “backing of Libya’s stability,” it would be naïve to think he welcomes such efforts. Additionally, it will embolden the Haftar family to continue pursuing an aggressive push for regional integration under its command, potentially leading to de facto unification, albeit under leadership with an abysmal human rights record and dubious allegiance to the West.

Why the LNA welcomes Turkey’s support

In 2019, when Haftar launched his military offensive to gain control over Tripoli, the capital city, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent military support to the GNU, including troops, ships, drones and advisers, for its defense, signaling Turkey’s strong commitment to the Western-backed government. Today, however, Turkey’s goal of repositioning itself regionally spurred a strategic cost-benefit calculus. Isolated after attempting to become a regional hegemon, Turkey has sought to reestablish itself in the region through strategic reengagement with countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

For its part, the LNA stands to benefit considerably from Ankara’s strategic repositioning. First, a potential defense partnership between the LNA and Turkey is quickly taking shape, and it stands to deliver substantial benefits to the Haftar family. In April 2025, Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa and deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan Ground Forces, met Turkey’s general chief of staff, Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu, to discuss a mutually beneficial defense agreement which would include joint military training, capacity building, information sharing, and the procurement of weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Earlier that month, Saddam Haftar paid an official visit to Ankara, marking a new chapter in relations between the nation and the Libyan faction. A subsequent visit by a military delegation from Libya’s eastern forces to Turkey confirmed that this shift is underway, and soldiers from Haftar’s LNA have recently begun training at bases in Turkey, as forces associated with the government in Tripoli have done beginning of  2020.

Secondly, Ankara is looking to deepen its energy ties by investing in gas exploration over disputed water with Libya’s eastern faction. In 2019, Ankara signed an exploratory agreement with Libya’s western faction in Tripoli, but the agreement failed to take off due to eastern opposition. Today, Libya’s eastern powerbrokers look poised to sign it—if, that is, they are granted oversight control over the outputs, after complaining for multiple years of being excluded from key revenue streams and leadership opportunities. If signed, the explorations could provide significant financial benefits to Libya’s eastern area, which suffers from recurring fuel shortages due to its lack of refining capacity. It would also help boost Haftar’s legitimacy by aiding him with key supplies for the local population under his control, strengthening his position both domestically and internationally. 

Third, a rapprochement with Ankara would give the Haftars valuable leverage with Russia and Turkey, enabling them to extract greater concessions from both nations. The Haftars have long been supported by the Russians, especially since their Tripoli offensive in 2019; in turn, they’ve allowed Russian Africa Corps troops to run wild in parts of the country, furthering Russia’s footprint on the continent. While Russia once held greater leverage over the Haftars, this dynamic shifted after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in January 2025, which prompted Moscow to withdraw its military equipment there and seek new military footholds in Libya. Now, with the Haftar family having the upper hand, the family can try to leverage this renewed position of strength to expand its alliances without fearing repercussions from Russia, Turkey’s long-standing rival in the region. It also can hope to exact concessions from both parties, extracting both economic and military benefits which would help consolidate domestic authority.

Implications for the Eastern Mediterranean

The engagement between Libya’s eastern faction and Turkey will likely have ripple effects across the region. First, it could sour the relationship between Egypt and Turkey over the disputed maritime zone agreements. Currently, Egypt rejects the maritime zone set between Ankara and Tripoli, considering them an infringement of Egyptian maritime sovereignty as they cut across water lines. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has made it abundantly clear he will reject any association agreement between Libya and Turkey, potentially reigniting tensions after their historic 2023 rapprochement. Egypt claims that any oil exploration will infringe on its territorial seas, denouncing them as an infringement of international law. Such tensions would have enormous consequences for the Mediterranean region writ large.

Second, Haftar, could use any growing tension between Egypt and Turkey to extract greater concessions for himself by playing Ankara against Cairo. By publicly signaling deference to Egyptian authority while quietly advancing his ties with Turkey, Haftar stands to emerge stronger, consolidating his family’s hold on power and potentially paving the way for unifying Libyan territory under their control.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Alissa Pavia is a nonresident senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.

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1. Who are the Iranian Kurds, and what is their relationship with the Iranian regime?

The Kurds are an ethnic minority group with a distinct language and culture that make up 10-12 percent of Iran’s population and have lived along the western border of what is now modern-day Iran for more than four hundred years. Iranian Kurds have struggled for more autonomy within a centralized Persian state for centuries—including during the Pahlavi dynasty preceding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s rule. Under the Islamic Republic, the Kurds have been brutally repressed through violence, and they continue to be marginalized economically, socially, and culturally. The average income of a Kurdish family in Iran, for example, is lower than that in Tehran and other major cities, and although the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution allows for educational instruction in languages other than Persian, the Kurds are often barred from doing so in practice. They are even frequently prohibited from giving their children Kurdish names.

Many Iranian Kurds supported the revolution in 1979, viewing it as an opportunity to demand greater autonomy. But the relationship with the fledgling Islamic Republic quickly soured. Representatives from the central government negotiated with Kurdish representatives over demands for local secular autonomy, but these talks fell apart and violence broke out between Kurds and government forces. This culminated in a fatwa in August 1979 from the Islamic Republic’s founder and first supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, that ordered the Islamic Republic’s armed forces to crush the Kurds. Notably, this was not just a call to fight Kurdish militants; it also empowered Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali—the head of the newly created Revolutionary Court who came to be known as the “hanging” judge—to follow the military through Kurdish towns and summarily execute dozens of men and boys on no apparent grounds beyond their Kurdish identity. Photos of firing squads executing Kurds made global headlines and caused an international uproar.

In the following decades, the Kurds continued to bristle under the Islamic Republic’s rule. Kurdish activists, lawyers, and teachers were arrested, jailed, and sometimes even executed for demanding Kurdish rights. This came to a head again in September 2022, with the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini—a young Kurdish Iranian woman who died in the custody of the Islamic Republic’s “morality police” for allegedly wearing improper hijab. Her killing sparked outrage and protests in her hometown of Saqqez, which quickly spread through the Kurdish region and then all thirty-one provinces of Iran.

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and a board member of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

2. What are the goals of the various Iranian Kurdish groups?

On February 22, five major Iranian Kurdish opposition parties came together to form the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan. A sixth group, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, joined on March 4 after initially holding off.

The coalition brings together groups with very different ideological profiles. The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), led by Mustafa Hijri, is the oldest and most established. The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), also based in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, has been the most active militarily in recent months, claiming multiple attacks on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) positions in Kermanshah and Lorestan provinces even before the war started. The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) carries the most complicated regional baggage. Originally an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) focused on Iranian Kurdistan, its armed wing, the Eastern Kurdistan Units (YRK), is assessed to be fielding the most capable fighters, many of them women, operating out of the Qandil Mountains near the Iran-Iraq border. Khabat and Komala are smaller parties rounding out the coalition, each with their own Peshmerga forces.

The coalition’s stated objectives include toppling the Islamic Republic, achieving Kurdish self-determination, and establishing a democratic administrative system in “Eastern Kurdistan,” the Kurdish term for Iranian Kurdistan. The formal goal is self-determination within Iran, though the precise endgame, such as a federated region (or something resembling the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq’s status), remains deliberately vague. Outright separatism, however, is not the aim.

That distinction has done little to ease tensions with other Iranian opposition figures, particularly Reza Pahlavi, the former shah’s son, who has accused the Kurdish groups of being separatists trying to carve up Iran. The Kurdish coalition responded by calling on “pro-freedom forces” to stand against authoritarianism. The tension between Kurdish self-determination and Iranian territorial unity is a real fault line within the broader anti-regime movement, though Kurds generally express no interest in non-Kurdish-majority territories.

These groups are based in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, and any cross-border operation would use Iraqi territory as a staging ground. Iran’s foreign minister has already spoken with Iraq’s prime minister and Kurdish leaders in Iraq, who emphasized that Iraq would not allow threats to be directed at Iran from Iraqi soil. But the Iraqi Kurds are in a difficult position. One senior Kurdistan Regional Government official described the situation as “very dangerous” but said they felt unable to resist US pressure. Trump reportedly asked Iraqi Kurdish leaders to choose between the United States/Israel and Iran, open the border, and provide military support. That loyalty test, if true, puts Kurdish leaders in what may be their biggest political dilemma in modern Kurdish history.

The Kurds have a long and painful track record of being courted by great powers during conflicts and then abandoned afterward. The United States backed Iraqi Kurds in the 1970s against Iraq, then cut them loose when it suited a deal with Iran. That history makes the Kurdish groups cautious. They are reportedly looking for political assurances from the Trump administration before fully committing. Whether those assurances will hold is, to put it mildly, an open question. Yet on balance, Kurdish cooperation with the United States has left the Kurds better off over the long term.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace at American University’s School of International Service.

3. What military capabilities do the Kurds have and what could the United States and/or Israel do to support them?

The prospect of a Kurdish incursion into western Iran is occurring in an operational environment already shaped by US and Israeli military pressure on Iranian infrastructure. Recent airstrikes have targeted Iranian military positions along the Iran–Iraq border, degrading command nodes, air defenses, and logistics networks that previously constrained Kurdish insurgent activity. This “shaping” phase has created space for Kurdish forces to maneuver across the Zagros frontier and reportedly conduct small-unit operations against IRGC units and internal security forces.

Several Kurdish groups recently formed a unified alliance to coordinate political and military operations against Tehran. These organizations maintain armed wings that have conducted intermittent insurgent attacks on Iranian forces for years, often using light infantry units equipped with AK-pattern rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars deploying from operating bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. Also, Kurdish security forces maintain elite special operations units such as the Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG), a US-trained force specializing in intelligence collection, high-value target raids, and unconventional warfare. CTG operators deploy with advanced small arms such as M4 carbines, Barrett sniper rifles, and night-vision systems, enabling precision operations against insurgent targets. 

The United States and Israel could amplify Kurdish operations by supporting them as a ground partner to the ongoing air campaign. Potential support includes intelligence sharing, aerial resupply of ammunition and equipment, additional artillery systems, and close air support against IRGC formations. US special operations forces could also deploy small advisory elements to coordinate combat controllers, direct precision strikes, and conduct advise-assist-accompany missions with Kurdish units operating inside Iranian territory. Such support would allow Kurdish forces to stretch Iranian security forces across multiple fronts while exploiting their familiarity with the mountainous terrain of northwestern Iran.

—Stephen Honan is a fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, a senior consultant for BVG and Company, and a former explosive ordnance disposal officer for the US Navy.

4. How would a Kurdish military offensive impact the situation on the ground?

An armed Kurdish insurgency—or that of any ethnic or separatist group—is a potential propaganda boon for the Islamic Republic. Iran is a nation with a 2,500-year history and near continuous territorial integrity. It’s hard to conceive a strategy more likely to keep anti-regime Iranians at home, fragment the opposition, and bolster a rally-around-the-flag effect. While it could bog down and kill a few more Iranian soldiers, it is highly unlikely to have a meaningful impact on the battlefield.

In the best/worst case scenario (depending on one’s perspective), it could potentially spark a civil war. If a US- and Israeli-armed offensive is truly underway, it is a devastating blow for Iranians hoping for a political transformation in Iran.

—Nate Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Beginning in 2015, he served as a senior advisor on Iran policy to successive administrations, including most recently as director for Iran at the National Security Council.

The Kurdish coalition’s entry into the war could hand Tehran a political opening even as it creates a military problem. Kurdish fighters might stretch Iranian forces and expose weak control in the northwest. But Tehran could also use the specter of separatism to rally Persian nationalism, split the opposition, and frame the war as foreign-backed dismemberment rather than domestic revolt, giving itself a justification for mass arrests and violence against Kurds inside Iran.

If Kurdish forces receive sufficient support, they could serve several strategic purposes. They might pin down Iranian security forces in the west, giving space for unarmed protesters in major cities to demonstrate without being massacred. They could stretch the regime’s resources thin and reduce pressure on the Gulf states and Israel. And if the Kurds were to take and hold territory in northern Iran, they could create a buffer zone beneficial to Israel and the West.

For all these reasons, any support for the Kurds should go beyond military backing. It must include political support for Kurdish autonomy in a post-regime Iran, so that the Kurds do not end up being used once again as expendable forces.

—Yerevan Saeed

5. How would an effort to arm the Iranian Kurds impact Iraqi Kurds?

Although a number of Iranian Kurdish groups are present in northern Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds and Iranian Kurds have distinct interests and goals. Iraqi Kurds remain focused on protecting their own autonomy and security and are therefore averse to taking steps that would bring the Iraqi Kurdistan region in direct conflict with Iran. Following news reports alleging a US effort to arm the Iranian Kurdish opposition, the Erbil-based Kurdistan Regional Government flatly denied any support to such an effort and emphasized that Kurdistan is “not part of this war.” 

Since the beginning of the conflict, Iran has struck sites within Kurdistan where the Iranian Kurds are located, and the Iran-aligned Iraqi militias have also been launching drone and rocket attacks on sites in the region. Iran’s January 2024 ballistic missile attack on Erbil is also fresh in the minds of Iraqi Kurdish leaders as the type of retaliation Kurdistan could expect should it provide any direct support to an Iranian Kurdish offensive into Iran. Despite the Iraqi Kurds’ longstanding and important partnership with the United States, Iraqi Kurds will remain reluctant to jeopardize their own security interests.

The two main Iraqi Kurdish parties also have their own relationships to maintain with Turkey and Iran. Given that one of the Iranian Kurdish groups, PJAK, is allied with the PKK, a terrorist-designated organization that has fought the Turkish government for decades, Turkey is likely to strongly oppose a US or Israeli effort to arm the Iranian Kurds. Support for such an effort would complicate the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s strong relations with Turkey, while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has traditionally had a stronger relationship with Iran that it is unlikely to jeopardize. Perhaps most importantly, Iraqi Kurdish support would squarely oppose Baghdad’s interests and previous agreements between Baghdad and Tehran to prevent Iraq from being used as a launching pad for attacks into Iran. 

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and a former deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran in the US State Department.

6. What are the broader regional implications of the Iranian Kurds joining the fight?

The consequences will largely depend on how far the United States and Israel are willing to sustain their political and military support for the Kurds. Continued backing could mitigate the instability and insecurity that come with this kind of endeavor. But if Kurdish forces are simply used to destabilize Iran temporarily and then left without protection, the blowback will be severe, not just for Kurds in Iran but for the security of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as well.

Any cross-border operations raise the stakes for Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, which has tried to avoid being dragged into a direct confrontation with Tehran but has nonetheless been on the receiving end of Iranian missiles and drones. Iran has already struck Iranian Kurdish targets near the border, fired missiles at Erbil’s airport (which hosts a US military base) and at the US consulate in Erbil, and hit a suspected Central Intelligence Agency facility in Sulaymaniyah. Tehran’s Shia militia proxies in Iraq have launched attacks on Erbil and Kurdistan’s energy sector. During last summer’s twelve-day war, these Iranian-backed proxies knocked out Kurdistan’s energy sector. A sustained Kurdish military role would give Tehran further reason to pressure both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, risking internal Iraqi strain at a moment when Baghdad also is trying to keep the country out of a wider conflict.

Turkey presents a second concern. Ankara has long treated armed Kurdish movements across the region as linked security threats because of their ties to the terrorist-designated PKK, even when the groups differ. If Kurdish parties were able to establish control over territory in Iranian Kurdistan, it would unsettle Turkey, which has its own large Kurdish population. A more active Iranian Kurdish front could sharpen Turkish fears of a wider Kurdish nationalist spillover into Iraq, Syria, and Turkey itself. That does not mean Ankara would side with Tehran, but it would make Turkey more anxious and more willing to act preemptively to contain Kurdish gains as it did in the case of Syria.

—Yerevan Saeed

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Bottom lines up front

• Adapting RAND scholar Gordon McCormick’s Magic Diamond model of counterinsurgency to US-China competition can provide insights into how the United States can counter China’s attempts to exert global influence.
• Using this model, China emerges as an insurgent power on the global stage, adapting strategies from Mao’s concept of a “people’s war” to displace the US-led order.
• To counter China’s strategy, the United States must both deter PRC aggression and convince allies and partners of the legitimacy of the US-led order.

WASHINGTON—Increasing competition among global powers has blurred the traditional boundaries of statecraft and war, challenging established international norms. This is demonstrated by the rise of so-called “gray zone” activities, which are often described as “competition below the threshold of conflict.” By design, the phrase evokes ambiguity; the action is neither clearly black nor white, neither war nor peace, but somewhere in the uncertain middle.

Even more unhelpfully, the phrase “gray zone” offers insufficient clarity about what is unfolding on the world stage: a struggle for influence, legitimacy, and control of the world order that has not yet escalated to military conflict to achieve it. It also does not explain the character of the revisionist efforts by US adversaries, which in many ways parallel an insurgency—protracted, subversive, and aimed at reshaping governance. But instead of traditional non-state actors, this contest involves nation-states, the population is global, and the governance they seek to alter, or outright replace, is the rules-based international order.

A better, more precise framework for understanding these pressing challenges to the liberal world order comes from adapting RAND scholar Gordon McCormick’s Magic Diamond from its familiar counterinsurgency origin to the political warfare domain. Applied to the increasing competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), this model draws from Mao Zedong’s theory of protracted war to interpret the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) long-game strategy for global influence.

What is the Magic Diamond?

The Magic Diamond is a conceptual model that simplifies the understanding of complex asymmetric conflict. Originally designed in the 1980s to analyze insurgent–state dynamics in internal wars, such as Peru’s communist Sendero Luminoso movement, the model establishes four interconnected actors—the insurgent, the counterinsurgent, the population, and the external supporters—and illustrates the dynamics of their interaction.

The insurgents erode the government’s legitimacy and mobilize the population against its rule, while the counterinsurgents strive to maintain control and legitimacy, including by attempting to negate support for the insurgents’ cause. This juxtaposition creates a mirrored system of tension and highlights the symmetry of competing efforts: Both are vying for the same population’s trust, external backing, and the ability to define “normal.” Here, McCormick illuminates the broader reality that legitimacy, rather than firepower, is the true center of gravity. The struggle is fundamentally cognitive and political.

Transposing today’s global gray-zone competition onto the Magic Diamond reveals striking parallels. Legitimacy, influence, and control remain the central objectives, but the arena now spans the interconnected global system. Applied to US-China competition, the CCP seeks “discursive power” to define norms, narratives, and “truths,” all of which are aimed at molding the global population and governing institutions to favor its political model and interests. At the same time, the United States seeks to preserve its global power standing and the free and open liberal order.

Although they employ different methods of exerting domestic and external influence, the reciprocal dynamics of this struggle for legitimacy underscore the importance of understanding how the rest of the world views these sides. Success in this irregular domain means shaping global perceptions sufficiently to minimize the need for military conflict—or ideally render it irrelevant.

Seeing China more clearly through the diamond

In this refreshed model, the PRC emerges as a revisionist global insurgent power: patient, legitimacy-driven, and methodically subverting the dominant international order. This view is reinforced by the continued reverence in China for Mao Zedong’s On Protracted War, which is a foundational text of the CCP’s strategic revolutionary culture. In the work, Mao envisioned a phased campaign: establish strategic defense, force a protracted stalemate, and then launch a counteroffensive. In many ways, the CCP’s global strategy today echoes this logic and translates Maoist insurgent theory into instruments of global statecraft under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s leadership. The CCP fuses political mobilization, cognitive and legal warfare, and economic coercion in a modern global “people’s war.” In recent years, Xi has operationalized a strategy of endurance and incrementalism to “displace the American-led order,” creating a persistent gray zone of ambiguity that clouds the bounds of soft power statecraft and avoids clear escalatory tripwires that would provoke outright conflict.

Whereas Mao mobilized peasants, Xi mobilizes state power through state-owned enterprises, diaspora networks, party-controlled media, and technology champions such as Huawei. Instead of rural battlefields, Xi’s campaign plays out in digital infrastructure, trade regimes, and global governance institutions. Domestically, the CCP cultivates legitimacy through economic growth, nationalism, and narratives of Western decline underpinned by strict censorship and control of information. Externally, international engagements, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, reshape the political and economic landscapes to embed influence and dependence. These projects cultivate global political and societal leverage, effectively creating a network of “safe havens.” Those zones of influence then serve as positional advantages, particularly in developing Global South countries, that strengthen the PRC’s position in the international system—allowing it to encircle the opposition and put in place its strategic defense.

The PRC’s “Three Warfares” strategy—public opinion, psychological warfare, and legal warfare—further supports a protracted competition. Like Mao, Xi aims to “win without fighting” by exhausting opponents over time, gradually eroding cohesion and political will. As regional security expert Kerry Gershaneck aptly described it, this is “political warfare in slow motion.” Control of technology nodes, such as undersea cables, TikTok algorithms, and 5G networks, gives the CCP powerful tools for shaping the flow of information and political sentiment—the modern-day equivalent of controlling the villages in contested provinces. Mis- and disinformation campaigns exploit these networks to amplify doubt in democratic governance and fracture coalitions. Coupled with volumes of international legal challenges—from maritime claims to trade disputes—the PRC creates a web of entanglements that impose a strategic delay, fixing the international community in a political and legal stalemate.

Like Mao’s guerrilla army, today’s PRC simultaneously builds military strength during the stalemate to gain parity with—or overmatch of—its opposition. Attributing China’s historic decline to its relative technological and military inferiority, Xi frequently invokes the “century of humiliation” narrative to justify the “great rejuvenation” modernization effort, vowing that “China will never be bullied again.” While the CCP pursues compellence without fighting, these efforts shape a deterrence signal and build a credible option to use military force if necessary. The PRC has studied its opposition’s military operations for decades, tailoring modernization to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and create dilemmas, especially in the space, cyber, and maritime domains. As Mao once wrote, “an increase in China’s own strength, an increase in (opposition) difficulties, and an increase in international support; it is the combination of all these forces that will bring about China’s superiority and the completion of her preparations for the counter-offensive.” The development of layered anti-access/area denial networks, precision strike capabilities, and assertive military posturing reflect preparation for high-end conflict, and Taiwan represents the clearest test case. Evoking a Maoist counteroffensive to recover China’s lost territories, a military campaign for “reunification” would validate the PRC’s modernization and demonstrate its readiness to project power for broader CCP ambitions.

How the United States fits in

Within this adapted Magic Diamond, the United States (and more broadly, the West) assumes the role of the counterinsurgent: the defender of the existing order and global norms. The challenge is not only to deter PRC coercion, but also to outcompete its legitimacy narrative by demonstrating that the liberal world model delivers security, prosperity, and political freedom. Much like the counterinsurgent’s role of winning hearts and minds, the United States must present a system and social contract more attractive than the insurgent—one that reinforces the internal cohesion and political equilibrium within the existing liberal system and also cultivates international confidence and credibility in open democratic governance. This is especially true when it comes to influencing middle-power nations in the Indo-Pacific and Global South, whose alignment could tip the scales to either system.

Alliances and international partnerships convey legitimacy. NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners, the Australia–United Kingdom–United States security pact known as AUKUS, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework are globally visible examples of multinational resolve and alignment. Expanding partnerships beyond mutual security and defense interests to include equitable trade, developmental growth, and shared values strengthens their appeal, deepens ties, and counters the PRC’s transactional and coercive influence.

Perhaps most important, the United States cannot solely focus on isolating revisionist malign global influence; it must wield its soft and hard powers together to reinforce the foundations of the liberal order faster than the PRC can undermine them. At the same time, it must avoid the trap of solely reacting to the PRC’s initiatives; proactive leadership is essential for sustaining legitimacy. Just as in counterinsurgency, one wins by proactively engaging and integrating with the population, not by isolating within defensive bases.

Although the battlefield has expanded, the logic remains the same. For scholars and policymakers, this adaptation offers fresh insight into a familiar framework, helping to translate gray zone competition into understandable lines of effort across all levels of government. It underscores that the next world order will not merely rely on military deterrence or dominance, but on persuasion, resilience, and partnership. Legitimacy is the key to victory.

Caution against the model’s literal application is warranted—while there are similarities, global political and international relations dynamics differ significantly from internal insurgencies. Changes to global political power and priorities, the high-end strategic military force capabilities, the leverage of nongovernmental organizations and corporations, the complex lattices of bi- and multilateral agreements, and the influence of nonaligned middle powers each diffuse power in a multipolar environment. These factors could tilt decisive advantages to either side, unlike the balance depicted in the model. As such, this adaptation should serve as a heuristic—a conceptual tool for framing the CCP’s strategy as a global insurgency and understanding the reciprocal global competition between liberal and authoritarian systems.

The post The US and China are in ‘gray zone’ competition. A counterinsurgency model can help explain what that means. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan are rising, with the two countries exchanging air strikes over the past weekend.
• If unrest resulting from the Iran war spreads to Pakistan, it could destabilize the country by further emboldening separatist and insurgent groups operating in the border regions.
• Persisting concerns in Islamabad over terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and past failures to mediate the conflict make escalation into a full-scale war between Pakistan and Afghanistan a distinct possibility.

This past weekend, Afghanistan and Pakistan suffered their most intense clashes in years. On Friday, Pakistan carried out air strikes in more than twenty locations across Afghanistan, including Kabul and Kandahar, two of its largest cities, while the Taliban targeted dozens of Pakistani border posts. The violence continued on Sunday, as Pakistani airstrikes hit Kabul. Pakistan claims its strikes targeted terrorists and Taliban military facilities, but the Taliban claimed that the strikes hit civilians.

The fighting broke out before Saturday’s US and Israeli strikes on Iran, which have sparked what is becoming a major war in the Middle East. But the crisis to Iran’s east should not be forgotten, as South Asia threatens to spiral, too. Moreover, South Asia’s conflict could be exacerbated by the war in the Middle East.

Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been tense since the Taliban returned to power in 2021—even though the Taliban was a Pakistani ally during the US-led war in Afghanistan, with Pakistan providing a cross-border sanctuary. The main reason for the current bilateral strain is Pakistan’s contention that the Taliban is sheltering Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a terrorist outfit that’s carried out increasing numbers of attacks in Pakistan since 2021. It also waged a massive campaign of terror across Pakistan between 2007 and 2014, until the military carried out operations along the border that killed many militants—but also displaced many others into Afghanistan.

Taliban leaders deny that they shelter the TTP, but they’ve long been allied with it. The two previously carried out joint operations in Afghanistan, and the TTP’s first supreme leader, Baitullah Mehsud, was once part of the Haqqani Network, one of the Taliban’s most brutal factions. The Taliban are known for not turning on their terrorist allies; most famously, after the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban refused to give up al-Qaeda even when faced with the threat of a US military invasion. The Taliban has additional reasons not to expel or curb the TTP: Doing so could stoke rebellion within Taliban ranks, or drive TTP fighters into the arms of Islamic State Khorasan Province—the Islamic State’s South Asia affiliate and a Taliban rival that periodically attacks Taliban targets.

More broadly, the Taliban has little incentive to help Pakistan. Despite their former wartime alliance, the Taliban has long mistrusted the Pakistanis. And with the conflict having ended in Afghanistan, it no longer needs Pakistani sponsorship. This deprives Pakistan of leverage over the Taliban.

Meanwhile, the war in Iran could destabilize Pakistan if unrest across its Iranian border spills over into Balochistan province, which could embolden separatist insurgents that operate there. And the TTP, which has stepped up its attacks in recent years, might view this as an opportunity to attack, too. Consequently, Pakistan could face a worsening conflict on its northwestern border and ever-increasing unrest on its southwestern frontier. And Pakistan would need to contend with all these dangers even as it continues to grapple with its tense eastern border with India, especially since the two fought their worst conflict since 1971 this past May.

For these reasons, diplomatic efforts—including several rounds of talks mediated by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar after Afghanistan-Pakistan clashes last October—have largely failed to ease tensions, resulting only in tenuous cease-fires that are now shattered.

Consequently, it’s hard to envision any outcomes that are stabilizing. The best-case scenario would be for the two sides to agree to new internationally mediated talks that result in a fresh cease-fire. But that would merely amount to a loose band-aid, as it would only be a matter of time until there’s another terrorist attack in Pakistan, followed by Pakistani strikes and Taliban retaliations. Not to mention, two of the countries that have previously served as mediators—Saudi Arabia and Qatar—will likely be too bogged down with the fallout from the war in Iran to intercede in the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict.

The mid-range scenario is that the two reject talks, and Pakistani airstrikes and Taliban ground operations continue, but each side’s desire to avoid all-out conflict prompts them to tone down the intensity of hostilities. Still, given that the most recent unrest was highly escalatory—the targeting, geographic scope, and overall intensity was much greater than during previous rounds of violence—even reduced hostilities would ensure tensions remain dangerously high.

The worst-case scenario would be if Pakistan decides to go all in, waging relentless air strikes across Afghanistan, targeting TTP terrorists and the Taliban regime it claims is harboring them. This could prompt the Taliban to ramp up border operations and mobilize the TTP and other radicals loyal to the group, ordering them to carry out terrorist attacks across Pakistan, including in major cities. Such a scenario, which would directly threaten US interests and lives, may prompt the Trump administration to intervene—though its bandwidth has shrunk significantly now that it’s embroiled in a much larger war in the Middle East. But Trump, as much as he would want to claim to have ended another war, would struggle to succeed. After all, the Saudis and Qataris have failed even though—unlike the United States—they have warm ties with both Pakistan and the Taliban.

Worst-case scenarios are often the least likely. But given the failures of diplomacy, the Taliban’s refusal to curb the TTP, Pakistan’s increasing alarm about Afghanistan-based terrorism, and rapidly escalating tensions and violence, an all-out conflict is a distinct possibility.

The post While the Iran conflict continues, the Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis is only getting worse appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent diplomatic push reflects this reality. Throughout 2025, he intensified efforts to shape a settlement that would not simply freeze the front, but also create a durable security framework. He did so knowing that any peace will be judged by its ability to prevent a future renewal of Russian aggression.

Crucially, peace through strength must mean the strength of the entire nation, not half of it. Ukraine’s security cannot rest on external guarantees alone. It must also be based on national capacity, including a cultural and institutional shift that integrates women as a pillar of defense planning. This is not a social policy argument. It is a force generation argument.

Even in an optimistic scenario, any agreement between Kyiv and Moscow will demand long-term readiness and self-reliance. Ceasefires can be violated. Commitments can erode. What endures is force posture: Trained units, predictable rotation, and the resilience to absorb pressure.

Deterrence is not a document. It is a condition and it rests on how effectively a state mobilizes and prepares its population. Yet Ukraine’s mobilization still reflects post-Soviet assumptions. Men between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-nine are treated as the default defenders of the state, while women are viewed as supplementary. That division no longer matches battlefield realities or Ukraine’s strategic needs.

Since 2024, Kyiv has tightened mobilization rules, expanded enforcement, and narrowed exemptions. These measures have stabilized force levels, but they have not solved the underlying problem: Ukraine is fighting a prolonged war of attrition against a far larger adversary. Pulling more men into the system without changing how the system functions will not produce sustainable results.

One weakness is preparation and allocation. Many men still only receive limited training before mobilization. At the same time, tens of thousands of women with in-demand support skills in fields such as logistics, communications, medicine, intelligence, engineering, IT, and drones, remain outside the recruitment and training pipelines.

The result is inefficiency on two fronts. Front line units are overstretched and denied predictable rotation, while rear area roles are often filled by personnel whose skills are misaligned with their assignments.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine does not need to mirror Russia’s mass mobilization model. It needs smarter force management. Women can be systematically integrated into roles currently performed by men far away from the front, including checkpoints, border duties, logistics hubs, training commands, communications and intelligence units, and other rear-area security functions.

In a war of attrition, regular rotation is essential to combat effectiveness. Reallocating personnel this way would relieve pressure on front line units. Over time, it would create a broader preparedness posture in which more Ukrainians have the skills to resist renewed aggression. It would also broaden the pool of people with military experience, which strengthens deterrence long after any ceasefire.

The case for integration is not hypothetical. Ukrainian women have volunteered in large numbers since 2014. Legislation adopted in 2018 granted women equal rights and responsibilities in the Ukrainian armed forces. By 2025, more than 70,000 women were serving in the Ukrainian military, including in drone units, medical evacuation teams, intelligence cells, and logistics chains. Recruiting data from the past year indicates that roughly one in five new candidates entering the pipeline was female.

Despite the growing prominence of women, the Ukrainian military has not yet fully adapted. Legal equality has not translated into institutional integration. Access to training and promotion is inconsistent. Women are still too often treated as volunteers rather than a core element of force planning. Discrimination and sexual harassment persist, while accountability is uneven.

Many barriers are practical. Units often lack properly fitted equipment and uniforms. Separate barracks, showers, and toilets are not universal. Access to gynecological care is inconsistent. Mechanisms to prevent and address harassment and misconduct are sometimes poorly enforced. These are not symbolic deficiencies; they directly affect retention, readiness, and morale.

A modern defense strategy is not built on weapons alone. It is built on resilience. Russia’s theory of victory assumes Ukrainian society will fracture under prolonged pressure. Zelenskyy’s diplomacy aims to deny Moscow that outcome by securing international backing and buying time. But society must disprove Russia’s assumptions in practice.

A whole-of-society defense that mobilizes women across military and security roles sends a strong signal of endurance. It demonstrates that Ukraine is prepared for years of deterrence and reinforces the message that Ukraine is building a modern European state.

This signal will also matter to allies. Western support is increasingly constrained by domestic politics. Ukraine’s strongest argument is not moral clarity alone, but strategic credibility. A country that can sustain defense over time is easier to support than one perpetually dependent on emergency assistance.

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Other states facing serious long-term threats have updated their security cultures. Israel mandated conscription for both genders in 1949. Norway introduced gender-neutral conscription in 2015; Sweden followed in 2018.

Ukraine has taken steps toward modernization. In 2024, it updated defense education curricula in secondary schools. By 2025, pilot programs expanded civilian preparedness. But beyond high school, structured pathways for women to acquire military training remain limited. Lyceums and military academies are still underused as talent pipelines.

The costs of delay compound. Exhaustion erodes combat effectiveness. Poor rotation accelerates burnout, desertion, and casualties. No peace plan, however carefully negotiated, can compensate for a force structure that excludes half the population from systematic preparation.

Whether Zelenskyy’s peace initiative succeeds or stalls, Ukraine will require endurance. The policy agenda should be clear. First, Kyiv should extend mandatory service to women aged twenty-five to sixty for designated non-front line support roles currently filled by men such as logistics, medical support, communications, and administration.

It will be crucial to clearly codify exemptions based on factors including parental and family commitments, along with professional status and medical limitations. This will make it possible to free more male personnel for front line duty while sustaining continuity of operations.

Second, the Ukrainian authorities need to fix the basics that determine retention and readiness. This includes properly fitted uniforms and equipment, adequate facilities, reliable medical and gynecological care, and strict enforcement against harassment and misconduct.

Third, Ukraine should expand training and education pipelines that actively target women, including military higher education. Recruiting data already shows demand; the state should convert that demand into readiness, while civil society tracks progress.

Fourth, Ukraine’s allies should support women’s integration through training exchanges. Western military commanders have decades of lessons to share on integrating women into units and training pipelines.

Finally, Kyiv will need to invest in long-term societal preparation. Ukraine cannot rely on emergency mobilization alone; youth must be educated early for the responsibility of defense. When service is framed as an expected civic duty rather than an abrupt wartime shock, conscription becomes a sustainable pillar of national security.

Security guarantees will shape Ukraine’s future, but guarantees are not substitutes for national capacity. Zelenskyy is right to pursue diplomacy that does not mortgage sovereignty; he is also correct to insist peace must be durable. Durability, however, will be measured in battalions, rotations, and readiness, not in signatures.

Ukraine’s most reliable long-term defense asset is its people: Men and women alike. Mobilizing and integrating women is not about ideology. It is a strategy for victory and long-term security.

Calin Trenkov-Wermuth is the former principal security governance advisor at the US Institute of Peace and co-author of The Future of the Security Sector in Ukraine, published by USIP. Sofia Kryshtal is the former executive coordinator of the USIP Task Force on the Future of the Security Sector in Ukraine.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s women may hold the key to the country’s future security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite rising temperatures, the Ukrainian civilian population will almost certainly continue to face challenging conditions in the coming months as the strategic emphasis of Russia’s invasion turns increasingly toward destroying Ukraine’s infrastructure and making the country unlivable. This shift reflects changing military realities, with Putin’s invading army unable to achieve any major breakthroughs while suffering catastrophic casualties.

Russia has held the battlefield initiative since late 2023 but has only managed to capture around one percent of additional Ukrainian territory during this period at enormous cost in terms of both manpower and equipment. With drones now dominating the front lines, the potential for conventional large-scale offensive operations has been greatly reduced.

This is forcing Putin and his generals to rethink. The Kremlin dictator remains determined to extinguish Ukrainian independence and force Ukraine permanently back into the Russian orbit. However, he knows that there is little prospect of achieving his ambitious objectives via the bloody battles currently taking place over the rust belt towns and villages of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

In order to break this strategic deadlock, Russia aims to systematically dismantle the conditions that allow Ukraine to function as a state. This means the continued bombardment of energy infrastructure throughout the country; it is also likely to involve expanded attacks on other crucial public utilities, such as municipal water services and sewage treatment. In parallel, Russia will increase strikes on civilian transport with an emphasis on Ukraine’s logistically vital rail network.

The end goal is to deprive Ukraine of the industrial capacity to defend itself and destroy the basic amenities to sustain even a minimum standard of living. Kremlin officials hope this will break Ukrainian morale and enable Putin to dictate the terms of peace.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia has made no formal declarations regarding its intentions, but the strategic shift toward the bombardment of infrastructure over the past year has been unmistakable. In 2025, Russia launched around 55,000 kamikaze drones at targets in Ukraine, representing a fivefold increase from the total one year earlier. Attacks have sought to deprive individual cities of power while severing Ukraine’s national energy network along the Dnipro River.

The impact of this bombing campaign extends far beyond civilian suffering. By cutting off major power generation assets and disrupting connectivity, Russia is pushing the entire grid into a near-permanent state of emergency. This is placing heavy strain on Ukraine’s defense industry, which is often deprived of the electricity it needs to function. With Kyiv now relying on domestic defense sector output to cover around 50 percent of the country’s military needs, this disruption to production poses a grave threat to national security.

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The coming spring season will be crucial. The next few months of warmer weather should be Ukraine’s window to rebuild and recover lost industrial capacity. However, Moscow will be working hard to slam that window shut with waves of attacks made possible by Russia’s surging domestic drone production.

The continued bombardment of infrastructure targets across Ukraine will also help exhaust the country’s limited air defense ammunition supplies. Every interceptor missile used to defend a Ukrainian city or a power substation is one less available to cover front line positions. This will force Kyiv to prioritize between protecting the civilian population or shielding soldiers in the combat zone.

Another key feature of the war during the first half of 2026 will be escalating Russian attacks on Ukraine’s railways. Recent strikes on key routes linking Ukraine to Poland indicate that this campaign is already well underway. Any major disruption to rail services could cause significant economic damage and prevent millions of Ukrainians from traveling. More importantly, it would leave the army under-supplied and logistically isolated during the height of the summer campaigning season when Russia’s offensive capacity is expected to peak.

It is still not too late to counter the Kremlin’s plans, but the clock is ticking. Kyiv’s partners must urgently enhance Ukraine’s air defense capabilities and provide the country with more systems to protect the expanding list of potential infrastructure targets. Efforts should also be made to fortify strategic sites and anticipate future repair requirements by providing likely replacement components in advance.

Russia’s current strategy should come as no surprise. At the very start of his reign, Putin learned in Chechnya that pulverizing infrastructure was a reliable path to victory in a conflict that conventional military force could not resolve. In 2003, the United Nations reportedly called Chechen capital Grozny “the most destroyed city on earth.”

The Kremlin dictator now plans to secure victory in Ukraine by employing similar tactics. If Ukraine’s electricity grid and critical infrastructure are allowed to fragment further, the authorities in Kyiv may find themselves literally powerless to defend their country.

William Dixon is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute specializing in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Putin’s plan: Make Ukraine unlivable by destroying essential infrastructure appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Fiber-optic drones first emerged at scale in August 2024 in response to Ukraine’s surprise cross-border incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. The territory Ukraine controlled in Kursk relied on a single logistical route running from the Ukrainian city of Sumy to the Russian town of Sudzha. This bottleneck served as an ideal proving ground for a new Russian weapon, a drone guided by fiber-optic cable. 

Simply put, fiber-optic drones are equipped with a cable thinner than a fishing line that trails back to the operator, maintaining a physical connection rather than relying on radio signals. With no radio link for electronic warfare systems to jam, fiber-optic drones can operate in areas where conventional drones struggle or fail. The result is an effectively unjammable drone capable of striking at a range of over 30 kilometers with pinpoint precision and a crystal-clear video feed.

In Kursk, this advantage proved consequential. Over seven months of fighting, Russian fiber-optic drones helped render Ukraine’s presence in the Kursk region increasingly unsustainable. Ukrainian forces ultimately withdrew back across the border in March 2025. 

Open source strike videos published by Russian war bloggers indicate that a disproportionate share of Russian fiber-optic drone attacks from August 2024 to September 2025 took place in the Kursk sector, even though the area represented only a small fraction of the overall front lines of the war during that period.

Strikingly, Russian fiber-optic drone attacks contributed to an unprecedented vehicle loss ratio that saw Ukraine lose 25 percent more vehicles than Russia in Kursk. Many of the vehicles damaged or destroyed were supply trucks and personnel carriers, but targets also included high-value equipment such as Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, systems that Ukraine did not have in abundant supply. In the words of a Ukrainian medic who fought during the Kursk campaign: “Our logistics just collapsed; fiber-optic drones were monitoring all routes, leaving no way to deliver ammunition or provisions.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

After Kursk, the trend soon spread. Fiber-optic drones began proliferating across other areas of the front, graduating from a niche capability to a staple weapon. Their use has since expanded to such an extent that vast swaths of Ukrainian farmland and forest are now littered with fiber-optic cables shed by drones. Fiber-optic drones have also featured prominently in a series of major battles, including the most consequential fighting of the past year in the Pokrovsk region of eastern Ukraine.

By mid-2025, the fiber-optic drone story was no longer so one-sided as Ukraine moved to replicate and adapt the capability. Domestic production surged thanks to Ukraine’s agile ecosystem of innovative defense tech startups. Within months, more than 80 Ukrainian-designed fiber-optic systems had been approved for use, while the number of Ukrainian companies involved in producing or integrating this category of drones has rapidly expanded.

Ukrainian developers are now pushing the boundaries of range, with the country’s famous Birds of Magyar drone unit fielding a fiber-optic drone model capable of reaching approximately forty kilometers. What began as a Russian experiment has evolved into a mutual innovation cycle in which Ukraine is now leading in certain aspects.

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The rapid emergence of fiber-optic drones has caught the attention of NATO officers. In 2025, countering fiber-optic drones became the central theme of NATO’s Innovation Challenge, with participants from Ukraine and the United States taking the podium.

There is no silver bullet to neutralize the threat posed by these unjammable drones. Countermeasures range from last-resort shotgun blasts and physical barriers to radar tripwires, acoustic sensors, and experimental AI-assisted detection systems. Some are improvisations; others are technologically sophisticated solutions with longer development timelines. As with much of the war in Ukraine, adaptation is continuous and ephemeral; what works today may fail tomorrow.

The rise of fiber-optic drones has implications that extend far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine. Sudanese militias,  Mexican cartels, and even the Chinese People’s Liberation Army are already reportedly incorporating fiber-optic drones into their growing arsenals. As drone warfare proliferates globally, the ability to avoid jamming will continue to attract attention wherever electronic interference is common or expected.

Ukraine’s experience suggests that militaries relying exclusively on radio-controlled drones and electronic warfare risk catastrophic disruption at critical moments. Fiber-optic drones may not replace conventional systems, but they have established themselves as a durable component of the modern battlefield toolkit. What began in Kursk as an experiment with a seemingly retrograde technology has now reshaped drone warfare.

Vlad Sutea is head of intelligence at Pravo Ventures and an open source intelligence expert focused on defense issues.

Further reading

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By David Kirichenko

As the Russian invasion enters a fifth year, Ukraine is hoping escalating Russian losses can finally force Putin to seek a meaningful settlement, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Fiber-optic drones have emerged as critical kit for both Russia and Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s political and military leaders recognize that they currently lack the military strength for the kind of large-scale offensive operations necessary to liberate the entire country. Instead, the strategic priority for 2026 is to inflict maximum Russian casualties as part of efforts to make Putin’s invasion unsustainable. Newly appointed Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated recently that the goal is to eliminate up to 50,000 Russian troops per month.

Ukraine’s emphasis on increasing the cost of the invasion makes sense. Russia has held the battlefield initiative since late 2023 but has failed to achieve any significant breakthroughs during that time. Instead, the Russian military has paid a very high price for extremely limited gains. Most assessments indicate that Putin’s army has seized less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory over the past two years, while suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties.

The battlefield itself has also changed, with the clearly defined front lines of the early years giving way to a shifting grey zone dominated by ubiquitous drone coverage. As a result, major offensives featuring armored units and massed infantry are now extremely difficult to conduct. Russia has refined its tactics in response to these changes, shifting away from a reliance on human wave assaults toward the use of small infiltration groups that probe Ukrainian defenses while seeking to establish footholds.

With Putin’s commanders under intense political pressure to capture more ground, the impetus is on Russia to continue offensive operations. As the defending force, this places Ukraine in a strong position. According to Ukrainian officials, Russian casualties have recently reached record highs of more than 30,000 per month. For the first time in the war, this means Russia’s losses are now higher than monthly recruitment levels.

The Russian army in Ukraine has recently experienced disruptions to Starlink connectivity, creating further challenges for the coordination of offensive operations. Without stable links between front line units and commanders, Russian forces are likely to become even more vulnerable and easier to eliminate. This has already led to a number of successful Ukrainian counteroffensives and could create the conditions for additional increases in Russian casualty rates.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Since the onset of the invasion, the Kremlin has been careful to reduce the risk of any backlash over heavy losses in Ukraine. Recruitment has concentrated on Russia’s ethnic minorities and the country’s poorest communities, with prisoners offered amnesties in exchange for military service. For the past few years, the emphasis has increasingly turned to attracting volunteers via large enlistment bonuses and generous salaries. Nevertheless, Russia’s ability to absorb casualties is not limitless. The longer the war drags on, the harder it will be for Moscow to maintain the current tempo, especially if Russian casualties continue to climb.

As part of efforts to maximize Russian losses, Ukraine has established a digital infrastructure to turn drone warfare into a systematic campaign of attrition. Through mechanisms such as the ePoints system, all Russian personnel and equipment losses are logged, verified, and analyzed. Ukrainian commanders can identify which units are most effective and adjust tactics as needed.

Ukraine’s strategy is producing striking results. In December 2025 alone, Ukrainian drone units claim to have hit over one hundred thousand Russian targets, a 31 percent increase compared to the previous month. Russian war blogger Dmitry Rogozin is one of many on the opposing side to acknowledge the effectiveness of this approach, noting that Ukraine is “building a model for the conflict as a long-term project designed to exhaust and exert systematic pressure.”

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The Russian army in Ukraine is already beginning to show signs of strain. According to UK Defense Secretary John Healey, Moscow is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign recruits as Russian commanders lose men faster than they can replace them. “Putin likes to give the impression that they’re making relentless and inevitable progress,” Healey noted recently. “But he’s weaker than he’s been and more reliant than he’s been on foreign fighters.”

Russia’s efforts to attract foreign mercenaries are a clear indication of the country’s mounting manpower challenges. Putin remains deeply reluctant to order a new mobilization due to concerns that this could destabilize the home front and spark a repeat of the exodus of fighting age Russian men that took place in 2022. However, with the Russian economy struggling, paying for new volunteers may become more challenging and lead to budget cuts elsewhere that could also fuel discontent.

If Russian losses continue to outpace recruitment, Putin may find himself with no good options. He could be forced to choose between mobilization, diverting state funds to sustain recruitment incentives, or scaling back offensive operations. All of these choices have the potential to fuel domestic instability. In recent days, there has been widespread speculation that Russian efforts to block the Telegram app may reflect growing Kremlin concerns over the possibility of unrest.

For much of the war, the Russian public has experienced the invasion of Ukraine as a distant conflict. Mounting casualties, particularly if paired with growing economic hardship, may gradually erode this sense of detachment and increase the pressure on the Kremlin. As the war enters a fifth year, Ukraine is hoping escalating Russian losses can finally force Putin to rethink his invasion and seek a meaningful settlement.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 17, 2026

A bad Ukraine peace could ignite new wars in Russia’s former empire

By Joseph Epstein

If a settlement in Ukraine frees up Russian military resources without establishing credible deterrents against further Kremlin aggression, Moscow will have the means and the motive to reassert dominance elsewhere in its former empire, writes Joseph Epstein.

Central Asia European Union

UkraineAlert Feb 12, 2026

Vladimir Putin is trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end

By Peter Dickinson

As the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale Ukraine invasion approaches, Vladimir Putin finds himself trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end for fear of entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Feb 7, 2026

Death by cold: Russia is attempting to freeze millions of Ukrainian civilians

By Kristina Hook

Russia is methodically bombing Ukraine’s power and heating infrastructure amid arctic weather conditions in a bid to freeze millions of Ukrainian civilians and make much of the country unlivable, writes Kristina Hook.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine hopes escalating Russian losses will push Putin toward peace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Forward Defense is grateful to Airbus Americas, Inc. for its support of this report.

Airbus U.S. Space and Defense, Inc. (a subsidiary of Airbus Americas, Inc.) operates under a Special Security Agreement (SSA)—the subject of this report—with the US government. Other companies mentioned in this report in the context of their SSAs with the US government—American Rheinmetall Defense and Leonardo—are also donors to Forward Defense, but are not supporters of this report.

This report was written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council’s Intellectual Independence Policy, which requires all donors to agree to the Council maintaining independent control of the content and conclusions of its work. The author is solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations.

The author thanks Abigail Rudolph for her writing and editing support.

Fellow

Rob Murray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

• Executive summary
• Introduction: SSAs and the US defense advantage
• Problem statement: US defense strategy—the five fault lines
• Advantages offered by SSAs
• Understanding SSA structures, proxy models, and national interest determinations
• SSAs under fire: Risks and critiques
• A risk-benefit analysis
• The SSA model and the future of defense technology
• Policy recommendations to maximize SSA benefits
• Streamlining SSA approval processes to encourage more investment
• Pathfinder projects for further SSA integration
• Conclusion

Executive summary

Special Security Agreements (SSAs) can help sustain a defense advantage for the free world amid rising global competition. These agreements allow foreign-owned, US-based defense companies to engage in sensitive US defense contracts under stringent government oversight, ensuring adherence to national security protocols.

SSAs strategically reconcile the use of foreign expertise with the protection of US interests, bolstering defense self-sufficiency by diversifying supply chains and augmenting domestic production capabilities. These companies can stimulate innovation and fortify the US industrial base. While it is predominantly European defense companies that utilize SSAs, Asian defense companies have long participated in US national security projects under SSAs—Japan, South Korea, and Singapore have maintained such arrangements for more than a decade. South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace is the latest example, currently undergoing the SSA accreditation process to expand its role in the US defense industrial base.¹

Maintaining engagement with allied defense technology via SSAs can help the United States; it ensures interoperability and alliance resilience even as current geopolitical dynamics require a flexible and pragmatic approach. For Europe, SSAs prevent the division of transatlantic defense cooperation and helps to assure compatibility with NATO systems. Companies operating under an SSA are subject to stringent safeguards, including direct oversight by the US Department of Defense (DOD) via the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) and continuous internal monitoring by a Government Security Committee (GSC) composed of cleared US citizens. This dual structure mitigates foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI), while enabling the US government to safely access and operationalize allied technologies for critical national security needs.

To optimize the advantages of SSAs, this paper recommends streamlining export approvals for defense systems, utilizing SSA companies to broaden US access to allied defense markets, countering Chinese and Russian arms sales with SSA-backed defense agreements, expediting the SSA approval process, and establishing a dedicated SSA office within the US DOD.

This report also identifies four Pathfinder Projects—in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), counter-hypersonics, maritime autonomy, and cyber resilience—that demonstrate how SSA companies can be leveraged as strategic enablers to enhance allied defense integration, while addressing regulatory, operational, and policy barriers to collaboration.

In sum, SSAs are a strategic asset that can enhance US military strength, reinforce alliances, and secure the United States’ ongoing leadership in global defense innovation.

Introduction

The United States has long maintained the world’s most advanced and capable large-scale military, underpinned by technological superiority and a robust defense industrial base. Yet, as global threats evolve, China and Russia are rapidly modernizing their militaries and challenging US dominance. To sustain its edge, Washington must strengthen its defense sector while maintaining control over foreign investment in sensitive industries.

SSAs are a critical, yet often misunderstood, tool in this effort. First introduced in 1984 during the Cold War, these agreements emerged as a response to growing concerns about FOCI in the US defense industry. By the 1970s, policymakers had started formalizing security measures to regulate foreign investments in defense companies. Over time, these mechanisms evolved through the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) and were further strengthened as security concerns deepened after 9/11. Today, SSAs provide a structured framework that allows foreign-owned, US-based defense companies to contribute to national security while operating under strict US government oversight.²

The advantages are clear. SSAs enable the United States to harness foreign technology, investment, and competition while managing national security risks through security controls. They also strengthen transatlantic and broader allied defense cooperation.

The strategic logic behind SSAs is simple: They ensure that foreign companies contribute to US military strength while remaining fully compliant with US regulations. In a world where technological dominance defines military superiority, Washington must use every available tool to stay ahead. Properly managed, SSAs are one such tool, allowing the United States to leverage foreign defense investments for competitive advantage.

Problem statement: US defense strategy—the five fault lines

The US defense industrial base is at a crossroads. While the United States maintains the world’s most advanced large-scale military, its ability to sustain technological dominance is under pressure from several converging trends.

• First, industrial capacity constraints have become a national security concern. The war in Ukraine has underscored bottlenecks in US production lines, from ammunition stockpiles to shipbuilding delays. The Pentagon has struggled to ramp up manufacturing at the speed required for sustained military operations.
• Second, US defense research and development (R&D) investment is falling behind. Insufficient internal R&D funding has made it difficult for defense primes and mid-tier contractors to drive innovation at the pace of geopolitical relevance. While China rapidly scales military-technological advancements, the US defense sector remains overly reliant on government-funded programs with slow procurement cycles.
• Third, the rise of dual-use technology is reshaping military competition. Critical advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), space-based defense, and cybersecurity—among other sectors—are now driven by the commercial sector rather than government labs or traditional defense contractors. The United States must find ways to integrate advanced allied technologies while safeguarding national security interests, protecting classified information, and maintaining appropriate oversight of foreign investment in sensitive sectors.
• Fourth, allied interoperability is no longer optional. As NATO and Indo-Pacific alliances grow in strategic importance, the United States must ensure its defense sector remains deeply integrated with allied defense industries. However, driven by geopolitical concerns, European nations are increasingly prioritizing defense-industrial sovereignty, creating risks of fragmentation.
• Finally, US defense exports face growing competition from adversaries. China and Russia have expanded their arms sales across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, offering cheaper alternatives to US defense systems. Without strategic measures to maintain US leadership in global arms markets, the influence of US defense technology could erode.

Given these structural challenges, the United States cannot afford an isolationist approach to defense industrial policy.

Advantages offered by SSAs

SSAs provide a powerful mechanism that can help expand US access to cutting-edge capabilities—enhancing domestic production where appropriate, strengthening R&D investment, integrating dual-use technologies, improving allied interoperability, and maintaining US export competitiveness—all while ensuring that foreign investment is subject to rigorous US government oversight. While SSAs can support the relocation of manufacturing to the United States, they do not require it; rather, their primary function is to permit secure integration of foreign-developed capabilities into the US defense ecosystem under tightly controlled conditions. This section will examine each of these strategic advantages in turn.

Strengthening US defense self-sufficiency by reducing dependence on adversarial supply chains

SSAs play a pivotal role in helping the United States diversify and secure its defense supply chains without retreating into full-scale onshoring. They enable US-based subsidiaries of trusted foreign defense firms to contribute to critical programs. These companies operate within a framework that includes cleared US citizen leadership, firewalls to prevent foreign parent interference, and strict compliance with US defense contracting and export-control regimes.

This structure achieves two objectives simultaneously.

• It allows the United States to safely access high-quality components and subsystems from allied supply chains in areas where domestic production might be insufficient or unavailable at scale.
• It encourages trusted foreign firms to invest directly in the United States—boosting local manufacturing capacity, injecting competition, and accelerating innovation.

One example of this dynamic can be seen in American Rheinmetall’s expansion into the US armored vehicle sector.³ As the US Army pursues its modernization agenda, Rheinmetall—a global defense prime operating a US subsidiary under an SSA—has invested in domestic production facilities, with vehicle components manufactured onshore and under US security protocols. Another example is Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace, Inc., which announced in September 2024 the opening of a new missile production facility in James City County, Virginia, investing more than $100 million in capital expenditure over the next few years and creating over 180 new jobs.⁴ This approach on-shores defense production with less reliance on potentially vulnerable foreign supply chains while still allowing the DOD to access allied technology.

While SSAs do not address commodity-level vulnerabilities—such as rare earth element (REE) dependencies—they are a critical part of the broader solution. The 2010 incident in which China restricted REE exports to Japan over a diplomatic dispute illustrates how adversaries can weaponize supply chains.⁵ SSAs help mitigate this risk at the system level by insulating the defense industrial base from undue foreign influence and expanding the set of trusted suppliers across allied nations.

Expanding US defense production capacity

Beyond securing supply chains, another key challenge facing the US defense sector is limited production capacity. The ongoing war in Ukraine has exposed severe bottlenecks in US ammunition and missile stockpiles, raising concerns about whether the United States can sustain high-intensity military operations over extended periods.⁶ Similarly, US shipbuilding faces significant delays, with the US Navy struggling to meet its long-term fleet expansion goals.⁷ These industrial constraints highlight the need for increased defense manufacturing capabilities—a challenge that SSA companies can help address.

SSA companies can contribute to US defense self-sufficiency by building and operating US-based manufacturing facilities, expanding domestic production capacity, and reducing strain on other US defense companies. Rather than replacing US companies, SSA companies serve as force multipliers that increase the United States’ ability to manufacture critical defense equipment. For example, Leonardo Electronics, an SSA firm specializing in military electronics and avionics, has established multiple production sites in the United States, providing technology to US military aircraft and battlefield systems while keeping production within US borders.⁸ Similarly, Elbit America has several US production sites. Its facility in Roanoke County, Virginia is set to undergo a $30 million expansion and add 288 new jobs.⁹

The benefits of this approach extend beyond immediate military needs. By increasing manufacturing output, SSA companies create US jobs, attract foreign investment, and strengthen local economies. These investments bolster US industrial capacity, ensuring that critical defense production remains resilient in times of crisis.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in US transportation equipment manufacturing—the Bureau of Economic Analysis industry category that captures aerospace, land systems, and missiles—rose from $167 billion in 2020 to $229 billion in 2023, a 37-percent jump despite tighter screening rules.¹⁰ Europe drove almost 40 percent of that 2023 increase; German-owned assets alone grew by $58.9 billion.¹¹ By industry, affiliates in manufacturing increased the most, increasing $58.6 billion to a total investment position of $2.22 trillion.

Understanding SSA structures, proxy models, and national interest determination

While SSAs provide a powerful framework for integrating foreign-owned companies into the US defense industrial base, it is important to understand how SSA companies differ from proxy companies, as well as how certain regulatory requirements—particularly NIDs—impact their operational flexibility and ability to deliver capability to the warfighter. While the SSA model successfully allows the United States to leverage allied industrial capabilities under controlled conditions, the NID process introduces an additional layer of regulatory scrutiny. The experience of some SSA companies suggests that the average NID approval time can exceed twelve months for Top Secret programs and Special Access Programs (SAPs), underscoring the schedule risk these requirements introduce. To clarify the operational and regulatory distinctions between these structures, the table below summarizes the key differences between SSA companies, proxy companies, and the role of the NIDs process.

Proxy companies are wholly US-controlled entities established when foreign ownership must be structurally separated from operational control to protect highly sensitive national security interests. While the foreign parent company retains economic ownership, the company is governed by a board of US citizens who exercise exclusive authority over day-to-day management and operations. Although the foreign parent does not have access to classified information or direct operational control, it does not surrender all forms of influence. Notably, in some cases, companies do have some control as to whether they are placed under a proxy agreement or an SSA. Proxy companies are generally allowed to access Top Secret programs, SAPs, and other highly classified activities without requiring additional government approvals beyond their facility clearance.

By contrast, while SSA companies operate under stringent US government oversight—including US citizen management, security controls, and regular audits—they must seek NIDs whenever they require access to classified information above the Confidential level, particularly for Secret, Top Secret, or SAP contracts. A NID is a formal finding by the sponsoring US government agency that granting classified access to an SSA firm for a specific program or contract is in the national security interest of the United States.

Many companies choose the SSA model over a proxy or voting trust because it offers a more practical balance between security and strategic integration. SSAs allow the US government to mitigate foreign influence while still enabling the subsidiary to benefit from the technical expertise, supply chain efficiencies, and innovation capacity of the parent company—provided these are delivered in a strictly advisory capacity. For founder-led businesses or long-term industrial partnerships, the SSA structure provides visibility and continuity that proxy agreements—often perceived as a total separation—do not allow. In this way, SSAs support both security assurance and operational alignment across allied defense ecosystems.

While the SSA model successfully allows the United States to leverage allied industrial capabilities under controlled conditions, the NID process introduces an additional layer of regulatory scrutiny. Delays in obtaining NID approvals—whether due to bureaucratic backlog, shifting security assessments, or political considerations—can slow contract execution, complicate program management timelines, and create uncertainty around an SSA firm’s ability to deliver capability to the warfighter on schedule. In an environment where defense acquisition increasingly emphasizes speed to deployment, any perceived risk of delay can erode customer trust, damage a company’s reputation, and disincentivize program managers from awarding contracts to SSA companies even when they offer technological or cost advantages.

Recognizing these structural realities is critical to refining SSA policy. While the safeguards built into SSA and NID processes are necessary to protect national security, a more predictable, streamlined, and risk-calibrated approach would strengthen SSA companies’ ability to contribute fully to US defense priorities without compromising operational timelines or trust. Properly managing these regulatory mechanisms is essential both for maximizing industrial capacity and ensuring that the strategic advantages of SSAs are realized at the speed required by modern conflict.

SSAs under fire: Risks and critiques

Despite the jobs, dollars, and infrastructure SSAs bring to the United States, their role in the US defense ecosystem is sometimes debated. While proponents argue that SSAs enhance the US industrial base and strengthen transatlantic and broader allied defense collaboration, critics raise concerns about their impact on national security, economic sovereignty, and US jobs. The most vocal opposition stems from two major areas: security risks and economic competitiveness.

National security concerns: Do SSAs expose US defense capabilities?

Critics worry that allowing foreign-owned companies to operate in the US defense sector—even under SSAs—introduces material risks of foreign influence and potential technology transfer.

While SSAs are designed to mitigate these risks through security controls, critics argue that they leave open channels for subtle, but powerful, influence by foreign parent companies. According to a 1990 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, which remains the office’s most recent comprehensive review of SSAs, many former Defense Department security officials expressed concerns that SSAs “do not negate” FOCI but accept it “as a risk/hazard,” especially in the absence of US-owned alternatives.

Indeed, unlike proxy agreements, which mitigate FOCI by transferring all voting power to cleared US proxies, SSAs explicitly acknowledge the presence of FOCI and manage its risk through a government security committee, independent US directors (though the foreign owner still has a presence on the board), and strict information-access controls. In other words, proxy agreements strongly mitigate FOCI; SSAs accept and mitigate it to a lesser degree. The former DOD officials mentioned above noted that company directors and employees might still feel beholden to foreign owners, thereby rendering them susceptible to undue pressure, even if it is unintentional. The 1990 GAO report also documented cases in which SSAs granted access to highly classified programs—including the stealth bomber and the Strategic Defense Initiative—raising alarm among security professionals who emphasized that such information is often not releasable even to close allied governments.

Furthermore, auditors found systemic weaknesses in how SSAs were implemented. In some instances, foreign owners were granted interim access to classified work for more than a year while formal safeguards were still under negotiation, undermining the DOD’s leverage and oversight. In other cases, National Interest Determinations (NIDs) used to justify SSAs lacked adequate documentation, and there were examples in which foreign companies had ties to adversarial states that were not formally evaluated during the clearance process.

These findings underscore a broader challenge with foreign investment in the defense sector: the security risks that arise when adversaries gain influence over US contractors. Despite oversight from DCSA, safeguards to mitigate foreign influence are historically reactive rather than proactive. Complex corporate structures and scattered information hinder the effectiveness of strategies to mitigate FOCI.¹³ Plus, agencies such as DCSA are facing budget cuts that could add to enforcement challenges.¹⁴

These shortcomings have fueled a perception among critics that SSAs, while administratively convenient, could compromise national security when used too broadly or without stringent enforcement.¹⁵

Understanding SSAs’ impact on American jobs and industry

Another critique of SSAs stems from a broader concern that allowing foreign defense companies to operate in the United States could displace US companies, impact domestic employment, and weaken the country’s industrial sovereignty. Some argue that foreign-owned companies, even if restricted by SSAs, still compete for US defense contracts—potentially squeezing out US suppliers and reducing opportunities for US-based manufacturers.¹⁶

There is also a perception that SSA companies might undermine the goals of “Buy American” policies, which aim to prioritize US workers and suppliers in defense procurement. This perspective has led to political opposition, particularly from factions that view any form of foreign participation in the defense sector as a threat to economic self-sufficiency.¹⁷ As US Senator Patty Murray put it during a 2008 debate over an Air Force contract, “We are hemorrhaging manufacturing jobs to foreign countries already, so I cannot imagine why … our government would decide to take 44,000 American jobs, good jobs, and give them to the Europeans.”¹⁸

A risk-benefit analysis

While concerns about SSAs are valid, they must be weighed against the strategic benefits these agreements provide. A blanket rejection of SSA companies would risk alienating key allies, reducing the competitiveness of US defense exports, and limiting the Pentagon’s access to cutting-edge technology. Instead, the focus should be on refining SSA policies to ensure even greater transparency, security, and alignment with national interests.

The United States must strike a balance between maintaining industrial sovereignty and leveraging allied defense investment. With the right safeguards in place, SSAs remain a strategic tool that strengthens US defense posture while keeping foreign participation firmly under Pentagon oversight regarding what technologies are developed, how they are used, and where they are exported.¹⁹

Ensuring the United States calls the shots

SSAs include rigorous legal and operational safeguards that restrict foreign influence over sensitive defense projects.

• US government oversight: SSA companies must comply with DOD regulations and operate under strict security protocols, including security controls to prevent foreign access to classified programs.
• US-controlled management structures: SSA companies are required to appoint US citizens to key leadership positions, ensuring that strategic decisions remain in American hands.
• Restrictions on FOCI: While the parent company might be foreign, the US subsidiary operates independently, adhering to US industrial security laws and regulations.²⁰

These safeguards are working. In fact, FOCI-mitigated companies receive high ratings in their DCSA security reviews. And that’s one reason why they serve as a model for other areas of the federal government.

In April 2025, DCSA announced that it is set to expand foreign ownership reviews to unclassified defense contracts. New regulations will soon require companies to conduct FOCI assessments before being awarded contracts over five million dollars, representing a significant change from the previous focus primarily on companies seeking or holding security clearances for classified work.²¹ In parallel, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has demonstrated its effectiveness in preventing acquisitions that could undermine US technological competitiveness and national security. For example, in March 2018, the first Trump administration blocked a proposed takeover of US telecom leader Qualcomm by a Singapore-based company.²² This successful intervention indicates that oversight mechanisms can work and security risks can be mitigated effectively.

More competition, lower costs, faster innovation, and supply chain resilience

Beyond technological access and security safeguards, SSA companies also play a key role in keeping the US defense sector competitive, cost-efficient, and innovative. The US military has long benefited from a defense market driven by competition among suppliers, which encourages efficiency and technological advancement. However, with a shrinking number of major US defense contractors dominating the industry, the risk of monopolistic pricing and slower innovation has increased.²³

SSA companies help counteract this trend by introducing additional competition into the defense procurement process. When SSA companies bid for contracts, they push domestic companies to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and accelerate technological development.

SSA companies can also expand access to cutting-edge technologies and specialized expertise that might not otherwise exist in the domestic industrial base. Such international technology infusion strengthens US warfighting capability and supports an operational advantage on the battlefield.

Additionally, the SSA framework signals a high level of trust and interoperability among allies and partners. It represents more than just diplomatic coordination—it enables industrial integration, linking allied nations through shared production, innovation, and security standards. This deepened collaboration fosters strategic alignment and ensures that the United States and its closest partners remain technologically and operationally synchronized in future conflicts. It also reinforces the resilience and diversity of the defense industrial base by broadening the supplier pool and reducing overreliance on a limited number of domestic contractors.

Strengthening global arms competitiveness

The benefits of SSA companies extend beyond domestic defense needs; these companies also play a crucial role in expanding US defense exports and maintaining US dominance in global arms markets.

When SSA companies operate within the United States, they become part of the US defense ecosystem, aligning their interests with US export strategies. This participation enables the following:

• International joint ventures: Whether led by the United States or allies in Europe, Asia, or elsewhere, these can expand arms exports by integrating complementary defense technologies into unified weapons systems, often making them more attractive to third-country buyers.
• Greater US influence over global arms deals: SSAs give the US government greater influence over foreign defense companies operating domestically, enabling Washington to shape how their technologies are marketed, integrated, and exported—often favoring US-led configurations and supply chains over those aligned with geopolitical rivals.
• Partnerships with US companies on international bids: SSAs can facilitate industrial partnerships that strengthen US companies’ participation in international bids by enabling secure collaboration on joint solutions, co-production, and technology integration that aligns with both US export controls and allied defense priorities.
• Help for US companies navigating international procurement regulations: SSA-governed companies can serve as trusted international intermediaries, helping US defense companies navigate foreign procurement dynamics by offering local insight, industrial access, and co-bid pathways aligned with both US compliance standards and foreign political expectations.
• The creation of joint defense platforms: These are more attractive to foreign buyers, strengthening US defense export potential.

By allowing foreign companies to participate in the US market under SSAs, Washington ensures that US defense companies remain deeply integrated into allied procurement decisions (increasing US companies’ global competitiveness) and that allied technological advancements primarily complement—rather than compete with—US military exports.

For an administration focused on “America First” policies, SSAs are a strategic asset that enhances US technological superiority while ensuring that foreign investment serves US national security goals.

Countering China and Russia in the global arms export competition

Beyond transatlantic defense markets, the United States faces growing competition from China and Russia in arms exports, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Both Beijing and Moscow have aggressively expanded their defense sales, offering lower-cost alternatives to US weapons and positioning themselves as preferred suppliers to nations that might otherwise purchase US systems.²⁴

• China has significantly expanded its arms exports, particularly in the drone and missile sectors, for countries that have struggled to navigate US export restrictions.
• Russia remains a leading global supplier of military equipment, leveraging historical defense ties with India and countries in the Middle East and Africa.

The United States cannot afford to cede global market share to its adversaries, particularly in strategically significant regions. SSA companies provide an opportunity to strengthen US arms sales abroad by ensuring that allied defense companies are working in alignment with US strategic goals rather than competing with them.

For example, the United States can leverage SSA companies to position joint US-European defense solutions as the preferred alternative to markets that Russia or China might seek to serve. This approach ensures that Washington remains the dominant supplier of advanced military technology to friendly nations while limiting the ability of China and Russia to expand their defense influence.

SSAs as a tool for strengthening NATO and allied defense capabilities

In addition to securing US defense exports, SSA companies play an important role in strengthening NATO interoperability and allied defense capabilities. One challenge of multinational defense cooperation is ensuring that allied forces can seamlessly integrate their military technologies.²⁵

Europe’s governments are simultaneously doubling defense budgets and signaling that at least 50 percent of those outlays should be spent on equipment “made in Europe” by 2030, according to the European Union’s first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), unveiled on March 5, 2024.²⁶ For many European primes, establishing or expanding a ring-fenced US SSA subsidiary is therefore the politically low-friction way to stay interoperable with US forces without appearing to export scarce production capacity across the Atlantic—a consideration that has become more salient as capitals debate strategic autonomy.

SSA companies help solve this problem by serving as a bridge between US and European defense platforms, allowing for better compatibility between NATO systems and joint development of interoperable technologies.²⁷

Balancing interoperability gains with political realities

For the United States, strengthening allied interoperability through SSAs is not only advantageous but necessary for future coalition operations and maintaining NATO’s technological edge. However, it is important to recognize that, in the current geopolitical environment, some European allies face domestic pressures to prioritize strategic autonomy and might be cautious about deepening visible industrial collaboration with the United States. Acknowledging these dynamics, Washington should continue to expand SSA-based cooperation in ways that are operationally meaningful but politically sustainable—emphasizing trusted, scalable frameworks that allow interoperability gains without forcing binary political choices. Flexibility and strategic patience will be critical to reinforcing alliance cohesion while ensuring that allied defense industries remain aligned with US strategic objectives.

By leveraging SSA companies as integrators of transatlantic defense capabilities, the United States ensures that its allies remain militarily compatible while also strengthening its own defense export potential.

Why “Buy American” policies should not mean “buy alone”

The idea of promoting domestic defense production through “Buy American” policies is widely supported across the US political spectrum.²⁸ However, any protectionist approach that might exclude SSA companies would be counterproductive. Instead of strengthening the US defense industrial base, such an approach would limit access to advanced technologies, increase procurement costs, and weaken defense ties with allies.

The reality is that the United States does not manufacture everything it needs within its own borders. In today’s global defense landscape, military technology development is inherently international, with key components, subsystems, and research collaborations spanning multiple countries.

For example, missile development, naval shipbuilding, and avionics technology all benefit from transatlantic collaboration.²⁹ If the United States were to shut out SSA companies, it would lose access to advanced allied technologies and risk damaging its alliances with key defense partners. A more effective policy would be to balance national security with strategic openness, ensuring that SSA companies operate under strict conditions but remain part of the US defense ecosystem.

The SSA model and the future of defense technology

While traditional defense primes remain essential to US military power, the character of warfare is shifting toward the integration of AI-driven operations, electronic warfare (EW), space-based defense, and autonomous systems. The emergence of new defense technology companies, many of them global in scope, demands an SSA model that can accommodate nontraditional defense players. Indeed, many of the most cutting-edge dual-use and single-use military technologies—particularly in cybersecurity, AI, and battlefield intelligence—are being developed by non-US companies, many based in Israel and Ukraine. SSAs provide a mechanism for bringing such companies into a US defense context.

Why SSAs are essential for emerging defense technologies

The SSA framework could help facilitate the integration of emerging foreign defense technologies, especially where the United States stands to gain from technologies advanced in the context of active battlefields overseas or through peacetime international defense co-production efforts.

The war in Ukraine has driven extraordinary advancements in drones, battlefield AI, and electronic warfare. Regardless of whether and when it moves toward a ceasefire, Ukraine’s burgeoning defense technology sector will need investment to commercialize and scale its capabilities.³⁰ A streamlined, tailored SSA framework—featuring faster processing, simplified compliance, and strategic prioritization—could provide a pathway for Ukrainian defense startups to integrate into US military development pipelines and ensure that battlefield-proven technologies and talent are retained within the US and NATO defense ecosystem, rather than being lost due to uncertainty, dispersion, or demobilization if the conflict enters a lower-intensity or politically unsettled phase. Indeed, this technology backflow should be seen as an important return on US and allied investment in Ukrainian security.

Additionally, SSAs could play a critical role in strengthening the AUKUS alliance between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which is central to Indo-Pacific security and deterrence against China.³¹ To advance AUKUS Pillar II cooperation on AI-enabled warfare, quantum technologies, and next-generation naval capabilities, Washington should encourage more UK and Australian defense tech firms to establish US-incorporated subsidiaries operating under SSAs. This would enable trusted collaboration within a US legal and security framework, ensuring that emerging AUKUS technologies are interoperable, export compliant, and developed in coordination with US national security priorities.

Policy recommendations to maximize SSA benefits

By refining SSA policies, streamlining regulations, and strategically leveraging foreign investment, the United States can ensure that SSA companies remain an asset to national security. To that end, the following proposals are recommended.

1. Coordinate export strategies with SSA-governed firms.
   • The State Department and DOD should better align export approvals and timelines for foreign defense companies offering systems with critical technology that are part of broader allied production chains.
   • Much of this coordination challenge relates to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which govern the export of US-origin defense technologies. Inconsistent or delayed licensing processes can disadvantage SSA-governed companies in international competitions, even when they operate under strict US oversight.
   • By harmonizing these strategies, Washington can ensure that allied defense firms operating under US jurisdiction strengthen—rather than undercut—US arms sales and industrial influence abroad.
2. Use SSA companies to expand US access to global defense markets.
   • For political and regulatory reasons, many foreign nations prefer to buy military equipment from manufacturers in their own country or region rather than US companies.
   • SSA companies provide a gateway for US defense companies to enter foreign procurement programs, as they can serve as a bridge between US technology and international market demands through various prime and subcontractor relationships.
   • Washington could negotiate preferential procurement agreements with foreign governments, ensuring that SSA companies facilitate greater integration between US and global defense industries.
3. Counter Chinese and Russian arms sales with SSA-backed defense agreements.
   • Both China and Russia are aggressively expanding their arms exports to developing nations, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
   • SSA companies could be used as a strategic tool to counter these sales by promoting joint US-European defense solutions in regions where China and Russia seek influence.
   • By offering SSA-backed defense agreements to strategic partners and their industry, the United States could reinforce global military alliances while limiting the reach of adversarial arms suppliers.

Streamlining SSA approval processes to encourage more investment

While SSAs provide a strategic advantage, the bureaucratic process for approving them is often slow and complex, discouraging foreign investment in US defense. Washington must balance national security concerns with a regulatory environment that encourages trusted allied companies to invest in the United States.

To fully leverage SSAs for US military, economic, and strategic advantage, policymakers should do the following.

1. Establish a clearer and faster SSA approval process.
   • The current SSA approval process can take years, potentially discouraging allied companies from pursuing US investments. This is particularly relevant for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific that might seek closer collaboration with the United States and thus use SSAs as a tool to help achieve such collaboration.
   • A more efficient approval system, with clear timelines and security benchmarks, would encourage greater FDI in US defense without compromising national security.
2. Elevate SSA-governed companies within US defense industrial strategy.
   • The DOD should establish a formal mechanism to integrate SSA-governed companies into broader defense industrial base planning, export strategy, and capability development frameworks. While the DCSA should continue to lead oversight and security compliance, a dedicated policy coordination function is needed to ensure these firms are recognized not just as compliant entities, but as strategic assets within the allied defense ecosystem.
   • SSA companies often possess advanced technologies, global supply chains, and R&D capabilities that are directly relevant to US modernization priorities. However, without a clear point of integration within DOD policy structures, these companies risk being under-leveraged or misunderstood—particularly when navigating export approvals, joint programs, or eligibility for domestic production incentives.
   • Establishing a policy focal point inside the DOD could help ensure that SSA-governed companies are factored into key decisions—such as National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) planning, trusted capital pathways, or Defense Production Act Title III investments.
   • This approach would not impose new compliance burdens but would instead unlock strategic value from firms that are already trusted, cleared, and operating under US law. It would also help align the SSA framework with US goals to expand allied production capacity, improve supply chain resilience, and strengthen transatlantic defense collaboration.
3. Expand SSAs to include emerging defense tech companies.
   • Create a specialized SSA pathway for US-prioritized emerging technologies—such as AI, space, quantum, and counter-hypersonics— ensuring US access to cutting-edge military innovations.
   • Create narrowly scoped ITAR exemptions or expedited licensing pathways for SSA-governed US companies engaged in co-development of AI and hypersonic technologies with trusted allies—in which the end users are pre-cleared partner governments and the programs fall within strategic initiatives such as AUKUS Pillar II.
   • Establish a transatlantic SSA Innovation Task Force to coordinate technology integration policy, streamline FOCI mitigation practices, and align US and European defense industrial innovation—particularly in areas such as AI, space, and next-generation munitions.
4. Establish a post-war SSA program for Ukrainian defense startups.
   • A streamlined, tailored SSA framework—featuring faster processing, simplified compliance, and strategic prioritization—could allow Ukrainian companies to integrate into US and NATO procurement at the speed of relevance.
5. Use SSAs to deepen AUKUS defense collaboration.
   • Encourage greater participation by UK and Australian defense tech firms in US-based SSA structures by improving standardization, accelerating approval timelines, and clarifying long-term strategic pathways—helping build the trust and predictability needed to deepen transatlantic and Indo-Pacific cooperation in the face of growing strategic competition with China.
6. Strengthen supply chain risk management for SSA-governed firms.
   • SSA companies are already subject to US supply chain security requirements, including restrictions under Section 889 of the fiscal year (FY) 2019 NDAA and the “Drone Act” provisions of the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).³² The DOD should better integrate SSA firms into its broader supply chain risk management ecosystem—providing access to tools such as the Supply Chain Illumination initiative.³³
   • Where critical dependencies persist—such as in rare earths, semiconductors, or specialized components—the Office of Industrial Base Policy should consider targeted support through Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III funding, NTIB co-production, or advance purchase commitments. These instruments can help SSA firms transition to secure allied sources without disrupting program timelines.
   • Finally, the GSC structure could be leveraged to include annual supply chain risk mitigation plans, aligned with DOD cyber and export control standards. This would reinforce the GSC’s strategic role while enhancing transparency and resilience across the industrial base.

Pathfinder projects for further SSA integration

To fully capitalize on the SSA model, the United States and its allies must actively integrate SSA companies into priority defense initiatives. This report proposes the following Pathfinder Projects to provide a structured way to demonstrate and expand the role of SSA companies in strengthening US security capabilities, ensuring they are leveraged not just as industrial assets but as strategic enablers of next-generation defense cooperation. These projects will also help address regulatory, operational, and policy constraints that currently limit the full potential of transatlantic defense collaboration.

Each Pathfinder Project outlined below is designed to tackle a critical defense challenge, illustrating how SSA companies can provide a competitive advantage and what specific steps are required to implement them effectively.

1. AI-driven multi-domain ISR: Closing transatlantic intelligence gaps

Strategic priority

The next generation of warfare requires real-time, multi-domain intelligence fusion across space, cyber, air, land, and sea. While US ISR capabilities remain formidable, foreign companies are pioneering AI-enhanced sensor fusion and passive detection technologies that could significantly enhance allied intelligence-sharing and decision-making capabilities.

Why SSA companies?

• US ISR remains platform-centric, whereas foreign SSA companies offer advanced AI-driven networked surveillance architectures.
• SSA companies can act as controlled integration nodes, ensuring secure and compliant transfer of foreign ISR innovations into US and NATO battle networks.
• The SSA model allows NATO-wide standardization of ISR fusion algorithms without exposing classified US ISR systems to foreign influence.

Implementation plan

• Establish a DOD ISR Task Force to oversee SSA-led AI sensor fusion standardization.
• Integrate SSA companies into US ISR modernization programs to enable dual-use AI for intelligence sharing.
• Address ITAR barriers for ISR data sharing, ensuring that SSA companies can legally contribute to AI-driven intelligence collaboration.

2. Counter-hypersonic defense: Aligning US and allied missile interceptors

Strategic priority

Hypersonic missile threats are one of the most urgent challenges facing the United States and its NATO allies. While the United States has invested in kinetic interceptors (THAAD, SM-6, Glide Phase Interceptor), foreign companies have developed complementary countermeasure capabilities, electronic warfare-based tracking, and multi-layered interceptor concepts.

Why SSA companies?

• Foreign SSA subsidiaries can integrate their sensor-fusion algorithms into US hypersonic defense architectures, improving target tracking and kill chain efficiency.
• SSAs enable secure and controlled software integration, preventing siloed national defense solutions that weaken NATO missile defense coordination.
• Without SSA collaboration, allied and partners could independently develop competing missile defense systems, leading to fragmented capabilities.

Implementation plan

• Mandate SSA participation in the Pentagon’s Hypersonic Defense Program, ensuring European tracking systems integrate with US missile defense platforms.
• Launch a joint US–European Hypersonic Task Force focused on aligning missile defense tracking architectures and addressing shared capability gaps. As trusted foreign firms demonstrate the ability to contribute, US agencies should facilitate SSA participation through a more transparent and predictable process—making it clear that integration into sensitive US defense efforts is both strategically necessary and procedurally achievable.
• Refine ITAR implementation guidelines to establish a dedicated, fast-tracked review process for SSA-governed firms contributing to counter-hypersonic technologies—enabling secure transatlantic collaboration while maintaining US export control authority and national security safeguards.

3. AI-enabled maritime security: Unmanned naval defense networks

Strategic priority

US and NATO maritime forces face increasing pressure from near-peer adversaries utilizing swarms of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (USVs/UUVs) to contest sea lanes. While the US Navy has initiated its Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) strategy, foreign companies are further ahead in developing operational AI-driven naval swarm technologies.

Why SSA companies?

• SSA companies can fast-track integration of European unmanned maritime platforms into NATO naval task forces.
• The SSA framework prevents technology transfer barriers, ensuring that European autonomous naval systems are interoperable with US networks.
• SSA companies allow controlled software and algorithm sharing, ensuring AI-based unmanned platforms comply with US and NATO cyber standards.

Implementation plan

• Designate SSA companies as key partners in the US Navy’s Disruptive Capabilities Office, enabling joint development of autonomous maritime security systems.
• The Pentagon should establish a Maritime AI Lab focused on developing and fielding autonomous naval systems, with structured participation from SSA-governed firms—enabling secure integration of allied technologies into US and coalition naval operations.
• Streamline ITAR and Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) approval for unmanned naval technologies, prioritizing SSA companies for expedited integration into US naval programs.

4. AI-driven cyber and electronic warfare resilience

Strategic priority

The battlefield of the future is increasingly digital, with adversaries leveraging AI-enhanced cyberattacks, electronic jamming, and digital deception. SSA companies have pioneered AI-led cyber deception tools, adaptive EW jamming, and quantum-resistant encryption, which could significantly enhance US and NATO cyber resilience.

Why SSA companies?

• SSAs allow foreign-owned companies to contribute to NATO-aligned AI-enabled cyber defense solutions, while ensuring compliance with US national security protocols governing access to classified systems and information.
• US and European cyber capabilities remain fragmented—SSA companies provide a secure bridge for coordinated cyber-EW collaboration.
• SSA companies can be tasked with joint development of AI-driven EW standards, ensuring future-proofed US and NATO digital defenses.

Implementation plan

• Create a Cyber and Electronic Warfare Task Force composed of SSA-governed companies, operating under US Cyber Command oversight, to integrate AI-enabled cyber resilience tools in alignment with NATO’s Cyber Defense Policy and in coordination with NATO’s center for cyber expertise.
• Expand SSA participation in the DOD’s Joint AI Cyber Operations Initiative, ensuring transatlantic AI cyber defenses remain interoperable.
• Update ITAR to address the classification and licensing of AI-driven cyber defense tools—ensuring SSA-governed companies can contribute to secure transatlantic integration without breaching US export control rules or delaying iterative software development cycles.

Conclusion: Reforming SSA policy to enable scalable implementation

In this era, the United States cannot afford to take an isolationist approach to defense procurement. Military technology is increasingly global in scope, and the United States’ ability to maintain its technological edge depends on strategically integrating the best capabilities from trusted allies while maintaining rigorous security controls.

SSAs provide a controlled and secure framework that allows the United States to benefit from foreign investment, increase industrial capacity, and enhance military readiness—without compromising national security. Instead of viewing SSA companies as a threat, Washington should leverage them as a force multiplier for US defense superiority.

A smart “America First” strategy does not mean closing the door on allied defense companies. It means ensuring that every dollar of defense spending strengthens US national security while keeping the United States at the forefront of military innovation. SSAs achieve this goal—enhancing US military strength, reinforcing transatlantic and Pacific alliances, and ensuring that the United States continues to set the global standard for defense excellence.

Forward Defense is grateful to Airbus Americas, Inc. for its support of this report.

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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• The strategic setting: Autocrats on the rise
• The threat: A formidable military backed by a resilient war economy
• The risk: NATO is not ready
• Target 1: Svalbard archipelago
• Target 2: Åland islands
• Target 3: Eastern Estonia
• Target 4: Gotland
• Target 5: Land bridge to Kaliningrad

The accession of Sweden and Finland as NATO’s newest members has fundamentally altered Russia’s security calculations in the Baltic and Nordic region. Should the war in Ukraine evolve into a prolonged frozen conflict, Russia will rearm its military in pursuit of Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions. He will seek opportunities to rebuild Russian prestige and recover former or disputed territories, improve Russia’s strategic posture, and test NATO’s resolve in Article 5 scenarios in which he assesses the chance of a robust Alliance response is low, or the chances of success at acceptable cost are high. As one expert notes, “Russia wants to expand its military and political opportunities in the face of the West and considers a direct clash with the West highly probable, if not unavoidable.”¹

The potential rewards for continued and successful Russian aggression in Europe include enhanced prestige for Putin’s regime, an improved geostrategic position along Russia’s periphery, delivery of a damaging and perhaps fatal blow to NATO, and the severing of the transatlantic link—all of which are powerful incentives. To deter future Russian aggression, NATO should identify and address these challenges now with concrete solutions. If Putin succeeds in such tests the lack of an effective response could well fracture NATO, fundamentally altering the transatlantic security environment.²

Despite its war in Ukraine, Russia remains a formidable, capable, and determined adversary in possession of the world’s largest and strongest nuclear arsenal. As Western intelligence services have warned, the Russian military is reconstituting its forces in preparation for future contingencies. Senior NATO military and intelligence leaders regularly warn that Russian aggression on NATO territory in the near term is a serious threat.³ This study will assess five key scenarios in which Russia might seek to improve its geostrategic position in the Nordic-Baltic region—the most likely target for future Russian aggression on NATO territory. In order of least to most risk for Russia, these are: military occupation of Svalbard; military occupation of the Åland islands; seizure of NATO territory in eastern Estonia; seizure of Gotland; and military operations to establish a land corridor to Kaliningrad. The intent of the study is to develop specific, realistic, and practical recommendations to deter Russian aggression in the Nordic and Baltic region.

The strategic setting: Autocrats on the rise

In 2025 the transatlantic community finds itself facing multiple serious challenges, framed by major-theater war on its doorstep in Ukraine, a new US administration critical of NATO and strongly prioritizing the homeland and China, dissensus within the Alliance on burden sharing and how to deal with Russia, and the potential for further Russian aggression in the European security space. More broadly, a consortium of autocratic states (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea)—enabled by supporters such as India, Brazil, South Africa, and others—supports Russian aggression in Ukraine directly and indirectly by providing arms, troops, or markets that prop up Russia’s war economy.⁴

The strongest and most alarming trend in global affairs is the rise of autocratic regimes that threaten the stability of the international system. On every continent, democratic institutions face concerted opposition from authoritarian movements and regimes seeking to undermine the rule of law, free elections, and constitutional frameworks. Many of these movements are supported and financed by China and Russia. As Europe and the United States struggled to recover from the effects of the pandemic, global supply chain disruptions, and rising inflation, worsening tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the outbreak of major-theater war in Ukraine roiled international markets, energy transfers, and food supplies. The international system today is marked by instability and increasing fragmentation as traditional alliances and coalitions come under growing pressure and strain.⁵

US economic policy, foreign policy, and national security responses to these challenges under the current administration differ strikingly from those of the past. US leaders have strongly condemned European Union (EU) trade practices, harshly criticized NATO member states, and imposed stiff tariffs on European and Canadian goods, provoking angry economic retaliation and damaging diplomatic relationships with traditionally staunch allies.⁶ It remains to be seen whether these measures are bargaining chips, which can be lessened or withdrawn in exchange for European concessions (such as increased defense spending or US defense contracts), or long-term shifts in US policy. US conservatives today regularly call for disengagement from Europe.⁷ Apparently serious US threats to expand territory by annexing Canada and Greenland have widened this breach, a process only intensified by the Donald Trump administration’s embrace of far-right movements across Europe and autocratic leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban. Senior officials have repeatedly argued that Europe must “look to itself” for security so that the United States can prioritize the Indo-Pacific, now described as its “sole pacing threat.”⁸ Increasingly, the United States is no longer seen across Europe as a reliable ally with common values and interests.⁹

Several alternative futures thus appear possible, ranging from outright US withdrawal to a measured drawdown of forces to a purely transactional approach, whereby the United States demands bilateral concessions (more European forces and defense spending, as well as economic and trade concessions) in exchange for continued support.¹⁰ Regardless of which outcome materializes, it seems clear that Europe must rapidly increase its defense capabilities. For the contingencies addressed in this study, solutions that rely primarily on European contributions are optimal.

The threat: A formidable military backed by a resilient war economy

Russian aggression in Europe clearly presents the most serious challenge facing NATO and the European Union.¹¹ The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept highlights Russia as “the most significant threat to Allied security,” while the 2025 Hague Summit cites the “long-term threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security.”¹² Following its seizure of Georgian territory in 2008, the occupation of Crimea in 2014, and the incursion into the Donbas in the same year—the latter two both sovereign Ukrainian territory—the Russian Federation conducted a festering campaign in eastern Ukraine resulting in more than fifty thousand killed and wounded through 2021.¹³ In February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked, massive invasion of Ukraine that continues today.

Russian losses in Ukraine have been severe, with as many as 770,000 killed, wounded, or missing, more than twice the size of the entire initial invasion force.¹⁴ (A disproportionate number are non-ethnic Russians drawn from more rural areas.¹⁵) Most of Russia’s inventory of modern main battle tanks—some three thousand in all—have been destroyed or captured, along with 5,600 armored fighting vehicles, 1,500 artillery systems, 110 fixed-wing aircraft, and more than one hundred helicopters.¹⁶ The Russian Black Sea Fleet has also been crippled, with seventeen ships sunk (including the flagship cruiser Moskva). At the outset, all of Russia’s then eleven combined-arms armies, its one tank army, and all of its airborne/air assault and naval infantry forces were committed to the invasion. That force was shattered by more than two years of intense combat.

Nevertheless, the Russian Federation’s ability to replace its losses has been remarkable.¹⁷ Through forced conscription and by offering financial incentives to boost recruiting, Russian forces fighting in Ukraine now total more than six hundred thousand.¹⁸ By drawing on reserve stocks of older equipment and ramping up production, Russia has made up for equipment losses, albeit with older and less capable systems and weapons.¹⁹ At the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that Russia is building an additional fifty combat divisions, totaling some 150,000 troops—far more than any European state.²⁰ Supported by China, Iran, North Korea, and others, Russia has managed to evade sanctions to obtain the microchips and other advanced electronics it needs to manufacture and repair its advanced military technology.²¹ Now on a war footing, with defense spending exceeding 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), Russia has escaped the worst effects of international sanctions.²² There is little evidence to suggest its economy will collapse in the near or medium term.²³

The state of the Russian military

The Russian armed forces consist of 1.5 million active-duty soldiers, with another nine hundred thousand reservists, organized into three branches (the aerospace forces, ground forces, and navy), two independent arms (the strategic rocket forces and airborne forces) and the Special Operations Forces Command. The National Guard and Border Service are paramilitary formations not controlled by the Russian General Staff. Russian military forces are made up of both contract and conscripted soldiers, with elite formations such as special operation, parachute, and naval infantry enjoying a higher proportion of volunteers. All physically qualified Russian males aged 18–27 are subject to one year of military service.

The world’s strongest nuclear power, Russia fields an array of strategic and tactical nuclear systems that provide a wide range of options on the escalatory ladder.²⁴ The total number of nuclear warheads of all types is 5,600, including some two thousand tactical weapons (almost ten times the US number).²⁵ Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are controlled by the strategic rocket forces, headquartered in Moscow with an alternate command post in the Ural Mountains. The aerospace forces control a fleet of some sixty-six strategic bombers, though as many as thirteen were damaged or destroyed in recent Ukrainian drone attacks.²⁶ The Russian navy has eleven ballistic missile submarines equipped with sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Russian ground forces include a variety of tactical nuclear systems, such as the Kalibr cruise missile and Iskander ballistic missile, deployed in the missile brigades found at army level. Russia also possesses air- and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons in its army and navy. This inventory provides Russian leaders with a variety of escalatory options below the strategic threshold that NATO is poorly equipped to answer.

The Russian ground order of battle today consists of fourteen combined arms armies (CAA), roughly equivalent to NATO corps, and one tank army (the 1st Guards Tank Army or 1GTA) with a total of seventeen army divisions.²⁷ (Ukrainian sources report that an additional fifteen divisions will be raised in the near term, although independent confirmation is lacking.²⁸) Russian ground forces also include some twenty-six independent motor rifle or tank brigades. (There are also three “army corps,” non-standard groupings with generally fewer units than armies.) Ground forces are geographically assigned to five military districts (Leningrad, Moscow, Eastern, Southern, and Central).²⁹ Russian field armies are less uniform in organization than in Soviet times and can include as many as three divisions plus supporting arms (as in the case of 1GTA) or as few as a single brigade (as with the 29th CAA in Siberia). However, all armies include an artillery brigade, missile brigade, and air defense brigade. Of note, Russian army units are supported by far more tubed and rocket artillery than is found in any NATO ally, including the United States.³⁰

The Russian military also fields strong airborne/air assault forces (considered a separate service), including four divisions and three separate brigades, often used as spearhead forces in conventional roles (a fifth division is reportedly forming).³¹ Referred to as Vozdushno-desantnye-voyska (VDV), literally “air landing troops,” all are mechanized with greater firepower and mobility than NATO counterparts. Their primary mission is to seize key strategic terrain in support of military operations or campaigns directed by the Russian General Staff.³² Russian naval infantry operates under control of the Russian navy in support of the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific fleets; there are five brigades, organized along army lines. Russian special operations forces (SOF) include eight spetsnaz brigades, much smaller units trained and equipped for deep penetration raids against high-value targets. All of these formations have been badly damaged in Ukraine and are reconstituting.³³

Private military companies (PMCs) such as the Wagner Group must also be considered. They have been used extensively in the Middle East, Africa, and, of course, Ukraine, where they sustained heavy losses.³⁴ PMCs offer several advantages: a degree of deniability, flexibility in the place and manner of employment, and a lack of accountability or public outcry when they suffer heavy losses. Since the abortive coup of June 2023, Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s Wagner Group has declined in importance and influence while PMCs have been more strictly subordinated to state control.³⁵ With some twenty-seven PMCs officially registered with the Russian Ministry of Defense, Russia has multiple options for employment of mercenaries in clandestine or covert operations in which a measure of deception is considered advisable. Just such a scenario appears in the 2024 Finnish documentary series Konflicti, which describes the introduction of Russian mercenaries on the Hanko Peninsula in an attempt to destabilize the Finnish government.

On the whole, Russian ground forces have underperformed in Ukraine despite massive superiority in artillery, armored vehicles, and airpower. Pre-war training and combined-arms proficiency were shown to be lacking, while command arrangements, battlefield leadership, and logistic planning have all been criticized.³⁶ Lack of initiative and an inability to fuse intelligence in support of targeting are common problems.³⁷ Since 2022, many Russian general officers have been killed, wounded, or relieved, disrupting the chain of command.³⁸ Nevertheless, Russian resilience has been impressive and Russian excellence in some areas, such as electronic warfare and use of drones, is impressive.³⁹ The Russian Army today is far more combat experienced than any NATO land force, and it continues to learn and adapt. Its resilience and willingness to take high casualties to achieve its objectives make it a dangerous adversary that should not be underestimated in future conflicts.⁴⁰

Traditionally, the Russian navy has operated in support of its land forces and not at great distances from the homeland, except in small numbers. Those trends are likely to continue.⁴¹ Even so, Russian naval power is increasing, with twenty-three new vessels commissioned since 2023.⁴² In the transatlantic region, its principal tasks are to contribute to strategic nuclear deterrence with its submarine-launched ballistic missile submarines; to defend the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) bastions in and around the Kola Peninsula; to threaten the Atlantic sea lanes with its attack submarines; to defend against enemy sea-launched carrier and missile strikes against critical targets ashore; and to support ground operations with its cruise missiles, naval gunfire, and naval infantry. The Russian navy currently lists 283 vessels in its order of battle, though many are aging or are smaller corvettes or coastal patrol craft. A significant number are partially manned, under refit, or otherwise not battle worthy. Principal surface combatants include one carrier (the Kuznetsov, under long-term refit if not cancellation), four cruisers, ten destroyers, and twelve frigates. These are supported by eighty-three corvettes, forty-eight mine warfare vessels, fifty patrol vessels, and seventeen amphibious assault vessels, along with other support craft. The Russian submarine force consists of fifty-eight vessels, including twelve nuclear ballistic missile boats and fourteen nuclear attack subs.⁴³ While most Russian submarines were commissioned in the 1980s or 1990s, a small number—such as the nuclear-powered guided missile sub Severodvinsk—are modern, powerful, and difficult to detect.⁴⁴ The bulk of the Russian navy is assigned to the Northern Fleet, based in Severomorsk on the Kola Peninsula. In confined waters, such as the Black Sea or Baltic Sea, the Russian navy has been shown to be vulnerable to land-based anti-ship missiles as well as unmanned surface attacks.⁴⁵ Beyond the range of its land-based anti-ship missiles, the Russian navy is vulnerable to NATO’s maritime forces—but the European allies will find it difficult to cope without the US Navy.⁴⁶

The Russian Air Force, on paper at least, is one of the strongest in the world, with some 1,200 fighter aircraft and more than one hundred bombers, supported by an array of command and control (C2), electronic warfare, transport, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft.⁴⁷ Russian aerospace forces also include eleven air and missile defense brigades. The Russian Air Force has not performed well in Ukraine despite its overwhelming numbers and despite facing older Ukrainian air defense systems.⁴⁸ With a ten-to-one superiority in fighter aircraft at the outset, Russia failed to achieve air dominance—primarily due to outstanding Ukrainian air defense, but also due to deficiencies in Russian training and airpower employment. More than one hundred fixed-wing Russian combat aircraft have been lost, while many others are aging out prematurely due to heavy strain in flying hours.⁴⁹ About half of Russia’s aircraft fleet is more than thirty years old.⁵⁰ Attack and transport helicopters belong to the Russian air force, not the army, and they have also suffered grave losses, losing 40 percent of their strength in combat. Maintenance issues, battle damage, and the requirements of other theaters also reduce the number of airframes available. Effective Ukrainian air defense forced Russia to change tactics, increasing reliance on attack drones and on aerial delivery of glide bombs launched beyond the range of enemy air defenses.⁵¹ Russian high and medium air defense also resides in the air force and is impressive, especially in the air defense bastions surrounding Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, and the Kola Peninsula. In the near term, Russia will field more modern replacement aircraft in modest numbers, but NATO airpower should have the advantage.⁵² In all scenarios involving military force, Russian unmanned aerial vehicles can be employed en masse and in sophisticated ways, with heavy use of decoys and deliberate targeting of civilian populations and infrastructure if deemed necessary.

Russian politics presents no threat to Putin’s control

Now in power for a quarter of a century, Putin at seventy-two is in firm control of the Russian political system, which stages periodic “show elections” that do not threaten his hold on power. Powerful oligarchs, military and intelligence figures, and legislators cannot establish independent centers of power able to challenge his authority, while opposition figures are regularly imprisoned, assassinated, or executed. As Freedom House reports:

Power in Russia’s authoritarian political system is concentrated in the hands
of President Vladimir Putin. With loyalist security forces, a subservient judiciary, a controlled media environment, and a legislature consisting of a ruling party and pliable opposition factions, the Kremlin manipulates elections and suppresses genuine dissent.⁵³

Strongly nationalist and supported by the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian political system follows centuries of Russian history as an authoritarian and autocratic regime preoccupied with expansion and external threats. As one expert observes, “The main aim of the system is the perpetuation of the ruling elite’s hold on power, first by shielding it against any challenges that might emerge from the society, and second, by regulating the intra-elite rivalries . . . the state is treated by the elite as if it were its collective property through neo-patrimonialism. Neither citizens’ welfare nor economic development are among its primary goals.”⁵⁴ The Russian system is opaque, rendering independent assessments and analyses difficult. Catastrophic defeat on the battlefield, economic collapse, or serious internal rivalries might conceivably cause Putin’s overthrow, but at present his hold on power appears solid and durable. For planning purposes, analysts should assume that the current power structures will remain in place through Putin’s lifetime.

The Russian economy has rebounded from sanctions pressure

Though beset with comprehensive sanctions since 2022, the Russian economy has proven to be resilient, with GDP growing by 3.4 percent in 2024 as Russia transitioned to a war economy. There is disagreement regarding Russian economic prospects going forward.⁵⁵ Rising inflation and interest rates, corporate debt increases, a weakening ruble, declining energy prices, labor shortages, sharp reductions in foreign investment, and the loss of European markets for Russian energy have all negatively impacted Russian economic performance.⁵⁶ Diversion of capital into the defense sector has also affected investment in other parts of the economy, stunting efforts to offset these impacts.⁵⁷ Russia’s sovereign wealth fund has also declined from $175 billion in early February 2022 to $135 billion in March 2025, while $340 billion in Russian assets held in foreign banks were frozen following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.⁵⁸ Some economists therefore conclude that the Russian economy might collapse or decline in the near term.⁵⁹

Others, however, point to factors that challenge this assessment.⁶⁰ Russia is self-sufficient in both agriculture and energy, rendering the state at least partially immune to external economic pressures. It includes perhaps the world’s largest reserves of natural resources, including oil, natural gas, timber, iron ore, coal, bauxite, diamonds, rare earths, and other commodities. The Russian shadow fleet, chartered by Russian entities but operating under foreign registries, includes hundreds of vessels engaged in carrying Russian cargoes (principally oil and natural gas) in order to evade international sanctions.⁶¹ The Russian steel industry ranked first in Europe in 2024 with $74 billion in revenue.⁶²

With new energy markets in China, India, Turkey, and elsewhere, the Russian energy sector has adapted well to Europe’s attempts to wean itself from Russian oil and natural gas (though a substantial fraction of Europe’s energy today is still supplied by Russian energy purchased from other countries on the secondary market and transported by Russia’s shadow fleet to avoid sanctions).⁶³ The EU also continues to import Russian oil, nickel, natural gas, fertilizer, iron, and steel.⁶⁴ Wages for Russian workers across the economy have risen and are running well ahead of inflation, while sanctions regimes have historically eroded as international business interests push for renewed access to Russian markets, commodities, and capital. Trade with China alone has risen by 70 percent, or $237 billion, since 2021.⁶⁵ Since then, Russia has transformed its economy to sharply prioritize military production, a change that will not be reversed quickly.⁶⁶ Russian debt, by international standards, is relatively moderate at 20 percent of GDP.⁶⁷ Unlike European consumers, the Russian population—especially in a starkly autocratic Russian state—appears well able to withstand privation and hardship. Given these realities, Russia is unlikely to suspend its military ambitions anytime soon due to economic constraints.⁶⁸ Stronger Western sanctions could change this calculus, but sanctions fatigue and an erosion of the sanctions regime over time appear just as likely.⁶⁹ While long-term collapse is possible, Russia seems well able to sustain its military activity for the near to medium term.

Russian hybrid operations seek to “fracture” Europe

Russian capabilities in the information domain are formidable and include offensive cyber, subversion, propaganda, and disinformation. State-sponsored media such as RT and Sputnik collaborate with sophisticated hacking and social media manipulation to sow dissension and distrust of institutions on a global scale. Financial support for opposition parties in Western democracies is a favored tactic with proven results; the recent election of an almost unknown, Russian-backed candidate in the Romanian presidential election is a primary example.⁷⁰ (As another example, almost every living Austrian chancellor has accepted highly paid employment with Russian businesses upon leaving office.⁷¹) Russian interference in US elections in 2016, 2020, and 2024 is well documented.⁷² The Baltic region is a high priority for Russian information operations, which seek to destabilize host nation governments using highly sophisticated means, often leveraging the ethnic Russian populations found there.⁷³

Direct sabotage is a regular feature of these efforts. Attacks on Baltic and Nordic infrastructure on land and at sea escalated alarmingly since 2022, often involving explosives and incendiaries as well as targeted assassinations.⁷⁴ Deniable attacks on undersea infrastructure have increased dramatically and are now a standard part of Russia’s hybrid toolkit.⁷⁵ Airspace violations by Russian aircraft and drones are now almost common, most spectacularly on September 9, 2025, when nineteen Russian drones entered Polish airspace.⁷⁶ These activities suggest at least an attempt to probe and test host country and NATO detection and response capabilities, if not a deliberate program of intimidation. Any kinetic operation launched by Russia in the region will almost certainly be preceded by comprehensive hybrid activities meant to fracture civilian support for the authorities, cripple financial and command-and-control systems, and alarm and distract civil society. These efforts are ongoing and increasing on a large scale.⁷⁷

Russian objectives

Russian active measures, in the Nordic and Baltic region and more broadly, are based on a series of strategic objectives with deep roots. Among these are:

• enhancing the prestige and stability of the regime by demonstrating influence and power relative to adversaries;
• destabilizing neighboring democratic states;
• laying the groundwork for recovery of former imperial possessions;
• restoration of the Russian Federation as a great power;
• reconfiguration of the international order in ways that benefit Russia in particular, and friendly autocratic regimes in general;
• resetting geostrategic conditions in ways that favor Russian political and military interests and goals;
• conducting intelligence preparation in support of future military operations;
• punishing formerly neutral Sweden and Finland for joining NATO; and
• fracturing the NATO Alliance and the European Union.

Though it has sustained serious losses in Ukraine, Russia remains a capable and determined adversary and the world’s strongest nuclear power. Its ultimate victory in Ukraine is in some doubt, with the conflict likely to subside into yet another frozen conflict.⁷⁸ (In the unlikely event of a Russian victory or a durable peace in Ukraine, Russia is even more likely to consider aggression in other parts of Europe, as more of its forces would be freed for other contingencies.) As Putin has repeatedly asserted, his ambitions go beyond Ukraine and encompass the recovery of former imperial territories lost over the centuries.⁷⁹ Both Finland and Sweden have difficult conflict histories with Russia extending back to imperial times, complicated by Russian anger over their recent accession to NATO.⁸⁰ Norway, formerly part of Sweden and sharing a border with Russia, is similarly a target of Russian ire as a strong supporter of Ukraine and an outspoken champion of sanctions. Baltic allies Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are regular targets as well; all formerly belonged to the Russian Empire and all possess ethnic Russian minorities that are oppressed, according to Russian propaganda.⁸¹ They also represent prosperous Western democracies whose high standards of living and free societies stand in sharp contrast to conditions in bordering Russia—a clear threat Putin is known to fear. Standing between Russian territory and the Russian exclave at Kaliningrad (home to the Russian Baltic Fleet), the Baltic states are a high priority for Russian disinformation and subversion, as well as outright aggression.

The Russian Federation today is an aggressive state determined to restore its former glory and its place as a great power.⁸² Russian troops occupy Moldovan and Georgian sovereign territory and are based in Armenia as well. With a powerful conventional military and the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, Russia has used force repeatedly and successfully in recent years to achieve its political aims. Western intelligence agencies assess that further aggression is under serious consideration.⁸³ Over the next two to five years, Russia will continue to rearm and reconstitute its forces, posing a serious threat to the transatlantic region.⁸⁴ Meanwhile, Russian hybrid warfare will continue to play a prominent role.⁸⁵

The potential rewards for continued and successful Russian aggression in Europe include enhanced prestige for Putin’s regime, an improved geostrategic position along Russia’s periphery, delivery of a damaging and perhaps fatal blow to NATO, and the severing of the transatlantic link. These are powerful incentives. The most likely scenarios for future Russian aggression in Europe share several factors in common: they are relatively close to Russian territory; they represent a lower probability of a strong NATO or US-led response; they are opposed by weak defending forces; and they are subject to Russian historical claims. Western leaders should have no illusions. The prospects for direct conflict with Russia are substantial.⁸⁶ As one senior Nordic officer opined when interviewed for this study, “What Putin says he will do, he does.”

The risk: NATO is not ready

For some seven decades, NATO has been the backbone of North American and European security. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered the security landscape in which NATO is operating, posing a threat not seen since its inception. How the Alliance meets these challenges will define its future and survival.

Inside the Alliance, NATO faces serious challenges. The Trump administration’s aversion to NATO is well documented, as is its strong prioritization of China as the principal threat.⁸⁷ Redeployment of some or all US forces in Europe is reportedly under active consideration.⁸⁸ A steady drift away from NATO’s core values of democracy, human rights, and rule of law in some member states impairs Alliance cohesion.⁸⁹ Key allies such as Canada, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium still fall well below the defense spending threshold of 2 percent of GDP. Autocratic states such as Hungary, Turkey, and Slovakia refused to participate in sanctions against Russia over Ukraine and represent difficult allies should direct conflict with the Russian Federation erupt. Readiness is low across the Alliance, with half of NATO allies possessing no tanks or combat aircraft. Differing threat perceptions across NATO and the EU further complicate concerted action.

These dynamics suggest opportunities for Russia to exploit in the next few years. The United Kingdom’s difficult exit from the European Union, chronically low interoperability and military readiness across the Alliance, underinvestment in key capabilities such as space, theater missile defense, and offensive cyber, and wide divergences in burden sharing all complicate Alliance cohesion.⁹⁰ The rise of far-right political movements in Germany, France, and elsewhere raises elemental concerns. Financial and military support for Ukraine is taxing strained defense budgets, particularly given reductions in US aid. Looming over all of this is the question of the US role in NATO going forward. Faced with US demands to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP “or else,” a requirement that many allies cannot realistically meet, European states must question the US administration’s actual commitment to the Washington Treaty and the defense of the transatlantic community.⁹¹ Alarmingly, the head of the German Federal Intelligence Service reported in 2025 that his agency “had clear intelligence indications that Russian officials believed the collective defence obligations enshrined in the NATO treaty no longer had practical force.”⁹²

NATO’s security posture on its eastern flank is generally characterized by small regular forces, limited reserves, an absence of large armored formations, and weak artillery. The Baltic states presently field no tanks or combat aircraft and only coastal patrol craft. Poland, much larger than its neighbors to the north, is an exception. It has much stronger active and reserve forces and formidable tank, artillery, and fighter holdings (though these are still far smaller than Russian forces). NATO forward forces in the form of multinational battalion battlegroups are present in each of the eastern flank countries.⁹³ Lacking strategic depth, the Baltic states are unlikely to successfully defend against Russian aggression without substantial augmentation from allies.

NATO’s posture in Nordic Europe is, in some ways, more reassuring. All Nordic allies (except Iceland, which has no military) require mandatory military service. Defense spending is well above the NATO average and rising. A shared strategic culture, common history, and geographical proximity ensure higher interoperability. Difficult terrain, limited road and rail nets, greater strategic depth, and harsh weather conditions favor the defense. Nordic defense cooperation is long-standing and advanced.⁹⁴ Finland, Sweden, and Norway, with their long experience bordering Russia, can boast resilient societies marked by high levels of defense preparedness, advanced technology, and significant defense industries. Finland possesses large reserves and the largest artillery inventory in European NATO, while Nordic air forces field some 250 modern fourth- and fifth-generation fighter aircraft.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, minimal force projection capabilities, small active forces, modest ballistic missile defense, and limited blue-water naval strength all constitute vulnerabilities. All Nordic countries lack corps and higher-level formations and staffs with appropriate enablers. A serious threat from Russia would require assistance from across the Alliance.

This discussion feeds into the larger question of how best to deter further Russian aggression in the Nordic-Baltic region under present circumstances. The following considerations should be addressed as the Alliance seeks to meet its many challenges in this dangerous time.

• A shared consensus and commitment to action with respect to Russia is imperative. NATO should establish clear redlines respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of members and speak with one voice. A major part of this effort must be combating Russian disinformation through unified and coordinated messaging from capitals.
• Readiness and interoperability are by far the most urgent concerns. Though NATO force structure far outmatches Russia’s on paper, low readiness undermines deterrence across the board.⁹⁶ Operational readiness rates, deployment timelines, training, and stocks of ammunition, spare parts, fuel, and precision-guided munitions must all be strengthened and improved.⁹⁷ Addressing the lack of space-based ISR is an urgent priority.
• Addressing capability shortfalls is also an urgent need. High-altitude air and missile defense, intra-theater airlift, division- and corps-level “enablers,” electronic warfare, and offensive cyber, drone, and counter-drone systems all require investment and strengthening.
• Across Europe, the defense industrial base must grow in size and capacity to generate adequate stocks of major end items (tanks, aircraft, warships), as well as ammunition and spare parts.
• Military mobility, long recognized as a debilitating problem, must be solved. Here, close coordination and effective interaction with the European Union will be required.⁹⁸ Stress testing through regular exercises should be implemented.
• Burden sharing—currently the most divisive issue within the Alliance—must be addressed and rationalized. Overall, NATO allies reached the target of 2 percent of GDP set at the 2014 Summit in 2024, spending $500 billion on defense, or about four times more than Russia. However, key allies such as Italy, Spain, Canada, and Belgium (among others) remain below the 2-percent threshold. To relieve rising pressures related to burden sharing, all allies must achieve a minimum threshold of 2 percent of GDP for defense spending now and show clear progress toward a revised goal of 3.5 percent within the next decade, as agreed at the 2025 NATO Summit at the Hague.
• Updates to NATO’s cyber and nuclear policies are also needed.⁹⁹ Especially for tactical nuclear weapons, important questions about basing, release authority, site security, deterrent posture, and messaging are all appropriate policy issues affecting NATO as a whole.¹⁰⁰ In the cyber domain, NATO can help to improve cyber defense and cyber awareness across the Alliance, sharing best practices and advanced technology.
• As the conflict in Ukraine has highlighted, addressing the lack of reserves is essential. Small volunteer militaries or limited conscription with short terms of service cannot generate the forces and replacements needed to deter and defend. Conscription based on the Israeli model, especially for those states under greatest threat, will almost certainly be required—and would send a strong deterrent signal.
• Above all, deterrence—the concrete ability and will to inflict unacceptable costs on any aggressor—must be strengthened. This requires the stationing of heavy NATO forces, with enablers, on the eastern flank. Specifically, the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle groups should be increased from battalion to brigade size, as NATO committed to in Madrid in 2022; NATO should assist the Baltic states in transitioning to heavy forces of divisional strength, with enablers; and the US “heel-to-toe” rotational brigade in Poland should be maintained. These forces represent a credible defensive deterrent but are far too small to pose an offensive threat.

Here NATO has many advantages. Its combined GDP is some twenty times greater than Russia’s, and its overall defense spending is some fourteen times greater. NATO’s thirty-two allies and close, official partners such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea constitute most of the economic and military power on the planet, and their combined populations dwarf Russia’s. Nevertheless, NATO must generate the political will to compete. The unity and cohesion of the Alliance is at stake. It is decisively in the US national interest to combine and cooperate with likeminded and wealthy allies who share common values and interests. Accordingly, key Alliance objectives include:

• maintaining Alliance unity and cohesion;
• deterring and defending member states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity;
• increasing overall defense spending;
• correcting capability shortfalls;
• strengthening the defense industrial base;
• improving readiness and interoperability to meet wartime requirements;
• generating manpower reserves; and
• improving NATO-EU cooperation.

What NATO could look like—from the status quo to full US withdrawal

In the near and medium term, NATO might assume one of three forms. The first is the status quo, perhaps with a reduced US footprint and a more transactional approach. Allies should expect continued strong pressure to assume greater defense burdens. In this scenario, the United States will continue to provide its nuclear umbrella; three European-based brigade combat teams; forward divisional and corps headquarters with enablers; one divisional set of pre-positioned equipment; four fighter squadrons based in Europe; the US Sixth Fleet; US European Command; and a US Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). In time of war, the US contribution would be reinforced to include four fighter wings, an army corps of two divisions with enablers, and the US Second Fleet. US pressure to assume costs for its presence in countries like Germany is likely. This option could see the United States prioritizing exercises and troop deployments in those countries that meet the administration’s defense spending demands.

The second would resemble France’s withdrawal from the military command structure in 1967, with a much-reduced US presence. This option would see most US ground and air forces withdrawn; retention of the US nuclear umbrella and pre-positioned equipment; trainers and advisers as well as staff representation in NATO structures; and a European SACEUR. In this scenario, the United States will remain committed to Article 5 but only in a reinforcing role, with far greater reliance on Europe.

In a third case, the United States withdraws from NATO, removes its nuclear umbrella, and redeploys its military forces to the United States or the Indo-Pacific region.¹⁰¹ In this circumstance, NATO might carry on without the United States, be disestablished, or perhaps function as the military component of an expanded European Union.¹⁰² Should the Alliance fold altogether, a regional coalition or consortium including the Nordic and Baltic states, Poland, and perhaps the United Kingdom (UK) could evolve.

This study assumes a reduced US presence in Europe, continued US extended nuclear deterrence, and a US SACEUR. As mentioned above, proposed solutions for the threats and challenges presented herein assume limited US participation. With these considerations in mind, the following discussion will examine possible scenarios for further aggression in the Nordic and Baltic region along with suggested solutions for deterrence and defense.

In all the scenarios discussed below, certain factors apply. Any Russian military operation to seize NATO territory will be preceded by an assessment of expected Alliance reactions; if the chances of a robust response are considered low, the probabilities that Russia might act increase. The scenarios considered here could unfold in isolation or in tandem. Russian diplomacy will focus on support for nationalist or right-wing parties in order to generate dissensus inside NATO and the EU. Russian forces based in western Russia, such as 1GTA, must first be reconstituted, reequipped, and returned to full strength. Any operation will be fully joint, involving air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains. In all, intelligence preparation of the battlefield will be intense, and Russia will deploy disinformation, espionage, and sabotage. Indicators of a pending operation might include redeployment of air and sealift platforms; increased aerial and maritime reconnaissance; increased activity of rapid intervention forces; stepped-up disinformation; and no-notice snap exercises intended to mask actual operations. Russian SOF will participate and will probably precede the introduction of conventional forces. Military deception, such as the use of civilian shipping and commercial air transport and diversionary operations elsewhere, should be expected. A “cold start” using elite intervention forces (e.g., naval infantry and airborne units) is more likely than extensive mobilization that might alert NATO forces in advance. Finally, the timing of Russian aggression might be linked to climactic conditions and time of year, Western political transitions or domestic unrest, or crises such as conflict in the Indo-Pacific or Middle East that might hinder effective responses.¹⁰³

Target 1: Svalbard archipelago 

Undefended and far from military assistance, the Svalbard archipelago is a tempting opportunity to test NATO resolve and improve Russia’s geostrategic posture in the High North.¹⁰⁴ A sudden, uncontested military occupation by Russian troops would pose a severe test for both Norway and the Alliance. Located 750 kilometers (km) north of the Norwegian mainland in the Norwegian Sea, the archipelago includes Svalbard (formerly Spitzbergen), Hopen, and Jan Mayen islands. In accordance with the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, the archipelago is sovereign Norwegian territory but subject to a number of stipulations: military installations cannot be placed there; citizens of any treaty signatories can reside and pursue commercial opportunities on the islands, subject to Norwegian law; and all parties must respect and preserve the local environment.

The archipelago is sparsely populated, with fewer than three thousand residents spread across seven locations and only two permanent settlements (Longyearbyen and Barentsburg, on Svalbard island). Seventeen percent of its population is made up of Russian nationals. Its principal mineral resources are coal, zinc, copper, and phosphate. Norway operated a single coal mine that exports 80,000 tons annually to European customers, but it closed in 2025.¹⁰⁵ One local airport supports regular commercial air service to Svalbard from mainland Norway. One of the world’s largest ground-based commercial telecommunications stations is based on the island. It was bombed by Germany in World War II and later used as a weather station by the German military.

In support of its commercial interests—and as allowed by the treaty—Russia has maintained a nearly permanent presence on Svalbard for decades, principally for mining. At the height of the Cold War, Svalbard was home to more than twice as many Russian citizens as Norwegians. A major mining complex at Pyramiden was abandoned in 1998; today it is manned as a research station by twelve Russian nationals. A Russian mining operation remains active at Barentsburg, producing 120,000 tons of coal per year but programmed for reduction to 40,000 tons by 2032.¹⁰⁶ A Russian Geographical Society office opened in Barentsburg in October 2025 as well. The Russian government also encourages tourism from “friendly” countries, raising the Russian profile and footprint on Svalbard. In recent years, Russia has stepped up its complaints, asserting various violations of the treaty concerning fishing rights, treatment of Russian citizens, research activities, Norwegian military activity, and Norwegian claims to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ).¹⁰⁷

Current Norwegian government documents acknowledge “the risk of military conflict involving Norway [has] increased” and assert that “the exercise of national control in Svalbard is to be strengthened.”¹⁰⁸ Though lacking in military infrastructure, the archipelago represents a potential platform for reconnaissance and surveillance of the Norwegian and Barents Seas and a listening post for observation of the High North, as well as Russian naval activity out of Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula, home to the Russian Northern Fleet.¹⁰⁹ The bulk of the Russian navy is based in the Kola Peninsula, including the majority of Russian ballistic missile and attack submarines, as well as long-range naval aviation.¹¹⁰ If militarized, Russian possession of Svalbard would deny NATO allies this potential advantage and enhance Russian presence and reach in these waters, contributing to a layered defense of the Kola complex and strengthening Russian access to the Arctic Ocean and the North Atlantic. Of note, Norwegian analysts report a strong Russian intelligence focus on the archipelago, as well as the Arctic region and the Northern Sea Route in recent years, highlighting the islands’ geographic importance.¹¹¹ In January 2022, just weeks before the invasion of Ukraine, a major telecommunications cable from the mainland to Svalbard was cut, almost certainly by Russian commercial vessels.¹¹²

These developments suggest that, as part of a larger program to drive wedges inside NATO and to punish Norway for its unstinting support of Ukraine (including economic sanctions), Russia could see greater political value in exploiting Svalbard’s territorial “ambiguity” by seizing the undefended archipelago. Contrived complaints about Norwegian treatment of Russian nationals and arguments over disputed Norwegian sovereignty in Svalbard have been simmering for years and would provide a ready, if thinly veiled, justification.¹¹³ In recent years, Russian officials have also falsely claimed that Norway is “militarizing” Svalbard, a clear attempt to generate a false narrative in support of possible military action.¹¹⁴

Any Russian operation to seize Svalbard would be preceded by hybrid activities, such as destruction of undersea telecommunications, the insertion of intelligence officers in civilian clothes, and SOF troops conducting strategic reconnaissance and seizing key locations such as the commercial airfield north of Longyearbyen. Naval infantry from the Northern Fleet (the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade, based in Murmansk) or airborne troops flown in from mainland Russia could rapidly seize and occupy the archipelago with little warning, presenting NATO with a fait accompli.¹¹⁵ Although an overt military movement using Russian amphibious assault craft or military transport aircraft is possible, a military occupation might involve maskirovka (military deception) using commercial aircraft or ships, at least for the leading echelon. The initial occupying force would likely be of battalion strength, followed by its parent brigade with the normal enablers (air defense, artillery, engineers, intelligence, and electronic warfare units), supported by fighters, warships, and submarines from the Kola Peninsula.¹¹⁶ Some form of civil administration and ministry of the interior border guards would follow in due course.

Given Svalbard’s remote location and small population, it is not certain that all thirty-two NATO allies would agree to oppose Russian aggression on Svalbard.¹¹⁷ Without consensus, a robust NATO response is less likely. At the outset, Norway’s small military can do little in response. Though a clear Article 5 violation, NATO’s failure to respond effectively will significantly damage Alliance prestige and cohesion, at low risk and low cost to Russia. Should Russian planners assess that NATO lacks the resolve to act, this scenario becomes far more probable.

Technically, Norway might not abrogate the 1920 treaty without the consent of the participating parties (which number some forty-eight, including Russia).¹¹⁸ The introduction of foreign troops is forbidden. However, Article 9 of the treaty permits the presence of Norwegian troops with caveats: Norway cannot establish naval bases or other military fortifications on Svalbard and the archipelago cannot be used “for warlike purposes,” but “defensive measures” are permitted.¹¹⁹ Citing repeated Russian aggression and violations of international law, Norway could station a rotational force—perhaps border guards or other paramilitary troops—in company strength as a reaction force on Svalbard to deter an unopposed landing. Such a force could not withstand a determined attack but would raise the political stakes and signal Norway’s determination to assert its sovereignty and defend its territory, strengthening the case for NATO and international diplomatic and military intervention.

These steps can be augmented by more focused intelligence and surveillance, including signal and human intelligence, aimed specifically at detecting Russian troop movements before they happen. Early detection could provide opportunities for diplomacy, activation of response plans, and perhaps some form of interdiction prior to the operation taking place. Any strong evidence of a pending coup de main should trigger stepped-up NATO air and maritime patrols. In these circumstances, the Norwegian government might also consider a preemptive deployment.¹²⁰

NATO should also prepare detailed plans to retake Svalbard in the event of aggression. Unfortunately, Norway has no amphibious assault ships or marines, other than a company-sized coastal ranger unit equipped with CB90 fast assault craft.¹²¹ It also lacks parachute troops needed for no-notice, long-range response. One option is to employ Norwegian special forces along with US, UK, and Dutch marines who regularly exercise in north Norway.¹²² Another is to employ UK, Dutch, and Belgian parachute troops along with Norwegian SOF—a more rapid solution.¹²³ Such an operation would require air and naval forces, as well as ground troops in sufficient strength to overcome local Russian resistance and any reinforcing echelon. Russian planners will surely anticipate a NATO response, so effective air defense and anti-submarine assets in support of the reaction force are essential. Speed is critical, as delay would enable the Russian military to both establish stronger defenses (such as air defense and anti-ship missiles) and bring in reinforcements. Norwegian and Alliance public diplomacy should reinforce Norway’s determination to defend its sovereign territory and NATO’s commitment to assist when threatened, reinforced by recurring exercises to demonstrate Alliance resolve and capability.¹²⁴ Should the North Atlantic Council decline to respond, an alternative is a “coalition of the willing” supported by the UK, the Nordic powers, and perhaps others.

Recommendations

• Conduct public diplomacy to reinforce Norway’s determination to defend its sovereign territory and NATO’s commitment to assist when threatened.
• Implement diplomatic and government information programs to inform residents and neighbors of forthcoming actions to deter or defend against aggression on Svalbard.
• Position a rotational company-sized Norwegian military or paramilitary unit on Svalbard.
• Conduct focused intelligence and surveillance, to include signal and human intelligence, aimed specifically at detecting Russian troop movements toward Svalbard.
• Conduct detailed military planning to reinforce or retake Svalbard in crisis scenarios.
• Conduct regular NATO exercises to practice rapid reinforcement, beginning with BALTOPS 2026.
• Stockpile supplies of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts in north Norway in support of contingency plans.
• Establish NATO defensive counter-air patrols if Russian aggression is imminent.

Target 2: Åland islands 

As with Svalbard, the Åland islands are undefended and represent a tempting prize for Russian forces. Situated at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia in the Baltic Sea, they are in close proximity to three NATO capitals: Stockholm in Sweden, Tallinn in Estonia, and Helsinki in Finland. Described by Napoleon Bonaparte as “a pistol aimed at the heart of Sweden,” the 6,700 islands in the chain were formerly Swedish territory but were ceded to Russia in 1809 along with the Grand Duchy of Finland.¹²⁵ Following the Crimean War, the islands were demilitarized in accordance with the Treaty of Paris. Though sovereign Finnish territory since Finland’s independence in 1917, the islands enjoy substantial autonomy and remain demilitarized, with no military installations or infrastructure.

The population is Swedish speaking and enjoys the highest standard of living in Finland. Residents are not subject to military service. With thirty thousand inhabitants and a surface area of 1,700 km, the regional economy is based on shipping, fishing, and agriculture. The regional capital is Mariehamn on Fasta island, home to 90 percent of the local population. The islands are a crucial maritime waterway, as shipping routes nearby carry $180 billion of regional trade annually along with critical undersea cables linking Finland to the rest of Europe.¹²⁶ There is daily ferry service to Sweden and the Finnish mainland, as well as to the Baltic states, and daily air service to Stockholm and Helsinki from Mariehamn, the islands’ only commercial airport. The islands’ status is governed by the 1921 Åland convention, brokered by the League of Nations, which grants substantial cultural and political autonomy to the islanders.¹²⁷

Largely due to the conflict in Ukraine and Finland’s subsequent joining of NATO, some Finnish politicians and analysts have suggested revisiting the islands’ demilitarized status, provoking a strong reaction from Russian commentators.¹²⁸ Although a majority of Finns support this step, local residents do not.¹²⁹ The Finnish government has tabled such proposals, careful not to inflame an already tense relationship with the Russian Federation.¹³⁰ Still, an evolving security environment in the Baltic and Nordic region could change that calculus. Given the geostrategic stakes, Helsinki must take such threats seriously.¹³¹

A prime driver for Moscow is the importance of Baltic Sea trade, a major contributor to the Russian economy.¹³² The Åland islands also sit astride the entrance to the Gulf of Finland and the approaches to St. Petersburg, Russia’s second largest city, while the Kaliningrad exclave to the south is the home of the Russian Baltic Fleet and Russia’s only year-round, ice-free port in the Baltic. With almost all of the Baltic coastline now NATO territory, Russian planners face an acute challenge: in the event of direct confrontation with the Alliance, their use of Baltic waters and airspace is at grave risk, as is the survival of Kaliningrad as a Russian entity. The defense of St. Petersburg, now almost a NATO suburb, is also in question from the Russian perspective.

For these reasons, the Åland islands represent an attractive target.¹³³ Their possession in time of war confers vital advantages to Russia, altering the strategic landscape in the Baltic region significantly. These include more defense in depth for St. Petersburg, an enhanced air defense zone in the northern Baltic, and a potential platform for surveillance and reconnaissance as well as anti-ship missiles and rocket artillery. A military operation to seize them would also punish Finland for joining NATO and, like Svalbard, pose a wrenching dilemma for NATO. Though clearly an act of war, as well as a striking violation of international law, an unopposed military occupation in time of peace would more likely than not result in diplomatic protests, but perhaps not a NATO military response.

As in the Svalbard scenario, any Russian operation to occupy the islands would be preceded by Russian SOF, inserted clandestinely, to conduct strategic reconnaissance and seize critical infrastructure, such as the commercial airfield at Mariehamn.¹³⁴ These would be supported by combat aircraft and air defense forces from the Leningrad Military District. The occupation force would likely come from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade based in Kaliningrad, or the 76th Air Assault Division based in Pskov.¹³⁵ As in Scenario 1, troops in battalion or regimental strength could be inserted by sea or air with little or no warning, possibly using commercial shipping or aircraft. Elements of the Russian Baltic Fleet would support the operation.¹³⁶ Moscow would likely then annex the islands, following up with national guard or border police troops and emplacing air defense, anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare units, and other enablers—in all, the equivalent of an independent brigade group.

Finnish military leaders are well aware of the Russian threat to the islands and increasingly advocate for their defense, as do a growing number of parliamentarians.¹³⁷ An appropriate response to the growing Russian threat is to amend the 1921 Åland convention (Russia is not a signatory) and position adequate defense forces on Fasta, perhaps with Swedish and other NATO elements equipped with armored vehicles, air defense, and supporting artillery, and supplemented by local volunteer reserve units. A possible solution is the Nyland Brigade, Swedish-speaking “coastal jaegers” currently based at Ekenas on the southern tip of Finland, augmented by air defense, field artillery, and anti-ship missile units.¹³⁸ This force would deny Russian forces an unopposed landing, impose costs on an attacking force, strengthen the case for NATO intervention in the event of Russian aggression, and buy time for reinforcements to arrive. Should the mission be to retake the islands, spearhead forces would be Finnish SOF (specifically the Uttii Jaeger Regiment) and the Nyland battlegroup, perhaps supported by Swedish marines.¹³⁹ Though the Russian government would protest any preventive deployment strongly, the islands are sovereign Finnish territory and such a deployment would clearly pose no offensive threat to Russian territory or interests. Given heightened tensions in the region and Russia’s demonstrated propensity for aggression, as well as direct Russian threats related to Finland’s accession to NATO, a defensive deployment like this is both prudent and necessary. Now, while Russia remains preoccupied in Ukraine, is the best time to bolster Finnish defenses in this critical area.

Recommendations

• Conduct public diplomacy to reinforce Finland’s determination to defend its sovereign territory and NATO’s commitment to assist when threatened.
• Implement focused diplomatic and government information programs to inform residents and neighbors of forthcoming actions to improve local defense.
• Establish declaratory policy that Russian aggression on NATO territory in the Baltic region will result in closure of the Baltic straits to all Russian commercial maritime traffic.
• Position a composite Swedish and Finnish mechanized battalion battle group and reserve infantry battalion on Fasta.
• Equip these composite forces with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, air defense, and electronic warfare units.
• Prepare the terrain for defense with fortifications and obstacles.
• Strengthen Finnish capabilities to react to and retake occupied territory.
• Conduct detailed contingency planning and regular NATO exercises to practice rapid reinforcement, beginning with BALTOPS 2026.
• Stockpile supplies of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts.
• Strengthen NATO air patrols and presence.
• Establish NATO defensive counter-air patrols if Russian aggression is imminent.

Target 3: Eastern Estonia

Located on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, Estonia shares a 294-km border with Russia (its easternmost city, Narva, is only 136 km from St. Petersburg). Formerly a possession of the Holy Roman Empire and later of the Kingdom of Sweden, Estonia was incorporated into the Russian empire in 1710 following the Great Northern War. Estonia enjoyed brief independence from 1918–1940 before reoccupation by Soviet troops, and it existed as part of the USSR until the end of the Cold War. Between 1945 and 1989, the presence of ethnic Russians in Estonia increased from 3 percent to 39 percent as part of a deliberate “russification” policy.¹⁴⁰ Since independence in 1991, Estonia has grown into a modern functioning democracy with a thriving economy and robust institutions. A member state of both NATO and the EU, Estonia has a population of 1.4 million, 21 percent of whom are ethnic Russians. Most are concentrated in Tallinn, the capital, and in Ida-Viru, Estonia’s northeastern province centered on Narva.

A prime target of Russian influence operations, Estonia has struggled to effectively integrate its ethnic Russian citizens, many of whom hold Russian passports and do not speak Estonian. (A recent constitutional amendment bars ethnic Russians who lack Estonian citizenship from voting.¹⁴¹) Russian intelligence services employ a variety of methods, including clandestine support of political parties, cyberattacks, disinformation spread through social media, vandalism, aggressive propaganda, and orchestrated bomb threat campaigns to affect Estonian social and political life.¹⁴² Although Estonian defense spending exceeds 3 percent, its tiny GDP means that external support is essential for its defense. Its defense forces consist of one active brigade, one reserve brigade, and no tanks or fighter aircraft; its navy consists of a handful of coastal patrol craft. A UK-led NATO battalion battle group based in Tapa is also present as a deterrent. (Allies committed in Madrid in 2022 to station NATO brigades in threatened eastern flank states “where and when required,” but that promise never materialized.¹⁴³) A NATO Air Policing activity is also located at Amari Air Base. Border fortifications are being constructed but will take time. With such a small and poorly equipped military, Estonia depends on NATO’s Article 5 security guarantees to deter possible Russian aggression. That threat is looming; as one expert recently opined, “Russia is thinking seriously about a combat operation in the Baltic region.”¹⁴⁴

In this scenario, Russian paramilitary troops, special operations soldiers, and intelligence officers without markings would enter eastern Estonia to carve out a separatist enclave in support of “oppressed” Russian minorities seeking reincorporation into the Russian Federation.¹⁴⁵

Using this cover story, Russian operatives backed with armed force would occupy the area around Narva and Lake Peipus. “Separatists” would then set up a mock government and vote for reincorporation into the Russian Federation, as seen in the Donbas and Crimea. The operational objectives would be to test NATO’s resolve, to intimidate and destabilize a neighbor and former imperial possession, and to set conditions for possible future aggression against the Baltic states.¹⁴⁶ Estonian authorities would surely act quickly in response to this threat, alerting military and police forces, mobilizing reserves, stiffening cyber defenses, and calling for immediate Article 4 and Article 5 consultations under the Washington Treaty. Should actual fighting break out, which is likely, Russia will swiftly escalate and introduce combat troops under the pretext of assisting ethnic Russians seeking self-determination. Local Estonian active and reserve forces and police might be able to deal with small incursions, but a sophisticated operation backed by Russian GRU and SOF, supported by conventional forces such as the 76th Air Assault Division in nearby Pskov and the 6th CAA in St. Petersburg, would exceed their capabilities. The lone NATO eFP battalion in Estonia is not enough to materially alter the balance of forces.

Here the risks for Russia appear to be relatively low. NATO intervention in strength is not certain; in all probability, close neighbors such as Sweden, Finland, and Latvia would not send ground forces or risk a direct confrontation with Putin. Large Russian forces would not be required, easing logistical requirements, and the prospect of high casualties is remote. A successful Russian operation of this kind would demonstrate the cleavages within NATO and force neighboring Baltic and Nordic states to reassess their relationships with the Russian Federation. Strong measures—above all, the timely deployment of a full-strength NATO heavy brigade combat team with enablers to Estonia—are needed now to deter this threat. In short, there is much Estonia can do for itself, but it will remain vulnerable without significant external support.

Recommendations

• Conduct public diplomacy to reinforce Estonia’s determination to defend its sovereign territory and NATO’s commitment to assist when threatened.
• Implement focused diplomatic and government information programs to inform residents and neighbors of forthcoming actions to improve local defense.
• Establish declaratory policy that Russian aggression on NATO territory in the Baltic region will result in closure of the Baltic straits to all Russian commercial maritime traffic.
• Increase active Estonian forces to divisional strength.
• Equip these forces with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, air defense, and electronic warfare units.
• Solicit increased security assistance from wealthier allies and partners in the form of needed equipment and funding.
• Revise Estonian conscription laws to expand military manpower and extend service commitments.
• Prepare the national territory for defense with fortifications and obstacles.
• Increase in-place NATO forces from battalion to brigade strength with enablers.
• Conduct detailed contingency planning and regular NATO exercises to practice rapid reinforcement.
• Stockpile supplies of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts.
• Strengthen national cyber defense and resilience measures.
• Establish NATO defensive counter-air patrols if Russian aggression is imminent.

Target 4: Gotland

Situated in the middle of the Baltic Sea, the island of Gotland confers major advantages to any regional power in time of war.¹⁴⁷ These include air and maritime dominance over the Baltic Sea and environs; enhanced security for Kaliningrad and the Russian Baltic Fleet; a strike platform and “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to threaten Sweden and the other Nordic powers; and an intelligence-gathering site to extend the reach of Russian sensors in the region. The Swedish government openly recognizes a deteriorating security environment.¹⁴⁸ Russian leaders, citing Swedish efforts to shore up Gotland’s defenses, state publicly that “western actions in Gotland, Bornholm, and other islands in the Baltic Sea threaten Russian national security . . . Russia will soon have no choice but to respond militarily.”¹⁴⁹ For these reasons, Swedish leaders are increasingly concerned that Russia might seize the island in time of crisis or war.¹⁵⁰

Gotland encompasses 3,200 square kilometers and lies 224 km from Stockholm and 345 km from Kaliningrad. A major Hanseatic trading emporium in medieval times, the island was ceded to Sweden from Denmark-Norway in 1645 and was briefly occupied by Russian troops in 1808 during the Napoleonic Wars. Gotland has sixty-one thousand inhabitants and its economy is based principally on agriculture and tourism. Its largest municipality is Visby, with twenty-two thousand citizens. The island is largely forested and free of ice year-round, with regular air and ferry service. There is one 2,000-meter airfield suitable for military use.

At the height of the Cold War, the Gotland garrison numbered some twenty-five thousand soldiers.¹⁵¹ Demilitarized in 2004, Gotland gained greater attention as a strategic flashpoint following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Control of the island gives Sweden, and NATO, virtual command of the air and maritime domains in the Baltic Sea, potentially a decisive advantage in times of conflict. In 2017, the Gotland regiment was reconstituted as a mechanized infantry battalion with CV90 infantry fighting vehicles and a company of Leopard 2 tanks.¹⁵² There is also a Home Guard reserve battalion, but no artillery. An air defense battery equipped with a modest array of air defense systems provides limited coverage.¹⁵³

Russian forces in the area are based in Kaliningrad and consist of the Baltic Fleet, a naval infantry brigade, a motor rifle division with supporting units, and strong air defense, anti-ship missile, and aviation formations.¹⁵⁴ The fleet includes one attack submarine, one destroyer, two frigates, fourteen corvettes, and an assortment of smaller patrol craft, minesweepers, landing craft, and support vessels.¹⁵⁵ Some nuclear systems are reportedly based in the exclave.¹⁵⁶ Gotland falls just inside the range of Russian S-400 long-range air defense systems based in Kaliningrad and is well within range of Russian missile systems.

Should Russian leaders decide to confront NATO in the Baltic region, seizure of Gotland is almost imperative, both to deny NATO its strategic advantages and to secure them for Russia itself.¹⁵⁷ For commercial as well as military reasons, control of the Baltic Sea is critical, as 40 percent of Russia’s total energy exports transit the region.¹⁵⁸ This might be attempted as a standalone operation to set conditions for future aggression, or as a supporting effort for larger-scale attacks.

A Russian coup de main against Gotland would, in all probability, avoid the use of conventional motor rifle or tank units. Naval infantry or VDV forces in brigade strength, assisted by the Baltic Fleet and supporting aviation and missile units, would likely conduct the operation with little advance warning.¹⁵⁹ (One battalion of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade at Kaliningrad is trained in airborne operations.) As in other scenarios, Russian SOF would be inserted clandestinely prior to invasion and commercial air and sea platforms might be used to preserve surprise.¹⁶⁰ (Russian ground forces in Kaliningrad would remain in place to defend against possible NATO reprisals.) Sabotage against critical infrastructure, such as the power grid, is likely.¹⁶¹ With surprise, these forces could overwhelm the defenders before Swedish reinforcements from the mainland could arrive. If successful, control of the Baltic Sea would shift from NATO to Russia—a decisive outcome.

To deter such an attack, or to successfully defend should deterrence fail, Sweden should increase its ground defense force on Gotland from battalion to brigade strength; position stronger artillery, air defense, and anti-ship missile units there; rehearse rapid reinforcement with Swedish SOF and the 1st Marine Regiment; conduct annual exercises with potential NATO reinforcements; prepare the terrain for defense with obstacles, mines, and field fortifications; and pre-position supplies and ammunition.¹⁶² Based on intelligence indicators, the Swedish military should be ready to increase air and sea patrols on short notice to provide early warning.

Attacking a major NATO state carries risks, to be sure, but the rewards for Russia are also great—a decisive strategic setback for the Alliance, a punishing blow to Sweden in response to its actions in joining NATO, and the intimidation of neighbor states such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland. Should Russian planners conclude that a coordinated, heavy response from NATO is unlikely, the prospects for a coup de main to seize Gotland could increase greatly.

Effective defense of Gotland, however, is certainly within Sweden’s means and would require strengthening the garrison in the near term. All this will require extensive diplomacy and domestic political work. Unlike the Svalbard and Åland cases, however, there are no treaty impediments or local autonomy considerations. If completed, these preparations can ensure that NATO holds the trump cards in any Baltic crisis.

Recommendations

• Conduct public diplomacy to reinforce Sweden’s determination to defend its sovereign territory and NATO’s commitment to assist when threatened.
• Implement focused diplomatic and government information programs to inform residents and neighbors of forthcoming actions to improve local defense.
• Establish declaratory policy that Russian aggression on NATO territory in the Baltic region will result in closure of the Baltic straits to all Russian commercial maritime traffic.
• Increase Swedish ground forces on Gotland from battalion to brigade strength.
• Incorporate NATO contingents in the Gotland defense force.
• Station a 155-millimeter (mm) self-propelled artillery regiment on Gotland equipped with the Swedish FH77BW L52 “Archer” system.¹⁶³
• Position an air defense battalion on the island equipped with the Swedish Saab MSHORAD system.¹⁶⁴
• Site anti-ship missile units on Gotland equipped with the Swedish RBS15 system.¹⁶⁵
• Conduct detailed contingency planning and rehearse rapid reinforcement through regular exercises, beginning with BALTOPS 2026.
• Pre-position critical supplies.
• Establish obstacles and fortifications on key terrain.
• Establish NATO defensive counter-air patrols if Russian aggression is imminent.

Target 5: Land bridge to Kaliningrad

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian exclave at Kaliningrad has been separated from mainland Russia by some 300 km. As Russia’s only ice-free port in the west and the home anchorage of the Baltic Fleet, it is a critical strategic asset. Supplied overland and by air and sea through NATO territory, and contiguous to powerful Polish forces, Kaliningrad is extremely vulnerable should conflict erupt—especially following Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO. From a geostrategic perspective, this situation is untenable for Russia and, under the right circumstances, a sudden and large-scale strike through Lithuania to link up with the Kaliningrad garrison would yield important and even decisive advantages.

With a population of 2.9 million and a surface area of 65,000 square kilometers, Lithuania borders Latvia to the north, Poland to the south, Belarus to the east, and the Baltic Sea to the west. The largest country in Europe in the fourteenth century, Lithuania occupied Moscow in 1410 as part of the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth in the Livonian War, but was absorbed into the Russian Empire in the late 1700s. Except for a brief period of independence between the world wars and German occupation from 1941–1944, Lithuania was a Russian and later Soviet possession, regaining its independence in 1991 (the United States, however, did not recognize its loss of sovereignty at any time). With modern transportation and industrial infrastructure, Lithuania is a prosperous, stable democracy, a member of the European Union, and a NATO ally. Its terrain is generally forested and rolling, or flat with few large urban centers. The capital, Vilnius, is located only 38 km from the Belorussian border.

Lithuania’s modest defense budget of $2.1 billion supports two regular brigades (one mechanized and one motorized), a reserve brigade, and a number of territorial defense battalions. Current plans call for this force to increase to divisional strength over the next few years.¹⁶⁶ At present, Lithuania has no tanks or fighter aircraft, and no frigates, destroyers, or submarines in its navy. A German-led NATO battalion battle group is forward deployed in Lithuania and Germany has announced plans to increase this force to brigade strength by 2027, though internal political challenges might curtail this initiative.¹⁶⁷ A US tank battalion and artillery battalion, drawn from the “heel-to-toe” rotational heavy brigade deployed to Poland, are also present and headquartered in Pabrade.¹⁶⁸ Swedish and Finnish air, maritime, and special operations forces might operate against Russian forces in the Baltic littorals but would probably not participate in strength on the ground.

Russian leaders make no secret of their desire to reincorporate the Baltic states into the Russian Federation. On multiple occasions, Putin has asserted the right to intervene using military force to “protect” ethnic Russians living abroad, citing the return of the Baltics and other former Russian territories as a matter of “historical justice.”¹⁶⁹ Such talk is no mere rhetoric. Since Putin’s strident presentation at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Russia has invaded Georgia (where Russian troops remain), occupied the Donbas, annexed Crimea, and invaded Ukraine, leading to hundreds of thousands of deaths and the destruction of entire cities.¹⁷⁰

What conditions could entice Putin to contemplate a sudden strike into Lithuania? US disengagement from NATO or withdrawal of troops from Europe, major conflict or tension with China that diverts US resources, an assessment that NATO would not respond, or internal challenges to the Russian regime requiring an external enemy could all factor into a decision to invade. The rise of right-wing, nationalist governments in Europe and a calculation that Russia should strike before NATO can harden its defenses in the Baltic region are also considerations. At least from the Russian perspective, some or all of these might apply in the near term, leading to a risk assessment that the potential gains of the venture outweigh the costs. At present, the war in Ukraine appears to be at a stalemate, with neither side likely to achieve a decisive victory. Should it harden into stasis, Russia can rearm and reequip its armed forces as Putin looks elsewhere in pursuit of his imperial ambitions.

An invasion of Lithuania would probably be conducted by the 1GTA, based in western Russia, with perhaps 7–10 days of strategic warning (probably masked as an exercise). 1GTA consists of two tank divisions, one motor rifle division, an independent motor rifle brigade, and supporting aviation, artillery, air defense, electronic warfare, and other enabling units. An airborne division and special operations (Spetsnaz) brigade would precede the main force. Marshaling in the vicinity of Minsk, the main effort would be a rapid attack across the Lithuanian border with two divisions along improved roads through Vilnius and Kaunas to link up with Kaliningrad, cutting off the Baltic states altogether and preventing NATO reinforcements from entering the region. A supporting effort with one division and one independent brigade would deal with Latvian forces, perhaps in tandem with elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (based in St. Petersburg), pinning down Estonian forces. These attacks would be supported by heavy ballistic missile strikes. The powerful Kaliningrad garrison is a grave concern as it is well postured to attack Lithuanian forces from the rear.¹⁷¹

Together, these forces represent less than 20 percent of Russian force structure, leaving substantial forces for Ukraine and other contingencies. Intense Russian disinformation, subversion, and cyberattacks would complement kinetic operations. Many experts assume that Russian forces will attack from jumping-off positions in Belarus and pass through the 64-mile-wide Suwałki Gap in northeastern Poland, the shortest and most direct path to Kaliningrad.¹⁷² However, that route will ensure that Russian forces take on the Polish Armed Forces, among the best in NATO, with their hundreds of tanks and dozens of fighter aircraft. The alternate route through Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, avoids Polish territory and might well limit Polish participation inside the Baltic states.

Here geography favors Russia. As a virtual satellite state, Belarus is an ideal staging ground for Russian operations against Lithuania. Meaningful NATO reinforcements must come from hundreds of kilometers away and are far from ready (Germany, France, Italy, and the UK cannot deploy a single division to Lithuania in less than 60–90 days—far too slow to affect the outcome). The remaining option is to rely on host nation solutions and in-place NATO forces. This approach will require significant security assistance to the Baltic states and strong support from key allies, but the Baltics themselves must step up first. Although small in population and GDP, they are capable of much more than they are doing now. With a combined population of some 6 million, only twenty-two thousand Baltic citizens are under arms. Most are contract soldiers who serve short tours of duty. Thirty thousand partially trained and equipped reservists are also on the books. In comparison, with a similarly sized population, Finland fielded more than five hundred thousand troops in the 1941 Continuation War. Tiny Latvia fielded a seventy-thousand-man army during its War of Independence in 1919. The Estonian army at the same time fielded eighty thousand. Today, Israel, with a mobilizable population of some 7 million, fields an active army of 170,000 with another 465,000 upon full mobilization.

These examples show that the Baltic states can do much more to increase their own defense potential. Universal conscription of males aged 18–24 for a period of two years, with fair compensation and incentives for those who choose to become career soldiers and officers, would yield an order of magnitude improvement in size and quality and provide the basis for expanding Baltic ground forces at lower cost than expensive professional soldiers.

A reasonable goal is for each of the Baltic states to field one active and one reserve division with enablers such as artillery, air defense, engineer, logistics, electronic warfare, and signal battalions—about 10,000–12,000 soldiers. (Lithuania, with its larger economy and population, should also field an additional independent heavy brigade.) At least one brigade in each division should be a heavy or mechanized formation with one tank and two mechanized battalions. The others should be motorized to allow battlefield mobility. Each brigade should include a direct-support field artillery battalion (ideally self-propelled 155-mm howitzers), air defense battery, engineer company, logistics company, electronic warfare company, reconnaissance company, and signals company. A general-support 155-mm artillery battalion with attached multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battery should be provided at division level. Maneuver units should be liberally supplied with modern drones as well as fire-and-forget anti-tank and man-portable air defense systems. Reserves should be organized to provide combat replacements (recently discharged soldiers are best for this task) as well as territorial defense units to secure critical infrastructure.

These formations should be supported by NATO mechanized or armored brigades in each of the Baltic states, as promised at Madrid in 2022.¹⁷³ Forward defense is critical, as US and UK naval units will likely not operate inside the Baltic Sea and, in the opening stages, NATO airpower will struggle to reduce Russian air defenses and gain air supremacy, making air-to-ground operations and close air support largely unavailable.¹⁷⁴ Poland is the best candidate to provide this brigade for Lithuania, as it is closest, more ready than others, and will be in great peril should Lithuania be overrun. High-altitude air and ballistic missile defense and fighter aviation are all-important and must also come from NATO, as small Baltic defense budgets cannot support them. These enhancements would yield a ground force of thirteen active brigades (seven of which are heavy), adequate to initially defend against the anticipated Russian first echelon—that is, 1GTA—and to impose significant costs on an attacking force. Given the enormous expense and long lead times required, the Baltic states should not attempt to procure fighter aircraft or major surface combatants, which must come from larger NATO allies.

The Russian garrison at Kaliningrad is, of course, a major concern in this scenario as it poses a direct threat to the rear of Lithuanian and NATO forces and to supporting allied air and naval activity. (Much of the garrison was deployed to Ukraine in 2022, where it was badly damaged. It has not yet been reconstituted.¹⁷⁵) Here there are two challenges. The first is to eliminate the air defense threat, which extends for hundreds of kilometers over the operational area, to reduce or nullify NATO air operations.¹⁷⁶ Only a well-executed aerial campaign, mounted in strength and supplemented by land, sea, and air-based missile strikes, can achieve this aim.¹⁷⁷ The second is dealing with Russian ground forces based there.¹⁷⁸ As sovereign Russian territory since 1945, any direct assault on Kaliningrad would probably elicit nuclear threats from Moscow, but actual use is problematic. The solution is likely a Polish-led operation to either mask or defeat the Kaliningrad garrison, in concert with strong NATO air operations to degrade the air defense threat, with or without an actual takeover.¹⁷⁹ In this way, Lithuanian and forward-deployed NATO forces are left free to confront attacking Russian forces at the border.

While the Baltic states can certainly field larger forces demographically, they will need help financially from wealthier allies such as the United States, Germany, France, the UK, and Italy (these contributions can, and should, be counted against NATO defense spending goals).¹⁸⁰ There are other innovative ways to help. For example, the US Army maintains a large stockpile of excess equipment—including M1A1 tanks, M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, and many other items—in storage.¹⁸¹ With minor refurbishment, some can be quickly returned to full operational status and transferred to the Baltic states as excess defense articles through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).¹⁸² For the first few years, US contract advisers can be provided to train new crews on maintenance and operations. Sustained funding would be required to ensure a regular pipeline of spare parts and ammunition.

These steps will go far to improve the ability of the Baltic states to defend themselves, but more is required. Like West Germany during the Cold War, the Baltic states should organize the national territory for defense. This means pre-chambering key bridges and overpasses for demolition; stockpiling munitions and developing plans to emplace minefields in key locations in accordance with a national obstacle plan; hardening command posts and logistics storage areas; constructing field fortifications; and preparing anti-tank obstacles along avenues of approach.¹⁸³ Civil defense preparations such as stockpiling food and medical supplies, potable water, oil, and natural gas will be needed. Such measures need not unduly disrupt civilian life, but they will go far to enhance deterrence and defense.

The existing solution is the NATO Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC-NE), a German-Polish-Danish formation located in Szczecin, Poland, on the Oder River near the German border. However, MNC-E is separated geographically from the area of operations (it is 900 km from Szczecin to the Lithuanian border and more than 1,200 km to Tallinn) and does not currently possess a trained battle staff closely linked to the Baltics. The corps also lacks many of the enablers required. MNC-E can play a vital role in organizing the reception, staging, and onward movement of reinforcing NATO forces in Poland and, with augmentation, can provide a corps-level headquarters to command Polish forces should Poland itself be attacked.

To provide C2 for Baltic ground forces, a Baltic corps headquarters with NATO-trained Baltic commanders and staff officers and NATO augmentees is probably the best solution. This formation should be commanded by a Lithuanian lieutenant general with a two-star deputy and chief of staff, respectively, from Estonia and Latvia. Enablers are essential and should include corps artillery, air defense, engineer, signal, logistics, medical, intelligence, and electronic warfare units. Importing one of NATO’s many lower-readiness corps headquarters is not a realistic option.

Recommendations

• Conduct public diplomacy to reinforce Lithuania’s determination to defend its sovereign territory and NATO’s commitment to assist when threatened; state clearly that if attacked, Kaliningrad will not enjoy sanctuary if Russia attacks a NATO ally.
• Establish declaratory policy that Russian aggression on NATO territory in the Baltic region will result in closure of the Baltic straits to all Russian commercial maritime traffic.
• Increase active and reserve Baltic forces to divisional strength.
• Equip these forces with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, air defense, and electronic warfare units.
• Establish a combined Baltic corps headquarters with NATO advisers and appropriate enablers.
• Solicit increased security assistance from wealthier allies and partners in the form of needed equipment and funding.
• Revise Baltic conscription laws to expand military manpower and extend service commitments.
• Prepare the national territory for defense with fortifications and obstacles.
• Increase in-place NATO forces from battalion to brigade strength with enablers.
• Conduct detailed contingency planning and rehearsals, along with regular NATO exercises, to practice rapid reinforcement, with emphasis on Polish participation.
• Stockpile supplies of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts.
• Strengthen Baltic naval establishments with anti-ship missiles and coastal patrol craft.
• Strengthen national cyber defense and resilience measures.
• Establish NATO defensive counter-air patrols if Russian aggression is imminent.
• Coordinate with NATO on measures to deal with Kaliningrad in time of war.

Observations

The foregoing discussion suggests that, while steps are being taken to strengthen deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic region, much remains to be done.¹⁸⁴ Current trends indicate a reduced US presence in Europe, which must embolden Putin as he considers next steps in executing a broader agenda to reincorporate former Russian imperial territories, fracture NATO and the EU, position Russia as a world power, and improve Russia’s geostrategic posture.¹⁸⁵ The Nordic-Baltic region is a high priority for Russian planners for several reasons: its prosperous democracies present a deadly threat to Putin’s regime as thriving examples of what the Russian people might aspire to without Putin; gaining Russian possession would add strategic depth that is now lacking, particularly with respect to high-value locations like the Kola Peninsula, St. Petersburg, and Kaliningrad; successful military operations offer opportunities to damage or collapse the NATO Alliance at lower risk than direct confrontation with the major powers; and the prospect of reincorporating former territories can, from the Russian perspective, only enhance the stability of the regime and Russia’s standing as a world power.¹⁸⁶

One area that deserves special mention is the advent of drones—unmanned or uncrewed air and maritime vehicles. As the conflict in Ukraine clearly demonstrates, they have come to dominate the battlefield. From large weapons that can strike over hundreds of kilometers with large payloads, to small commercial drones that can be used to attack individual soldiers, drones are superseding, though not replacing, other forms of combat power.¹⁸⁷

As technology advances at speed, microprocessors become both smaller and more powerful, increasing range, accuracy, explosive power and endurance, and doing so at lower cost. Both Ukraine and Russia employ, and lose, tens of thousands of drones per month.¹⁸⁸ Their prolific use enables dynamic, real-time targeting and situational awareness to a degree unknown before. Very soon, autonomous drone swarms that can acquire and attack targets without operator control (and therefore downlinks that can be jammed) will appear.¹⁸⁹ They will be used to attack enemy targets and to counter enemy drones, as well as for persistent surveillance.¹⁹⁰ To cope with this emerging reality, all NATO allies—but particularly those most threatened—must embrace drone and counter-drone warfare as a matter of urgency. That means fielding capable electronic warfare units in all tactical formations; acquiring commercial, off-the-shelf unmanned platforms at scale and integrating them into training and doctrine programs; investing in cutting-edge technology to stay abreast of rapid advances in capability; and fostering organizational cultures that can support and exploit these extraordinary changes. In so doing, allies should avoid the trap of buying large, costly platforms in favor of cheaper, more readily available, easier to replace systems that can be employed by the average soldier.¹⁹¹

This study identifies numerous shortfalls, such as air and ballistic missile defense, lack of reserves, low readiness, inadequate force structure, and others. At the Alliance level, one capability is glaring for its absence: the lack of a genuinely high-readiness, air-transportable combat force that can project meaningful combat power to threatened areas on short notice. Through 2002, that force existed in the form of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force or AMF, a formation manned by fourteen troop-contributing nations commanded by a NATO major general and battle staff. Built primarily around parachute battalion battlegroups from major allies such as the United States, France, the UK, Germany, and Italy, the AMF included light artillery, antitank, engineer, and air defense units and could deploy with as little as 48–72 hours’ notice. The intent was to provide a credible force that could move rapidly to threatened areas to demonstrate Alliance resolve. As these units still exist in many NATO countries, maintained at high readiness and able to move quickly using national air transport, it makes sense to recreate the AMF to provide rapid response options for SACEUR that are now lacking. Such a force could play a major role in all of the scenarios addressed in this study.¹⁹²

Relatedly, the current NATO command structure is also not optimized for today’s threat environment and invites revision. At present Svalbard is in Joint Force Command (JFC) Norfolk’s area of responsibility (AOR). Located more than 6,000 km away in Virginia and commanded by a US three-star admiral, JFC Norfolk is primarily a maritime headquarters whose chief responsibility is securing the sea lanes of communication in the North Atlantic. A better solution would be to establish a “JFC North” command under a Swedish or Finnish four-star, perhaps supported in this scenario by NATO’s Maritime Command, with responsibility for the Nordic region. Similarly, scenarios two through five fall under JFC Brunssum, located in the Netherlands and also far from the scene. Commanded by a German or Italian four-star, JFC Brunssum lacks a fully manned battle staff and is commanded by an officer whose parent nation would not provide the bulk of the forces needed to resist Russian aggression. A more optimal arrangement is to establish a “JFC East” in Poland—perhaps in Szczecin—under a Polish four-star. Ideally, for all scenarios the NATO command structure should align with the principles of geographic proximity (to ensure a fuller understanding of local conditions), preponderance of force, and national sensitivities.¹⁹³ These commands should be fully staffed with officers with strong expertise in the region.

Summary

Future Russian military operations in the Baltic and Nordic regions are not certain but could well occur in the near to medium term, given recent examples of Russian aggression and repeated Russian claims to former and disputed territories. The prospect of US withdrawal or disengagement from Europe can only serve to encourage such aggression. Russian leaders have made clear that they consider the war in Ukraine to be a conflict with NATO and the West, and that they aspire to recover former Russian lands.¹⁹⁴ NATO and host nation planners and leaders should prepare accordingly to deter and, if necessary, defend these areas to preclude escalation and preserve NATO solidarity and cohesion, as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. These measures should assume limited US participation. Should certain allies block an effective Alliance response based on Article 5, contingency planning for coalition-based responses is prudent. The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, which includes the Nordic and Baltic countries as well as the Netherlands, is one example.¹⁹⁵

The steps described herein are well within the capabilities of NATO allies. Essential factors are a shared understanding of the threat and the political will to deter or counter Russian aggression. In the recent past, Russia has demonstrated repeatedly that perceived weakness invites aggression. Accordingly, this project is intended to provide specific, realistic, and practical options for policy and military planners to deter potential Russian aggression against NATO members in the Nordic and Baltic regions. The danger is immediate and real, and effective solutions are urgent and imperative.

The author acknowledges review and comment from the following experts in the preparation of this study:

Field Marshal Lord Richards; Field Marshal Lord Houghton; General Phil Breedlove; Admiral Jamie Foggo; General Sir James Everard; Ambassador Doug Lute; Ambassador Sandy Vershbow; Frank Kramer; Ian Brzezinski; Ambassador Tomasz Szatkowski;  Professor Sir Hew Strachan; Giedrimas Jeglinskas MP; Karolis Aleksa; Vaidotas Urbelis; Janne Kuusela; Major General Pekka Toveri; Rasmus Hindren; Fredrik Lindvall; Kate Hansen Bundt; Marius Endsjø; Dr Hans Binnendijk; Dr. Fiona Hill; Nina Borgen; Vice Admiral Sir Martin Connell; Lieutenant General Arne Dalhaug; Lieutenant General Rick Waddell; Lieutenant General Ben Hodges; Lieutenant General Michel Yakovleff; Lieutenant General Sir Nick Borton; Air Marshal Sir Chris Harper; Liis Mure; Steve Shapiro Esq.; Professor S. Neil MacFarlane; Major General Gordon Davis; Brigadier General Peter Zwack; Air Commodore Carl Scott; Dr. Tormod Heier; Colonel Seth Johnston

Fellow

Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Europe & Eurasia National Security

Issue Brief Nov 26, 2025

How the Baltic Sea nations have tackled suspicious cable cuts

By Elisabeth Braw

Two places in the world’s oceans see a lot of suspicious maritime behavior: the Baltic Sea, and the waters around Taiwan. Elisabeth Braw reports from the NATO task force charged with protecting the undersea cables and pipelines essential to daily life in Europe, with lessons for Baltic states and Taiwan, too.

Europe & Eurasia Maritime Security

New Atlanticist Aug 6, 2025

Dispatch from the Russian border: The Curonian Spit and the contest of the Baltic Sea

By Justina Budginaite-Froehly

A recent visit to Lithuania’s border with Kaliningrad reveals how the Baltic Sea has become one of Europe’s most contested maritime zones.

Eastern Europe NATO

Issue Brief Jun 5, 2025

Immediate steps that Europe can take to enhance its role in NATO defense

By Franklin D. Kramer, Kristen Taylor

As NATO members gather in the Hague amid uncertainty about US commitment to the continent and concerns about Russia’s military rebuilding, what can European nations do to deter and, if necessary, defeat threats from Moscow?

Europe & Eurasia NATO

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

Learn more

The post Putin’s next move? Five Russian attack scenarios Europe must prepare for appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Swedish government is crafting a new Arctic strategy, updating its 2020 document of the same name and building on its 2024 National Security Strategy. This makes indubitable sense. The last five years have seen significant global developments, including a pandemic, Russia reinvading Ukraine, a European energy transition, increased great-power competition, and the rise of artificial intelligence, unmanned warfare, and other potentially disruptive technologies. The Nordic-Baltic-Arctic region was not immune to changes. Finland and Sweden joined NATO. The Arctic saw greater levels of military activity. The Arctic Council ceased having in-person meetings with Russia. Data showed that the Arctic was warming four times faster than the rest of the planet.¹ Ice melt could lead to increased economic opportunities in northern latitudes but also potential environmental and cultural dislocation for northern inhabitants. Those developments suggest a need for a revised Arctic strategy.

In this issue brief, I explore the contours of a hypothetical Swedish Arctic strategy given today’s circumstances. What follows is a thought experiment on what would be a logically consistent strategy that achieves reasonable objectives given available means, while minimizing risks associated with the strategy. I begin by reviewing existing Swedish government priorities, the domestic constraints facing Sweden’s government, and Swedish capabilities. I then turn to an assessment of the global context as one might perceive it from Stockholm’s perspective. The strategy follows, with a discussion of a prioritized objective, strategic approaches to meet that objective, and how to minimize risks associated with those approaches.

Existing priorities, domestic politics, and Swedish capabilities

Protecting the Arctic is crucial to our national and to our collective security. For Sweden, the Arctic is an area where national and international interests intersect.
—Maria Malmer Stenergard, Sweden’s minister for foreign affairs²

Strategies do not exist in a vacuum. Absent a dramatic exogenous shock, we would expect any future Arctic strategy to be relatively consistent with preexisting policies. For example, Sweden has a long history of supporting the rule of law, which makes sense for a relatively small country seeking to insulate itself from the whims of more powerful neighbors and to enhance its own voice in international affairs. The most recent manifestations of that predilection include Sweden’s advocacy of an EU policy for the Arctic; Sweden’s support for Ukraine in its war against Russian aggression even at the expense of Sweden’s other foreign aid projects; and, in the Arctic context, the importance of the Arctic Council for Arctic governance.³ We would expect any Arctic strategy acceptable to government stakeholders to reinforce, or at least not undercut, those core initiatives.

This is particularly true for identified national interests. Sweden released a National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2024. The vital interests listed in the Swedish NSS fell naturally into three categories: security, which includes the protection of Sweden’s sovereignty, independence, freedom of action, and allied defense; a functional, resilient society; and support of Swedish values, including democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of rights. Limited interests listed in the NSS included a rules-based, democratic, connected, and united Europe and the United States, robust domestic safety, and multifaceted resiliency. I would not expect the new Arctic strategy to diverge substantially from this characterization.

Relative consistency is also reinforced by Sweden’s government structure. Sweden is a parliamentary democracy with a tradition of consensual policies promulgated by coalition governments. On the security front, Sweden uses periodic Defense Commissions to get cross-party buy-in for multiyear budgets and long-term defense initiatives. This helps insulate foreign and security policy from changes in government coalitions. (The same might not be true for domestic policy initiatives, which are often the battlefield over which elections are fought.) Cross-party agreement in the Riksdag, Sweden’s parliament, is yet another reason why we would expect relative continuity between documents across time, including the forthcoming Arctic strategy.

Capabilities also matter. Strategies with overly ambitious goals relative to available capabilities suffer from the classic ends-means mismatch. Adequate capabilities are vital for determining the feasibility and sustainability of any strategy. Sweden has respectable capabilities for a country of 10.6 million people but is by no means a European great power.

On the diplomatic front, Sweden’s foreign service has approximately 2,700 employees, of whom eight hundred are based in Stockholm while five hundred work abroad in Sweden’s one hundred or so international missions, supported by fourteen hundred local staff.⁴ Sweden has embassies in all Arctic nations as well as in Brussels. Sweden has a dedicated Arctic ambassador portfolio handling circumpolar issues. These capabilities give Sweden a voice in Arctic developments.

In terms of gathering and processing information, Sweden has three main intelligence entities. The Swedish Security Service (SAPO) employs roughly 1,500 people focused on counterterrorism and counterintelligence. The nine-hundred-person National Defense Radio Establishment (FRA) is focused on signals intelligence collection and has a very good reputation. Finally, the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) collects and analyzes military and security information. In addition to these formal intelligence agencies, the nine-hundred-person Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) is a Swedish government resource capable of intelligence analysis, though that is not its sole purpose. Finally, Sweden is in the process of creating a new civilian foreign intelligence agency to complement and build upon existing intelligence capabilities.⁵

Sweden is expanding its relatively small military. The Swedes maintain a very capable air force, are modernizing their navy, and have a relatively robust defense industry (dominated by Saab and BAE Systems) whose growth is a government priority. They have created a new NSC system with a national security advisor, a new Civil Defense Ministry with authorities in emergency preparedness, and a reorganized defense ministry. The Swedish government has dramatically increased the defense budget, tripling it over the last seven years and doubling it within the last four.⁶ It has committed to meeting NATO’s defense spending goals of 3.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for direct spending and an additional 1.5 percent for infrastructure spending, as specified in the July 2025 NATO Summit communique. As part of that effort, the Swedish army will create two northern mechanized brigades, each with a motorized rifle battalion, and will also acquire up to four frigates for service beyond the Baltic Sea.⁷ Sweden has volunteered to lead NATO’s Forward Land Force in northern Finland. Sweden’s defense efforts are bolstered by comprehensive defense planning—called Total Defence—that includes roles for the Swedish population writ large and Sweden’s private sector in the event of war, as well as a renewed emphasis on societal resilience.

Sweden has the largest economy of the Nordic states. It has a low national debt and ranks high in competitiveness indexes.⁸ Sweden is a member of the EU, giving it access to the continental market. The economy is highly dependent on trade through the Baltic Sea. Sweden’s total imports and exports represent roughly $400 billion in economic activity, with Germany, Norway, and Denmark its largest trading partners.⁹ The Swedes fear depopulation and economic stagnation in their northern regions and have attempted to build a green northern economy to attract workers, with mixed success.¹⁰ The positives include the Esrange space launch facility and the LKAB iron ore mine, both outside Kiruna. The Northvolt battery initiative did not fare as well, filing for bankruptcy in early 2025. That said, Sweden has a reputation as a low-corruption, high-wealth, stable trading partner with an innovative economy.

The international context

For many years, the Arctic region was seen as a peaceful zone of cooperation. That era ended with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Security policy now plays a greater role in Arctic affairs than it did before 2022. That is the main reason why the Swedish Government will present a new, updated Arctic strategy next spring.
—Maria Malmer Stenergard¹¹

To have any chance of success, strategies must account for the current and future international context. Swedish foreign policy has been dominated by four large events. The first was the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. This created a sea change in Swedish rhetoric and policy toward Russia. No longer was Russia portrayed as a potential partner. Instead, successive Swedish governments recognized Russia as posing a significant threat to European stability and Swedish sovereignty. A recognition also emerged that conflict between NATO and Russia would spill into the Nordic-Baltic region and affect Sweden. In reaction to Russian aggression, Sweden would negotiate new defense partnership agreements with Finland, with all of Sweden’s Nordic neighbors, and with the United States; develop and participate in large-scale military exercises against possible Russian attack; reactivate its military conscription program; station a larger military force on Gotland island in the Baltic Sea; and begin a general rearmament program.

The second event was the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016. Sweden took in more than 160,000 refugees in 2015 alone, equal to 1.6 percent of Sweden’s population. Swedes were overwhelmed by the sheer volume, leading the government to close the border with Denmark in 2016 and dramatically tighten asylum laws. The refugee situation and growing youth violence led to a crisis in Swedish governance. The influx undermined the left-leaning governing coalition’s popularity while support grew for the nationalist Sweden Democrats party. Prime Minister Stefan Lofven of the Social Democrats lost parliamentary confidence in late September 2018. The main political factions—the Red-Greens and the Alliance—then spent four months arguing about who should lead the government.¹² Lofven’s Red-Green coalition eventually came out on top but would be replaced in 2022 by a conservative governing coalition led by Ulf Kristersson of the Moderate Party.¹³ Election issues centered around immigration, crime, and electricity prices. The important point was that cross-party unity on external security policy did not necessarily translate to consensus on domestic policy issues.

The third shock was Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Ukraine war focused Sweden’s security policy on the Baltic Sea and Russia’s threat to international order and international law. Government statements painted a grim picture, noting the Russian military threat in the Baltic Sea as well as the threat of Russian-backed gray zone activities.¹⁴ As discussed below, Sweden increased its defense spending in response and abandoned its nonaligned posture by joining NATO. The Arctic Council ceased formal meetings, though working groups continued without their Russian counterparts.

The fourth and final shock is recent changes in US foreign and security policy. Sweden, like the rest of the EU, was hit with steep US tariffs early in President Donald Trump’s second term.¹⁵ Soon after, a Pew global survey noted that 79 percent of Swedish respondents had an unfavorable view of the United States, a dramatic change from the 44-percent unfavorable view in 2024.¹⁶ On the security front, Sweden has been a steadfast supporter of Ukraine and does not share the Trump administration’s desire to end the war quickly if that comes at Ukraine’s expense.¹⁷ The Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy is a clear example of this transatlantic disconnect. It warned, “The Trump Administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the war perched in unstable minority governments, many of which trample on basic principles of democracy to suppress opposition.”¹⁸ The US strategy noted that Europe should take “primary responsibility for its own defense,” with a target date of 2027 for doing so.¹⁹ Together, these initiatives signified that, from a US perspective, European nations including Sweden need to dramatically increase their focus on military security. That shook Europe. EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius exemplified the European reaction: “The question is whether we need to have some kind of additional security guarantees and institutional arrangements in order to be ready—in case Article 5 suddenly is not implemented.”²⁰

Assumptions, objective, strategic approaches, and risks

With all this as background, what might a prudent Swedish Arctic strategy entail? It cannot veer too far from the priorities listed in the 2024 Swedish NSS or undermine any cross-party defense agreements in the Riksdag. It must be capable of being implemented with somewhat limited means and in a parliamentary election year. It needs to account for a revanchist, aggressive Russia and do so without significant US assistance. And it needs to be consistent with longstanding Swedish principles, including the rule of law, the critical nature of the EU, and the usefulness of forums like the Arctic Council.

Assumptions: Any strategy requires assumptions. A first assumption is that this is a short-term strategy for the next four years, rather than Sweden’s strategy in perpetuity. I assume that the strategy will focus on the European Arctic rather than the circumpolar Arctic, given Sweden’s limited means. As noted in the earlier context section, I assume regional officials realize that the Nordic-Baltic-Arctic region is a military operating environment with the potential for spillover from one part of the region to another. I assume that Russia will continue to represent a threat to regional peace and stability for the duration of the strategy, and that China is not a direct threat to Sweden’s economy or security—or more broadly, to regional governance by the European Arctic nations, at least for the next four years.²¹ I further assume that the United States will prioritize the Western Hemisphere and East Asia over Europe, consistent with its NSS. I assume that the EU will remain unified in the face of US tariffs. I further assume a continuation of the Russia-Ukraine war, and that Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Nordic and Baltic states will continue to support Ukraine. Finally, I assume that NATO faces an uncertain future given emerging US policies.²²

Objective and approaches: The strategy’s overall objective is to deter Russian aggression in the European Arctic. Achieving that objective requires a deterrence-by-denial approach toward Russia and a persuasion and inducement approach toward European allies that are concerned about the Russian threat.

Deterrence by denial requires developing the capabilities to deny an adversary the ability to achieve its objectives and signal to the adversary that one has those capabilities. From a military security perspective, that will require Sweden to improve its unilateral defense capabilities, especially in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic warfare, air and drone defenses, distributed operations by small units, and unmanned systems, above levels in current plans. Sweden is taking steps in that direction, with the Riksdag borrowing $31 billion to fund increased defense spending and dramatically speeding up defense acquisition programs.²³ According to Defense Minister Pål Jonson in October: “The Government is now taking steps to rapidly operationalize anti-drone capabilities and increase the availability of our combat aircraft. There is a significant need for new anti-drone capabilities, and we are shortening lead times by eight years. This will result in increased safety and security for the Swedish Armed Forces and for Sweden.”²⁴

Unilateral capabilities are important signals to allies and adversaries alike, but they will be insufficient to deter a much larger adversary like Russia. Sweden must integrate more closely with its regional neighbors, particularly as a hedge against NATO’s uncertain future. Sweden should deepen its already excellent air force integration with Norway and Finland, and should consider adding Denmark to the mix. Sweden should consider proposing an explicit naval division of labor across the region, with Norway focused on the eastern Atlantic and Barents Sea, and Sweden and Germany focused on the Baltic Sea in joint operations that build on NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry. Finland, Sweden, and Norway should consider dual-hatting the Forward Land Force in northern Finland as both a NATO command and a mini-multilateral force outside of NATO, and should expand it beyond a brigade size. In addition, the three countries should partner to diversify and standardize the rail lines connecting Finnish Lapland to Swedish Lapland and Norrbotten, and Norway’s Finnmark, Nordland, and Troms regions. To keep the US and Canadian militaries involved in the European Arctic, if only tangentially, Sweden should continue to support the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the Arctic Security Policy Roundtable. Finally, Sweden could take a larger role in efforts to integrate Total Defence and societal resilience both vertically within Sweden and horizontally across northern counties in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. This initiative would build on existing coordination efforts through more frequent exercises, first responder cross-training, and trilateral actions to protect critical infrastructure.²⁵ Combined, these actions would signal to Russia that overt military or gray zone aggression in northern latitudes is doomed to fail.

These actions are not without costs and risks. A unilateral military buildup and increased multilateral operations and planning will require significant funds, likely above and beyond current budgets. The same holds true for improved rail infrastructure and multilateral operations. The stakes involved in the current moment, however, would seem to justify such additional expenditures. Moreover, these actions are consistent with current trends in terms of Sweden’s defense spending, focus on Total Defence, and need to keep trade routes open for continued economic viability.

In terms of risks, strategy is interactive. These actions could lead to a security dilemma in which Russia perceives Nordic defensive actions as offensive in nature and shifts its aggressive activities north. The counterargument, of course, is that Russia preys on weakness, so Swedish half measures would invite aggression, whereas a defensive buildup and visible societal resilience initiatives could forestall that aggression. Russia could respond by focusing its attention on a particular Nordic-Baltic-Arctic country, seeking to intimidate that target into inaction or neutrality. That risk can be countered with the strategy’s second line of effort.

Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic-Arctic region can only succeed if allies signal their unified willingness to resist Russian aggression. Here, Sweden could position itself as a key interlocutor between the Nordic north and the rest of Europe through a combination of persuasion and inducements. The persuasive line of effort would see Sweden as a convening authority, facilitated by Sweden’s geographic location and its reputation for supporting multilateralism, international institutions like the EU and the Arctic Council, and the rule of law, as well as Sweden’s openness to non-Arctic countries playing a constructive role in the Arctic. It would also see Sweden taking a larger role in publicizing Russian gray zone activities and threats to the EU project. Sweden’s diplomatic presence across the Arctic and a willingness to declassify SAPO, FRA, and MUST intelligence analyses could facilitate regional coordination and broad-based public support for such coordination. Finally, the persuasive approach would see Sweden taking a leadership role in deepening classified intelligence sharing with likeminded governments.

Inducements could be used to further unify Western signals aimed at Russia. This might include larger, long-term contracts to Nordic defense industries to speed up procurement. This would improve Nordic interoperability and military integration, which sends a powerful signal to any aggressor.²⁶ Inducements could include accelerating the construction of the LKAB critical mineral refining facility in Luleå and then offering refined products at below-market rates to countries taking an active role in deterrence-by-denial efforts in the north. Sweden could also offer to work with Norway on space launch and satellite management, as partners rather than competitors.

There are, of course, costs and risks for persuasion and inducements. This strategy calls on Sweden to focus more on the European theater and perhaps less on global issues. That comes as an opportunity cost and could potentially weaken Sweden’s reputation as a provider of international aid. Such a shift is justified, however, when we look at the Swedish NSS’s prioritization of interests. Inducements always cost money. Larger defense contracts, building a critical minerals processing facility, and expanding space launch are no exceptions. Again, the needs of the moment arguably necessitate such expenditures. Consensus already exists in the Riksdag to suspend debt limits and increase defense spending by 18 percent in 2026.²⁷ Convening an off-cycle Defense Commission could provide additional cross-party support to sustain these initiatives. Moreover, Sweden is in a strong debt and fiscal situation, giving it the leeway to increase government outlays as recommended here.²⁸ All this suggests that Sweden’s Arctic strategy could advocate successfully for greater government expenditures, even in an election year.

The largest risk in this portion of the strategy involves trust; trust that Nordic partners will be there for one another in a crisis, will use shared information responsibly, and will not take advantage of each other for short-term gain. Today’s threat environment and preexisting cultural and economic ties across the Nordic region should minimize that risk.

Conclusion

The last five years have witnessed dramatic changes to Sweden’s circumstances. The world suffered a pandemic. Russia is nakedly aggressive, both militarily in Ukraine and via gray zone actions across Europe. Sanctions against Russian energy forced Europe to change its energy portfolio. Drones, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence have changed the character of war. The United States has new foreign policy priorities. And the Arctic is warming much faster than expected.

All this necessitates a new Swedish Arctic strategy. The notional strategy discussed above is heavily weighted toward security, which I believe is appropriate given today’s circumstances. Its goal is to deter Russian aggression in the European Arctic, which it does via two strategic approaches. The theory here is that urgently creating the needed capabilities for a deterrence-by-denial approach, and signaling the Nordic states’ willingness to resist Russian aggression, will lead Russia to reconsider its aggressive intentions. Sweden can improve that willingness through a series of persuasive and inducement actions aimed at its regional partners. The added benefit of these actions is that they prepare Sweden for war should deterrence fail. The strategy is not without costs and risks. Costs are consistent with current Swedish priorities and are bearable given Sweden’s economic power and resources and its tradition of cross-party consensus on security policy. The risks are arguably better, and certainly no worse, than doing nothing.

The time is ripe for a new Swedish Arctic strategy. The ideas put forward here are one possible way of crafting such a document.

David Auerswald is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also professor of security studies at the US National War College in Washington, DC. 

The views expressed here are the author’s own and not those of the National Defense University or any other US government entity.

This issue brief was made possible by support from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Atlantic Council maintains a strict intellectual independence policy for all its projects and publications. The Council requires all donors to agree to the Council maintaining independent control of the content and conclusions of any products resulting from sponsored projects. 

Issue Brief Nov 26, 2025

How the Baltic Sea nations have tackled suspicious cable cuts

By Elisabeth Braw

Two places in the world’s oceans see a lot of suspicious maritime behavior: the Baltic Sea, and the waters around Taiwan. Elisabeth Braw reports from the NATO task force charged with protecting the undersea cables and pipelines essential to daily life in Europe, with lessons for Baltic states and Taiwan, too.

Europe & Eurasia Maritime Security

Issue Brief Dec 23, 2025

Prioritizing Canada’s investment in Arctic infrastructure

By Jason C. Moyer

Canada’s new budget promises a “generational investment” in infrastructure, with a significant amount earmarked for Arctic dual-use infrastructure—improving Canada’s military presence in the north, accessing untapped critical mineral reserves, and offering new economic opportunities. But this is only the beginning of the region’s infrastructure needs.

Energy & Environment Infrastructure Protection

Dispatches Dec 15, 2025

How Europe can strengthen its own defenses and rebalance transatlantic relations

Europe should advance a new security architecture aimed at strengthening its own defense while continuing to cooperate with the United States in areas of mutual interest.

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

Learn more

The post A new Arctic strategy for Sweden appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO in 2024 has completed the Alliance’s northern arc, effectively transforming the Baltic Sea into what is often described as an “allied lake.” Yet the geostrategic gains of the Alliance have not eliminated the region’s exposure to sub-threshold aggression, especially against critical infrastructure in the energy, data, communications, and transportation sectors. As Russia continues to probe NATO’s resolve with hostile actions calibrated to stay below the threshold of armed conflict, the core challenge for Sweden—as a Baltic littoral state and a NATO member—and for the Alliance more broadly is to extend deterrence and defense to the sub-threshold domain. Failing to close this gap risks signaling political hesitation to Russia, which, in turn, might increase the likelihood that hybrid pressure escalates into a conventional conflict.

Geostrategic shifts after recent NATO enlargement

Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO closed the long-standing strategic gap in the Baltic Sea region. With nearly the entire northern coastline—from Norway to the Baltic states—now within NATO’s defense perimeter, only Russia’s Gulf of Finland coastline and the Kaliningrad exclave remain outside of the Alliance’s territory. This shift significantly strengthens NATO’s ability to reinforce the Baltic states and secure vital lines of communication in the entire region. Central to this new posture is Sweden’s Gotland island, whose location at the geographic center of the Baltic Sea gives NATO a decisive position from which to influence regional air and maritime movement and to counter Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, preventing the eastern Baltic from being sealed off militarily.

These strategic gains extend westward to the Danish Straits, the critical maritime chokepoints linking the Baltic and North Seas. With Sweden’s accession, NATO now controls both sides of these passages, enhancing the Alliance’s freedom of maneuver and safeguarding naval reinforcement routes. This consolidated control simultaneously restricts the operational flexibility of Russia’s Baltic Fleet, reinforcing NATO’s dominance across the broader Baltic maritime space.

Sub-threshold aggression in the Baltic Sea region

These geostrategic shifts in the Nordic-Baltic security map favor NATO and were met with an asymmetric response from Russia. Hesitant to use conventional military power against the enlarged Alliance, yet willing to test NATO’s readiness and political cohesion, Russia adapted to operate within the “allied lake” by employing covert hybrid tactics that exploit sub-threshold seams in NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. Russia’s goal is to relativize and downplay the Alliance’s strategic advantage in the Baltic Sea region. Russia bets that its strategy of persistent sub-threshold pressure can convince the Nordic-Baltic societies that NATO is weak, unready, and unwilling to defend its member states, while signaling that Russia can retain the initiative within the so-called “NATO lake.”

Russia’s hybrid toolkit includes, but is not limited to, sabotage against undersea energy, data, and telecommunications cables; recurrent airspace violations using military jets, drones, and meteorological balloons; and massive disruptions to civilian aviation through Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming and spoofing. Russia’s hybrid attacks are designed to exploit the characteristics of the Baltic Sea and its surroundings as a densely networked area, with vital infrastructure such as pipelines, cables, liquified natural gas terminals, ports, and airports connecting the littoral states to form an integrated energy, communications, transportation, and trade hub.

As the sub-threshold contest formally unfolds in a peacetime setting where traditional military superiority offers limited deterrent value, NATO’s geostrategic advantages resulting from the recent enlargement do not seamlessly translate into operational leverage against Russia’s hybrid strategy in the Baltic Sea region.

The Alliance has recognized the problem and has taken steps to improve information sharing, coordination, and situational awareness. This is demonstrated by the recent launch of the Baltic Sentry maritime and Eastern Sentry multi-domain activities, the creation of a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the establishment of a Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure within NATO’s Maritime Command in Northwood, United Kingdom. Despite progress, NATO still lacks a comprehensive sub-threshold deterrence and defense architecture that would enable swift responses to hybrid attacks and also serve to deter future disruptions.

Challenges with sub-threshold aggression

Sub-threshold attacks are designed to blur the lines between peacetime incidents and deliberate hostile actions, complicating the ability of NATO and littoral states to calibrate their responses. It is a combination of structural, legal, political, and technical constraints that create the gray zones that Russia exploits.

Sabotage of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea almost always occurs in environments where determining responsibility is slow, uncertain, and highly contestable. Underwater pipelines and data cables lie in complex maritime traffic zones where accidental damage can look nearly identical to deliberate interference, making attribution analysis lengthy and often inconclusive. Russia also relies on commercial vessels and proxy actors—mainly from its shadow fleet—to launch hybrid operations, as seen recently in sabotage incidents against undersea energy infrastructure, and as suspected in some cases of drone sightings near European airports.

The timing, political context, and type of attacks clearly point to Russia as the mastermind behind them. But because Moscow deliberately sustains this activity below the threshold of open conflict, allies lack the definitive evidence and legal grounding required for a conventional collective response. This creates a cycle of operational hesitation in which Western governments know who is responsible but cannot act decisively without risking escalation, undermining international law, or generating political divisions among NATO capitals. This ambiguity is precisely what Russia seeks to exploit.

Much of the critical infrastructure that has been targeted by sabotage includes undersea pipelines and cables that lie in international waters or exclusive economic zones (EEZ), where states have limited enforcement authority and ambiguous rights to interdict suspicious vessels. Russia conducts hybrid attacks through civilian-flagged or dual-use vessels, exploiting legal regimes that protect freedom of navigation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and constrain states from boarding or detaining ships without incontrovertible evidence. Despite these legal constraints, Finland has set a significant precedent by boarding the Cook Islands-flagged tanker Eagle S, which had damaged the Estlink 2 power cable connecting Estonia and Finland. Although this did not directly target Russia as the mastermind behind the attack, it at least had ramifications for the proxies executing its plans.

Furthermore, there is an acute issue with multi-actor and inter-agency coordination, which is crucial for countering hybrid threats. In addition to running through several EEZs and international waters, resulting in a single hybrid attack affecting several countries, critical infrastructure is often civilian and privately owned, further expanding the number of actors to consult in the event of an attack. As armed forces, coast guards, intelligence agencies, and private operators act under different mandates, gaps emerge in who can respond, when, and under what legal justification.

Finally, there is a significant technological challenge. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has accelerated its ability to combine inexpensive technologies—unmanned systems, electronic warfare tools, and simple disruptive devices—with covert tactics to generate asymmetric, high-cost effects for Baltic Sea littoral states. Europe is developing cost-effective countermeasures, but these capabilities still lack scale and, more importantly, the defense-industrial and governmental alignment needed to drive rapid operational innovation. Only by testing new technologies early and repeatedly in realistic operating environments can innovators adapt to a fast-evolving threat landscape and stay ahead of Russian tactics rather than merely reacting to them. At the same time, European critical infrastructure often relies on bespoke, complex systems that are difficult to repair quickly and frequently lack redundancy or standardized backup capabilities, making them especially vulnerable to sabotage.

Sweden’s edge in countering hybrid threats

As NATO adapts to this nontraditional security environment, Sweden offers several unique advantages that position it at the center of the Alliance’s hybrid deterrence and defense architecture. While Sweden’s geography provides strategic depth and operational access to allied armed forces that would greatly benefit the Alliance in wartime, it is Sweden’s institutional, societal, and technological foundations that give it leverage in shaping an effective allied response to hybrid threats evolving in the gray zone between war and peace.

First, Sweden’s deeply institutionalized model of civil-military integration, underpinned by its Total Defence concept, offers NATO a framework for improving cross-sectoral, multi-actor coordination in response to hybrid threats. Through this concept, Sweden integrates its armed forces, government agencies, civilian infrastructure operators, municipalities, private companies, and the population into a single national preparedness system. This is precisely the type of model NATO now needs for the sub-threshold domain, in which deterrence hinges on multi-actor inputs for better situational awareness and cross-domain coordination on responses.

Second, Sweden’s advanced, technologically sophisticated armed forces are well designed to operate effectively in environments most prone to hybrid pressure. The Swedish Navy’s shallow-water expertise and underwater domain awareness platforms are uniquely adapted to the Baltic Sea’s complex environment, making Sweden one of NATO’s most capable members for monitoring seabed infrastructure and detecting anomalous maritime activity. Similarly, the Swedish Air Force—with its advanced Gripen fleet, dispersed basing model, surveillance systems, and deep interoperability with other Nordic nations—provides NATO with a regionally integrated situational awareness model that can identify anomalies early and shorten the decision window for response.

Beyond operational capabilities, Sweden’s well-established defense industry and research ecosystem have the potential to give the Alliance a technological advantage in sub-threshold competition. From innovations in integrated surveillance systems to advanced unmanned platforms and cutting-edge electronic warfare solutions, Sweden brings industrial depth and innovation capacity that can directly support NATO’s emerging initiatives on seabed security, autonomous systems, and contested electromagnetic environments.

Third, Sweden’s regional integration with other Nordic and Baltic states creates a multiplier effect for sub-threshold deterrence and defense. Sweden participates in the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) format, the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) group, and numerous trilateral and bilateral arrangements with Finland, Norway, Denmark, and the Baltic states. These formats enable intelligence sharing, coordinated crisis procedure, surveillance, and cross-border military support. The combined effect of these formats is a resilient, interoperable, and politically agile security ecosystem in which hybrid aggression against one state is more likely to be detected, shared, interpreted correctly, and met with a coordinated response.

Finally, Sweden’s political credibility and strategic culture give it influence within NATO’s internal debates on how to deter hybrid threats effectively. Sweden has long prioritized resilience, whole-of-society readiness, and the defense of critical infrastructure as core pillars of national security. As NATO strives to articulate clearer thresholds for hybrid aggression and to improve coordination between civilian and military domains, Sweden can help the Alliance integrate resilience, societal endurance, infrastructure protection, and rapid attribution mechanisms into its broader deterrence and defense model.

Steps forward for Sweden and NATO

As hybrid aggression becomes an increasingly central feature of Russia’s strategy in the Baltic Sea region, Sweden and NATO must adopt a forward-leaning posture that closes the current gaps between NATO’s geostrategic advantages and its sub-threshold operational vulnerabilities. In this area, Sweden and NATO should pursue a dual-track approach: strengthening the capacity to respond rapidly and effectively to hybrid attacks when they occur, while building a credible, Alliance-wide deterrent that raises the political and operational costs of sub-threshold aggression before it occurs. The following recommendations outline priorities for Sweden and NATO as they consolidate an effective hybrid deterrence and defense architecture in the Baltic Sea region.

Measures to strengthen the responses to hybrid attacks

1. Increase pressure on Russia’s shadow fleet.
   
   Sweden should work with the European Union (EU) and regional groups to expand the list of sanctioned shadow fleet vessels, blocking their access to services and ports. Sweden, along with other Baltic littoral states, should argue that vessels that are improperly insured or flying under false flags do not have the right of free navigation under UNCLOS. Such vessels can be denied passage near critical infrastructure sites and can be boarded for inspections.
   
2. Create a Nordic-Baltic interagency hybrid-attribution cell.
   
   Sweden could lead efforts to fuse intelligence, maritime surveillance, cyber forensics, and private-sector reporting on suspicious activities close to critical infrastructure sites. The goal is to shorten the time between an incident and a coordinated response. This cell should promote a more flexible interpretation of attribution: when identifying the ultimate chain of command behind an attack is impossible within relevant timelines, NATO and the EU should adopt the principle that proxies can be targeted with diplomatic, legal, or economic consequences. This would help erode the network of intermediaries willing to take risks on behalf of state actors.
   
3. Apply Ukraine’s lessons on operational innovation.
   
   Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine shows that rapid integration of new technologies can shift an adversary’s cost-benefit calculus. Sweden and NATO should establish mechanisms, such as testing corridors along the Baltic littoral, to accelerate the deployment of unmanned systems, counter-UAS (unmanned aerial system) solutions, distributed sensors, and electronic warfare tools. The keys are modularity, adaptability, and cost-effectiveness, rather than high-end technological excellence.
   
4. Enhance redundancy and standardization of critical infrastructure.
   
   Sweden should advocate within the EU for standardized infrastructure, backup systems, and repair capabilities. Europe’s infrastructure is interconnected but technologically fragmented. The EU should establish a standing capability to conduct urgent repairs after sabotage against critical infrastructure. This would shorten response time, reducing Russia’s ability to generate lasting effects through low-cost attacks. Harmonizing standards and repair protocols could significantly reduce downtime and prevent Russia from exploiting single points of failure.
   
5. Expand joint situational awareness and incident response exercises.
   
   Sweden can lead recurring exercises focused on hybrid scenarios such as cable failures, GPS interference, and anomalous vessel activity. Regular rehearsals of multi-agency cooperation improve legal coherence, decision speed, and interagency coordination.

Measures to strengthen deterrence against further sub-threshold aggression

1. Operationalize NATO’s 1.5 percent resilience spending pillar.
   
   NATO should operationalize the new 1.5 percent resilience spending pillar, agreed to during the 2025 The Hague NATO Summit, to build a durable Alliance-wide architecture for sub-threshold defense. NATO should define which projects qualify, how performance should be measured, and which outcomes at the regional and Alliance levels are required for sub-threshold deterrence and defense architecture to merge into the broader NATO defense and capability planning process.
   
2. Support innovation among Baltic-littoral defense tech companies.
   
   Regional companies understand the operational environment better than global contractors. Sweden and NATO should streamline procurement processes and enable rapid field testing, replicating successful Ukrainian models. This would keep NATO ahead of Russian adaptation cycles.
   
3. Impose coordinated consequences on hybrid proxies.
   
   Deterrence in the gray zone requires clear, predictable penalties. NATO members should agree that hybrid attacks—whether carried out by Russian state vessels, intelligence operators, or commercial proxies—will trigger coordinated diplomatic expulsions, maritime inspections, targeted sanctions, or legal action against the companies enabling malign activity.
   
4. Clarify NATO’s hybrid thresholds.
   
   Sweden should advocate for clearer definitions of hostile hybrid acts requiring collective action. Thresholds should consider intent, pattern, and cumulative destabilization, rather than rigid criteria that Russia could exploit.
   
5. Deepen integration with Nordic-Baltic frameworks.
   
   Integration with Nordic and Baltic response frameworks should be deepened. Sweden should leverage NORDEFCO, JEF, and NB8 to build habitual coordination on detection, strategic communications, and consequence management. More coherent regional messaging and synchronized decision-making will increase the credibility of deterrence and limit Russia’s opportunities to isolate or pressure individual states.

Toward a Nordic-Baltic sub-threshold deterrence architecture

The strategic task now facing Sweden and NATO is to convert geostrategic advantage in the Baltic Sea region into operational resilience in the sub-threshold domain. Hybrid threats will remain Russia’s preferred tool in the region for as long as they continue to produce political hesitation and asymmetric effects. Sweden’s accession to NATO offers an opportunity to close this gap by strengthening rapid-response mechanisms and shaping a credible, collective deterrence framework for the sub-threshold domain. By driving operational innovation, improving attribution processes, hardening critical infrastructure, and enabling coordinated regional action, Sweden can help ensure that hybrid aggression in the Baltic Sea produces not operational indecision, but strategic backlash.

Justina Budginaite-Froehly is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Her professional focus is on security and defense-related issues, including defense industrial developments, military mobility, and energy security in Europe.

This issue brief was made possible by support from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Atlantic Council maintains a strict intellectual independence policy for all its projects and publications. The Council requires all donors to agree to the Council maintaining independent control of the content and conclusions of any products resulting from sponsored projects.

Report Jan 2, 2026

The evolution of Latvia’s defense and security policy in resilience building

By Armands Astukevičs and Elīna Vrobļevska

Latvia has embraced a broader concept of national resilience encompassing not only military strength but also the resilience of its society, the continuity of government and essential services during crises, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the cultivation of psychological defense among its populace.

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

Issue Brief Nov 26, 2025

How the Baltic Sea nations have tackled suspicious cable cuts

By Elisabeth Braw

Two places in the world’s oceans see a lot of suspicious maritime behavior: the Baltic Sea, and the waters around Taiwan. Elisabeth Braw reports from the NATO task force charged with protecting the undersea cables and pipelines essential to daily life in Europe, with lessons for Baltic states and Taiwan, too.

Europe & Eurasia Maritime Security

Dispatches Jan 22, 2026

The US is taking action against Russia’s shadow fleet. In the Baltic Sea, Europe should follow suit.

By Justina Budginaite-Froehly

European nations should force Russia’s shadow fleet out of the Baltic Sea and help to reshape the maritime legal order.

Maritime Security Northern Europe

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

Learn more

The post Sweden’s role in countering hybrid threats in the Baltic Sea region appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Under the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the US Marines are set to relocate away from Okinawa, a move that risks undermining deterrence against China.
• With China emboldened and US-Okinawa relations improving, it is time to renegotiate the DPRI.
• Such a renegotiation should focus on providing economic incentives for Okinawa and reorganizing the Japanese and US military footprint on the island.

The US-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), initiated in 2002 and signed in 2006, was designed to reduce the number of US servicemembers stationed on Okinawa for political reasons dating back thirty years or more. The plan now calls for shifting 5,000 Marines and 1,300 dependents from Okinawa to Guam, as well as a lesser number to other Pacific locations, and for building associated infrastructure over the next decade. But the United States only began moving the first tranche of one hundred Marines forces from Okinawa to Guam in December 2024. This move comes at a time when China is accelerating its bid for dominance in the Western Pacific and pressing its claim on Taiwan, which Beijing calls a “core interest.” This realignment undermines deterrence by pulling critical rapid-response forces from the First Island Chain, the first line of major islands running north to south along Asia. Now is the time to revisit the DPRI by providing Okinawa with economic incentives, reaffirming US commitments to its allies and the region, and restructuring the US plan for the Marines’ future force posture in Japan and across the Pacific.

Tension in the Western Pacific remains unabated, as China continues its bid for dominance over the East and South China seas. The People’s Liberation Army Navy controls several key islands and atolls, projecting influence over critical sea lanes. The Chinese Communist Party has clearly stated its intention to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, with Chinese President Xi Jinping tying unification to China’s “national rejuvenation” by 2049. These developments raise pressing questions about the United States’ ability to deter aggression in the near term.

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The importance of Okinawa

Since the end of World War II, the US armed services have maintained a stable and secure network of military bases, stations, and training areas in what would be the most critical area of influence in the event of a future military operation near Taiwan. The US military forces stationed in the First Island Chain, specifically in Japan, extending to Okinawa, are the bulwark of Western power in the Pacific—daily countering malign Chinese influence and deterring potential aggressors such as North Korea. Stand-in forces—small, lethal, mobile units that can operate within contested areas—need to be present there to allow for an effective response in the event of a conflict. If war breaks out, Chinese military planners will need to contend with the risk of intervention from nearby forces from bases and stations such as the Marine Corps camps Foster, Hansen, and Schwab, as well as Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

US forces in Okinawa are known for rapid-response capabilities, demonstrated in major missions such as Operation Tomodachi and typhoon relief efforts in the Philippines and elsewhere. The III Marine Expeditionary Force and its new Marine Littoral Regiments are designed to operate within Chinese missile threat zones and emplace survivable expeditionary advanced bases through dispersion, concealment, and signature management to ensure they can’t be detected. They could delay enemy advances and buy time for US reinforcements as key elements of the stand-in force by holding combatant ships and maneuver elements at risk as the rest of the US military moves into place. Chinese military planners would seek every method to deny or otherwise distance these Marine Corps littoral forces from the immediate vicinity prior to any military operation. Unfortunately, if fully implemented, the DPRI would give Chinese military planners exactly what they want—a removal of US forces from the locations where they would be most essential in a First Island Chain conflict.

The background

The DPRI was put into place in very different political and security environments. Earlier phases of the plan resulted in significant construction of new infrastructure on and off Okinawa to facilitate consolidating, moving, and removing forces to alleviate the perceived burden of hosting elements of the US military. Over the long term, this plan will move certain key US Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam, about 1,500 miles away, or a three-day uncontested ship transit. Today’s political and military context, with an emboldened China, North Korea remaining a threat (albeit quiet for the moment), and improved US-Okinawa relations, demands a reassessment of this plan. According to a 2024 assessment, US military felony crime rates on Okinawa are now far lower than in decades past*, a trend that runs counter to some of the original arguments for relocating US forces. Moving stand-in forces away from the First Island Chain now risks undermining their strategic deterrence at a critical juncture.

A resolution to this dilemma will not be easy. This is mostly due to the long-term commitment to the original DPRI tenets over the past twenty years by both the Japanese and US governments. But the time has come to rework this agreement. With the Pentagon’s willingness to make dramatic changes to long-standing programs and policies, along with the leverage now in place with the Trump administration’s tariff policies, Washington has a window of opportunity to rework old DPRI agreements in a new, substantial way. Both the United States and Japan share an interest in pushing back against Chinese influence in spaces that should be open for international commerce—in accordance with the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration—and ensuring geographic proximity to any potential Chinese move on Taiwan. A solution will likely revolve around three main areas: enhancing incentives for Okinawa, renegotiating new terms with the Japanese government, and reorganizing the Japanese and US military footprint within Okinawa itself.

Renegotiating the DRPI

First, any renegotiation will need to adequately incentivize the people of Okinawa to continue to support the thousands of military servicemembers and their families that they have already supported for decades. Economic incentives will be important, as Okinawa is generally the most economically disadvantaged prefecture in all of Japan. A special dispensation by the US and Japanese governments could recognize Okinawa as a unique status location—which would exempt it from US tariffs—to boost Okinawa’s economic viability nationally and regionally. A reduced-tariff designation could strengthen Okinawa’s tourism sector, which buoys much of the prefecture’s economy. The 2024 Okinawa Prefectural Assembly elections show that economic issues are forefront on the minds of its citizens, as the “All Okinawa” faction, which is traditionally opposed to the US military bases, lost its legislative majority. Additionally, US bases should relax regulations to make it easier for Japanese businesses to operate on base. Making the facilities shared by both the United States and Japan would be one way to accomplish this, as Japanese-owned businesses could operate on a shared facility.

Second, building a foundation to renegotiate terms with the government of Japan will be essential. Academics have shared growing concern within the Japanese government over the United States’ commitment to shared defense, especially nuclear security. US President Donald Trump’s visit to Japan in October was a good start. Now, additional public statements by senior US officials reiterating that Washington is committed to the defense of Japan, including the US nuclear umbrella, and extended deterrence if Japan continues to increase defense spending, could help lay the foundation for a renegotiation of the DPRI. The Japanese government understands the need to continue to bolster defenses in the First Island Chain. In 2024, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force scrambled its jets 464 times in response to Chinese incursions, mostly around southern islands, underlining a clear need for enhanced military response capability.

Third, if done right, reworking the overall laydown of forces in Okinawa could result in more efficient and advantageous basing options for both the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the United States. The US Army may be able to use some of the facilities that were built on Guam for the Marines—the Army has been pushing more presence in the Pacific. It may make sense for the larger, heavier army units to position themselves in the vicinity of the Marianas, which are outside the range of many Chinese missile systems but close enough to push forward at the right time, adding backstop deterrence. While some argue that keeping Marines in the First Island Chain leaves them vulnerable to missile threat, the truth is that maintaining a rapidly disbursable, low-signature force-in-readiness inside Chinese missile range is the exact intent of having a Stand-In Force—to deter adversaries, defend US and allied bases and territory, retain forward staging locations, and give political leaders decision space. Additionally, China must then consider what a strike on bases within Japanese territory would do to galvanize an opposing alliance.

What about Futenma?

Next, the decision to close the still-active Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, based on past crimes committed by US troops and noise concerns, deserves reassessment. Futenma is a superbly capable, safe United Nations-designated airfield with an almost three-thousand-foot runway sixty meters above sea level, and the replacement ocean-front runway under construction at Camp Schwab isn’t nearly as long or capable. All US fixed wing basing operations at Futenma were moved to Iwakuni more than a decade ago during previous DPRI iterations, which means that Futenma is currently a safer, quieter, and underutilized location prime for use in the defense of the First Island Chain. Washington and Tokyo should keep both Futenma and the replacement facility in Schwab, and use Futenma for both US and Japanese forces. Keeping both Futenma and Schwab open would maximize operational flexibility and preserve a vital logistics hub for responses to regional crises. The new nearby US Naval Hospital and University of the Ryukyus medical facility makes Futenma an ideal disaster response hub, as well.

Finally, if some Marines still must be moved from the main island of Okinawa, the US military could work with Japan’s Western Army to increase their presence in other locations in the First Island Chain through exercises or training. One such place might be Yonaguni Island, where a Japan Ground Self-Defense Force base was established in 2016. Yonaguni is the westernmost Japanese island, and on a clear day one can see Taiwan from there. In 2015, island residents voted for a referendum supporting Japanese troops being stationed there. Making Yonaguni part of the special tariff-free zone, along with increased economic benefits from the additional personnel living there, may increase the appeal. Sending Marines to Yonaguni even on a rotational or temporary basis would send an undeniable message of support for Japan, push back against China’s intentions in the South China Sea, and clearly demonstrate US resolve in the region.

The way forward

The current administrations in Tokyo and Washington now have an opportunity to resolve a long-standing challenge in a manner that benefits the United States, Japan, and Okinawa. History will always serve as a guide but should not tie allies’ hands when the security environment has changed so dramatically. Successfully renegotiating the DPRI along these suggested lines would send a strong message of renewed US commitment to Japan and the entire region. With enhanced incentives for Okinawan economic development, a reenergized deterrence policy covering Japan, and a new force laydown across the region, a renegotiated DPRI could contribute to deterrence rather than undermine it.

This article was updated on February 18, 2026, to clarify that the data cited for lower rates of US military crime on Okinawa is for felony crimes as of 2024.

The post The Marine Corps presence in Okinawa is critical to deterring China and North Korea appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The resumption of US-Iran nuclear talks this week does not mean US military action is off the table.
• Iran may push for a short-term deal in which Iran gets rid of its highly enriched uranium for unspecified concessions.
• But in the face of the regime’s brutal massacre of protesters, these talks are likely to disappoint many Iranian protesters.

Following a massive military buildup in the Gulf, US President Donald Trump now appears to be pivoting toward negotiations with Iran. White House envoy Steve Witkoff and the president’s son-in-law Jared Kushner are tentatively scheduled to meet with Iranian officials in Istanbul later this week. The foreign ministers of Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are also expected to attend the summit. At first glance, this seems to indicate that the Trump administration will delay striking Iran, but lots of questions remain. Here are seven things to know about potential Iran nuclear negotiations: 

1. This is not necessarily a clear pivot to diplomacy: Prospective talks don’t mean that Trump won’t strike Iran in the future. Last June, the United States struck Iran’s military sites two days before a new round of nuclear negotiations was scheduled to take place. Perhaps this is once again an elaborate setup to keep Iran off-balance or a chance to seek massive concessions before reverting to strikes if talks fail to achieve the desired outcome. The inclusion of regional foreign ministers indicates that this will likely not be an intimate or technical negotiation.
2. Military risks may outweigh elusive rewards: If this is a pivot away from a potential conflict, Trump has likely determined that his military options aren’t worth the risk. His reported options don’t have a clearly defined objective, probably wouldn’t tangibly help Iranian protesters at this point, and risk unknown regional implications. Perhaps most importantly, the administration has signaled that it doesn’t know what comes next if the regime falls. Uncertainty regarding the longer-term outcome has led many regional partners to actively lobby Trump against the strikes and facilitate a diplomatic off-ramp.
3. There may not be a deal to be made: There are conflicting reports about what negotiations may entail. Last month, Witkoff stated that Iran would need to permanently end enrichment, impose significant constraints on its missile program, and cease support for its proxies. These are probably still the long-term goals, but Trump has been more circumspect, returning to his initial 2025 position that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. As for Iranian leaders, they are continuing their long-standing position that talks should only focus on their nuclear program.
   
   At one point, it appeared that Iran planned to propose handing over its stockpile of 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) to a third party such as Turkey.  Although Iran has since publicly wavered on this point, this is the same concession discussed at the United Nations General Assembly in September to avoid the “snapback” provision of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. The United States and Europe rejected the offer in September. However, if off-loading Iranian HEU is coupled with a continued suspension of Iranian enrichment and restores access for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, it will be a notable achievement. Iran’s HEU is arguably its most significant piece of remaining nuclear leverage, and IAEA access is critical to ensuring that Iran does not covertly attempt a nuclear breakout.
   
   Of course, the specific details of a potential arrangement will be extremely important. We do not know what Iran is asking for in return. Furthermore, the IAEA must be able to account for all 440 kilograms of HEU that it was tracking in advance of the strikes on Iran’s nuclear program in June.
4. Many nations have tried mediating this dispute, with limited success: Turkey is the latest in a long line of well-meaning mediators. In the past few years, Oman, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Switzerland, Norway, France, the E3 (France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), France (by itself), and the European Union have all attempted to facilitate and mediate negotiations between Iran and the United States. In the case of Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s close relationship with Trump is a clear benefit. However, this is not Turkey’s first attempt at mediating the Iran nuclear issue. In 2010, Turkey attempted to engineer a deal around the Tehran Research Reactor that left all sides unsatisfied. Regardless, the fact that Iran continues to insist on a mediator and to avoid direct talks with the United States is a major concern and shows both a lack of Iranian seriousness and an unwillingness to make meaningful concessions.
5. This will not sit well with Iranian protesters: There is no sugarcoating that many Iranian protesters will see talks as a significant disappointment. Trump’s January 2 post offering support and protection to Iranian protesters had a significant impact on the trajectory of the protests, adding fervor and bringing more people to the streets. In the aftermath of Iran’s brutal crackdown on its people, many Iranians expected Trump to deliver a miracle. While this was likely an unreasonable expectation, this scenario has parallels to Hungary in 1956 and Iraq in 1991, where the United States called for the people to rise up but did little, and the protesters were brutally crushed.
6. Negotiations are a short-term win for Iran… Returning to negotiations is undoubtedly a short-term win for Iran. Eric Brewer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative nailed it when he noted: “Not to say that Iran feels safe or confident in its position, but I have to imagine it’s pretty stoked that just a few weeks after massacring thousands of its citizens, the conversation has returned to nuclear diplomacy and the disposition of its highly enriched uranium.”
7. …but do little to impact the Islamic Republic’s long-term trajectory: However, the benefits of negotiations or even a small deal will be temporary and will not address the systemic problems that led to Iranian protests in the first place. The Iranian economy is still in shambles. Iran is still facing an existential water crisis, and Iran’s decades of investment in its nuclear program and axis of resistance are virtually worthless. To address these failures, Iran must radically change its foreign policy and how it interacts with its own people. There is no indication the current regime is willing to do that.

As an analyst who has advocated against negotiating during the protests and warned about the downsides of a strike on Iran, I have mixed emotions about the reported negotiations. I am extremely skeptical about the utility of a military strike on Iran. There are also important nonproliferation benefits that could potentially be gained from a transactional agreement, especially if they come at a low cost in terms of sanctions relief. However, there are significant reasons to be skeptical of a diplomatic breakthrough. Most importantly, the fact that negotiations are coming in the aftermath of a brutal crackdown in which Iran massacred thousands of its people is extremely disconcerting, and there is no avoiding that reality.

The post Seven things to know about the potential for resumed Iran nuclear negotiations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Colombian President Gustavo Petro will meet with US President Donald Trump at the White House on Tuesday amid the most tense period of US-Colombia relations in decades.
• Despite the two presidents’ public disputes, the United States and Colombia have shared interests when it comes to combating drug trafficking in Latin America and ensuring Venezuela’s stability.
• An Oval Office meeting that focuses on these two areas can help put bilateral relations on a better path ahead of the next Colombian president’s inauguration later this year.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s Oval Office visit on February 3 comes on the heels of the tensest year in the US-Colombia relationship in the past three decades. Based on significant policy disagreements and inflamed by the US and Colombian presidents’ affinity for bombastic declarations, the two nations careened from crisis to crisis over the past twelve months.

There have been several notable low points: In January 2025, Petro refused to accept deportees from the United States, only to back down after US President Donald Trump threatened to levy crippling tariffs on Colombia. In September 2025, Petro made an outrageous speech in New York, calling on US troops to ignore Trump’s orders. Trump retaliated by revoking visas from several Colombian officials, including Petro. And in October, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Petro and his family. But all this was just a prelude for an even more dramatic moment—when last month, Trump suggested that the United States might stage military operations inside Colombia, possibly even targeting Petro. For two nations accustomed to close cooperation and a long tradition of defusing disagreements in private, this seemed to be a startling display of how far the two governments had diverged. 

However, that may not be fully accurate. On key issues such as stability in Venezuela and the need to address transnational criminal activity, including illegal migration and drug trafficking, Colombia and the United States appear to agree on the ends they seek, even if they differ on how to reach those ends. The Trump administration obviously favors a more aggressive approach on transnational crime, including the use of military force and restarting the aerial eradication of Colombian coca crops. Petro’s team understands the threat posed by transnational crime but has failed to achieve a negotiated solution. It is in the interests of both nations that Venezuela again become a “normal” nation, a good commercial partner that no longer suffers from such turmoil that it causes millions of its citizens to flee as migrants.

So what would a productive approach to US-Colombian relations look like? Petro has some cards to play when it comes to counternarcotics and Venezuela. With the failure of his Paz Total (Total Peace) strategy, Petro is now willing to use force against illegal armed groups. That needs to be done in the context of a rigorously designed strategy—an approach that the Colombian armed forces are well prepared to develop and execute. And consistent with the long and successful history of bilateral military cooperation, US support could underpin the execution of a serious and effective military effort to push back on illegal armed groups to the benefit of both nations. Petro asking for such help is likely to get a favorable response from Trump.

Additionally, Colombia should want the US effort in Venezuela to be a success and should say so. It appears that the meaning of Trump’s claim that the United States will “run” Venezuela is that Washington has taken control of Caracas’s petroleum industry and is giving nonnegotiable instructions to the Bolivarian regime on issues such as the release of political prisoners, as well as Venezuela’s commercial and security relations with Cuba, Iran, Russia, and China. The ultimate goal, which US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described in his Senate testimony last week, is that Venezuela again become a stable partner in the region. 

Real stability in Venezuela is profoundly in Colombia’s interest. No country has received more Venezuelan migrants than Colombia, so no nation would benefit more from the return of those individuals to their home country. But they will only return to a stable and safe Venezuela. Further, Colombia would benefit economically from trade with a stable Venezuela. In 2008, two-way trade between those two nations peaked at more than seven billion dollars. Colombian exporters will be anxious to recover those markets; Petro would be wise to use this meeting to position Colombian businesses to benefit from these opportunities. 

This meeting could put the bilateral relationship on a better path. Colombia will hold presidential elections this year, and Petro is term-limited. It would be a gift to his successor, who will take office on August 7, as well as to the nation, for Petro to begin the process of recuperating the relationship between two nations that have accomplished so much together over the past quarter-century.

The post To repair US-Colombia ties, Trump and Petro should focus on counternarcotics and Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia is also facing serious problems. Unsustainable Russian military spending constitutes an economic time bomb for the Putin regime. Meanwhile, the Russian military continues to suffer heavy losses in Ukraine while making very limited territorial gains. Despite enjoying the initiative throughout 2025, Russia managed to capture less than one percent of Ukraine.

In order for Russia’s emerging weaknesses to prove decisive, Ukraine may need to sustain the war for longer than some believe is realistic. With this in mind, an increasing number of voices now argue that Ukraine’s allies should compel Kyiv to accept a Kremlin-friendly peace agreement. However, the idea that Kyiv has little choice but to end the war on Russian terms overlooks the importance of Ukraine’s role at the epicenter of a revolution in military affairs that is currently taking place.

After almost four years of full-scale war, Ukraine now leads in the development of inexpensive and highly accurate drones and cruise missiles. By fully embracing this revolution, Ukraine and its allies stand a good chance of regaining the battlefield initiative and obliging Russia to compromise on its objectives.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Historians have long known that the development of warfare is not linear. For long periods of time, weaponry and tactics tend to develop only incrementally. European armies in 1780, for example, looked almost identical to those of 1680. Likewise, little distinguished the medieval forces of 1300 from the armies that fought two centuries earlier.

At specific junctures, however, a confluence of new weapons, tactics, and forms of organization can fundamentally transform how wars are waged. In the late medieval period, a military revolution saw disciplined, salaried infantry displace mounted knights. Then came the early modern military revolution characterized by cannons, star-shaped forts, and oceanic warships. Centuries later, the industrial revolution empowered those states able to master the new technologies of railways, steel artillery, and mass conscription.

Not all military revolutions are the same. Some have led to the introduction of new technologies that only the wealthiest states can afford, while others have seen new military capabilities become more readily available to a wider range of states.

These two trends can clearly be seen in the military history of early modern Europe. In the late fifteenth century, the emergence of bronze artillery and star-shaped fortresses fundamentally changed the nature of war. Bronze cannon meant that armies could demolish castles and city walls in a matter of days rather than mounting lengthy sieges. To counter these new cannons, defenders developed star-shaped fortresses. Both technologies were exceedingly costly and were initially only accessible to a handful of leading powers such as France, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire.

It was a small state that kicked off the next wave of military revolution. This began in 1568 when the Dutch revolted against Imperial Spain. By almost any measure, the rebellious Dutch provinces should have lost. Spain was flush with silver from the Americas and had a far larger population base. Spain was also the indisputable military superpower of the period, having humbled France in the 1551-59 Italian War and crushed the Ottoman navy in 1571.

Initially, the war went as expected, with the Spanish conquering key cities such as Antwerp. However, the Dutch then began innovating. They discovered that the expensive and complex masonry employed in the construction of star-shaped fortresses was superfluous in wartime. Once they realized this, they started mass producing star-shaped fortifications out of earth and timber. Paid laborers or conscripted peasants could now build fortresses, so long as a trained engineer was present to supervise.

Likewise, the Dutch also pioneered casting cannon from iron. In many respects, these iron cannon were inferior to bronze; they weighed more and were prone to bursting. Iron guns, however, cost only one-tenth as much to manufacture. The Dutch used these cheaper cannons to equip larger fleets than the Spanish and to supply their many earthen fortifications with plentiful guns.

Dutch innovation in the late sixteenth century enabled the Netherlands to record one of the greatest military upsets in history. By 1609, they had obliged Spain to sign a truce. In 1648, The Spanish granted the Netherlands full independence. This military revolution did not introduce intrinsically different technologies. Instead, the Dutch developed ways of accessing capabilities that had hitherto only be available to great powers. What we are seeing in Ukraine today is a modern iteration of this dynamic.

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In the modern era, the United States has led the way in another military revolution by pioneering the development and deployment of precision-guided long-range strike weapons. Once again, the cost and complexity of these new weapons meant that only the world’s wealthiest and most technologically capable states could initially embrace this revolution.

Ukraine now stands on the brink of replicating the success of the Dutch more than four centuries ago. As the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion approaches, Ukraine is manufacturing large quantities of attack drones and developing its own cruise missiles, with plans to expand domestic production further. This ambitious objective is realistic, particularly if Ukraine’s allies provide sufficient support.

The conditions that have enabled Ukraine to achieve such innovations are unique in modern history. The existential nature of the war for Ukraine has meant that a vast talent pool of individuals hitherto uninvolved in the arms industry such as software engineers, tech entrepreneurs, and physicists have all embraced the task of developing novel solutions for Ukraine’s defense.

The funding of Ukraine’s war effort, with multiple Ukrainian ministries and foreign partners all financing projects, has created a remarkably pluralistic environment. In other words, entrepreneurs with promising products and potential backers are perpetually in search of one another. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s wartime circumstances have swept away many of the bureaucratic barriers and regulations that typically impede the testing and evaluation of weapons. The upshot is an innovation ecosystem more akin to Silicon Valley that typical military-industrial complexes.

Ukraine’s unique defense sector ecosystem has made it possible to produce an extraordinary number of long-range strike systems with unprecedented cost effectiveness. This is democratizing the long-range weapons technologies first pioneered by the United States in the final decades of the twentieth century. Ukraine’s progress is reminiscent of Dutch achievements in the sixteenth century, when they developed cheaper versions of existing technologies that had shaped Renaissance Europe’s earlier military revolution.

By leaning into this progress, Ukraine’s allies can help the country regain the initiative in the war against Russia. Ukraine currently lacks the resources to fund the production of cruise missiles and drones at the necessary scale, but Ukrainian defense sector companies do have spare capacity to produce more. By financing additional output of drones and missiles in Ukraine, partner countries can help transform the military situation.

Increased volumes of long-range strike weapons can enable a strategically successful campaign with an operational depth stretching hundreds of kilometers behind the front lines. In conditions of modern warfare, infantry and armored units are comparatively brittle and ineffective if they are denied supplies and long-range fire support. Ukraine’s expanding arsenal of deep strike assets provides a plausible means of achieving this, especially if supported with real-time intelligence from the country’s partners.

Ukraine’s long-range strike systems can also be used effectively in tandem with Western sanctions measures to increase the pressure on Russia’s overstretched wartime economy. A combined policy of tightening sanctions on Russian energy exports and escalating Ukrainian strikes on refineries and pipelines can seriously damage the strategically crucial Russian oil and gas industry.

The military revolution that Ukraine is currently leading has already succeeded in democratizing the production of long-range strike systems. With sufficient support from Kyiv’s partners, this revolution offers a viable pathway to Russia’s battlefield defeat and can set the stage for an acceptable peace agreement.

Dr Marc De Vore is a senior lecturer at the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 29, 2026

Ukraine’s defense tech sector can play a key role in economic security

By Eric K. Hontz

Ukraine’s defense tech and dual-use sector is a rare wartime success story, with over six hundred innovative and combat‑tested firms becoming increasingly attractive to international investors, writes Eric K. Hontz.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jan 27, 2026

Unable to win on the battlefield, Putin escalates war on Ukrainian civilians

By Peter Dickinson

A war crime of staggering proportions is currently unfolding in full public view across Ukraine as Russia methodically bombs the country’s utilities in a calculated bid to freeze millions of civilians in their own homes and spark a humanitarian catastrophe, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Jan 30, 2026

Drone superpower Ukraine can teach Europe how to defend itself

By Lesia Orobets

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion four years ago, Ukraine has emerged as a drone superpower and is now recognized as indispensable for the future defense of Europe, writes Lesia Orobets.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine is leading a military revolution but needs more Western support appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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The NDS’s emphasis on allies is reassuring for Japan, but questions over commitments remain

For Japan, the United States’ new NDS and its emphasis on working with Indo-Pacific allies to strengthen “collective defense” in the First Island Chain provided some assurance. But the NDS also further underlined long-standing questions about the Trump administration’s intentions and expectations toward allies. 

To some extent, the NDS brought a sigh of relief in Japan, given that there were concerns about how the Trump administration’s focus on the Western Hemisphere and the administration’s arguably somewhat softer posture toward China in recent months would impact Washington’s defense efforts and regional partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. In this light, the NDS was reassuring, as it did not completely de-prioritize the Indo-Pacific region.

Still, some concerns remain. Above all, while the NDS suggests that the United States will deter full-scale aggression by China, much remains unknown about Washington’s posture toward the gray-zone situations that persist in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the NDS makes clear its demand that allies and partners “take on a greater share of the burden,” adding pressure on states like Japan to increase defense expenditures and take on a more proactive defense role. Combined with the United States’ strategic ambiguity toward China and North Korea, Japan remains concerned about when and how Washington will respond if a contingency were to erupt. Such ambiguities and gaps undermine progress toward enhancing strategic, operational, and tactical readiness of the bilateral alliance US-Japan alliance, as well as US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation and other vital frameworks in the Indo-Pacific region.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

The NDS’s call for collective defense of the region is thin on details 

From Seoul’s vantage point, two phrases stood out most: “critical but limited support from U.S. forces” and “collective defense” along the First Island Chain.  

If the premise is that Seoul—and other regional allies—assume primary responsibility in the conventional domain, a central question is whether (and how far) that logic could bleed into the nuclear backstop. This would mark, not a “shift” in declaratory terms, perhaps, but a perceptible change in the visibility, tempo, and scope of the United States’ provision of extended deterrence.

At the same time, while the latest NDS and National Security Strategy both prescribe building “collective defense” in the region, both documents are notably thin on how Washington intends to operationalize it. The NDS states that the United States will seek to “make it as easy as possible for allies and partners to take on a greater share of the burden of our collective defense, including through close collaboration on force and operational planning and working closely to bolster their forces’ readiness for key missions.” Yet it avoids specifying the connective tissue—South Korea–US–Japan trilateral cooperation, or other mini- or multilateral pathways—that could be the key means to implement the concept.

None of this, however, makes me doubt that the South Korea–US alliance will keep adapting; if anything, Seoul’s description in the NDS as a “model ally” reinforces that expectation. But precisely because adversaries look for seams, the United States and South Korea need tighter communication, coordination, and signaling—so that capability shifts or posture adjustments do not create deterrence vacuums or generate unnecessary provocation in the region. 

—Bee Yun Jo, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and research fellow in the Security Strategy Division at the Sejong Institute. 

Manila has a ‘pragmatic’ response to the NDS amid tensions with China

The reaction in Metro Manila to the Pentagon’s 2026 NDS has been largely pragmatic and firmly Philippine-focused. The softer language on China has not generated public backlash among government officials, politicians, and policymakers. This is largely because Philippine policy debates are driven less by Washington’s terminology than by concrete security conditions in the West Philippine Sea, domestic development imperatives, and existing military cooperation with the United States anchored by the National Defense Authorization Act.

At the same time, there has been a subtle recalibration among some Philippine policymakers toward a more pragmatic approach to economic engagement with China. This shift has been hinted at by the Philippines’ ambassador to the United States, Jose Manuel “Babe” Romualdez, who has argued that persistent geopolitical frictions should not preclude selective economic cooperation with China. This recalibration reflects growing concern that the Philippines is falling behind regional peers, particularly Vietnam, whose manufacturing sector has expanded rapidly through export-oriented growth and deeper integration into global supply chains. Economic underperformance has also become increasingly visible in tourism vis-à-vis neighboring countries, prompting policy responses aimed at stimulating demand. One such measure has been the introduction of fourteen-day visa-free entry for Chinese citizens, a move widely interpreted in Manila as economically motivated rather than geopolitical signaling.

However, this pragmatism has not translated into accommodation toward Beijing on sovereignty issues or political influence. This week, Philippine senators across party lines signed a resolution condemning what they describe as verbal attacks and intimidation by Chinese officials against Philippine institutions defending the West Philippine Sea. In addition, the publicly disclosed meeting between the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines and Davao City Mayor Sebastian “Baste” Duterte drew scrutiny in Manila political circles. The meeting’s timing coincided with heightened tensions in the West Philippine Sea, reinforcing concerns about political signaling and elite influence pathways, anxieties that have been shaped by China’s prior patterns of elite engagement across Southeast Asia.

—Alvin Camba is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

Australia will welcome clear messaging on China and an emphasis on re-industrialization 

On the surface, the 2026 NDS is a radical departure from its predecessors. Its bombastic rhetoric, political focus, and sharp tone make it an unconventional document and in key areas it represents significant policy shifts, particularly as it relates to European allies and the threat Russia presents. Moreover, while it repeatedly states that it is not isolationist in nature, the document also heavily emphasizes a refocus to its own region through the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Beneath the surface, however, there is also a lot of continuity, and for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific there is a lot in the document to be reassured by.

For Australia, the clear articulation of the threat China poses, the need to deter rather than confront, along with a clear message to China on what the United States considers an acceptable balance of power in the region will be encouraging, particularly as China has often exploited the strategic ambiguity of previous policy documents. However, the lack of any mention of Taiwan or how the United States will view a potential crisis there will create uncertainty and anxiety.

But the acknowledgment of the speed and scope of the threat China poses, and reassurances that the United States will continue to support efforts to stand up to it will be well received in Canberra. The need for increased burden sharing and re-prioritization of effort have reverberated throughout the national security community for over a decade and will come as no surprise to Australian policymakers. Moreover, the emphasis on re-industrialization is a trend already under way there, and the NDS’s language will be viewed as a seriousness of intent on the part of the United States. While the document is simplistic and short on details, its strength is the clarity of messaging and pragmatic views on the reality of regional and global threats. For those in Australia, that statement will be well received.

—John T. Watts is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as a senior policy advisor to the US Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and a staff officer at the Australian Department of Defence.

The NDS leaves unanswered questions about what a ‘decent’ US-China peace would mean for Taiwan

Taiwan is concerned about being left out of US defense perimeters and becoming seen as primarily an economic issue, rather than a security one, for Washington.

The clearest sign is that the 2026 NDS does not mention Taiwan by name at all. There is also the softening in NDS language concerning China. The 2018 NDS from Trump’s first term referred to China and Russia as “revisionist powers”; the 2026 NDS no longer does. This raises the question of whether China’s repeated claim that it will annex Taiwan, by force if necessary, is no longer considered an act of revisionism.

The NDS does talk about the importance of deterrence by denial and pledges to “make clear that any attempt at aggression against U.S. interests will fail.” But is defense of the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait still a US interest?

The answer is unclear. The NDS mentions five areas where the United States will prioritize the provision of “critical but limited support from U.S. forces,” and the Taiwan Strait is not one of them.

Furthermore, while it may be reassuring for some to read the NDS’s promise “to prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies,” Taiwan is not a US ally.

The NDS does say that all nations should “recognize that their interests are best served through peace and restraint.” Is “restraint,” then, what the United States expects from Taiwan?

The NDS also calls for reaching a “decent peace” with China, stating later that such an accord “on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under is possible.” This language brings back the long-standing specter of a US-China “grand bargain” over Taiwan. Especially since Beijing has long seen Taiwan as nonnegotiable and a core interest, Washington seeking to strike a deal on “terms that China can accept” is not generating much optimism inside Taiwan.

Yet with crisis comes opportunity. Taiwan’s strategy should be threefold. First, Taiwan needs to reassure domestic audiences that Taiwan is not mentioned in the NDS because strong US-Taiwan relations are now a given. Second, increase Taiwan’s defense spending to show that Taipei is not a security free-rider and is doing its fair share. To this end, Taiwan’s defense spending is set to reach 3.32 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2026, and Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has pledged to reach 5 percent of GDP on defense spending before 2030. Third, Taiwan needs to contribute to the Trump administration’s reindustrialization agenda. Taiwan has made progress in this area as well. This month, Taiwanese companies committed to investing at least $250 billion in the United States, especially in the semiconductor and technology sectors.

Taken together, Taiwan is seeking to signal that it is an understanding, responsible, and helpful partner to the United States, one that is too valuable to let fall into Beijing’s hands.

—Wen-Ti Sung is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

The post What the Indo-Pacific thinks of the new US National Defense Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Europe is rearming but at too slow of a pace, as countries encounter several structural challenges that hinder development.
• Ukraine offers what Europe lacks—speed. Kyiv has rapidly become a leader in unmanned technologies and other cutting-edge, battle-tested innovations.
• Combining Europe’s long-term capital with Ukraine’s high-speed innovation can help the continent achieve greater strategic autonomy and a military edge.

KYIV—In an age of global instability, the most important dimension is time. In Davos and throughout the continent in recent weeks, European leaders have spoken of the need for a common defense strategy. As European nations work to make this a reality, building joint investment processes in defense technology between Ukraine and the European Union (EU) is not merely desirable—it is strategically indispensable.

Europe is undergoing the deepest security reappraisal in the history of the EU. Since 2022, the continent has shed its illusions about a “stable order” and shifted into a phase of rapid rearmament. Over the past year alone, the EU has approved multiyear defense funds worth tens of billions of euros, launched new mechanisms for joint procurement and, for the first time, begun a serious conversation about defense autonomy.

This is hardly surprising: the United States continues to remind Europeans that they must be able to shoulder the burden of their own defense and rely on their own capabilities rather than await salvation from across the Atlantic. The question now is how Europeans can best accomplish this.

Europe is accelerating its defense industry but running into structural problems

Europe continues to be one of the key technological centers of the global defense industry and is actively investing in military innovation. The continent hosts both traditional defense giants and a new generation of defense-tech companies and start-ups. European states are investing in unmanned systems, cybersecurity, air and missile defense, space and sensor technologies, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven military applications. The European Union also remains one of the world’s largest arms exporters—reaching sixty billion euros in 2024—underscoring the bloc’s industrial capacity and technological depth.

At the same time, several structural problems continue to hinder the development of Europe’s defense industry and its ability to meet new challenges. Three stand out in particular:

1. Spending gaps. Against the backdrop of constrained credit and fiscal rules, EU member states together spend roughly half as much on defense as the United States does. At the same time, moving toward spending 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense would represent a genuinely revolutionary shift for Europe. A series of statements by European leaders in 2025 have made it increasingly clear that such a change in approach is becoming politically unavoidable. Securing funding is, in effect, Europe’s primary political homework assignment.
2. Fragmentation of production, technologies, standards, and procurement. In his 2024 report on European competitiveness, former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi highlighted one of the EU’s core strategic weaknesses: fragmentation. By preserving the sovereignty and autonomy of member states, the EU has produced a kaleidoscope of defense approaches. Member states operate under different procurement policies and lack unified standards. This problem can’t be solved by simply increasing spending. Without common policies and standardization, Europe risks achieving lower levels of efficiency compared with other major military powers even with nominally comparable levels of expenditure.
3. Heavy dependence on foreign suppliers, especially the United States. As Draghi noted in his report, “The choice to procure from the US may be justified in some cases because the EU does not have some products in its catalogue, but in many other cases a European equivalent exists, or could be rapidly made available by the European defence industry.” This dependence constrains Europe’s strategic autonomy, and it slows the development of its own industrial and technological base.

Europe’s rearmament will cost hundreds of billions of euros. Yet the critical question is not only how much money is spent or what is bought today or tomorrow. What matters most is the speed of the defense-industrial system whose development these funds are intended to support.

What is missing? Speed.

Europe still lacks an adequate answer to Russia’s drone technologies, honed through years of war. In September 2025, the intrusion of nineteen Russian drones into NATO airspace forced the scrambling of F-35 fighter jets to shoot them down, an absurdly expensive response. When unidentified drones disrupt air traffic around European capitals, nobody is certain how to react. Inevitably, attention turns east—to Ukraine, which has learned to survive in a modern drone war, repel incursions of more than seven hundred airborne targets in a single night, and strike back. All this has been achieved through military innovation. As Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said in October 2025, “The only expert right now in the world when it comes to anti-drone capacities is Ukraine, because they are fighting the Russian drones almost every day.”

Many now argue that Ukrainian unmanned technologies are precisely what Europe needs—and could become the continent’s trump card in its hybrid confrontation with Russia. “Ukraine is already helping us and teaching us how to fight the wars of tomorrow. Ukrainian drones destroy 80 percent of targets on the ground,” said Andrius Kubilius, the EU’s defense commissioner, at the Conference on Ukraine’s European Future in November 2025.

Ukraine is often described as a drone superpower: It produces four million drones a year (the United States makes less than one hundred thousand a year), fields hundreds of systems and models, and has logged thousands of confirmed drone strikes on Russian targets. With drones, Ukraine has crippled Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, damaged its strategic aviation, and now threatens one of the foundations of Russia’s power: its oil infrastructure. The low cost of Ukrainian drone technology compared with conventional weaponry greatly impresses political leaders who must approve defense budgets. But the real issue runs deeper.

Defense technologies are constantly evolving: No matter what new weapons appear on the battlefield, none of them remains decisive for long. Within months, adversaries develop countermeasures—new tactics, new technologies. Wars are won not by those with the largest arsenals or the most soldiers but by those who win this race. Europe’s true strategic problem is slowness. The main thing Europe can learn from Ukraine’s defense sector is speed.

At the strategic level, Europe can win any war or technological race—if it buys itself a faster engine.

The Ukrainian precedent: Frontline research and development as a model

This is the first war in which dual-use products—such as agricultural drones and open-source software platforms—are often more lethal than conventional weapons. It has also made one thing clear: Preparation for war must involve not only professional armies, but the entire nation. During the war, millions of civilians joined in the defense of Ukraine, bringing their own approaches and fundamentally transforming the process of developing defense innovations.

Drone production in Ukraine resembles a vast open-source frontline research and development lab. Volunteers, private firms, military units and government agencies all test, iterate, and refine designs on a weekly basis. Strike videos circulate on social media; experts debate performance; thousands of chats buzz with feedback; ideas are exchanged in kitchens, workshops, and smoking areas. This may appear absurd from the perspective of traditional military rules and procedures, but it works.

There are almost no examples of drones built by defense giants remaining effective on the battlefield for long. The reason is the slow pace of adaptation and evolution. Ukrainian drones also do not last long on the battlefield—but the best of them evolve faster than the adversary can adapt to them.

No wonder NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte remarked in October 2025 that Ukraine is “a powerhouse when it comes to innovation, insights, for example, when it comes to anti-drone technology [and] anti-cyber threats.”

European militaries do not operate this way. Yet Europe possesses a strategic advantage of its own—one it can put to powerful use.

Europe’s slow money and Ukraine’s speed

Ukraine and Europe have opposite superpowers.

• Europe is slow but has cheap, long-term capital. Slowness is, in fact, a form of trust: Investors know the rules will not change and their rights will be protected. This is precisely what Ukraine has long lacked.
• Ukraine is fast and unpredictable, but its capital is always expensive. Speed means risk, which means a high cost of capital.

Combining Europe’s capital with Ukraine’s speed and innovation would create a unique dynamic.

Investment is not merely capital; it is a way to synchronize Europe’s pace with Ukraine’s school of fast-evolving combat systems.

Europe’s future hinges on integrating Ukraine into its defense ecosystem

Europe has entered an era of rapid military evolution. Ukraine is the country of the free world that best understands what modern war looks like. This is why European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen now speaks of a new drone alliance between Ukraine and Europe. “Before the war, Ukraine had no drones. Today, Ukrainian drones are responsible for over 23 percent of Russian equipment losses, highlighting the impact of human ingenuity in open societies,” she said in September 2025.

Europe is already entering a phase of practically implementing Ukrainian defense technologies and more closely cooperating with Ukrainian defense-tech companies. This is reflected both in joint manufacturing projects and in the integration of Ukrainian solutions into European rearmament programs—from cooperation on unmanned systems and counter-drone technologies to the creation of joint research and development teams. Notable examples include initiatives to establish joint ventures with Ukrainian manufacturers, as well as growing interest from European defense-tech players in Ukraine’s combat-tested experience with AI- and network-centric solutions. 

The process has already begun. Many announcements have been made about joint investments and co-development of unmanned systems between European and Ukrainian firms. More will follow. It is part of a broader shared strategy.

If Europe and Ukraine carry this strategy through, the continent will at last acquire genuine defense autonomy, making it capable of withstanding any threat.

The post Time matters: Why Europe needs Ukrainian defense innovation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 7, Forward Defense Senior Fellow Steven Grundman was featured in an article on CNN entitled “Trump threatens defense contractors with restrictions while promising sharp increase in spending,” arguing that Trump’s proposed limits on defense contractors’ buybacks, dividends, and executive pay would amount to an unprecedented form of state intervention. In his view, even if the intent is justified, the approach risks damaging incentives, investment, and the long-term health of the defense industrial base.

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

Learn more

The post Grundman in CNN reporting on defense contracting appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• To spend larger defense budgets wisely, European NATO allies will need to develop an ecosystem that fosters innovation.
• To increase innovation and the adoption of new technologies, NATO allies will need to address regulations that too often inhibit cooperation.
• Among other steps, NATO should establish a Defense Innovation Unit modeled after the US organization of the same name.

WASHINGTON—From the specter of US retrenchment to ongoing Russian revanchism, European NATO members must face up to a harsh reality: the Alliance lacks the industrial capabilities to meet today’s security challenges. Their recent promises to increase defense spending, while substantial and welcome, will not be enough alone to change this. 

To adapt quickly enough to confront evolving threats, NATO allies must get the basics right. This means adopting functional and flexible financing mechanisms, streamlining regulatory frameworks, and building production foundations that prioritize scalable and sustainable innovation.

These challenges that NATO faces, as well as the need for the Alliance to get the basics right, are being actively discussed, including at the 2025 Netherlands-US Defense Industry Days conference in Washington, DC, this past October. At this event, organized by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Atlantic Council, policymakers, industry leaders, financiers, and experts discussed how transatlantic allies can accelerate defense innovation while strengthening their defense industrial bases. Below are a few of the authors’ major takeaways from this conference on how NATO can meet these challenges.

Don’t just spend more—spend smarter

Increasingly, the battlefields of the future will be won in the realm of innovation. Building ecosystems to support technology development will require allies to use newly unlocked defense dollars to fill immediate capability gaps and build flexible financing pathways to foster innovation. If done right, these defense ecosystems can allocate more resources directly to innovators, boosting returns on investment and generating cutting-edge capabilities in North America and Europe. 

To do this, allies should take a two-pronged approach to financing innovation:

Accept risk to accelerate adoption. Many innovation initiatives—such as NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) organization—too often fall short because they prioritize immediate return on investment or quick-turn results over long-term innovation development. This places a strain on innovators, limiting their access to seed money and signaling to the private sector that the Alliance does not prioritize lasting defense technology innovation. Instead, NATO should give these initiatives greater latitude to prioritize experimentation and iteration rather than meeting often arbitrary metrics and quotas. 

Protect research and development budgets. From the rise of the space domain to electromagnetic warfare, NATO allies must win not just a single innovation race; they need to win many at once. Research and development (R&D) budgets are critical to this effort. Yet, far too often, as participants at the conference noted, R&D budgets for defense technologies are cannibalized in favor of immediate operational needs, particularly during periods of heightened security pressure. By prioritizing R&D budgets, governments can send a clear signal to defense industries, investment bankers, and venture capitalists that NATO members see investment in defense technology as a long-term and sustainable demand. These signals can help spur greater private-sector investment in these technologies.

To produce at scale, regulate at scale

Current regulatory environments on both sides of the Atlantic are not designed for the speed of innovation or adoption needed in today’s rapidly evolving security environment. Instead, NATO allies must strike a careful balance: NATO countries should impose regulations that protect sensitive technologies and intellectual property while also encouraging cooperation among allies on innovation development. Two main principles should inform this approach: 

Break down barriers to transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. In the United States, having to navigate dense bureaucracy can stifle innovation, hamper collaborative partnerships, and stretch lead times for critical defense technologies. However, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently made several announcements that show promise in this area—including loosening restrictions on defense contractors and emphasizing speed—indicating that the Pentagon will work to streamline defense cooperation for allies looking to buy US capabilities. Despite this positive momentum, meaningful changes to US foreign military sales and armaments cooperation will require sustained efforts to reform these overly burdensome bureaucratic processes. 

Keep agile firms top of mind when writing regulations. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will make or break the next era of warfare. Yet defense industrial and innovation regulations often impose disproportionate costs on SMEs because they are designed only for the largest defense companies. For example, the US Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification rightly protects sensitive data through third-party audit and monitoring requirements. But as written, the cost of compliance with these regulations is prohibitively expensive for SMEs, risking pushing many smaller defense firms out of the market altogether. Therefore, policymakers and military planners must establish more frequent, institutionalized relationships with SMEs to better understand how regulations affect these new players. A good step in the right direction would be for policymakers to apply regulations on a sliding scale, setting thresholds for how large a defense company must grow before it has to comply with certain requirements.

Build integrated innovation ecosystems

NATO should adopt a holistic approach to capability development that marries research, design, and production to turn industrial development into more than just the sum of its structural parts. Three ways to build this holistic approach are: 

Champion defense industrial cooperation. To innovate at the necessary pace, the Alliance must build defense industrial co-development, co-production, and co-assembly pathways. Working industry-to-industry or industry-to-partner, such collaborative efforts can help enable allied industries to scale up production and develop cutting-edge defense technologies. This approach defrays risk for industry, builds stronger transatlantic bonds, and shortens lead times for capability delivery. 

Advance a model that combines expertise across sectors. To build more resilient and sustainable defense innovation ecosystems, allies should foster a defense innovation model that integrates government, industry, and academia. With these three sectors working together, allies can coordinate experimentation, testing, and manufacturing efforts to accelerate development and deployment timelines. Applied across the Atlantic, such a model could replace isolated national pilot projects with a coordinated framework for sustained, interoperable innovation.

Establish a NATO Defense Innovation Unit to spur development. Modeled after the United States’ own Defense Innovation Unit, a NATO version of the institution would help the Alliance coordinate funding, regulation, and capability development. A NATO Defense Innovation Unit would maintain shared test facilities, align technical standards, and guide the transition of prototypes into fielded systems. It would serve as a permanent platform connecting NATO’s innovation initiatives—such as DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund—with national and private-sector efforts.

Building transatlantic innovation ecosystems must begin with the basics: financing innovation wisely, regulating for speed and scalability, and building integrated defense innovation models across sectors and allied capitals. A roadmap grounded in smart investment, adaptive regulations, and collaborative production can transform innovation into readiness.

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With Ukraine’s Western partners unlikely to defend the country against a new Russian invasion, the most realistic option is to build up Kyiv’s own military capabilities. This process is already well underway. Since 2022, the Ukrainian army has expanded dramatically to become by far the largest fighting force in Europe and a world leader in drone warfare. Ukraine’s transformation into a major European military power has been supported by the country’s allies, who have provided large quantities of weapons and equipment along with the financial support needed to power the rapid expansion of the Ukrainian defense industry.

The growing strength of the Ukrainian military has been instrumental in stemming the tide of Russia’s invasion. Despite holding the battlefield initiative throughout 2025, Putin’s army was able to seize less than one percent of Ukrainian territory while suffering heavy losses. The priority now is to freeze the front lines further and reach a point where even minor Russian advances become increasingly unfeasible. However, effective defenses alone will not be enough to end the war or prevent a new Russian invasion. In order to deter Putin, Ukraine must also be able to strike back effectively at targets across Russia.

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Ukraine’s arsenal of long-range weapons has evolved significantly since 2022. Over the past four years, the country has managed to develop a variety of strike drones with the capacity to reach targets located well over a thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Ukraine also now boasts an expanding selection of domestically produced cruise missiles. This enhanced long-range firepower has made it possible for Ukraine to conduct an escalating bombing campaign inside Russia that has already changed the geography of the war.

Since summer 2025, long-range Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory have reached record highs. Ukraine has struck dozens of military facilities and defense industry enterprises, while also paying special attention to the oil and gas infrastructure that fuels the Russian war economy. Ukraine has hit refineries, pipelines, oil rigs, ports, and a number of tankers belonging to the Kremlin’s so-called shadow fleet. These strikes have complicated the logistics of the invasion while contributing to a significant decline in Russia’s energy export revenues.

In addition to hampering the Kremlin war machine and causing economic damage, Ukraine’s mounting campaign of long-range strikes has also had a major psychological impact that is helping to bring home the reality of the war to the Russian public. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has worked hard to shield ordinary Russians and contain the conflict within the borders of Ukraine. However, with air raid sirens becoming an increasingly routine feature of daily life in Russian towns and cities, the Putin regime is no longer able to control the narrative.

A recent survey conducted by Russia’s only remaining independent pollster, the Levada Center, has highlighted the impact Ukrainian strikes are having on Russian public sentiment. Asked to name the most notable event of the past year, 28 percent of respondents cited Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian cities and industrial facilities, making this the third most popular answer. Clearly, Ukraine’s long-range bombing campaign has succeeded in breaking through the Kremlin propaganda bubble and has made a strong impression on the Russian population.

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For Ukraine’s partners, the objective now should be to boost Ukraine’s long-range capabilities to the maximum in order to equip the country with the kind of strike power that can deter Russia. Numerous Western leaders have shied away from providing Kyiv with long-range missiles from their own arsenals due to escalation fears. The solution is simple: Western partners should focus their efforts on helping Ukraine produce sufficient quantities of drones and missiles domestically.

Ukrainian officials are well aware that the ability to hit targets across the Russian Federation may be their country’s most effective security guarantee against further Kremlin aggression. They are now appealing to Kyiv’s international partners for increased support as they seek to exploit the country’s considerable spare defense industry production capacity and crank up output.

“The modern arms race is not about nukes. It is about millions of cheap drones. Those who can scale up production quicker will secure peace,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha in late 2025. “This requires quick and sufficient funding for Ukraine’s defense industry, which is now the greatest source of defense innovation in the world. We can produce up to twenty million drones next year if we get sufficient funding.”

Throughout the past year of faltering US-led peace efforts, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he has no intention of ending the invasion. As long as the war is being fought predominantly inside Ukraine, he is unlikely to change his position, regardless of Russian combat losses. However, if Ukrainian drone and missile strikes inside Russia continue to expand during 2026, the economic and social impact may become too serious to ignore. This could force Putin to abandon his stalling tactics and finally enter into genuine negotiations. It would also oblige him to think carefully before restarting his invasion in the years ahead.

Serhii Kuzan is chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and as an advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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News of this successful recent deployment highlights the potential of Ukraine’s robot army at a time when the country faces mounting manpower shortages as Russia’s full-scale invasion approaches the four-year mark. Robotic systems are clearly in demand. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has reported that it surpassed all UGV supply targets in 2025, with further increases planned for the current year. “The development and scaling of ground robotic systems form part of a systematic, human-centric approach focused on protecting personnel,” commented Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal.

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The current emphasis on UGVs is part of a broader technological transformation taking place on the battlefields of Ukraine. This generational shift in military tech is redefining how modern wars are fought.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, homegrown innovation has played a critical role in Ukraine’s defense. Early in the war, Ukrainian troops deployed cheap commercial drones to conduct reconnaissance. These platforms were soon being adapted to carry explosives, dramatically expanding their combat role. By the second year of the war, Ukraine had developed a powerful domestic drone industry capable of producing millions of units per year while rapidly adapting to the ever-changing requirements of the battlefield.

A similar process has also been underway at sea, with Ukraine deploying domestically produced naval drones to sink or damage more than a dozen Russian warships. This has forced Putin to withdraw the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet from occupied Crimea to Russia itself. Recent successes have included the downing of Russian helicopters over the Black Sea using naval drones armed with missiles, and an audacious strike on a Russian submarine by an underwater Ukrainian drone.

By late 2023, drones were dominating the skies over the Ukrainian battlefield, making it extremely dangerous to use vehicles or armor close to the front lines. In response to this changing dynamic, Ukrainian forces began experimenting with wheeled and tracked land drones to handle logistical tasks such as the delivery of food and ammunition to front line positions and the evacuation of wounded troops.

Over the past year, Russia’s expanding use of fiber-optic drones and tactical focus on disrupting Ukrainian supply lines has further underlined the importance of UGVs. Fiber-optic drones have expanded the kill zone deep into the Ukrainian rear, complicating the task of resupplying combat units and leading to shortages that weaken Ukraine’s defenses. Robotic systems help counter this threat.

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Remote controlled land drones offer a range of practical advantages. They are more difficult to jam electronically than aerial drones, and are far harder to spot than trucks or cars. These benefits are making them increasingly indispensable for the Ukrainian military. In November 2025, the BBC reported that up to 90 percent of all supplies to Ukrainian front line positions around Pokrovsk were being delivered by UGVs.

In addition to logistical functions, the Ukrainian military is also pioneering the use of land drones in combat roles. It is easy to see why this is appealing. After all, Ukrainian commanders are being asked to defend a front line stretching more than one thousand kilometers with limited numbers of troops against a far larger and better equipped enemy.

Experts caution that while UGVs can serve as a key element of Ukraine’s defenses, they are not a realistic alternative to boots on the ground. Former Ukrainian commander in chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi has acknowledged that robotic systems are already making it possible to remove personnel from the front lines and reduce casualties, but stressed that current technology remains insufficient to replace humans at scale.

Despite the advances of the past four years, Ukraine’s expanding robot army remains incapable of carrying out many military functions that require infantry. When small groups of Russian troops infiltrate Ukrainian positions and push into urban areas, for example, soldiers are needed to clear and hold terrain. Advocates of drone warfare need to recognize these limitations when making the case for greater reliance on unmanned systems.

UGVs will likely prove vital for Ukraine in 2026, but they are not wonder weapons and cannot serve as a miracle cure for Kyiv’s manpower challenges. Instead, Ukraine’s robot army should be viewed as an important part of the country’s constantly evolving defenses that can help save lives while raising the cost of Russia’s invasion.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Further reading

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On January 4, GeoStrategy Initiative distinguished fellow Tobias Ellwood authored an opinion piece in Express titled “The UK is woefully underprepared for global war – we must bring back National Service.” He explains that the United Kingdom has grown complacent and argues that restoring mandatory national service is essential amid intensifying strategic competition.

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On January 4, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Wall Street Journal article titled “A New Trump Game Plan Takes Shape: Strike and Coerce.” He evokes the Maduro regime’s ties to US adversaries and affirms the US military’s ability to operate in multiple theatres.

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On January 3, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Politico article titled “The hawks are winning.” He argues that widespread support for military action in Venezuela was driven less by policy conviction than by an awareness of internal power dynamics, with officials mindful of where influence resides within the White House.

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• Executive summary
• Introduction
• A comprehensive approach to defense and resilience
• Key pillars of Latvian resilience
• Challenges and future imperatives for resilience
• Annex 1: Management structure
• Annex 2: Framework of concepts, plans, laws, and regulations

Executive summary

Latvia has significantly evolved its defense and security policy, focusing on national resilience as a cornerstone of its statehood, as analyzed in LVARes: The Evolution of Latvia’s Defense and Security Policy in Resilience Building, a project of the Centre for East European Policy Studies and the Atlantic Council. This transformation is anchored in Latvia’s Comprehensive National Defense (CND) framework, a whole-of-society strategy that integrates civilian, military, and private-sector efforts to deter aggression and manage crises. Key to this approach are legal underpinnings from evolving state defense concepts and amendments to foundational laws like the National Security Law.

Pillars of this resilience include ensuring the continuity of essential services and critical infrastructure, with a shift from mere asset protection to guaranteeing operational functionality through public-private partnerships and an enhanced role for municipalities. Regular exercises like Namejs and Pilskalns test these preparations.

To counter hybrid threats, Latvia formally recognizes the information space as a defense domain, implementing multilayered strategies that combine government-led strategic communications, support for independent media, civil-society engagement against disinformation, and international cooperation, notably through hosting the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence. Societal resilience is further boosted by public-preparedness campaigns like “72 Hours: What to do in case of a crisis,” media literacy programs, and integrating national defense education, including psychological defense and nonviolent civil resistance, into curricula.

Significant reforms are modernizing Latvia’s crisis management, with the planned National Crisis Management Center (CMC) under the prime minister, centralizing coordination and decision-making. Civil-protection measures are strengthening as well, with new legislation for public shelters and updates to the State Civil Protection Plan.

International cooperation is indispensable, with NATO providing collective defense, the EU offering funding and policy coordination, and robust bilateral ties with the United States and regional cooperation with Baltic and Nordic partners. The LVARes project itself exemplifies Latvia’s proactive international engagement in studying national capabilities, raising awareness, and sharing best practices.

Challenges persist, including resource constraints, interagency coordination complexities, evolving threats, and the need to bolster societal cohesion. Future imperatives involve fully operationalizing the CMC, implementing the shelter program, sustained investment in capabilities, and deeper public engagement in CND. Strategic recommendations for policymakers emphasize CMC effectiveness, civil-protection investments, public-private partnerships, psychological resilience, volunteer engagement, and integrating nonviolent resistance. For international partners, continued support for Latvian capability development, amplifying LVARes findings, facilitating resilience benchmarking, and supporting cross-border exercises are crucial. Through these efforts, Latvia fortifies its security and contributes valuable lessons to the Euro-Atlantic community.

Introduction

The contemporary security environment is characterized by an array of complex and interconnected threats. These range from the potential for conventional military aggression to the more pervasive and persistent challenges of hybrid warfare, sophisticated information operations, and malicious cyber activities. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and its full-scale war against Ukraine have significantly amplified these threats, underscoring the vulnerability of states in the region and the urgent need for robust national preparedness. Latvia’s position as a frontline state of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), sharing a direct border with the Russian Federation, has inherently shaped its national security posture and necessitated a continuous adaptation of its defense strategies, pushing for an essential shift in Latvia’s defense thinking.

The traditional focus on military defense, while still fundamental, is increasingly understood as insufficient on its own. Consequently, Latvia has progressively embraced a broader concept of national resilience encompassing not only military strength but also the resilience of its society, the continuity of government and essential services during crises, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the cultivation of psychological defense among its populace. This evolution reflects a growing understanding that national security in the twenty-first century is a whole-of-society endeavor.

Latvia’s pursuit of national resilience is not confined to a single strategy but is realized through a multifaceted approach that addresses various dimensions of security. These include ensuring the operational continuity of essential services and the resilience of critical infrastructure, actively countering hybrid threats in the information and cyber domains, fostering broad societal resilience through public preparedness and education, and acknowledging the potential role of nonviolent civil resistance. The aim of this report is to systematically analyze the evolution in Latvia’s defense and security policy, particularly its implementation of a comprehensive national defense framework, and to share the insights and lessons learned with allies, partners, and the broader public to enhance collective security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

A comprehensive approach to defense and resilience

Latvia’s approach to national defense has undergone a significant evolution, moving from a primary focus on conventional military capabilities and professional military service orientation toward a more encompassing strategy known as Comprehensive National Defense (CND). Adopted in 2018, the CND system is designed to ensure security and crisis preparedness across all sectors of the state and society, thereby enhancing Latvia’s overall deterrence posture and its resilience against armed conflicts or a wide spectrum of potential crises. The overarching aims of CND are the following:

• Preparing the Latvian population to actively participate in the defense of their country. 
• Facilitating efficient and effective crisis management at the national level. 
• Ensuring the continuity and support of critical state functions, including government operations, energy supply, healthcare, and logistics, even under duress. 

A fundamental and defining characteristic of Latvia’s CND is its “whole-of-society” approach, which recognizes that national defense and resilience are not the sole responsibility of the armed forces or government ministries but require the active involvement and cooperation of every element of society. This comprehensive vision entails the systematic integration of municipalities, the owners and managers of both public and private critical infrastructure (spanning sectors such as energy, communications, finance, and healthcare), nongovernmental organizations, the broader business community, and individual citizens into national defense planning and preparedness efforts. 

A significant emphasis within this approach is placed on building and nurturing mutual trust and robust partnerships between public authorities at all levels and private-sector entities. These collaborative efforts are seen as essential for creating a networked civil and military defense system where each component is prepared and able to work in sync. The success of the CND model hinges on the ability to overcome traditional challenges and foster a shared sense of responsibility for national security.

The whole-of-society approach is further strengthened through the way the CND is managed and its legal basis, both of which are designed as a multitiered framework to ensure a whole-of-government and -societal approach to national resilience. The management structure (detailed in Annex 1) integrates political leadership, ministerial responsibilities, operational agencies, local governments, and societal actors to prepare for and respond effectively to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from military aggression to civil emergencies. Whereas the framework of strategic concepts, national plans, legal acts, and supporting regulations (a detailed list provided in Annex 2) ensure that CND is not merely a theoretical construct but a systematically planned and implemented national effort. Strategic concepts like the National Security Concept and the State Defense Concept, both approved by the parliament, articulate Latvia’s high-level strategic assessments, goals, and priorities in response to the evolving security environment, providing the overarching vision and direction for the development of the CND.

This approach also aligns with the direction set by NATO at its 2016 Warsaw Summit, where the Alliance adopted seven baseline requirements for national resilience. For the first time, NATO established clear conditions that member states’ civilian institutions must meet to support Article 4 and 5 military operations. These requirements include: continuity of government and critical services; resilient energy, food, and water supplies; the ability to manage uncontrolled population movements; resilient civil communication and transportation systems; and the capacity to handle mass casualties. In this regard, Latvia’s CND system goes beyond these NATO requirements by also incorporating societal resilience and the involvement of the private sector in defense operations and other aspects.

Alongside NATO’s framework, relevant EU-level initiatives provide significant complementary support for resilience. These include the EU’s crisis-management framework, particularly its Civil Protection Mechanism, and the Military Mobility initiative, which supports development of civilian infrastructure to facilitate the rapid movement of military forces across Europe. These efforts directly reinforce both NATO and national resilience objectives, providing practical tools and funding to enhance collective defense.

Beyond multilateral alliances, Latvia cultivates strong bilateral partnerships and engages actively in regional cooperation formats to enhance its security and resilience. The 2020 State Defense Concept emphasizes the strong military cooperation between Latvia and the United States, highlighting the long-standing and highly valued partnership between the Latvian National Armed Forces and the Michigan National Guard. The United States is widely regarded as a major strategic partner for Latvia’s security and independence.

The three Baltic states also work closely together to develop their collective security and defense capabilities. This cooperation includes joint efforts to strengthen their external borders, deepen collaboration in civil protection and crisis management, combat disinformation through shared intelligence and strategies, and enhance overall societal resilience. Joint military exercises are also a regular feature of this trilateral cooperation.

Nordic-Baltic cooperation provides another layer of security collaboration. Latvia’s comprehensive defense approach shares many similarities with the strategies adopted by Nordic countries, facilitating mutual learning and coordinated efforts. The Nordic and Baltic countries have also demonstrated solidarity through joint statements and coordinated actions, for example, in reaffirming their support for Ukraine.

Latvia’s multifaceted international engagement—spanning NATO, the EU, key bilateral relationships such as with the United States, and intensive regional cooperation—is not merely about receiving security assistance or aligning with external frameworks. It increasingly reflects a strategy of proactive contribution. As a frontline state that has rapidly developed its resilience concepts and capabilities in response to direct and evolving threats, Latvia is well-positioned to share valuable expertise and lessons learned.

Key pillars of Latvian resilience

Since the adoption of CND, Latvia has pursued a comprehensive approach to defense based on an understanding that every element of the government and population plays a part in creating a networked civil and military defense system—and recent lessons from Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression have further reinforced this understanding. This approach grew out of necessity: Latvia, a small country with limited strategic depth, neighbors Russia, a large, aggressive military power that has attacked countries in its so-called near abroad. Latvia’s approach, like those of its fellow Nordic-Baltic countries, is built on a straightforward idea that the country’s civil and military defense systems can achieve a greater deterrence and defense impact if they collaborate and if each part is prepared. Meanwhile, Latvia’s pursuit of national resilience is not confined to a single strategy but is realized through a multifaceted approach that addresses various dimensions of security. 

While the CND concept encompasses eight dimensions, ranging from military development to psychological resilience, our report examines it through four perspectives: military, civil, societal, and governmental resilience. This approach allows for a cohesive, strategic evaluation of the dimensions of readiness without sacrificing the scope of the original concept.

Military resilience

Latvia’s military resilience is a central aspect of its national defense, resting on the fundamental pillars of domestic responsibility for developing its own capabilities and a robust collective defense provided by its allies.

Lessons learned from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine since 2014 have driven initiatives to ensure that Latvian institutions and society can respond effectively to any unconventional or hybrid threat scenarios. Changes to the National Security Law have empowered the National Armed Forces (NAF), from the lowest level up, with the authority to respond to any military threat, conventional or unconventional, even without immediate orders from the political leadership. The law explicitly states that armed resistance may not be prohibited in times of war or occupation and affirms that every citizen has the right to take up arms to resist an aggressor. This legal framework solidifies the principle of total defense, ensuring that the entire nation is prepared and authorized to contribute to the defense of the country.

To maintain this posture, Latvia has steadily increased its defense budget. By 2018, Latvia had met the NATO defense spending goal of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), which has significantly contributed to the development of military capabilities, including within the National Guard. Military resolve is evident in the budget’s rapid growth, which is projected to reach approximately 3.65 percent of GDP in 2025, with announcements indicating a further increase to 5 percent by 2026. This funding is crucial for keeping military modernization on track through the strategic procurement of advanced weapon systems. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Latvia has significantly increased investment in conventional war-fighting capabilities to enhance its deterrence posture. The commitment to acquiring advanced systems—such as High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers, IRIS-T air defense systems, and coastal defense missiles—sends a vital message that the country is serious about bolstering its defense. National resilience also necessitates forging a cohesive fighting force from diverse sources of manpower. Latvia is proactively addressing manpower challenges, most notably through the reintroduction of mandatory conscription in the form of the State Defense Service (SDS). Introduced in 2023, the SDS aims to increase recruitment and build a larger, well-trained reserve force. This policy of eleven-month mandatory service has shown early signs of success. Latvia plans to enlist four thousand new recruits annually by 2028 and, notably, 40 percent of the 2024 intake opted for professional careers after their mandatory service. Current military plans envision 31,000 troops by 2029, complemented by an equally large reserve contingent thereafter. However, this rapid expansion presents significant challenges. The primary obstacles include a lack of sufficient modern training infrastructure to accommodate the larger number of recruits, a shortage of qualified instructors to lead the training, and the immense organizational task of building a functional reserve system that can effectively manage and retrain thousands of new reservists annually after their active service ends. Successfully overcoming these hurdles is critical to ensuring the SDS translates into a genuine increase in combat-ready forces.

Advanced capabilities and increased manpower are only effective if they are maintained at a high state of readiness. This is achieved through a rigorous schedule of military exercises designed to test plans and ensure interoperability. The flagship event is the annual Comprehensive Defense Exercise “Namejs,” which tests the armed forces in joint operations at every level.

These exercises are crucial for more than just military units, serving as the primary mechanism for implementing the whole-of-society defense concept in practice. During Namejs, the NAF systematically drills its cooperation with the civilian sector. This includes collaborating with municipalities and state-owned companies to support military mobility and countermobility efforts, and working with private-sector entrepreneurs on resource mobilization. Similarly, through this whole-of-society approach, Latvia has demonstrated both ingenuity and cooperation. It is exemplified by efforts to formalize the roles of civilian groups in national defense, such as the involvement of hunters in the national defense system—a patriotic and armed segment of society that can be integrated with the National Guard and tasked with support assignments. As comprehensive defense evolves into a societal reality, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia.

Civil resilience

Civil resilience in Latvia focuses on the comprehensive preparedness of its civilian structures and population, encompassing robust civil-defense planning across all government levels, from national ministries to local municipalities. This emphasis recognizes the critical role of municipalities in fostering a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine beginning in 2014 and 2022 deeply reverberated across Latvian society, creating significant momentum for action. The latter created public demand that pushed local governments beyond mere declaratory contingency plans to proactively explain preparedness strategies to their constituents. Latvia has adopted the necessary legislative basis that mandates that Latvian municipalities ensure the continuity of essential services during crises or war, therefore actively participating in developing a society-wide culture of preparedness and resilience.

Another key aspect of civil resilience involves ensuring the continuity of essential services and protecting critical infrastructure. Latvia has strategically shifted its crisis-management thinking from solely focusing on infrastructure protection to prioritizing the uninterrupted delivery of essential services and functions. While this shift presents additional planning challenges, it stems from the understanding that critical infrastructure cannot operate in isolation from broader national defense factors; it is rendered ineffective without skilled personnel, operational processes, and supporting services vital for its functioning. Businesses are consequently required to develop robust continuity plans.

The ability to ensure the flow of money for goods and services constitutes another critical service. Societal upheavals, crises, and wars often disrupt peacetime payment systems, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s experience. To address this, the Bank of Latvia (which is analogous to the US Federal Reserve) is developing crisis payment solutions, both cash and noncash, for a society with a high adoption rate for noncash transactions. For example, the Bank of Latvia is collaborating with major commercial banks to develop approved offline solutions, ensuring individuals can use their bank cards for basic necessities even if bank communications are down. Similarly, during a crisis or war, banks are required to maintain a predefined network of ATMs, with at least one ATM per municipal center, and have developed a map of critical ATMs that would operate in case of crisis.

Latvia also has proactively sought to improve the integrity of its communications systems. This involves ensuring that critical data—including sensitive healthcare, defense, security, and economic data—remains within Latvian territory and that critical information technology systems continue to function without interruption even if the connection to the global internet is disrupted. To achieve this, the government now mandates that national and municipal institutions, companies, and owners/managers of critical IT infrastructure prioritize using a single national internet exchange point, GLV-IX, a statewide and state-operated local internet ecosystem, for their data flows if the outer perimeter of electronic communications is compromised.

Finally, Latvia has actively addressed two common challenges in building preparedness: improving the communication of preparedness requirements and funding resilience efforts. Many national governments struggle with effectively communicating military crisis and war preparedness expectations to municipalities and private industries. While both disseminating information and issuing legislation are important, these efforts must be augmented by activities that encourage thoughtful planning, accurate understanding of requirements, and knowledge development. Indeed, Latvian municipalities have sometimes voiced concerns about insufficient resources for civil preparedness, arguing it should be a national responsibility. Similarly, even large, well-funded hospitals struggle to meet the three-month supply requirement for medicine and supplies, while smaller hospitals lack adequate funding altogether.

Latvia has sought to address these questions through legislative changes, clarifying responsibilities and tasks, and mandating regular exercises. Over time, continuous cooperation and the mandatory requirement of yearly exercises are expected to foster a better understanding of the overall defense system, individual roles within it, and mutual expectations among all parties involved. Regular exercise schedules significantly benefit Latvia’s preparedness across sectors by stress testing developed plans, building knowledge, and informing participants about potential organizational challenges during a military crisis or war. For example, the yearly state-wide comprehensive defense exercises Namejs involve municipalities, allied forces, and local companies playing out different scenarios alongside the National Armed Forces. On a local level, Pilskalns exercises, in use since 2020, test municipalities’ planning and practical response capabilities under wartime scenarios, involving national and local institutions, the NAF, and local companies. These exercises are crucial for stress testing plans, identifying gaps, and building practical experience among all involved parties. Ultimately, however, private enterprises are expected to fund their own preparedness planning and implementation activities.

Societal resilience

Societal resilience in Latvia is built on the principle that national security is a shared responsibility that extends to every citizen, empowering individuals with the practical knowledge and tools needed to withstand a crisis. The government has fostered a “culture of readiness” through regular information campaigns and hands-on materials that include tips to spot false information.

The most visible example of this is Latvia’s “72-hour preparedness guide,” a practical tool aimed at bolstering individual and, by extension, societal resilience. This campaign advises citizens on how to be self-sufficient for the first seventy-two hours of a crisis, a critical period before state emergency services may be able to provide widespread assistance. The booklet provides practical guidance on reliable information sources, identifying and countering disinformation, essential supplies to stock like water and food, preparing an emergency kit, and developing a family crisis action plan. This proactive approach is rooted in both general emergency-management principles and Latvia’s specific geopolitical and historical context. It not only promotes self-sufficiency that reduces the immediate burden on state resources, but also empowers citizens with concrete actions they can take, which reduces feelings of helplessness and fosters a sense of control and readiness. Public preparedness campaigns like this booklet encourage citizens to volunteer and self-organize, which are foundational elements for any form of collective resistance. The State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD) plays a vital role in this public preparedness effort by actively informing the population on safety measures. To significantly enhance these capabilities, Latvia fully implemented a national cell broadcast system in early 2025. This modern alert system allows the VUGD to instantly send critical warnings directly to all mobile phones within a specific geographic area during an emergency, functioning without requiring users to install an application. This technology provides an immediate and widespread communication layer, complementing existing tools like sirens and the “112 Latvija” mobile application, which is also promoted by the VUGD as a key resource for emergency information.

These practical and educational efforts are underpinned by a broader national defense strategy that formally acknowledges psychological defense and nonviolent civil resistance as crucial components of CND. A noteworthy aspect of Latvia’s posture is the formal integration of nonviolent civil

resistance, where the 2020 State Defense Concept explicitly includes “nonviolent civil resistance against occupation forces” as a component of the societal dimension of “total defense.” This signifies a preparedness to resist aggression through a wide spectrum of means, not limited to armed conflict. This is, in large part, a direct response to Russia’s information manipulation and its treatment of the information space as a critical front. Securing an open media space and bolstering psychological resilience against manipulation is now a paramount security goal, involving the cultivation of critical thinking skills to withstand attempts to sow discord.  

To defend this front, Latvia employs a multilayered approach. The state has bolstered strategic communication resources, with a dedicated unit under the State Chancellery that coordinates messaging and works to disarm foreign malign information activities. Quality journalism is supported by funding and policy, and authorities have banned most of the Russian propaganda channels. In 2021, Latvia became the first Baltic state to prosecute individuals for willfully spreading dangerous falsehoods as per the criminal law, though there have been few convictions due to legal ambiguity in Article 231 around the definition of “fake news.” This state-led approach is complemented by a vibrant ecosystem of nongovernmental organizations, academics, and volunteers—such as the “Baltic elves”—who actively debunk falsehoods. Investigative journalists, fact-checkers, and initiatives like the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence also work to expose disinformation and promote high standards in journalism.

At the community level, these principles are put into practice through societal and municipality-led initiatives. Continuing work started in the previous year, the Riga municipality has organized a cycle of seven practical civil-defense seminars across various city neighborhoods. During the workshops, residents learn about specific risks in their area, such as nearby high-risk objects and evacuation routes, as identified by the Riga city municipality. They also receive practical training on how to: adapt a basement into a safe shelter; properly assemble a seventy-two-hour emergency bag; and build mental resilience with psychological self-help techniques.

To address the wider Russian threat to Western society, Latvia is sharing what it is learning with its allies and partners. It hosts NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, and it works with allies and partners to combat malign influence. Examples of this kind of cooperation are IREX (International Research and Exchanges Board), which conducts media training in the Baltic area, and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, which investigates disinformation and debunks narratives, educates media consumers, and has had staff based in Latvia since 2017.

Governmental resilience

Governmental resilience is the central pillar that ensures the state can continue to lead and function during a crisis, providing the necessary command, control, and coordination within the CND system. This is achieved through a robust legal framework, a clear institutional hierarchy, contingency and crisis-response planning, and a commitment to testing these plans through regular exercises to guarantee the continuity of government.

The crisis-management system of Latvia is multilayered. The State Civil Protection Plan clearly outlines the responsibilities and leading roles of all state institutions in case of state-level contingencies. The system is designed to be flexible; for example, the Ministry of Health has the leading role and responsibility for management of pandemics, as was the case with COVID-19, with all institutions (including the armed forces) supporting these efforts. Meanwhile, in the case of a military threat or war, civilian institutions have the role of supporting the armed forces and ensuring continuity of governance and essential services. At the practical level, the system envisions the establishment of the Civil Protection Operational Management Centre (abbreviated in Latvian as CAOVC), that is formed in case of state-level contingencies, including war. It would be led by the Ministry of the Interior and composed of delegated experts from across the government, tasking it with coordinating interinstitutional response, compiling a comprehensive situational picture, and providing support to the NAF.

This role is to be complemented by municipal-level responsibility through the establishment of municipal civil-protection commissions that are obliged to plan and execute response activities on a regional level, as well as coordinate with state-level efforts.

The “Kristaps” series involves the Cabinet of Ministers in simulating strategic decision-making, as well as NATO Crisis Management Exercises (CMX), while the operational comprehensive defense exercise Namejs includes tests of civil-military cooperation, the practical implementation of civil defense plans, and the coordination functions of the planned CAOVC.

Latvia’s current push to improve its crisis-management system and governmental resilience is a direct response to lessons learned from a series of major crises. The COVID-19 pandemic served as a stark, real-world test of cross-sectoral crisis management, exposing significant shortcomings in interministerial coordination, public communication, and the ability to manage state material reserves effectively. The 2021 hybrid attack and instrumentalization of migration organized by Belarus on the EU’s eastern border tested the state’s ability to coordinate a response between interior, defense, and foreign policy bodies under “gray zone” threat conditions that are, as another Atlantic Council report put it, diffuse and hard to attribute. Most significantly, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022 has provided an invaluable, albeit grim, case study in the requirements of modern national defense. It underscored the absolute necessity of a resilient government able to overcome the massive scale of civil-defense challenges and pervasive hybrid threats. These events collectively created a clear need for reevaluation and reform of the crisis-management system in Latvia, highlighting systemic challenges in achieving effective horizontal coordination across ministries.

To resolve these issues, Latvia is establishing a new centralized National Crisis Management Center (CMC). The concept for the CMC, approved by the government in early 2025, represents the keystone of the nation’s reformed resilience architecture. Its creation is a direct answer to the lessons learned from past crises, designed to provide the professional, permanent, and agile coordination that was previously lacking. Operating under the direct authority of the prime minister, the CMC is designed to provide a single, empowered hub for analysis, planning, and, crucially, to improve coordination in crisis management between key state institutions, especially in complex threat scenarios, and provide support to decision-makers and political leadership.

The core functions of the CMC will include: continuous monitoring of the situation and information gathering; identifying potential risks and threats; conducting analysis of information and data to assess these risks and threats; strategic planning and coordination of operational planning; coordinating the planning, logistics, and recovery of state-level civilian crisis-management resources, including state material reserves; and coordinating crisis-communication efforts. Meanwhile, in the specific context of a military crisis, the CMC will be responsible for coordinating the civilian sector’s response and ensuring seamless cooperation with the military sector.

In essence, this new structure, continuously validated through planning and exercises, aims to ensure the leadership and effective whole-of-government coordination deemed essential for navigating these complex security challenges.

Challenges and future imperatives for resilience

Latvia has been systematically working to integrate all societal elements into its national defense posture, particularly since 2014. This ongoing effort, while showing significant progress, presents a range of challenges and necessitates clear future developments to ensure sustained and enhanced security in a complex geopolitical landscape.

Latvia’s commendable strides in building a comprehensive national resilience model are met with several persistent and evolving challenges; therefore, for the continued evolution and strengthening of Latvian resilience it is crucial to address them in a timely manner:

1. Building and maintaining robust military defense capabilities. Maintaining momentum in military modernization programs and ensuring the capacity to sustain combat operations beyond an initial phase are crucial for credible deterrence and defense. This includes addressing the timeline for military buildup in relation to potential Russian force reconstitution. While Latvia’s defense spending is projected to reach 3.45 percent of GDP in 2025, with ambitions for 5 percent by 2026, efficient allocation across diverse needs—from military modernization to civil protection and societal programs—remains a complex undertaking. This financial strain also impacts critical infrastructure operators and municipalities tasked with new preparedness responsibilities. Therefore, continued investment in critical military capabilities, including air defense, coastal defense systems (like Naval Strike Missile systems), and long-range precision fires (HIMARS) should be pursued.
2. Expanding the National Armed Forces. Planned expansions of the NAF and the full implementation of the State Defense Service face manpower constraints, requiring substantial investment in training infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative recruitment policies. The current reserve system also requires significant overhaul. Latvia should continue the expansion of the NAF, overhaul the reserve system to effectively integrate SDS graduates, and implement both dedicated reservist training and early military education. Ensuring adequate infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative policies for recruitment and training is crucial.
3. Developing targeted strategies for critical areas. The development of industry-specific expertise for business and service continuity, particularly for critical infrastructure, can be a bottleneck. Cultivation of a deeper culture of shared responsibility with the private sector through targeted incentives, joint training programs, and secure information-sharing platforms should be continued. Additionally, mechanisms for improving intermunicipal coordination and resource sharing can alleviate the burden or strain associated with this issue. Latvia should also move beyond awareness campaigns to foster active participation, skill building, and a sense of ownership among the citizenry. Relatively low levels of public trust in certain state institutions can potentially hinder the full engagement of society in defense and resilience efforts. Actively integrating civilian agencies, businesses, and citizens into national resilience and defense planning through practical taskings and drills could help resolve this challenge. A primary challenge is also extending the intensity of preparedness from military threat scenarios to encompass nonmilitary crises across all civilian institutions. Intermunicipal coordination, particularly in resource sharing, needs strengthening. Consistent funding for new municipal responsibilities in civil defense is also a point of discussion, which the municipalities have on previous occasions cited as one of the reasons for their inability to build up civil defense capacities.
4. Interagency coordination and centralized leadership. Ensuring seamless collaboration and clear, consistent communication of preparedness requirements across all sectors and among numerous actors remains a continuous task. Latvia faces persistent interagency coordination complexities. While the spirit of comprehensive national defense promotes collaboration, the practicalities of aligning different ministries, agencies, and even different levels of government can be challenging. Each entity has its own priorities, budgets, and institutional cultures. The MoD, while a key actor, cannot guarantee or ensure the engagement and resource commitments of other ministries. Effective comprehensive national defense requires a process led by a centralized authority with the power to direct and synchronize efforts across government—ideally the prime minister’s office or a dedicated high-level body. This is especially true for distributing tasks effectively among ministries and bodies of equivalent hierarchical power. Therefore, the establishment of the new Crisis Management Center is a promising development that could further leadership in the implementation of comprehensive national defense and serve as a central actor for confronting crisis situations. However, its mandate, authority, and resourcing will be critical. It must be empowered to not just coordinate but also to direct and enforce; it also must avoid becoming yet another silo and instead act as a true hub for national crisis response and comprehensive national defense implementation. The assurance that the CMC is rapidly and effectively staffed, resourced, and empowered to coordinate across all government levels, municipalities, and the private sector is paramount. The CMC should also be tasked with leading institutionalized, regular, complex cross-sectoral crisis-management exercises. Engaging all nongovernmental organizations and local media more consistently in preparedness exercises and overcoming local political inertia are both ongoing efforts. Effective Comprehensive National Defense coordination across ministries, especially in horizontal tasking, presents difficulties. 
5. Countering evolving threats in the information landscape. Democratic countries like Latvia must counter influence within political, ethical, moral, and legal constraints, while adversaries often operate without such limits, giving them an advantage in proactive narrative projection. Latvia must continuously adapt its resilience strategies to counter new and evolving hybrid threats, sophisticated disinformation techniques, and novel cyberattack methods. Sustaining and enhancing programs to equip the population to withstand long-term information influence operations and maintain morale during crises is crucial. Further exploration and integration of nonviolent resistance concepts into national defense training and public guidance could promote the adaptability of resilience in this area. Latvia’s main approach to countering malign activities in the information space has been blocking narratives rather than proactively projecting its own strategic messages. A shift in policy is also needed from primarily blocking disinformation to more proactive narrative projection by developing and disseminating national strategic narratives that reinforce democratic values and societal cohesion. Expanding media literacy and critical thinking education is still an option; so, too, is allocating more support to independent and local media. Collaboration with allies on resilience benchmarking particularly for critical services, countering hybrid threats, and protecting critical infrastructure could bring about collective benefits in resilience building. 
6. Reviewing the conceptual framework of national defense. Latvia has made impressive progress in defining and implementing the CND concept. However, we believe that the evolution of its conceptual framework must continue to better adhere to the complexities of real-life challenges and diverse crisis situations. As time passes, a review of the initially laid out core principles is needed. A primary concern is preventing comprehensive national defense from becoming a catch-all concept. While its all-encompassing nature is a strength there is risk that its boundaries are too wide and therefore its core purpose can become diluted, leading to a diffusion of effort and resources. For instance, if every societal issue is framed as a comprehensive national defense matter, prioritization becomes difficult and the focus on core security and defense preparedness could be lost. Future work should aim to refine the operational scope of the comprehensive national defense, ensuring it remains a focused and effective framework while clearly delineating its relationship with broader societal well-being initiatives. We need to clearly define what falls within comprehensive national defense and what is supportive but distinct to maintain its strategic integrity. 
7. Deepening societal engagement and cohesion. Latvia should continue its efforts to make its comprehensive defense concept a nationwide reality not just a government policy on paper. As comprehensive defense evolves into a social reality, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia. Although we have seen great examples of civil engagement from businesses in actively pursuing their role in the defense system, challenges remain with broad-based individual and community-level engagement. Latvia, for various historical and societal reasons, doesn’t always exhibit the strong deeply embedded community culture seen in some other nations. This can make reaching individuals and fostering grassroots resilience initiatives more challenging. Simply put, many individuals may not yet fully internalize their role or feel connected to a local preparedness network. Achieving genuine societal cohesion and developing the resilience of individuals within their respective communities must become a more pronounced strategic goal. This requires more than just information campaigns. It means investing in local leadership development, supporting community-based organizations, designing exercises that actively involve ordinary citizens in practical ways, and perhaps leveraging existing structures like schools, cultural centers, or even hobby groups to build networks of mutual support and preparedness. The aim should be to empower individuals and communities to self-mobilize for constructive action in crisis rather than relying solely on top-down directives.
8. Continued advocacy for enhanced support from NATO, the EU, the United States, and regional allies for Latvia’s capability development, military modernization, joint exercises, and resilience projects is crucial, as is maximizing the prepositioning of allied military equipment and stocks. The current strategic window, while Russian forces are degraded by the war in Ukraine, should be used to rapidly build up defense capacity and societal resilience, secure continued US commitment, generate a greater NATO forward presence, deepen regional integration, and refine reinforcement mechanisms. Other regional resilience priorities include transitioning the Baltic defense line from a concept to a concrete reality with fortified positions, leveraging natural terrain, and ensuring forces train to fight effectively from these prepared positions.

Editors: Armands Astukevičs, Elīna Vrobļevska.

Contributors: Mārcis Balodis, Hans Binnendijk, Marta Kepe, Beniamino Irdi.

Annex 1: Management structure

A. Strategy and policy level

President of Latvia and National Security Council (NSC): The president, as NAF supreme commander, chairs the NSC. The NSC, comprising top state officials and security heads, advises and coordinates on national security and defense, and offers recommendations to the Saeima (see below) and Cabinet.

Saeima (Parliament): Enacts national security, defense, and civil-protection laws; approves key strategic concepts (National Security Concept, State Defense Concept); and provides parliamentary oversight.

Key committees:

• National Security Committee: Prepares national security policy documents for Saeima approval.
  • Defense, Internal Affairs and Corruption Prevention Committee: Oversees relevant ministries, legislation, and budgets.
  • Comprehensive National Defense Subcommittee: Monitors government implementation of Comprehensive National Defense (CND) elements within the National Security and State Defense Concepts.
  • Other committees: May address specific CND implementation aspects as needed.

Cabinet of Ministers (CoM): The highest executive body, implementing national CND policy, approving strategic plans and regulations, allocating resources, and directing ministries.

Key bodies:

• Crisis Management Centre (CMC): Concept approval in early 2025; planned to be fully operational when legislation has been passed. Envisioned as the central, national crisis-management coordinator (monitoring, analysis, strategic planning. Its potential role in leading overall CND coordination is under active discussion.
  • Ministerial-Level Working Group for CND: Chaired by prime minister or lead minister. Ensures political alignment and high-level interministerial CND strategy coordination.

B. Planning and coordination level

State Secretary-Level Working Group for Comprehensive Defense (CND): Chaired by MoD state secretary. Coordinates CND plan development, harmonization, and monitoring across ministries at the senior-civil-servant level, translating Cabinet decisions into actionable plans.

Ministry of Defense (MoD): Lead institution for the State Defense Concept/Plan and CND concept development; responsible for military defense, NAF development, and civil-military cooperation planning.

Ministry of Interior (MoI): Lead institution for public order, internal security, and the State Civil Protection Plan; oversees the State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD), State Police, and Border Guard; coordinates the Civil Defense Operational Management Centre.

Line ministries (e.g., health, transport, economy): Develop and implement sector-specific resilience plans and CND measures, ensuring continuity of essential services and participating in relevant working groups and exercises.

Bank of Latvia: Ensures financial-sector resilience, including payment systems and cash circulation, in cooperation with commercial banks.

C. Implementation and operations (state level):  

National Armed Forces Headquarters (NAF HQ): The NAF’s highest military headquarters and main operational command and control entity under the chief of defense; manages NAF operations, plans/executes joint operations (peacetime, crisis, war), and coordinates with civil authorities such as the Operational Control Centre of Civil Protection.

Operational Control Centre of Civil Protection: A state-level coordination body for major crises or military threats; integrates multiagency expert groups and works closely with NAF HQ to coordinate civil-military efforts.

State Fire and Rescue Service (VUGD): Primary state agency for firefighting, rescue operations, and practical civil-protection measures; implements elements of the State Civil Protection Plan.

Other key state agencies and services (e.g., Emergency Medical Service, State Police, Border Guard): Implement crisis response and resilience measures according to their mandates and plans, participating in exercises and interagency coordination.

Municipal and private-sector actors:

Civil Defense Commissions (thirty-seven at municipal level): Develop and implement local civil defense plans; coordinate local resources and crisis response (including public notification, evacuation, basic services, shelters); cooperate with regional NAF units and state services.

Private sector/critical infrastructure operators: Develop and implement business continuity plans for essential service resilience; cooperate with state and municipal authorities; may be involved in resource mobilization.  

Annex 2: Framework of concepts, plans, laws, and regulations

Armands Astukevičs is a researcher at the Center for East European Policy Studies in Riga, Latvia. Currently, he is working on his doctoral dissertation on authoritarian regime resilience. He has a master’s degree in political science from University of Latvia. Astukevičs’ previous work experience includes policy analysis and planning in the Latvian Ministry of Defense, where he focused on crisis management and comprehensive national defense issues. His current research interests relate to topics on the defense and security policy of the Baltic states, national resilience and resistance to hybrid threats, and analysis of Russia’s foreign policy processes.

Elīna Vrobļevska is a researcher and deputy director at the Center for East European Policy Studies in Riga, Latvia. She has a doctoral degree in international relations from Rīga Stradiņš University, with her thesis on “Russia’s foreign policy identity ideas and their manifestation in foreign policy (2012–2022).” Vroblevska serves as a lecturer and researcher at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Rīga Stradiņš University. Her research interests include the analysis of Russia’s foreign policy narratives and their impact on political processes, the study of Russia’s foreign policy and the security challenges it poses, as well as the examination of Russia’s activities in the information space.

Mārcis Balodis is a researcher and a member of the board of the Center for East European Policy Studies. His primary research focuses on Russia’s foreing and security policy as well as Russia’s use of hybrid warfare.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Marta Kepe is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a senior defense analyst at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization.

Beniamino Irdi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also the head of strategic and international affairs at Deloitte Legal Italy and founder and CEO of HighGround, a political risk consulting firm.

New Atlanticist May 14, 2025

Inside Latvia’s race against time to build deterrence against Russia

By Armands Astukevičs and Hans Binnendijk

Latvia must convince its NATO allies to commit the necessary resources for its defense before Russia reconstitutes its forces.

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New Atlanticist May 7, 2025

Lessons from Latvia’s efforts to keep essential services running during a crisis

By Mārcis Balodis and Marta Kepe

Latvia has shifted its crisis-management thinking from a focus on infrastructure protection to an emphasis on continuity of essential services and functions.

Crisis Management Europe & Eurasia

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

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The post The evolution of Latvia’s defense and security policy in resilience building appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Israel has threatened escalated military action against Hezbollah if it doesn't withdraw further north by the end of the year.
• Hamas has rejected calls to disarm, and no other countries have agreed to forcibly disarm the group as part of a stabilization force in Gaza.
• The central risk facing the region is cascading escalation, from Gaza to Lebanon to Iran and beyond.

As a turbulent year comes to a close, the Middle East is entering another period of acute strategic tension. There is a complex web of players involved: Israel, Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, alongside armed nonstate actors including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and multiple factions within Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces. No one should confuse the patchwork of temporary cease-fire agreements in place throughout the region for sustainable deterrence and peace, as underlying issues remain unresolved and adversaries’ desired end states remain diametrically opposed.

There is an elevated risk of renewed multi-theater conflict over the coming months. This risk is driven by three converging dynamics: Iran’s effort to reconstitute strategic strike and deterrent capabilities, the continued refusal of Hezbollah and Hamas to disarm, and the increasing linkage between regional theaters from Gaza and southern Lebanon to Iraq and the Red Sea.

Israeli leaders have publicly stated that diplomatic arrangements to stabilize Israel’s northern border cannot remain open-ended. Israel has indicated that Lebanon has until the end of the calendar year to demonstrate meaningful compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, particularly regarding Hezbollah’s armed presence south of the Litani River. Absent such progress, Israeli officials have signaled that they may consider military action to be a matter of necessity rather than choice. Israel could also escalate to achieve its goals of disarming Hamas and ensuring Iran no longer possesses a ballistic missile or nuclear threat.

What distinguishes the current moment is not just the persistence of these conflicts, but the degree to which escalation in one theater is increasingly likely to trigger responses across others. With Washington focused on a military buildup in the Caribbean and negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, US policymakers should not take their eye off the prospect of a renewed crisis in the Middle East.

Iran, proxies, and the reconstitution of deterrence

Iran’s regional strategy has long relied on a layered deterrence model built around proxies, long-range fires, and ambiguity rather than direct state-to-state confrontation. This model seeks to impose cumulative costs on adversaries while insulating Iran from direct retaliation.

According to repeated assessments by the US Department of Defense and the United Nations, Iran maintains the largest and most diverse missile force in the Middle East and continues to invest in survivability, underground basing, and production capacity. These capabilities are complemented by Iran-aligned armed groups operating across Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

From Israel’s perspective, this proxy-based deterrence architecture is an existential threat. Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack fundamentally altered Israeli threat perception by demonstrating that Iran-aligned groups could inflict a strategic shock without triggering immediate regional war. Israeli officials have since made clear that they will not allow Iran to reestablish a deterrence environment that sets conditions for similar attacks in the future.

This dynamic significantly narrows Israel’s tolerance for Iranian rearmament and proxy consolidation, particularly when combined with explicit timelines it has set for Hezbollah on its northern border.

Hezbollah, Lebanon, and the limits of state authority

Among Iran-aligned groups, Hezbollah remains the most capable militarily. Independent assessments estimate that Hezbollah possesses tens of thousands of rockets and missiles, including increasingly accurate systems capable of striking deep into Israel.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended Israel’s 2006 war with Lebanon, requires the disarmament of nonstate armed groups in southern Lebanon and the extension of Lebanese state authority. Nearly two decades later, Hezbollah has explicitly refused to disarm, framing its arsenal as a necessary resistance force.

The Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces have acknowledged that they are unwilling or unable to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. Public statements by Lebanese officials and international reporting confirm that the state lacks the capacity and consensus to enforce Resolution 1701 without risking internal conflict.

This reality has increasingly shaped Israeli planning. Israeli officials have framed the issue not as Lebanon’s unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah but its inability to do so. They have also argued that continued Hezbollah entrenchment along the border is incompatible with long-term stability. Since the 2024 cease-fire was signed between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel has been sporadically striking targets in southern Lebanon, and Iran has attempted to resupply Hezbollah with funds and weapons, exacerbating tensions that could reach a tipping point.

Gaza, phase two, and the missing path to disarmament

In Gaza, Hamas remains an armed political actor despite sustained Israeli military operations and international mediation. Hamas has explicitly rejected disarmament as a condition for any cease-fire or post war arrangement.

The US proposal for phase two of the Gaza cease-fire envisions a transition from active combat to a sustainable security and governance arrangement. However, none of the regional or international actors that have expressed willingness to participate in a future international or Arab-led stabilization force in Gaza have committed to forcibly disarming Hamas.

Arab states have made clear in public and private statements that they will not assume responsibility for Gaza if it requires direct confrontation with Hamas. As a result, phase two currently lacks an enforcement mechanism capable of eliminating Hamas’s armed capacity, leaving Israel skeptical that any interim arrangement can prevent future attacks.

This gap reinforces Israeli concerns that de-escalation without disarmament merely postpones rather than resolves conflict.

Cascading triggers across theaters

The central risk facing the region is cascading escalation.

Israeli military action in Gaza could intensify pressure along the northern border with Lebanon. Escalation with Hezbollah could increase the likelihood of direct or indirect confrontation with Iran. Iranian or Israeli strikes could, in turn, prompt the Houthis to resume missile and drone attacks against Red Sea shipping or launch long-range systems toward Israel, as they have previously done in response to regional military action.

Simultaneously, escalation elsewhere has historically coincided with increased activity by Iran-aligned groups in Iraq, including rocket and drone attacks on US and coalition facilities.

These pathways are not theoretical. They reflect repeated patterns observed over the past decade, now compressed by explicit timelines, rearmament efforts, and eroding deterrence.

Policy and the challenge of a stable end state

US policy should help shape an end state in which Israel’s security is credibly guaranteed and regional actors believe that further escalation will not produce strategic gain.

This is an exceptionally difficult balance. Historically, Iran’s use of proxies to establish deterrence has rested on its ability to convince adversaries that attacks on Iranian interests will produce widespread retaliation throughout the region. Israel, particularly after October 7, is unwilling to accept that framework and is increasingly determined to dismantle it rather than manage it.

US policy should therefore focus on restoring deterrence rather than pursuing temporary de-escalation alone. This means reinforcing credible regional defense postures, protecting maritime commerce, and ensuring that Iran and its partners understand that further proxy escalation will impose direct and cumulative costs.

At the same time, policy should define enforceable security arrangements, not aspirational ones. Stabilization frameworks in Gaza or Lebanon that lack credible disarmament or enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to reassure Israel or deter future attacks.

Finally, the creation of escalation management mechanisms that preserve decision space during crises. These include crisis communication channels, regional military deconfliction, and diplomatic engagement designed to prevent miscalculation even when underlying conflicts remain unresolved.

The region is not yet in open war. But the convergence of unresolved conflicts, proxy-based deterrence, and explicit timelines for disarmament has sharply reduced the margin for error. Preventing escalation now requires addressing not only immediate triggers, but the deterrence structures that made them possible.

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At the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, allies committed to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense, with 3.5 percent focused on core defense and 1.5 percent on related defense expenditures. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney says his country is committed to reaching NATO’s new defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP by 2035—and his government is also on track to meet the previous 2 percent target for the first time by spending an additional C$8.7 billion ($6.58 billion) this fiscal year (which ends in March 2026). Canada has struggled to meet NATO goals in the past. In 2023, it failed to meet both of NATO’s defense spending targets of 2 percent of GDP on defense and 20 percent of that spending allocated for research, development, and equipment. 

Although there is now support for increased defense expenditure at the highest levels of government, Canada has underinvested in its defense industrial base for decades and will need renewed focus, resources, and support to meet the country’s Hague commitments. How will Canada’s defense industrial base adapt to meet the current moment? Carney has put forward the bold claim that “Canada is meeting this moment with determination and resolve—modernising our defence capabilities, strengthening our industrial base, and reaffirming our role as a reliable partner in global security.” But what must its defense industrial base do to match this commitment?

In late 2025, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative hosted a workshop with government officials, academic experts, and participants from the public and private sectors of Canada, the United States, and Europe. The insights gathered from these conversations helped inform this issue brief, which assesses challenges, recommendations, and opportunities for Canada’s defense industrial base in an era defined by multiple conflicts and increased coordination by adversaries.

Canada’s defense industry at a crossroads

Canada has an extensive list of military equipment it needs to either produce domestically or purchase internationally, such as new warships, submarines, coastal defense vessels, fighter aircraft, and surveillance aircraft. This new equipment is needed for both national defense and to modernize Canada’s military to meet the current threat environment. In addition to renewing its leadership of the multinational NATO forces in Latvia, Canada has needed to strengthen its military capabilities along its three seas: in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans. This comes at a time when Canada is also juggling bilateral border security cooperation and engaging in a major renewal of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in close cooperation with the United States.

Central to Canada’s defense industry is its reliance on the US market and US companies, which supply much of Canada’s defense needs. Carney has often noted that one challenge facing Canada’s defense industry is that approximately 75 cents of every dollar in capital spending on defense winds up going to firms based in the United States. The relative size of the Canadian defense industrial base and its ability to compete internationally for contracts remain concerns as new funding flows to industry at an unprecedented rate. 

For the first time, Canada’s military is poised to receive additional funding through the new federal budget and facing “the uncomfortable position of having so much cash it will be hard to keep up.” This represents a dramatic mindset shift for the military, which has had to cope with deficits of people, equipment, training, and sustainment. Now, with more funding allocated for defense, the hard work begins as Canada tries to use that funding effectively to address gaps in equipment, personnel shortages, and better training opportunities for its military. 

With this increased available funding, the question matters of Canada’s procurement process and how to adapt it to meet the current moment. Canada’s procurement process, sometimes described as “glacial,” has received more attention lately and has a new agency focused on eliminating waste and accelerating the process. At the same time, Canada should recognize the constraints it faces regarding the size and scope of its defense industry; it should instead focus on niche areas in which it can excel, such as the maritime or Arctic domains. Many hurdles remain for Canada to meet the current moment, including personnel shortages in both the Canadian Armed Forces and industry roles. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), in its army modernization report, outlines the challenges facing the CAF to modernize, with at least another fourteen thousand recruits needed to meet the current security environment.

Recommendations for the Department of National Defence

1. Create consistent and predictable defense contracts for industry

A frequent refrain from industry is that the lack of consistency and predictably about defense contracts makes it challenging to scale and expand. A stable defense industrial base can foster innovation and address evolving challenges facing Euro-Atlantic security. The Canadian defense industry contributes about $10 billion annually to the economy and supports an estimated eighty-one thousand jobs. By investing in its domestic defense industry, niche capabilities, and evergreen infrastructure in the near term, the Canadian government can not only meet its NATO commitments but also expand job growth and economic performance. The long-term timeline for this investment in Canada’s defense industrial base will be key—Carney leads a minority government and this inevitably leads to a degree of uncertainty about long-term government commitment. Canada’s defense industrial base will not be able to meet the current moment with a one-off surge in available funding; it requires consistent and predictable funding over a longer-term horizon.

To get a sense of the importance of consistent and predictable defense contracts, look no further than the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) modernization process. Canada has been in the market for a new submarine fleet that is deployable in the Arctic with extended range and endurance. Two qualified suppliers—a German company and a South Korean company—will work with the Canadian maritime and defense sectors to deliver new submarines by 2035. So far, there is no project budget for this initiative, leading to uncertainty from an industry perspective. The Justin Trudeau government frequently made promises about defense spending that failed to materialize. The Parliamentary Budget Office recently quantified past underspending: between 2017 and 2023, efforts to buy new equipment fell short by C$18.3 billion. Ammunition producers claim they need at least C$800 million to open new production lines. Ultimately, for industry to respond to government decisions regarding its defense and security needs, a level of consistency and predictability must be provided, which has been a challenge for Canada’s defense industrial base in the past.

2. Streamline and strengthen the procurement process 

If defense spending is now a given, the question then turns to how the Canadian Armed Forces will acquire the materiel they need. On October 2, Carney announced the formation of a new agency, the Defence Investment Agency (DIA), to facilitate and accelerate the defense procurement process. The procurement process had previously been fragmented across multiple departments, resulting in significant slowdowns in obtaining critical equipment. The DIA removes some of the red tape and redundancies with a centralized review and approval process. The agency has a specific aim to bolster Canada’s domestic defense industry, to empower Canadian companies to compete globally while also investing in dual-use capabilities. This will specifically address a frequent criticism that by the time equipment is delivered it is either out of date or unfit for the current mission. Additionally, the agency hopes to bridge the divide between industry and government by bolstering awareness on both sides of the timelines, costs, and expectations for equipment deliveries.

The formation of the DIA is the first step in an overdue streamlining and strengthening exercise for procurement. As the Canadian government seeks to foster innovation and create national champions in the defense space, it needs to continue bridging the divide between industry and government. Additional work can be done to ensure a role for Canada’s many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in its industrial base, which is critical to ensure agility and flexibility. The current conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the significance of drones, but the next conflict might look very different and, in turn, might require industry to adapt to changing battlefield conditions. SMEs are better poised to adapt and pivot as technology evolves at a rapid pace and ensure Canada’s military is ready to respond to future conflicts. 

3. Balance “Buy Canadian” with buying the right equipment for the mission

Despite the improvements to the procurement process, the Canadian Armed Forces still needs to ensure they are buying the best possible equipment for the mission. As the CAF seeks more expeditionary and proactive capabilities, this modernization effort places a premium on not just buying domestically but buying the best possible equipment. The prime minister’s new goal of focusing investment on domestic manufacturers will naturally come into conflict with the army’s modernization efforts if Canada’s defense industrial base cannot produce equipment to meet its operational needs. In turn, this decision to “Buy Canadian” will impact Canada’s ability to export its materiel and potentially raise barriers to other markets. Canada exports about half of the defense materiel it produces, with 63 percent destined for the United States and a further 12 percent to the Middle East and Africa. Striking the right balance between investing in its domestic industrial base and strengthening ties to international markets will be key to the long-term sustainability of Canada’s defense industrial base.

4. Strengthen ties with Europe

The conversation around bolstering Canada’s defense industrial base mirrors those conversations taking place in Germany, France, and elsewhere across Europe. Indeed, a deepening of Canada-Europe relations has been on display in the last year in response to the growing complexity of international conflicts and crises. This includes a landmark security and defense partnership between the European Union (EU) and Canada, which was agreed to in June 2025. This defense pact paves the way for the two to cooperate on cyber, maritime, and space security, and also opens the door to joint weapon procurement. Additionally, Canada has been proposed as a potential participant in the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, offering low-interest loans to accelerate procurement and investment in defense capabilities.

Diversifying and increasing the number of strategic partnerships globally, instead of over-relying on a single provider for its defense materiel, is a logical step to strengthen Canada’s defense industrial base—and also spurs innovation and supply chain resilience. Beyond the EU, Canada has sought to strengthen opportunities to collaborate with its fellow Five Eyes members, particularly the United Kingdom and Australia. The newly formed Canadian DIA aims to facilitate conversations with its counterparts in France, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Due to the similarity of their intentions to spend more on defense, Canada will have natural partners in European nations, as well as the EU more broadly. 

5. Focus on doing a few things well rather than trying to do everything all at once

A consistent theme across the various challenges facing Canada’s defense industry—its size, speed, and reliance on the US market—can all be partially solved by specializing in a few niche areas rather than doing too much all at once. Three specific areas in which Canada has both urgent needs for development and the opportunity to specialize are: unmanned autonomous systems (aerial and underwater vehicles in particular); Arctic-specific technologies, including icebreakers; and maritime capabilities leveraging Canada’s three-ocean geography. The Arctic region emerges repeatedly as a unique domain in which Canada should invest more, for both its own national security purposes and for enhancing wider Alliance capabilities. Canada has the most icebreakers of any NATO ally and is working through the trilateral ICE Pact (with Finland and the United States) to build even more of these highly specialized vessels. Capitalizing on the dearth of icebreakers within NATO would give Canada a unique opportunity to leverage its Arctic capabilities to support its shipbuilding industry while enhancing Alliance capabilities in the Arctic.

Conclusion

Carney’s government is taking unprecedented steps to strengthen Canada’s armed forces, invest in the country’s industrial base, and reaffirm Canada’s role as a reliable partner within NATO and the wider global security context. While his government’s approach and announcements so far are laudable, Canada now must turn to the task of how to support and expand its defense industrial base to meet these goals. Without this foundation, Carney’s pledges will fail to translate into improved capabilities and will hinder attempts to modernize the CAF. Time is short, the amount of work ahead is significant, and history will remember how Canada meets the current moment and security environment. 

Fellow

Jason C. Moyer

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Europe & Eurasia NATO

New Atlanticist Jul 23, 2025

To meet NATO’s 5 percent benchmark, allies need more industrial capacity. Here’s how they can build it.

By James Hursch, Kristen Taylor

Without more industrial muscle to increase defense production, the positive momentum coming out of The Hague summit could grind to a halt.

Defense Industry Europe & Eurasia

Issue Brief May 30, 2025

The frontier is the front line: On climate resilience for infrastructure and supplies in Canada’s Arctic

By Jeffrey Reynolds, Kristen Taylor

The front lines of strategic competition now run through the Arctic. Ottawa must do more to enhance its military readiness and infrastructure preparedness in the region.

Climate Change & Climate Action Defense Policy

Report Aug 1, 2025

Defining Canada’s threat landscape: Resetting for a new reality

By Peter Engelke, Ginger Matchett, Samantha Wong

In a changing strategic landscape, Canada must reinforce its national security and confront the threats of geopolitics, climate change, and emerging technology.

Climate Change & Climate Action Defense Policy

The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

Learn more

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On December 19, Atlantic Council Vice President and Scowcroft Center Senior Director Matthew Kroenig published an opinion letter in the Wall Street Journal titled “What Trump’s Foreign-Policy Detractors Miss.” In the article, Kroenig argues that critics of the new NSS overlook the practical roadmap it lays out for addressing core strategic challenges.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in the Wall Street Journal on the US National Security Strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These tensions have resulted in a new geopolitical landscape in the region, one in which any crisis should be analyzed through the lens of possible Russian subversion or interference. This reality is already reordering regional dynamics. The Kremlin’s militarization of the Black Sea has highlighted littoral allies’ vulnerabilities, including energy availability, gaps in the defense and technological industrial base (DTIB), reinvigorated nationalist and secessionist movements, and challenges to maritime traffic and commercial activity. And the Black Sea’s insecurity has implications far beyond its regional boundaries. Most recently, Russia’s drone and fighter jet actions have violated the airspace of Romania, as well as that of Poland and Estonia, demonstrating that Moscow’s hybrid aggression in the region threatens to spill over into equally vulnerable neighboring states.

To help secure the region and deter further Russian aggression, littoral allies must enhance their energy security and bolster the DTIB, those enterprises and institutions that provide the materials, products, and services vital to national defense. The wider Black Sea region boasts vast oil and gas reserves, and new offshore discoveries link the region with the global economy, while pipelines and commercial maritime activity act as a conduit. As a high-value commodity, hydrocarbons are a prime target for an adversary willing to destabilize an enemy’s economy, military readiness, and civil society.

For example, hybrid threats to offshore energy infrastructure could cause considerable disruptions to countries’ entire energy sectors. Romania’s Neptun Deep and Turkey’s Sakarya gas fields are especially exposed to such risks, requiring new technologies, such as unmanned undersea systems, to counter these hybrid threats. The Black Sea littoral states are also vulnerable to Russian-sponsored lawfare and maritime coercion, including the use of floating mines and other threats to maritime traffic and naval operations. Russia has designated large sections of the Black Sea off limits to maritime traffic for the purpose of military exercises, which impede freedom of navigation and commercial activity. These exercises are often unannounced or conducted with little advance warning, reducing investor confidence, creating timetable delays, and eroding the Black Sea’s longstanding maritime legal regime.

Black Sea regional stability is key to deterring Russian expansion into Eastern Europe, where the Kremlin wishes to splinter NATO and widen its sphere of influence. China and Iran are also trying to gain regional influence, leading to greater tensions on NATO’s southeastern flank. As Russia’s long-term goals in the wider Black Sea region are diametrically opposed to those of the West, much remains to be done to advance a counterstrategy. The Black Sea region’s instability demands greater transatlantic engagement across all domains and economic sectors. The United States’ Black Sea strategy, which was proposed in 2023 under the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, has languished. On May 28, 2025, the European Commission submitted a Black Sea strategy, but it is too soon to evaluate its impact.

Over the long term, there is a need for more resilient civil-military infrastructure, as well as for increased military capability and interoperability in the region. While all the Black Sea littoral states will benefit from a continued transatlantic presence, three nations in particular stand out. Ukraine is bearing the brunt of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Romania’s size, strategic location, and strong transatlantic credentials have positioned it to become a military and economic hub, particularly as more NATO assets are deployed there. Turkey, with its burgeoning defense industry, has NATO’s second-largest military and serves a vital security role as the Alliance’s guardian of the straits, as codified under the Montreux Convention of 1936. NATO’s Black Sea states have taken the initiative in the face of growing regional threats from Russia. For instance, in January 2024, Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria signed the Mine Counter Measures, which creates a framework for joint efforts to address naval mine threats and improve operational coordination among Black Sea NATO allies.

Countering Russian aggression in the wider Black Sea region will be expensive in both funds and political capital. It will also require greater collaboration among the Black Sea’s non-Russian littoral states. While not a NATO member, Ukraine has emerged as Europe’s most seasoned military power, capable of rapidly innovating and deploying new technologies. For example, Ukraine’s use of unmanned systems has inflicted considerable losses on the Russian Black Sea fleet, forcing it to disperse to safer ports and diminishing its effectiveness. In this regard, the Alliance has much to learn from Ukraine, particularly in twenty-first century multi-domain operations.

Whether or not a lasting cease-fire is implemented in Ukraine any time soon, Russian aggression has forever altered the Black Sea region’s security landscape. This escalation of the Black Sea’s militarization has heightened tensions, forcing regional governments to allocate increasing portions of their budgets to defense. All this portends greater destabilization, increased national debts, and the absence of a predictable commercial environment well into this century.

An effective response from NATO allies and partners requires novel and forceful policies that energize governments and private sectors to address key weaknesses in energy security and the DTIB. Indeed, a special emphasis should be placed on the private sector, which has demonstrated tremendous innovation and flexibility in the rapidly evolving battlespace.

While Kyiv’s role as a bulwark against Russian aggression deserves the greatest attention, Romania and Turkey have a major role to play in the Black Sea region’s security, as well. Both countries have increased their defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product, stepped up joint exercises, and enhanced cross-border collaboration. But further actions will be needed if Turkey, Romania, and their littoral allies and partners are to help defend the Black Sea from Russian aggression. While Turkey has a generally robust DTIB, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s are underfunded and in need of reform. Additionally, the region’s infrastructure is in need of rapid expansion and modernization, especially when it comes to trade routes running north-to-south and energy interconnectors. Admittedly, there have been positive steps on this front, including the launch of the Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria, which became operational in October 2022, among other successful Black Sea infrastructure projects. Romania’s efforts to increase its energy interconnection with Moldova are laudable, as well. And in December, Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria announced a joint project to build three new bridges over the Danube. Even so, time is not on NATO’s side.

These states and their neighbors cannot secure the Black Sea alone; this will require greater support from the transatlantic community. Moreover, the Black Sea states will need to find solutions with limited US involvement; the new 2025 US National Security Strategy makes it clear that Washington’s attention will be on the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific.

As Russia continues to destabilize and militarize the wider Black Sea region, helping bolster its security will require a concerted focus on informed government policies supported by a robust private sector to advance resilience, capabilities, and interoperability in the face of these growing security threats.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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This raised concerns among Western policymakers that Russia might shift its regional posture to Libya if its foothold in Syria unraveled, given Russia’s existing relationship with the Libyan National Army (LNA). Moscow has cultivated ties with LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar for nearly a decade to secure access to eastern Libyan territory and military infrastructure, turning Libya into a logistical hub for Russia to project power deep into Africa. 

One year later, Russia’s situation in Syria appears better than many expected in the early post-Assad days. Russia has preserved a reduced but durable presence in Syria. High-level engagements between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa reaffirmed Moscow’s role in the country, and al-Sharaa publicly committed to honoring preexisting military agreements. The result is a more constrained footprint, but not one that represents a strategic loss. 

While its plan B in Libya proved unnecessary, Russia nevertheless has spent the past year building up its logistical network in eastern and southern Libya. Serving as a transit hub, Libyan airbases give Russia the ability to reach deep into the African continent, where it seeds for instability with arms shipments and members of its Africa Corps—a Russian defense ministry-controlled paramilitary group and successor to the Wagner Group.

Why southern Libya became Russia’s new strategic platform

By late 2024, before its future in post-Assad Syria was determined, Russia was actively searching for alternatives for strategic relationships in the Middle East and North Africa. Flights from Syria to eastern Libya, movements of personnel and equipment, and diplomatic visits by Russian officials to eastern Libya were being reported, as concerns about Russia establishing a naval port in eastern Libya grew among Western leaders. A year later, Russia still has not secured a port in the southern Mediterranean, likely because Libya’s eastern authorities are unwilling to jeopardize improving ties with the United States, Turkey, and European partners by granting Moscow a major coastal facility. 

Instead, Russia expanded inland in Libya. The Maaten al-Sarra airbase provides a key example. This strategically located airbase near the borders with Chad and Sudan is a staging point for Russia’s destabilizing operations across the Sahel. It predates the Assad regime’s collapse and is reportedly financed by the United Arab Emirates. But beginning in December 2024, Russian equipment, personnel, and Syrian fighters tied to the Assad regime began arriving at the desert airbase 

Although Maaten al-Sarra is a key location in Russia’s southern Libya presence, Moscow uses multiple airfields as part of its transit corridor to the Sahel. These include the al-Khadim base in eastern Libya, the al-Jufra base in central Libya, the Brak al-Shati base near Sabha, and the al-Qardabiya base south of Sirte. Together, these dispersed locations form a resilient transit network connecting Russia’s foothold in Syria to its growing activities in the Sahel, increasing Russia’s ability to sustain Africa Corps deployments and arms supplies to its African partners. The inland network faces less international scrutiny, requires fewer political concessions from Libyan authorities, and gives Moscow access to remote corridors that support long-range logistical movements.

Countering Russia’s gains in Libya  

Russia’s increased presence in Libya over the past year hasn’t gone entirely unchecked. The United States and its key international partners have sought to counter Russian activities and influence. This has primarily been through a strategy to accelerate military unification between eastern and western Libya, with promises of security cooperation and training. LNA Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar has been the main focus of these efforts to untangle the LNA from Russia’s hold.  

In February, the United States sent two B-52H Stratofortress aircraft into Libyan airspace as part of a joint training with Libyan military tactical air controllers. In April, the US Navy conducted its first port call to Libya in over fifty years with stops in Tripoli and Benghazi. That same month, Ankara hosted a visit by LNA’s Saddam Hafter, and in August, the Turkish Navy conducted port calls to both Tripoli and Benghazi as well.

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly this September, the United States hosted a senior officials meeting on Libya. Participants included representatives from Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The importance of Libyan east-west security integration was highlighted, as was the importance of modifying the UN arms embargo in January 2025, which enables joint training and technical assistance in support of east-west integration. 

In October, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. John Brennan announced that Libya will participate and co-host part of the US military’s annual Flintlock exercise in the spring of 2026. Brennan commented that “this exercise isn’t just about military training; it’s about overcoming divisions, building capacity, and supporting Libya’s sovereign right to determine its own future.” 

During the first week of December, AFRICOM Commander Gen. Dagvin Anderson met in Tripoli with Deputy Minister of Defense Abdulsalam Zubi and Chief of Staff Gen. Mohamed al-Haddad, as well as with Haftar and his son Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar in Benghazi. These discussions focused on maintaining regional stability, supporting Libyan efforts to unify military institutions, and US-Libya security cooperation, including Flintlock 26.

While these efforts by the United States and its partners have likely nudged along east-west military integration in Libya, it remains unclear if the strategy has done much to counter Russian activities or separate Russia and LNA leadership. Incentives, such as legitimacy and security cooperation, may be insufficient when used alone to try to pull the LNA away from Russia’s orbit. Economic sticks, such as targeted sanctions, may be required too.  

Eliminating or greatly diminishing Russia’s use of Libya as a transit hub for its arms shipments and for personnel to flow into the Sahel would be a significant step toward promoting stability and ending conflicts on the continent. This would advance US President Donald Trump’s peacebuilding priorities, pushed forward over the past year by Senior Advisor Massad Boulos. 

One year after the fall of Assad, Russia’s most important bases in the region may not be Khmeimim Air Base or the Tartus naval facility in Syria, but instead a handful of small air bases scattered across Libya. This represents a key front in Washington and its partners’ efforts to counter Russia. 

Frank Talbot is a nonresident senior fellow with the North Africa Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafid Hariri Center & Middle East programs. Previously, he served in the Department of State supporting stabilization initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa.

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Bottom lines up front

• The new US National Security Strategy presents a view of US foreign policy that is, at best, noncommittal to the transatlantic relationship.
• In response, European countries should work to develop a new security architecture that allows for bold and decisive European action.
• This effort should be aimed not at breaking with the United States, but to boost Europe’s ability to act alone while bolstering cooperation with Washington when practical.

WASHINGTON—US President Donald Trump’s new US National Security Strategy (NSS) makes clear that the United States does not maintain a shared perception of threats with its NATO allies. In an incredible reversal of priorities from the first Trump administration’s NSS, the latest document spends more time describing an internal threat to Europe from European Union (EU) overregulation, censorship, and “civilizational erasure” than it does the threat of Russian aggression, which is largely absent from the document. While calling for an end of the war in Ukraine, Trump’s NSS clarifies the United States’ position as a neutral arbiter. In response, the Russian government lauded the NSS for being “largely consistent” with its worldview, even as Russia’s own strategic documents consider Moscow to be in an existential conflict with the West.

Rather than lament the United States’ noncommittal approach to the transatlantic relationship, European leaders should instead lean into the NSS directive for greater “burden sharing and burden shifting.” Specifically, European countries should work to develop a new security architecture that allows for bold and decisive European action. This architecture should be based on coalition and consortium models for decision-making, action, and capability development. Europe must also continue to plan a central role for Ukraine in Europe’s long-term security architecture, irrespective of Kyiv’s near-term prospects for NATO or EU membership.  

Some Europeans may hesitate at this idea, fearing that too much political leadership and autonomy might push the United States to further decouple from the continent. But if anything, the new NSS reinforces the need for Europe to develop new models of decision-making to bolster cooperation with the United States when practical and boost European agency to act alone when necessary and where interests diverge. If carried out effectively, this reorganization will lead to a stronger European pillar in NATO, more capable European allies and partners, and a more resilient relationship with the United States.  

Momentum is building for Europe to take on a greater share of conventional deterrence

Even before the White House released its new NSS, elements of a new European security architecture had already begun to emerge. Since Russia launched its full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, European nations have made unprecedented investments in their militaries and have been preparing their armed forces for territorial defense. On the Alliance’s eastern flank, where deterrence and defense are most at stake, NATO’s posture has evolved from a tripwire force of four battlegroups first deployed in 2017 to nine Forward Land Forces, positioned from Finland to Romania, that are better equipped to defend allied territory. The investments made by the lead European Forward Land Forces nations represent burden-sharing in action. 

With Sweden and Finland’s integration into NATO, the Alliance can now operate as a united front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The quick accession of both countries has put Russia in a more difficult position geographically along the eastern flank: the Black Sea is effectively neutralized and the Baltic Sea has become a NATO bastion. This consolidation allows for unprecedented European military activity and reinforces allied territory against air and missile threats, which have been compounded in recent years by the broken or expired arms control treaties that previously underwrote European security.

As NATO adapts its posture to new forms of pressure from Russia, many of its military activities and operations now rely on European initiatives and assets. This is the case with NATO’s Operation Baltic Sentry, which was launched in January after several allied undersea cables were damaged or severed in 2023 and 2024. NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry, launched in September 2025 in response to Russian drone incursions into Poland, also relies extensively on European capabilities. Both operations show that European nations can operationalize NATO’s adapted posture.  

And even outside NATO frameworks, European countries and the United Kingdom are creating new dilemmas for Russia. Europeans have continued to push sanctions and are focusing on dismantling Russia’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers. In October, for instance, French forces boarded a Russian shadow fleet tanker as part of a broader effort to hinder Russia’s ability to illegally acquire revenue.

New defense agreements between several European countries have reinforced a commitment to mutual defense that has, outside of US extended deterrence, primarily existed to date in NATO’s realm of crisis management. In just the past few months, the United Kingdom and France penned the Lancaster House 2.0 Agreement to modernize their defense and security relationship, Germany and France agreed to develop a defense and security council to better operationalize joint responses, and the United Kingdom and Germany signed a mutual defense agreement called the Kensington Treaty.

While these agreements and initiatives affirm the respective nations’ commitment to NATO’s collective defense and the EU’s mutual defense clause, they also highlight European countries’ push to work more closely with one another on security amid increasing uncertainty emanating from Washington. Importantly, these agreements also create complexities for Russia and China, both of which would prefer to deal with a less-intertwined continent.

Coalition and consortium approaches to security

Next, Europe needs to strengthen its ability to take bold and decisive action. The first step in doing so is for democratic European nations to follow through on their pledges to increase defense spending. NATO’s new target of 5 percent of gross domestic product for defense spending, coupled with the EU’s Readiness 2030 plan, gives leaders fiscal and political headway to drive up defense budgets. This will not be easy given anemic economic growth and the strength of populist opposition parties across Europe, but the threat of a revanchist Russia makes higher defense spending even more urgent. With defense industrial capacity nowhere near the scale and speed necessary to meet the strategic environment on both sides of the Atlantic, nations should also direct new defense spending toward effective and efficient defense industrial initiatives that will fill Europe’s urgent capability shortfalls. 

At the multilateral level, if Europe is to spearhead proposals for and by itself, European nations must prioritize decision-making formats that are smaller than NATO and the EU. This is true with Ukraine, as the future of Kyiv’s armed forces will be a cornerstone of the new European security architecture. The British and French-led “coalition of the willing” that supports Ukraine began as a summit. Today, twenty-six countries have made formal pledges, the coalition has established a permanent headquarters in Paris, and it plans to create a coordination cell in Kyiv.  

The coalition, though currently stalled amid frustrated cease-fire negotiations, at least allows Europeans to shape how Ukraine could integrate into Europe’s security architecture in the future. The coalition has announced that it would support Ukraine in a post-cease-fire environment by regenerating Ukraine’s land forces (possibly with boots on the ground), securing Ukraine’s skies, and ensuring safe and secure access for vessels transiting Ukraine’s ports. This structure remains the best model for supporting Ukraine in the future, given the United States’ lack of clarity around security guarantees for Ukraine or support for Kyiv’s future NATO membership.  

To build up the continent’s defense industrial base, European nations should adopt a consortium approach aimed at jointly developing and procuring military equipment and technologies that are complementary with NATO. This approach will be critical for rapidly resourcing and filling gaps that might be left by departing US capabilities in the coming years. For example, the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) shows promise, and it can be regarded as a blueprint for how European nations can work together to develop new capabilities together and decide when and how to use them. ELSA, which includes France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, aims to build a full-spectrum system for weapons with a range exceeding 500 kilometers. It complements the European Sky Shield Initiative, which although incomplete, aims to create a ground-based integrated air-defense system to protect European airspace that remains heavily dependent on US enablers.  

For these capability-centric consortiums to reach their potential, Europeans should pool financial resources through the EU and make better use of the intergovernmental European Defense Agency for funding and coordination. Several projects show promise such as the satellite programs for intelligence or observation as a future alternative to Starlink through Eutelsat. The uptick in Italian and French land-air missile SAMP/T co-production, which will in the future equip Denmark, the third European country to operate the system rather than Patriot. For smaller scale projects, the EDA should continue to support programs like the Belgian Dutch-led “replacement Mine Countermeasures” (rMCM), which aims at upgrading mine warfare capabilities.

A new way of working with the United States 

As Europe seeks to maintain US interest and commitment in the near term, it has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to rethink its security architecture and rebalance the transatlantic relationship. In this new strategic landscape, the future of transatlantic relations will rest on Europe working toward being able to defend itself while carving out room to advance proposals with the United States where advantageous for both sides of the Atlantic. Europe has strengths of its own in the balance of power against Russia, despite the latter’s perceived escalation advantage, and a major one is its high level of cooperation and interoperability.

Only a few years ago, building European coalitions and capabilities independent of the United States would have seemed a potential threat to transatlantic and European unity. Now it is the opposite. As the United States repositions and reprioritizes, more European action does not have to equal less cooperation with Washington. This new security architecture would also allow the United States to better identify points of dialogue on specific issues, helping answer the Cold War–era dilemma of who to dial when the United States wants to call Europe. Especially as the new NSS calls for the United States to “organize a burden-sharing network.”

Trump’s new NSS has outlined US goals, and neither Europe nor Ukraine should wait any longer for Washington to reinforce its commitment to transatlantic security. US priorities lie outside the European theater regardless of the security threats Russia or China may pose. Moreover, Europe will not receive such strategic clarity from an administration that pursues a situation-based and transactional approach to security dilemmas. Instead, Europe must be bold in advancing a new security architecture that has the potential to strengthen European defense and reset the transatlantic relationship for the better.

The post How Europe can strengthen its own defenses and rebalance transatlantic relations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 11, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig published an article in Foreign Policy titled “Two Cheers for the National Security Strategy.” In the article, Kroenig lays out the strengths and weaknesses of the NSS and places it in a broader strategic context.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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Director for Northern Europe, Anna Wieslander, featured in the New York Times on Wednesday December 10 on the challenges to Europe’s security.

Wieslander underlines that Ukraine is Europe’s first line of defense against Russia but explains that “we don’t follow through on what that means and what it costs”. The frozen Russian assets are essential for Ukraine to stay in the fight, says Wieslander adding that Europe must “take higher risks or pay a higher price later”.

The post Wieslander in New York Times appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Director for Northern Europe, Anna Wieslander was interviewed in the Swedish Radio podcast “USApodden” (The USA podcast) on the European reactions to the new US NSS and its implications for European security and policy.

While Europe remains important for the US Administration, it is perceived to have several challenges that Europe needs to deal with, says Wieslander. Wieslander argues that we are in a new era of European security and that the current Administration’s take on European security appears to be a longterm policy. “Europe must react and not remain passive”, Wieslander says.

It is “completely unrealistic”, argues Wieslander, that Europe would take over all US NATO responsibilities on European soil by 2027, as has been circulating over the weekend, adding that this may be a tactic from the US Administration to get European countries to do more on defense and quicker.

Listen to the whole episode to know more. It is recorded in Swedish.

The post Wieslander in Swedish Radio podcast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 10, Alexander B. Gray, a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Scowcroft Center, published an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal titled “The Logic of Trump’s Foreign-Policy Doctrine”. He argues that the new National Security Strategy’s greatest strength is its clear prioritization of core national interests within a larger strategic context.

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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On December 6, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on “PBS News Weekend” about the Trump administration’s national security strategy. He discusses key takeaways and areas where the NSS marks a departure from past policy.

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Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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However, the administration should consider the consequences of agreeing to a deal that favors the clear aggressor instead of fighting for a more balanced and just peace. The effects of the former would be felt far beyond Ukraine, Russia, and Europe: the very terms that would be agreeable to Russian President Vladimir Putin are exactly the ones that could embolden China to take military action of its own. The United States cannot isolate its actions in one part of the world from its goals in another. China will learn from any peace in Ukraine made under the current situation. The United States will reap the consequences.

Unacceptable terms

The most contentious issue in any peace deal is that of territory. Russia occupies large portions of eastern and southern Ukraine. Putin thinks he can lay claim to what his forces already occupy (and potentially more) in any negotiated settlement, especially because Ukraine has not demonstrated the ability to reclaim that territory. Also concerning are the implications of a potential near-term peace deal on the issues of Ukrainian sovereignty and a renewal of international economic cooperation with Russia. Putin wants limits on Ukraine’s military and its ability to join NATO. He also wants a cessation of sanctions against Russia, Moscow’s readmittance to the Group of Eight (G8), and the restoration of frozen Russian assets. Instead of a pariah, Putin wants Russia to be a respected member of the international community—the status quo ante but better.

China will learn from the outcome of Putin’s bid to secure these terms, just as Beijing has learned from the rest of the war. If Putin can secure vast amounts of territory through military force, then so can China. If Putin can restrict Ukrainian sovereignty via an invasion, then China can secure similar limitations on Taiwan. Given that Beijing’s greatest concerns vis-à-vis Taiwan revolve around questions of the island’s sovereignty, such peace terms for Russia would be a veritable coup for China.

Similarly, if Putin can forestall any permanent economic consequences for his invasion, China will learn it can do the same. The economic consequences China would face as a result of an invasion of Taiwan are some of the most important deterrents to a possible conflict. If China is led to believe it can return to its place in the global economic community—or even improve on it—after the short-term pain of a conflict, the deterrent value of these tools will be reduced.

Questions of resolve

The Trump administration seems prepared to give Russia what it wants because it assesses that Russia is winning, and winners dictate the terms. Underlying the urgency to actually end the conflict, however, is a desire by some in the Trump administration to shift resources away from Europe and to the Indo-Pacific to better deter conflict there. However, the actual amount of blood and treasure the United States has spent on Ukraine, while significant for the Ukrainians, is relatively small for the United States. The United States has no direct military involvement in the war in Ukraine, has not lost a single service member, and has deeply degraded the Russian military with relatively little cost to itself, all while spurring increased competition and growth in the US defense industrial base.

Therefore, ending the war in Ukraine under these conditions will not strengthen the United States’ hand in the Indo-Pacific. It will do the opposite. Peace under these terms will teach China what it stands to gain from military action and demonstrate the limits of US resolve. Deterring a conflict over Taiwan or elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific is as much about having the proper capabilities to fight a war as it is about having the will to see it through. If Beijing’s leaders are led to believe that US resolve over the Taiwan issue will dissipate before their own, deterrence will fail regardless of how many US ships, missiles, and aircraft are in the theater.

Changing the calculus

Given his current calculus, any peace that Putin will sign will send the wrong messages to Beijing. Thus, the United States must change Putin’s calculus. To do so, and thereby strengthen the Washington’s hand vis-à-vis Beijing, the United States and its allies and partners should make Putin question the idea that a Russian victory is assured. They must demonstrate the will and resolve to outlast him in Ukraine. Only then will Putin sign a peace that does not teach the wrong lessons to China. Anything less, and the administration may find the peace it has brokered to be fleeting.

Lieutenant Phillip M. Ramirez is a military SkillBridge fellow for Forward Defense in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

The post The cost of an unjust peace in Ukraine? An emboldened China. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, our experts dig into what the strategy includes and leaves out—and emerge with their biggest takeaways. This post will be updated as more contributions come in.

Click to jump to an expert analysis: 

Matthew Kroenig: Where the NSS succeeds—and falls short 

Jason Marczak: The NSS gives new insight into Trump’s Venezuela goals 

Alexander B. Gray: The Western Hemisphere “Trump Corollary” is a logical focus on strategic geography 

Tressa Guenov: The NSS avoids taking on US adversaries’ goals

Daniel Fried: The NSS offers an inconsistent but workable set of elements 

James Mazzarella and Kimberly Donovan: The NSS is as much about economic statecraft as national security

Torrey Taussig: The administration’s treatment of Europe undermines its own interests

Rama Yade: On Africa, the NSS emphasizes trade and a more interventionist security policy 

Markus Garlauskas: The NSS sends clear signals to friends and adversaries in the Indo-Pacific

Thomas S. Warrick: An emphasis on national sovereignty and business interests

Jorge Gastelumendi: Trump’s energy- and technology-dominance goals will need more of a focus on resilience

Caroline Costello: A major evolution in how Washington frames its competition with Beijing

Alex Serban: NATO’s eastern flank must respond to shifting US priorities with greater self-reliance and European cooperation 

Dexter Tiff Roberts: Trade and tariff policy is jeopardizing the strategy’s worthy goals

Tess deBlanc-Knowles: To reach the NSS’s tech leadership goals, the administration needs to invest in research

Where the NSS succeeds—and falls short 

While they might not have conceived of it this way, the true challenge facing the authors of the United States’ new national security was how to update the country’s mostly successful eighty-year, post-World War II grand strategy for a new era. The new National Security Strategy’s greatest strengths, therefore, come when it doubles down on past principles that still work and identifies creative solutions to new problems. 

The strategy is traditional in its strong support for nuclear deterrence and preventing hostile powers from dominating important regions. It calls for strong alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific—to be achieved in part by allies stepping up to do more for their own defense and greater coordination on economic security. The document prioritizes achieving freer and fairer terms for global trade and deeper economic engagement in most world regions. 

It provides creative solutions for new challenges with a suite of policies to address the downsides of globalization (on border security, revitalizing domestic manufacturing, and so on) and by laying out a vision for US victory in the new tech arms race. 

The document falls short where it rejects principles that have worked in the past (e.g., the pragmatic promotion of democracy and human rights) and where it fails to clearly identify and address new challenges before the country (the threat from revisionist autocracies and their interlinkages should have received much more attention). 

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies. 

The NSS gives new insight into Trump’s Venezuela goals 

The new NSS is clear: The Western Hemisphere is now the United States’ top priority. This is a long overdue and welcome shift, as US interests should begin close to home. The strategy captures on paper what we have seen from the Trump administration in action thus far, including the twin goals laid out of “Enlist and Expand.” This approach underpins efforts to control migration, stop the proliferation of drug cartels, reduce nonfriendly foreign influence, and secure critical supply chains. But also, and importantly, it includes incentivizing new waves of US investment, since strong domestic economies serve US interests.  

The priorities laid out in the NSS—from a holistic perspective—dovetail with many of the interests of countries across the Western Hemisphere, such as security and economic growth, which have been the top concerns of voters in recent elections. There’s also a regional yearning for greater US investment, especially in infrastructure such as telecommunications, technology, and ports, all of which simply has not come at the desired scale. The NSS provides a blueprint for the broader US government to elevate its role in these critical sectors, and it underscores the need for a whole-of-government approach. 

The strategy gives insight into the Trump administration’s ultimate goal in Venezuela. A country where Maduro and his cronies currently provide safe haven for criminal groups, profit from trafficking, and welcome the influence of foreign adversaries is a direct threat to US national security. Success in Venezuela, therefore, means ushering in a democratic government that’s a genuine US partner as part of the goal to “expand” US partnerships. And a US shift to the Western Hemisphere as part of the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine also signals that the redeployment of US forces to the Caribbean is not time-bound. 

The NSS further details a multi-pronged hemispheric effort to counter the influence of external powers, including Russia and, especially, China. For China, this means addressing Beijing’s growing footprint across commerce, investment, soft diplomacy, military training, and more. What should we look at next? How will implementation be prioritized, and how will this strategy translate at the country level across the hemisphere? 

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The Western Hemisphere “Trump Corollary” is a logical focus on strategic geography 

Trump’s NSS is a much-needed corrective to decades of “strategies” that, through their failure to force difficult choices about priorities and resource allocation, commit the United States to an overstretched conception of national strategy. This NSS is remarkably and refreshingly frank about the essential objectives of the United States: securing the homeland, which requires a secure Western Hemisphere, and preventing outside great power adversaries from exerting malign influence in the hemisphere. The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, which seeks to guarantee US access to key hemispheric locations (think the Panama Canal, Greenland, and much of the Caribbean) will likely stand as an overt, twenty-first century statement of a logical and previously unexceptional focus on strategic geography. The Trump Corollary carries real security and economic implications for American interests and security in the homeland. This strategic focus is likely to encourage new resources dedicated to intelligence, military, law enforcement, and economic statecraft programs focused on the hemisphere. 

The administration’s statement of intent for the Indo-Pacific is a consistent throughline from its 2017 NSS, but it also reflects evolving geopolitical realities. The NSS reiterates US commitment to preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific and strengthening regional partners and allies against China’s malign activity. It defines the region as the essential non-hemispheric theater for geopolitical competition. Importantly, the NSS seeks to draw a line between security in our hemisphere and deterrence of Beijing more broadly. This makes explicit a long-running reality of the US competition with China: Beijing seeks to distract the United States from maintaining the status quo in the Indo-Pacific by pursuing adversarial activities in the Western Hemisphere. 

Finally, the NSS is a useful thematic reminder that US national strength stems from more than simply the military balance. The strategy is explicit on the need for a strong defense-industrial and manufacturing base to sustain that military balance, alongside dominance in technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, and supercomputing. The NSS should be understood as a limiting document that seeks to more narrowly define US objectives globally, while also expanding the definition of US national power in a more comprehensive direction, building upon Trump’s long-stated belief that economic security is national security.  

Taken together, these lines of effort reflect a coordinated, holistic approach to preserving US national power in the decades to come. 

—Alexander B. Gray is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Gray most recently served as deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council (NSC).

The NSS avoids taking on US adversaries’ goals

This NSS articulates key policy patterns into a declarative set of priorities for the administration. But it also leaves several strategic holes on how and whether the United States will address the effect that adversaries will continue to have on realizing the NSS’s goals. 

On Russia, the strategy notes that Europe sees Moscow as an existential threat, but it does not contain any meaningful treatment about the threat Russia poses to the United States in terms of realizing its economic, soft power, or military projection—not just in Europe but around the world. The United States is cast more as an arbiter between Russia and Europe rather than the object of an almost singular focus by Russia on counteracting US influence and power projection. The strategy’s focus on Africa is welcome, but there is no acknowledgement that Russia and China continue to actively thwart nearly every US objective on the continent.  

The strategy acknowledges Iran’s role as a major regional destabilizer, but the Tehran problem is largely set aside as bygone. Let’s hope that is the case. Still, the Middle East has continuously demonstrated to every successive US administration that the United States must always remain vigilant in the region. Iran’s influence in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Gaza, and beyond must be closely monitored even as the administration pursues its investment-focused regional agenda. Similarly, North Korea is not explicitly named in the strategy, yet Pyongyang surely will have designs on global attention over the next three years.   

The strategy’s muted treatment of adversary goals is likely intentional, a bid to signal a new chapter for the United States where it is less encumbered by the strategic irritants of the post-Cold War era and is free to pursue a bolder interest-based agenda. The reality remains that US adversaries do not want to see this NSS realized whether the United States names them or not. US strategy must continue to take those factors into account.  

—Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, she was the US principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the US Department of Defense. 

The NSS offers an inconsistent but workable set of elements 

The newly released NSS seems to combine: 

• an overlay of post-Iraq/Afghanistan weariness and reaction, a sort of right-wing version of the post-Vietnam “come home, America” thinking of the Democrats in the early 1970s; 
• ideological posturing, particularly directed against Europe with a sharp partisan element of support for “patriotic” (presumably meaning nationalist and nativist) parties; 
• a call for fortress America (the document refers to the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” which seems to mean a desire to prevent outside powers such as China from establishing economic leverage in the hemisphere);
• a strong assertion of US interests in pushing back on Chinese economic coercion and distortion of global trade as well as Chinese expansionism. The section on Asia has good language about no change to the Taiwan “status quo” and lots about protecting the Western Pacific island chains;
• possibly workable language on economic policy, with emphasis on preventing foreign domination of critical resources and technologies and foreign exploitation of international trade, and; 
• inconsistent, occasionally odd, and probably compromise language on Europe that combines partisan hostility to Europe’s mainstream politics with grudging but welcome recognition that the United States needs to work with Europe.

The NSS is weak on Russia, which is mentioned only in a European context. But it does call for a “cession of hostilities” in Ukraine that leaves Ukraine a “viable state” and terms this a “core interest” of the United States. That’s not sufficient, given Russian President Vladimir Putin’s refusal to engage in US efforts to end the war, but it is good enough to support a good-enough policy, if the Trump team decides to push Russia to achieve this core interest. 

The strategy’s ideological hostility toward Europe combines with its implied bitterness over perceived US overextension and general disdain for “values” to drive US withdrawal from leadership of the free world—and even the concept of the free world itself. At the same time, the NSS elsewhere recognizes that the United States will need its friends, Europe included, to contend with its adversaries, especially China. This gives the NSS an internal incoherence. To a policy practitioner, the incoherence could provide an opportunity to build on the NSS’s better elements. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He formerly served as special assistant and National Security Council senior director for presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, ambassador to Poland, and assistant secretary of state for Europe.

The NSS is as much about economic statecraft as national security

The second Trump administration’s NSS is as much an economic statecraft strategy as it is a national security strategy, justifying US internationalism primarily based on economic interests, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, and, perhaps surprisingly for those concerned about the merger of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) into the Department of State, reinforcing the importance of soft power.  

It frames foreign policy around traditional economic statecraft objectives such as preserving secure supply chains, access to raw materials, protecting US export markets, and ensuring dominance of US technology and industrial capacity. International assistance is not dismissed, but it is also not presented as a tool of humanitarian obligation or for providing global public goods. Rather, assistance is considered meaningful when it helps protect or advance US interests.  

While this may seem cold-hearted, it actually reflects what many in the Global South already assume to be the reality of all foreign assistance and is how this funding has been justified to the American people for decades. Even as the United States provides food aid, for instance, US leaders talk about it as helping US farmers or creating global stability to ensure Americans’ own safety and prosperity. The NSS also notes plans to scale up the use of two of the most important US government development tools, the Development Finance Corporation and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, reversing a Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)-era assault on development in general.  

—James Mazzarella is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. From 2017 to 2019, he served at the White House’s National Security Council (NSC) and National Economic Council, first serving as director of international development and then senior director for global economics and development. 

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served as acting associate director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) Intelligence Division, in the US Treasury Department.

The administration’s treatment of Europe undermines its own interests

Throughout 2025, the Trump administration’s purported aim in Europe has been to shift the burden of conventional defense onto the shoulders of European allies. The administration scored a win at the Hague Summit by pushing NATO allies to agree to an ambitious defense spending pledge of 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2035. Unfortunately, the NSS does nothing to help further US national security interests, by the administration’s own definition, on the European continent.  

By underplaying—and refraining from even referencing—the conventional threat Russia poses to transatlantic security, the NSS does not empower those nations that are working to take on greater defense responsibilities. Instead, the NSS seeks to embolden those nationalist and populist parties (such as the AfD in Germany) that would be the most likely to cut defense budgets and downplay the conventional threats that have traditionally fallen to a reliance on the United States. In this regard, the NSS is an own goal that undermines the administration’s stated objectives for what it seeks to achieve with European allies. 

—Torrey Taussig is the director of and a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, she was a director for European affairs on the National Security Council.   

On Africa, the NSS emphasizes trade and a more interventionist security policy 

On the Africa front, the paper is thin—a half page at the bottom of the strategy—and is not surprising. It repeats the key angles of the Trump administration’s approach to Africa as already outlined before Trump’s election by Project 2025 (with a clear refutation of “liberal ideology”) and after Trump’s election by Troy Fitrell, the State Department’s senior bureau official for African Affairs, in Abidjan and in Luanda.