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Signing ten-year defense partnership agreements with three leading Gulf states is a significant outcome for Ukraine. However, the positive optics that surrounded Zelenskyy’s recent regional tour may have been even more important for the country.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than four years ago, Ukraine has been widely seen as a recipient of military aid and a drain on international resources. Zelenskyy’s visit directly challenged this unflattering and outdated view. For the first time, Ukraine was presented as a potentially attractive security partner with much to offer in terms of unique military experience and innovative defense technologies.

For anyone who has been closely following the Russia-Ukraine War, this is hardly news. Over past four years, Ukraine has built Europe’s largest army and has emerged as a world leader in drone warfare. The country’s formerly stagnant defense industry has expanded exponentially and now produces millions of drones every year as well as a growing arsenal of domestically developed cruise missiles.

This has made it possible for the Ukrainian military to blunt Russia’s offensives along the front lines of the war. At sea, Ukraine has used domestically designed marine drones to chase Putin’s Black Sea Fleet away from Crimea. Meanwhile, Kyiv has brought the war back to Russian territory with a long-range bombing campaign that recently knocked out around 40 percent of Russia’s oil export capacity.

Ukraine’s emergence as a major military force is already transforming the balance of power in Europe and will define Kyiv’s relationships with the wider world for decades to come. Zelenskyy’s tour of the Gulf states has helped to highlight this new geopolitical reality.

The Ukrainian leader’s trip was in many ways a masterclass in wartime diplomacy. By moving so nimbly, Zelenskyy secured vital support for the Ukrainian war effort and laid the foundations for potentially game-changing strategic partnerships with the Gulf states. Crucially, he also debunked negative perceptions of his country and enhanced Ukraine’s global standing as a drone warfare superpower.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Diplomatic dissonance in the Mediterranean

This vision of Turkey as a regional stabilizer sharply contradicts conventional wisdom across much of Europe. In Athens in particular, memories of the 2020 tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean remain vivid. At that time, Turkish Navy warships accompanied a seismic survey ship of Turkey’s national oil company, TPAO, as it searched for oil and natural gas in waters that both Turkey and Greece claim as part of their exclusive economic zones. Tensions peaked in August 2020, when a Turkish and Greek warship collided near Crete. Recent months have seen a resurgence of pointed rhetoric over the countries’ maritime claims. Senior Greek officials have expressed deep skepticism regarding Ankara’s ambitions, with Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias early last month stating that Turkey’s “revisionist agenda” remains a threat to Aegean stability. Greek leadership has specifically raised alarms over Turkey’s rapidly expanding defense industrial sector and its “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) naval doctrine, which calls for Turkey to defend its interpretation of international law on maritime borders and exclusive economic zones. For Greece, Turkey’s strong military is viewed less as a tool for regional peace and more as a mechanism for coercive diplomacy that continues to challenge Greek and Greek Cypriot sovereignty.

The rhetorical attacks have been even sharper between Turkey and Israel, posing a potentially serious challenge to Ankara’s mediation ambitions. Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have regularly accused each other of crimes against humanity.

Growing support for Turkish mediation elsewhere

Despite the reservations of Greece and Israel, interest in Turkish mediation is growing elsewhere. On March 1, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated in a social media post that she welcomes Turkey’s “readiness to mediate and support a resolution” to the Iran war “through peaceful means.” Pakistan, along with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, have now taken the lead in relaying messages between the warring parties in the hope of containing regional chaos.

Most importantly, US support for Turkish mediation also seems to be growing. A key factor is the personal rapport between the US and Turkish presidents. US President Donald Trump has frequently praised Erdoğan, describing him in October 2019 as a “hell of a leader” and a “tough man who deserves respect.” More recently, when asked whether Erdoğan could play a useful mediation role between Ukraine and Russia in October 2025, Trump replied, “Yeah, Erdoğan can. He’s respected by Russia, Ukraine. I can’t tell you about it, but he is respected by the world. And he’s a friend of mine.”

Ankara has indeed taken a balanced approach toward Kyiv and Moscow. On the one hand, Turkey has sustained military-technical cooperation with Ukraine throughout Russia’s invasion and steadfastly supported its territorial integrity. Turkey also prevented Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet via the Turkish Straits in accord with the Montreux Convention of 1936. On the other hand, Turkey has refused to join sanctions against Russia and Erdoğan has maintained a robust communication line with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This evenhanded positioning allowed Turkey to broker, together with the United Nations, the July 2022 agreement between Ukraine and Russia on grain exports via the Black Sea.

Turkey’s behind-the-scenes mediation was also crucial to securing the release of hostages from Gaza in late 2023. While the world focused on Qatar’s high-profile mediation, Ankara quietly leveraged its long-standing relations with Hamas’s political bureau, (a relationship that had irritated both Israel and the United States for years), to facilitate the release of more than twenty Thai agricultural workers who were not part of the primary prisoner-exchange deals negotiated by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt. Hamas credited Turkish mediation with securing the deal.

At the time, then US President Joe Biden made no mention of Erdoğan’s role in securing the Thai hostages’ release, instead crediting trilateral efforts by Washington, Doha, and Cairo. Trump has been more willing to publicly credit Turkey’s mediation role in the Israel-Hamas war. While announcing his twenty-point plan to end the Gaza conflict in October 2025, Trump stated, “President Erdoğan was fantastic. He really helped a lot, because he’s very respected.”

US embraces Turkey’s mediation

Trump’s appreciation for Turkey’s mediation seems sufficiently strong to have prompted his administration to drop the criminal case against Halkbank, a major Turkish state-owned bank. The bank was awaiting a multibillion-dollar fine after its 2019 indictment for money laundering over illicit gold shipments to Iran. Had the United States imposed the fine, Halkbank could have collapsed, possibly sparking a crisis across Turkey’s banking system. For years, the Turkish government argued that Halkbank enjoyed sovereign immunity and the case should be dropped, but as recently as October 2025, the Trump administration refused to express support to the US Supreme Court for Halkbank’s appeal that the case be dropped.

Then on March 6, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) requested that Judge Richard Berman drop the case, citing “extraordinary national security and foreign policy considerations.” The DOJ’s main justification was that Turkey’s assistance was “critical to securing the ceasefire agreement and Hamas’s release of the hostages” that the Trump administration brokered in early 2025.

The timing of the Trump administration’s reversal on the Halkbank case may be telling. Coming a week after the United States and Israel launched their attacks on Iran, Washington’s move may suggest that Trump foresees a role for Turkish mediation in the war. While Netanyahu may balk, Trump may find Ankara’s record of mediation too successful to resist. And indeed, Ankara has already begun playing that mediation role in concert with Pakistan, Saudia Arabia, and Egypt.

Matthew Bryza is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Ukraine bombs Russia’s Baltic ports as Zelenskyy targets Putin’s oil exports

David Kirichenko — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 10:15:43 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says some of the country’s partners have called on Kyiv to scale down strikes on Russia’s oil sector as global energy prices surge amid the ongoing Iran War. These international appeals underline the impact of Ukraine’s most recent long-range attacks, which have reportedly reduced Russia’s oil export capacity by at least 40 percent.

Zelenskyy did not specify which of Ukraine’s allies had requested a pause in the country’s current air offensive. In recent weeks, the United States has temporarily relaxed some sanctions on Russian oil exports in a bid to ease mounting pressure on international energy markets due to the closure of the logistically crucial Strait of Hormuz.

Speaking on Monday in Kyiv, the Ukrainian leader indicated that he would only stop targeting Russian oil exports if Moscow also agrees to end its attacks on Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. “We are open to discussing any type of ceasefire; a full ceasefire, an energy ceasefire, a food security ceasefire. We have already proposed all of this and we are still open. If the Russians are ready, let them suggest any time frame,” he stated.

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Zelenskyy’s comments come following some of the most significant Ukrainian airstrikes of the entire war. In recent days, Ukrainian long-range drones have repeatedly struck Russia’s main oil export terminals on the Baltic Sea, causing extensive damage and disrupting one of the Kremlin’s most important economic lifelines.

These Baltic drone raids came just as rising global oil prices linked to the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East threatened to produce a major economic windfall for the Kremlin. By hitting the most critical elements of Russia’s oil export infrastructure, Ukraine is seeking to limit Putin’s ability to translate higher oil prices into increased wartime revenue.

This tactic appears to be working. Speaking to the Current Time media outlet, independent oil and gas industry analyst Boris Aronshtein described the recent series of Ukrainian strikes as “the most serious threat to exports of Russian oil” since the onset of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in 2022. “The thoughtfulness, the scale and direction of the attacks, as well as the timing of their execution; all this together produced an effect that I personally cannot recall in the four-plus years of the war,” he commented.

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Ukraine’s recent attacks on Baltic Sea oil terminals are part of a strategic bombing campaign to weaken Putin’s war machine by targeting the ports, refineries, and associated infrastructure that drive Russia’s economically crucial energy industry. This has been made possible thanks to Kyiv’s decision during the initial phase of Russia’s invasion to prioritize the development of domestically produced long-range strike drones and cruise missiles. As more drones and missiles become available, the scale of Ukraine’s strikes is steadily increasing.

Zelenskyy has repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine’s expanding long-range strike capability is critical for the current war effort and equally important as a deterrent against future Russian aggression. While long-range weapons provided by Kyiv’s partners often come with limitations on how they can be deployed, there are no such restrictions on the use of domestically produced drones and missiles.

Kremlin officials have certainly noticed Kyiv’s growing reach. In recent weeks, former Russian defense minister and current Security Council secretary Sergei Shoigu warned that Ukraine’s domestic drone program had now advanced to the point where no Russian region is safe from attack.

Ukraine’s ability to conduct large-scale airstrikes deep inside Russian territory has sparked vocal criticism from within Russia’s influential war blogger community, while also generating widespread concerns over the effectiveness of the country’s anti-drone defenses. Many have questioned how slow-moving drones could pass through multiple Russian regions to hit targets often located more than one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

In fact, the stage for Ukraine’s recent successes was set by efforts to methodically eliminate Russian air defenses and create corridors for long-range strikes. This approach looks set to continue. With much of the Kremlin’s existing air defense capacity already deployed along the front lines in Ukraine or being used to protect major Russian cities along with the palaces of Putin and his cronies, there is now thought to be little left in reserve to counter the growing Ukrainian drone threat.

The scale and frequency of Ukrainian strikes on oil and gas infrastructure will likely continue to increase in the coming months as Kyiv seeks ways to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. The Ukrainian authorities are hoping these attacks can help bring the end of the war closer by depriving the Kremlin of vital funding and threatening the foundations of Russia’s economic stability.

So far, Putin has rejected calls for a compromise peace. However, he may finally be forced to rethink his invasion if confronted with the prospect of dangerous destabilization on the home front. The Kremlin dictator remains determined to achieve his goal of erasing Ukrainian statehood, but he is also haunted by fears of a new Russian collapse to mirror the catastrophes of 1917 and 1991.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The Gulf states

The Gulf states understand this instinctively. For years, some of them pursued a careful balancing act by relying on US security while maintaining pragmatic relations with Iran, even amid accusations that elements within them tolerated or indirectly supported Iranian-linked proxy networks. That strategy collapses the moment infrastructure becomes a target. Ambiguity is a luxury of stability; it rarely survives contact with risk. States whose prosperity depends on uninterrupted energy flows will not tolerate prolonged uncertainty. They will align decisively with the only proven security architecture capable of guaranteeing stability. That architecture is American.

Iran

By contrast, Iran under the current regime risks a historic miscalculation. Its strategy has long relied on asymmetry—pressure without full confrontation, disruption without decisive response. But there is a threshold beyond which such a strategy becomes self-defeating. Targeting the infrastructure that underpins global energy flows is such a threshold. Nations rarely fail because they lack power. More often, they fail because they misjudge the consequences of using power. If Iran is perceived not merely as a regional challenger but as a systemic disruptor of global energy flows, then the response it provokes will not be incremental. It will be structural.

Russia, China, and North Korea

Much has been written about a new alignment among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—an emerging axis opposed to the West. In reality, this has always been more fiction than fact. China depends on stable energy flows from the Gulf. Russia benefits from higher prices but seeks equilibrium, not chaos. North Korea follows but does not lead. When the stakes become real, ideology gives way to interest—and those interests diverge.

Europe

Europe may be another major victim of this situation. At precisely the moment when hard power, energy security, and strategic clarity are required, Europe finds itself largely absent from the field. For decades, it built a model based on external energy, outsourced security, and the belief that economic and normative influence could substitute for geopolitical strength. That model is now showing its weaknesses, and a persistent energy shock could diminish Europe’s geopolitical role further. Without unified military capability or independent energy security, Europe is increasingly reacting to events rather than shaping them. It has shifted, quietly but unmistakably, from actor to arena.

The United States

Beneath all of this lies a deeper truth that has stayed with me for years. During my time at the London Business School, my professor Andrew Scott made a deceptively simple observation: oil and the dollar are the liquidity of the world. He was right. Oil remains the physical liquidity of the global economy. The dollar remains the financial system that prices and stabilizes it. Despite years of discussion about energy transitions, alternative currencies, and new geopolitical alignments, moments like this reveal how little has fundamentally changed. The system still runs on dollar-denominated energy flows. Liquidity, in the end, has no substitute.

There is also a historical parallel worth noting. When US President Ronald Reagan entered office, he defined a small number of strategic priorities. These priorities included restoring economic strength and confronting the Soviet Union. But on everything else, he reacted. That clarity allowed events, many of them unforeseen, to move in his favor. A similar dynamic may be unfolding today. US President Donald Trump did not set out to engineer a global realignment through crisis. But history does not ask whether leaders planned events. It asks whether they were positioned to benefit from them.

If the United States maintains economic strength, energy leverage, and military credibility, then shocks of this kind do not weaken its position. Instead, they reinforce it. Because when the system becomes unstable, the world does not look for consensus. It looks for order. And order requires a guarantor.

This is where one’s legacy is ultimately defined—not in moments of calm but in moments when the system begins to fracture, when uncertainty spreads and decisions become irreversible. Reagan understood this. He did not control events, but he shaped the environment in which they unfolded. History rewarded him for it. Trump may find himself in a similar position. If current dynamics continue, this period may be remembered not as a series of isolated crises, but as the moment when global ambiguity collapsed—and when US power reasserted itself, not by design but by necessity.

In geopolitics, power is measured not by who speaks the loudest, but rather by who cannot be replaced. In a world once again defined by energy, security, and liquidity, the United States remains indispensable.

The post The Iran war has set in motion a global realignment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Inside Tehran’s toll booth

Alisha Chhangani — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 18:37:23 +0000

WASHINGTON—There is a lot of attention right now on how Iran is managing access to the Strait of Hormuz—operating a kind of “toll booth” in which it clamps down on commercial flows through the vital waterway while reportedly allowing some vessels to transit for as much as $2 million per voyage or according to particular political and financial conditions.

But an important question has received far less attention: How are Iran and oil purchasers settling their payments under current conditions? What follows is an effort to answer that question, drawing on new GeoEconomics Center research, to shed light on the policy levers Tehran is pulling and the economic-statecraft and technological tools it is employing—as well as the implications for sanctions enforcement.

How Iran settles cross-border payments today

Iran’s cross‑border payments system reflects years of sanctions‑driven adaptation. In 2012, sanctioned Iranian banks were disconnected from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network, which serves as the core infrastructure for global financial messaging. While this did not make all transactions with Iran impossible, it made standard cross-border settlement much more difficult by cutting off access to the main channel for bank-to-bank communication.

In January 2016, following verification steps under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, many Iranian banks were reconnected to SWIFT and some financial sanctions were lifted. But after the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed secondary sanctions, access to formal financial channels narrowed again. This repeated cycle of reintegration and new restrictions made it clear to Tehran that formal dollar-clearing or euro-denominated trade finance was unreliable.

In response, Iran has shifted its cross‑border payments system to a set of overlapping workarounds. Some transactions still move through formal banking channels in jurisdictions willing to absorb sanctions risk. Others are routed through intermediaries that can hold funds, net obligations, or obscure beneficial ownership. Complementing these efforts are state-led initiatives such as the Shetab system. While primarily focused on domestic payments, Iran recently expanded Shetab for cross-border use through a strategic integration with Russia’s Mir payment system. This link connects the national payment switches of both countries, allowing their respective bank cards to be “read” and processed by the other’s banking hardware. There also are several informal networks that settle transactions entirely outside of the banking system. For example, the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has described Iranian “shadow banking” networks that rely on Iran‑based exchange houses and foreign front companies—particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hong Kong, and Singapore—to move billions of dollars tied to oil exports and other activities.

At the base of this structure is hawala, a long-standing, trust-based system that enables value transfer without formal cross-border movement of funds. These networks are anchored in regional hubs such as Dubai, where a large number of Iranian-linked firms operate and provide counterparties for informal settlement. On top of this, Iran uses state-linked intermediaries, including front companies and trading entities, to facilitate transactions tied to oil exports. More recently, Iran also has relied on cryptocurrency to facilitate transactions that can bypass traditional banking rails. For example, the blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis estimated that Iran‑linked crypto activity reached $7.8 billion on‑chain in 2025, with stablecoins increasingly used for settlement and a growing share tied to sanctioned entities. US enforcement actions have increasingly targeted these channels, including sanctions on exchanges and wallet clusters associated with Iranian activity.

For Tehran, formal, semi‑formal, and informal channels operate in parallel, with transactions routed through different layers depending on risk tolerance, counterparties, and the constraints in place at any given time.

How China’s yuan fits in

China is now Iran’s main oil customer, buying over 80 percent of its seaborne exports. In this partnership, Iran trades discounted oil for Chinese investment and goods, with payments increasingly handled in yuan instead of dollars to reduce exposure to US oversight while also advancing the internationalization of China’s renminbi (RMB). Chinese refiners often buy Iranian oil through intermediaries and non‑dollar banks. The money stays in controlled accounts and is mainly used to pay Chinese contractors or cover imports rather than flowing directly into Iran’s banking system.

China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), a clearing and settlement network launched by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) in 2015 to process cross-border renminbi transactions, could be a potential channel for these yuan-denominated purchases of Iranian oil.

GeoEconomics Center analysis of CIPS data shows in the chart below that monthly averages for daily transaction volume remained within a $85–105 billion (600–750 billion yuan) range over the past year. In mid-to-late March, however, daily observations rose to over $130 billion (around 940 billion yuan). The increase in volume is notable in the context of the ongoing Iran war, which began on February 28, but it does not by itself show that Iranian oil payments are moving through CIPS. CIPS handles tens of thousands of transactions a day that reflect a wide range of uses, so the data are best read as a sign of broader growth in renminbi settlement capacity, not as direct proof of Iran-linked flows. Beijing also has widened the mandate of CIPS so it can handle some non‑renminbi currencies and provide broader cross‑border services, making it more flexible as a backbone for regional payments.

The UAE could be emerging as an increasingly important player in this network. First Abu Dhabi Bank joined CIPS as a direct participant in mid‑2025 and was later named an official renminbi clearing bank. Iran has incentives to use RMB in its energy trade with China, while the UAE has long functioned as a hub for Iran’s trade and commercial finance. Given China’s role as the primary destination for Iran’s shipped oil, a Gulf‑based RMB clearing hub could reduce friction in RMB‑denominated trade flows linked to China and support greater regional RMB liquidity. But there is little visibility into how these channels are being used during the current conflict or what is driving the recent uptick in CIPS activity. Any such transactions would likely occur indirectly through Chinese or third-country banks rather than through direct participation on the CIPS network, limiting visibility into how the systems are being used now.

China also could leverage Project mBridge, a cross‑border payments platform designed to enable direct settlement between central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), for purchases of Iranian oil. Originally incubated under the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Innovation Hub, the project brings together the PBOC, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Bank of Thailand, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, and the Central Bank of Saudi Arabia. The project has made more than 4,000 transactions worth $55.49 billion, with China’s digital yuan comprising 95.3 percent of the volume.

In November 2025, the UAE executed its first government payment using the wholesale digital dirham on mBridge, testing readiness for settling energy and commodity trade—sectors in which China dominates. Data on mBridge usage remains limited, as neither the PBOC nor participant banks are required to disclose those details. There is no public evidence yet of Iran-linked usage of mBridge, and Iran is not a member of the system, which remains experimental. In practice, however, the UAE’s banks, exchange houses, and free‑zone shell companies already serve as conduits for Iranian‑linked trade and finance, raising the possibility that mBridge‑linked institutions could indirectly handle Iranian‑linked transactions even if Iran itself is not a participant in the platform.

Conversations that the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics team recently had with policymakers in Europe indicate that Group of Seven (G7) finance officials believe participants may be leveraging mBridge during the Iran war. But the linkages and scale are impossible to know without more information. Given the project’s focus on commodity trade with Gulf countries and China, interest in its potential role in Iranian oil payments is high.

What to watch next

As developments around Iran and its oil trade continue to draw attention, policymakers should focus on several key signals.

First, will renminbi‑based payment infrastructure continue to grow? In particular, will CIPS continue to expand its network in the Middle East, where yuan‑denominated trade is easier to facilitate? Project mBridge remains opaque, with limited public data available. Still, as central banks continue to develop and test wholesale CBDCs, indicators such as new country participation in cross-border projects, energy-related pilot transactions, or spikes in activity during periods of financial or geopolitical stress could point to this technology being used more actively.

Iran, too, is advancing its “digital rial” CBDC, initially a reaction to US sanctions, which could eventually give Tehran an additional channel to steer retail and wholesale payments through digital channels. All founding BRICS countries are testing wholesale CBDCs and continue to push for a more multipolar global currency system. Much of this effort focuses on building domestic digital payment networks while piloting cross‑border applications that enable trade settlement in local currencies. Watch for any signals emerging from the next BRICS summit, planned for September 2026 in India, as well as broader developments in these payment systems—particularly given that India is the second‑largest buyer of Iranian oil.

It is important to note that these systems still do not challenge the dollar’s status as the reserve currency and its prevalence in international transactions. CIPS continues to have a much smaller network than the West’s financial architecture, which includes SWIFT and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). However, these alternative systems do undermine a pillar of dollar dominance: the power of financial sanctions. Especially in this case, they provide Iran with channels to maintain oil revenue and trade flows despite pressure.

Iran has levers it can use to facilitate trade in yuan or other non-dollar currencies. Tehran’s payment landscape, however, remains fragmented. The yuan does not provide Iran with a way out of sanctions, but it may offer a cheaper way through them by reducing dependence on dollar-clearing channels and lowering the compliance and intermediary costs associated with sanctioned transactions.

Perhaps the most important shift to watch, then, is how the routes connecting trade to payment are changing. Are those changes limited to the current crisis? And will they have longer-term implications for cross-border payments outside the dollar?

The post Inside Tehran’s toll booth appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ten lessons from the first month of the Iran war

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 27 Mar 2026 22:02:18 +0000

One month ago, US and Israeli forces launched a military campaign against the Iranian regime that has had profound, globe-spanning consequences ever since—from energy markets to the global economy, and from the Gulf and broader Middle East to Romania, Sri Lanka, Russia, and China.

With scenarios for the conflict’s next phrase ranging from diplomatic off-ramps to military escalation, we asked Atlantic Council experts to identify their biggest takeaways from the war so far.

What we’ve learned about . . .

The Iranian regime

The Trump doctrine

The Iranian opposition

The Gulf states

Israel

The global economy

Global energy markets

Russia and Iran

China and Iran

The Iranian regime

One month into the Iran war, the Iranian regime is bruised, battered, and (perhaps irrationally) bullish about its future. The regime’s apparatus has withstood the decapitation of its leadership and more than 15,000 strikes on its capabilities and infrastructure. At the same time, the regime has executed a premeditated and effective response that has imposed significant costs on US Gulf allies and energy infrastructure. The de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been its most potent weapon, inflicting significant pain on the global economy that has netted the regime unilateral concessions from the United States to relieve stress on financial markets.

Internally, the regime appears stable. The Islamic Republic has proven to be much larger than any one individual. There has not been any significant domestic uprising to date. Most notably, there have not been any defections among political and security elites. The most hardline voices within the system have been empowered. All these factors have led many within the regime to believe it is winning the war despite the conditions of the battlefield.

Yet there are significant challenges ahead for the regime that extend beyond the war. It’s increasingly clear that after rejecting talks with the United States, Iran has no clear plan for what comes next. A reported US offer was nowhere near viable, but the rejection of that offer increases the likelihood of US ground troops invading Iranian territory. A messy situation looks primed to get much worse.

Assuming the Iranian regime does survive the war, it still faces a long-term existential crisis. The regime cannot provide the economic or political opportunities its population craves. To stay in power, Iran will either need to consistently and systematically repress dissent or make significant changes to the Islamic Republic’s core ideologies. Those changes seem unlikely to happen in the short term. Therefore, surviving this war will only delay the next crisis.

—Nate Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Beginning in 2015, he served as a senior advisor on Iran policy to successive administrations, including most recently as director for Iran at the US National Security Council.

A man holds a poster with the image of Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, during an anti-US and Israeli rally in Tehran, Iran, on March 22, 2026. (Majid Asgaripour/WANA via Reuters)

US military capabilities

The United States can execute fast, precise, and integrated multi-domain operations at scale, but it can’t sustain this kind of high operational tempo over time.

Headlines have highlighted new technologies, such as the US military’s use of LUCAS (Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Aircraft Systems), PrSM (Precision Strike Missiles), and an artificial intelligence–driven battle management system.

The real story, however, is the joint integration of these and other capabilities across at least six combatant commands and thousands of soldiers. The United States is delivering coordinated strikes faster than ever while simultaneously working with allies and partners to effectively defend against Iranian attacks. No other military in the world has demonstrated this level of proficiency. Adversaries can acquire new technologies, but they can’t buy talent and the type of command-and-control culture that empowers US soldiers to act together seamlessly.

Sustaining these capabilities, however, is a perennial challenge. Demand for munitions exceeds available supply, and as Diana Maurer of the US Government Accountability Office noted in her testimony this month: “DOD has been unable to sustain its weapon systems to meet its goals across all domains and faces challenges providing logistical support to US forces, especially in contested environments.”

This is why it’s a national security imperative to invest in domestic capacity. The United States must be able to sustain its military in a longer high-end fight—a topic of Forward Defense’s ReForge Commission.

—Joe Costa is the director of the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans and posture in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Trump doctrine

One month into the war with Iran, Trump’s actions have us rethinking his “peace through strength” doctrine. Until this point, it was pretty clear that Trump was okay with short, sharp, decisive actions like we saw with the strike to eliminate Iranian IRGC general Qasem Soleimani in the first Trump administration; Operation Midnight Hammer, which targeted Iranian nuclear sites; and Operation Absolute Resolve, which removed strongman Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela. We also know that Trump is uncomfortable with long, drawn-out military campaigns with no end in sight, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine.

So while I am not surprised by the airstrikes against Iran, I am surprised by the scale of the campaign and by the fact that it now appears Trump is on the verge of sending in ground forces. Some commentators had previously remarked that we were never going to see Trump send the 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East. But that’s exactly what he did this week.

It is still my prediction that, consistent with Trump’s “peace through strength” doctrine, the US president will ultimately declare victory and end the conflict soon rather than allow himself to get into an extended military quagmire.

—Matthew Kroenig  is vice president for geostrategy and fellows and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The Iranian opposition

Amid conflicting messages from the Trump administration about the goal of continued US and Israeli military strikes on Iran (is it for regime change or to only weaken the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and ballistic-missile capacity?) the Iranian opposition has found itself needing to urgently define the path forward.

This weekend, a group of hundreds of ideologically diverse opposition activists are meeting in London as part of the Iran Freedom Congress to discuss Iran’s future and a pluralistic vision for guiding a transition. Critically, they are not positioning this as a challenge to any other opposition figure, including Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah. Rather, it is intended to “broaden the tent” to ensure that diverse voices are represented in any democratic process moving forward. Pahlavi has also made efforts in recent weeks to expand his reach by holding meetings with a wider set of activists and bringing Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Iranian jurist Shirin Ebadi on to chair a transitional justice committee. Ebadi’s involvement is significant not only for her deep global reach and connections to figures leading transitional justice processes in other countries, but also for the fact that she once supported the 1979 revolution that unseated Pahlavi’s father.

While this show of unity was celebrated by some, it has also been critiqued by others who have even called for Ebadi to be stripped of her Nobel (which is a technical impossibility). Meanwhile, still others contend that no movement for human rights and democracy can move forward without an immediate cease-fire, that the bombs only weaken the civil society that is seeking an end to this regime, and that a meaner, harsher regime may be left standing once the strikes end.

In short, much is yet to be determined but will become clear over the next few weeks—including in light of reports from some on Pahlavi’s team that Iranians have organized a ground game that will be activated soon.

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and a board member of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

The Gulf states

However the Iran war ends, it will not eliminate all of Iran’s attack capabilities. The Iranian regime’s apparent resilience and resolve suggest that the war will not change Iran’s intent to terrorize the region and assert leverage over the Strait of Hormuz either. The United States and Israel may feel comfortable with the dent the war has put in Iran’s long-range missile capabilities and nuclear program, especially as Trump seeks an exit that will quell global markets and relieve political pressure at home. But the threat to Iran’s Gulf neighbors will remain.

Iran’s attacks on all six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provide an unprecedented opportunity for its member countries to deepen their diplomatic, security, and economic integration in ways that could profoundly strengthen their resilience. GCC solidarity in the immediate aftermath of the attacks demonstrated the potential of such unity, including a historic UN Security Council Resolution.

One month in, however, longstanding fissures are re-emerging, including around how and when to end the war and what the region should look like after the bombs stop. And it appears there is still a rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that will jeopardize Gulf unity going forward.

Gulf countries do not have a simple solution for navigating heightened security and economic threats after the war. While there may be frustration with the United States, Russia and China’s responses to the war make it clear that there is no replacing US security support. And while the war’s disruption to oil and gas production reinforces Gulf countries’ efforts to diversify their economies, the disruption to air travel, shipping, and investor confidence underscores that no sector is completely safe.

The Gulf solution to these threats is likely to be intense diversification: deepening security partnerships with a range of different partners, reducing strategic redundancy through new trade and energy corridors, and embracing a range of industries that are less vulnerable to disruptions to the movement of goods and people, such as advanced technology.

—Allison Minor is the director of the Project for Middle East Integration with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. She previously served as US deputy special envoy for Yemen and as director for Arabian Peninsula affairs at the National Security Council.

Israel

While US and Israeli forces engage in an unprecedented, combined military campaign in Iran with considerable operational achievements—a high point in bilateral military cooperation—views on the conflict diverge considerably among the American and Israeli publics.

In contrast with US polls that indicate around 60 percent opposition to the war, support for the war effort began and remained high in Israel, with initial polls indicating well over 80 percent support, and over 90 percent among Jewish Israelis. More recent polling suggests slight slippage, as four weeks of being sent to bomb shelters by missile attacks wears on the population, but an overwhelming majority still support continuing the war. That steady backing is understandable, considering the Iranian regime’s long-held and oft-stated commitment to Israel’s destruction, and its hostility expressed in sponsoring terrorist organizations, attacks on Israel with ballistic missiles, and pursuit of a nuclear program that could enable Iran to possess a nuclear weapon.

The global interests that animate so much of the American debate around the war—the fear of overstretch in regime-change wars, the global economic shock caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the impact on strategic competition with China and Russia—feature far less prominently in the Israeli discourse.

While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains a divisive figure in Israeli politics, his political opponents have nearly universally expressed backing for the campaign in Iran. They have echoed his hope that the campaign will weaken the regime to the point that the Iranian people will overthrow it. But that consensus has not translated into a meaningful boost for the prime minister in polls ahead of a crucial election later this year. In a sense, the Israeli consensus, surrounding the need to strike a dangerous foe at its weakest point and take advantage of the opportunity presented by Trump’s willingness to join the fight, exists alongside, and distinct from, Israel’s longstanding polarized politics.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017 and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.

The global economy

We’ve learned two connected things about the global economy in the month since the Iran war started. The first is that the markets matter for the military. Strikes have consistently ramped up on Friday evenings and over the weekend, while statements about deescalation have often coincided with Sunday evening (when Asian markets open) or Monday morning. This is not a coincidence. There is a direct line of communication between the White House and Wall Street. But Tehran understands this dynamic as well: Many Iranian statements have been crafted precisely to sow confusion in markets at key moments.

But neither market sentiment nor media rhetoric can overcome the hard reality of oil and gas not being transited through the Strait of Hormuz. Time and again, the reality of the closure has rippled throughout the global economy. In the first week, gas prices dominated concerns. In the second, it was helium, a key component for chip-making throughout the world. In the third week, it was fertilizer and the potential strain on the global food supply. Just like the COVID-19 pandemic, the war has reminded us that for all the discussion about resiliency and artificial intelligence, the global economy is still incredibly reliant on a few strategic chokepoints, and the Strait of Hormuz is one of the most vital.

—Josh Lipsky is the chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council and the senior director of the GeoEconomics Center. He previously served as an advisor at the International Monetary Fund.

Global energy markets

Geopolitical risks are and will remain an enduring feature of energy markets, but the next energy crisis could dwarf even the Iran war.

In recent history, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sent world energy and food prices soaring, further amplifying inflation already triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic’s effects on global supply chains and revenge consumption. In 2026, the US–Iran war could become the world’s largest energy crisis in living history, with the head of the International Energy Agency warning that the current supply shock could outstrip the two oil crises of the 1970s combined.

While energy-related geopolitical risks are inherently unpredictable, they are generally not unforeseeable. The COVID-19 pandemic was sui generis, but Russian President Vladimir Putin credibly threatened a full-scale military action in Ukraine in early 2021, and analysts have been warning about Iran’s ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz for decades.

Another, greater foreseeable geopolitical risk looms over global energy markets. If the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attempts to coercively absorb Taiwan, probably via quarantine or blockade, Beijing will likely trigger the greatest geopolitical and energy crisis in history. Both the United States and the PRC are nuclear-armed, of course, but both also hold critical leverage over global energy supply chains.

If the PRC initiates hostilities, Beijing would use its monopoly across critical minerals, including graphite for batteries and possibly petrochemicals, while potentially exploiting cyber vulnerabilities embedded in its energy exports. The United States would seek to constrain the PRC’s imports of crude oil, iron ore, and other commodities, although Beijing is assiduously mitigating its Malacca Dilemma and reducing oil-import exposure via electric vehicles and other measures.

Just as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz were foreseeable risks, a cross-Strait crisis, while not inevitable, must be prepared for—starting now.

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report.

Russia and Iran

Russia has largely been a beneficiary of the war for several reasons. First, US and global attention has shifted from Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine to the war in the Gulf. Second, the United States’ need for weapons in the Middle East may reduce stocks available for Ukraine. Third, the predictable jump in oil prices prompted by the war led Washington to suspend its sanctions on Russian oil, providing a substantial, immediate income boost to Russia’s stumbling economy.

But not every consequence of the war works in Moscow’s favor. The Gulf countries’ air defense, which is heavy on expensive US weapons, has not been fully up to the task of protecting against Iranian drones and missiles, and has prompted some of these countries to make deals with Ukraine for both drones and help in establishing a layered air defense system. This provides money for Ukraine’s growing drone and defense industries, which means more production not just for the Gulf Arab states but also for Ukraine to use against Russia. This has also improved Ukraine’s standing in the Middle East, where many states had leaned in Moscow’s direction.

There is one more important issue related to Russian policy in this war: Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to provide Iran with drone components and intelligence that Tehran can use to target US forces, Israel, and the Gulf Arab states. Iran’s drone supply to Russia after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was critical to its campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure and civilians. Russia not only used those drones in its war on Ukraine, but also took the prototype and started improving the drones and producing them in large numbers. Iran has been a beneficiary of these improvements.

Moscow’s aim is clear: To prevent a US victory in Iran, or at least to slow it down and make it more expensive. It also wants the suspension in oil sanctions to continue as long as possible. The perplexing thing here is the Trump administration’s efforts to ignore or explain away this unpleasant fact. While criticizing US allies for not being more supportive in the Middle East—a fair criticism—it lets Russia off the hook for aiding Iran’s attacks on US servicemembers.

This situation is not likely to hold. Washington’s inaction on this matter may be encouraging Russia to provide additional help. According to Western intelligence, Moscow may now be sending drones to Iran. If a Russian drone or an Iranian drone with Russian components strikes and kills US soldiers, that may prompt the Trump administration to take strong measures to force Putin to knock it off. One such step would be to provide Ukraine the weapons it needs to take out Russia’s massive drone factory in Tatarstan.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

China and Iran

One month into the war, Beijing increasingly views this conflict as a strategic opportunity. On the energy front, it is less dependent on imported oil than many of its neighbors and has massive stockpiles that it can use to offset near-term shortages. It is in Iran’s interest to keep the oil payments from China flowing, so Tehran is carefully avoiding firing on China-flagged tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Those ships are among the few passing safely through, with Iran’s blessing.

Thus far, the downsides for China are minimal, and Beijing is focusing on a major upside: This war is forcing the United States to draw down military assets in the Asia-Pacific region. For China, that is a massive strategic win, and well worth any near-term disruptions to global energy markets. China has long complained about the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antiballistic missile system stationed in South Korea. Now, for the first time since its deployment in 2017, the United States is moving some of those interceptors to the Middle East to deal with Iran’s retaliatory strikes.

Across the board, the US military is already running low on munitions, forcing it to consider pulling assets away from Ukraine as well. That will further embolden Russia, which is yet another win for China given that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said Beijing needs to ensure Russia does not lose that conflict. The Chinese foreign minister told his European counterparts that Beijing benefits when Russia’s actions toward Ukraine keep the United States tied up in that war and unable to focus on China. The Iran conflict is delivering an even bigger distraction from China than the war in Ukraine.

Chinese analysts do not expect the Iranian regime to fall or the United States to achieve its objectives. Instead, they anticipate that the United States will become mired in a protracted war that further drains US resources. One of China’s leading think tankers recently published a piece framing the war as a “strategic opportunity” for China. China’s censors quickly pulled that article down, most likely to avoid angering Iran or undermining Beijing’s message of outrage over the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But make no mistake: That is the inside view. China sees the United States as dropping a rock on its own foot, becoming (yet again) entangled in the Middle East in ways that will make it exponentially harder for the United States and its allies to counter China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.

—Melanie Hart is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. She previously served as senior advisor for China in the Office of the Undersecretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment at the US Department of State.

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Only additional pressure can push Putin toward peace

Kira Rudik — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 21:19:03 +0000

After more than a year of US-led talks to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is little sign of progress toward peace. Instead, Moscow is now reportedly aiding Tehran as Iranian drones target United States bases and American allies across the Gulf region. New approaches are clearly needed in order to prevent a further descent into international insecurity.

When US President Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025 and began efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine via diplomacy, many Ukrainians were not overly optimistic. This skepticism was rooted in their own bitter personal experience of broken Russian promises over the past few decades.

Since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Russia signed a long list of treaties and agreements obliging Moscow to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and refrain from acts of international aggression. These commitments did not prevent Russian President Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine in 2014 or launching a full-scale invasion eight years later. Understandably, few in Kyiv now believe Putin can be trusted to respect future deals.

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Over the past year, it has become evident that Russia is using US-led negotiations to stall for time and divide the transatlantic alliance. Putin has refused to join Ukraine in accepting an unconditional ceasefire and continues to insist on maximalist goals that would mean the end of an independent Ukrainian state. Meanwhile, the Kremlin underlines its lack of commitment to peace by sending low-level delegations led by figures such as presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky, who is best known for penning radically anti-Ukrainian history textbooks.

On the battlefield, Russia’s intentions are equally clear. Despite suffering catastrophic losses over the past four years, the Russian army remains on the offensive and continues to recruit tens of thousands of new troops each month to fill the depleted ranks of Putin’s invasion force.

In parallel, Russia is escalating attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population. During the recent winter months, millions of Ukrainians found themselves without access to heating and electricity amid Arctic temperatures due to a strategic bombing campaign targeting critical civilian infrastructure that aimed to freeze the country into submission. According to UN data, 2025 was the deadliest period of the war for Ukrainian civilians since the first months of the invasion, with the number of civilian deaths rising by 31 percent compared to the previous year.

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With the Kremlin ignoring calls for a compromise peace, the only way to advance negotiations is by putting more pressure on Putin. Failure to do so could have disastrous consequences that would be felt far beyond the borders of a subjugated Ukraine.

The current Russian plan is to drag out negotiations indefinitely while grinding down Ukraine’s resistance and sowing division among Kyiv’s international allies. Moscow seeks to entice the United States with promises of lucrative economic cooperation, while supporting populist political forces across the EU in a bid to weaken European support for Ukraine. If this strategy succeeds, Ukraine may at some point become unable to defend itself.

The collapse of Ukrainian resistance would not bring peace to Europe. Instead, a victorious Russia would take control of Ukraine’s formidable military and the country’s rapidly expanding domestic defense industry. Putin would then command the two most powerful armies in Europe, with unrivaled combat experience and knowledge of drone warfare. In such circumstances, it is dangerously delusional to think that Russia would not seek to go further. At the very least, European governments would be forced to increase defense budgets to levels that would dwarf the current cost of supporting Ukraine.

The steps necessary to secure peace through strength are no secret. First and foremost, this means adequately arming Ukraine. Trump suggested in 2025 that if Russia continues to reject peace efforts, he may provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles. This would be a welcome and meaningful step. Other partners including Germany have also spoken of increasing Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Now is the time to do so.

In parallel, sanctions measures targeting Putin’s war economy must be expanded and tightened. This should include steps to increase the costs for international customers who continue to purchase Russian oil and gas exports, thereby funding the Kremlin war machine.

Western leaders have always had the tools at their disposal to counter the Russian threat. Unfortunately, however, they have so far failed to demonstrate the political will necessary to deploy these tools effectively. This excessive caution is counter-productive and only serves to embolden the Kremlin. Moscow believes it is already at war with the West and treats calls for compromise as signs of weakness. If Kyiv’s partners are serious about stopping Russia, they must abandon appeasement and increase the pressure on Putin.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party and a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Drone superpower Ukraine is an ideal tech partner for the Gulf states

Anatoly Motkin — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 20:43:08 +0000

In recent weeks, the Iran war has shone a spotlight on Ukraine’s emergence as a drone superpower. Kyiv’s decision to help defend the Gulf states against Iranian attack drones by deploying teams of Ukrainian specialists is now highlighting the scope for broader tech sector cooperation between Ukraine and the region. This potential for partnership was underlined by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Saudi Arabia on March 26.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, few analysts predicted that the outgunned Ukrainians would soon fundamentally alter the global understanding of unmanned systems warfare. Yet that is precisely what has happened. From improvised FPV drones strapped with grenades to the long-range naval strike drones that have forced Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to retreat, Ukraine has demonstrated that asymmetric drone warfare can neutralize conventional military advantages in ways that expensive Western defense systems never quite anticipated.

What distinguishes Ukraine’s drone program is not simply its scale, but also the speed and adaptability of its development cycles. Ukrainian engineers, often operating in basements and converted workshops, upgrade drone designs in a matter of days rather than the year-long processes typical of conventional defense procurement. Software updates are pushed out overnight. Lessons from the morning’s combat inform the afternoon’s engineering innovations. The Ukrainian battlefield has become the most demanding product testing environment in the world.

This lean, decentralized, and ruthlessly practical model has not gone unnoticed in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and their Gulf region neighbors. All have been studying the Ukrainian experience carefully. For countries that have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in conventional military hardware only to find themselves operating in a world where a commercially available drone can threaten a warship, the Ukrainian approach represents both a warning and an opportunity.

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The Gulf states are not passive observers of technological change. The UAE’s Vision 2071, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, and Qatar’s National Vision 2030 all share a common ambition to transform their economies from hydrocarbon dependency into diversified, knowledge-based societies where technology plays a central role.

Defense and security technology, long imported wholesale from the United States, United Kingdom, and France, is increasingly identified as a sector where these nations want enhanced domestic capacity. This is not merely a matter of patriotic pride; it is increasingly recognized as a strategic necessity.

For now, ambition and execution remain some distance apart. The Gulf states have capital in abundance and a genuine appetite for technology transfer. What they have found harder to cultivate organically is the specific combination of engineering talent, risk tolerance, regulatory flexibility, and competitive urgency that drives genuine innovation. This is precisely where Ukraine’s wartime technology ecosystem presents an intriguing counterpart.

The case for deeper Ukraine-Gulf technology cooperation rests on synergies that are easy to overlook amid the noise of geopolitics. Ukraine possesses what the Gulf states most covet: Battle-proven engineering expertise; a deep talent pool in software, electronics, and materials science; and a development culture forged under conditions of extreme pressure.

Meanwhile, the Gulf states can offer what Ukraine most urgently needs: Capital, global commercial networks, and the ability to provide a stable platform for technology commercialization at a time when much of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and economic base remain under threat.

Drone technology sits at the most visible intersection of these complementary strengths, but it is far from the only area for potential cooperation. The ecosystem that has made Ukraine’s drone program so formidable is built on broad technical foundations including robust software engineering, AI-assisted target recognition, electronic warfare countermeasures, and sophisticated logistics platforms. Each of these capabilities has substantial civilian and commercial applications in areas that match the priorities of the Gulf states.

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Any deepening of Ukraine-Gulf technology ties must navigate a complex geopolitical landscape. The Gulf states have, with varying degrees of success, sought to maintain working relationships with both Russia and Ukraine throughout the current war.

This studied neutrality is a potentially valuable asset in fostering Ukraine-related technology cooperation. Some Ukrainian companies might prefer partners who can operate without the political complications of deeper NATO engagement, while Gulf-based joint ventures offer a flexibility that Western partners often cannot.

At the same time, the Gulf states maintain active ties with both Russia and China, creating potential risks for Ukraine’s battle-tested tech to travel further than intended. EU and US sanctions packages have repeatedly flagged UAE-based entities for supplying military and dual-use goods to Russia, including microelectronics and UAV components. The threat of Ukrainian defense IP migrating toward Beijing or Moscow through a Gulf intermediary is not theoretical. It is a structural problem that any co-production framework would need to resolve before NATO partners could endorse it.

Western governments are watching these dynamics carefully. There is a legitimate concern in Washington and Brussels about the dual-use nature of drone and AI technologies amid alarm that capabilities developed by Ukraine could, if commercialized through Gulf intermediaries, find their way into the hands of hostile actors.

These concerns will require careful management. But they should not obscure the more fundamental point that technology partnerships between Ukraine and the Gulf, conducted transparently and within a clear governance framework, could potentially serve the strategic interests of both parties and of the broader rules-based international order.

Ukraine’s drone program is the most dramatic expression of a broader technological transformation that the country has undergone since the Euromaidan Revolution of 2014 and, with accelerating urgency, since 2022. The war with Russia has in many ways turbo-charged Ukraine’s tech sector, driving engineers toward defense applications with the same creative energy previously directed at consumer software.

For the Gulf states, engaging with this ecosystem means potentially accessing not just drone know-how but a broader pipeline of technology talent and startup energy. A deliberate focus on Ukrainian technology companies, whether through direct investment, co-investment structures with Ukrainian state entities, or technology accelerator partnerships, would represent a logical extension of existing Gulf region investment strategies.

Transforming this potential into reality requires deliberate institutional architecture. At the governmental level, the frameworks for technology and investment cooperation between Ukraine and the Gulf states remain underdeveloped compared to those with EU member states or the United States. Bilateral investment treaties, technology transfer agreements, and joint venture frameworks need to be negotiated, or existing agreements updated, to reflect the current reality of Ukraine’s technological capabilities and the investment priorities of individual Gulf states.

At the industry level, dedicated platforms for technology matchmaking are needed. Existing tech sector events are useful, but a more targeted mechanism such as an annual Ukraine-Gulf technology forum could provide the sustained attention that one-off exhibitions cannot. Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation and the country’s tech industry associations have the institutional capacity to anchor such an initiative from the Ukrainian side.

At the financial level, the structure of Gulf investment in Ukrainian technology will need to be carefully designed to account for the realities of war, reconstruction, and regulatory complexity. Special purpose vehicles, escrow arrangements, and the use of third-country holding structures may be necessary to provide Gulf investors with the governance certainty they require.

The interest that Gulf region governments and investors are showing in Ukraine’s drone capabilities is, at one level, simply pragmatic. But this interest, if properly cultivated, could serve as the entry point for a much broader and more consequential relationship.

Ukraine needs to rebuild its economy, attract sustainable foreign investment, and establish itself as a technology hub that can thrive in the postwar era. The Gulf states need to accelerate their technology transitions, diversify their strategic partnerships, and develop genuine domestic innovation capacity rather than simply buying capabilities off the shelf from Western defense contractors. These are not competing objectives. They are, in important respects, the same objective approached from different directions.

The drones are the headline. But behind the headline lies the possibility of a durable, mutually beneficial technology partnership between two of the world’s most dynamic and consequential technology stories of the current decade. Whether that possibility is realized will depend on the vision and initiative of policymakers, investors, and entrepreneurs on both sides. The ingredients for something significant are present. The question is whether those involved will have the strategic clarity to combine them.

Anatoly Motkin is president of the StrategEast Center for a New Economy, a non-profit organisation with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, developing the knowledge driven economy in the Eurasian region.

The sovereignty that isn’t

Baghdad typically responds to proposals for direct US air defense assistance by asserting that such measures would violate Iraqi sovereignty. However, sovereignty is meaningful only when a government can effectively protect its territory and population. Baghdad lacks sufficient control over its federal territory to prevent Iranian missile strikes on Erbil, ongoing proxy drone campaigns against Kurdish energy infrastructure, or attacks on coalition facilities. The government has not established a monopoly on the use of force, as Iran-aligned militias operate both within and outside formal state structures without restriction. Regardless of these distinctions, the outcome remains unchanged.

Following the February strikes, Kurdish leaders Masoud Barzani and Bafel Talabani urged Baghdad to implement substantive measures to halt militia attacks, emphasizing that their restraint was not unlimited. While Baghdad issued condemnations, it did not intercept any attacks. When a government repeatedly fails to fulfill its duty to protect its territory, the legitimacy of its sovereign veto over external defensive assistance is undermined. The primary violation of Iraqi sovereignty is not the potential deployment of a US-supplied shield in Erbil, but rather Tehran’s accurate assessment that it can strike Iraqi territory without consequence.

The Taiwan precedent

The United States has established a precedent for addressing similar challenges. The Taiwan Relations Act obligates Washington to provide Taiwan with defensive arms and to maintain the capacity to resist coercion. Since the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Taiwan has been treated as a de facto Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) for the transfer of defense articles and services. The KRI presents a direct parallel: It is a self-governing entity where the recognized sovereign claims exclusive control over defense, faces a hostile power employing both conventional and proxy tactics, and is unable to acquire necessary defense systems due to its lack of sovereign status. If the United States were to designate the KRI as an MNNA for air defense, it would provide the KRI priority access to foreign military sales, streamline the US review process for arms sales to KRI, and circumvent the bureaucratic obstacles imposed by Baghdad’s procedural veto. This approach would not alter Iraq’s borders but would acknowledge the existing reality.

What the shield looks like

The goal is not to duplicate Israel’s layered air defense architecture, but rather to develop a credible deterrence system tailored to the specific threats faced in northern Iraq: armed drones, loitering munitions, short- and medium-range rockets, and the ballistic missiles deployed by the IRGC in January 2024 and 2026. A US package should include counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar systems, counter-drone platforms, Shahed-type devices, integrated radar, hardened command-and-control infrastructure, and the selective deployment of Patriot batteries at critical locations.

The events of February demonstrated the effectiveness of existing US air defenses in Erbil, which intercepted most incoming projectiles and minimized damage to US facilities. However, these systems do not provide comprehensive coverage for the broader Kurdish population and infrastructure. The fatal March 24 attack highlighted this gap, as Peshmerga bases in Soran remain outside the US defense perimeter. Establishing a Kurdish air defense layer constitutes an extension of force protection, particularly as the KRI now hosts the majority of US forces in Iraq following withdrawals from other Iraqi bases.

How to get there

Legislative mechanisms are available to address these needs. Section 1266 of the fiscal year (FY) 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the Pentagon to develop a plan to equip and train Peshmerga forces, including air defense provisions, but both deadlines were missed. The FY2026 NDAA, enacted in December 2025, allocates $343 million to the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund for partner forces in Iraq and Syria, which could be adapted to support site defense, radar, and short-range intercept systems for the Peshmerga. The SPEED Act, included in the same legislation, reduces Pentagon acquisition timelines from eight hundred days to approximately five months and facilitates the deployment of commercial and military-off-the-shelf systems. Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act grants the president drawdown authority for unforeseen emergencies, a mechanism previously used for Ukraine and Taiwan. Congress should establish a KRI-specific air and missile defense line item in the next appropriations package, with notification to Baghdad but without granting Baghdad veto power.

Washington faces a choice: continue to defer to Baghdad’s procedural objections while Iran conducts unimpeded strikes on Kurdish territory or acknowledge the strategic reality and take decisive action. The former approach results in inaction, while the latter helps establish deterrence. The recent missile strike on the Peshmerga’s 7th Division has eliminated any remaining ambiguity. Washington should send a message to Tehran that Erbil is no longer a vulnerable target and to Baghdad that sovereignty entails responsibility rather than an unconditional veto. Where this responsibility has not been met, Washington should be prepared to act.

Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

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What Iran’s attacks on Turkey reveal about NATO’s future

Ali Mammadov — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 17:12:23 +0000

The US-Israeli war against Iran has not bypassed Turkey. Since the beginning of the conflict, NATO air defenses intercepted three ballistic missiles fired from Iran toward Turkish airspace, according to Turkish officials. This included an incident that produced an explosion near Incirlik Air Base. Turkey has asked Tehran for clarification, while Iran has denied deliberately targeting Turkish territory. The result is a strategically sensitive reality: A NATO ally has found itself exposed to direct spillover from a regional war it is trying hard not to enter.

The implications extend well beyond Turkey. These incidents are testing NATO’s credibility under modern conditions, where threats often fall into the gray zone between peacetime nuisance and full-scale armed attack. In such cases, the Alliance faces a genuine strategic dilemma. It must reassure an exposed ally and preserve deterrence while also avoiding an impulsive response that could widen a regional war and create a far more dangerous confrontation. Turkey’s current predicament shows that the future of NATO will be shaped not only by whether its members can fight together in a worst-case scenario, but by whether it can respond credibly to dangerous cases that fall short of one.

At first glance, the obvious question is whether this is an Article 5 moment. But Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was never designed to operate as a mechanical trigger. The treaty states that an armed attack against one ally shall be considered an attack against all, while also leaving each ally to take “such action as it deems necessary.” NATO’s own explanation of collective defense and Article 5 makes the same point: Solidarity is firm, but the form of assistance remains up to member states’ political and strategic calculations rather than being automatically triggered. That is why Alliance leaders were able to keep Article 5 off the table after the first incident without suggesting indifference to Turkey’s security.

That should not be read as passivity. Turkish officials said explicitly that NATO air defenses shot down the missiles, with the interceptions carried out by Alliance assets in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara also announced on March 10 that the Alliance reinforced Turkey’s air defenses by deploying a US Patriot system near the Kürecik radar site in Malatya, a key NATO facility for missile tracking and early warning. These steps show that the Alliance is already doing what modern deterrence increasingly requires: Reinforcing defenses, reducing vulnerability, and containing escalation before it gets out of hand.

Still, restraint by itself does not fully answer the credibility question. Alliance credibility today cannot rest only on treaty language or quiet military measures. It also depends on whether exposed allies and potential adversaries can see that attacks affecting NATO territory produce visible political seriousness. If repeated incidents on allied territory are met in a way that feels too muted, too improvised, or too private, uncertainty begins to grow around what solidarity actually looks like in practice. NATO does not need to escalate militarily every time a missile or drone crosses into allied airspace. It does, however, need to show more clearly that pressure on member territory is noticed, discussed, and answered with coordinated resolve.

Turkey is an especially important test case because it sits on NATO’s southern flank, where Alliance challenges have often looked different from those on the eastern flank. Much of NATO’s recent debate has focused, understandably, on Russia’s war against Ukraine and the defense of eastern Europe. But NATO has long insisted that its commitment extends to threats “from all directions” under a 360-degree approach. If that language is to carry strategic weight, the Alliance has to show that the security of a southern ally under regional pressure is treated as part of the same collective credibility problem, even when the source of danger is different.

Turkey’s own behavior also deserves careful attention. Ankara has not sought Article 4 consultations, and Turkish officials have signaled that they do not want to be pulled more deeply into the Iran war. That caution is understandable. A government can view an incident as serious while still deciding that a formal Alliance process is not the wisest next step. This is precisely what makes the Turkey case so revealing. Modern Alliance management depends not only on what NATO is willing to do, but also on what an exposed ally wants NATO to do, and when. At times, an ally may prefer reinforcement and quiet coordination to a dramatic collective declaration. However, even if Turkey demurs from direct requests or consultations, NATO offering these things still benefits the Alliance’s reputation in Ankara and among the general public in Turkey.

At the same time, caution should not obscure a larger institutional lesson. Turkey has turned to NATO consultation mechanisms before during regional crises, especially in 2012, when violence spilling over from Syria led Turkey to seek Article 4 consultations and later prompted NATO’s deployment of Patriot batteries to help protect Turkish territory. The current moment therefore fits into a broader pattern: Turkey periodically reminds NATO that the southern flank can become a front line with little warning, and NATO periodically rediscovers that credibility is not only an eastern-flank question. The difference today is that the surrounding international environment is even more polarized, making calibrated responses more difficult and more important.

This is also part of a wider pattern of pressure on Alliance boundaries. In recent years, Russian drones and missiles have repeatedly entered or threatened NATO airspace, prompting calls for a more coordinated response. Alliance commanders have argued that firm responses to Russian incursions have helped deter further violations. The pattern is becoming clear: NATO is increasingly being tested not only by invasion scenarios, but by limited, ambiguous, and politically complicated actions that probe its thresholds without crossing them in the clearest possible way. Turkey’s experience with Iranian missiles now belongs in that same category of Alliance stress test.

For NATO, the challenge is to prevent these gray-zone incidents from producing a credibility gap. If every incident below the level of a major attack is treated as too minor for a serious political response, adversaries may conclude that there is broad space to pressure Alliance members without triggering meaningful consequences. If, on the other hand, every such incident is treated as a trigger for dramatic escalation, deterrence risks becoming recklessness. The future of the Alliance depends on avoiding both errors. What is needed is a stronger middle ground, one in which NATO pairs strategic restraint with visible solidarity, rapid consultation, and practical defensive action.

That is why the Alliance now needs a clearer framework for military incursions that fall short of open war. Drones, missile overflights, limited strikes, airspace violations, and similar coercive acts no longer belong to the margins of Alliance security. They are becoming part of its daily strategic environment. NATO should therefore develop more explicit procedures for what happens when members’ territory is exposed to repeated sub-threshold attacks. Such a framework would not replace Article 5, nor would it commit the Alliance to automatic escalation. It would instead clarify the menu of responses available below that threshold: immediate consultations, public statements of solidarity, temporary defensive deployments, intelligence coordination, air and missile defense reinforcement, and clear diplomatic signaling toward the source of the incident. In today’s security environment, credibility requires that allies and adversaries alike understand that NATO has a plan not only for full-scale war, but also for the increasingly common forms of aggression that fall below it.

That means several steps should now be considered. NATO should become more comfortable using consultation mechanisms quickly and flexibly when allied territory is repeatedly exposed to missile, drone, or airspace incidents, even when Article 5 is not under discussion. The Alliance should make defensive reinforcement more visible, especially on the southern flank, where reassurance has often been quieter than on the eastern one. It should also improve public signaling. Even where NATO chooses restraint, it should communicate that limited attacks on allied territory are neither being normalized nor ignored. These steps would not make the Alliance more escalatory. They would make it more credible.

Turkey’s recent missile incidents therefore reveal something important about NATO’s future. The Alliance’s credibility in this challenging period will not be judged only by whether it can invoke Article 5 in the most dramatic scenario. It will also be judged by whether it can handle repeated, dangerous, sub-threshold challenges without appearing passive, divided, or uncertain. In that sense, the attacks affecting Turkey are not just a regional security story. They are a warning that NATO’s next great test may come not from a single unmistakable attack, but from the accumulation of smaller crises that force the Alliance to prove that prudence and credibility can still go together.

Ali Mammadov is a PhD researcher at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government focusing on global stability, alliance formation, and rising powers. You can find him on X.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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From drones to rocket fuel, China and Russia are helping Iran through supply chains

Kimberly Donovan and Emily Ezratty — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 20:59:35 +0000

WASHINGTON—As the US-Israeli war with Iran continues, some commentators have speculated about why China and Russia appear to be keeping their distance from the conflict. Neither appears eager to intervene militarily to support Iran. Moreover, China is reportedly hesitant to send arms to Iran, while Russia is benefiting from the global oil supply shock caused by the conflict. Some rhetorical support aside, many commentators predict that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping will not get meaningfully involved in Iran.

But such conjecture misunderstands the economic relationships and motivations behind the “Axis of Evasion,” the network of US adversaries that coalesce to circumvent Western economic restrictions. Specifically, it misunderstands how Beijing and Moscow enable Tehran to continue its violence across the Middle East through supply chains.

The war with Iran is not solely a challenge posed by Iran. To bring about an end to the war and prevent Iran from rebuilding its military capacity, US President Donald Trump will need to confront Xi and Putin about their support for the Iranian regime and their schemes to evade sanctions and export controls.

How the Axis of Evasion works

China enables Russia and Iran by importing their sanctioned oil and selling them sophisticated dual-use technology. Over the past few years, we in the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center have proposed the term “Axis of Evasion” to describe the complex networks these countries use to evade and bypass Western sanctions. Our research has focused, for example, on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, as well as on alternative payment systems, money laundering schemes, and the barter trade. The current war with Iran has brought attention to yet another system or tactic of this Axis: integrated supply chains.

Trade and technology transfer between China, Russia, and Iran—and the associated supply chains—are the result of geography as well as significant Western economic pressure. Due to restrictive export controls and sanctions, these states cannot easily access Western technology and components directly from the United States and other Western countries. Because trade among the Axis of Evasion occurs outside of the Western financial system and, therefore, the reach of Western economic restrictions, these integrated supply chains are more resistant to sanctions and export controls enforcement.

Iran has been subject to extensive and comprehensive US sanctions and Western restrictive economic measures for decades. In October 2021, the United States announced the first export controls specifically targeting unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production. Since then, the Department of Commerce, Department of State, and the Treasury have also restricted third-party countries from exporting US-origin technologies to Iran. Despite the intensity of these restrictions, Western components continue to feature in Iranian drone designs. Often, these components come from China.

China has supplied Iran with drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and the components thereof, to aid in its aerial and maritime defense capabilities. In other instances, China directly supplies Iran with Western or Chinese technology components that are found in Iranian drones used against US military installations and economic interests in the Gulf, as well as on Russia’s battlefield in Ukraine. Treasury and Commerce actions targeting Iranian sanctions evasion schemes frequently identify and designate Chinese individuals, entities, and addresses that are used as shell or front companies and transshipment hubs. This cooperation extends beyond trading goods, but helps partners to develop and improve their own technological capabilities.

Drones

Iran’s drone program offers the clearest example of how the Axis of Evasion uses localized supply chains to circumvent restrictive economic measures and enhance military production. Iranian UAVs, such as the Shahed series, rely on an ecosystem of imported electronics, engines, navigation components, batteries, and semiconductors. While many of these parts originate in the United States, Europe, and Japan, procurement networks frequently route them through Chinese distributors or trading companies before they reach Iranian manufacturers. Chinese dual-use exports to Iran spiked in January 2024 when the two states formalized a strategic partnership emphasizing defense and security cooperation. Likewise, Chinese exports rose after Trump signed a memorandum restoring maximum pressure on Iran and again in June 2025 after the US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Russia further reinforces this system through wartime cooperation with Iran. Since 2022, Moscow and Tehran have exchanged drone technology and production know-how, allowing both countries to expand manufacturing capacity. In February 2023, Russia established a drone production facility supported by Iranian technology and expertise at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia. As part of a deal, Iran transferred 600 disassembled Shahed-16 drones, components for 1,300 drones, training, and technical expertise to Russia to assist in its war in Ukraine. By 2025, Moscow had moved roughly 90 percent of Shahed assembly to Russia. Meanwhile, Russia developed the Garpiya-3, a modified and improved version of the Shahed, with the help of Chinese specialists and a reported Russian drone factory in China.

This partnership now appears to be coming full circle. Recent comments by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reveal that Russia is now supplying Iran with Russian-made Shahed drones to use in attacks against the United States and Israel. What began as a sanctions-driven workaround has evolved into a self-reinforcing production network, fueled by Western components, Chinese procurement channels, and Russian manufacturing capacity.

Navigation systems

In another example of these integrated supply chain networks, China facilitates the transfer of both Chinese- and Western-made navigation technology to Iran. Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly sharing satellite imagery and modified Shahed drone technology to improve navigation and targeting based on Russia’s experience of using drones in Ukraine.

Chinese electronics markets and distributors play a critical role in this process. Components originally manufactured for civilian applications—such as inertial sensors or satellite navigation modules—can be purchased through Chinese intermediaries and integrated into Iranian weapons systems. Russia’s experience adapting commercial electronics also feeds into this innovation ecosystem.

Some experts believe that Iranian drones and missiles incorporate Chinese satellite navigation systems to target US and Israeli military assets. In February 2025, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese front companies that were supplying gyro navigation devices to enhance Iranian-made UAVs. In November 2025, a separate network connected to Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company was accused of using shell firms to acquire Chinese sensors and navigation equipment.

In 2021, China gave Iran access to BeiDou, the global positioning satellite system owned and operated by the China National Space Administration. Since the start of the war with the United States and Israel, Iran has used BeiDou to produce decoy signals to confuse threat analysis and conceal actual Iranian military movements.

Chemical precursors

Iran’s ability to sustain missile and explosives production depends on access to chemical precursors and industrial materials. Although these substances are subject to Western export controls, and the US Treasury has sanctioned individuals and entities in Iran and China for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients, enforcement is more difficult when production is distributed across multiple jurisdictions. Chinese chemical companies—many of which operate in sprawling industrial clusters—have repeatedly been linked to shipments of dual-use materials to Iran as well as Russia. Another recent report suggests that Iranian shadow fleet vessels sailing from China contain precursors for rocket fuel.

For Iran, these imports provide critical inputs for solid rocket fuels, propellants, and explosives used in missile systems and other weapons systems. By purchasing precursor materials through intermediaries or reexport hubs, Iranian procurement networks obscure the destination of shipments and exploit gaps in global export-control and sanctions enforcement. The scale and diversity of China’s chemical industry make it particularly difficult for regulators to monitor the end use of every exported compound.

What to do now

China, Russia, and Iran continue to work together to circumvent and evade Western sanctions and export controls. Meanwhile, the United States has been inconsistent in implementing economic restrictions. After the last Trump-Xi summit in October 2025, Washington suspended the Bureau of Industry and Security Affiliate Rule in exchange for China’s lifting of export controls on critical minerals, effectively revealing how much leverage Beijing retains through its dominance in rare-earth supply chains. Additionally, Washington is easing oil sanctions on Moscow and Tehran in response to rising energy prices and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, exposing the precise issues on which the US is willing to compromise.

As the White House diverts its attention toward the Middle East, the Trump-Xi summit, originally scheduled for next week, was postponed until May. However, a productive push on China could also advance the US position in the Iran conflict. In his meeting with Xi—if not sooner—Trump should confront China’s role in enabling these supply chains, tightening scrutiny of Chinese exports and intermediaries that facilitate sanctions evasion. The White House must make stronger export control enforcement, expanded entity listings, and greater transparency requirements for Chinese distributors involved in dual-use trade central to the agenda.

But pressure on China alone is not enough. Iran’s procurement networks depend on a web of transshipment hubs and trading companies that move controlled technologies across jurisdictions before they reach their destination in Iran. These networks often rely on distributors and logistics firms in third countries to obscure the origin and destination of sensitive components.

The United States should therefore expand its focus beyond direct exporters and identify the intermediaries and transshipment hubs that repeatedly appear in Iranian procurement chains. With targeted sanctions, enhanced export control enforcement cooperation, and intelligence sharing with partner governments, the United States can help disrupt the flow of dual-use goods before they reach Iran’s defense sector.

This increased enforcement should be paired with incentives. Many countries that serve as transshipment hubs are not politically aligned with Iran but lack the regulatory capacity or economic incentives to fully enforce export controls. Such third countries have also been hit hard by US tariffs, pushing them toward US adversaries purely due to economic incentives. In deploying incentives to encourage stronger compliance, the United States can cooperate with countries willing to strengthen export-control enforcement. In addition to incentives, capacity building programs, including customs modernization, export-control training, and industrial diversification could also enable firms in these jurisdictions to comply with Western restrictive economic measures.

Despite the severity and consistency of US sanctions and export controls targeting Iran’s drone acquisition, Iran maintains the technical knowledge, mature production lines, and continued access to dual-use components necessary to rebuild its drone stockpiles. Cooperation with adversarial states—predominantly China and Russia—further reinforces these capabilities by distributing supply chains and insulating production from Western pressure.

A failure to confront this Axis of Evasion across its networks allows it to continue enabling the flow of dual-use technologies among its members, which will allow Iran to rebuild and expand its drone and missile arsenals both during and potentially after the current war.

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How ISIS and its affiliates might capitalize on the Iran war

Morgan Tadych — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 20:57:48 +0000

WASHINGTON—In the March 5 edition of Al-Naba, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS’s) global newsletter, the group portrayed the ongoing US-Israeli war against Iran as a “divinely sanctioned” war among the disbelievers on both sides. This should surprise no one, as ISIS has long condemned Iranian Shia Muslims as following a “rejectionist” brand of Islam and labeled the United States and Israel as “infidels.”

What might be more unexpected, however, is that ISIS seems poised to exploit this moment of regional instability to its advantage. Specifically, ISIS appears eager to attract new followers, inspire attacks, and consolidate territory amid the chaos caused by the Iran war and by the security situations in Syria and Afghanistan.

Targeting the West

ISIS views itself as the protector of Sunni Islam, and its adherents have cheered the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei even as they condemn the US and Israeli strikes against Iran. ISIS’s preferred outcome in the Iran conflict would be the downfall of both sides, but it’s not waiting for that outcome. It is instead seizing the initiative by expanding its messaging directed at its followers in the West.

The Islamic State manages a number of regional affiliates under a single umbrella, and these affiliates often share resources such as personnel, training, and funding, enabling the movement of people and expertise across borders. Part of this larger umbrella includes the group’s messaging operations, of which Al-Naba is just one output. Through the internet, including on mainstream social media sites such as TikTok, ISIS distributes messages targeting Western youth to gain traction beyond the Middle East and South Asia.

In particular, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), the Afghanistan-based affiliate, has demonstrated its skill at reaching youth online, including developing a growing network of teenagers in Europe, some of whom were involved in a 2024 plot to conduct simultaneous attacks across several cities in Central Europe. Should a European nation, for example, become involved in the conflict against Iran, then an ISIS-inspired cell or individual might use that as an excuse to conduct an attack there.

Concerningly, there have already been two ISIS-inspired attacks in the United States since the Iran conflict began. Although investigations into both events are still ongoing, preliminary details suggest that, in one of the attacks, the young men used ISIS’s online how-to guides to build improvised explosive devices. The two teens who staged an attack outside of the home of New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani on March 7 had accessed ISIS materials online in the weeks prior to the attack, according to investigators. Some analysts have suggested that they had communication with, and coaching from, ISIS leadership overseas. In the second attack, a known ISIS supporter killed a military officer at Old Dominion University in Virginia. The attacker had previously been convicted of attempting to provide material support to ISIS. The timing of these attacks suggests that ISIS supporters may be seeking to take advantage of the global distraction created by the war, targeting locations and events that they perceive as “infidel.”

Gaining territory in South Asia

ISIS-K is perhaps the Islamic State’s most capable affiliate, and it has demonstrated its ability to conduct and inspire attacks far from Afghanistan over the past three years. A confluence of factors, when combined with the global distraction caused by the Iran conflict, raise the possibility of an ISIS-K attack against Western interests in the medium term.

But ISIS-K is not only focused on its efforts abroad. In addition to the Iran war, the group stands to benefit from the crisis emerging between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In late February, Afghanistan and Pakistan escalated the long-simmering conflict against each other, with Pakistan accusing Afghanistan of harboring the Pakistani Taliban. Much of the fighting so far has concentrated on the ungoverned border areas between Afghanistan and the tribal areas of northern Pakistan.

Historically, ISIS-K has struggled to hold territory in this region due to pressure from the Afghan Taliban. But with the Taliban preoccupied with the fight against Pakistan, the conflict may provide ISIS-K with an opening it could exploit to seize and hold territory in northern Afghanistan. Securing territory can, in turn, provide the group with space to plot further attacks and messaging.

Regrouping in Syria

Similarly, ISIS has leveraged the devolving security situation to gain territory in Syria. Since fall 2025, there has been a notable uptick in the number of ISIS attacks inside Syria, and the group recently declared jihad against President Ahmad al-Sharaa. ISIS perceives al-Sharaa as a puppet of the United States and not sufficiently committed to Sunni Islam. The recent uptick in attacks by ISIS emanating from the Syrian desert indicates that it is likely regrouping in that area, where the Syrian government struggles to maintain security and control.

In addition to increased freedom of movement in Syria, ISIS is also benefiting from an influx of fighters who recently escaped from prison camps in northern Syria. Earlier this year, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) came under pressure from Damascus to relinquish control of the territory it held to the central government. The SDF, which fought alongside the United States in the fight against ISIS, had for years guarded the Al-Hol prison camp, which held tens of thousands of ISIS fighters and their families. When the SDF retreated in January in the face of a Syrian government offensive, the camps were left unguarded, leading to a major prison break. US intelligence agencies estimate that as many as 20,000 people, including family members of ISIS fighters and the group’s affiliates, are at large. These ISIS-linked individuals, many of whom are combat veterans from the Syrian civil war, are expected to increase ISIS’s experienced manpower. Regional reporting indicates that at least some of these individuals are Afghan nationals. If these individuals return to Afghanistan, then ISIS-K could leverage their fighting experience for operations or training.

At present, the Iran war commands the headlines. But it is nonetheless critical to continue monitoring ISIS. The group has already demonstrated its ability to exploit conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria to gain territory. It may have recently added an influx of former prisoners. And it has shown its ability to enable ISIS-linked or inspired attacks in the West. None of these threats disappeared when the Iran war began.

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Amid the Hormuz crisis, an Iraq-Jordan-Egypt oil pipeline can no longer wait

Maisoon H. Kafafy — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 20:28:22 +0000

In the summer of 1983, with Iranian missiles turning Gulf shipping lanes into something resembling a free-fire zone, Saddam Hussein’s government sat down to solve a problem that has never really gone away. Iraq’s oil, the lifeblood of its wartime economy, was moving almost entirely through the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow corridor that an emboldened adversary regularly threatened to close.

The solution his planners devised was elegant in its simplicity: a pipeline running southwest from the oil fields of Basra, through the Jordanian desert, terminating at the Red Sea port of Aqaba. From there, Iraqi crude could reach global markets without passing through a single contested chokepoint. The project was announced, studied, negotiated over, and quietly abandoned. It has been revived since but derailed at different moments by war, occupation, insurgency, and internal Iraqi politics. This cycle repeated itself, with remarkable consistency, for four decades—and the Basra-Aqaba pipeline was never built.

Now the bill for that failure is coming due. This time, Aqaba is not the end of the answer. So long as the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz remain similarly volatile, a pipeline that stops short of Egypt and the Mediterranean trades one vulnerability for another.

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A warning unheeded

When Iran moved to close the Strait of Hormuz following the outbreak of conflict with the United States and Israel, Iraq had to face what its planners had known since 1983: that an estimated 90 percent of its crude exports flow through a waterway it has no power to protect. The consequences cascaded almost immediately. Baghdad began shutting production at its largest fields—Rumaila and West Qurna 2—making the deepest cuts in a generation, not because of any direct military threat to the fields themselves, but because southern storage facilities (designed for operational throughput rather than long-term holding) simply ran out of space. In the absence of viable alternative export pipelines, estimates suggest that Iraq is losing between $260 million and $280 million in revenue each day.

Despite over a decade of talks, construction on the Basra-Aqaba pipeline never meaningfully advanced. The failure to advance the project had no single cause: It can be attributed to the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, the US invasion, ISIS’s territorial expansion, and even resistance by pro-Iran Shia factions in Baghdad, who opposed the pipeline on the grounds that it would bring Iraqi oil into proximity with Israel.

Now, Baghdad is improvising. After acrimonious negotiations—and a formal threat of legal action from Baghdad accusing Erbil of breaching the Iraqi constitution—Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government struck a deal on March 17 to restart crude flows through the long-dormant Iraq-Turkey Pipeline to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. Exports resumed at an initial capacity of 250,000 barrels per day, with the two sides agreeing to form a joint committee to oversee operations and return revenues to the federal treasury. That figure is a rounding error against the roughly 3.5 million barrels Iraq was exporting daily before the crisis.

With output from Iraq’s main southern fields having already plunged 70 percent, the northern pipeline restart, even if volumes climb in coming weeks, recovers only a fraction of lost export capacity. The Basra-Aqaba pipeline, had it been completed to its phase one capacity of 2.25 million barrels per day, would have offset the majority of what the Hormuz closure took offline, providing a genuine and immediate alternative without the dormancy, the standoff, or the frantic eleventh-hour diplomacy. A second phase, running from the Iraqi city of Haditha to Aqaba with an additional capacity of one million barrels per day, would have brought total corridor capacity to 3.25 million barrels—nearly matching Iraq’s pre-crisis export volumes in their entirety. Instead, with the northern pipeline restart, Iraq is celebrating a partial fix to a problem that should never have been left unsolved.

Egypt’s compound exposure

There is a dimension of this crisis that has received far less attention than it deserves, and it runs through Cairo. When the Basra-Aqaba pipeline discussions gained momentum in 2016, Egypt was formally brought into the conversation with the longer-term vision of positioning Cairo as an active hub in a land-based Gulf energy corridor reaching Mediterranean and global markets. The original Basra-Aqaba proposal, designed to terminate at Jordan’s Red Sea port, had by then been expanded to include Egypt—extending the corridor’s ambition westward to the Mediterranean. That vision was soon shelved along with everything else. Egypt now finds itself absorbing the costs of the current crisis from every direction at once, with none of the structural revenues that corridor integration would have provided.

The picture is one of compounding fragility. Suez Canal revenues, which had been projected to recover toward eight billion dollars in 2026 following the Gaza cease-fire, are once again under pressure as major carriers weigh the risk calculus of Red Sea routing against the longer but safer passage around the Cape of Good Hope. At the same time, Israel has halted natural gas flows from the Tamar and Leviathan fields to Egypt, a supply that the country had come to rely on for both domestic consumption and liquefied natural gas (LNG) re-export revenues. Egypt’s budget for this fiscal year was calculated assuming oil at seventy-five dollars per barrel, a figure that now bears little relationship to market reality, forcing the government to chase spot LNG cargoes at elevated premiums it can ill afford.

Meanwhile, Egypt faces $27 billion in external debt service due in 2026 against roughly $53 billion in international reserves. An estimated two billion to six billion dollars in foreign holdings of Egyptian government debt instruments has already exited the market, renewing pressure on a currency that took years of painful International Monetary Fund–guided adjustment to stabilize.

Against this backdrop, Egyptian Mediterranean ports have quietly become an improvised transit lifeline, with cargo being offloaded and moved overland to Red Sea ports for onward delivery to Gulf destinations. Egypt is already performing the corridor functions that a formal Basra-Aqaba-Egypt pipeline architecture would have institutionalized, only now it is doing so informally, without the infrastructure investment, long-term agreements, or revenue arrangements that would make the role sustainable. The country’s geographic value is being recognized in a crisis that its economy is simultaneously struggling to survive.

A foundation without a roof

The corridor logic, however, has never been purely theoretical—nor has it lacked institutional foundation. Since 2019, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan have convened a series of trilateral summits under the Amman-Baghdad-Cairo framework, with energy integration and pipeline connectivity among the agreement’s explicit pillars. The precedent runs deeper than recent diplomacy. During the Iran-Iraq War, Jordan served as Iraq’s primary import-export conduit while Egypt supplied over a million laborers to fill jobs vacated by Iraqi conscripts—making Iraq, at that moment, Egypt’s single largest source of remittances. These three countries have an economic interdependence that keeps reasserting itself in moments of regional stress, and they have been trying, with the tools available to them, to give it permanent form. The summits exist. The framework exists. And the political will among the three governments, however constrained by Baghdad’s internal divisions, Amman’s fiscal limits, and Cairo’s institutional pressures, has proven more durable than the results suggest.

Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt should build the pipeline, extend it through Egypt to the Mediterranean, and treat it as the strategic infrastructure it has always been. The financing question, which has too often been regarded as a reason to delay rather than a problem to solve, is more tractable than it appears. It is the politics, not the funding, that has always been the harder obstacle. Iraq has already allocated federal budget funds for the first leg and structured the second phase for private investment. The missing ingredient is the sustained engagement of international partners—Gulf sovereign wealth funds, multilateral development institutions, and Western governments with a direct interest in regional energy stability—willing to bring the institutional weight that transforms a framework agreement into a pipeline in the ground.

Every year the Basra-Aqaba-Egypt corridor remains unbuilt is a year in which the region’s most crisis-tested economic relationships remain hostage to infrastructure that was never completed. Iraqi planners understood the problem in 1983. The pipeline that they all agreed was necessary has still never been built, and the region is paying the price. Until it is, the next crisis will find the same vulnerabilities in the same places.

Maisoon H. Kafafy is a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, where her work focuses on Middle East and North Africa security, regional cooperation strategies, and geoeconomics.

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How the Iran war could change the US relationship with Gulf states

Abram Paley — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 16:47:59 +0000

WASHINGTON—The next phase of the Iran war will be defined by uncertainty. At the moment, there is uncertainty over whether the United States, Israel, or Iran will escalate the conflict further. This phase could end abruptly if the conflict does escalate, or it might persist for some time, since even a lull in attacks or a deal might not sustainably address the fundamental issues that led to the outbreak of conflict. What is known, however, is that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states sit at the center of this uncertainty. It is those states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—that Iran would likely target with even more drones, missiles, and potentially further asymmetric attacks if the war intensified. And, more importantly, it will be those states that will share their neighborhood with the Iran that emerges from this conflict.

Prior to the current conflict, many in Washington viewed GCC countries as holding the keys to resolving widespread concerns about Iran in ways short of war. I saw firsthand over the years the ways in which the Gulf’s diverse relationships helped advance US interests. Oman, for example, has long served as a quiet mediator between the United States and Iran, including when I served as acting US special envoy for Iran from 2023 to 2025. Oman has continued this role right up to the current crisis. Qatar too maintained channels with Iranian leadership that facilitated negotiations for the release of US hostages in Iran and deconfliction efforts between Washington and Tehran in the region and beyond. Saudi Arabia, while maintaining deep suspicions about the regime in Tehran, had taken tentative steps to rehabilitate its relationship with Iran through a series of high-level meetings following years of effort by the United States, other regional countries, and ultimately China to broker a reconciliation that stabilized the region. And the UAE maintained economic ties with Iran that stretched back decades and served both to tighten sanctions pressure on Tehran and hold out hope of potential economic incentives if the Iranian regime changed its worst behaviors.

But as the war continues, these dynamics that had served the interests of the Gulf states and, in many cases, the United States are shifting, and US policymakers need to be attuned to these changes. This begins with asking the right questions. What the war will ultimately mean for Gulf countries and for the US relationships with them turns on answers to a handful of still-open questions. Five of the most pressing of these questions are explored below. The answers could determine how successful the United States is in securing its interests in the region going forward, both in finding an off-ramp for the conflict and in its broader regional objectives. Iran, too, is likely asking many of the same questions as it seeks to exploit opportunities to shape the Gulf to its own ends.

Will the “new normal” stick?

Since it began its retaliation, Iran has targeted GCC oil and gas infrastructure and commercial interests. Its goal has been to pressure Gulf states to lean on the United States and Israel to cease their strikes. In its more recent and consequential strikes on Qatar’s Ras Laffan Gas Facility, Tehran has shown that it could potentially expand the scope of its attacks, increasing the economic pain on Gulf states and the global economy. Iran can potentially wield this threat to its advantage, but the approach also carries risks. It is dangerous, for example, to assume that Iran can continue to calibrate its strikes to avoid unintended escalation. Iranian forces might strike Gulf economic interests that, whether intentionally or not, would dramatically widen the war. And even without a dramatic incident, experts and advisers have suggested that global companies and even the Gulf countries themselves are considering what the “new normal” in the region looks like, given the lingering impacts and uncertainty from the current conflict and the fact that even a weakened Iran could threaten its neighbors.

Will the Houthis join the fight?

There is an immediate concern that the Houthis in Yemen, either for their own interests or at Iran’s behest, will enter the conflict. If the group does get involved, then it would likely be by restarting attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb Strait—threatening the flow of an additional 12 percent of international seaborne oil transits and 8 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade. For shipping companies, these attacks would add to the already rising costs from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the higher shipping prices as a result of rerouting still occurring from Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in late 2023. These dangers and the costs associated with them would also affect global markets and, even more immediately and profoundly, Saudi Arabia and other GCC member states, given their proximity and the security implications of a re-escalation of the conflict in Yemen.

Aware of the threats the Houthis pose to global shipping and regional security, the US military could continue to carry out new strikes to weaken the group. But regardless of how Houthi actions play out in the coming weeks, Yemen’s instability and entrenched domestic conflict will undoubtedly endure, as it has for over a decade, threatening to amplify instability in the Gulf region in unpredictable ways. As Yemen director at the National Security Council during the outbreak of fighting with the Houthis more than a decade ago, I witnessed firsthand how the conflict in Yemen reordered Gulf security and economic priorities—and over time even led to fissures between GCC member states. Against the backdrop of a worsening conflict with Iran, a second front of fighting in the region might threaten Gulf and US interests in unpredictable ways.

Will GCC unity fracture?

As the conflict drags on, Iran may increasingly try to fracture GCC unity. It could, for example, seek to exploit the differences in interests and perspectives between Gulf countries, each of which has different relationships with Iran, the United States, Israel, and each other. While the GCC does not traditionally have the same rigorous organizing principles as, for example, the European Union, Gulf member states have benefited when they act in unison. To date, there has been a noticeable “rally around the flag” dynamic in the face of Iranian attacks that has papered over differences among Gulf countries. While Iran has engaged with the GCC as a group in prior instances, it has had more success pursuing and maintaining its individual relationships with member states. Iranian leaders likely believe there is value for them in fracturing the group, in the same way that Iran has sought to exploit differences in interests and values between the United States and its other traditional partners and allies.

Memories are both short and long in the region, and GCC member states have not forgotten the Gulf rift that occurred during US President Donald Trump’s first term. Then, years of simmering criticism and concern ignited an escalation of mutual accusations leading Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain to sever relations, close airspace, and enforce a blockade on Qatar, for what they said was Doha’s funding of terrorism, fomenting regional unrest, and ties to Iran. I saw the direct implications for US interests as the head of the political section at the US embassy in Riyadh at that time.

GCC unity will also likely be a factor in how this conflict ends. At times in recent weeks, some Gulf nations have reportedly urged the United States to find an off-ramp. At other times, some have advised escalating strikes to destroy the Iranian regime. These conflicting preferences among Gulf countries augur a worrying trend. The ability of the GCC to maintain a unified voice, which Iran will actively work to divide, will affect the group’s ability to support an end to the conflict that advances the stability of the region as a whole rather than their own parochial interests—as well as its ability to work collectively to advance economic, political, and security goals beyond the Iran war.

Will domestic instability increase in the Gulf?

Since the war began, there has been little news about domestic instability in the Gulf countries, which aim to continue projecting confidence and stability to the wider world. However, the longer the conflict drags on, the more that it could affect each nation in various ways. This in turn could lead the Gulf states to respond in ways that might be antithetical to US interests and values.

Three points are worth considering here. First, citizens and residents’ economic opportunities and physical security have been, and will continue to be, affected by this conflict. If the fighting gets worse, it could reach a tipping point where there is greater public outcry to end the conflict. Second, economic duress will affect nations’ residents and migrant labor populations more acutely than their citizens, given many Gulf states’ economic systems. If this pressure becomes too much, it could lead to wide-ranging and long-lasting human rights and economic issues. Third, in the past few decades some Gulf countries have at times viewed minority populations with suspicion, accusing certain individuals, especially Shia and other minorities, of receiving support, training, and backing from Iran. As Iran’s grip on its proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen weakens, Tehran might seek to take advantage of any preexisting relationships with these Gulf minority populations. At the same time, Gulf states might use such rumors and fears to quell domestic unrest with potentially devastating consequences.

Will Gulf states turn toward China and Russia?

In the current phase of the war, Gulf countries will undoubtedly try to reinforce their security through closer partnerships with the United States. But depending on the outcome of this conflict, some Gulf countries may develop concerns about US reliability as an economic and security partner. Gulf leaders might, for example, fault Washington for an inability to control the conflict or for failing to find an off-ramp at an appropriate time. If this happens, some GCC countries might then choose to reinforce their partnership options beyond the United States by strengthening ties with Russia and China—perhaps economically at first, but potentially also strategically. This in turn could make it more difficult for the United States to pursue its interests in the region, not only in terms of its security goals and Iran policy, but also longer-term strategic partnerships on issues as varied as advanced technology, artificial intelligence, and nuclear energy.

Gulf countries have long proven that they maintain their own relationships with Iran and other groups to advance their own interests, much in the same way that many European countries do. These channels have proven useful to convey messages over the years, but the Trump administration should not underestimate Gulf countries’ ability to use the same channels to take steps with Iran that might undercut US interests and long-term goals if Washington is unable to find a suitable off-ramp that serves GCC interests. Similarly, Iran might try to take advantage of its relationships with China, Russia, and the GCC in ways that run counter to US interests, even if the current conflict has created suspicion in Iran’s relationship with its neighbors.

Mitigating these potential end states will be a long-term project that will require the focused attention of the Trump administration even after a resolution to the immediate conflict.

The Trump administration and GCC countries share an interest in finding a resolution to the current conflict that leaves the region more stable than it was before the launch of Operation Epic Fury. But despite the tactical victories of the US and Israeli campaign against Iran, the war appears to have opened the door to a new wave of uncertainty in the Gulf, which might threaten the very regional stability and economic prosperity it is meant to ensure.

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Russia bombs Ukrainian UNESCO site as Putin escalates terror tactics

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 24 Mar 2026 21:35:39 +0000

Russia bombed a UNESCO World Heritage site in the historic heart of west Ukrainian city Lviv on March 24 as Kremlin efforts to target Ukraine’s civilian population continue to escalate. The rare daytime drone strike hit a residential building close to the Bernardine monastery complex, causing extensive damage and leaving two people seriously injured. The area has featured on the UNESCO World Heritage Site List since 1998 as part of Lviv’s historic architectural ensemble.

Ukrainian officials condemned Tuesday’s attack on the bustling downtown district of Lviv and called on the international community to react. “Russia brutally struck the center of Lviv, a city of exceptional cultural value and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. I urge the UNESCO Director General to immediately respond to this crime in the strongest terms,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha. “Russia is doing exactly what the Iranian regime is doing in the Middle East, but in the middle of Europe.”

Video footage of the bombing appears to show a Russian drone flying unimpeded into the building in central Lviv, indicating a targeted airstrike. This was the latest in a series of similar Russian attacks on Ukrainian heritage sites that have fueled accusations of a deliberate campaign to erase the symbols of Ukrainian culture and national identity. In response to these repeated Russian attacks, UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee has already added three Ukrainian sites located in Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa to the UN agency’s official List of World Heritage in Danger.

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Many Ukrainians saw Tuesday’s attention-grabbing airstrike on a non-military target in central Lviv as part of Kremlin efforts to terrorize the civilian population and break Ukrainian society’s will to resist the ongoing Russian invasion. “This is how Russia tries to make normal life impossible,” commented Ukrainian member of parliament Inna Sovsun.

Over the past year, Russian attacks of civilian targets have risen sharply. According to United Nations data, 2025 was the deadliest period for Ukrainian civilians since the initial months of the full-scale invasion, with the number of deaths rising by 31 percent compared to the previous year.

Many of these civilian deaths came as a result of an escalating bombing campaign made possible by the dramatic expansion of Russia’s domestic drone production capacity. Whereas aerial attacks in 2023 and 2024 typically involved dozens of drones, it is now common for Russia to launch hundreds of unmanned bomber drones at targets across Ukraine in a single day. For example, Tuesday’s strike in central Lviv was part of a nationwide attack involving almost one thousand drones over a 24-hour period. The sheer scale of these bombing raids means that Ukrainian air defenses are often overwhelmed.

The recent winter season saw Russia’s most extensive bombing campaign against the Ukrainian civilian population of the entire war, with a coordinated air offensive targeting critical heating and power infrastructure amid Arctic temperatures. This apparent attempt to freeze millions of Ukrainians into submission in their own homes ultimately failed, but it did serve to underline Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin’s readiness to employ terror tactics as he seeks to increase the pressure on the Ukrainian authorities and push Kyiv toward capitulation.

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Moscow’s mounting attacks on Ukrainian civilians have come against a backdrop of growing battlefield frustration for the Kremlin. Despite enjoying the military initiative throughout 2025, Russia managed to seize less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory while suffering catastrophic losses.

This underwhelming military performance has continued in recent months. For the first time in more than two years, Ukraine actually liberated more land during February 2026 than Russia was able to occupy. The Russian army’s inability to achieve a decisive breakthrough is now causing rumblings of discontent on the home front, including among Russia’s vocal pro-war blogger community.

Despite his army’s lack of progress on the battlefield, Putin shows no signs of a willingness to compromise on the maximalist goals of his invasion. Instead, he continues to insist on peace terms that would leave postwar Ukraine isolated, defenseless, and completely at his mercy.

The Russian ruler knows he cannot afford to settle for anything less. After all the sacrifices of the past four years, a negotiated peace that left 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and firmly anchored in the Western world would be viewed in Moscow as a defeat of historic proportions.

With no obvious route to military victory in Ukraine, Putin finds himself trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end for fear of weakening his grip on power and tarnishing his place in Russian history. So far, he has responded to this dilemma by increasing attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population.

There is very little evidence to suggest this approach is working. On the contrary, recent polls indicate that the bombardment of civilians has hardened Ukraine’s resolve to fight on rather than accept peace terms dictated by the Kremlin. Nevertheless, Russian attacks on civilians are likely to expand further in the coming months as Putin lacks credible alternatives to revive his faltering invasion.

Russia’s decision to bomb a heritage site in the middle of a major Ukrainian city in broad daylight was a signal of intent that points unmistakably toward a coming escalation. Putin is clearly struggling to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, but he remains committed to extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and is prepared to ruthlessly target the civilian population in order to break the current deadlock and force the country’s surrender. Tuesday’s attack on a UNESCO site in the heart of Lviv sent a chilling message that nobody and nowhere in Ukraine is safe.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Lukashenka’s decision to release 250 detainees was widely welcomed. Many of those freed had been in prison since the crackdown that gripped Belarus following the country’s 2020 presidential election, which sparked unprecedented nationwide protests amid allegations of massive voter fraud. The released prisoners included Valiantsin Stefanovich and Marfa Rabkova of Belarusian human rights group Viasna, along with journalist Katsyaryna Andreyeva.

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Under President Trump, the United States has sought a thaw with Minsk. These efforts have so far led to the release of hundreds of political prisoners and an easing of US sanctions against Belarus.

Increased engagement between the US and Belarus represents a significant change in strategy following years of growing tensions between Minsk and Western capitals. Western governments have expressed alarm over Lukashenka’s repressive domestic policies, along with his involvement in Putin’s hybrid war against Europe and his complicity in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Trump administration initiative to reengage with Lukashenka has brought clear humanitarian benefits and has had a life-changing impact on released prisoners along with their families. Nevertheless, concerns remain that the current US approach risks creating incentives for the Belarusian authorities to imprison more domestic opponents.

Despite a number of large-scale releases over the past year, human rights groups claim there are still almost one thousand political prisoners in Belarus, with new names regularly being added to the list as arrests continue. Activists have likened this process to a “revolving door” of repression, with new political prisoners regularly detained as others are pardoned and released.

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Beyond the humanitarian dimension, the US diplomatic outreach to Minsk is seen as an attempt to counter Lukashenka’s near complete dependence on Moscow. Since the 2020 protest movement that almost ousted the Belarus dictator, he has been heavily reliant on Russia for his political survival. In exchange for its support, the Kremlin has sought to expand its grip on neighboring Belarus. This has led to what some have labeled as a “creeping annexation.”

Trump has sought to restart dialogue with Minsk against a backdrop of faltering US-led peace efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine War. So far, however, there is little indication that Lukashenka may be prepared to downgrade his backing for Putin’s invasion or offer any assistance to advance negotiations.

The Belarusian ruler has been a key Russian ally throughout the invasion. This support has included allowing Putin to use Belarus as a gateway for Russia’s initial attempt to seize Kyiv in 2022. More recently, Lukashenka has agreed to host Russian nuclear weapons. He is also accused of aiding Moscow’s drone attacks on Ukraine and partnering with China to produce ammunition for the Russian army.

Lukashenka may now be on track to join Putin among the criminal suspects wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. On March 12, the ICC officially opened an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed by Lukashenka and his security apparatus against political opponents. In March 2023, the ICC issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest in connection with his alleged involvement in the large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children.

The latest Belarusian prisoner releases are an indication of improving relations between Washington and Minsk. However, it remains to be seen whether the benefits of this diplomatic outreach will extend beyond humanitarian goals and lead to broader gains in the security sphere. Lukshenka is no doubt ready to offer more pardons in exchange for economic incentives, but he has yet to demonstrate a willingness to decrease domestic repression or distance himself from the Kremlin.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Could Russia use fake separatists to destabilize Estonia and discredit NATO?

James Rice — Tue, 24 Mar 2026 20:31:17 +0000

In recent weeks, references to a pro-Russian separatist movement in neighboring Estonia have begun appearing with increasing frequency on social media. The so-called “Narva People’s Republic” clearly echoes the “People’s Republics” established by the Kremlin in eastern Ukraine during the early stages of Russia’s invasion in spring 2014. However, not everyone is convinced that this virtual movement is worthy of serious attention.

Estonia’s Internal Security Service, which has earned considerable respect in recent years for a string of high-profile counterintelligence successes, has dismissed the “Narva People’s Republic” initiative as an information operation. Meanwhile, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service doubts any direct Russian government involvement.

A journalist from the Estonian newspaper Postimees recently managed to infiltrate a Telegram chat group and expose the “Narva People’s Republic” as a tiny operation being run by someone likely outside Estonia with apparent ties to St. Petersburg. Given the small scale of the campaign, there is a lively debate in Estonia and across social media over whether highlighting it is a sensible precautionary measure or counterproductive.

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Many have inevitably drawn comparisons with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the role played by fake separatist movements created by the Kremlin to justify Moscow’s expansionist agenda in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. When separatist propaganda about “People’s Republics” first began appearing in Ukraine in the years prior to the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, it was not initially taken seriously.

Recent references to a “Narva People’s Republic” appear to refer to the entire Ida-Viru County in northeastern Estonia rather than the city of Narva alone. Like Ukraine’s Donbas, Ida-Viru County was subject to an extended period of russification. During the Soviet occupation following World War II, large numbers of Russian-speakers from various parts of the Soviet Union were settled in Narva and in newly built Soviet industrial cities in the region.

With a current population that remains dominated by Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians, this would seem to make Ida-Viru County ripe for the Kremlin’s influence operations and grievance politics. However, the Estonian government has invested significantly in the region’s economic development and cultural integration.

Also, the fact that many residents of Estonia’s northeast have family links to Russia means they are well aware that they currently enjoy a far better standard of living than most people across the Narva River in the Russian Federation. With Estonia, like Ukraine, one must avoid the fallacy of conflating language with loyalty.

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The fact that a grassroots separatist movement is unlikely to develop in Ida-Viru County will not necessarily prevent Russia from using the separatist narrative to advance its agenda. When efforts to cultivate a local separatist movement in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine proved insufficient in 2014, the Kremlin sent in Russian citizens and military personnel without insignia. Soon after, they were followed by an undeclared invasion force.

Russia’s goal in Estonia might not be military conquest. It is often suggested that Moscow could aim to test NATO’s collective security commitments and discredit the alliance by launching a relatively minor incursion and claiming a small chunk of Estonian territory on the pretext of protecting compatriots. This would be much easier said than done, however, given Estonia’s heavily monitored border, where even the smallest infraction is noticed quickly. In such a case, Estonia would not wait for NATO to respond.

Estonian officials can be prickly about any portrayal of their country as particularly vulnerable or overly reliant on others for security. Since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, there have been endless articles asking “is Narva next?” This framing has been met with strong push back from Estonian security experts.

Similarly, war games exercises resulting in a quick Russian takeover of the Baltic region have been criticized by Estonian officials as lacking understanding of the Baltic states’ own security posture to the point of being insulting. In common with nearby Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania, Estonia employs a whole of society “total defense” concept that should not be underestimated.

Due to the enormous losses it is sustaining in Ukraine, Russia’s military is currently thought to be in no position to launch an invasion of Estonia. In its annual report for 2026, Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, while clear-eyed about the Kremlin’s expansionist ambitions, assessed that Russia has no intention of militarily attacking Estonia or any other NATO member state in the present year, or likely the next.

It is no wonder that Estonia’s foreign and defense policy has been focused on marshaling support for Ukraine as it confronts Russian aggression. It is also easy to understand why elements in Russia would like to create the impression of a looming threat to Estonia. So far, Estonia’s reaction to social media chatter about a supposed separatist movement has been typically phlegmatic. As this narrative has drawn media attention, we can expect to see it pushed further and recycled. Estonia’s NATO allies should follow Tallinn’s lead and react by remaining alert but calm.

James Rice is a doctoral student at the Institute of World Politics and former legislative director for US Senator Chuck Grassley.

The first war is one of missiles, drones, and Israel’s targeting of Iranian leaders, now entering its fourth week. By most measures, Iran is losing that war, as the United States and Israel reduce Iranian conventional military capabilities more every day. Nevertheless, Washington thus far has underestimated the Iranian regime’s resilience, dispersal of critical weaponry, and ability to continue attacking its neighbors.

That brings us to the second conflict unfolding in shipping lanes, in energy markets, and among political leaders. In its war on the global economy, Iran maintains dangerous leverage. Tehran’s moves to halt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow artery in the global energy economy’s circulatory system, have produced shocks to the global system.

Trump’s ultimatum to Iran over the weekend to fully open the strait within forty-eight hours or suffer attacks on its power plants vividly underscored the linkages between these two wars. The president’s five-day postponement of those strikes on Monday to provide space for talks with Tehran could provide a pathway to ending these wars. But Trump will have failed if these negotiations don’t remove Iran’s capabilities to inflict destruction on its neighbors, Israel, the United States, and the global economy.

How Iran claims ‘victory’

Geoeconomic weaponry will be as critical as military materiel in determining the outcome of this two-front conflict. Iran can’t defeat the United States and Israel militarily, but it may not need to. It only needs to ratchet up the cost of military action to a level that fractures American political will. Iran’s relatively inexpensive tools—missiles, drones, proxies, mines, even just the fear of the use of these tools—can disproportionately disrupt systems built on predictability.

Conventional wisdom holds that Trump must decide which war to prioritize because he can’t win them both. Some argue, for example, that to relieve the economic pressure Iran is applying, Trump should bring his military efforts to a rapid close even if the mission isn’t yet complete. Nothing, however, could be more short-sighted than leaving a vengeful and still formidable Iranian regime in place—one that can further rebuild its military capabilities over time and conduct terrorist attacks, after achieving the “victory” of countering the United States and Israel through asymmetric means.

For Tehran, regime survival would be sufficient triumph. It will tell its people, its proxies, its partners China and Russia, and the wider world that it absorbed the blows of the world’s greatest military power and exposed its vulnerabilities. That narrative will travel far beyond Iran, serving as a playbook that other US adversaries will employ.

How the US emerges victorious

For the United States, winning the two-front war doesn’t mean an open-ended military campaign with maximalist goals. What it would require is something that has been difficult to discern so far: a concerted strategy by the Trump administration that recognizes the larger stakes of this moment for the United States and its still-hedging allies.

What would such a strategy look like in practice? It would start with US forces stepping up their targeting of the missile, drone, and maritime capabilities that underpin Tehran’s asymmetric strategy, weakening them to the point that they are an occasional nuisance but not an ongoing threat. The United States also must decisively break Iran’s ability to hold the global economy hostage, beginning with opening the Strait of Hormuz. This step can be taken together with Gulf allies that now have no remaining doubt that their adversary is Iran, not Israel. These countries will proceed to structure their militaries and defense plans accordingly.

Beyond opening the strait, Trump will need to reach into his familiar geoeconomic toolkit if he hopes to win the economic war with Iran. As the Atlantic Council’s Josh Lipsky has written in the Wall Street Journal, such tools—from shipping insurance to asset seizures—used to be far more commonplace in conflict. On Friday, Trump temporarily waived sanctions on Iranian oil in order to calm global markets, but that was a defensive economic move rather than a proactive one. The United States possesses not only the world’s strongest military but also its largest economy. As his tariffs have shown, Trump is not afraid to leverage that power.

Israeli forces, for their part, should continue targeting the Iranian regime, particularly leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Undermining the IRGC would have the additional benefit of weakening Iran’s regional proxy networks, which have done so much harm over the past half century. If the IRGC remains strong after this conflict is over, it would allow the Iranian regime to regenerate its coercive power—both within Iran and across the region.

Even if the US and Israeli campaign does not result in regime change in Tehran, it should aim to produce a changed regime that lacks capacity to seriously threaten its neighbors, the United States, and the global economy. It may have been wishful thinking for Trump to call on Iranians to rise up against their despotic leadership, particularly after the regime killed as many as 30,000 demonstrators earlier this year. However, the more that the United States, Israel, and its partners defang Iran’s regime and its enforcers, the greater the chance of the regime’s eventual collapse.

His administration also must focus on building what comes after the war: a more resilient and robust Gulf security architecture in which Saudis, Emiratis, and their neighbors join in common cause despite their inevitable differences. Given the economic and strategic significance of the region, the United States will need to join with European allies and Asian stakeholders, including China, to share the burden and responsibility of safeguarding the world’s economic lifelines.

Many US allies opposed the Trump administration’s decision to go to war alongside Israel in Iran. Some supported it. But particularly as the war continues across two fronts, one aimed at the global economy, all have a stake in its outcome. The Trump administration now must stay the course to win both aspects of this war. As it does so, Washington would do well to rediscover the neglected value of coalition-building and alliances in managing a world where continued volatility will require every friend the Trump administration can muster.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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The Iran conflict exposes the new cost curve of war

Nic Adams — Mon, 23 Mar 2026 21:06:41 +0000

“Shock and awe” was the term of art when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. That conflict saw the United States bring to bear overwhelming military force backed by superior technology in the form of precision-guided weapons, stealth aircraft, and satellite technology, as well as a finely tuned military force built on sound doctrine, world-class training, and a professional cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers. In many ways, the initial strikes on Iran resemble this dynamic—a world-class military with superior weapons and training engaging a weaker foe, aiming to achieve a lightning-fast military victory in service of political aims.

A closer look, however, reveals a shift in the battlefield dynamic over the past twenty years that often gives weaker militaries more tools to offset stronger adversaries. Cheap drones, open-source satellite imagery, and cyber tools give weaker states such as Iran new ways to hold superior militaries at risk, while forcing them to expend munitions and resources at far greater cost. And despite deep capital markets, a strong innovation base, and a growing defense tech sector in the United States, costs remain high and development timelines remain long due to an ornery requirements process, misaligned acquisition incentives, and bureaucratic inertia. The Pentagon’s challenge is to rapidly field innovative, lower-cost technologies alongside its exquisite capabilities, ensuring each is used where it delivers the greatest advantage.

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Consider the overwhelming firepower with which the United States initiated combat operations in 2003. Joint Direct Attack Munitions, aircraft carrier strike groups, and stealth bombers remained out of reach for Iraqi defenders. US bases in the region were also largely untouchable; while Iraqi Scud missiles inflicted serious damage in the first Gulf War, US missile defense systems proved highly effective during Operation Iraqi Freedom, leading to a decisive end of initial combat operations after just a few weeks of fighting, the following insurgency notwithstanding. Much has changed since then, especially with the proliferation of low-cost drone technology, at which Iran has become adept. By producing and exporting the Shahed-136 drone to Russia for use in Ukraine, Iran has refined both the technology and doctrine behind these systems.

The result is a weapon that forces the United States to intercept $30,000 drones with $2-million defensive systems—while still inflicting casualties in the opening salvos of a conflict. Iran’s combination of ballistic missiles and low-cost drones threatens to swiftly deplete defensive systems, leaving US, Arab, and Israeli targets vulnerable to attack. Additionally, Iranian-aligned groups in the region, such as the Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq, or even the much-weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon, can employ much of the same low-cost weapons to stretch and harass American and Israeli troops, broadening the battlespace across the region and striking civilian traffic and infrastructure to impose global costs to a growing conflict.

While the United States will continue to enjoy unquestionable military overmatch, both the United States and Israel enjoy another advantage over the terrorist regime in Tehran and its regional proxies: a deep pool of innovation, capital markets, and industry ready to produce in support of national security and defense. While there will always be a place for exquisite weapons systems and precision munitions, cheaper and more attritable weapons systems must be part of the fight to both adequately and economically defend against some of the systems being employed by Iranian forces, as well as weapons the United States might encounter in a future Pacific conflict. The Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS) drone is one example of the United States leaning into more cost-effective weapons, a rare case of reverse-engineering the Iranian Shahed. Other novel and emerging technologies changing the battlefield today include autonomous ground systems, artificial intelligence-driven counter-drone weapons, and energetics (such as propellants and explosives) for artillery strikes.

For example, autonomous ground vehicles armed with counter-drone weapons or sensors could be cheaply and effectively deployed across the Middle East to defend US bases as well as civilian oil infrastructure, allowing soldiers and civilians to take cover while autonomous systems remain exposed and engage incoming drones. This would obviate the need for expensive missiles to take down low-cost drones, allowing the United States to keep its high-cost systems in reserve for bigger targets that may yet be on the way.

In addition to hardware, the United States has a strong advantage over Iran in big data, computing power, and software. US systems are far more networked than they were twenty years ago. Intelligence collection and analysis is now supported by artificial intelligence. Open-source imagery solutions provide the United States with more options to locate enemy capabilities and stockpiles.

Supported by deep capital markets and institutional investors, the United States dominates the defense tech landscape—and will continue to do so. That means it’s up to the Department of Defense and the services to send a strong demand signal. Unless leaders are willing to employ proven innovative systems at scale, the United States will continue to rely on older, slower, and far more expensive weapons systems both in this fight and in the next.

From Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine to Iran, drones and loitering munitions have repeatedly demonstrated how inexpensive systems can reshape the battlefield. Now the United States must adapt in order to remain the world’s premier fighting force. The technology is already here. The question is whether policymakers have the vision and the flexibility to deploy it.

Nic Adams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He also advises frontier technology firms on strategic communications, business development, and government relations. He previously served as a professional staff member on the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and as a commissioned US Army officer.

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What Romania’s role in the Iran war reveals about its diplomatic positioning

Alex Șerban, Kirsten Fontenrose — Mon, 23 Mar 2026 18:55:38 +0000

BUCHAREST and WASHINGTON—Recent diplomatic tensions involving Iran and Romania reveal more than a temporary geopolitical episode. They illustrate the increasingly complex strategic environment facing NATO allies on Europe’s eastern flank. Romania’s decision to authorize additional US military capabilities on its territory reflects a long-standing commitment to the transatlantic alliance. But it also highlights the delicate balancing act Bucharest must perform: reinforcing its strategic partnership with Washington while maintaining cohesion with European partners that are navigating a more uncertain transatlantic relationship.

The developments began when the United States requested temporary access to Romanian military infrastructure to support operations in the Middle East. Romania’s Supreme Council of National Defense approved the US request to deploy several capabilities, including aerial refueling aircraft and satellite communication systems serving a defensive role. Romania’s Parliament then endorsed the decision, reaffirming the legal framework that governs US access to Romanian bases under bilateral agreements and NATO commitments.

Soon after the approval, the first visible signs of this deployment appeared. According to Romanian media reports, three US Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft landed at the 90th Air Base near Otopeni. While these aircraft are not combat platforms, they are among the most critical enablers of modern air operations. By allowing fighter jets and surveillance aircraft to refuel midair, tanker aircraft extend operational range and endurance, effectively expanding the geographic reach of allied airpower. Their presence in Romania strengthens the logistical backbone supporting US and NATO operations across multiple theaters.

Iran’s reaction followed quickly. A spokesperson for the Iranian foreign ministry warned that allowing US forces to operate from Romanian territory could be interpreted as participation in military aggression. Bucharest responded to Tehran’s threats with notable restraint. Romanian officials emphasized that the country is not involved in any conflict with Iran and reiterated that the deployment of US assets is defensive and conducted under existing bilateral agreements. The Romanian foreign ministry also stressed that the missile defense infrastructure hosted by Romania serves purely defensive purposes and operates within NATO’s collective security framework.

When Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei warned that hosting US aerial refueling tankers would make Romania a participant in military aggression, he was not making a legal argument so much as a threat intended to deter US partners. Tehran’s objective is to ensure that each US partner—including Romania, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom—concludes that the risk is not worth bearing alone and quietly declines. If enough partners hesitate, then the coalition Washington is trying to consolidate never fully materializes, improving Iran’s strategic position without requiring direct military confrontation.

Iran has pressed Gulf states and European partners separately, issuing warnings calibrated to each country—threatening Gulf states with strikes on energy infrastructure while warning European governments of legal consequences and damage to bilateral ties. The logic is consistent: Make the cost of cooperation feel personal and isolating, in the hope that no partner feels confident enough in collective backing to hold firm. The approach works when partners deliberate alone; it is far less effective when they coordinate openly and signal unity.

Romania has strong grounds to hold firm on its position. The 2005 US-Romania Defense Cooperation Agreement established the framework for US military access to multiple joint-use facilities, including the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base. Together with the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and the 2011 Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century, this creates a comprehensive legal basis for US operations on Romanian soil—one that has been ratified by the Parliament and upheld consistently for two decades. Iran’s invocation of potential damage to bilateral relations underscores the limits of its leverage. Romania-Iran ties are sufficiently limited that their deterioration carries minimal strategic cost for Bucharest.

The energy dimension reinforces this asymmetry. Iran does not export natural gas to Romania and has no infrastructure or contractual mechanism through which it could exert pressure. Meanwhile, Romania’s energy sector is expanding, positioning it to become a major European gas producer. Tehran therefore lacks meaningful economic leverage over Bucharest in the energy domain.

On the military side, Romania has approved the deployment of support assets rather than strike capabilities. After weeks of sustained military pressure on Iranian infrastructure, Tehran’s ability to project force into southeastern Europe is constrained, though not eliminated. More importantly, US forces are present on Romanian territory. Any direct attack on facilities such as the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base would involve US personnel, raising the stakes significantly and triggering a bilateral response that would not depend on full NATO consensus.

However, Iran has a documented history of covert operations across Europe, and Romania’s role as a host for US forces increases its exposure to malign activities. While real, this threat remains limited by Iran’s current operational constraints and the escalation risks associated with targeting a NATO member hosting US troops.

That said, Romania’s position also brings into focus one of NATO’s most sensitive strategic assets: the ballistic missile defense installation at Deveselu. Operational since 2016, the Aegis Ashore system forms part of NATO’s broader missile defense architecture designed to intercept ballistic threats originating outside the Euro-Atlantic area. While the system is purely defensive, its presence places Romania at the center of ongoing geopolitical debates and makes it a frequent target of criticism from both Russia and Iran.

Asked about Iran’s warnings on March 19, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte emphasized Alliance unity, stating that “Romania is safe; we will defend every centimeter of allied territory,” while highlighting Romania’s key role in strengthening security on the eastern flank. This reassurance reflects the broader strategic importance of Romania within NATO’s deterrence posture, particularly in the Black Sea region.

Even more recent developments—including Iran firing missiles toward the Diego Garcia military base and threatening to attack power generation across the Gulf—point to the regime’s willingness and capability to strike beyond its immediate neighborhood. In recent days, several European countries have put their security services on heightened alert. Reports by the Romanian news site HotNews that Iran may be activating operational networks in Europe have increased the relevance of NATO’s missile defense shield. The Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu increasingly represents not only a defensive buffer but a front line in the protection of major European capitals against evolving ballistic threats.

At the same time, the episode highlights a broader debate within the Alliance. While Romania continues to rely heavily on the United States as the cornerstone of its security guarantees, discussions in Europe increasingly emphasize strategic autonomy. Proposals such as expanding France’s nuclear deterrence to cover European allies reflect concerns about the long-term reliability of US security commitments. Romania’s response has been cautious: open to deeper European cooperation but firmly committed to NATO as the central pillar of deterrence.

Meanwhile, the current tensions among NATO allies over the Iran war may ultimately strengthen allied cohesion despite short-term turbulence. As Iulian Chifu, a former advisor to the president of Romania on strategic affairs, put it, the war has “exposed the limits of unilateral action, forcing the United States to rediscover the strategic necessity of allied coordination and reinforcing NATO as the central framework for collective security.”

Navigating this environment requires careful diplomacy. Romania’s challenge is not to choose between Washington and its European partners, but to reinforce both pillars simultaneously. Clear coordination and collective messaging among allies will be essential to counter efforts to fragment the coalition. In an era of intensifying geopolitical competition and evolving transatlantic dynamics, Romania’s ability to maintain that balance may prove to be one of its most important strategic contributions to the Alliance.

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Demand destruction has begun: What Sri Lanka reveals about the global energy crisis

Phillip Cornell — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 16:04:40 +0000

GALLE—For the past two years, I have been based largely out of Sri Lanka, closer to Asian clients, while still working regularly from Washington and London. The experience has been an education in emerging market resilience. This is a society in recovery from conflict and natural disaster that remains exposed to external shocks, challenged by entrenched interests, and subject to the influence of larger neighbors. Forged in this crucible, Sri Lanka’s tightly knit communities are highly adept at managing uncertainty. But over the past two weeks, that resilience has been tested in ways that are both familiar and deeply alarming.

Since the US and Israeli strikes on Iran, Sri Lanka has been an unlikely subject of headlines. It provided emergency rescue to Iranian sailors after the US torpedoed their ship off the coast near the city of Galle, where I live. It also gave refuge to a second crew and impounded their vessel in a remote port to keep it away from sensitive commercial traffic around Colombo. A relatively new popular government is desperate to remain neutral and focus on the reforms it was elected for. Yet painstaking economic recovery is now colliding with a massive energy crisis and its immediate effects.

The disruption to flows through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one fifth of global oil and shipped gas transits, has triggered a rapid and systemic shock to energy markets. Prices have surged and availability has tightened severely. A crippling shortage of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) means there is little fuel for cooking. Restaurants and small businesses are shuttering. The lack of fertilizer shipments is thwarting the critical March planting season in this heavily agricultural country. Petrol stations faced strain initially from panicked hoarding behavior (memories of the 2022 crisis are still fresh), and, more recently, from restricted distribution.

Sri Lanka is just a small example of the energy havoc spreading around the world. Within days of the conflict’s outbreak and the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, much of South and Southeast Asia have moved from price pressure to physical constraint. Asia is particularly reliant on oil and gas from the Gulf, with around 60 percent of its crude oil imports and nearly a third of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) moving through the strait. Almost all countries in the region import most of their fuel and gas, and some only have enough supplies to last a few more weeks. Several Southeast Asia–based refineries, including facilities in Singapore and Malaysia, have cut back ‌output due to constrained crude availability. Panic fuel-buying has spread to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Household reliance on imported LPG is on another scale altogether in India, where hundreds of millions of customers wait for days to replace canisters.

This is what a real energy shock looks like on the ground.

Governments are now scrambling to secure supply, drawing on limited reserves, issuing emergency tenders, and in many cases trying to reduce demand.

In recent days, the Sri Lankan government has taken extraordinary steps. It introduced a four-day workweek, and it began moving schools to remote learning on Wednesdays. Transport and public services are being curtailed. On March 15, the government reintroduced a mandatory petrol rationing program that saw millions of subscribers crash the registration website. These are emergency responses to address a fuel-import dependent system under stress.

Lines form to purchase gas near Galle, Sri Lanka, on March 17, 2026. (Phillip Cornell)

Sri Lanka is not alone. Across Asia, governments are implementing emergency measures. Countries are prioritizing household LPG over commercial use. Industrial activity in sectors such as petrochemicals is being curtailed. The Philippines has shortened the workweek. Pakistan has closed schools. Myanmar introduced mobility restrictions.

Air travel is highly sensitive to fuel prices, and airlines are now cutting routes as jet fuel prices rise sharply. This is compounding the air travel chaos caused by closed airspace over the major Gulf “superconnector” airline hubs, with direct impacts on Asian tourist destinations. Across southern Sri Lanka, hotel bookings have dried up.

The latest pressures have been on the power system in Sri Lanka. The Ceylon Electricity Board is a traditional integrated utility; less than 10 percent of its generation is from liquid fuel. But fuel still provides key flexibility, and local diesel generators are common. After a dry season that reduced hydroelectric capacity, and labor disputes in the face of critical power sector reforms, the fuel shortage is adding to existing system stress. Rolling curtailments and power outages began in earnest this week, forcing hotels and critical services like hospitals to draw further on diesel stocks to feed emergency generation.

The economic effects of these various price and supply shocks are quick to materialize. Higher fuel costs are feeding through into transport and food systems, contributing to inflation and growth pressures. Prices for daily goods at our local markets have already gone up as shopkeepers anticipate supply chain disruptions. Economies like Sri Lanka are particularly exposed due to weaker currencies, limited fiscal space, and dependence on imports. The International Monetary Fund has warned that sustained increases in energy prices could raise inflation and reduce growth globally, with emerging markets especially exposed.

Perhaps the most important development is that demand destruction is already underway. The Financial Times, citing JPMorgan analysis, shows that refined fuel shipments in Asia have fallen by 30 to 35 percent, while global oil demand could drop by around one million barrels per day as a result of both price increases and policy measures. The speed of adjustment makes the current crisis unique. During the 2022 energy shock following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, the effects unfolded over months as supply chains reoriented. In this case, disruption to a central maritime artery has compressed the timeline. Physical shortages, policy responses, and economic contraction are occurring in rapid succession.

Rationing and demand suppression can provide temporary relief, but perceptions and expectations of duration are already causing changes in behavior. Business owners are contemplating risk-mitigation investments such as solar panels and batteries. A neighbor has become the local agent for Sri Lankan–built electric three-wheelers to replace the classic tuk-tuk. There is a real sense of preparing for a structural change.

Motorists line up to purchase gas near Galle, Sri Lanka, on March 17, 2026. (Phillip Cornell)

Resilience is a word often used to describe technical systems, but it is ultimately about people. Sri Lanka has endured considerable hardship in recent decades, but a very real sense of community and shared responsibility provide informal social safety nets that kick into action during tough times. Even as only a guest of the country, I have felt embraced by the community. Invitations to communal iftar dinners, shared use of barbecues or microgrids, and conviviality during hour-long waits for petrol are just small examples of a community solidarity that feels different.

In developed economies, economic disruption is often framed in terms of price increases and inflation. In markets where the impact on daily activities such as cooking, transport, and work is immediate and tangible, disruption becomes a test of crisis behavior.

Sri Lanka is not an outlier but an early warning, and a reminder that the global energy system remains deeply vulnerable to disruption, especially for those who depend on it most.

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Zagorodnyuk in Foreign Policy: Four years of war in Europe

Atlantic Council — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 15:28:01 +0000

The post Zagorodnyuk in Foreign Policy: Four years of war in Europe appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Temnycky in Forbes: How Ukraine’s youth organizations have been impacted by Russia’s war

Atlantic Council — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 15:19:43 +0000

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Aquatic Tiger: How long-range submarine drones could play a role in a Taiwan conflict

Fri, 20 Mar 2026 15:11:51 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The Aquatic Tiger wargame explored how long-range autonomous underwater vehicles (LRAUVs) could help the US deter or counter Chinese military action against Taiwan.
LRAUVs showed promise for pre-conflict surveillance, mine countermeasures, and swarming attacks in chokepoints, but showed vulnerabilities in the shallow, constricted waters of the Taiwan Strait.
LRAUVs would be useful contributors—not decisive—if deployed in large numbers, with advance planning, and integrated into broader US and allied military operations.

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Introduction

According to the Pentagon, “[China’s military] continues to refine multiple military options to force Taiwan unification by brute force. Those options include, most dangerously, an amphibious invasion, firepower strike, and possibly a maritime blockade.”

To address this threat, the new National Security Strategy unveiled in late 2025 declares that “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority” and emphasizes, to this end, “reinforcing U.S. and allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan. The new National Defense Strategy of January 2026 further reinforces the goal to establish a “strong denial defense along the First Island Chain” and the need to “supercharge the defense industrial base.”

For this approach to succeed, the United States and its allies must rapidly field new military systems to counterbalance China’s military buildup. To offset China’s tremendous rate of military production, US defense thinkers and policymakers are increasingly focused on unmanned systems—particularly those far cheaper and faster to produce than the most advanced manned warships and aircraft. Such low-priced unmanned systems would be a key element of accelerating a buildup of US military capability to deter or defeat Chinese aggression against Taiwan at a feasible cost.

As Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, told the Washington Post: “I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities so I can make their lives utterly miserable for a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything.”

Thanks to both sides’ mass use of unmanned aircraft in Russia’s war against Ukraine, this quote might bring to mind swarms of flying drones dropping munitions or ramming into targets. But Ukraine is largely a land war, and a fight to control Taiwan would be a different kind of warfare. Undersea drones could play a critical role in defending Taiwan, particularly if they could be produced relatively cheaply and paired with AI that would allow them to operate autonomously while submerged and maintain communications silence to preserve their stealth. Given the long distances involved in the Indo-Pacific region and the distance of US bases from Taiwan, such drones could be particularly useful for the US military in a Taiwan conflict if they had a range of over 1000 kilometers. This led to the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI)’s interest in exploring, through wargaming and analysis, the potential of US LRAUVs in a Taiwan contingency. This issue brief is the result of Aquatic Tiger, an initial two-day wargame and post-wargame analytic effort conducted by IPSI, using the expertise of former US military, intelligence, and defense officials, along with non-government scholars and industry experts. This wargame, conducted over two days in November 2025, was the first of its kind with publicly available results, and is summarized below from the perspectives of a range of participants.

Aquatic Tiger’s initial results suggest that additional analysis, wargaming, modeling, technical experimentation, live exercises, and simulation on key issues related to such LRAUVs are warranted, including: how units of such drones would be best organized and employed by the United States, Taiwan, and US allies in such a contingency; whether such LRAUVs could be produced at a low enough cost and in sufficient scale to be effective; what tactical-level synergies these LRAUVs would have operating in concert with other manned and unmanned platforms; and the potential efficacy of various Chinese countermeasures.

LRAUV capabilities: A submariner’s perspective

The LRAUVs employed in Aquatic Tiger are systems still in development that have not been fielded in large numbers or used in combat. For the purposes of Aquatic Tiger, we made assumptions about the capabilities they would have in the next few years. The LRAUVs for Aquatic Tiger were uncrewed, extended-duration, multi-mission submersible platforms controlled by AI. Due to communications limitations imposed by the need to remain submerged and minimize the risk of detection when approaching their targets, they relied heavily on mission planning, programmed autonomous action, and post-mission data recovery. They were modular and configurable to various mission roles such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), seabed survey, mine countermeasures (MCM), electronic warfare (EW), and maritime kinetic effects (high-explosive warhead) delivery. For the purposes of Aquatic Tiger, we also assumed that they would have an austere deployment capability, meaning they could be launched directly from the back of a truck or dropped from a ship or aircraft.

LRAUVs reduce personnel risk and are low cost, expendable, and less attributable than crewed submersibles. However, they lack the speed, endurance, mission versatility, stealth and survivability, payload, and real-time situational awareness and decision-making capability of crewed platforms like US attack submarines.

Compared to unmanned aerial systems (UAS), LRAUVs benefit from longer range and time on station, underwater concealment, and reduced exposure to the adversary’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, particularly sensors and missiles. However, LRAUVs are also much slower, lacking the rapid deployment and potential wide-area coverage of UAVs, while their limited communication capabilities preclude the same level of immediate dynamic tasking and constant sharing of situational awareness with other platforms.

Wargame director’s overview of Aquatic Tiger

To explore LRAUVs’ potential in a near-future Taiwan scenario, we conducted the two-day Aquatic Tiger wargame with three teams including former US military, intelligence, and defense officials, along with non-government scholars and industry experts. The Blue Team representing the US military, including notional LRAUV capabilities, was led by a former US Defense Department senior executive with extensive experience with East Asian issues. The Red Team, representing China, was led by a former senior defense intelligence analyst whose career focused on China’s military. The control team planned and ran the wargame, adjudicated the results of player actions, and addressed the roles of countries other than the United States and China as needed. It consisted of former US government and military leaders with experience running wargames and tabletop exercises—including one retired US Navy officer with extensive experience directing wargames on undersea warfare—and a distinguished scholar bringing academic rigor to the analytic methodology.

Road to crisis and first turn: Chinese pressure on Taiwan building

To provide a starting point for the scenario, we began with a notional crisis, set a few years from now, in which China’s military placed unprecedented military pressure on Taiwan to convince its people to seek reconciliation with Beijing and oppose further defense budget increases. As tensions rose, a Chinese military aircraft crashed after a collision with a drone from Taiwan. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-controlled media claimed several members of the aircrew were killed, and Chinese fighter jets soon shot down three more drones. CCP leadership threatened further escalation, warning that a “wrong decision” would trigger “decisive military action.” For its part, Washington announced stiff new economic punishments against China, warning they would remain in place until Beijing agreed to “maintain peace and to renounce aggression.” With that, the scene was set for a confrontation.

Figure 1: Turn one of the Aquatic Tiger wargame

The Red Team, simulating China, initiated the wargame planning to keep the Taiwan situation “an internal matter,” using an air and sea quarantine to pressure Taiwan while keeping out the US military and preparing for a potential armed conflict. China’s priorities included

enforcing a quarantine of Taiwan framed by the CCP as a domestic law-enforcement action (attempting to force all air and sea cargo to Taiwan to be routed via air and seaports on China’s mainland for inspection);
enhancing defensive military posture, including surveillance assets to detect potential US military intervention; and
conducting a messaging campaign targeting the populations of Taiwan, the United States, and the international community, along with diplomatic actions around the world to underscore that the goal is a peaceful resolution.

The Blue Team’s overall concept at the outset was to “flood the zone” to signal resolve and deter escalation. Its priorities included: surging ISR assets, including LRAUVs, into the area around Taiwan; increasing military posture, including with LRAUVs; and engaging allies and partners for support.

During the first turn of the wargame, US military-operated LRAUVs, along with small numbers operated deniably by the US government and others operated by non-government research entities and private contractors, successfully deployed into key areas to conduct surveillance and support public release of information on Chinese activities—though non-LRAUV assets proved to be more effective collectors of images compelling for public release. Beijing’s calculus and plans were ultimately unaffected. The information campaign built some international support and sympathy, but China leaned into its narrative and US key allies and partners ultimately remained hesitant due to risks and costs.

Second turn: China escalates and the United States responds

Figure 2: Turn two of the Aquatic Tiger wargame

In the second turn of the wargame, the situation rapidly escalated as Chinese coast guard vessels attempted to enforce the quarantine and Taiwanese coast guard vessels moved to escort incoming ships. Chinese military vessels intervened, with a People’s Republic of China (PRC) frigate sinking one of Taiwan’s coast guard vessels. A short time later, this frigate exploded and sank quickly, apparently hit by a torpedo or unmanned underwater vehicle.

The Red Team escalated under the premise that China would “prepare to achieve a resolution to the Taiwan question.” China declared a full blockade of Taiwan and, shortly thereafter, conducted limited joint firepower strikes on Taiwan bases. To stifle international opposition and justify its position, Beijing simultaneously conducted a strategic messaging campaign targeting the international community.

The Red Team’s pivot from pressuring Taiwan to use of force was a major and rapid escalation and a reaction to perceived US direct intervention. China was trying to impose costs to compel the United States to back off, not hesitating to destroy LRAUVs and other “interference” in the Taiwan Strait, while assuming US involvement in LRAUV operations and the sinking of the frigate. The Blue Team’s posture adjusted to provide broader military options and complicate PRC efforts beyond the vicinity of Taiwan, while leveraging allies and partners. LRAUVs were augmenting, but not replacing, a wide range of other surveillance assets and saw some limited use for counter-mine operations.

Third turn: Military conflict to control access to Taiwan

Figure 3: Turn three of the Aquatic Tiger wargame

At the start of the third turn, the Red Team continued wanting to convince the Taiwan government to come to the negotiating table. But it shifted to primarily focus on defeating (but not destroying) US military operations supporting Taiwan, while still attempting to avoid an all-out war with the United States and its allies. The PRC approach included three main elements.

Prevent US/allied military interference and support to Taiwan: Conduct A2/AD focused on chokepoints south and northeast of Taiwan in order to keep the US military at bay and impose costs on Washington, while warning the United States that China has deployed portions of its nuclear triad.
Defeat Taiwan’s forces with standoff attacks: Conduct joint firepower strikes on Taiwan’s military and infrastructure targets in order to damage logistics, disrupt command and control, and reduce Taiwan’s ability to resist.
Control the Taiwan Strait: Reinforce China’s control of the Taiwan Strait in order to deny US support and unity of action, and to enable cross-strait access for an amphibious assault, if needed.

The Blue Team’s overall concept, meanwhile, was to “throw Taiwan a lifeline” by securing access corridors east of Taiwan while countering and complicating PRC military efforts to threaten Taiwan. This included three main elements.

Stop the blockade: Attrit Chinese forces in the Taiwan Strait, continue mine countermeasures, and degrade Chinese blockading forces.
Increase US posture: Neutralize Chinese control of the South China Sea and demonstrate counter-invasion capabilities and rehearsals south and east of Taiwan.
Support Taiwan: Resupply and reinforce Taiwan, prioritizing mine countermeasures, anti-ship weapons, and beach defenses.

China successfully established clear maritime superiority in the Taiwan Strait despite some US LRAUVs entering. The control team, based on analysis of China’s countermeasures, adjudicated that China was able to take advantage of the geographic constriction and relatively shallow waters of the strait to detect, disable, and destroy the LRAUVs through various means faster than replacement LRAUVs could enter the strait through the passages at its north and south ends. China was also able to disrupt and interdict much of the air and maritime traffic coming into Taiwan from the east, particularly given the limited east coast port capacity.

The conflict began to coalesce around four key geographic areas prioritized by Blue Team forces.

The northern end of the Taiwan Strait: China achieved clear air and surface superiority in this area. LRAUVs were the primary US capability directly contesting Chinese control of this area, due to the Blue Team’s unwillingness to risk losing any of its relatively small number of high-value attack submarines.
Ryukyus, including Okinawa: In this area, the United States and Japan established a clear advantage by employing aircraft and warships supported by land-based assets and LRAUVs. China did not attempt to contest US control of this area but was content to block movement toward Taiwan by US and Japanese forces in this area.
The Luzon Strait: This area was heavily contested, including by air, surface, and subsurface forces engaged in intense combat with high attrition on both sides. US LRAUVs were a significant contributor to this fight, swarming and sinking Chinese surface vessels as they attempted to move through the strait.
South China Sea: The United States kept its carrier strike groups in this area well protected and away from the Chinese mainland, which limited China’s ability to find and strike them. There was little role for US LRAUVs in this area.

The wargame concluded with the conflict escalating and no end in sight, with all three teams having learned some important lessons. Observations from key members of the Red Team, Blue Team, and Control Team follow.

Red (China) Team leader’s perspective

For Beijing, managing the Taiwan issue in this type of scenario encompasses three principal components. The first is to convince Taiwanese authorities that actions opposing Beijing’s desires will be punished. China does this by demonstrating the capacity to ratchet up military or paramilitary pressure at points around the island. The second is to convince Taiwanese authorities that they have no realistic hope of decisive support from outside powers. These efforts primarily leverage the suite of US-focused A2/AD capabilities the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been developing for more than two decades. The third is to ensure that China retains a credible capacity to take control of the island by force.

LRAUVs present some, albeit limited, opportunity to impact each of these components.

The platform presents some utility to provide enhanced warning of PRC pressure operations or intent to use violence to impose Beijing’s will. China has been posturing kinetic assets for a short-notice use of force against Taiwan for decades. There has been a marked increase in their coercive posture around Taiwan in recent years. A transition to violent resolution could begin within days, or even hours, of receiving an order from Beijing. With the ability to loiter in place (unlike low-earth-orbit satellites or aircraft), LRAUV swarms in surveillance positions in the Taiwan Strait and off PRC marshalling points could augment national technical means to help differentiate between ambiguous and unambiguous warning.

The platform has the potential to shape PLA operations but not to deter them. The decision whether to use armed force to compel Taiwan to submit to CCP control will be a political decision, with relative military postures being only one of several considerations. Once the decision is made to place military force in the leading role, the PLA will calculate optimized campaign operations designed to mitigate the effect of Taiwanese or US resistance, including the already anticipated presence of LRAUV platforms. Platforms with counter-mine payloads could complicate blockade operations that include mining Taiwan’s ports. Swarming attacks by LRAUV platforms against PRC support vessels or capital ships could complicate PRC countermeasures. Thus, LRAUV platforms might have effect at shaping, but not deterring, PRC military operations.

LRAUVs’ contributions to defeating PRC blockade operations or an invasion will be a function of numbers of platforms, payload types, and their integration into larger US or Taiwanese systems of systems. PLA War Control theory and Systems Warfare doctrine emphasize warfare that is highly intense but also highly focused on carefully defined objectives. The result is a hybrid of maneuver and position warfare fought in a resource-intensive, and therefore potentially highly attritive, manner. PRC emphasis on optimization of military operations includes the ability to adapt to unforeseen battlefield developments. For these reasons, the impact of LRAUV platforms on PRC operations will be closely linked to volume and flexibility.

Strategic level

PRC military and paramilitary elements play a supporting role at the strategic level. Beijing’s objective at this level is to shape political thinking, primarily in Taipei and Washington. This is true even in more extreme strategies such as quarantines or blockades. Military coercion is more central in these strategies, but the objective remains to shape political thinking.

The utility of LRAUVs at the strategic level is less straightforward than at the operational level. It will probably be limited to shaping the choice and execution of China’s military operations to implement its strategy.

LRAUV platforms will likely be ineffective at providing enhanced strategic warning. A PRC decision to turn to armed force to resolve the Taiwan issue will almost certainly be rooted in CCP leaders’ political assessments that peaceful (albeit coerced) unification is no longer possible. LRAUVs are not positioned to monitor political decisions—only their operational manifestations.

These platforms will also likely be ineffective at deterring PRC strategic action. Although LRAUVs, in concert with other systems, have the potential to impose costs on China for military action, PRC leaders will almost certainly calculate that these platforms will be unable to deny them the achievement of key political objectives.

LRAUV platforms will not prove decisive in defeating a PRC strategy to resolve the Taiwan issue by use of military force—but they could play a role in shaping the course of the conflict. The CCP uses military force to drive political outcomes. The theory of victory underlying a blockade or invasion of Taiwan will be based on shaping political dynamics, not strictly military outcomes. By complicating certain types of operations, such as minefield components of blockade operations, LRAUV platforms could—in concert with other systems—help shape PRC military strategies so that Chinese leaders seek offramps from conflict rather than pursue complete domination of Taiwan.

Contextual limitations and political considerations

China has developed a wide range of military tools to deal with a Taiwan conflict scenario. Only those tools that operate in the maritime domain appear to be susceptible to LRAUV influence. This leaves significant elements of China’s toolkit unaffected. Notably, these include the mainland-based ballistic missiles, long-range artillery, and aircraft that would constitute the major part of a joint firepower strike designed to put logistical, communications, psychological, and political pressure on Taiwan’s leadership. Similarly, the majority of the A2/AD tools China has developed to hold potential US or third-party intervention at risk also operate predominately from PRC territory and are therefore beyond the influence of LRAUVs.

It is worth noting that the ways in which LRAUV kinetic payloads shape PRC operations will probably vary significantly depending on which party employs them. LRAUVs or shorter-ranged underwater platforms employed by Taiwan will almost certainly generate a different response than those employed by US forces. China will likely see Taiwan’s use as staying within the confines of a domestic conflict. Under its Active Defense doctrine, China might seek to avoid striking US targets—which would likely draw the United States into the conflict as a direct combatant—unless the United States has already struck PRC targets. Kinetic employment by US forces against PRC targets would likely escalate to a larger exchange of fires between the two sides. Depending on the scope and scale of escalation, this could increase PRC perceptions of the need to project larger amounts of military force across the Taiwan Strait earlier in the conflict, in an effort to compel resolution before the United States could posture forces for open-ended conflict.

Blue (US) Team leader’s perspective

From a US Blue Team perspective, Aquatic Tiger highlighted both the potential value and the inherent limitations of LRAUVs in a plausible China-Taiwan conflict. For Blue Team planners, the appeal of LRAUVs rested less in their ability to deliver decisive military effects than in their capacity to operate persistently and at scale, with comparatively low political and operational risk, in highly contested maritime environments. The wargame demonstrated that LRAUVs could support Blue Team objectives during selected phases of a crisis, while also revealing how quickly their utility narrowed as conflict escalated and China accepted higher levels of military risk.

Blue Team objectives and strategic logic

Across the turns of the wargame, the Blue Team pursued three consistent objectives: deterring further PRC escalation, maintaining access to the Western Pacific—particularly east of Taiwan—and preserving alliance cohesion while managing escalation risks with a nuclear-armed peer competitor. Blue Team decision-making was shaped by concerns related to attribution, proportionality, and alliance politics, which constrained both the timing and visibility of military actions.

Within this framework, Blue Team force posture prior to hostilities served two distinct purposes. The first was signaling—demonstrating resolve to deter PRC aggression, reassure allies and partners, and support diplomacy and strategic messaging with third parties. The second was positioning—quietly placing forces to gain an operational advantage should conflict occur. Aquatic Tiger demonstrated that LRAUVs were far better suited to the latter than the former.

Pre-hostilities posture and strategic messaging

LRAUVs’ low detectability, while operationally advantageous, limited their utility as signaling tools. Unlike air or surface platforms that can be employed deliberately for visible demonstrations of presence, LRAUVs operate largely outside public view. As a result, they contributed little to strategic messaging with allies, partners, or the broader international community.

During the wargame, strategic messaging and diplomatic efforts were more effectively supported by other assets, particularly those capable of generating clear, shareable imagery and data. Although contractor-operated concepts were discussed as a means of increasing volume, LRAUVs remained ill-suited to strategic messaging due to their limited fields of view and constrained sensor outputs. In short, their primary value before hostilities lay in positioning rather than persuasion.

ISR: Tactical value and strategic limits

LRAUVs contributed to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance during the wargame, but Aquatic Tiger underscored clear limits to their ISR utility from a Blue Team perspective. These systems did not provide the strategic or operational indications and warning that Blue Team decision-makers would prioritize in a Taiwan contingency, such as detecting large-scale mobilization of PRC amphibious forces, munitions, or logistics.

Instead, LRAUV ISR proved most relevant at the tactical level, supporting localized awareness for operators already engaged in contested environments. In this role, LRAUVs complemented rather than substituted for airborne, space-based, and other ISR platforms, which proved more effective for broad-area coverage and early warning. The wargame reinforced that LRAUVs should not be viewed as primary ISR platforms for strategic or operational warning, but as contributors to tactical awareness once hostilities were imminent or under way.

Employment across escalation phrases

As the scenario progressed into the second turn and China declared a blockade, Blue Team objectives shifted from deterrence toward complicating PRC operations and imposing costs. LRAUVs were employed to augment ISR, support counter-blockade efforts, and contribute to mine countermeasures and maritime awareness. These contributions were incremental rather than decisive. LRAUVs enhanced the Blue Team’s ability to contest the blockade at the margins but did not alter the underlying balance of forces in the Taiwan Strait.

By the third turn, once China adopted a more explicit A2/AD posture along the First Island Chain, the constraints on LRAUV utility became more pronounced. Attrition increased rapidly as PRC forces demonstrated a willingness to destroy autonomous systems with limited concern for escalation. In the Taiwan Strait itself, LRAUVs were lost faster than they could be replaced, reinforcing the conclusion that constricted waters close to the mainland favored PRC countermeasures, including unconventional approaches.

In contrast, LRAUVs proved more effective in geographically differentiated areas such as the lower Ryukyus and portions of the Luzon Strait, where Blue Team and allied forces enjoyed greater standoff advantages, and where LRAUVs could complement land-based and maritime capabilities.

Blue Team leader perspectives on LRAUV capabilities in the Aquatic Tiger wargame

Within the wargame, the LRAUV system capabilities in the Blue Team’s inventory resonated with Blue Team planners because they reflected attributes aligned with their team’s operational needs—including long endurance, modular payloads, and forward deployability—without placing personnel at risk. These characteristics made such systems suitable for early deployment and for missions emphasizing persistence and access in contested environments.

At the same time, the LRAUV systems employed by the Blue Team during Aquatic Tiger proved not to be decisive platforms. Limited payload size and maneuverability constrained individual kinetic effects, while relatively slow transit speeds required advance planning and careful positioning. Once PRC decision-makers assumed Blue Team ownership of LRAUV operations, the political advantages of ambiguity diminished and kinetic employment risked escalation.

Kinetic employment and the access problem

During the wargame, the Control Team expressed skepticism regarding the kinetic utility of the LRAUVs in the Blue Team’s inventory, particularly against high-value targets such as large surface combatants or invasion force transports. Concerns focused on warhead size and maneuverability, leading to an adjudication that kinetic effects of individual LRAUVs would be limited.

Subsequent reflection suggests that this assessment might have undervalued the role LRAUVs could play in addressing one of the central challenges of a Taiwan contingency: gaining kinetic access inside heavily defended, shallow-water environments dominated by PRC A2/AD systems. In such environments, the principal constraint on Blue Team operations was often the ability to deliver kinetic effects at scale, rather than targeting information.

Viewed through this lens, the limitations appear less constraining than initially assumed. Employment as a form of point defense or a limited, mobile minefield aligns with the operational reality that adversary forces—particularly invasion and transport elements—must move through predictable maritime approaches. While individual warheads might be insufficient against large platforms, employment at scale could generate meaningful aggregate effects, consume PRC decision-maker bandwidth at multiple echelons, complicate PRC operations, and impose costs in areas otherwise inaccessible to Blue Team kinetic forces.

Constraints and integration challenges

Several clear constraints emerged from a Blue Team perspective. First, scale mattered. Individual LRAUVs had limited impact and were mission constrained by their pre-planned payloads. Only through numbers and pre-positioning could they influence PRC operations, and even then primarily at the tactical level. Second, command-and-control and integration challenges limited effectiveness. In this first iteration of wargaming, LRAUVs were considered largely as a standalone capability, fully leveraging neither the operational benefits of collaboration between and among LRAUVs at scale nor of teaming LRAUVs with other manned and unmanned systems.

Third, geography was decisive. LRAUVs were most useful in areas where PRC land-based sensors, aircraft, and missile forces constrained Blue Team air and surface operations, but least effective in narrow waters where maritime militia and other countermeasures could be employed. Attrition, while expected, raised questions regarding sustainment and replacement under combat conditions.

Strategic implications for the Blue Team

From a Blue Team perspective, Aquatic Tiger suggests that LRAUVs should be regarded as enabling capabilities rather than decisive instruments of deterrence or warfighting. Their greatest value lies in pre-hostilities and early crisis phases, where they can support positioning, access, and selected tactical effects at relatively low risk to personnel. As conflict escalates, their role narrows and must be integrated carefully with broader joint and allied operations.

The wargame also underscored the importance of allied and partner considerations. LRAUVs’ employment by third parties, including Taiwan and regional allies, could complicate PRC political and military calculations in ways distinct from their employment exclusively by Blue Team forces, particularly given Beijing’s sensitivity to legitimacy and escalation dynamics.

Bottom line for Blue Team planners

The Blue Team perspective emerging from Aquatic Tiger indicates that LRAUVs could occupy an important, but bounded, role in a Taiwan contingency. When employed with disciplined expectations and integrated into a broader operational framework, they can improve access, complicate adversary planning, consume adversary decision-maker bandwidth, and reduce risk to personnel. They cannot substitute for robust force posture, alliance coordination, or timely Blue Team strategic decision-making. Their value lies not in decisiveness, but in enabling options in environments where other capabilities face prohibitive risk.

Technical and tactical limitations

A number of technical and tactical considerations arose during the wargame that are relevant to consider in terms of potential challenges to the effectiveness of the small, autonomous, expendable LRAUVs employed in Aquatic Tiger, including limitations on intelligence collection, difficulties in attacking moving targets, and potential countermeasures.

ISR limitations

The collection of optical, electromagnetic, and sonar data by sensors on a small LRAUV is limited by the size of sonar carried and the low height of optics and collection antennas. The high density of maritime traffic along the Chinese coast—particularly of military vessels during a crisis—creates an extremely cluttered environment in which acoustic sensors with limited range and aperture, and lacking accurate positional information, offer limited insight. Small, lightweight, electromagnetic spectrum sensors and limited on-vehicle processing capability offer similarly limited capability to provide intelligence-quality electromagnetic spectrum data. Wide-area collection of limited-quality data can be leveraged to contribute to maritime domain awareness in general, but is more applicable to tracking commercial vessels of interest or sanctions enforcement than supporting military operations. A mast height of about one meter offers limited visibility in open ocean environments, where swells of 1–2 meters are common, offering significant periods of obstructed observation and difficulty ascertaining range, target angle, and vessel identification at more than a few nautical miles.

Target detection, classification, identification, localization, tracking, engagement, and assessment

Many of the challenges to intelligence collection are also relevant to completing a “detect to engagement sequence” or “kill chain” for an LRAUV to attack a target with its onboard warhead. Acoustic sensors for individual vehicles offer limited directional discrimination and require robust communications among swarms to reduce errors by taking directional readings from multiple vehicles. Detecting a potential target in a likely target-rich environment is not necessarily difficult, but the other steps to determine how effectively a target can be engaged pose different challenges depending on whether they are based on acoustic, optical, or electromagnetic sensing. The difficulty ascertaining range makes a decision to start a “run in” especially problematic because LRAUVs have only a limited amount of battery power to make a high-speed run to a target. They must also be close to have reasonable potential to intercept a fast-moving target, or even to chase down a slower target from behind.

The wargame did not explore the specifics of how decisions to authorize individual autonomous lethal attacks would be made. The decision to conduct a kinetic attack autonomously also could add considerable complexity to the planning aspect of the mission. Current US Department of Defense restrictions on autonomous lethal engagement might be difficult to satisfy without communications between a weapon release authority and the LRAUV. The workaround of having a contractor operate the vehicle might not eliminate this complication. These policy restrictions could also affect the viability of foreign military sales. Assuming policy issues can be worked out, aspects of international law (e.g., The Hague Convention on mines) require restrictions on location of use and notification of third parties that complicate planning and operational employment of “indiscriminate attack” by lethal autonomous systems.

Potential countermeasures

A number of potential counters to small LRAUVs were raised in Aquatic Tiger, ranging from broad sweeping using modified minesweeping or fishing gear, localized use of such sweeps to “clear limiting lines of approach,” the use of obstructions (nets, modified oil containment equipment), intervening lower-cost vessels to guard flanks of transit lanes, use of “hunter-killer” unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and UAVs alone or in conjunction with the above (vulnerability while snorkeling/surfacing might be exploitable). Defensive barrier modifications and active defense systems on ships themselves are possible in analogous fashion to those on tanks for aerial drones. Double-hulled vessels are fairly resilient to contact explosions and are used to sweep areas as attractors. Reviving the historical use of torpedo nets in various configurations could prove effective. The development of torpedoes that ran at depth and exploded under the keel rendered such nets ineffective, but they could effectively counter UUVs impacting the hull at slow relative speed, particularly against ships at anchor or in port.

Recommendations for Congress

Autonomous systems broadly provide US and foreign forces the benefit of ambiguity of attribution and deployed intent. LRAUVs can particularly shine, given their potential oceanographic and environmental use, which might obfuscate the purpose, to be deployed at or before the first sign of indicators or warnings at the strategic level. However, to be effective, the systems must be better resourced and included in existing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs or through more creative export means such as encouraging co-production or direct commercial sales.

Oversight and acquisition follow-through: Congress should consider how LRAUVs can be used across theaters. Due to technical requirements, LRAUVs perform best in calmer waters, including in littorals and inland seas such as the Black Sea. Congress has already recognized the importance of such systems and included them in the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (FY 2025 NDAA), Section 1032, which defines LRAUVs as systems that exceed one thousand nautical miles in range and are capable of operating completely submerged at sea with modular payloads. Section 1032 further requires competitive demonstrations of these systems for the services. Congress, however, has not yet passed follow-up legislation on these competitive demonstrations or on the acquisition of LRAUVs. In the medium term, Congress should follow up on the required competitive demonstrations outlined in Section 1032 of the FY 2025 NDAA and solicit immediate feedback from the services on next steps for LRAUV development.
Export controls and dual-use framing: Congress should consider leveraging the oceanographic and environmental uses of LRAUVs with modular capacity to reclassify such systems for export from the more-restrictive ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) list to the less-restrictive EAR (Export Administration Regulations) category. By encouraging the sale of the LRAUVs separate from specific advanced kinetic and electronic effects, the United States can enhance the credibility of such systems for environmental and oceanographic use and encourage further indigenous modular innovations. To support such efforts, Congress should direct the Department of Commerce to consider additional support for the export of US LRAUVs to countries of interest. It should also consider a pilot program for a special license exemption for select countries purchasing such systems for environmental purposes.
Further analysis of LRAUVs’ impact: Congress should encourage more research and wargaming on the utility of LRAUVs as the technology develops. While this report posits that the strategic and operational effects of these systems are presently limited, continued technological development and the integration of LRAUVs into larger frameworks—such as regional maritime surveillance and interdiction—might yield higher-tier effects. Providing further encouragement—and, importantly, appropriations—toward analysis of LRAUVs is essential to maintaining a qualitative edge in this frontier technology and realizing its potential as a contributor to deterrence and war preparedness.

Key findings

The Aquatic Tiger Wargame and follow-on analysis led the authors to a set of key findings.

These types of LRAUVs are uniquely suited to forward deployment into sensitive areas during a crisis prior to hostilities, when US senior leadership is likely seeking to minimize escalation risks and conserve resources for a potential conflict. The lack of personnel placed at risk, along with LRAUVs’ low cost and low signature, could allow these platforms to conduct surveillance for extended periods to provide situational awareness and warning of impending attack. Their long-range capability could also equate to a long dwell time in a target area during an extended, open-ended period of crisis, meaning they offer a lower risk of burnout than other types of surveillance platforms. Their deniable, unclear national origin is also an advantage in terms of limiting the risk of crisis escalation. However, this lower risk profile, deniability, and ambiguity also mean that China could attack or interdict US LRAUVs prior to the outbreak of hostilities (including with unconventional means like fishing nets) with a relatively low fear of uncontrolled escalation.
Geography is a key consideration for LRAUV employment, and chokepoints can be a double-edged sword. US LRAUVs could be deployed into areas—including into constricted areas north and south of Taiwan—where PRC land-based sensors, surface-to-air missiles, aircraft, surface ships, and missile strike forces and sensors make air and surface operations high risk and high cost. Though constricted waters advantage Chinese countermeasures against LRAUVs moving through such areas, maritime chokepoints can also be excellent places for LRAUVs to loiter and detect vessels, as well as a good location to mass large numbers of LRAUVs to conduct swarming ambushes against surface vessels moving through the area. For sustained combat operations in the Taiwan Strait itself, the wargame’s results suggested it would be far preferable to have autonomous underwater vehicles deployed directly from Taiwan’s west coast into the strait rather than attempt to sustain a presence of LRAUVs in the strait by moving them via chokepoints where they could be more easily interdicted.
Sufficient numbers of platforms and sufficient advance planning are key factors for successful LRAUV employment. The limited payload size and relatively slower speed of LRAUVs require advance planning to ensure the right mix of payload capabilities is in the right place at the right time. Swarming capability and multiple types of LRAUV payloads could provide synergy, particularly to better position for attacks against fast-moving military vessels. Though attrition of LRAUVs will likely be high, large numbers of LRAUVs sustained over time could have a great impact.
Alternative uses for LRAUVs discussed in the wargame after-action discussions could dramatically increase their cost efficiency in a conflict if the United States is willing to operate them across an area much broader than the vicinity of Taiwan, particularly against slower, non-military vessels. Use against military targets and in constricted areas close to China could be effective, but this is probably not the most efficient use of such LRAUVs. They could instead be used, for example, to shadow high-value Chinese merchant and transport ships moving through the region to support China’s war effort—selectively signaling the US ability to put these ships at risk to influence Beijing’s calculus and then disabling or sinking them to hamper China’s war sustainment effort. LRAUVs could also be used to block access in and out of China’s mainland ports from a distance, as a sort of maneuverable minefield. LRAUVs could also be used in a conflict to bog down Chinese naval, paramilitary, and commercial vessels in areas north and south of Taiwan as part of a maritime insurgency approach.
The results of this initial Aquatic Tiger wargame suggest that additional analysis, wargaming, modeling, technical experimentation, live exercises, and simulation on key issues related to such LRAUVs are warranted. Subjects to consider include: how units of such drones would be best organized and employed by the United States, Taiwan, and US allies in such a contingency; whether such LRAUVs could be produced at a low enough cost and in sufficient scale to be effective; what tactical-level synergies these LRAUVs would have operating in concert with other manned and unmanned platforms; the potential efficacy of various Chinese countermeasures; and China’s potential employment of its own LRAUVs.

About the authors

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and was the wargame director for the Aquatic Tiger wargame.

Nicholas Takeuchi is a retired US Navy submarine officer and was a Blue (US) Team participant in the Aquatic Tiger wargame.

Drew Holliday is a former US deputy defense intelligence officer for China and was the Red (China) Team leader for the Aquatic Tiger wargame.

Paul Vebber is a retired US Navy and former assistant director for wargaming and future warfare research at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center. He was a part of the Control Team in the Aquatic Tiger wargame.

Adam Kozloski is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and former congressional staffer. He was a Blue (US) Team participant in the Aquatic Tiger wargame.

Acknowledgements and disclaimer

The Aquatic Tiger wargame and this associated issue brief were made possible by a financial grant and technical input from Albacore Inc., a developer of autonomous underwater vehicles, but Albacore personnel did not participate in developing the issue brief and the brief does not represent Albacore’s views. The Atlantic Council maintains strict intellectual independence for all of its projects and publications. The Council requires all donors to agree to the Council maintaining independent control of the content and conclusions of any products resulting from sponsored projects.

The authors are especially grateful to Colonel Gittipong “Eddie” Paruchabutr, IPSI nonresident senior fellow (US Army, retired) for his generosity in donating his time and support as wargame coordinator. The authors are also thankful to David Helvey for his time, expertise, and support in the project. Thanks also go to IPSI nonresident fellow Andrew Brown for his contributions to this project, and to IPSI program assistant Audrey Roh for her support.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the individual authors of each section.

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The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

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Temnycky in Forbes: Hungary creates rift with EU and Ukraine over Russian energy sanctions

Atlantic Council — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 15:05:25 +0000

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Temnycky in the Hill: Congress can boost US trade and strike a blow to Iran with Azerbaijan’s help

Atlantic Council — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 14:59:07 +0000

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Hook in the Hill: Business with dictators is a security risk America has fallen for before

Atlantic Council — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 14:46:23 +0000

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Hook in the Hill: No peace in Ukraine until Russia returns its children

Atlantic Council — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 14:43:47 +0000

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Bociurkiw in the Globe and Mail: Four years into the war, Ukraine has endured – and it has been transformed

Atlantic Council — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 13:48:18 +0000

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Putin is counting on Western disunity to hand him victory in Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 20:14:13 +0000

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine recently entered a fifth year and has now been underway for longer than the entire cataclysmic conflict between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during World War II.

This historical comparison does not flatter Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has turned veneration of the fight against Hitler into an unofficial state religion. While Red Army troops played a key role in the Nazi defeat and managed to advance thousands of kilometers from Stalingrad to Berlin, today’s Russian army is in many cases still stuck within walking distance of their positions when the invasion first began in February 2022.

Despite this lack of progress on the battlefield, Putin has so far demonstrated zero interest a compromise peace. Instead, he continues to insist on maximalist demands during negotiations that would destroy Ukraine as an independent state and as a separate nation.

This uncompromising stance makes perfect sense when viewed from Putin’s perspective. After all, the invasion he unleashed in 2022 has cost countless Russian lives and plunged the country into a new Cold War. Putin knows that only total victory can justify these sacrifices.

If Putin accepted the peace terms currently on offer, this would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine free and beyond Kremlin control. Most Russians would regard that as a disastrous defeat. Putin’s dreams of entering Russian history alongside Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Stalin would be shattered. Instead, he would be condemned as the man who lost Ukraine.

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In a very real sense, Putin is caught in a trap of his own making and has no real choice but to fight on. At the same time, however, it would be wrong to suggest that the Kremlin dictator is merely seeking to postpone the inevitable. On the contrary, he remains convinced that the goals of the invasion are still achievable and is now counting on Western disunity to hand him victory in Ukraine.

Putin’s low opinion of the democratic world is based on personal experience. Time and again throughout his reign, Russia’s aggressive actions have sparked vocal condemnation from Western capitals followed with indecent haste by calls for a return to dialogue and “business as usual.”

Western leaders loudly condemned Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, but were soon queuing up to reset relations with the Kremlin. The same lack of resolve was on display following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, with minimal costs imposed on Moscow and multiple European countries actually increasing their dependence on Russian energy exports.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Putin treats the proclamations of his Western counterparts with thinly veiled contempt. While he has been unpleasantly surprised since 2022 by the scale of support for Ukraine, the Russian leader’s own dealings with his Western counterparts have encouraged him to conclude that this unity will prove temporary. As the war grinds into a fifth year with no end in sight, Putin believes he can ultimately outlast the West.

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Shifts within the Western alliance over the past year are fueling confidence in Moscow that current levels of support for Ukraine will not last forever. Since returning to the White House in January 2025, US President Donald Trump has cut military aid to Ukraine and sought to reposition the United States as an intermediary in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

This has placed the burden of supporting the Ukrainian war effort firmly on Europe. According to recent Kiel Institute data, Ukraine’s European partners have done a good job of filling this gap. However, the majority of aid is now coming from a relatively small group of nations including Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain. This places Ukraine’s war effort on fragile foundations.

Meanwhile, a ninety billion euro financing package agreed by EU leaders remains blocked by Hungary. This is part of long-term pattern that has seen Hungary’s pro-Kremlin Prime Minister Viktor Orban repeatedly obstruct or delay efforts by the European Union to strengthen Ukraine or increase pressure on Putin.

With far-right populist parties currently riding high in the polls throughout Europe, Putin also has good cause for optimism over the possible imminent appearance of more Orban-style allies. This could help the Kremlin in its efforts to divide and weaken Europe from within.

Broader geopolitical developments are also placing new strains on Western unity and threatening to undermine backing for Ukraine. The US-Israeli joint operation against Iran is currently causing unprecedented tension among NATO allies, with European countries reluctant to participate in efforts to safeguard the Strait of Hormuz. This has highlighted a growing transatlantic divide that could seriously weaken Ukraine’s position.

Putin cannot risk a compromise peace in Ukraine, but he remains confident that time is on his side. While the Russian army has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, Putin is prepared to wait until Western disunity leaves the Ukrainians stripped of support and at his mercy. While this would not mean an immediate end to the carnage, Putin believes a dramatic decline in Western support would finally allow Russia to pummel an exposed and abandoned Ukraine into submission.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Kaluderovic in Fox News: Trump’s strike on Iran deals a major blow to Putin’s war machine in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 20:09:30 +0000

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Why the Iran war energy shock is different

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 19:53:05 +0000

JUST IN

Call it a crude awakening. On Thursday morning, the price of Brent crude shot past $115 per barrel, up roughly 50 percent in the past month. This latest surge followed an Israeli strike on Iran’s South Pars gas field and an Iranian attack on a major Qatari gas hub, which raised fears that attacks would spread to other critical energy infrastructure in the region. All told it’s been a rollercoaster week for financial and energy markets, as Iran has maintained its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz and the conflict in the region has spread and shown no signs of ending. Below, Atlantic Council experts identify the throughlines in the ups and downs—and forecast what to expect next.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Landon Derentz: (@Landon_Derentz): Vice president for energy and infrastructure at the Atlantic Council and former director for energy at the White House during the first Trump administration
Lisa Basquel: Program assistant for European energy security at the Global Energy Center and former staffer with the Delegation of the European Union to the United States
Khalid Azim: Director of the MENA Futures Lab within the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and former global capital markets banker
Josh Lipsky: (@joshualipsky): Chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council and former International Monetary Fund advisor

What’s happening?

The Wednesday attacks on facilities at Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City—a site that accounts for roughly 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply—“have heightened market concerns that the conflict could spiral into a structural supply disruption,” Landon says. “Such a scenario would carry lasting consequences for global energy affordability, rather than proving a transitory shock that subsides once hostilities end and the Strait of Hormuz reopens.”
The disruptions resulting from the extensive damage to Ras Laffan are hitting “just as Europe begins its critical summer storage refill season,” Lisa adds. There’s little prospect for prices to come down as long as Qatari supply remains offline and Europe and Asia compete for limited LNG cargos, she explains.
“From a market perspective, the issue is uncertainty, both around the path forward and the duration of the shock,” Khalid tells us. “When the fear of loss outweighs the prospect of gain, capital starts to come off the table. Expect fund managers to lock in gains and increase hedges in the absence of clearer policy direction.”
Khalid points to warning signs coming from leveraged private credit markets. “The risk is not the shock itself, but the point at which it forces adjustments across the most leveraged parts of the financial system,” he tells us.
Yet markets are not in freefall. Josh interprets that reaction as many investors continuing to believe that Trump will find a way to resolve the crisis, possibly looking at his pullback from high tariff levels last year and resolution of the Greenland dispute this year as examples of the president’s nose for an offramp. “But it is also possible markets are mistaking geopolitical resilience for immunity,” he adds.

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What’s different about this energy shock?

Since the 1970s, the world has experienced an energy supply shock at least every decade. But Josh offers one explanation for why the rise in energy prices is more severe now than during past shocks: “The concentration of energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz” is coinciding with “ongoing disruptions from Russia’s war in Ukraine,” which has prompted efforts to limit Moscow’s oil and gas exports.
“Markets are starting to realize that a greater share of global energy production is involved in these conflicts than at any time since World War II,” Josh says.
The eleven countries directly involved in the Iran war and the war in Ukraine, Josh notes, account for 51 percent of global crude oil production and 56 percent of global gas production—a larger share than during the first Gulf war.

What can be done?

“Reopening the Strait of Hormuz is the single most consequential step coalition forces can take to stabilize energy markets,” says Landon. “Achieving this will require neutralizing Iran’s stockpile of anti-ship cruise missiles and its asymmetric drone capabilities—the latter also posing a significant threat to regional energy infrastructure.”
Israel and the United States, Landon adds, are targeting drone-production sites and military installations along Iran’s coastline as they “seek to curtail Tehran’s ability to strike critical energy assets in the Gulf and disrupt international shipping through the strait.”
With Gulf states already reducing oil production, Khalid notes, JPMorgan estimates that supply cuts could reach twelve million barrels of oil per day by the end of the week, accounting for around 10 percent of global demand.
The adjustment mechanism for such a supply shock is reducing energy consumption, says Khalid. But in the short term “energy demand is highly inelastic.” Meaningfully reducing demand “requires a structural shift in consumer behavior,” he explains. And that, in turn, “takes time.”

Read more analysis on the Iran war’s energy and economic impact from Landon, Lisa, Josh, and Khalid.

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Gongadze in Ukrainska Pravda: “Europe at war.” Friends of Europe’s warning shot

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 19:17:13 +0000

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Wartime Ukraine offers global lessons on the future of cyber resilience

Oleksandr Bakalynskyi, Maggie McDonough — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 17:58:46 +0000

The twelve years of cyber warfare that have accompanied Russia’s escalating invasion of Ukraine have transformed the country’s digital environment into a proving ground for modern conflict. Persistent cyber attacks against government systems, critical infrastructure, energy networks, media outlets, and the financial sector have become a defining feature of Ukraine’s wartime reality. Amid this sustained pressure, Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to defend itself and has developed a degree of cyber resilience that is now embedded in the digital state.

Russian aggression in the cyber sphere has forced Ukraine into rapid and often improvised defense. Coordination mechanisms have emerged across government agencies, volunteer networks, and private sector IT firms, with operational responses conducted under constant pressure. Permanent mobilization, however, is not sustainable. Instead, the goal is to codify the next phase of reform in Ukraine’s evolving cyber security strategy.

For Ukraine, the strategic objective is no longer limited to repelling cyber attacks. It is to ensure continuity of state functions even when attacks succeed. This requires a national cyber resilience framework that encompasses government, business, and civil society. It demands continuous professional training along with strengthened legislative and risk management frameworks. It also implies a culture of cyber hygiene at the citizen level. Together, these measures represent a shift from episodic defense to durable digital statehood.

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Ukraine’s experience over the past twelve years underscores a central truth of cyber defense: People play a decisive role in cyber security. Since 2014, thousands of professionals from the private sector, volunteer networks, and academia have mobilized to defend Ukraine’s digital front. Sustaining this momentum requires institutional support and a long-term talent strategy.

Priority areas include integrating cyber education across schools, universities, and military institutions. Partnerships between industry and academia should undergo expansion through education and internships. Workforce development is not merely a labor market issue; it is a pillar of cyber sovereignty and continuity of government. It is also crucial to establish a national cyber reserve supported by access to cyber ranges and allied training platforms.

Wartime conditions have already accelerated innovation in Ukraine. Cloud-based backups, relocation of critical data to secure environments abroad, and decentralized platforms for citizen services are now routine. These practices must be institutionalized to endure beyond the war. Priorities include embedding innovations into permanent government processes and establishing applied cyber research centers at universities.

The convergence of academia, defense institutions, and the technology sector in wartime Ukraine is enabling a distinct national cyber security model to emerge rooted in operational experience and continuous adaptation. It is a model that complements existing frameworks while reflecting Ukraine’s realities. As a result, Ukraine has become an integral actor within the Euro-Atlantic cyber ecosystem.

At the international level, cooperation with the EU, NATO, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan has evolved from ad hoc assistance to structured partnerships. Core focuses include joint threat intelligence-sharing mechanisms; harmonization with EU and NATO standards; participation in multinational exercises; and the development of a shared resilience space in which national resilience contributes to collective defense. Ukraine’s expertise positions it not only as a recipient of assistance, but increasingly as an exporter of operational resilience models to partners confronting hybrid threats.

Ukraine’s progress demonstrates the importance of embedding cyber resilience in institutional architecture rather than treating it as a reactive function. A resilience-by-design model entails distributed system architecture to reduce single points of failure. It requires adoption of open standards and transparent protocols, along with continuous training and simulations embedded in institutional life cycles.

Psychological resilience training for cyber professionals operating under sustained pressure and information warfare conditions is also crucial. This should position cyber security as a governance principle, framing Ukraine not only as a state under attack but as a testing ground for next generation digital resilience.

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Since the onset of Russia’s invasion in 2014, Ukraine has become the world’s most consequential real-time laboratory for cyber resilience. The country’s experience demonstrates that effective cyber security is an integrated system encompassing governance, education, law, diplomacy, and economic resilience. Institutionalizing these lessons into a durable national cyber resilience ecosystem will underpin postwar recovery and long-term digital sovereignty.

For partners, Ukraine’s experience offers much more than a narrative of resistance. It represents a practical plan for collective security for the coming decades of international military conflicts, each of which will have a mandatory digital component.

As Ukraine develops its forthcoming National Cybersecurity Strategy 2.0, several priorities should guide the next phase of institutional reform. First, Ukraine should expand the doctrine of active cyber protection, enabling defensive operations that proactively detect, disrupt, and neutralize threats before they impact critical systems.

Second, the continued Euro-integration of Ukraine’s cyber regulatory framework will be essential. This should include alignment with EU directives such as NIS2, the Critical Infrastructure Resilience framework, and the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), ensuring interoperability with European cyber governance standards.

Third, Ukraine should actively participate in the development of a European cyber shield. The goal should be a collective resilience architecture built on shared threat intelligence, joint incident response mechanisms, and coordinated defensive capabilities across the continent.

Fourth, long-term resilience requires sustained investment in cyber workforce development aligned with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0. This should include standardized training pathways, public-private talent pipelines, and the expansion of national cyber reserve capacities.

Fifth, strengthening cyber security capacity at the regional administration level across Ukraine will be vital. This can help ensure that local governments and regional critical infrastructure operators possess the operational capabilities and resources necessary to implement national cyber resilience policies effectively.

Finally, Ukraine’s next cyber strategy should also define a clear wartime framework that establishes legal authorities, operational coordination mechanisms, and public–private responsibilities for defending national digital and operational infrastructure during periods of armed conflict or hybrid attack.

With each subsequent international conflict, the digital component will grow in importance and become an increasingly critical part of the battlefield. This is already becoming clear in the current context of revolutionary progress in robotics, the development of AI, big data, parallel computing, and ever-accelerating data transmission technologies.

In this evolving environment, success will no longer depend on greater human or conventional military resources, but on an innovative, flexible, and progressive approach toward the development and use of the latest technologies. In these conditions, cyber resilience is not only a security strategy but also the foundation of freedom.

Dr. Oleksandr Bakalinskyi is a Senior Researcher at the G. E. Pukhov Institute for Modeling in Energy Engineering at the National Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. Maggie McDonough is the Senior Vice President and Chief Innovation Officer at the Baltimore Development Corporation. She was previously affiliated with the Purdue Applied Research Institute (PARI) and Purdue’s Center for Education & Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS), where she served as a technical advisor on global cyber security resilience programming.

Six strategic risks the Trump administration should evaluate in the Iran war

Nathan Freier — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 20:58:13 +0000

WASHINGTON—War is a serious endeavor. And, make no mistake, Operation Epic Fury is a war. Its current scale and the scope of its desired outcomes render the suggestion that it is anything less than war implausible.

Epic Fury features the largest concentration of US military power in the region since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Though subject to different official narratives, the conflict seems focused on eliminating—or inspiring an end to—Iran’s current regime, neutralizing the coercive structures that enable it, and destroying Iran’s capability to threaten US interests. Epic Fury’s conduct, ongoing impacts, and strategic outcomes are globally significant. And finally, the Iranian regime seems to perceive Epic Fury as an existential threat and is fighting as though this is the case. This all adds up to a real war, and US officials should not consider it anything less.

In practical terms, preparing for a war means that US policymakers should have performed thoroughgoing strategic risk assessment before hostilities and apply similar risk logic to adapt their approach as they proceed. As policymakers, we have lost sight of this fact before. Moving forward, it would be wise to ensure we not do so again.

How to think about risk

As a defense and military strategist with experience advising senior leadership in a wartime theater and, most recently, as a Pentagon official from 2022 to 2024, I know there is one aspect of conflict and rivalry that cannot be ignored: War is an exercise in risk management. Risk connects wartime objectives, the ways and means to pursue them, and preferred strategic outcomes. Moreover, wartime strategic risk assessment should be clinical—avoiding preference, and instead using facts and reasonable assumptions to consider the likeliest, the most dangerous, and the most disruptive outcomes.

At its best, risk-informed strategic planning focuses on one animating question: What is the likelihood that the chosen approach will deliver the desired outcomes at acceptable cost? Given how Epic Fury has unfolded so far, it is unclear how much this question informed prewar decision-making and, even now, ongoing US actions. This operation may have been judged as high-risk, high-reward and, therefore worthy of pursuit. But inadequate risk assessment of an endeavor this complex and this consequential can make it a gamble.

Six “gray rhinos”

Experience suggests that war has far fewer of author Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s “black swans,” or high-impact and unpredictable events, than it does author Michele Wucker’s “gray rhinos,” or highly probable, high-impact yet neglected threats. The latter are foreseeable, prone to derail the best intent, and core to strategic risk assessment. Here are six important strategic risk factors US policymakers should consider to remedy any earlier oversights.

The war is being conducted by a coalition of two—the United States and Israel—and they may not be pursuing the same ends against a rival that has so far chosen the only version of “total war” within its reach. Iran’s “mosaic defense” strategy—which prioritized decentralization and asymmetric warfare—might not be an operational war winner. However, it may just be enough to outlast the US-Israeli coalition strategically. Iran’s continued resistance—potentially ultimately made more complex by future political destabilization and civil conflict—may extend US and Israeli commitment longer than either preferred or anticipated. It may also create irreconcilable asymmetries between the two governments’ approaches to terminating the war.
The war is rattling troubled US alliances. Washington reportedly did not meaningfully consult its partners before US-Israeli strikes began on February 28, and the war is having a profound and unanticipated impact on many of them. Given the latest US national security and defense strategies, many NATO allies in particular are already adapting to an emerging US strategy perceived as transactional and hostile to their interests. Downstream, US allies also know that they may have to enter hostilities without the benefit of prior consultation just to protect their own interests and defend against or contain escalation. In combination, these factors complicate already tenuous foreign partnerships, both making them less secure and undermining relationships that the United States relies on to solve many other consequential security challenges. In short, Epic Fury may only widen the “rupture” in trust recently described by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney.
The war offers US rivals opportunities for strategic mischief. Many US rivals, too, did not see Epic Fury coming (at least not as it has unfolded) but they are certain to avail themselves of any advantages it might offer. US commitment in Iran is an open invitation for rivals to materially tie down and deplete US power. Under circumstances where US activism matters most (especially, in Ukraine/Europe and the tense Indo-Pacific), postwar US exhaustion (material, political, and moral) may engender US self-deterrence to their benefit. Finally, another US Middle Eastern war opens doors for rival military and economic opportunism contrary to US interests. The usual suspects are important to watch here: China, Russia, and North Korea.
Both the scope and consequences of the war are expanding. Iran’s regime will try to open new threat vectors against the United States whether precision strikes end in days, weeks, or months. The Iranian regime’s goal is survival. Therefore, it is likely to try and make the United States’ problem bigger and more costly. It has already closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked targets regionwide.

Iranian allies, proxies, and customers can also be useful extensions of its “mosaic defense,” which employs a decentralized military strategy to help ensure battlefield continuity. Though the United States is currently on the offense against Iran, its proxies, allies, and customers are vulnerable to US offensive action, too. However, they might also perceive exploitable opportunities in the war, as well. They can support Iran directly or free ride on the war for their own purposes. Either way, they complement Iran’s war aims with active resistance or latent threats. For example, a Hezbollah-Israeli second front along the Lebanese border already exists, and Shia militias have attacked US interests in Iraq. The Houthis in Yemen are a wild card. While they have been quiet so far, they are capable of threatening the Red Sea, Israel, and the Arabian Peninsula.

Finally, the US homeland itself may not be safe from direct retaliation from Iran or its sympathizers via kinetic proxy military strike, cyberattack, and terrorism. The United States has been mostly immune to the effects of foreign conflict since the immediate post-9/11 period. But save for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States has not presented an existential threat to any capable rival since. Iran’s perception of total war in an existential fight portends unique approaches to dislocate US security and sentiment. Iran’s threats to the US homeland may not be either credible or materially strategic, but that does not necessarily limit their psychological value.
The war has induced a shock on commerce and the global economy. There are enormous direct military costs that will trigger substantial postwar defense investments to reset the Joint Force. However, the big story is Epic Fury’s global economic disruption. Like US partners and rivals, markets were hit by Epic Fury with little warning. The private and public sectors were not prepared to buffer their assets against sharp but ephemeral adjustment (in the best case) or a structural disruption extending across multiple sectors over time (in the worst case). The war’s unexpected economic costs will have global impacts, and their scope and scale are highly dependent on the war’s duration.
The war is unpopular. Less than a month into the war, more than half of Americans oppose it, according to recent polling, and history shows that many conflicts lose support over time. While unpopular wars are not necessarily unjustified, favorable public opinion is the currency of continued military freedom of action. Failure to turn it around will affect the United States’ ability to fight now and, perhaps, more importantly, later, when the stakes are higher and the interests more compelling.

The work ahead

Wartime strategic risk calculation is homework that separates success from failure. It balances the downstream impacts of military action against the nation’s broadest strategic objectives. Risk does not decide. Risk informs. High-risk is not a stop light. It is a warning sign. Leadership heeds and acts on risk—or ignores it, often at the expense of desired outcomes and the safety of those in harm’s way.

My experience suggests significant working-level risk assessments occurred prior to Epic Fury. However, it is not apparent that work drove US leadership toward meaningful risk mitigation. The six factors above are among the key areas of strategic risk that would have benefited from the prior attention of senior US officials. They certainly merit attention now, as well.

Going forward, future wars will engender new strategic hazards. Then, like now, decision makers should put consequential risk-related insight at the center of their most consequential decisions about war and peace.

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Attacks on desalination plants in the Iran war forecast a dark future

Ginger Matchett — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 19:27:31 +0000

WASHINGTON—The ongoing conflict in Iran has focused global attention on surging energy prices caused by supply-chain disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. As devastating as these oil and gas constraints are to both the Middle East and global markets, the war also poses a threat to another critical resource that keeps the Gulf afloat: water. Several limited attacks on desalination plants in both Iran and Bahrain in the past two weeks offer a glimpse at the potential danger if this infrastructure were intentionally and systematically targeted. Either in this war or a future Middle Eastern conflict, water resources could prove an attractive target for anyone seeking to cause harm and destabilize communities.

On March 7 and 8, desalination plants in Iran and Bahrain were targeted in the ongoing conflict. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi accused the United States of attacking a desalination plant in Iran, while Bahrain’s interior ministry said that its plant was struck by an Iranian drone. The damage to the Bahraini desalination plant reportedly affected water supply in as many as thirty villages. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also reported missile-related damage to desalination plants during the conflict. Though it is unclear if Iran deliberately targeted all of these plants, this infrastructure is critical to Gulf states and within a short striking distance of Iran. It could become a tempting target for Tehran if the conflict persists.

Countries in the Middle East face arid conditions and frequent water shortages, often relying on desalination infrastructure to turn saltwater into freshwater. Without such technology, which removes salt through reverse osmosis, roughly 100 million individuals in the Middle East would have no regular access to drinking water. There are around five thousand desalination plants across the Middle East, more than four hundred of which are in the Gulf. And a smaller number of plants are responsible for a large share of the output. More than 90 percent of the Gulf’s desalinated water, for example, comes from just fifty-six plants. This concentration and proximity to Iran makes the Gulf’s desalination infrastructure particularly vulnerable as the exchange of missiles and drones intensifies.

In Kuwait and Bahrain, desalinated drinking water accounts for around 90 percent of the countries’ supply, along with roughly 86 percent in Oman, 80 percent in Israel, about 70 percent in Saudi Arabia, and 42 percent for the UAE. In Qatar, it is upwards of nearly 99 percent.

A deliberate series of strikes on desalination plants could deepen regional instability and trigger further humanitarian disasters or migration crises in the Gulf.

If Iran successfully destroyed the Gulf’s desalination infrastructure, then the consequences could be devastating. The effects of a significant strike would likely ripple across cities, disrupting water supplies to local and state-operated public facilities, businesses, houses, hotels, and agricultural operations. This infrastructure is also integrated into national electrical grids, meaning damage could cascade into city-wide power outages or necessitate calls for complete evacuations.

Though not as dependent on desalination plants as some Gulf countries, Iran, too, is experiencing a water crisis. The country is currently in its fifth year of drought, and strikes on Iran’s currently operating plants would likely cause far-reaching pain. This would be made worse by Iran’s constraints on repairing and building additional desalination plants due to international sanctions and rising energy costs.

Moreover, the Gulf’s reliance on desalinated water is only projected to grow. The accelerating effects of climate change are increasing the value of this water source as shallow groundwater supplies—the only renewable water source in the Gulf region—dry up. Saudi Arabia, for example, has announced plans to invest around $80 billion in building additional plants in the coming years.

To date, international humanitarian and water laws haven’t safeguarded civilian water infrastructure, as demonstrated by attacks on targets vital to water supply in Ukraine and Gaza. The Gulf itself has suffered attacks on desalination plants in the past. During its invasion in 1990 of Kuwait, for example, Iraq targeted desalinations plants. It took Kuwait years for the country to restore the infrastructure. More recently, the Houthis in Yemen attacked plants in Saudi Arabia in 2022. The toll is often quick and the consequence potentially long: US intelligence reports have indicated that striking water infrastructure and critical equipment in Gulf states could cause them to lose the majority of their drinking water in days and face national water crises lasting months.

Since 2006, Gulf countries have invested at least $53.4 billion in developing desalination infrastructure. They have also created contingency plans to defend the plants with pipeline networks, massive storage reservoirs, and protective barriers to shield intake valves. Currently, the strategic resiliency capacities of Saudi Arabia and the UAE are significantly greater than Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait.

The consequences of a full-scale water war would extend beyond the Gulf, as the region supplies 40 percent of the world’s desalinated water. As the Gulf’s population grows, continues to rapidly urbanize, and consumes increasing volumes of water, a natural resource crisis there could lead to water scarcity in communities throughout the Middle East and beyond. Studies indicate that by 2030, there could be a 40 percent global shortfall in freshwater resources while demand increases by more than 20 percent, making desalination technology all the more essential. Many threats to water supplies need to be considered, including climate change, pollution, agricultural production, and ecosystem degradation. But safeguarding water supplies also requires investing in the defense of water infrastructure and technologies. Perhaps most urgent are anti-drone capabilities.

As the Iran war continues, there is a serious risk that a deliberate series of strikes on desalination plants could deepen regional instability and trigger further humanitarian disasters or migration crises in the Gulf. All parties to the conflict should avoid escalating what is already a regional war into an even deeper conflict over the Gulf’s water supply.

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Europe should help in the Gulf to serve its own interests, regardless of Trump’s demands

Daniel Fried, Jörn Fleck — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 19:27:26 +0000

WASHINGTON—The Iran war wasn’t their idea, and they may not like the way President Donald Trump is conducting it. But despite bullying rhetoric from Trump, the United States’ European allies might consider what they can reasonably do to support security around the Gulf rather than reject White House demands for it out of hand.

Building a coalition and preparing the battlespace for military action takes time and effort, especially when the conflict is in the Middle East. The United States sought and received significant military help from its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite sharp political differences; help that grew over time. Failure in Afghanistan, mixed success in Iraq, and popular frustration over both wars have not made it easier for the United States to get help this time with Iran. The Trump administration’s approach has hurt too: Trump has swung from initially keeping allies in the dark about the operation to demanding allied military support, to then spurning such help as unneeded. The United States started out from behind after Trump’s public attacks on those allies who did fight alongside US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, Trump has denigrated Ukraine’s actual offers of drones and drone specialists to Gulf countries—a field in which the embattled country is arguably the world leader.

Trump’s March 17 social media post was another sharp rejection of European help: “[W]e no longer ‘need’, or desire, the NATO Countries’ assistance – WE NEVER DID!” That post also included another attack on NATO as a “one way street – We will protect them, but they will do nothing for us.” Given all this, it would be understandable for Europeans to slam Trump for starting a war without consulting with them, only to demand their military support when things start to look complicated.

Nevertheless, European allies would be better advised to consider what they can do to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz and defend Gulf states under attack by Iran. They should do so not to assuage Trump or to help him out of a self-induced jam, but because Europe’s own critical interests are at stake in this conflict.

Why Europe should act

The spiking price of oil hurts the entire free world and has sent European governments scrambling for short-term fixes at the gas pump. Parallel surges in oil and gasoline prices have worsened an already bleak outlook for European industry, its competitiveness, and economic growth. At home, rising costs could cause political instability and benefit pro-Russian challengers on the right and left. Abroad, the price spikes in oil could create an estimated three to five billion dollars in additional revenue by the end of March for Russia, Europe’s most aggressive adversary, whose war against Ukraine remains the defining threat to the continent’s own freedom and security.

That windfall from energy-price shocks risks giving Russia a boost, just as Moscow’s position on the battlefield and the prospects for its war economy were deteriorating. Until the present moment, Russia’s position was weakening , thanks primarily to Ukraine’s bravery, grit, and sacrifice, but also because Europe stepped up to provide the financing needed to keep US weapons flowing to Kyiv over the past fourteen months.

European weapons stocks and production are a well-documented problem, but Europe’s stronger engagement in the Gulf could also present important openings in the defense space. The continent’s defense companies have been among the most effective and nimble partners for Ukraine’s battle-tested drone start-ups, and together they could bring new and more cost-effective means for Gulf allies to defend themselves against future attacks from Iran or other actors. That could achieve multiple European-Ukrainian objectives at once: It would preserve much-needed high-end interceptors that Ukraine needs—and Europe would buy from the United States—to defend against Russian ballistic missiles. It would expand cooperation and build new trust in Europe-Gulf relations. And it might shift the position of Gulf countries that have long sat on the fence when it comes to Russia’s war in Ukraine. It would accomplish all of this while avoiding further deterioration in transatlantic relations.

European leaders, therefore, have plenty of reasons to engage constructively with the United States and partners in the Gulf. Speed matters here. How quickly European countries move in pursuit of their own interests sends an important signal to Washington and adversaries in Moscow and Beijing alike. It matters almost as much as the movement itself.

What Europe can do

Some Europeans had already figured this out. On March 1, a day after the start of the military action, a joint statement by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom declared:

“We will take steps to defend our interests and those of our allies in the region, potentially through enabling necessary and proportionate defensive action to destroy Iran’s capability to fire missiles and drones at their source. We have agreed to work together with the US and allies in the region on this matter.”

That statement suggested a willingness to attack Iranian drone and missile sites. An experienced former senior Pentagon official pointed out to the authors that the United Kingdom and French navies could support the United States in protecting Gulf terminals and cities from Iranian attacks and, possibly, help with escorting ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Ukrainian know-how combined with European resourcing and production, from air defense to drone-based mine-hunting, could make important differences as well. If Trump’s language has made it politically complicated for European leaders to help, then these leaders could arrange to respond to requests from Gulf states or other countries affected by the war.

Trump’s social media posts are unlikely to last; responding to them as they are written risks locking in their bluster and threats. The US military is apt to be a steady partner in figuring out practical details of how European forces can fit into defensive operations intended to limit the war’s damage to the world economy and regional countries. Even if European capabilities are limited, they could free up some US assets elsewhere.

NATO is probably not the institution to organize such operations and, at this point, gaining Alliance-wide consensus might prove too complex. But individual NATO countries working together could offer military support for Gulf states and safe(r) passage through the strait, structured in a way to be most politically acceptable to domestic audiences. European leaders could even make that offer on the understanding that the United States would continue, and even increase, its support for Ukraine, as Finnish President Alexander Stubb has suggested.

It is neither pleasant nor glorious to respond constructively to Trump’s bullying rhetoric. But finding a way forward that meets European interests and avoids damage to transatlantic ties may be the best of a bad deal.

Trump himself could help, as a start by thanking Ukraine for pitching in and calling on Europeans to follow that example and do what they can. Some, for their own reasons, might take him up on it.

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Now that the Iran war is here, the US must complete its mission

Frederick Kempe — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 11:00:00 +0000

What frustrates senior Gulf officials, as Iran aims missiles and drones at their citizens and countries, is that too many in Washington are making the war a matter of US domestic politics and President Donald Trump. For them, what’s at stake is whether the Middle East moves in a uniquely positive direction or reverts to a more familiar, uglier one.

Over the past two weeks, I have spoken with a number of Gulf officials to better understand how leaders in the region view this ongoing war. The conversations have been strikingly consistent. For many of them, this conflict was not a matter of if, but when. One senior Gulf official told me that his country has long known its greatest danger lies in Iran and not in Israel—a reality made obvious in recent days.

The war’s inevitability was not due to any one factor, the officials told me. Rather, it was a cumulative consequence of a revolutionary regime that for nearly half a century built its power through murderous proxies, deadly missiles, nuclear aspirations, and relentless intimidation. Another senior Gulf official told me that his country had long argued to US negotiators from Democratic administrations that they were wrong to think that containing Iran’s nuclear capabilities was sufficient, as that failed to address the missiles and proxies that posed threats to its neighbors.

In the telling of Gulf officials, the region has been living in a form of shadow war for years. Proxy conflicts, cyberattacks, and military strikes on energy infrastructure were part of a sustained campaign designed by Iran to test and erode the Gulf’s security architecture. Look at Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and increasingly Riyadh. They reflect a degree of religious tolerance, political moderation, and economic modernization that contrasts sharply with Iran’s theocracy.

A regime down but not out

Some officials in these countries argued privately against Trump’s decision to go to war alongside Israel. Others argued in favor. But none of those I spoke with now want the United States to cut and run before the job is done. Even those Gulf officials wary of escalation (and that includes most of those I spoke to) see this war as the culmination of a long trajectory that required a response at some point—before the balance of power tilted irretrievably in Iran’s direction.

That doesn’t mean Gulf officials favor regime change in Iran, as no one can accurately calibrate how to pull that off. That needs to be a job for the Iranian people. However, it does mean, in their view, that the United States, Israel, and other willing partners should continue eroding the Iranian regime’s destructive capabilities—particularly as it now will be left in a vengeful state.

Their bottom line: If Iran comes out of this neutered and defanged, it’s better for everyone, even if the regime can’t be fundamentally changed from one that’s run through some combination of theocratic and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders. Put more diplomatically, a senior Gulf official told me: “If Iran is incapable of inflicting harm and exporting instability to its neighbors, that will be a good thing.”

As for Iran’s leaders, they likely are betting that US domestic politics will save the regime from total collapse. For decades, the Iranian regime has believed that its 1979 revolution, including the taking of American hostages, embarrassed US President Jimmy Carter, weakening his political support and costing him the next election. Iranian leaders probably think that they can impose similar political pain on Trump through a drawn-out conflict and elevated gas prices. If that costs Trump’s party control of Congress in the country’s upcoming midterm elections, it would be Tehran’s “own form of regime change,” as the Atlantic Council’s Alex Plitsas put it to me.

The pivotal weeks ahead

My conversations with Gulf and US officials in recent days have reinforced many of my own views regarding the significance of this moment. There are plenty of pessimistic assessments of the war right now, but they obscure a historic opportunity. The conflict with Iran may prove a true inflection point. It could neutralize the Middle East’s greatest destabilizer over the past four decades, creating new openings for regional security and prosperity. And it could splinter the emerging Axis of Aggressors comprised of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. The White House estimates that Iran, through its direct actions and proxy networks, has been responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Americans—including US service members, diplomats, and civilians—since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

So how can the United States get from here to there? Through military resolve, strategic patience, and diplomatic cunning. Above all, the United States should not end its military campaign early. That could inadvertently strengthen the position of a weakened Iranian regime. And the regime is weak; its attacks on its neighbors are more the desperate flailing of a failed regime than the resurgence of the revolution. Even now, it will be years before Iran can rebuild its navy and missile capabilities, or again aspire to a nuclear-weapons arsenal. But the next two to three weeks will be critical, as the United States continues to target Iranian capabilities.

“The good news is that the US military is on course over the next few weeks to achieve the stated objectives to destroy or severely degrade Iran’s missiles, drones, the associated industrial base, navy, and nuclear program,” Plitsas, a former Pentagon official, told me. What’s most likely to result in “failure to complete the military operation in Iran is ending it early due to economic pressure from the risk-based closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which is Iran’s objective.”

That is why the United States and its partners must get control of the strait, enable freedom of movement, and prevent economic damage that could give Iran greater leverage.

US officials have told their Gulf partners that they have made progress in bringing together a coalition of countries to escort ships through the strait, despite several countries publicly refusing to contribute to that effort. More US military assets are arriving in the region to provide protection for shipping while continuing to strike at Iran’s ability to disrupt that traffic.

Even as US forces pursue these objectives, Americans should not lose sight of the larger opportunity. This past week, one Trump administration official spoke to me about a longer-term vision harbored by some in the White House of a Middle East where not only moderate Arab and Israeli leaders normalize their relations—as they have done through the Abraham Accords—but a new Iranian government and Arab leaders eventually do so as well, ultimately leading to Israeli-Iranian normalization.

At this time of war without an obvious end, that vision sounds fantastical. But it is seemingly impossible developments like this one that could become reality, serving both US interests and those of its regional partners, if the Trump administration sees through the mission in Iran that it has set out for itself.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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How the Iran war could trigger a European energy crisis

Lisa Basquel — Tue, 17 Mar 2026 16:22:41 +0000

WASHINGTON—With the conflict in the Gulf well into its third week, a difficult reality is setting in across Europe: Even if a cease-fire were agreed today, the continent is likely already heading toward an energy crisis.

The ongoing US-Israeli strikes on Iran, along with Tehran’s retaliation across the Gulf, have produced one of the most severe disruptions to global energy markets in decades. At the center of the crisis is the Strait of Hormuz, the most critical chokepoint in the global energy trade. Before the current conflict, roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil supply transited the strait each day. The looming threat of Iranian sea mines and missile attacks has brought commercial tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to a near standstill, as some operators opt to anchor outside the waterway rather than risk passage.

While the effective closure of the strait has sent shockwaves through global oil markets, Europe’s immediate vulnerability lies elsewhere: liquefied natural gas (LNG). Approximately 20 percent of global LNG trade passed through the strait before the current conflict, much of it originating in Qatar, the world’s second-largest LNG exporter. There is no viable alternative export route for this LNG.

For Europe, the timing could scarcely be worse.

Preparation for winter starts now

Europe is entering the critical period when underground gas storage must be replenished ahead of winter. Yet European countries are beginning this process in one of the weakest positions in years. Refilling these reserves now depends heavily on LNG imports, following Europe’s rapid shift away from Russian pipeline gas following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. According to the Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory database, European storage levels are currently below 30 percent, a five-year low. A colder-than-average winter, combined with increased gas burn in the power sector, pushed European gas demand up nearly 7 percent since the start of the year. At the same time, pipeline year-over-year exports from the European Union (EU) to Ukraine surged more than tenfold, further accelerating withdrawals.

Under EU regulations, storage levels must reach at least 90 percent capacity by December. Given current conditions, Europe will need to inject nearly 60 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas during the upcoming refill season just to meet this target. For context, that translates to about 586 terawatt-hours (TWh) of energy—enough to power around 57 million US homes annually, based on average household consumption data from the US Energy Information Administration. Crucially, not all gas imports can be directed into storage; much of it must first satisfy ongoing daily consumption. Even before the escalation in the Gulf, Europe’s depleted storage position was forcing it to plan record LNG imports in 2026.

Further squeezing the LNG market is the March 2 Iranian drone strike on QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan facilities, which forced an immediate shutdown of production. Two days later, the company declared force majeure, meaning that QatarEnergies is temporarily suspended from its contractual commitments of LNG shipments to customers. This declaration has added significant uncertainty to the timeline for restoring Qatari output. Even if the conflict were to end today and the strait were to reopen, full restoration of production could take weeks or even months. Markets know this: QatarEnergy’s announcement triggered an abrupt spike in European gas benchmarks, with prices jumping by more than 50 percent on March 2. It was the largest single‑day increase since the 2022 energy crisis following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing disruption of Russian pipeline flows. These market pressures affect far more than just Europe; they risk reigniting competition between European and Asian importers for scarce LNG cargoes.

Between Asia and Europe

In the past, Asian importers dominated global LNG markets through long-term contracts with exporters, while Europe relied heavily on pipeline gas from Russia. When those flows collapsed after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, European buyers drove LNG prices sharply higher, drawing cargoes originally contracted for Asian markets toward European terminals. This dynamic characterized the 2022 energy crisis, when Europe repeatedly outbid Asian buyers for flexible supply. The current crisis, however, may reverse that pattern. As the loss of Qatari supply tightens global LNG markets, Asian buyers may be willing to outbid Europe for available cargoes—particularly the four major East Asian economies of China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Together, these four accounted for approximately three-quarters of all LNG imported across Asia in 2025, according to data sourced from Kpler. China alone relied on Qatar for 29 percent of its LNG imports in 2025, making it the world’s top LNG importer that year.

Early signs of this dynamic may already be emerging, with reports in recent days that a US LNG tanker originally bound for Belgium changed course toward China—a potential signal that this competition for cargoes is one Europe will likely lose on cost. US LNG exports have become one of Europe’s most important diversification tools since 2022, but even if US producers increase output, it is unlikely to fully offset the loss of Qatari supply in the near term. US liquefaction facilities are already operating near capacity, and the JKM–TTF spread, the price differential between Asian and European LNG markets, has fluctuated sharply in recent months. The spread could significantly widen as Asian buyers compete for alternative supply.

The scale and cost of this supply gap are further amplified by Europe’s decision to phase out Russian pipeline gas and LNG imports by the end of 2027. The EU is set to ban short-term Russian pipeline contracts beginning in June of this year, with all remaining long-term flows required to cease by the end of September 2027. While Russian LNG accounts for a relatively small share of Europe’s supply, it remains a meaningful component: In 2025, the EU imported roughly 17 bcm of Russian LNG, representing approximately 13 percent of total gas imports. European policymakers had anticipated replacing this volume primarily with US LNG, but given the ongoing Middle East conflict, Europe’s plans to fill this gap are increasingly fragile, placing immense strain on both supply security and cost.

Back where it was in 2022

Brussels has yet to offer a meaningful solution for the energy shock. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has indicated that the EU is exploring measures such as the expanded use of power purchase agreements, temporary state aid mechanisms, and potential gas price caps. During the 2022 crisis, proposals for a gas price cap faced strong opposition from Germany and the Netherlands, which argued that artificially limiting prices could undermine Europe’s ability to attract scarce LNG cargoes and allow Asian buyers to outbid European importers. Today, too, similar measures are likely to face contention and stoke further divisions among the EU member states.

The current crisis has reignited a debate that emerged in 2022 regarding Europe’s energy strategy and dependence on external suppliers. From 2022 to 2024, Europe undertook an ambitious push to diversify its energy mix and accelerate the deployment of nuclear and renewable capacity. However, these efforts were partially overshadowed by reliance on US LNG and related trade negotiations, in effect trading one dependency for another. Analysts have long cautioned against this pattern of dependence, yet after years of shutting down continental energy projects, most notably the near-complete collapse of German nuclear energy, Europe now finds itself back where it was in 2022: heavily reliant on US LNG, exposed to global price competition, and bringing a policy knife to a global production gun fight. To break this cycle, Europe would need to invest more in its own production capacity. But further deployment of clean energy infrastructure or nuclear development is a multi-year process, and thus it is not a solution to the current crisis.

The Russia question

The energy shock has also reopened the question of Russian sanctions. Notably, the United States appears to be signaling a change in tone. Last week, the White House temporarily loosened restrictions to allow India to import Russian crude oil stranded at sea—a shift from what was agreed to during US-India trade negotiations in February. On March 12, the administration went further, issuing a broader temporary exemption in permitting the sale of Russian seaborne oil currently in transit. The administration’s rationale was that this will help ease pressure on global energy prices. Though framed as a short-term measure, the move underscores how quickly sanctions policy can shift under acute energy market pressure. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent further justified the measure by arguing that Russia taxes production rather than sales, so licensing completed shipments therefore does not provide significant financial benefit to the Kremlin. This argument is difficult to sustain: Since February 2022, Moscow has repeatedly restructured its oil and gas tax regime to maximize state revenues, and there is little reason to believe it would not do so again.

The Group of Seven (G7) price cap could tell a similar story. The mechanism works by using Western control over global shipping insurance and finance as leverage: tanker operators and insurers who want access to Western financial services must certify that the oil was sold below a set price ceiling, forcing buyers to demand a discount from Moscow. When the cap was set at sixty dollars in 2022, it was just below the market price for Russian oil. But Russian crude has since fallen well below that level, meaning the cap no longer constrains prices. In response, the EU and the United Kingdom lowered their ceiling to around forty-seven dollars to restore its bite, but the United States declined to follow, creating a gap that operators can exploit, and particularly undermining the EU’s move. The Trump administration has never been enthusiastic about the mechanism, and a decision to stop enforcing it entirely cannot be ruled out. If that happens, then one of the few remaining tools limiting Russian energy revenues effectively collapses.

So far, European leaders have mostly remained firm in their commitments to diversify away from Russian energy. On March 11, von der Leyen warned that returning to Russian energy would be a “strategic blunder” that increases Europe’s vulnerability. At a recent meeting, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni joined other Group of Seven (G7) leaders in rejecting calls to ease sanctions despite the turmoil in global oil markets. Merz has also publicly criticized the US decision to temporarily lift sanctions, calling it “wrong.” However, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever broke openly with the EU’s agreed position this past weekend, arguing that Europe “must normalize relations with Russia and regain access to cheap energy.” He added that European leaders privately agree with him but are unwilling to say so publicly. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán remains another strong European voice publicly urging a reconsideration, though his position carries little weight among his peers because of his long-standing alignment with Moscow.

Could the EU extend the window of continuing Russian supply past the current deadlines? Perhaps, but doing so would require reopening a complex political and legislative process between the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council. Even under accelerated or emergency procedures, such a move would be politically fraught. In practice, this would mean revisiting the sanctions architecture that has been painstakingly constructed since 2022. Beyond the legal and institutional challenges, such a move would undermine the EU’s geopolitical strategy and effectively finance Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine. For Brussels, this option remains politically untenable. But pressure from individual member states may continue to intensify if prices rise sharply.

The European dilemma

What this conflict has made clear is that while higher oil prices will raise energy costs globally, Europe’s more immediate challenge is securing sufficient LNG cargoes to refill its depleted gas storage. Toward this end, the calendar is working against European importers. With the refill season running from April to November, losing even two months to a Qatari production halt means forfeiting roughly 25 percent of the injection window before a single additional cargo arrives. European countries could attempt to suppress demand for gas through conservation measures and reduced industrial energy consumption, though the scale required would be politically and economically difficult to sustain.

More realistically, European buyers will be forced to wait until Asian demand is satisfied, and then pay whatever price remains. Unlike emerging market economies, which may be priced out entirely, Europe has the financial depth to outbid most competitors. But that calculation carries its own cost: securing supply at any price means passing that cost onto households and industry, with all the economic and political consequences that follow.

Ultimately, the crisis reduces to a binary—scarce cargoes mean physical shortages; available but expensive supply means an extraordinary price shock. An obvious release valve—importing Russian pipeline gas once again—remains politically toxic. Reopening that faucet would undercut two years of painful European energy diversification, hand Moscow a significant revenue stream at a moment when the war in Ukraine remains unresolved, and reintroduce precisely the strategic dependency that left Europe exposed in the first place. Either way, this episode has exposed structural weaknesses in Europe’s energy supply chain. Finding a way out of this dilemma will dominate the continent’s political and economic agenda for months to come.

The post How the Iran war could trigger a European energy crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Iran war is good for the Russian economy but bad for Putin’s prestige

Maksym Beznosiuk, Will Dixon — Tue, 17 Mar 2026 15:50:23 +0000

Two weeks since the outbreak of the Iran war, commentators around the world are already declaring Vladimir Putin the winner. It is easy to see why so many seem to believe that the Russian President will emerge as the main beneficiary of escalating hostilities in the Middle East. After all, from energy exports to the invasion of Ukraine, Putin clearly has much to gain.

The Russian economy has been showing signs of severe strain in recent months as the combined toll of international sanctions, Ukrainian airstrikes, and ballooning defense spending negatively impact the Kremlin coffers. The Iran war now threatens to transform this picture in Moscow’s favor.

With energy prices already spiking and the Strait of Hormuz blocked, the world is entering a fuel crisis that could reinvigorate Putin’s war economy. The United States has already relaxed sanctions on the Kremlin in a bid to ease energy pressures elsewhere. If the current conflict becomes a prolonged campaign, Moscow may be able to repair much of the economic damage done over the past four years.

The Iran war could also provide a more direct boost for Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. With the Trump administration now firmly focused on the Middle East, the Kremlin will face significantly less diplomatic pressure to engage in US-led peace talks with Ukraine, while Kyiv will struggle to keep Russia’s invasion high on the international agenda.

Crucially, the US is expected to prioritize the supply of air defense interceptor missiles to the Middle East over Ukraine. With limited numbers of missiles produced annually, this means Ukrainian air defense crews might soon find themselves short of the ammunition required to defend their cities and infrastructure against Russian ballistic missiles. The consequences for the civilian population could be disastrous.

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Despite these potential advantages, there is little sign of celebration in the Kremlin. While Russia appears well-positioned to benefit economically and militarily, the US-led war with Iran has also served to highlight Russia’s declining international influence and has underlined Moscow’s limitations as an ally.

Since the onset of hostilities at the end of February, the Kremlin has restricted itself to a limited number of statements and has largely refrained from any strong condemnation of the United States. While reports indicate that Moscow is providing Iran with military assistance including targeting data and drone warfare expertise, the Russian response has been strikingly muted and has fallen far short of America’s very public support for Ukraine following Putin’s 2022 invasion.

Putin’s cautious reaction is particularly noteworthy in light of the support Iran has provided to Russia over the past four years. Since 2022, Tehran has supplied Moscow with large quantities of drones, missiles, and ammunition. This backing proved especially important during the early stages of the war, before Russia was able to expand domestic production and diversify its lines of supply.

Despite much speculation over an emerging “Axis of Autocrats” including both Russia and Iran, Putin has so far proved unwilling or unable to repay Tehran for its earlier backing. While Russian and Iranian officials hailed the signing of a “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement” in January 2025, this has not translated into significant Russian aid since the current conflict erupted.

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Russia’s failure to robustly support its Iranian allies is the latest in a series of similar geopolitical setbacks since the beginning of the full-scale Ukraine invasion more than four years ago. In late 2022, Kremlin credibility was dented by Moscow’s inability to prevent a renewal of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, leading to the collapse of Russia’s traditional security role in the South Caucasus. US President Donald Trump has since stepped into the void to lead peace efforts in the region.

The fall of Kremlin-backed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was to prove an even more humiliating blow for Putin. For almost a decade, Moscow had invested significant military and diplomatic resources to keep Assad in power. This engagement was touted by Moscow as proof of Russia’s return to great power status. However, when the Assad regime began to rapidly unravel in late 2024, Russia was unable to intervene. Instead, the Kremlin limited itself to offering the ousted Syrian leader asylum.

Likewise, Russia proved powerless to assist Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro when he was captured by the United States in early 2026. Moscow was seen as a key strategic partner of Maduro and had provided Caracas with a wide range of financial and security backing. Days before the American operation, Russia was still voicing its “full support” for Venezuela. However, the Kremlin ultimately took no action when US forces swooped.

From Armenia and Syria to Venezuela and Iran, Moscow’s obvious inability to aid its allies in times of crisis has seriously damaged Russia’s reputation as a global power. While the Kremlin is still capable of supplying weapons and spreading propaganda, these limited tools are no substitute for the kind of substantial security support that potential partners seek.

For Putin, this matters. Throughout his reign, he has carefully cultivated a strongman image and sought to reassert Russia’s claims to superpower status. However, the world’s leading powers do not maintain their influence through rhetoric alone.

Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s repeated failure to defend its international allies has revealed the underwhelming reality behind Putin’s posturing. This loss of prestige has very practical implications for Moscow’s ability to attract partners and project strength on the world stage. Putin hoped that by conquering Ukraine, he could return Russia to the dominant role it occupied during the Cold War. Instead, he has become bogged down in an invasion that has ruthlessly exposed modern Russia’s geopolitical limitations.

William Dixon is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute specializing in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.

Peter Dickinson — Sat, 14 Mar 2026 12:10:22 +0000

Russia’s mass deportation of Ukrainian children is a crime against humanity, a new United Nations investigation has found. Published this week by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the report concluded that following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Kremlin officials “at the highest level” have overseen large-scale deportations from occupied regions of Ukraine targeting thousands of Ukrainian children.

The report provides fresh insights into Russia’s comprehensive wartime program of child deportations. Moscow is accused of abducting tens of thousands of Ukrainian children since 2022 and forcibly transferring them to Russia as part of a “carefully organized plan” coordinated at the highest levels of the Russian Federation state apparatus. Many victims are reportedly subjected to ideological indoctrination designed to strip them of their Ukrainian identity and impose Russian nationality. This process often includes name changes and adoption into Russian families.

Despite extensive campaigning and humanitarian efforts by Ukraine and the international community, only a relatively small number of abducted children have so far been rescued. The plight of Ukraine’s deported kids has made global headlines and has attracted the attention of US First Lady Melania Trump, who has reportedly sought to help facilitate the return of victims by engaging directly with the Kremlin.

The new UN report noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s direct involvement in the mass deportations has been “visible from the outset.” This tallies with existing criminal charges against Putin brought by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. In spring 2023, ICC officials issued an arrest warrant for Putin for his personal role in Russia’s child abduction program. This warrant has since prevented the Kremlin dictator from attending a number of international summits due to fears that he may face arrest for war crimes.

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This is not the first time United Nations investigators have accused Russia of committing crimes against humanity during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A spring 2025 UN probe concluded that the large-scale detention of Ukrainians in occupied regions of the country represented a “systematic attack against the civilian population” that qualified as a crime against humanity. In areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, Moscow is accused of conducting a Stalin-style terror campaign of mass arrests targeting thousands of civilians including elected officials, journalists, civil society activists, religious leaders, cultural figures, and military veterans.

Similarly, a more recent UN investigation into targeted Russian drone strikes against the civilian population in three front line regions of southern Ukraine determined that these aerial attacks amount to a crime against humanity. The killings are clearly intentional, United Nations investigators concluded, with Russian troops reportedly using video-guided drones to hunt down individual victims. Terrified locals refer to Russia’s drone strikes on civilians as a “human safari.”

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The Kremlin’s ongoing program of child deportations and accompanying anti-Ukrainian indoctrination are viewed in Kyiv as elements of a broader Russian plan to erase Ukrainian national identity entirely. Throughout occupied regions of Ukraine, the Russian authorities are ruthlessly eradicating all traces of Ukrainian statehood, history, language, and cultural heritage. Meanwhile, local residents are being forced to accept Russian citizenship. Anyone who refuses to cooperate risks being denied access to basic public services or deported.

Moscow’s efforts to forcibly Russify thousands of abducted Ukrainian children have been widely cited as evidence of the genocidal intent underpinning Russia’s invasion. This is hardly surprising. The 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention specifically identifies “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as one of five internationally recognized acts of genocide.

Russia rejects United Nations claims that it is committing crimes against humanity in Ukraine and has consistently denied allegations of mass child abductions. Instead, Kremlin officials maintain that the large-scale transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia is a routine wartime safety measure. However, nobody in Moscow has been able to explain why it is necessary to indoctrinate children against their native Ukraine and force them to adopt a Russian national identity in order ensure their safety.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Nobody is better equipped to address this challenge than Ukraine. Since 2022, the Ukrainians have gained unrivaled experience defending their country against massive Russian drone attacks on an almost daily basis. They have learned to do so in a cost-effective and sustainable manner by employing a wide range of tools including cheap interceptor drones, sophisticated monitoring systems, electronic warfare equipment, and helicopter gunships.

Since the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, Ukraine has signaled a readiness to share its drone warfare experience with the United States and its Gulf region allies. Kyiv’s offer has been readily accepted. As a result, the Ukrainian drone defense crews currently deploying to the Middle East are likely to be the first of many. Others are also taking note. Berlin confirmed plans this week to have Ukrainian experts train German troops, while Romania unveiled a major joint venture to co-produce drones together with Ukraine.

This is having a profound impact on Ukraine’s international image. Until recently, Ukraine was widely regarded as a country with little leverage that was heavily dependent on the West for survival. In light of recent developments, a radically different picture is now emerging of Ukraine as a valuable security partner and a major military power in its own right.

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Ukraine’s rise to drone superpower status has been remarkably rapid. The country first began experimenting with the use of drones on the battlefield in the wake of Russia’s initial invasion in 2014. However, major breakthroughs would not take place until the full-scale invasion of 2022.

In the space of just four years, Ukraine has gone from defense tech startup to global leader in the art of drone warfare. This remarkable progress owes much to Ukraine’s vibrant prewar tech sector and the country’s strong entrepreneurial spirit, which have combined to turbo-charge the wartime development of a domestic drone manufacturing sector. The existential nature of the Russian threat has also played a key role, providing local producers and government officials with all the motivation they need to remove potential roadblocks and maximize domestic output.

Ukrainian officials recognized early in the war that they could not rely on Western partners to supply the necessary weapons and ammunition on time and in sufficient quantities. Prioritizing the mass production of comparatively cheap drones was identified as Ukraine’s most realistic strategy as the country sought to counter Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower and conventional firepower. The results speak for themselves. When the full-scale invasion began, Ukraine only had a handful of drone producers. In 2026, domestic output is expected to reach seven million drones.

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1. Is the US accomplishing its goals in the war?

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Ukraine’s strategic emphasis on drones has transformed the war on land, in the air, and at sea. Around three-quarters of all Russian battlefield casualties are now inflicted by Ukrainian drones. Meanwhile, a drone-dominated kill zone stretching for over ten kilometers either side of the front lines makes any major offensive operations fraught with danger for the attackers. As the Russian invasion enters a fifth year, Ukraine’s “drone wall” is now the key to the country’s defensive strategy.

At sea, Kyiv has used domestically developed naval drones to break the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and neutralize around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet. Following a string of naval humiliations, Putin was forced to withdraw the remainder of his warships from Crimea to the relative safety of Russia itself.

Ukraine’s naval drones are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Some recent models have been armed with anti-aircraft missile capabilities, while others have served as mini aircraft carriers for smaller drones. This creative use of maritime drone technologies has made it possible for Ukraine to gain the upper hand in the Battle of the Black Sea, despite not having a conventional navy to speak of.

Ukraine’s growing drone arsenal also includes long-range drones that have made it possible to strike targets deep inside Russia. In recent years, Kyiv has escalated attacks on military and industrial sites located over one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. This has expanded the geographical scope of the war and brought Putin’s invasion home to Russia in ways that the Kremlin propaganda machine is unable to censor.

Ukraine’s new friends in the Gulf region are primarily interested in Kyiv’s interceptor drone technologies. These weapons have been developed in response to Russia’s own innovative use of attack drones. Since acquiring the blueprints from Iran during the early stages of the war, Russia has significantly upgraded its fleet of Shahed drones to make them bigger, faster, and more maneuverable. Moscow has also dramatically increased production, enabling far larger nightly attacks on targets throughout Ukraine.

The Ukrainian authorities have responded to this escalating Russian bombardment by developing a series of interceptor drones that can be mass produced for a fraction of the cost of traditional air defense missiles. Customers including oil giant Saudi Aramco are reportedly now queuing up to acquire these Ukrainian interceptors.

When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he expected an easy victory and vowed to “demilitarize” the country. With Ukrainian drone specialists now training NATO forces while guarding Gulf petrostates and US military bases, it is safe to say that this attempted demilitarization has backfired in spectacular fashion.

Rather than leaving Kyiv disarmed and defenseless, the war unleashed by Putin four years ago has transformed Ukraine into a drone superpower. This newfound status is already changing outside perceptions of the country and looks set to further strengthen Ukraine’s geopolitical standing as more countries seek to benefit from Kyiv’s drone warfare expertise. Zelenskyy clearly holds plenty of cards and is prepared to play them.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Turkey limited its response to the violation from Iran to formal diplomatic channels, summoning the Iranian ambassador in Ankara and holding a private call between the two nations’ foreign ministers. Meanwhile, public pronouncements from Turkish government officials underscored the state’s commitment to protecting its sovereignty. There was no indication that the missile would trigger NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause—Alliance officials quickly poured cold water on the notion and it’s not clear Turkey would even want or seek it in this circumstance.

But on March 9, NATO intercepted a second Iranian missile over Turkey, creating new complications for Ankara. The debris of the second missile fell over the inland province of Gaziantep, in contrast to the first, which hit Hatay, located on the coast. The second missile strike to breach Turkish airspace is therefore less easily explained as an error than the first, and it is likely that one or both of them were aimed at Incirlik.

US intelligence appears to be lining up behind this assessment. On Monday, the US State Department raised its warning for southeast Turkey, the region nearest the Iranian border, to “do not travel,” the highest risk level. And nonessential staff were ordered to leave the US consulate in Adana. The second missile also led to a more direct and targeted rebuke from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who said Tehran continues to take “wrong and provocative” steps and that Turkey has issued the necessary warnings to Iran.

Meanwhile, the news that the CIA was arming Kurdish forces to combat Iran set off alarm bells in Turkey, which has been burnt badly by previous partnerships between the United States and auxiliary Kurdish ground forces. Most notably, there have been Turkish tensions with the United States over US support for the People’s Defense Units (YPG), a Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and Turkey. With US support, the YPG was effective in combatting and curtailing the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) starting in 2014, but the group also precipitated a diplomatic crisis with Turkey that the US-Turkish bilateral relationship is only now beginning to recover from. The prospect of a similar scenario repeating itself in Iran was raised at a recent event the Atlantic Council’s Turkey program hosted on US-Turkey cooperation in Syria.

Moreover, the emboldening of the transnational Kurdish nationalist movement in Syria also played a key role in the breakdown of the peace process between Turkey and the PKK in 2015. Now in 2026, Turkey is once again moving toward resolving the PKK issue, under the “terror-free Turkey” initiative. Regional spoilers or irritants to this very delicate and choreographed process could once again threaten to derail the conclusion of the almost fifty-year conflict between Turkey and the PKK, which has claimed the lives of tens of thousands.

Fortunately, based on US President Donald Trump’s messaging over the weekend and signals that the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq was not keen to put itself more into the crosshairs, it looks as if Turkey’s fears of a Kurdish uprising in Iran aligned with the PKK will be avoided.

But the fact that support for such an insurgency was being considered underscores the lack of clarity on the goals and endgame of the conflict, which is particularly concerning for states like Turkey that neighbor Iran. Given its experiences with the Syrian civil war and the war in Iraq, Turkey is deeply averse to the potential of regional disintegration and power vacuums at its border. The specter of terror organizations with freedom to operate on its border is something Turkey cannot help but be vigilant against, as would any country in its position.

In this context, Turkey is adopting a delicate balancing act, seeking to protect its territory, security, and economic interests. Despite significant concerns over the war in Iran, Turkey has invested heavily in its outreach to the Trump administration, working to turn its bilateral relationship with the United States around from historic lows. Thus far, Turkey has crafted public messaging aiming to avoid criticizing the United States and drawing Trump’s ire.

But much in the same way Turkey approaches Russia, Ankara views Iran as a fact of life to be managed simultaneously through cooperation when possible and competition when it is not. An irony is that Turkey has been one of the largest beneficiaries of the severe degradation to Iran and its regional proxy network wrought mainly by Israel since the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Since then, Turkey’s influence in Syria, the South Caucasus, and Iraq has increased while Iran’s has decreased.

But when it comes to the US and Israeli war against Iran, the risks are greater and the outcomes more uncertain. Any actions Turkey considers taking to respond to Iran’s missiles or to protect its borders are calibrated against the inevitability that it will need to deal with whatever Iran is left standing after the conflict ends—and the regional fallout that results. For now, that means Turkey is, to the extent possible with war raging next door, seeking to avoid escalating in both kinetic and rhetorical terms.

Grady Wilson is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post Turkey has weathered regional instability before. But the war in Iran poses greater risks to Ankara than past conflicts. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Twenty questions (and expert answers) about the Iran war

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 20:37:41 +0000

The US and Israeli militaries are hammering Iran for a second week. Iranian forces and proxies are striking back across the Middle East. Global financial and energy markets are full of volatility. And questions abound about the future trajectory of this conflict and its wider consequences.

Below, Atlantic Council experts pierce the fog of war with clarifying answers to twenty of the most pressing questions about these fast-moving events.

Click to jump to a question

2. Is Israel achieving its aims in this conflict?

3. Will the US put boots on the ground in Iran?

4. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the Iranian regime?

5. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the US?

6. What do we know about Iran’s new supreme leader?

7. What happens if the Iranian regime collapses?

8. How is the Iranian opposition responding to the conflict?

9. Is Iran’s nuclear stockpile a danger?

10. What threat does Iran pose to the US homeland?

11. What impact is this war having on US weapons stockpiles?

12. What’s the economic impact on Americans?

13. How is this conflict changing global energy markets?

14. What happens if Kurdish groups launch an armed resistance in Iran?

15. What impact will this conflict have on China?

16. What impact will this conflict have on Russia?

17. Will the Houthis in Yemen get involved?

18. How will this conflict impact Gaza?

19. How will the war impact US-Gulf relations?

20. What other countries could get involved if this war expands?

1. Is the US accomplishing its goals in the war?

Washington’s stated goals have included degrading Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, navy, drones, and control of its terror proxies. The United States is well on its way to achieving these objectives. All of these capabilities are badly degraded with, for example, more than fifty Iranian naval vessels resting on the sea floor. Going after remaining missile and drone manufacturing capabilities will likely take a couple of more weeks, at which point US President Donald Trump will be able to declare victory.

A better government in Iran that is more cooperative internationally and that respects the human rights of its people is also desirable, but that outcome is largely in the hands of the Iranian people.

Regardless of who governs next, Iran will be much weaker for years to come and less able to threaten the United States.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president for geostrategy and fellows and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

2. Is Israel achieving its aims in this conflict?

Israel almost certainly has set as a strategic objective the collapse of the Iranian regime. That is an expansion of initial goals following the June 2025 twelve-day war. In that conflict, Israeli and US strikes significantly set back the Iranian nuclear program. But some Iranian ballistic missile attacks also managed to penetrate Israeli and US missile defenses. Given the limited stockpile of interceptors, and Iranian ambitions to ramp up production of ballistic missiles that could reach Israel from roughly two thousand to ten thousand—meaning that they could overwhelm Israeli defenses and pose a strategic threat—Israel was prepared to strike at this threat later in 2026.

But that changed following the popular protests against the regime in January, when it appeared that the Islamic Republic’s internal weakness matched the damage to its nuclear program and deterioration of its regional position and proxy network over the past two years. So in addition to degrading the missile threat by striking launchers, storage sites, and production facilities, Israeli targeting since the beginning of the war has included regime leadership (starting with the supreme leader and others in the conflict’s opening minutes), state security organs that participated in the crushing of the protests (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Basij militia, and police), and oil storage tanks in Tehran described as essential to the regime’s war machine.

It is understandable that Israelis would seek the demise of the regime. For decades, they have lived with a major regional player openly and ideologically committed to Israel’s destruction, seeking strategic weapons to advance that aim, and arming and funding proxy terror groups that have spilled no small amount of Israeli blood. Tens of thousands of rockets and missiles have been launched against Israeli civilian targets over the past twenty years by Iran and its proxies. Seeing an opportunity to change this reality, which much of the world has taken for granted, has broad appeal in Israel. So far, with a few deadly Iranian missile attacks but Israel’s defenses otherwise holding, the campaign seems to most Israelis to be both necessary and being conducted at a tolerable price.

What is less clear is how well the Israeli goal of regime change matches the United States’ objectives, or if it does, how long that will remain the case. Trump and his administration have offered inconsistent explanations of the war’s strategic objectives, but at least some of those calls—for “unconditional surrender” and creating the conditions that allow the Iranian people to take over their institutions—are consistent with Israeli goals. But as oil prices spike, markets dip, shipping and supply chains are disrupted, and Iran continues to find gaps in its Arab neighbors’ air defense and cause economic and infrastructure damage, it is possible to imagine Trump seeking an earlier off-ramp with a claim of having significantly defanged the regime. Further, the prospects of regime collapse followed by chaos, civil war, instability spilling over into neighboring countries, and refugee flows is of potentially far greater concern to the United States and its Arab partners than to Israel. If such a gap between Israeli and US goals opens up, expect Trump to be the determiner of when the war ends and to impose that endpoint on Israel, even if it is short of regime change.

3. Will the US put boots on the ground in Iran?

The United States is not mobilizing conventional ground forces either in the region or in the United States. Iran is a massive country with very difficult topography and would require hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy. Any use of ground forces would likely be limited to special operations forces for specific missions. Trump has espoused military objectives that are achievable through air and sea power without the need for a ground invasion. The military can seed the conditions for regime change by accomplishing its objectives, but a transition to an organic protest movement that the military doesn’t control or a negotiated settlement with the current regime is a political objective.

Looking back to the Iraq war, Trump has cited the deployment of conventional ground forces and the disbanding of the Iraqi army and government as the reasons the United States became ensnared in a costly insurgency. He is seeking to avoid that by not deploying ground forces and preferring to work with a member of the existing government—if the regime is willing to change its approach. If those conditions come together, Trump can achieve his military objectives and leave at a time of his choosing without a transition to a new government.

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and leads the initiative’s Counterterrorism Project. He previously served as chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

4. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the Iranian regime?

There is an assumption among some in Washington that Iran will stop fighting when Trump and Israel want to end this war. This is the same reasoning that led the Trump administration to assume Iran would capitulate in nuclear talks and not respond forcefully to the war that Trump and Israel initiated on February 28. This is a very different conflict than the twelve-day war in 2025 or other conflicts in which Iran rapidly de-escalated.

The Iranian regime perceives that it is in an existential conflict, and it does not appear to be interested in an immediate off-ramp. From Iran’s perspective, a cessation of hostilities would merely be a temporary respite, before the United States or Israel restart the conflict once they have replenished their military supplies.

Therefore, a slow, protracted, war of attrition is probably Iran’s intended outcome. Iranian leaders are calculating that their country is more willing to take casualties and absorb pain than either the United States or Gulf countries. Therefore, if Iran retains the military capability (including asymmetric threats) to inflict pain on the United States and the Gulf, as well as keep energy prices high, then Iran is more likely to determine the end of the conflict than the United States is. In fact, Iran may only accept an off-ramp if it ensures there is not another near-term war. This would likely entail compelling Trump to enforce a cease-fire that Israel adheres to. This type of belligerent approach is a risky gamble for Iran, as it increases the chances that the United States doubles down on the war and that it draws in the Gulf, but it is also probably a risk the remnants of the regime are willing to take.

5. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the US?

The United States is going to come out ahead in this war in almost every conceivable outcome. The president has smashed Iran’s missile capabilities, supported the destruction of some additional nuclear facilities, and killed scores of Iran’s top leaders. Tehran was unwilling to trade its uranium enrichment capability and has never countenanced negotiations on its missiles or proxies. Now it has less of all three.

Iran, of course, also has a vote on ending the war, but once the threat to the regime is gone—and it looks like it’s receding—Iran will eventually return to business as usual. It could keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, but that would require continuing to expose itself to attack and pressure, and it does need oil revenue, too. Israel could conceivably continue the war alone but would likely scale down—think Gaza—once the United States indicated its desire to stop.

Perhaps the only unacceptable outcome for the war is if a sustained opposition movement emerges and either suffers more brutality on the streets of Tehran or manages to liberate some territory and then is violently suppressed by the regime. The conditions required for a US win also change if there is a mass casualty terrorist attack at home or overseas directly related to the war, which the United States would need to justify with a more acute strategic objective. If the regime thus wanted to inflict harm on the United States, it might well strike at the homeland, goad Washington into making a sustained effort to replace it, and then try to make the United States suffer further as a result.

—Andrew L. Peek is the director of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He was previously the senior director for European and Russian affairs at the National Security Council and the deputy assistant secretary for Iran and Iraq at the US Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

6. What do we know about Iran’s new supreme leader?

Iran’s new supreme leader, fifty-six-year-old Mojtaba Khamenei, is the son of the recently deceased Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Many analysts believe that Mojtaba will be a continuation—and potentially more extreme version—of his father. However, less is known about the younger Khamenei, as he rarely speaks or appears in public.

What we do know is that the new supreme leader was trained by a string of hard-line, anti-Western clerics, played a prominent role in past repression of protesters, and was recently embroiled in a corruption scandal. As a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and an active participant in Iran’s intelligence and defense, he was reportedly the IRGC’s favored candidate. However, his selection is controversial even within the remnants of the Islamic Republic. According to reports, his appointment contravened his father’s written wishes and was opposed by senior political figures in Iran. In this sense, Mojtaba Khamenei’s selection is about more than just succession. It is about stabilizing a system at a moment when uncertainty poses a strategic risk to the regime.

Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, attends a rally in Tehran, Iran, on May 31, 2019. (Hamid Forootan/ISNA/WANA via Reuters Connect)

In the short term, Mojtaba Khamenei will likely be focused on Iranian defense, ensuring relative domestic stability, and power projection. Israel and the United States have already expressed opposition to his ascension, leaving open the possibility—perhaps even likelihood—that he will be targeted in future US or Israeli military actions.

—Nate Swanson

7. What happens if the Iranian regime collapses?

The end of the regime is less likely to foster democracy as it is to birth what some are calling “IRGCistan”—a military-dominated state in which the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamanei, is a partner but not the final or ultimate authority, as his father was, and with power firmly vested in the hands of the IRGC. Such a result would provide three pathways forward.

An IRGC-run Iran could initially be a bigger regional and domestic threat, staking out even harder-line stances in seeking to consolidate power and focused on ensuring no other insider can outflank it. Second, it could seek to quickly gain the support of the Iranian people by showing greater flexibility for a deal with the United States in exchange for an economic boost in the form of sanctions relief. Third, it could lead to a period of confusion and jockeying for power in which Western states will have to decide how much to try to jump into the fray and influence the outcome.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Dispatches

Feb 28, 2026

Experts react: The US and Israel just unleashed a major attack on Iran. What’s next?

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts assess the unfolding Operation Epic Fury and where it goes from here.

Conflict Iran

8. How is the Iranian opposition responding to the conflict?

Many in the Iranian opposition both inside and outside of Iran had welcomed targeted military strikes on regime officials and targets in the lead-up to the war. The thinking was that there was no other way to dislodge a violent regime that over forty-seven years had resisted international pressure, sanctions, and multiple internal nationwide anti-regime protests. The war’s opening salvo in killing then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and top regime officials was celebrated widely in Iran and seen as an optimistic start to what many believed would be certain regime change. But with Israel’s strikes on oil depots in Tehran that sent a black smoke cloud over the sky in the second week of the war, along with the destruction of cultural heritage sites, moods have started to shift. Some question how much they are willing to sacrifice for a free Iran and whether the regime—which so far has proved resilient—will actually fall, or whether all the war did was replace one Khamenei with another Khamenei who is thirty years younger.

But bright spots remain. Many Iranians say there is no turning back now and that the regime has to go or else it will emerge more brutal than ever before. There are reports of people organizing to take to the streets once the bombing stops. Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah, continues to offer to act as a transitional leader for Iran to guide the country to free and fair elections and has attracted new key constituencies to broaden his tent. Inside Iran, seventy opposition activists have joined to form a new group called the Strategic Council of Republicans Inside Iran. Their names have not been declared publicly, but they have made their leadership known to Western governments. And outside Iran, opposition figures are meeting to discuss core transitional issues and encourage pluralistic politics.

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and a board member of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

9. Is Iran’s nuclear stockpile a danger?

Since Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow in June 2025, it has been difficult for experts to assess how much of Iran’s nuclear stockpile remains accessible and potentially dangerous. Prior to those attacks, Iran’s stockpile had been estimated at about 440.9 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the existing stockpile is “mainly” at Isfahan, while other parts of the stockpile may have been destroyed last year. Some experts believe that the stockpile is largely inaccessible and buried underground. After receiving a briefing from the Trump administration, US Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL) raised concern that the administration “never had a plan for that nuclear stockpile of enriched uranium—to destroy [it], to seize it, or to put it under international inspection.”

If the nuclear stockpile is still accessible, then its future may parallel the political future of Iran; a regime that is compliant with US requirements may wish to take measures to safeguard the stockpile and could even allow inspections to resume. However, if the regime feels that it remains under threat, then it could be more motivated to rebuild military and nuclear weapons capabilities. Additionally, if Iran devolves into political chaos and civil war, then the stockpile could fall into the hands of rogue elements with nefarious purposes.

—Jennifer T. Gordon is the director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

10. What threat does Iran pose to the US homeland?

Iran’s long history and experience in asymmetric warfare—including being a state sponsor for terrorism and perpetrator of cyberattacks—suggests that the kinetic portion of this conflict could be just a start. In retaliation for the death of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020, for example, Tehran sought to murder both Trump and then National Security Advisor John Bolton. While no specific threats have been identified, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appear to be on high alert. Press reports indicate that the DHS warned of potential lone wolf attacks, which are notoriously difficult to identify in advance, in response to the conflict.

Iran’s proxies across the Middle East are another arrow in Tehran’s quiver. Tehran has cultivated, armed, trained, and financed a network of non-state armed organizations operating across the region with links to Africa and parts of Latin America. These groups include Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian militant organizations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, and Yemen’s Houthi movement. Together and individually, they enable Iran to project influence, deter adversaries, and retaliate asymmetrically while preserving a degree of paper-thin plausible deniability.

Currently, Iran’s proxy network remains operational, although increasingly constrained. Hezbollah retains significant military capabilities, though persistent Israeli attacks and the potential that Lebanese authorities work to limit the group’s activities could challenge its efforts to mount a campaign. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias wield influence yet risk nationalist backlash and sanctions. The Houthis have demonstrated reach but face sustained military pressure.

—Ingrid Small is the deputy director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. She previously served as a senior analyst and analytic methodologist in the US intelligence community for over three decades.

11. What impact is this war having on US weapons stockpiles?

The problem of prioritizing near-term requirements over long-term priorities is not new. This is why the recently released National Defense Strategy rightly called for being clear-eyed about available military resources and emphasized a ruthless prioritization on homeland defense and China, along with rebuilding the US defense industrial base.

But now the Iran war is degrading US military readiness for homeland defense and China.

While the cumulative readiness impacts of this decision are difficult to quantify in the near-term, the war in Iran will likely drain inventories of critical munitions and parts, with knock-on effects across the force from training schedules to unit strength.

Major assets employed for the war in Iran that are also relevant to homeland defense and/or China include air defense systems, long-range standoff weapons, naval vessels, strategic airlift and aerial refueling, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets. Moreover, military planners must consider the resources required to monitor, deter, or fight North Korea, Russia, and China simultaneously in the event they join a Pacific conflict or a worst-case homeland defense scenario.

How quickly the United States can regenerate readiness for homeland defense and great power competition remains an open question and will depend both on the Trump administration’s decisions and factors outside the administration’s control.

—Joe Costa is the director of the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans and posture in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

12. What’s the economic impact on Americans?

Most Americans are likely to feel the war in two ways—gas prices and groceries. Nearly 20 percent of the global oil supply transits through the Strait of Hormuz and right now movement is at a standstill. It’s true that the United States is far less reliant on energy imports than it was during the previous two Gulf wars, but the nature of the energy market is that a price spike quickly impacts everyone around the world. And that’s exactly what has happened.

After some wild swings, the price of oil as of Wednesday is sitting at about ninety dollars a barrel—up from sixty dollars in December. Many Americans are driving by gas stations and seeing a first number starting with a “3.” It may not be long before that becomes a “4”—and it could get worse, depending on how long the crisis lasts. This is something that will be particularly painful for Americans who already list cost of living as one of their top concerns in surveys. The administration is taking a series of actions to try and relieve the pressure: It’s coordinating with allies to put more oil on the market. It’s providing shipping insurance to convince tankers to make the passage. And it’s even temporarily relieving some sanctions on Russian oil. But none of those steps will stop prices from surging higher as long as transit remains blocked and oil production in the Gulf continues to be a target of Iranian drones.

High gas prices would be bad enough, but expect the cost of other items to tick up, too. Everyday grocery items could soon become more expensive as goods transited across the country on trucks face higher diesel fuel costs.

All of this creates a headache for Trump’s choice to chair the Federal Reserve, Kevin Warsh. Up until the start of the conflict, inflation pressures had been cooling. But if the war continues and Warsh is confirmed, he will face a president who wants lower interest rates but an economy facing price pressures. That means all those looking for relief on mortgage rates and car loans may have to wait a little longer.

13. How is this conflict changing global energy markets?

The conflict is forcing energy markets to price in geopolitical risk that, until recently, was largely theoretical. For years, governments have assessed the energy security vulnerability posed by the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint responsible for roughly one fifth of global oil and gas flows. Today, that vulnerability is no longer a contingency exercise. Even in an otherwise well-supplied market, traders are confronting the real consequences of supply chains tied to a region capable of removing millions of barrels per day from the global market. Oil may be relatively fungible, but the world cannot quickly replace a sudden loss of fifteen million barrels per day. As the conflict persists, the economic knock-on effects compound, and Tehran may be gaining a new layer of deterrence if even the threat of short-range drone or missile attacks can trigger geoeconomic disruption by intermittently halting traffic through Hormuz.

Natural gas markets are even less flexible. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) export infrastructure takes years—often more than a decade—to move from concept to first cargo, leaving Europe and East Asia structurally exposed. Emerging economies may increasingly forgo planned gas buildouts in favor of alternative energy sources. At the same time, upstream capital may pivot toward the Western Hemisphere—particularly the United States, Guyana, and Canada—where geopolitical risk is perceived as lower. That shift could further entrench North America as a global energy powerhouse while simultaneously accelerating political support in vulnerable capitals for technologies less dependent on Hormuz, including solar and battery storage.

—Landon Derentz is vice president, energy and infrastructure, senior director, and Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. He previously served as director for energy at the White House National Security Council.

14. What happens if Kurdish groups launch an armed resistance in Iran?

The Kurdish coalition’s entry into the war could hand Tehran a political opening even as it creates a military problem. Kurdish fighters might stretch Iranian forces and expose weak control in the northwest. But Tehran could also use the specter of separatism to rally Persian nationalism, split the opposition, and frame the war as foreign-backed dismemberment rather than domestic revolt, giving itself a justification for mass arrests and violence against Kurds inside Iran.

If Kurdish forces receive sufficient support, they could serve several strategic purposes. They might pin down Iranian security forces in the west, giving space for unarmed protesters in major cities to demonstrate without being massacred. They could stretch the regime’s resources thin and reduce pressure on the Gulf states and Israel. And if the Kurds were to take and hold territory in northern Iran, they could create a buffer zone beneficial to Israel and the West.

For all these reasons, any support for the Kurds should go beyond military backing. It must include political support for Kurdish autonomy in a post-regime Iran, so that the Kurds do not end up being used once again as expendable forces.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Dispatches

Mar 6, 2026

How would a Kurdish offensive change the war in Iran?

By Atlantic Council experts

Our experts explain the goals of the various Kurdish groups the United States is reportedly backing for an attack against Iran and how their involvement could impact the wider war.

Conflict Defense Policy

15. What impact will this conflict have on China?

Beijing is in wait-and-see mode. China was Iran’s major oil buyer, but that dependence was mainly one-way: China was buying around 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports, but those purchases accounted for less than 15 percent of China’s total imports.

Chinese leaders have always known that, as a net oil importer, the straits of Hormuz and Malacca (two narrow sea lanes that ships must traverse to deliver oil from the Middle East to China) presented a major energy security risk. Beijing has long feared that Washington would target Chinese oil tankers in a future US-China crisis, and it has been working furiously to reduce those risks. Today, due to that contingency planning, China is less dependent on imported oil than many observers realize. China is working to electrify the nation’s auto fleet and making shocking progress (electric vehicles can run on coal-fired power, which China has in abundance). And Chinese leaders took advantage of the past few years of low oil prices to go on a buying spree, beefing up their domestic reserves to plan for a future supply crisis such as the one they are now facing.

Overall, China is perhaps more prepared than any other major economy to face the energy crisis that could emerge from the situation in Iran. And Chinese leaders are very good at strategic planning. They will be looking for ways to turn this situation into an opportunity. Already, for example, the United States is reportedly moving some of its most advanced missile defense units from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East—removing systems that, in Beijing’s view, directly threatened China’s security interests in the region. It is impossible to overstate the degree to which those movements are a massive win for Beijing. And if the United States ends up stuck in another Middle Eastern quagmire that cedes the Indo-Pacific to China, the wins will keep coming.

16. What impact will this conflict have on Russia?

The conflict in the Middle East is already playing into Russia’s hands.

The war in Iran has created global anxiety around the supply and availability of crude oil coming out of the Gulf. Earlier this week, oil prices surged to the highest they have been since 2022. To quell oil market fears, the Trump administration eased sanctions on Russian oil. Last Thursday, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a general license to allow for the delivery and sale of sanctioned Russian oil to India for thirty days. Meanwhile, reporting indicates that the administration is considering additional sanctions relief for Russia to enable the sale of Russian Urals.

This is a win for Russia. Russia’s economy has been in a steady decline since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Low oil prices combined with significant Western economic pressure including sanctions on oil majors and shadow fleet vessels as well as the oil price cap, reduced Russia’s energy revenue. US sanctions relief helps Putin sell Russian Urals, generating income for Moscow’s war machine.

It’s important to note that US sanctions relief does not equate to sanctions relief from the United Kingdom, the European Union, or other Western partners. If the United States eases sanctions on Russian oil but its partners do not, then there could be significant confusion in the compliance space. Financial institutions and the private sector will have to navigate a complex sanctions landscape and may risk exposing themselves to British or European sanctions if they facilitate the sale of Russian oil. Hopefully, the US administration is considering these challenges and coordinating its decisions with its coalition of partners that have sanctioned Russia in response to the war in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Qatar’s LNG capacity remains offline. Russian LNG is not sanctioned, and Russia remains a global supplier of LNG. If the Middle East conflict continues and Qatar is not able to restart its LNG infrastructure quickly, then we could expect to see Russia increasing its LNG exports in attempts to fill the gap and generate income.

—Kimberly Donovan is director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She is a former senior Treasury official and National Security Council director.

17. Will the Houthis in Yemen get involved?

Coming to Iran’s defense does not provide the Houthis with the same domestic and reputational benefits that their involvement in the Gaza war did. It also carries new risks, particularly related to the detente the Houthis have had with Saudi Arabia since 2022. The Houthis could still decide to get involved in the Iran war, especially if they calculate that it makes sense to break that detente as Saudi Arabia doubles down on its support to the Houthis’ main rival inside of Yemen, the internationally recognized Yemeni government.

There are three scenarios for Houthi involvement:

Limited strikes on Israel to demonstrate solidarity with Iran;
Limited strikes on Red Sea shipping as they seek to test whether this is a new red line for Saudi Arabia or extract new concessions, given that Riyadh is depending on the Red Sea to maintain some oil production with the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed; or
Widespread Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, Saudi Arabia, and/or ground offensives inside of Yemen aimed at finally seizing Yemen’s oil and gas resources. This third scenario risks reigniting the Yemen war after years of calm and opening up a major new front in the region.

MENASource

Mar 10, 2026

Will the Houthis join the Iran war?

By Allison Minor

Houthi involvement in the Iran war could reignite the Yemen war after four years of relative calm, with significant implications for Yemen and the region.

Conflict Iran

18. How will this conflict impact Gaza?

Hamas would not have been what it is over the past twenty years without direct financial and material support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, which turned the terror group into one of its chief proxies, given its presence at Israel’s doorstep. Despite differences in religious orientation and doctrine between the Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and the primary Shia force in the world, Tehran has effectively used Hamas to ensure that there wouldn’t be peace or long-term stability between Palestinians and Israelis, prolonging the conflict, which is foundational for the theocratic regime.

Iran helped undermine the Oslo process of the 1990s, militarize the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, and turn post-2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza into a “resistance” citadel. Thus, the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and Gaza’s subsequent decimation would not have occurred without cumulative Iranian involvement. Furthermore, the regime is constantly meddling in the West Bank, supporting rogue Palestinian militants and plots to destabilize the Palestinian Authority and encourage heavy-handed Israeli military actions, hoping this could trigger chaos and a “Third Intifada.”

A severely weakened regime in Tehran that lacks financial means and reach will likely roll back Iran’s involvement in the Palestinian issue and minimize meddling and sabotage by IRGC agents and officers. This would have various political implications, making groups like Hamas much more vulnerable and unable to rely on Iranian support for armed resistance, while weakening the pro-Iran faction within the group’s politburo.

Alternatively, there is a small but not insignificant risk that the battered and angry remnants of the regime may deploy its limited resources in support of extreme terror activities in Israel and Gaza and the West Bank by using Palestinian elements either sympathetic to Tehran’s cause or purely lured in by financial incentives. Nevertheless, Iranian-aligned elements of Hamas and other Palestinian groups will experience significant setbacks that compound the calamity faced by the Palestinian national project in the aftermath of October 7, further strengthening Israel’s position in the conflict and bolstering its desires for how Gaza’s future trajectory and prospects should unfold.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib leads Realign For Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse and develops a new policy framework for rejuvenated pro-Palestine advocacy.

19. How will the war impact US-Gulf relations?

The war will have lasting impacts on US-Gulf relations, but those impacts are still evolving in the war’s second week. In the near term, Gulf countries will seek stronger US security support, including munitions and other air defense support to help defend against Iranian attacks. They will also want clearer US security guarantees over the long term. How the United States responds to these requests will shape Gulf countries’ calculus as they grapple with whether the benefits of housing US military bases are worth the growing risks those bases bring.

Another critical factor will be what the Iranian threat looks like after US operations conclude and the degree to which the United States coordinates with its Gulf partners as it concludes its operations. Early signs suggest the Iranian regime will prove resilient, and Iran has demonstrated that it can terrorize its neighbors with low-cost drones and disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz that are difficult to eliminate with an air campaign alone. Alternatively, regime collapse and a civil war inside Iran could have lasting consequences for Gulf security. If the Iran that emerges from this war poses a long-term threat to Gulf national security and economic growth, and if Gulf countries assess that the United States is not doing enough to help them combat that threat, then it will create a crippling strain on US-Gulf relations.

—Allison Minor

20. What other countries could get involved if this war expands?

While the United States and Israel are leading operations against Iran, it is Arab Gulf countries that have found themselves on the front lines. The vast majority of Iranian missile and drone attacks have targeted Gulf countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Gulf countries are weighing how best to deal with the Iranian threat both now and in the long term, but it remains unclear if they will choose to confront Iran militarily, pursue targeted actions to restore a degree of deterrence, or seek to negotiate a new detente with Iran. Thus far, the Gulf countries have not responded militarily to Iranian attacks and have refuted claims suggesting otherwise. The UAE is reportedly considering non-kinetic means to restore deterrence with Iran, while Oman is actively pursuing negotiations.

Lebanon and Iraq are also being pulled into the conflict: Israel launched a major campaign in Lebanon following attacks from Hezbollah that included airstrikes in southern Beirut and an expanded Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government sees the campaign as a threat to its efforts to navigate Lebanon out of an economic and political crisis and is actively pursuing negotiations with Israel and the United States while demonstrating that it is willing to crack down on Hezbollah in new ways.

The United States is conducting strikes on Iran-backed militias in Iraq in response to attacks on US bases and diplomatic facilities inside the country, and the stoppage of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has forced Iraq to halt oil production. All this comes as Iraq navigates difficult government formation negotiations and threatens to disrupt an era of relative stability in the country.

—Allison Minor

The post Twenty questions (and expert answers) about the Iran war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Three lessons from Libya for the war in Iran

Frank Talbot — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 14:36:13 +0000

Debate over the US and Israeli intervention in Iran is already settling into a familiar frame: will Iran become “another Libya”? While the United States and its partners carried out sustained air campaigns inside both countries that led to the killing of their longtime leaders, there are obvious differences. Iran and Libya differ in size, institutional strength, regional position, and military capability. Treating the Libya intervention as a simple precedent risks drawing the wrong lessons.

The NATO campaign in Libya in 2011 is often remembered as a case of operational success followed by political collapse. But that framing misses the deeper problem. The campaign did not fail because NATO airpower was ineffective. It faltered because military success was never clearly connected to a viable political end state. Libya’s experience highlights three intervention design challenges that remain relevant as policymakers assess the trajectory of the Iran campaign.

Define the political end state

The Libya intervention is an example of how quickly strategy can drift when political goals are unclear or evolving during a campaign. NATO’s mission began under the objective of protecting civilians, authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. However, as the operation progressed over seven months, the campaign increasingly aligned with the objective of removing Muammar al-Qaddafi from power. Protecting civilians, coercing a regime into negotiations, and enabling regime collapse all have unique strategic designs. A coercive campaign aimed at bargaining might focus on limited military pressure and political off-ramps. A campaign that anticipates regime collapse must plan for the far harder task of establishing political authority after the conflict to ensure a degree of stability.

In Libya, that distinction was never fully resolved. Once Qaddafi fell, the coalition had no shared strategy for how Libya’s political transition would be organized, how security would be restored, or which institutions would carry the state forward. Authority quickly fragmented across militias, regional actors, and weak interim governments, leaving the post-revolutionary state unable to consolidate control.

The lesson for the Iran war is not about regime change itself. It is about clarity of purpose. If military operations aim to coerce Iran’s leadership, policymakers must define the conditions under which pressure stops and negotiation begins. If military action risks destabilizing the regime more fundamentally, then the question of political succession and institutional continuity cannot be treated as an afterthought. Then Major General David Petraeus’s dictum during the Iraq war, “Tell me how this ends,” remains an appropriate question to consider.

Align the coalition’s goals

Coalition politics can shape the trajectory of an intervention as much as military capability. In Libya, NATO presented a unified front during the air campaign, but participating states held different views about the campaign’s purpose and limits. Some governments treated the intervention as a narrowly defined civilian protection mission, while others saw it as a pathway toward removing Qaddafi.

These differences did not prevent military coordination, but they complicated strategic alignment. Coalition members pursued different lines of effort, and responsibility for planning Libya’s political stabilization remained diffuse. Regional endorsement from the Arab League helped legitimize the intervention, yet the endorsement did not resolve disagreements among intervening powers about the campaign’s long-term goals.

For the Iran intervention, coalition management extends beyond military interoperability. The United States, Israel, and any supporting international partners must align on what success actually looks like. If one actor seeks deterrence, another seeks coercive bargaining, and another hopes the campaign weakens the regime beyond repair, strategy will inevitably drift.

Control escalation

The Libya campaign also illustrates both the power and the limits of airpower. NATO air strikes were effective in halting Qaddafi’s advances and shifting the battlefield balance toward opposition forces. From a purely operational standpoint, the campaign achieved its immediate objectives. Yet tactical success did not produce a stable political outcome. In Libya, the military campaign accelerated regime collapse without establishing a credible framework for what would replace it.

Interventions that rely heavily on airpower also face a familiar escalation dilemma. Once outside powers intervene, the logic of the campaign often shifts toward securing decisive outcomes on the ground. As intervening powers relied on Libyan rebel forces to sustain military pressure on the regime, those actors gained leverage within the coalition’s strategy. External support strengthened particular militias and factions, shaping the political trajectory of the conflict.

The central question for the Iran intervention is whether military operations are embedded in a strategy that manages escalation and defines credible stopping points. Without clear political limits, even a limited campaign can expand beyond its original objectives.

Designing the Iran intervention

Libya’s central lesson is not that intervention inevitably leads to instability, nor that airpower is strategically ineffective. The deeper lesson is that military effectiveness cannot compensate for weak intervention design and understanding of politics. When outside powers use force to shape political outcomes, they inherit broader strategic responsibilities and unstable politics. They must define the political end state they seek, align coalition partners around a shared strategy, and establish credible escalation controls while considering how military pressure will interact with the political institutions that must ultimately sustain order.

The current debate about Iran would benefit from focusing on those questions. Whether Iran resembles Libya is ultimately beside the point. What matters is whether policymakers have absorbed the intervention design lessons from the Libya experience. Military operations can alter the trajectory of a conflict, but without a strategy that connects military pressure to political order, tactical success can quickly give way to strategic uncertainty.

Frank Talbot is a nonresident senior fellow with the North Africa Program within the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He previously served as the Middle East and North Africa team lead in the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and managed the economic/sanctions file for the State Department’s Libya Desk.

The post Three lessons from Libya for the war in Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Beirut: Is this Hezbollah’s ‘last war’ with Israel?

Nicholas Blanford — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 14:35:16 +0000

BEIRUT—Following the inconclusive end of the month-long Hezbollah-Israel conflict in 2006, Hezbollah fighters began referring to the “last war with Israel,” a climactic future confrontation in which there would be no restrictions on the use of force and from which only one winner would emerge. When Hezbollah launched its conflict with Israel on October 8, 2023, there was an initial fear in Lebanon that this was the beginning of the long-awaited “final war.” After nearly a month of border clashes, then Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah made it clear in his first speech that the “support front” for Hamas in Gaza was but one battle “on the road to Jerusalem” and not a final confrontation.

However, the ongoing US-Israeli attacks on Iran and the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have changed the calculus. Hezbollah is now embarking on what fighters and others close to the organization describe as the “last war,” and the group is fully committed to a long and painful confrontation with Israel. “There won’t be another one after this. Either we win or they win,” a veteran Hezbollah source told me.

Hezbollah entered the war in the early hours of March 2 by firing several rockets from an area north of the Litani River, targeting an Israeli military base near Haifa. Curiously, there is a growing conviction that the decision to join battle was not made by Hezbollah’s political leadership. Instead, it may have been coordinated directly between the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Islamic Resistance, Hezbollah’s armed element. This was confirmed to me by several people close to and inside Hezbollah.

According to a diplomatic source, as soon as reports of the initial rocket fire spread, a senior Lebanese official contacted Hezbollah’s political leaders and asked if they were responsible. The response was a hesitant “maybe.” The official urged Hezbollah to issue a statement denying responsibility. Hezbollah agreed, wrote a statement, and sent it to the official for approval. But by the time the official returned the statement, Hezbollah informed him that it was too late and that the Islamic Resistance had released its own statement confirming responsibility for the cross-border attack. The anecdote indicates that Hezbollah’s political leadership may have been unaware in advance of the rocket attack into Israel.

The decision to strike

Although Khamenei’s assassination in the opening hours of the war on Iran was a shock for Hezbollah, there was no indication that it was planning an imminent retaliation. Even Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem’s statement mourning the loss of Khamenei contained no threats of revenge, only pledges to follow the supreme leader’s path.

Emerging differences between the Islamic Resistance and Qassem, who was elected secretary-general in October 2024 following the death of Nasrallah, have been growing more apparent for some time. Before the latest US-Israeli operation in Iran, Qassem seemed to want to steer Hezbollah in a more Lebanon-centric direction. He had, for example, focused attention on restructuring Hezbollah, centralizing the decision-making process, and tightening security. He had also taken steps to reduce the size of the Islamic Resistance, sideline officials who were close to Nasrallah, and promote figures with more of a political than religious, security, or military background. In part, these efforts were an attempt to streamline an organization that has grown too large and unwieldy, and thus vulnerable to penetration by Israeli intelligence. Another reason was to strengthen Hezbollah’s domestic position at a time of unprecedented pressure due to the battering it received in the 2023–24 conflict and the Lebanese government’s decision this past August to have Hezbollah disarmed.

My Hezbollah source emphasized that Qassem is a pragmatist who seems to adhere more closely to the line of Imam Hassan than his younger brother Imam Hussein, both of whom are historical figures revered by Shias. The description requires a brief history lesson to understand its import. Imam Hassan was the second caliph after the assassination of his father, Ali. He struck an agreement with his enemy Muawiya, the governor of Syria, in which he relinquished the title of caliph to Muawiya in exchange for a treaty intended to preserve the peace. Shia tradition interprets Imam Hassan’s decision as a strategic and moral choice to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. The agreement outlived Imam Hassan and Muawiya but was breached by the latter’s son, Yazid, spurring Imam Hussein to launch his doomed uprising that culminated in his death and that of his companions at the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD.

Comparing Qassem to Imam Hassan suggested that the Hezbollah leader might have preferred to avoid entanglement in a war with Israel that would prove highly destructive for Lebanon. Hezbollah’s Shia support base in Lebanon would likely bear the brunt of any major conflict, and it could prove existential for the organization as a viable political, let alone military, entity.

Much of this is now moot; Hezbollah has entered the conflict and will have to let the chips fall where they may. The reaction of the Lebanese government to the launching of rockets into Israel came quickly. The cabinet held an emergency meeting within hours and banned all Hezbollah’s military and security activities. Implementing this decision is another matter, and any serious moves in that direction may not occur until the current conflict is over. Nevertheless, the unprecedented step underlined the government’s sense of frustration and anger that Lebanon has been dragged into a fresh conflict not of its choosing.

“An existential battle”

In his first comments on entering the war, Qassem, setting aside any presumed private misgivings, played down the linkage to the war on Iran and the assassination of Khamenei. Instead, he said Hezbollah’s actions were the result of its patience being exhausted after fifteen months of Israeli occupation in parts of south Lebanon, and as Israeli forces continue near-daily air strikes against his organization’s cadres and facilities. Qassem added that war was “an existential battle” and that “surrender is not an option.”

Sources within and close to Hezbollah tell me that the organization has committed as many as thirty thousand fighters to the battle, some of them drawn from the elite Radwan unit currently deployed in south Lebanon. They are well trained, motivated, and eager to fight. Many fighters had grown frustrated at Hezbollah’s policy of “strategic patience” by turning the other cheek to Israel’s repeated attacks. The existential nature of this conflict for the Iranian regime and possibly for Hezbollah has helped galvanize ideological and religious sentiment to drive the fighters onwards. A letter addressed to the fighters this past week from the leadership of the Islamic Resistance was filled with references to “Karbala” and “jihad” to inspire the cadres. The letter urged the fighters to battle “the tyrants of this age—the killers of prophets and saints, the ‘Great Satan’ America and the cancerous tumor ‘Israel,’” and to fight their enemy “like the self-sacrificing fighters of Karbala.”

So far, Hezbollah’s operations are following a similar pattern to the 2023–24 conflict: confronting Israeli troops on the ground in southern Lebanon, and firing rockets, precision-guided missiles, and suicide drones across the border at targets in Israel. In the previous confrontation in 2023–24, Hezbollah fought with one hand tied behind its back because the Iranians refused to allow the organisation to employ its full arsenal of precision-guided missiles in sufficient numbers to have an effect, a source of great bitterness among the cadres at the time. However, in this battle, there are believed to be no restrictions on the weaponry and tactics that can be used. On March 9, Hezbollah said that it had fired a barrage of precision-guided missiles at a satellite communications station belonging to the Israeli army’s Cyber Defense and Communications Division in the Ella Valley, ninety-five miles south of the border. Two of the missiles struck the site and caused significant damage, judging from footage on social media, in what was Hezbollah’s deepest ever attack into Israel.

At this stage, it is unlikely that Hezbollah is considering cross-border raids into Israel, a tactic for which the Radwan Brigade had trained but is today far harder to achieve given the Israeli troop presence inside Lebanese territory.

Hezbollah’s strategy, likely in coordination with Iran, appears to be to inflict as much pain on Israel for as long as possible in the hope that a settlement is reached between the warring parties that essentially leaves the regime in Tehran in place. Where that result would leave Hezbollah remains to be seen.

The response from Israel

This past week, Israel issued large-scale evacuation warnings for dozens of towns and villages in south Lebanon, both north and south of the Litani River, as well as for the southern suburbs of Beirut. The latter evacuation order on March 5 caused panic and massive traffic jams across Beirut as tens of thousands of residents attempted to flee ahead of a series of Israeli air strikes. Initial Israeli ground operations suggest an intention to deepen an existing buffer zone the army maintains adjacent to the Blue Line, the United Nations term for Lebanon’s southern border.

Whether the Israelis push further into Lebanon, possibly as far as the Litani River, remains to be seen. Such a step would require a significant military effort and risk an increase in casualties. The area is too large for Israel to occupy for any length of time, which suggests that it may prefer to employ airpower and artillery to destroy populated areas rather than deploy ground forces in large numbers. After all, in the previous conflict in the so-called Sixty-Six-Day War in October and November 2024, the Israeli military was modest in its territorial reach. Mainly special forces units ventured no further than five miles into Lebanese territory, moving on foot, with tanks playing fire-support roles. These operations concentrated on dynamiting villages immediately adjacent to the Blue Line. The geography of south Lebanon, with its steep hills and wooded valleys, is not advantageous for armored columns, as the Israelis have learned to their cost in the past. This lesson could now weigh against a more ambitious push into Lebanon.

It is far too soon to predict with any certainty when and how this war will end. Its fate is intertwined with the convolutions of the ongoing conflict with Iran. But even if the Iran war draws to some form of closure, the Hezbollah-Israel front may well continue until Israel is satisfied that Hezbollah can no longer exist as a military force.

One thing is for sure, however: the Hezbollah that emerges from this war will not be the Hezbollah that entered it.

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Foe or friend? US-Turkey bilateral relations seem set to improve as interests align

Rich Outzen — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Few alliance relationships generate as much public drama as US-Turkish ties. In the roughly seventy-five years since Turkish accession to NATO there have been ups and downs between Washington and Ankara, with the past twenty years marked by particularly sharp differences over regional policy and frequent bouts of public criticism and recriminations. President Trump’s second term has brought a positive turn in tone and optics—but there are still widespread perceptions in both capitals that the “other” ally is at best unreliable and perhaps more foe than friend.

Mutually antagonistic narratives have served domestic political purposes in both countries and have become something of a staple in the age of populist democracy of the twenty-first century. Yet the two countries rely on each other extensively in matters of trade, diplomacy, and security. State-to-state relationships are sometimes smoothed over in public but fractious in practice; the US-Turkish dyad is the rarer obverse: disagreeable in public for domestic audiences while resting on a high degree of alignment and collaboration.

Where do bilateral relations go when trust is low, mutual perception negative, but operational collaboration frequent? The answer depends less on rhetoric or polemical discourse and more on alignment of practical interests: We therefore must clear away the smoke of domestically motivated rhetoric to instead focus on mutual benefit. If two states pursue compatible goals and interests, room remains to balance internal political benefits with geopolitical cooperation in a form of complex interdependence. Whether that is the case for the United States and Turkey is a matter of substantial interest, given the weight that both have in the international system and the substantial number of crises and international matters that affect them.

Rorschach test

Articulating interests is more of a political than an academic exercise. It also presents something of a Rorschach test: If you ascribe ideological frames as determinative of status for Ankara (e.g., neo-Ottomanism, Muslim Brotherhood Islamism, reckless aggression) it brings you to one implied set of Turkish interests. If you accept declarative policy as the whole story you get another implied set. It is similarly the case for the United States: If you assume hegemonic interests are the primary driver, it takes you down a certain path; however, that road shifts significantly between and sometimes within presidential administrations. American interests as viewed by Trump differ significantly from those of his predecessor. Yet pattern analysis over time—observed behaviors and statements toward particular goals—tell us how specific a US president and his Turkish counterpart actually perceive the degree to which their interests overlap.

As an imperfect but useful generality, we can ascribe the following traits to Turkish foreign policy: multiaxial engagement and balance-seeking, nationalistic, hard power/realpolitik, traditionally but conditionally attached to the status quo. For decades, Ankara has sought to maximize autonomy while pressing for positive coalitions, where possible. For most of the current century, the United States has focused on maintaining a privileged or primary position in the international system, leavened increasingly with a dose of parsimony and pragmatism, but resting on what might be called enduring counter-revisionism (still in the tradition of US naval strategist and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan).

Ankara and Washington have demonstrated a generally cooperative approach across numerous regional and global issues in recent decades because their top-line approaches are compatible: one a retrenching-but-potent leading power, the other a rising middle power, both disinclined to establish imperial arrangements or to allow others to do so. A brief review of these issues illustrates this general (if imperfect) alignment by assigning numeric values reflecting relative alignment of strategic and diplomatic approaches between the two. Any such numbers game comes with attendant risk of overgeneralizing and missing some context, but statecraft and policy analysis at the higher levels of abstraction unavoidably entail some risk in this regard. So the numbers below are presented as suggestive rather than determinative.

In the table below, full interest alignment equals 1, partial interest alignment 0.5, neither alignment nor friction 0, friction -0.5, counteralignment -1. Descriptions of the cases follow the table.

Table 1: Sizing up US-Turkish alignment and friction on sixteen issues

Regional matter	Turkish position	US position	Assessment	Score
Ukraine/Black Sea	Ukraine survives	Ukraine survives	Full alignment	+1
Caucasus	Peace/prosperity deals	Iran, Russia lose influence	Full alignment	+1
Central Asia	Middle Corridor/ Organization of Turkic States	Russia, China influence limited	Full alignment	+1
Africa	Greater engagement	Russia, China influence limited	Full alignment	+1
Syria	Stable, unified	Stable, unified	Full alignment	+1
Iraq	Stable, unified, not under Iranian control	Stable, unified, not under Iranian control	Full alignment	+1
Gaza	Peace/Israel out	Peace/Hamas out	Partial alignment	+0.5
Energy	Diversify supply	Diversify supply/ marginalize Iran and Russia	Partial alignment	+0.5
US global leadership	US leadership conditional	US leadership but with counterbalances	Partial alignment	+0.5
Trade/defense trade	Autonomous Turkey, sales both ways	Turkey buys more/ doesn’t compete with US firms	Partial alignment	+0.5
European Union	Key trade partner, accession woes	Key trade partner, perceived as exploitative	Alignment but not cooperation	0
Eastern Mediterranean	Greater role for Turkey	Protect Greece	Friction	-0.5
Iran	Deterred but engaged, stable	Regime replaced or weakened	Friction	-0.5
Sanctions	Only multilateral	Multilateral and Minilateral	Friction	-0.5
Israel	Constrain Israel	Fully support Israel	Friction	-1
Venezuela	Engaged	Deterred/punished	Unalignment	-1

Black Sea/Ukraine: Both sides wish to see the war end with Ukrainian independence intact; neither recognizes Russian claims over Crimea or Donbass, though Washington has signaled willingness to negotiate the status of territories Russia partially or fully occupies at present. Some differences exist regarding Black Sea access: The United States might like to have access for its own ships and more broadly for a NATO presence and routine access, while Turkey has preferred littoral NATO states do the lifting and a strict interpretation of the Montreux Convention; but neither wants a Russian conquest of Ukraine’s coastline. For a Trump administration interested in some compromise deal with Moscow, the Turkish position is complementary.

Caucasus/Russia: While the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) offers wins for the region and the United States, the Armenian position is a wildcard with elections approaching. Should Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan get the boot in parliamentary elections (to be held no later than mid-June 2026), the United States may tack back to a position that pressures Azerbaijan and marginalizes Ankara. Russian and Iranian pushback on a deal that opens the region to trade on US-friendly terms can be expected. Interest alignment here between Ankara and Washington is solid, though the prospects for realized gain uncertain.

Central Asia: The TRIPP shows US interest in opening up more trade to Central Asia and balancing against outright domination of the region by Russia or China. The Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States both have value in this regard—and have generated more interest from the Trump administration than its predecessor. Central Asia has not traditionally been an area of high investment for the US government; however, energy companies are interested, so having an ally be more engaged is an advantage.

Africa: US investment and engagement in Africa has lagged, but Washington has concerns about Chinese or Russian influence on the continent. Meanwhile, Turkey has dramatically increased its diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Africa over the past two decades. In countries like Somalia and Libya, Turkish presence has lent heft to US diplomatic and counterterror initiatives. Africa demonstrates the complementarity of having compatible goals but varying levels of commitment.

Syria: Trump has made clear his policy that Syria will be stabilized and maintained as a unitary state and that Ahmed al-Sharaa is an acceptable figure to lead. This comports with Turkish policy, despite Israel’s objections. The assignment of Trump confidant Thomas J. Barrack Jr. as special envoy and positive statements from the US-Turkish working group on Syria have shown close convergence on Syria policy, a remarkable turnaround from the previous decade. The January 2026 agreement to reintegrate northeast Syria with the Syrian Transitional Government was a sign that this alignment was proving determinative on the ground.

Iraq: Washington wants a stable Iraq that is: not dominated by Iran; oriented to Western energy markets more than Iranian or Chinese; and working amicably with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Iraq may not fulfill all those interests, but Ankara shares them, and the Development Road project to foster Eastern trade with Europe provides a vehicle for all three countries to earn profits while tightening Baghdad’s ties to Western economies. The presence of PKK fighters in northern Iraq remains a point of friction, but ongoing negotiations to disarm the PKK – and US support for those talks – has taken helped reduce that friction.

Gaza: Washington and Ankara both pressed Israel and Hamas, respectively, to accept a ceasefire deal, return of hostages, and military withdrawal from Gaza in return for disarmament. While the truce remains shaky as of late 2025 and the end state Trump and Erdoğan have in mind may differ somewhat, the coordination on diplomatic efforts has been unambiguous.

Iran: There is divergence here between the hard line taken in Washington toward the Islamic Republic and the modus vivendi approach in Ankara. While Ankara may not want regime change in Tehran, and wants to protect trade with its neighbor, the Turkish government has no illusions about Tehran’s destabilizing regional behavior and shares an interest in deterring it. Ankara has tightened enforcement of multilateral sanctions on the Iranian nuclear program—partially redressing a long-standing US grievance with Ankara. The launch of Israel-U.S. Operation Epic Fury to destroy Iran’s power projection and nuclear capabilities has driven fears of instability and chaos along the Turkish border, turning this from an area of some overlap into an area of friction.

Energy: Ankara’s energy diplomacy has sought to position the country as a hub for multidirectional energy transit and major new gas, oil, and nuclear deals have been signed with Washington. US pressure to decrease oil purchases from Russia has created some strain, as Ankara cannot shift to alternate suppliers as quickly as it can with gas.

US global leadership: American leadership that cooperates with Ankara on key strategic objectives, praising in public and transacting in private, plays like music to the ears of Turks. This contrasts greatly with the constraining approach Turkish leaders called for regarding perceived American overreach in Iraq, Syria, and other regions over the past two decades, including demands to reform the United Nations to lessen the power of the five permanent members. Still, this middle power and the great power have imperfect but positive alignment at present.

Trade/defense trade: The relatively light 15 percent tariff levied on Turkish goods and the $100 billion shared goal for bilateral trade are clear indicators of positive intentions. But defense trade is thorny, with a congressional role and some competition between rising Turkish defense players and US prime defense contractors.

European Union: Ankara and Washington remain at odds with Brussels ideologically and stylistically, while maintaining strong strategic and trade ties with numerous members states. Yet the tensions stem from different sources: Turkish desire to enter the bloc and the American administration’s desire to end what it perceives as the EU’s exploitative trade and security practices.

Eastern Mediterranean: The continuing friction between Greece and Turkey redounds against US-Turkish bilateral relations—a problem that continues to play out in the region and in Congress.

Sanctions: The divergences are clear regarding imposition: Ankara supports multilateral but generally not unilateral sanctions and enforcement, whereas the Turkish track record looks spotty from Washington’s perspective.

Israel: Ankara and Jerusalem pursued a rapprochement in the months before October 7, 2023; since then, rancor, acrimony, and mutual suspicion have become the norm. While regional competition over Syria, the Palestinians, and other issues can be managed, related tensions spill over into US-Turkish bilateral relations in a major way—and that seems likely to persist.

Venezuela: Erdoğan’s quixotic friendship with President Maduro had its roots in terms of oil sales and multipolarity theory, but was a clear point of policy divergence as Trump upped the pressure level on Caracas. With the early 2026 arrest of Maduro and muted response from Ankara, this seems likely to be a decreasing source of tension in U.S.-Turkish relations.

A clear trend and policy takeaway

In conclusion, this assessment sketch of sixteen complicated cases of regional and global policy matters yields eleven that demonstrate substantial bilateral alignment, four with significant unalignment, and one somewhere in between. The aggregate score by the simple rubric of “words and deeds reflect alignment” was positive (+4.5 – with the caveat that these numbers are illustrative but rooted more in subjective alignment rather than formal quantitative criteria). An honest critic might quibble with individual ratings and the framing of the cases or argue for the salience of other matters. Yet sixteen is a reasonable sample size, the thought exercise is revealing, and the trend clear: more alignment than friction overall.

The policy takeaway is equally clear: maintaining a working relationship is vital for both countries. Those arguing for punitive approaches (by the United States) or hedging (by Turkey) disregard potential mutual benefits as well as both opportunity costs and implementation costs. Managing differences and satisfying domestic sentiment require an adaptive response from policy elites in both countries, but the record of cooperation in 2025 indicates that the pragmatism of both presidents fits the moment—and the alignment.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.

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Navigating change: US-Turkish defense relations in 2026

Atlantic Council Turkey Program — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Foreword

As we enter the second year of the Trump Administration, US-Turkish relations and developments in regions critical to both have been dramatic and fast-paced. Events in Syria and Libya are trending towards state consolidation and strategic opportunity for both Washington and Ankara, while the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine at NATO’s doorstep, the volatile situation in Gaza, and the unfolding war in Iran present challenges both sides seek to navigate in complementary ways.

Technological and geopolitical developments have increased the need for close consultation between the NATO allies, and bilateral coordination has been evident across a range of issues. Yet strategic cooperation remains constrained by a variety of factors. This issue of the Defense Journal takes up several of the regional, military-technical, and policy issues of interest to readers in both countries and to those tracking US-Turkish relations. In an era of positive relations between the two countries’ presidents, parliamentary relations and policy influence also carry great weight—and in this issue we are pleased to have interviews with US Congressman James Walkinshaw and the chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Turkish Parliament Fuat Oktay to add the legislative perspective to bilateral strategic ties.

Rich Outzen and Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council Turkey Program co-managing editors

Articles

Foe or friend? US-Turkey bilateral relations seem set to improve as interests align

By Rich Outzen

Is Syria on the right path?

By Asaad Sam Hanna

Q&A with Rep. James Walkinshaw (VA-11)

By Atlantic Council Turkey Program

Q&A with Turkish Member of Parliament Fuat Oktay

By Atlantic Council Turkey Program

Ankara and Washington can build on recent groundwork to improve relations and stability

By Murat Yeşiltaş

As Ankara rethinks its Libyan policy, the Haftar family stands to gain

By Karim Mezran and Alissa Pavia

Air defense in the age of saturation: Europe after the post-Cold War peace dividend illusion and Turkey’s Steel Dome

By Can Kasapoğlu

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council Turkey Program‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International and Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council; former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Assistant Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Permanent Representative to NATO

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Under Secretary of Defense

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Western leaders must abandon false hopes of negotiated peace with Putin

Oleksandr Merezhko — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 21:35:07 +0000

For more than twelve years, Ukraine has been defending itself against an escalating Russian invasion that seeks to erase the Ukrainian state from the map of Europe and overturn the existing world order. So far, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield or break the Ukrainian nation’s resistance. Despite this lack of progress, however, he shows no sign of compromising on his maximalist goals.

Many in the West are still in denial over the scale of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia and continue to believe a negotiated settlement is the only realistic option to end the war. This is dangerously delusional. In reality, attempting to make deals with Putin today is as shortsighted as seeking to bargain with Adolf Hitler at the height of World War II. In the 1940s, the allies rejected that idea because they recognized Hitler would never stop and had to be defeated. There is a desperate need for such clarity today.

For the past year, Putin has sabotaged US-led peace talks with endless stalling tactics and diplomatic distractions. It should now be obvious that the Russian ruler is only engaging in negotiations for cynical reasons. First, he seeks to avoid further pressure from the United States. Second, he wishes to buy time to continue destroying Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure. Third, he intends to divide the West and deter further support for Kyiv.

Putin signals his lack of interest in peace by making absurd demands that no Ukrainian government could possibly accept. He calls for Ukraine to surrender the country’s most heavily fortified region without a fight, despite the fact that the Russian army has been unable to capture this territory for more than a decade. He demands a Russian veto over security guarantees for postwar Ukraine, while insisting on the right to interfere in Ukrainian domestic affairs. He questions the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and calls for wartime elections, despite having systematically dismantled Russia’s own fledgling democracy during his twenty-six year reign.

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Putin’s uncompromising position makes perfect sense when viewed through the prism of Russian imperialism. The peace terms being offered by Trump, which would allow Moscow to retain the approximately 20 percent of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation, may seem generous, but the Kremlin dictator knows he cannot accept anything less than Kyiv’s complete capitulation. For Putin, the survival of a sovereign, democratic Ukraine would be a political death sentence. Russian audiences would view such a deal as a defeat of historic proportions. Rather than securing his legacy as one of Russia’s greatest rulers, Putin would be condemned as the man who lost Ukraine.

In practical terms, Putin has also come to depend on the war. Over the past four years, it has become the main source of his legitimacy and power. The Russian economy now relies heavily on war-related spending. Russian society as a whole has undergone a radicalization, making it possible to impose new levels of censorship, repression, and propaganda. Without the war, this entire edifice could collapse.

Then there is the issue of Russia’s military veterans. Almost a million men are currently serving in Ukraine. Most have been brutalized by a daily ration of war crimes amid staggering casualties. The vast majority are also now accustomed to receiving salaries far in excess of anything they could hope to earn in Russia. Putin is no doubt painfully aware that if he demobilizes these damaged and dangerous men, he would be unleashing a destabilizing force that could cause chaos across Russia. The only way to prevent this is by extending the invasion indefinitely.

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None of this means that peace is impossible. In order to secure a sustainable settlement, however, current efforts to appease Putin must end. It is a grave mistake to treat the aggressor and the victim as equals, and an even bigger blunder to pressure the victim into further concessions. Bringing Putin out of international isolation only emboldens him. In Putin’s zero-sum world, goodwill gestures are signs of weakness. It is no coincidence that as calls for a compromise deal have grown louder over the past year, Russia’s bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian population has intensified.

Western leaders must instead send an unambiguous message to Moscow that they are not prepared to reward Russian aggression. The objective should be to raise the costs of the invasion for the Kremlin until continuing the war poses risks to Putin’s grip on power inside Russia. This goal is realistic. With Putin’s army struggling to achieve any major breakthroughs in Ukraine despite suffering catastrophic casualties, rumblings of discontent are growing. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the Russian economy is beginning to show signs of serious strain. Now is the time to increase the pressure on Putin.

Tightening economic sanctions is critical. This means tougher measures against Russia’s energy exports along with Putin’s shadow fleet of tankers. It also means implementing secondary sanctions against those who fund the war by purchasing Russian oil and gas. Recent decisions to relax sanctions temporarily in response to the US war in Iran and spiraling global energy prices are a step in the wrong direction that threatens to rescue the Russian economy and fuel international instability. Putin will not stop the invasion until he runs out of money.

Kyiv’s partners must also provide Ukraine with the military backing to defeat and deter Russia. This should include credible long-term commitments that dash any Russian hopes of outlasting the West in Ukraine. Western countries must overcome their crippling fear of escalation and provide Ukraine with the long-range weapons that will make it possible to strike deep inside Russia. This will allow Ukraine to target Putin’s war machine and create the kind of deterrence that could prevent future repeats of the current invasion.

If Putin is unable to advance in Ukraine while facing mounting economic costs and escalating destruction on the home front, he may finally have to accept that continuing the war poses very real dangers for the stability of his regime. At that point, genuine peace talks could prove possible.

Subsequent negotiations must focus on protecting Ukraine against further Russian aggression. It is vital that any security guarantees transcend political cycles in Western capitals and leave Putin in no doubt that a renewed attack on Ukraine could spark the collapse of the Russian Federation.

The best security guarantees of all remain NATO membership or nuclear status. If these options are currently not feasible, Ukraine needs to receive clear commitments from its major partners that spell out the responses Russia can expect.

Above all, Ukraine’s own armed forces must receive the necessary support to serve as the country’s ultimate security guarantee. European countries have an obvious self-interest in maintaining Ukraine’s military strength. After all, a strong Ukraine is now indispensable for Europe’s broader defense strategy as the continent confronts resurgent Russian imperialism.

Current Western efforts to broker a compromise peace with Putin are based on false assumptions and wishful thinking. This misguided approach only encourages Russia and other authoritarian regimes including Iran, China, and North Korea to pursue aggressive foreign policies. If the West wants a sustainable peace in Europe, it must work to ensure Putin’s defeat in Ukraine.

Oleksandr Merezhko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament for the Servant of the People Party and Chair of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

When Russia occupied Crimea in 2014 and shortly afterward invaded east Ukraine’s Donbas region, many observers in Washington and European capitals saw it as a shocking but limited land grab. Many accepted the narrative that Crimea and eastern Ukraine were “Russian lands,” populated by Russian speakers who supposedly wanted to be part of Russia. Some even argued that Moscow was merely responding to local preferences, albeit illegally. Even then, it was clear that this reading was dangerously wrong. In reality, Moscow was asserting a unilateral right to intervene wherever it claimed the population as compatriots, regardless of what those communities actually wanted.

The idea of protecting Russian compatriots has long served as the backbone of a broader Kremlin project aimed at redrawing borders and reasserting Russian dominance across the post‑Soviet space. Similar tactics including cultural outreach, imperialistic propaganda, the distribution of Russian passports, and military intervention, have been evident in Moldova’s Transnistria region, Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and Ukraine. This approach also poses an obvious threat to a range of other countries.

Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 confirmed that Crimea was not an exception but a pilot project. Putin’s justification for war leaned heavily on the idea of restoring Russia’s so-called historical unity and protecting Russian speakers in the Donbas region from alleged discrimination.

Alarmingly, even as Russia bombed Ukrainian cities and attempted to seize Kyiv, many Western discussions continued to treat parts of Ukraine as spaces where Russia’s claims might be partially legitimate or at least negotiable. This conceptual carve‑out has endured over the past four years, subtly shaping proposals to freeze the conflict along the current lines of control.

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The idea of a single, unified Russian people stretching across borders is less a sociological reality than a political ambition. The Kremlin has long blurred the lines between ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, non‑Russian ethnic minorities such as Abkhazians and Ossetians, and political “compatriots.” This allows Moscow to manufacture a constituency that justifies military intervention, even where Russian speakers are a minority or have no desire for Moscow’s protection.

This dynamic is visible in Ukraine today. Moscow claims to be acting on behalf of Ukraine’s Russian‑speaking communities, but in practice it has bombed, tortured, deported, and repressed these communities throughout the occupied territories. Meanwhile, millions of Ukrainians who speak Russian at home, including many in cities like Kharkiv and Odesa, have chosen to resist Russian forces, volunteer for the Ukrainian army, or flee westward, contradicting the notion that language determines loyalty.

Putin’s talk of defending compatriots is a not a minority rights policy; it is a carefully crafted propaganda script to justify military aggression. First, Moscow defines a broad, elastic category of compatriots. Then it alleges discrimination against them. The target group next receives Russian passports. Finally, the Kremlin claims a duty to intervene militarily. When international policymakers and commentators accept the vocabulary of “protection” on Moscow’s terms, they are accepting the logic of empire. After all, modern borders depend on international law not historical grievance or dubious ethnic claims.

As the largest European invasion since World War II enters a fifth year, Western policy is still constrained by the remnants of these myths. When officials suggest that a peace settlement might involve Ukraine “recognizing realities on the ground” in Crimea or the occupied east of the country, they echo the idea that these territories are somehow less Ukrainian because of their demographic and linguistic profile.

In practice, this means legitimizing and rewarding the Kremlin’s compatriot policy. Accepting this logic in Ukraine would signal that using Russian speakers and the protection of ethnic Russians as a pretext for occupation and annexation is an acceptable tool of statecraft. That message would not only entrench Russia’s gains in Ukraine; it would also open the door to similar tactics in other states from Kazakhstan to the Baltics, where Moscow could once again weaponise bogus historical narratives to justify future aggression.

To move toward real peace, Western governments need to update not only their military and economic policies, but also their mental maps. That means rejecting Russia’s imperial expansion strategy built on historical myths that foster the quiet assumption that Crimea and eastern Ukraine are “different” in ways that justify special rights for Moscow. Instead, any settlement must reflect international law and the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, rather than Putin’s imperial ambitions.

As long as the West grants tacit legitimacy to Russia’s compatriot doctrine and Putin’s claims to “historically Russian lands” in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and beyond, it will be extremely difficult to end the current war in a manner that will safeguard European security.

Dr. Agnia Grigas is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.

Will the Houthis join the Iran war?

Allison Minor — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 16:02:13 +0000

One week into the Iran war, the Houthis have not yet come to Iran’s defense but have warned in official communications that their “fingers are on the trigger.” The Houthis’ apparent reticence has been a surprise for those who view them as simply an Iranian proxy or a trigger-happy militia. Both of these descriptors are reductive—the Houthis are a highly adaptive group with both grand regional goals and unresolved domestic objectives.

Getting involved in the Iran war will not yield the same domestic and international benefits for the Houthis that attacking Israel and Red Sea shipping during the Gaza war did, and fighting in the Iran conflict could pose greater risks. The Houthis’ involvement in the Gaza war elevated them on the international stage and allowed them to capitalize on broad support among Yemenis for Palestinians at a time when their population was growing restless. But Yemenis are much more reticent about supporting Iran—a state with ample resources that many Yemenis see as yet another foreign power meddling in their country. On top of this, Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the current war means that Houthi involvement could disrupt the Saudi-Houthi détente that has been in place since 2022, potentially plunging Yemen back into an active war with Riyadh.

If the Houthis do decide to insert themselves into the Iran war, it could be because they have decided that détente is no longer in their interests. Therefore, Houthi involvement in the Iran war could reignite the Yemen war after four years of relative calm, with significant implications for Yemen and the region.

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Three scenarios for Houthi involvement in the Iran war

The lowest-risk option for the Houthis would be to resume attacks on Israel. While the vast majority of Houthi missile and drone attacks against Israel during the Gaza war were intercepted or failed to reach their target, the group has demonstrated that it can penetrate Israeli airspace. Indeed, Houthi strikes on Israel have inflicted dozens of casualties and damaged Ben Gurion Airport. This scenario would invite renewed Israeli airstrikes on Yemen, which were militarily and economically costly for the Houthis but also help rally popular domestic support. Israeli strikes against Hudaydah Port were particularly damaging for the Houthis, as the port is an essential lifeline for the import-dependent country and a source for illicit Houthi oil revenues. At the same time, the Houthis have demonstrated considerable resilience to air strikes, having now withstood heavy air campaigns for most of the past decade. While an Israeli strike killed some political leadership in Sanaa, Houthi military leadership and the true power brokers within the movement remain untouched.

The second option would be for the Houthis to resume attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, which could potentially threaten their détente with Saudi Arabia. Disrupting commercial shipping is far easier for the Houthis than striking Israel, given their strategic location along the Bab el-Mandeb maritime chokepoint. The Houthis sank multiple commercial ships during the Gaza war using a combination of drones, missiles, and manned and unmanned boats. And the risks posed by their attacks nearly halted passage through the Red Sea and Suez Canal in 2023. Attacking the Red Sea would be both more impactful and far riskier for the Houthis in 2026. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed because of the Iran war, Saudi Arabia is relying on its facilities along the Red Sea to maintain some oil exports—most of which are going to Asia and would typically transit south toward Yemen. Absent the Red Sea route, Gulf oil flows could grind to a halt after a couple more weeks of war. Given this, Saudi Arabia is likely communicating to the Houthis that attacks on Red Sea shipping are now a red line and could invite a Saudi military response. The Houthis have a tendency to test red lines, so they could conduct minor Red Sea attacks and then pull back if they determine doing so would break their détente with Saudi Arabia. Alternatively, the Houthis could seek to exploit heightened Saudi fears over disruptions in the Red Sea to extract new concessions from Riyadh.

The third and most consequential option would be for the Houthis to resume attacks on Saudi Arabia and/or the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This could potentially unfold in combination with attacks in the Red Sea and ground offensives inside of Yemen aimed at seizing control of Yemen’s oil and gas resources and weakening the internationally recognized Yemen government. In doing so, the Houthis would effectively reignite the Yemen war. If Saudi Arabia or the UAE decides to respond militarily to Iran’s attacks on civilian and economic infrastructure in both countries, the Houthis could use that retaliation to argue that it was the Gulf countries that broke the détente, not the Houthis. If the Houthis decide to go this route, they will have been driven primarily by their calculations over the situation inside of Yemen, not the war in Iran.

Shifting sands inside Yemen

The Houthis agreed to a United Nations-mediated truce with the Yemeni government in April 2022 after a series of costly Houthi offensives failed to gain control of the oil and gas resources in Yemen’s Marib governorate. While approximately 75 percent of Yemen’s roughly 35 million people live under Houthi control, the Houthis do not control any of Yemen’s oil and gas resources. The Houthis have used illicit oil sales, aggressive taxation, and a stranglehold on economic activity to fund the movement’s military buildup, but northern Yemen faces a perpetual economic crisis that threatens the viability of Houthi control over the long term. That crisis has grown more acute as Houthi detentions of aid workers and other harassment forced the World Food Programme to stop food distributions in the northern part of the country in January, leaving Houthi-controlled Yemen increasingly isolated.

The April 2022 truce and the Saudi-Houthi backchannel talks that grew out of it signaled a shift in the Houthis’ approach. After failing to secure a sustainable revenue source and cement their control over Yemen through military means, they sought instead to do so through negotiations. The Houthis remained hopeful that Saudi Arabia would force the internationally recognized Yemeni government to accept a deal that gave the Houthis control over most of the country’s resources, even after the Houthis started their Red Sea campaign and were re-designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States in March 2025. Fears over such a deal may have been one factor motivating the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) to seize territory from other government-affiliated factions in December.

Following the STC operations and amid escalating tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Saudi leadership decided to redouble its support to the internationally recognized Yemeni government, giving it hundreds of millions of dollars in new economic support and centralizing its military command. This could signal a shift in the Saudi approach: When the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the Yemeni government’s executive body, was formed in 2022, Riyadh seemed to view it as a negotiating body for future peace talks with the Houthis. Now, the Saudis are bolstering the PLC as an effective governing body in a manner that—if successful—could present a direct threat to the Houthis.

If the Houthis assess that the Saudi approach has shifted and that a deal is no longer viable, this could lead them to resume the war. The Houthis could determine that, with the Yemeni government still reconstituting and Saudi Arabia distracted by Iranian attacks, now is the time to launch a military offensive to seize Yemen’s oil and gas resources. Some Yemen analysts have begun warning that the Houthis appear to be mobilizing for a ground war, including via mass recruitment campaigns.

The consequences of reigniting the Yemen war

While Yemen remains a persistent source of regional instability, the civil war and Houthi cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been on pause for the past four years. Even before the April 2022 truce, the Saudi-led coalition had significantly scaled back its operations inside the country. Not since 2018 has Yemen witnessed large-scale conflict and coalition campaigns attempting to unseat the Houthis. If the Yemen war reignites, it would open another major front at a time when the Middle East is already reeling from war. For Yemenis, this would deepen the country’s humanitarian crisis, which would be even further exacerbated by the lack of food aid. Renewed Houthi attacks would also present a serious tactical challenge for Saudi Arabia, as Riyadh would be forced to direct already limited air defenses against attacks from both its south and the east.

By expanding the number of actors involved in intertwined conflicts across the Gulf, an active war inside Yemen could also make it significantly harder to find off-ramps and broaden the consequences of a war that is already certain to change the region for years to come.

Allison Minor is the director of the Project for Middle East Integration with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs. She previously served as US deputy special envoy for Yemen and as director for Arabian Peninsula affairs at the National Security Council.

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When the Iran operation is finished, Trump should prioritize ending the war in Ukraine

William B. Taylor — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 15:42:58 +0000

KYIV—Stopping Russia’s war on Ukraine has been the Trump administration’s highest priority foreign-policy challenge for over a year. Shortly after his inauguration, President Donald Trump began this effort in a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Since then, US officials have held a series of meetings with their Ukrainian and Russian counterparts. Yes, there have been targets of opportunity that focused US attention and resources for short periods of time, such as Venezuela and now Iran. But over the past year, the administration’s top officials have almost certainly devoted more hours to Ukraine than to any other foreign-policy issue. Trump and Putin spoke again by phone on Monday, with aides saying both Iran and Ukraine were topics of discussion. When the current Iran operation is finished, the administration should return to devoting its primary attention to ending the largest land war in Europe since World War II and finish the job.

When the US and Israeli attacks on Iran began on February 28, I was on a train leaving Kyiv as part of an Atlantic Council delegation. It was for me the latest of more than a dozen visits to Ukraine since February 2022. After a week of conversations with Ukrainian friends, soldiers, officials, and former officials in Odesa and Kyiv, I left impressed with their guarded optimism and unguarded determination to prevail in this war.

At the same time, it was clear immediately after the US strikes began that the Iranian operation would absorb resources and top-level attention for the duration of the operation. But when it ends, there will be a great opportunity for US President Donald Trump to help end the fighting in Ukraine.

Freedom’s name

After enduring the coldest winter in memory and the most intense Russian attacks of the entire war, Ukrainians had welcomed the end of winter and a perceptible shift in momentum on the battlefield. According to Ukrainian generals I spoke with, successful counterattacks on the southern end of the thousand-kilometer conflict zone had regained hundreds of square kilometers of territory, in part because Elon Musk had denied Starlink communications to Russian military forces. A homegrown, long-range Ukrainian cruise missile had severely damaged a Russian military production center in Votkinsk, a thousand kilometers deep into Russia, causing panic among Russians. Unmanned interceptors have blunted Russian attack drones and are now being deployed in the Middle East to defend against Iranian attacks—attacks that are being aided by Russian intelligence, which is helping Iran target US military facilities.

Some Ukrainians I spoke with held out hope that the ongoing negotiations among Ukraine, Russia, and the United States could lead to a cease-fire. Most, however, were skeptical that the Russians were serious.

The author meets with Ukrainian soldiers and staff at a rehabilitation clinic in Kyiv, Ukraine, on February 25, 2026. (Credit: RECOVERY)

Ukrainian soldiers expressed grim determination to hold off and even push back Russian attacks. They appreciated the US and European support that had sustained them for the past four years. One captain described a moment of panic when, alone in a trench on the contact line, he was unable to contact his supporting command and felt momentarily abandoned. In that moment, he questioned whether all their sacrifices had been worth it. It was an intensely personal account, but he was also making a larger point that US support—military, financial, political, and moral—was supremely important to Ukrainians’ ability to continue defending their country. Left unsaid was the understanding that US support enables Ukrainians to defend the rest of Europe and vital US national interests against an aggressive Russia.

While the Trump administration might pay less attention to a principled rationale for supporting Ukraine—they have other strong reasons—one young woman nonetheless put it clearly and forcefully; she said, “Freedom’s name is Ukraine.”

Trump’s opportunity

The US president is uniquely capable of ending the war in Ukraine, the most difficult conflict he has addressed. And while progress over the past year has at times been slow, Putin knows that Trump has the leverage to force him to stop the killing. Putin fears long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles coming into Ukrainian hands. Trump seriously considered sending these weapons to the Ukrainians last fall and could still do so—or, even better, he could allow the Ukrainians to manufacture these weapons themselves.

There are other steps Trump could take, too. Despite a temporary reprieve for Russia’s oil revenues due to the oil price spike caused by the Iran war, Putin is terrified by the prospect of resumed pressure on the oil exports that fund his war on Ukraine. The Trump administration has already levied tariffs against India for buying Russian oil, sanctioned the two largest Russian oil companies, and seized Russian-flagged oil tankers used to evade sanctions on Russian oil exports (as have the French, Belgians, and British). Trump could use this military and financial leverage to force Putin to stop the war.

Europe’s moment

With or without Russian agreement on a cease-fire, the Ukrainians will need the ability to deter and defeat, if necessary, another Russian invasion. After all, Putin has blatantly disregarded previous promises not to invade Ukraine. The first line of defense will be the Ukrainian army—which is trained, equipped, supported, and funded with Western help. The French and British, the two nuclear-armed European powers, are leading the planning for a military force to be deployed on Ukrainian territory, which has the support of more than thirty other nations. Moreover, Trump has agreed to back up this European-led reassurance force with air power based in Eastern European NATO nations. The current thinking is that this “coalition of the willing” would deploy in western Ukraine after a cease-fire. But since the Russians refuse to negotiate seriously and a formal cease-fire might not be possible, the coalition should deploy this force now.

Because they understand the threat from an imperialistic Russian autocrat more immediately than the United States, the Europeans have augmented their military planning with impressive financial support to Ukraine. Stymied so far by a couple of European Union (EU) member states in the effort to use hundreds of billions of dollars in Russian frozen assets to support Ukraine, a majority of EU nations plan to borrow ninety billion euros to keep Ukraine solvent and able to purchase weapons, including from US defense manufacturers, for another two years. That $200-plus billion in blocked Russian assets also remain available if the bloc were to agree to use it.

The Europeans are also offering Ukraine another security guarantee—membership in the EU on an accelerated basis, perhaps as early as next year.

The Ukrainians continue to defend themselves and the rest of Europe from a hostile Russia. The Europeans are stepping up both militarily and financially. Trump has the unique ability to force Putin to stop the killing. When the Iran operation ends, he could reestablish himself as a man of peace by using that leverage to end the war in Ukraine.

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How would a Kurdish offensive change the war in Iran?

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 22:40:39 +0000

“I’d be all for it.” That’s what US President Donald Trump said Thursday when asked about the prospect of an offensive by Kurds in Iran, with reports swirling that the United States and Israel are arming the ethnic minority group in an effort to put further pressure on the Iranian regime. The idea of armed Kurdish groups entering the war launched last weekend by the United States and Israel raises all sorts of questions. We turned to our experts for answers drawing on their decades of experience in the region.

1. Who are the Iranian Kurds, and what is their relationship with the Iranian regime?

The Kurds are an ethnic minority group with a distinct language and culture that make up 10-12 percent of Iran’s population and have lived along the western border of what is now modern-day Iran for more than four hundred years. Iranian Kurds have struggled for more autonomy within a centralized Persian state for centuries—including during the Pahlavi dynasty preceding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s rule. Under the Islamic Republic, the Kurds have been brutally repressed through violence, and they continue to be marginalized economically, socially, and culturally. The average income of a Kurdish family in Iran, for example, is lower than that in Tehran and other major cities, and although the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution allows for educational instruction in languages other than Persian, the Kurds are often barred from doing so in practice. They are even frequently prohibited from giving their children Kurdish names.

Many Iranian Kurds supported the revolution in 1979, viewing it as an opportunity to demand greater autonomy. But the relationship with the fledgling Islamic Republic quickly soured. Representatives from the central government negotiated with Kurdish representatives over demands for local secular autonomy, but these talks fell apart and violence broke out between Kurds and government forces. This culminated in a fatwa in August 1979 from the Islamic Republic’s founder and first supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, that ordered the Islamic Republic’s armed forces to crush the Kurds. Notably, this was not just a call to fight Kurdish militants; it also empowered Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali—the head of the newly created Revolutionary Court who came to be known as the “hanging” judge—to follow the military through Kurdish towns and summarily execute dozens of men and boys on no apparent grounds beyond their Kurdish identity. Photos of firing squads executing Kurds made global headlines and caused an international uproar.

In the following decades, the Kurds continued to bristle under the Islamic Republic’s rule. Kurdish activists, lawyers, and teachers were arrested, jailed, and sometimes even executed for demanding Kurdish rights. This came to a head again in September 2022, with the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini—a young Kurdish Iranian woman who died in the custody of the Islamic Republic’s “morality police” for allegedly wearing improper hijab. Her killing sparked outrage and protests in her hometown of Saqqez, which quickly spread through the Kurdish region and then all thirty-one provinces of Iran.

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and a board member of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

2. What are the goals of the various Iranian Kurdish groups?

On February 22, five major Iranian Kurdish opposition parties came together to form the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan. A sixth group, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, joined on March 4 after initially holding off.

The coalition brings together groups with very different ideological profiles. The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), led by Mustafa Hijri, is the oldest and most established. The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), also based in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, has been the most active militarily in recent months, claiming multiple attacks on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) positions in Kermanshah and Lorestan provinces even before the war started. The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) carries the most complicated regional baggage. Originally an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) focused on Iranian Kurdistan, its armed wing, the Eastern Kurdistan Units (YRK), is assessed to be fielding the most capable fighters, many of them women, operating out of the Qandil Mountains near the Iran-Iraq border. Khabat and Komala are smaller parties rounding out the coalition, each with their own Peshmerga forces.

The coalition’s stated objectives include toppling the Islamic Republic, achieving Kurdish self-determination, and establishing a democratic administrative system in “Eastern Kurdistan,” the Kurdish term for Iranian Kurdistan. The formal goal is self-determination within Iran, though the precise endgame, such as a federated region (or something resembling the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq’s status), remains deliberately vague. Outright separatism, however, is not the aim.

That distinction has done little to ease tensions with other Iranian opposition figures, particularly Reza Pahlavi, the former shah’s son, who has accused the Kurdish groups of being separatists trying to carve up Iran. The Kurdish coalition responded by calling on “pro-freedom forces” to stand against authoritarianism. The tension between Kurdish self-determination and Iranian territorial unity is a real fault line within the broader anti-regime movement, though Kurds generally express no interest in non-Kurdish-majority territories.

These groups are based in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, and any cross-border operation would use Iraqi territory as a staging ground. Iran’s foreign minister has already spoken with Iraq’s prime minister and Kurdish leaders in Iraq, who emphasized that Iraq would not allow threats to be directed at Iran from Iraqi soil. But the Iraqi Kurds are in a difficult position. One senior Kurdistan Regional Government official described the situation as “very dangerous” but said they felt unable to resist US pressure. Trump reportedly asked Iraqi Kurdish leaders to choose between the United States/Israel and Iran, open the border, and provide military support. That loyalty test, if true, puts Kurdish leaders in what may be their biggest political dilemma in modern Kurdish history.

The Kurds have a long and painful track record of being courted by great powers during conflicts and then abandoned afterward. The United States backed Iraqi Kurds in the 1970s against Iraq, then cut them loose when it suited a deal with Iran. That history makes the Kurdish groups cautious. They are reportedly looking for political assurances from the Trump administration before fully committing. Whether those assurances will hold is, to put it mildly, an open question. Yet on balance, Kurdish cooperation with the United States has left the Kurds better off over the long term.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace at American University’s School of International Service.

3. What military capabilities do the Kurds have and what could the United States and/or Israel do to support them?

The prospect of a Kurdish incursion into western Iran is occurring in an operational environment already shaped by US and Israeli military pressure on Iranian infrastructure. Recent airstrikes have targeted Iranian military positions along the Iran–Iraq border, degrading command nodes, air defenses, and logistics networks that previously constrained Kurdish insurgent activity. This “shaping” phase has created space for Kurdish forces to maneuver across the Zagros frontier and reportedly conduct small-unit operations against IRGC units and internal security forces.

Several Kurdish groups recently formed a unified alliance to coordinate political and military operations against Tehran. These organizations maintain armed wings that have conducted intermittent insurgent attacks on Iranian forces for years, often using light infantry units equipped with AK-pattern rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars deploying from operating bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. Also, Kurdish security forces maintain elite special operations units such as the Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG), a US-trained force specializing in intelligence collection, high-value target raids, and unconventional warfare. CTG operators deploy with advanced small arms such as M4 carbines, Barrett sniper rifles, and night-vision systems, enabling precision operations against insurgent targets.

The United States and Israel could amplify Kurdish operations by supporting them as a ground partner to the ongoing air campaign. Potential support includes intelligence sharing, aerial resupply of ammunition and equipment, additional artillery systems, and close air support against IRGC formations. US special operations forces could also deploy small advisory elements to coordinate combat controllers, direct precision strikes, and conduct advise-assist-accompany missions with Kurdish units operating inside Iranian territory. Such support would allow Kurdish forces to stretch Iranian security forces across multiple fronts while exploiting their familiarity with the mountainous terrain of northwestern Iran.

—Stephen Honan is a fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, a senior consultant for BVG and Company, and a former explosive ordnance disposal officer for the US Navy.

4. How would a Kurdish military offensive impact the situation on the ground?

An armed Kurdish insurgency—or that of any ethnic or separatist group—is a potential propaganda boon for the Islamic Republic. Iran is a nation with a 2,500-year history and near continuous territorial integrity. It’s hard to conceive a strategy more likely to keep anti-regime Iranians at home, fragment the opposition, and bolster a rally-around-the-flag effect. While it could bog down and kill a few more Iranian soldiers, it is highly unlikely to have a meaningful impact on the battlefield.

In the best/worst case scenario (depending on one’s perspective), it could potentially spark a civil war. If a US- and Israeli-armed offensive is truly underway, it is a devastating blow for Iranians hoping for a political transformation in Iran.

—Nate Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Beginning in 2015, he served as a senior advisor on Iran policy to successive administrations, including most recently as director for Iran at the National Security Council.

—Yerevan Saeed

5. How would an effort to arm the Iranian Kurds impact Iraqi Kurds?

Although a number of Iranian Kurdish groups are present in northern Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds and Iranian Kurds have distinct interests and goals. Iraqi Kurds remain focused on protecting their own autonomy and security and are therefore averse to taking steps that would bring the Iraqi Kurdistan region in direct conflict with Iran. Following news reports alleging a US effort to arm the Iranian Kurdish opposition, the Erbil-based Kurdistan Regional Government flatly denied any support to such an effort and emphasized that Kurdistan is “not part of this war.”

Since the beginning of the conflict, Iran has struck sites within Kurdistan where the Iranian Kurds are located, and the Iran-aligned Iraqi militias have also been launching drone and rocket attacks on sites in the region. Iran’s January 2024 ballistic missile attack on Erbil is also fresh in the minds of Iraqi Kurdish leaders as the type of retaliation Kurdistan could expect should it provide any direct support to an Iranian Kurdish offensive into Iran. Despite the Iraqi Kurds’ longstanding and important partnership with the United States, Iraqi Kurds will remain reluctant to jeopardize their own security interests.

The two main Iraqi Kurdish parties also have their own relationships to maintain with Turkey and Iran. Given that one of the Iranian Kurdish groups, PJAK, is allied with the PKK, a terrorist-designated organization that has fought the Turkish government for decades, Turkey is likely to strongly oppose a US or Israeli effort to arm the Iranian Kurds. Support for such an effort would complicate the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s strong relations with Turkey, while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has traditionally had a stronger relationship with Iran that it is unlikely to jeopardize. Perhaps most importantly, Iraqi Kurdish support would squarely oppose Baghdad’s interests and previous agreements between Baghdad and Tehran to prevent Iraq from being used as a launching pad for attacks into Iran.

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and a former deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran in the US State Department.

6. What are the broader regional implications of the Iranian Kurds joining the fight?

The consequences will largely depend on how far the United States and Israel are willing to sustain their political and military support for the Kurds. Continued backing could mitigate the instability and insecurity that come with this kind of endeavor. But if Kurdish forces are simply used to destabilize Iran temporarily and then left without protection, the blowback will be severe, not just for Kurds in Iran but for the security of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as well.

Any cross-border operations raise the stakes for Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, which has tried to avoid being dragged into a direct confrontation with Tehran but has nonetheless been on the receiving end of Iranian missiles and drones. Iran has already struck Iranian Kurdish targets near the border, fired missiles at Erbil’s airport (which hosts a US military base) and at the US consulate in Erbil, and hit a suspected Central Intelligence Agency facility in Sulaymaniyah. Tehran’s Shia militia proxies in Iraq have launched attacks on Erbil and Kurdistan’s energy sector. During last summer’s twelve-day war, these Iranian-backed proxies knocked out Kurdistan’s energy sector. A sustained Kurdish military role would give Tehran further reason to pressure both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, risking internal Iraqi strain at a moment when Baghdad also is trying to keep the country out of a wider conflict.

Turkey presents a second concern. Ankara has long treated armed Kurdish movements across the region as linked security threats because of their ties to the terrorist-designated PKK, even when the groups differ. If Kurdish parties were able to establish control over territory in Iranian Kurdistan, it would unsettle Turkey, which has its own large Kurdish population. A more active Iranian Kurdish front could sharpen Turkish fears of a wider Kurdish nationalist spillover into Iraq, Syria, and Turkey itself. That does not mean Ankara would side with Tehran, but it would make Turkey more anxious and more willing to act preemptively to contain Kurdish gains as it did in the case of Syria.

—Yerevan Saeed

The post How would a Kurdish offensive change the war in Iran? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Washington’s limited levers to shape a post-Khamenei Iran

Nate Swanson, Ingrid Small — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 22:01:37 +0000

WASHINGTON—On Thursday, US President Donald Trump said that he must be “involved in” selecting Iran’s next supreme leader. This pronouncement came as signs in Iran pointed to Mojtaba Khamenei, the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s son, as the leading candidate to replace his father.

However, it’s highly unlikely that Trump or any non-Iranian will direct the succession process, absent either an unlikely capitulation by the remnants of the Iranian regime or a massive escalation of the conflict from the United States that includes a sustained troop presence.

At this point, no one either inside or outside of Iran can say for certain who the next leader will be—or whether there will be multiple leaders before the Iran war ends. Nor should anyone assume that Iran will emerge from the conflict with another supreme leader. It is entirely possible that the country departs from Velayat-e Faqih (the philosophy underpinning the role of the supreme leader as head of state) and moves toward a military takeover or constitutional referendum instead.

But whoever emerges in charge will face an important decision. In a post-conflict scenario, a future Iranian leader must choose between prioritizing stability and the well-being of the Iranian people—by engaging rationally with the international community—and continuing to be driven by the revolutionary and ideological ambitions that defined Khamenei’s reign. In 2006, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger summed up this choice as deciding between “a nation and a cause.” Choosing the former could help quell decades of hostility between the West and Iran, while choosing the latter could perpetuate the confrontation well into the future.

In the weeks leading up to the conflict, and prior to the death of Khamenei, we consulted with a group of Iran experts to explore ways the United States and allied nations could coordinate efforts and coax change that might result in a more Western-leaning Tehran. The levers available to Washington are limited, but there are three areas where the United States and its allies can exert influence.

1. Iran’s economy and international integration

In a post-conflict Iran, one of the most important factors shaping a post-Khamenei government will be how it views Iran’s economy. Key economic indicators to watch include inflation, unemployment, the payment of public sector salaries, and the regime’s ability to make necessary subsidy reforms and diversify its revenue beyond oil sales.

To rebuild and transform its economy, Iran will need international investment; for that, Iran will need sanctions relief; and for that, it will need a complete overhaul of its foreign policy. Since the United States put in place many of the toughest sanctions on Iran, there are steps Washington can take to encourage the new Iranian leadership to recognize this reality.

However, this likely requires that regime elites face new eruptions of popular unrest over the failing economy and feel economic pressure in their own lives. One of the downsides of US sanctions is that they have created a robust black market that has allowed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other elites to bypass and benefit from the current sanctions regime. There are numerous examples of the entrenched elites benefiting from the current system. If this trend continues during a transition, it makes a pivot toward a more Western-leaning state more difficult.

Western pressure on regime elites would need to be paired with clear carrots to encourage change. One of the failures of former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s rapprochement with the West was that he could not show how Iran’s nuclear concessions—and his more pragmatic approach—led to a better economic outcome for everyday Iranians. A future Iranian leader will need to be convinced that a pro-Western posture will be economically profitable for both the country and the leader’s interests.

Since the Carter White House, successive US administrations have enacted policies that punish countries that trade with the current regime. In a break with this approach, the United States and its allies could establish benchmarks that, if met, would create a path for a new Iranian administration to move away from trade with US adversaries and competitors. Recent commitments to investing in post–Bashar al-Assad Syria suggest a way forward, such as Riyadh’s pledge to commit $6.4 billion in investments this past July. Seeking ways for a new Iranian leadership to continue and grow emerging diplomatic ties, like the renewal of Iran-Saudi relations—notably brokered by China three years ago—could present initial building blocks for such an approach.

2. Iran’s government

Over the course of his tenure, Khamenei did a masterful job maintaining regime unity and avoiding high-profile defections. Any internal dissent has been sidelined without meaningful repercussions on his reign. Even during the recent massacre of Iranian protesters and the subsequent war, there were no significant defections among regime elites.

This elite cohesion presents a predicament for a potential transition to a Western-oriented state. Anti-regime opposition and human rights advocates understandably seek to hold the regime accountable for its crimes but use rhetoric that paints all members of the Iranian establishment with the same broad brush. This eliminates an outlet for those within the existing regime who may secretly want to free themselves but see no way out.

The 2003 US decision to bar Iraqis from the top tiers of the Baathist party from serving in government and disband the Iraqi military contributed to the challenges in governing Iraq’s multi-ethnic and religious population in the immediate aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s fall. To mitigate the risk of similar fallout, providing a process that isolates apparatchiks from ideologically ambivalent technocrats could spur fence-sitters in the regime to consider life beyond the current political and security construct. In short, to increase the odds of a pro-Western state emerging, there at least needs to be room for a figure like either Reza Pahlavi—the son of the deposed shah—or the Irish Republican leader Gerry Adams to emerge in Iran.

There is room for the United States and its allies to help lay the groundwork for a process that addresses the needs of the Iranian people for accountability and justice. In considering a rebuilding of the state administration, identifying ways to incorporate an Iran-specific truth and reconciliation mechanism could accomplish this. But critically, it would also need to be designed to signal that regime technocrats will not face retribution for their contribution to the running of the state. In this vein, the mechanisms applied in post-apartheid South Africa and Northern Ireland differed based on the nature of the conflicts and crimes committed. Each wrestled, for example, with the concept of amnesty in exchange for confession. Drawing from lessons of recent investigations, such as the United Nations’ Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, could inform the process and direction of such an effort.

3. Iran’s security structure

In the run-up to the war, the Iranian security doctrine was a three-legged stool—a latent nuclear weapons capability, a robust and capable missile program, and Iran’s network of nonstate regional proxies known as the “Axis of Resistance.” The Islamic Republic’s commitment to this paradigm in the face of crippling sanctions, military threats, and domestic unrest reflect the paramount role that threat perception plays in driving Iranian policymaking.

This will be difficult to change with a new Iranian leadership keen to avoid the same fate of other leaders. In 2003, for example, Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi voluntarily dismantled his country’s nuclear program; in 2011, he was driven from power and killed. Hardliners in Iran have warned against limiting military capabilities, blaming Libya’s civil war and Qaddafi’s ultimate demise on forfeiting his weapons program. Khamenei himself criticized Qaddafi for abandoning his nuclear ambitions and chided the former leader of Libya for trusting the United States. Other Iranians point to Ukraine as another cautionary tale, in which Kyiv gave up its nuclear weapons following its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 only to be invaded by Russia later.

However, the key driver shaping Iran’s transition and its future is establishing a security infrastructure acceptable to Iran and tolerated by Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. On its face, this may not seem possible. But the current Iran-Israel hostility has not always existed. They share no borders, and Persians and Jews share more than a millennium of relatively peaceful co-existence.

For a Western-leaning state to emerge in Iran, it will almost certainly be incumbent upon new Iranian leadership to change Israeli perceptions about Iran’s intentions. The United States and its allies should make clear that the key indicator might very well be Iran’s continued support (and specifically lethal assistance) to Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. The irony is that these groups’ degradation since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks makes them more of a liability to Iran than an asset. But even still, an end to Iranian backing for these proxies would be a massive ideological shift for a regime that built a large part of its internal legitimacy on opposition to Israel.

In many ways, Iran’s hostility to Israel, the United States, and the Gulf is more important than the exact specifications of Iran’s missile and nuclear program. If that hostility is reduced, diminished Israeli and US perceptions of threat could pave the way for limiting both programs in ways that are potentially acceptable to all parties.

Ultimately, the choice is in the hands of Iran’s next leader. But the United States and its allies and partners can and should help clarify what is at stake—and these three areas are strong places to start.

The post Washington’s limited levers to shape a post-Khamenei Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iran war could save Vladimir Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 22:34:17 +0000

The mood in Moscow was strikingly subdued in late February as the country marked four years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin officials made little mention of the anniversary, while the heavily censored Russian media offered only minimal coverage. With no end in sight to the increasingly costly war, this lack of fanfare is easy to understand. However, events currently unfolding in the Middle East may yet rescue Vladimir Putin’s faltering invasion.

When Putin first announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he vowed to “demilitarize” and “denazify” Ukraine. He has also sought to justify the war as a campaign against NATO expansion and crusade to revive Russia’s great power status. By almost any measure, Putin has failed to achieve these goals.

The Russian leader’s inability to demilitarize Ukraine has been perhaps his most glaring failure. Indeed, few countries have ever looked less demilitarized than today’s Ukraine. As the war with Russia enters a fifth year, Ukraine possesses Europe’s largest army and is a world leader in drone warfare. From NATO members to Gulf petrostates, countries are now queuing up to access Ukraine’s unrivalled expertise. Meanwhile, a consensus is emerging in European capitals that Ukraine has an indispensable role to play in the future security of the continent.

Likewise, Putin’s bid to “denazify” Ukraine has proved spectacularly counterproductive. The entire concept of “denazification” is Kremlin code for the eradication of Ukrainian national identity, but Putin’s invasion has sparked an unprecedented surge in patriotism among the Ukrainian population along with a deep distrust of all things Russian. As a result, it is now virtually impossible to imagine the emergence of a pro-Russian government in Kyiv, unless permanently propped up by Kremlin bayonets.

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Putin has gone to great lengths to blame the war on NATO’s post-1991 eastward expansion beyond the old Iron Curtain. Far from arresting or reversing this process, Russia’s actions have sparked a new and highly significant wave of enlargement. In response to the invasion of Ukraine, both Finland and Sweden opted to abandon decades of neutrality and join NATO. This has more than doubled Russia’s shared border with the alliance, while also transforming the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake.

On the global stage, the invasion of Ukraine has left Russia unable to project strength or justify its claims to great power status. With the vast majority of his military forces deployed in Ukraine, Putin has proved unable to aid a series of international allies during moments of crisis. Syria, Venezuela, and Iran have all learned the hard way that Putin’s promises of partnership are empty.

Russian prestige has taken a further pounding on the battlefields of Ukraine. Like many others in Moscow and elsewhere, Putin fully expected to secure a quick and complete victory in Ukraine. Instead, his armies have been unable to achieve any decisive breakthroughs despite suffering catastrophic losses. More than four years on, they remain bogged down in brutal attritional warfare.

Putin has tried to distract from this underwhelming military performance by projecting confidence in eventual success, but his boasts of relentless Russian advances now ring increasingly hollow. In February 2026, Ukraine actually liberated more territory than the Russian army was able to seize, making a mockery of Kremlin efforts to portray Russian victory as inevitable.

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With Russia’s prospects in Ukraine looking increasingly grim, the joint US-Israeli operation against Iran could hardly have come at a better time for Putin. While Russia’s inability to assist a key ally is undoubtedly embarrassing, the Kremlin could potentially emerge as a major beneficiary of the escalating conflict in the Middle East.

The scope for economic gains is obvious. With the Strait of Hormuz under threat and key energy export routes out of the Middle East facing major disruption, Russia stands to benefit more than most from rising oil and gas prices. This could reinvigorate Putin’s war economy at a time when it was beginning to show signs of serious strain.

The US focus on Iran may also distract the Trump administration from diplomatic efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. While these US-led peace talks had not resulted in any tangible progress toward a sustainable settlement, they represent a diplomatic challenge to the Kremlin. Putin will now likely be able to breathe a little easier, at least while the United States remains preoccupied with Iran.

Crucially, escalating hostilities in the Middle East may force Washington to limit the supply of weapons to Ukraine. The US, Israel, and the Gulf states are all reportedly struggling to cope with Iranian drones and are already in danger of running low on air defense ammunition.

In particular, the first days of the conflict have reportedly seen unprecedented use of Patriot air defense missiles, which are in limited supply and desperately needed by the Ukrainians to intercept Russian ballistic missiles. If Kyiv finds itself without these missiles in the coming months, Russia will be able to strike critical infrastructure targets across Ukraine with impunity. This could leave large parts of Ukraine unlivable and have a major impact on the country’s ability to maintain the war effort.

None of this is inevitable. If US-Israeli forces succeed in curtailing Iran’s ability to strike back and can conclude their campaign within a matter of weeks, Putin will have little to cheer. However, if the current air offensive escalates into a protracted military conflict, this will likely strengthen Russia economically while weakening Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and prolonging Europe’s largest invasion since World War II.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

What a Middle East oil and LNG crisis means for China and East Asia

Joseph Webster, Reid I’Anson, and Kevin Li — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 21:48:49 +0000

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration’s decision to launch air strikes against the Iranian regime could prove enormously consequential for global oil and gas markets. Even as the strikes and Iranian retaliation continue, it’s worth examining the potential impact of the war on China and East Asia more broadly. A crisis that hits oil supplies clearly harms Beijing’s strategic interests, but one that affects liquefied natural gas (LNG) could end up advancing them.

China, the world’s largest oil importer, would suffer significant economic costs from a long-term, large-scale oil outage in the Middle East. Still, it would fare better than other regional economies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Not only does the People’s Republic of China (PRC) enjoy greater domestic oil production than any of those Asian democracies, but its economy is about as oil-intensive as Japan’s or Taiwan’s, and much less so than South Korea’s. Accordingly, while an oil crisis would bring real pain to the PRC, it might empower Beijing relative to its regional rivals.

While China would suffer from oil outages, a Middle East crisis with disproportionate LNG outages might benefit the PRC. Natural gas accounts for a relatively small share of China’s primary energy consumption, the country enjoys substantial domestic production, and it can tap pipeline imports from Russia, Central Asia, and Myanmar. Significantly, many of the PRC’s competitors or rivals—the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—are substantially or even wholly reliant on LNG imports for their natural gas consumption. Dutch TTF natural gas prices are up more than 50 percent against last Friday’s close, fueling concerns of an energy-induced inflationary spike. In addition, LNG outages in Qatar, the world’s second-largest producer, would benefit the US LNG complex—and fuel accusations that Washington was reaping windfall benefits from a war it started. Beijing may therefore judge that another LNG-tinged crisis would impose little economic cost on it while potentially further antagonizing Washington’s already-fraught ties with its allies.

Ominously, Russian President Vladimir Putin said this week that he would deprioritize natural gas exports to Europe as “other markets are opening up.” But the Russian leader is once again lying—he has no major pipeline export alternative to Europe, not even China. Instead, he appears to be establishing Russia’s baseline negotiating position ahead of a likely crisis in LNG markets.

While Tehran has so far not targeted significant regional oil infrastructure in its retaliatory strikes, it still might. With the United States and Israel showing no signs that they will stop targeting Iran’s political leadership, the remnants of the Khamenei regime are becoming increasingly desperate and are taking more risks. Even a trigger-happy regional commander could act independently from the regime. If Iranian forces do start targeting regional oil exports en masse, it could quickly raise Beijing’s ire. On the other hand, large-scale LNG outages might be more palatable for Beijing while harming Tehran’s adversaries—and Iran has not refrained from targeting LNG infrastructure so far. US and allied policymakers should closely follow Beijing’s actions and rhetoric, especially if a Middle East energy crisis disproportionately affects LNG. And from the present crisis, Indo-Pacific capitals should draw important lessons, not the least of which is the importance of strengthening energy security ahead of a potential Taiwan crisis.

The Strait of Hormuz’s vulnerabilities

Iran’s ability to threaten the world economy centers around the Strait of Hormuz. Traffic along this maritime bottleneck has already ground to a halt amid the threat of attacks, which could send the prices of oil and other commodities higher and potentially trigger a global economic crisis. East Asian economies would be particularly impacted by a closed strait. In 2025, around 78 percent of all Middle Eastern crude oil exports to China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan flowed through this important chokepoint. While Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pipeline capacity of about 2.6 million barrels per day to reach Red Sea ports, this is only a fraction of even their own domestic production, and most Gulf states would not be able to find alternative shipping routes.

East Asian economies are particularly vulnerable to a Middle Eastern oil crisis, and Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are among the most exposed.

Conversely, the PRC imports less via the Strait of Hormuz and has insulated itself, to a degree, from a potential long-term oil outage through rapid vehicle electrification and robust domestic oil production. It has also diversified energy sources—mostly coal, but also renewables. Indeed, China is far less exposed to energy imports than its regional rivals.

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have virtually no domestic crude production and rely almost exclusively on imports. The PRC, meanwhile, meets over a quarter of its oil demand through domestic production. Moreover, the economies of Taiwan and South Korea are much more oil-intensive than that of the PRC, meaning that mainland China generally requires fewer barrels of oil than its rivals to produce one thousand dollars of gross domestic product.

The PRC is therefore better positioned to withstand a major Middle East oil supply disruption relative to regional rivals. Of course, oil is but one of many macroeconomic variables, so the PRC’s economy could still underperform relative to other regional players—especially Taiwan and South Korea—if, for example, the artificial intelligence boom continues along its current trend. However, in addition to its oil production, the PRC’s current stockpiles of crude oil leave it relatively well-prepared for a crisis.

PRC and East Asia crude oil inventories

Japan has robust import coverage. At present, Japanese onshore crude inventory is holding at 350 million barrels, according to Kpler data. Assuming 2025’s average refinery runs of 2.4 million barrels per day persist in 2026, Japan has nearly 150 days of oil supply in its reserves. This figure is even higher, at 182 days, when accounting only for domestic transportation fuel demand (gas oil/diesel, gasoline, jet). In other words, Japan’s refineries could supply its domestic fuel needs, at current activity levels, for 182 days if it seeks to only satisfy domestic needs and eschews exports.

While Taiwan and South Korea appear more exposed to a prolonged oil supply disruption at first glance, they are more secure if one distinguishes between only domestic consumption and total demand, which includes crude oil ultimately destined for export as a petroleum product. Based on our measures of Taiwanese and South Korean inventory levels and refinery runs, Taiwan can cover thirty-nine days, while South Korea has just thirty-three days of cover. But both could sustain domestic consumption for much longer. Taiwan, for example, is mandated to hold at least ninety days of cover for current core transportation fuel demand; South Korea has 107 days, with the potential to increase this further with additional policy adjustments to lower domestic retail consumption.

For instance, in April 2024, Taiwan held that its domestic inventories equated to about 167 days of supply for all petroleum products. Taiwan no longer appears to report inventories data, although its Energy Administration at the Ministry of Economic Affairs reports that domestic inventories are compliant with statutory mandates requiring commercial and governmental inventories to hold at least ninety days of consumption.

The governments of Japan and South Korea report that they have at least 254 days and 210 days, respectively, of supply, while Taiwan has enough for about 120 days, according to The New York Times.

The PRC has the largest onshore crude stockpiles in the world, with inventory levels estimated at 1.2 billion barrels as of January 2026 with builds amounting to 100 million barrels over the previous year, per Kpler data. With average refinery runs of 15.5 million barrels per day in 2026, less domestic crude production of 4.3 million barrels per day, this implies around 108 days of import cover. On the other hand, if the PRC decided to also maximize domestic consumption and eschew exports of petroleum products, its supply would extend to 130 days.

China may also be able to obtain another 38 million barrels of floating Iranian crude on tankers, many of which are located offshore of Malaysia or China. While the status of these Iranian barrels is currently unclear, the PRC’s existing inventories leave it relatively well positioned to weather an oil crisis, at least compared to its regional rivals.

LNG’s role in energy, by economy

But a crisis may not only exist solely or even largely in the oil domain: LNG outages could also damage East Asian economies. If Tehran disproportionately targets LNG infrastructure in the Gulf, then its relationship with Beijing may be a significant or even primary factor, as the PRC is much less reliant on LNG imports than other energy importers. Unlike many of its democratic rivals across Europe and the Indo-Pacific, natural gas is a small share of China’s primary energy consumption, and the PRC produces much of its needs domestically. East Asian economies should be alert to the possibility that Tehran will disproportionately target regional LNG infrastructure—not necessarily because it was directed by Beijing, but because the Iranian leadership will likely seek to maximize Western pain while minimizing Chinese anger.

If Iran does target regional LNG infrastructure, Qatar, the world’s second-largest LNG exporter, could be hit hard. Significantly, Iran drone strikes have already hit Qatar’s Ras Laffan facility, and the complex accounts for about 20 percent of global LNG exports. LNG outages in Qatar would hold significant geopolitical ramifications, as the fuel is only semi-fungible, meaning transportation of the fuel faces infrastructure constraints and bottlenecks. As seen below, the PRC is less exposed to Qatari LNG than Taiwan, South Korea, or Japan. Moreover, as much of its LNG imports satisfy southern Chinese power demand, China can also replace its LNG imports, to a degree, by shifting to other forms of electricity, such as coal or renewables.

Furthermore, if Middle Eastern LNG outages persist, prices may spike even further. There is virtually no global spare capacity right now. Any unplanned incremental expansions would take well over a year, and European natural gas storage levels are low.

If prices continue to spike, this would boost LNG exports for the United States—already the world’s largest LNG exporter—at the expense of consumers across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. While this development would produce short-term commercial benefits for the United States, it would also potentially widen diplomatic fissures between Washington and its allies across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Washington would be in the awkward position of receiving commercial benefits, at the expense of its allies, from a war it initiated. This dynamic could be a diplomatic boon for Beijing, especially since its media outlets falsely blamed the United States for the 2022 LNG price spike arising from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Energy security risks and lessons

As the world’s largest energy importer, China has a lot to lose from a conflict in the Middle East. Nevertheless, in certain scenarios, Beijing could reap geopolitical benefits that offset some or perhaps even all of the economic costs. Accordingly, policymakers should watch for signs that Tehran is disproportionately targeting LNG infrastructure, pursue short-term mitigation steps, and consider the long-term consequences of the conflict.

Short-term risk mitigation steps are straightforward. To guard against any short-term price spikes, the United States may need to tap its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in coordination with its allies and partners. In addition, Washington may need to incentivize domestic crude oil and natural gas production. In some cases, export projects could be accelerated, perhaps via financing from the Office of Energy Dominance Financing or the Export-Import Bank. Furthermore, agreeing to fill the SPR at a price floor could provide certainty for long-term production, likely sending domestic crude oil production higher. If the crisis metastasizes, however, other measures may be warranted.

The long-term consequences of this crisis are potentially alarming. It could provide a template for Beijing if it attempts to conquer Taiwan via coercion. The PRC’s energy security is transforming in important ways as it becomes increasingly self-reliant. While Beijing is, for now, highly exposed in an oil crisis, its vulnerability will be substantially reduced in a few short years. Vehicle electrification and improving fuel economy have ended Chinese total transport fuel demand growth. Domestic gasoline consumption has already peaked. If—when—China commercializes more advanced batteries, such as semi-solid state or solid-state batteries, its overall demand for oil will likely decrease further. In 2025, China marginally increased domestic crude oil production, and it could likely expand further if energy security becomes an overriding priority; Beijing could also quickly increase overland crude oil pipeline connectivity with Russia by expanding the mainland Chinese leg of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline. In sum, while Beijing remains vulnerable to an oil crisis, it is narrowing its oil exposure to seaborne volumes. If vehicle electrification and battery advances accelerate, Beijing’s interests could shift, including in the Middle East.

The East Asian democracies and the United States should quickly learn and apply these lessons. The present crisis poses serious dangers but may also foreshadow even graver dangers ahead related to a potential Taiwan crisis. A future confrontation over Taiwan may be determined not only by military might but by logistics and energy security. Accordingly, while East Asian democracies should expand their military capabilities, they would also be wise to bolster energy security by reducing domestic demand, bolstering domestic supply, and stockpiling and hardening dispersed storage.

The post What a Middle East oil and LNG crisis means for China and East Asia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Enforce sanctions to prevent Russia from benefitting in a prolonged Iran crisis

Kimberly Donovan — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 18:03:00 +0000

WASHINGTON—As all eyes turn to the war in Iran, the United States and its Western allies cannot afford to take their sights off Russia. Ongoing US and Israeli strikes on Iran, combined with Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz and its attacks on energy and military infrastructure across the Middle East, are leading to spikes in oil prices. Some analysts warn that oil prices could rise to one hundred dollars per barrel if there is a prolonged disruption of oil exports from the Gulf. Watching all this is Russia, eager to sell the hundreds of millions of barrels of sanctioned oil it currently has sitting in storage tankers at sea.

Oil’s rise

Oil futures have fluctuated since the war began. On Tuesday, Brent crude traded at nearly $84 per barrel, its highest price since July 2024. While the surge appears to be leveling off, oil prices are up 15 percent this week. Many analysts anticipate that the longer the conflict goes on and risks to the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf energy infrastructure persist, the greater the likelihood of further price increases.

There are global economic implications associated with high oil prices, including higher inflation, negative impacts on markets, and increased prices at the gas pump and for common goods. But there are also more specific implications for the Russian economy: Higher oil prices could help Moscow continue funding its war against Ukraine despite being under heavy sanctions. As policymakers consider next steps with Iran, they should double down on enforcing sanctions against Russia to prevent Moscow from benefiting from the conflict in Iran.

Russia’s opportunity

Russia has been under increasing economic pressure from Western sanctions since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The United States and its allies imposed sanctions, export controls, asset blockings, an oil price cap, and other restrictive economic measures aimed at reducing Moscow’s ability to fund and equip its war. This pressure, for example, includes US and UK sanctions targeting Russia’s four largest oil companies—Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom Neft, and Surgutneftgas—and their subsidiaries, as well as US, UK, and European Union (EU) sanctions targeting the “shadow fleet” of Russian oil tankers and facilitators enabling Russian sanctions evasion. These sanctions took the Group of Seven (G7) advanced economies’ sixty-dollar price cap on Russian oil, enacted in December 2022, a significant step forward by further restricting Moscow’s ability to sell its oil and reducing Russia’s oil revenue.

As these sanctions have taken hold, Russia’s economy has been hit hard. While the Kremlin has sought to reshape Russia’s economy into supporting its war, its revenue from oil exports has fallen. Prior to 2022, fossil fuel exports funded nearly 40 percent of Russia’s federal budget. In 2025, this dropped to 25 percent. This fall in revenue was due to a combination of a global oil surplus, low oil prices, and Western economic pressure.

After European countries started to phase out purchases of Russian Urals due to the price cap and sanctions, China and India became the primary importers of Russia’s oil. In the past year, however, Beijing and New Delhi reduced their imports of Russian oil due to concerns over US secondary sanctions exposure, tariffs, and, in India’s case, difficult trade negotiations with the United States. China continued to buy oil from Iran and Venezuela, evading US sanctions, and it began importing more oil from Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, India started sourcing more oil from the United States and Gulf states to meet its domestic demand.

But now, as oil prices surge and it becomes more difficult to move oil out of the Persian Gulf, big oil consumers such as China and India will need to shore up their supplies. Russia is ready and waiting for fresh demand for its oil: On Wednesday, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said that Russia is getting “signals of renewed interest from India.”

In January, the EU and the United Kingdom reduced the Russian oil price cap to $44.10 per barrel, a move that was intended to further curb Russian oil revenue. But with oil prices over $80 per barrel this week and many analysts expecting those prices to rise, $44.10 per barrel becomes an attractive discount for readily available oil, giving Russia an opportunity to increase oil sales.

The Western response

While the US-Israeli war against Iran is expanding across the Middle East, Russia’s war in Ukraine continues. If Russia is left unchecked and sanctions are not enforced, Russia may have the opportunity to replenish its coffers with oil revenue. This would shore up Russia’s declining economy, provide it with the funds it needs to continue the bloodshed in Ukraine, and weaken US and Western leverage in peace negotiations. The West cannot afford to let this happen.

The United States, the EU, the United Kingdom, and the broader G7 sanctions coalition should step up the enforcement of their existing sanctions against Russia now. This should include levying additional sanctions on Russia’s energy sector, including currently unsanctioned oil companies, refineries, ports, and financial institutions that facilitate oil and gas transactions.

In addition, the United States should align its shadow fleet sanctions with those of the EU and the United Kingdom. Aligning or matching sanctions with allies extends the tool’s reach across jurisdictions and reduces sanctions evasion. In addition to designating the shadow fleet vessels, allies should expand operations to seize them. These seizures reduce Russia’s profits from sanctioned oil and send a clear message that sanctions evasion will not be tolerated. Further, these operations remove dangerous unseaworthy vessels from the water, preventing potential environmental and maritime accidents, as well as potential national security risks, such as undersea cable cutting.

Beyond oil, Western partners should also pursue sanctions on Russia’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector, especially now that Qatar’s LNG capacity is shut down as a result of the war in Iran. Qatar’s LNG exports represent 20 percent of the global supply. Meanwhile, Russia remains the fourth-largest LNG supplier, behind Australia, Qatar, and the United States. With Qatari LNG offline, Russia, if left unchecked, could fill the gap in supply. Further, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU should make clear to China and India that sanctions on Russian energy remain in place and it would be in their best interest to comply with them.

The weaker the Russian economy performs, the greater the West’s leverage in negotiations to end Moscow’s war in Ukraine. To maintain and bolster this leverage over Russia, the United States and its allies should enforce and increase their sanctions efforts to ensure that the Kremlin cannot economically benefit from a boost in energy sales as a result of the Iran war.

Energy Sanctions Dashboard

This dashboard focuses on US sanctions and restrictive measures placed on crude oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela—including the unintended consequences and the lessons learned.

The post Enforce sanctions to prevent Russia from benefitting in a prolonged Iran crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the Iran conflict continues, the Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis is only getting worse

Michael Kugelman — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 17:37:28 +0000

This past weekend, Afghanistan and Pakistan suffered their most intense clashes in years. On Friday, Pakistan carried out air strikes in more than twenty locations across Afghanistan, including Kabul and Kandahar, two of its largest cities, while the Taliban targeted dozens of Pakistani border posts. The violence continued on Sunday, as Pakistani airstrikes hit Kabul. Pakistan claims its strikes targeted terrorists and Taliban military facilities, but the Taliban claimed that the strikes hit civilians.

The fighting broke out before Saturday’s US and Israeli strikes on Iran, which have sparked what is becoming a major war in the Middle East. But the crisis to Iran’s east should not be forgotten, as South Asia threatens to spiral, too. Moreover, South Asia’s conflict could be exacerbated by the war in the Middle East.

Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been tense since the Taliban returned to power in 2021—even though the Taliban was a Pakistani ally during the US-led war in Afghanistan, with Pakistan providing a cross-border sanctuary. The main reason for the current bilateral strain is Pakistan’s contention that the Taliban is sheltering Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a terrorist outfit that’s carried out increasing numbers of attacks in Pakistan since 2021. It also waged a massive campaign of terror across Pakistan between 2007 and 2014, until the military carried out operations along the border that killed many militants—but also displaced many others into Afghanistan.

Taliban leaders deny that they shelter the TTP, but they’ve long been allied with it. The two previously carried out joint operations in Afghanistan, and the TTP’s first supreme leader, Baitullah Mehsud, was once part of the Haqqani Network, one of the Taliban’s most brutal factions. The Taliban are known for not turning on their terrorist allies; most famously, after the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban refused to give up al-Qaeda even when faced with the threat of a US military invasion. The Taliban has additional reasons not to expel or curb the TTP: Doing so could stoke rebellion within Taliban ranks, or drive TTP fighters into the arms of Islamic State Khorasan Province—the Islamic State’s South Asia affiliate and a Taliban rival that periodically attacks Taliban targets.

More broadly, the Taliban has little incentive to help Pakistan. Despite their former wartime alliance, the Taliban has long mistrusted the Pakistanis. And with the conflict having ended in Afghanistan, it no longer needs Pakistani sponsorship. This deprives Pakistan of leverage over the Taliban.

Meanwhile, the war in Iran could destabilize Pakistan if unrest across its Iranian border spills over into Balochistan province, which could embolden separatist insurgents that operate there. And the TTP, which has stepped up its attacks in recent years, might view this as an opportunity to attack, too. Consequently, Pakistan could face a worsening conflict on its northwestern border and ever-increasing unrest on its southwestern frontier. And Pakistan would need to contend with all these dangers even as it continues to grapple with its tense eastern border with India, especially since the two fought their worst conflict since 1971 this past May.

For these reasons, diplomatic efforts—including several rounds of talks mediated by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar after Afghanistan-Pakistan clashes last October—have largely failed to ease tensions, resulting only in tenuous cease-fires that are now shattered.

Consequently, it’s hard to envision any outcomes that are stabilizing. The best-case scenario would be for the two sides to agree to new internationally mediated talks that result in a fresh cease-fire. But that would merely amount to a loose band-aid, as it would only be a matter of time until there’s another terrorist attack in Pakistan, followed by Pakistani strikes and Taliban retaliations. Not to mention, two of the countries that have previously served as mediators—Saudi Arabia and Qatar—will likely be too bogged down with the fallout from the war in Iran to intercede in the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict.

The mid-range scenario is that the two reject talks, and Pakistani airstrikes and Taliban ground operations continue, but each side’s desire to avoid all-out conflict prompts them to tone down the intensity of hostilities. Still, given that the most recent unrest was highly escalatory—the targeting, geographic scope, and overall intensity was much greater than during previous rounds of violence—even reduced hostilities would ensure tensions remain dangerously high.

The worst-case scenario would be if Pakistan decides to go all in, waging relentless air strikes across Afghanistan, targeting TTP terrorists and the Taliban regime it claims is harboring them. This could prompt the Taliban to ramp up border operations and mobilize the TTP and other radicals loyal to the group, ordering them to carry out terrorist attacks across Pakistan, including in major cities. Such a scenario, which would directly threaten US interests and lives, may prompt the Trump administration to intervene—though its bandwidth has shrunk significantly now that it’s embroiled in a much larger war in the Middle East. But Trump, as much as he would want to claim to have ended another war, would struggle to succeed. After all, the Saudis and Qataris have failed even though—unlike the United States—they have warm ties with both Pakistan and the Taliban.

Worst-case scenarios are often the least likely. But given the failures of diplomacy, the Taliban’s refusal to curb the TTP, Pakistan’s increasing alarm about Afghanistan-based terrorism, and rapidly escalating tensions and violence, an all-out conflict is a distinct possibility.

The post While the Iran conflict continues, the Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis is only getting worse appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian army faces comms crisis amid Starlink cut and Kremlin crackdown

Katherine Spencer, Marc Goedemans — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 14:05:45 +0000

The Russian army in Ukraine is facing a growing communications crisis amid recent disruptions to Telegram and Starlink, leaving troops increasingly in the dark and exposing mounting strains inside Russia.

The problems began in early February when Elon Musk imposed restrictions on unauthorized Russian access to Starlink satellites operated by Musk’s SpaceX company that provide high-speed internet. The move came following talks between Musk and recently appointed Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

Starlink made headlines in 2022 as a crucial tool for the Ukrainian military during the initial phase of the Russian invasion. More recently, Russia has acquired thousands of Starlink internet terminals and incorporated them as an important element of the invading army’s communications infrastructure.

Efforts to disable unauthorized Russian terminals operating in Ukraine had an immediate impact, with Ukrainian officials reporting a sharp drop in Russian bombardments and drone attacks on front line positions. In one incident on the Zaporizhzhia front, twelve Russian soldiers were reportedly killed by friendly fire after a Starlink terminal failure.

Ukraine appears to have benefited from Russia’s sudden loss of connectivity. In the first five days following the Starlink cutoff, Ukrainian forces reportedly liberated more than two hundred square kilometers of territory, representing an area roughly equivalent to the Russian army’s gains throughout the whole month of December. This trend has continued into early March.

While there is still some debate over the extent to which the areas reclaimed by Ukraine had previously been under Russian control, the advances provided a boost to Ukrainian morale while strengthening the country’s front line position. According to the Institute for the Study of War, this battlefield success owed much to the disruption caused by Russia’s loss of Starlink services.

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With no domestically produced alternative to Starlink technology, Russian units are now scrambling to find alternative ways to communicate. Some have sought to revive access to the Starlink system, with the Ukrainian authorities warning that Russians are now attempting to pressure the families of Ukrainian prisoners to register terminals.

Russia’s own satellite communications system, which is run by Gazprom Space Systems, has been used in a limited capacity during the war. However, it is regarded as far less reliable than Starlink and is not seen as a viable alternative.

The fallout over the loss of Starlink has sparked a scandal in Russia, with many questioning why the army allowed itself to become so dependent on a communications system owned and controlled by an American company. Critics have attacked this development as both a national humiliation and a strategic blunder which left the Russian military dangerously vulnerable.

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Russia’s recent communication woes are not only due to external restrictions. Days after Musk agreed to cut Starlink access, the Kremlin moved to slow down the hugely popular messenger app Telegram, citing the application’s failure to comply with Russian data laws.

This was widely seen as a significant step toward closing one of the few remaining uncensored communications channels in Putin’s Russia. Telegram serves as a leading news platform among Russian audiences with over 93 million users in the country.

The Kremlin decision to restrict Telegram sparked a rare backlash within Russia’s own ranks, with pro-war bloggers particularly vocal in their criticism. The limitations further undermined connectivity between Russian forces fighting in Ukraine, with many soldiers complaining that the loss of Telegram would hamper their ability to share battlefield information and conduct fundraising activities.

Recent measures against Telegram are part of a much larger effort by Putin to exert greater control over all digital communications. The end goal appears to be the establishment of a “sovereign internet” inside Russia sealed off from foreign influence.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has banned Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, and X. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is now actively pushing Russians to use the new state-controlled MAX app, which contains extensive tracking capabilities for surveillance and is now pre-installed on all phones in Russia.

As the war in Ukraine has progressed, Russia has also restricted internet usage through the widespread implementation of mobile internet blackouts. Putin recently signed a law expanding the ability of state bodies to restrict connectivity, essentially handing the security services a kill switch to the internet inside Russia.

Putin’s readiness to target Telegram despite the challenges this creates for the Russian army in Ukraine has led to speculation that he may be prioritizing domestic regime stability over military success. Some have suggested that he could be preparing for a new and politically risky mobilization; others believe the Kremlin fears unrest as the economic situation in Russia worsens.

Whatever the true motives behind recent efforts to throttle Telegram in Russia, the Kremlin’s actions do not project confidence. On the contrary, they hint at a regime seeking to silence critics and prevent any potential grassroots discontent from gaining traction.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Marc Goedemans is a Young Global Professional at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Fellow

Mark Temnycky

Nonresident Fellow

Eurasia Center

Ukraine Geopolitics & Energy Security

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Dispatch from Kyiv: After a long, cold winter, momentum is back on Ukraine’s side

John E. Herbst — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 21:57:02 +0000

KYIV—The woods around Ukraine’s capital were still snowy and the skies overcast as our train approached Kyiv–Pasazhyrskyi station in the early morning of February 24. The carriages were filled with former senior Western officials, prominent journalists, and national security experts heading to the Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference, which takes place every February on the anniversary of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In previous years, the forum was the capital’s most high-profile event, with many Ukrainian leaders and elites in attendance. This year it came in a close second to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcoming eleven European leaders and senior officials to the city, as the visitors announced a €920 million aid package for the country’s battered energy system.

A delegation from the Atlantic Council, including the author, meet with Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Olexandr Mischenko on February 26, 2026. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine)

What’s more, over thirty leaders of the Coalition of the Willing, including British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, convened virtually to speak with Zelenskyy alongside those leaders physically in Kyiv. They reaffirmed the role the coalition would play to prevent future Russian aggression—including by deploying troops—if US President Donald Trump’s efforts to broker a peace deal prove successful.

It all added up to a more positive atmosphere than one might think given the typical tone of the discussion about this war in Washington.

The beginning of warmer weather

At 28 degrees Fahrenheit, the morning air was crisp but a good bit warmer than the often subzero lows Kyiv suffered in January. The extreme cold had given Russian President Vladimir Putin one more reason to intensify his air assault on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, a major focus of Moscow’s military campaign every winter since the 2022 invasion. In targeting energy infrastructure, Putin’s goal has been to bludgeon Ukraine’s civilian population into submission, something the Russian military has not been able to manage on the battlefield.

In recent weeks, Russian attacks have inflicted significant damage on an already weakened Ukrainian energy system. These attacks follow other major blows to Ukraine’s ability to generate power, including Russia’s seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in March 2022 and its destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric dam in June 2023. As a result, Ukraine’s electrical generating capacity has fallen from nearly 34 gigawatts before February 2022 to less than 14 gigawatts today.

Even with a significant amount of energy imports, Ukraine experienced major power outages throughout the country this winter, and many homes were without heat and electricity in subzero weather. But this was of little strategic value to Putin. Many of the Ukrainians I spoke with in Kyiv said that they were furious but not disheartened by the bombings. They had no choice but to continue the war because, however unpleasant, living under Russian bombs is much better than living under Russian occupation. Besides, they added, spring would soon be here.

In the middle of the battlefield

At the YES conference and in meetings across Kyiv over the following three days, I had the opportunity to speak with senior Ukrainian officials in the president’s office and in the foreign affairs, security, energy, and economic ministries and agencies. I also spoke with opposition leaders, journalists, and everyday Ukrainians. I found that the warming temperatures—and the presence of supportive European leaders bearing vital aid—were not the only reasons that many Ukrainians were more upbeat than I had anticipated.

Perhaps the most important factor was the modest good news from several quarters on the battlefield. While commentary in the West over the past year has spoken of small but inevitable Russian gains on the ground, recent developments suggest a less gloomy situation.

To begin with, Ukrainian forces took advantage of billionaire Elon Musk’s decision in early February to switch off Starlink service near the battlefield—thus substantially slowing Russian communications and weakening the accuracy of Russian weapons. In addition, Ukraine recently launched and expanded several small offensives in the Donbas, the south, and the north, retaking some 200–400 square kilometers of territory. These gains have undermined Moscow’s claims—repeated often—that Russian forces have taken control of Pokrovsk in Donbas and Kupiansk near Kharkiv. They also help puncture the narrative, regrettably shared by some officials in Washington, of inevitable Kremlin battlefield advances.

In some areas, Russia is making advances, but they come at an exorbitant cost—an average of nearly 35,000 dead or wounded per month in 2025, according to a report by analysts Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe. Last spring, there were reports of casualty ratios of one to five or six favoring Ukraine. Recent reporting suggests the ratio has gone up substantially—to the point that Russian recruitment efforts cannot fully replace combat losses, the first time this has happened in the war. Ukraine’s new defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, has indicated that Russian casualties could increase to 50,000 or more a month. Russia’s tactic of deploying what are effectively kamikaze waves of troops, in an attempt to conquer more territory as fast as possible, will only increase its losses.

The Ukrainians I spoke with were also heartened by the successful deployment of the long-discussed Ukrainian Flamingo cruise missile in late February. It successfully hit a Russian arms production facility in the city of Votkinsk, more than eight hundred miles from the Ukrainian border. This new weapon will force Russian defense production and the basing of Russian military aircraft further from the battlefield. It will also complicate the movement of Russian military supplies to occupied Ukraine. Growing economic woes in Russia resulting from the sanctions imposed by Trump on Rosneft and Lukoil, as well as the seizure of several Russian “shadow fleet” oil tankers, also complicate Putin’s war effort.

An end to the war?

There was much talk in Kyiv about the state of the negotiations to end the war. Some Ukrainians were concerned by reports that the Trump administration was pushing hard for their country to hand over the heavily fortified territory of the western Donbas that Russian forces have been unable to take—on the dubious assumption that Moscow would be willing to agree to a durable peace once it controls all of the Donbas. Few Ukrainians accept that logic, but some find comfort in the fact that the United States and Ukraine are now discussing turning this area into a “free economic zone” that would require both Ukrainian and Russian forces to withdraw an equal distance from their current positions.

Some Ukrainians I spoke with also echoed Zelenskyy’s public statements that the US security guarantees agreed by the two parties are robust. As a reminder of how far things have come, a year ago Washington was not willing to discuss guarantees. Of course, according to news reports, these details are only being discussed between the United States and Ukraine. There is no indication that Moscow would be willing to accept anything less than full control of western Donbas. Nor does Russia appear willing to accept European troops in Ukraine as a deterrence force.

We left Kyiv late on February 27. Before arriving in Warsaw the next day, we heard the news of US-Israeli strikes on Iran. Some reports suggested that Trump made the decision because he concluded that Iran was not negotiating in good faith, which was hardly a secret. This decision underscores the puzzle in the Trump administration’s efforts to establish a durable peace ending Russian aggression in Ukraine. Most of the diplomatic energy thus far appears directed at reaching agreement between the United States and Ukraine, while the Kremlin has said no to a half-dozen US proposals to stop the shooting. From time to time, there have been rumors of flexibility from the Kremlin, but so far there is no hard evidence. There were similar rumors about Iranian flexibility—until Trump got tired of being played.

The latest developments in the Middle East underscore the important role that Ukraine can play as a partner to the United States. For years, Iranian Shahed drones have been used by the Russians against Ukrainians. Ukrainians have gained experience protecting themselves against hundreds of Shahed drones aimed at their nation almost every night. As Zelenskyy rightly pointed out in response to the attacks in the Gulf, the world can see that Ukrainian air defense experience is “irreplaceable.”

Note: The author’s travel to Kyiv was sponsored in part by the Victor Pinchuk Foundation, which hosts the Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference.

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Trump wants Iranians to ‘take back their country’ from the regime. Can they?

Alan Pino — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 21:37:09 +0000

As US and Israeli warplanes and missiles began attacking Iran’s military and security infrastructure and senior leaders, both US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for the Iranian people to seize the opportunity to rise up and overthrow the regime. Can a mass uprising bring the Islamic Republic down, especially after the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior officials, and after days or weeks of sustained attacks destroy much of the regime’s security and intelligence apparatus?

On the surface, there would appear reason for optimism. Opposition to the clerical regime in Tehran has been growing for almost a decade. Massive protests erupted in 2017 and 2019 over poor economic conditions but quickly turned into calls by many protesters for the downfall of the government. And the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement, which roiled the country for months in 2022 and 2023 over the security forces’ killing of a young Kurdish woman for not wearing the hijab, featured demands to replace the Islamic Republic with a democratic government committed to protecting basic freedoms.

Many observers felt these protests had crossed the Rubicon in challenging the cleric-led regime’s legitimacy and calling its survival into question. But regime security forces eventually regained control by killing some 550 people, arresting tens of thousands, and maintaining heightened surveillance and the repression of suspected protest leaders and their families.

So, the massive protests that engulfed Iran in January were only the latest wave in growing opposition to the regime during the past decade. The despair of a population over a collapsing economy and a ruthlessly repressive and corrupt regime deaf to calls for change helps to explain why many Iranians are reportedly cheering the US and Israeli assault. But once the bombs stop falling, can the people rise up to oust what remains of the regime?

No one knows exactly what will follow once the US-Israeli strikes end, but a few considerations create grounds for questioning whether an uprising can succeed.

Any effort by the Iranian people to overthrow what is left of the current regime will have to deal with those who have the guns.

First of all, in none of the earlier protests has a clear leadership emerged that was able to inspire and organize followers and articulate a compelling vision of what could come after the mullahs are overthrown. Most of those with the courage to speak out against the regime are currently in prison or in exile, and the regime has been vigilant in preventing any coherent opposition organizations from developing.

Iranian leaders who previously mounted efforts to reform the Islamic Republic rather than overthrow it—such as former President Mohammad Khatami and former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who led the Green Movement after the disputed 2009 election—have been suppressed or sidelined by the regime. They have been largely discredited in the eyes of younger Iranians, who are convinced that for real change to take place, the regime must go.

Outside of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, whose father, the shah, was ousted in the 1979 revolution, has emerged as a potential leader in a post-Islamic Republic government. He has been preaching a message of unity among those who oppose the regime and portraying himself as a potential leader if there were to be a transition to a government chosen freely by the Iranian people. During the recent protests, some demonstrators expressed support for Pahlavi’s return as leader once the current regime is gone. But Pahlavi’s supporters in the diaspora have a history of sowing division and seeking to intimidate other voices in the opposition, and it isn’t clear how much support he actually has inside the country. On Tuesday, Trump told Reuters that he had doubts about Pahlavi’s ability to lead Iran.

Several potential developments could complicate the picture of Iranians rising up to, as Trump put it, “take back their country.” Perhaps, as the regime and its security apparatus grow weaker, Iran’s ethnic minorities will seize the moment to press for greater independence. Kurds in Iran’s northwest, Baloch in the southeast, and Iranian Arabs in Ahvaz province in southwestern Iran have long sought greater autonomy and have at various times taken up arms to challenge the regime’s control.

Regime elites have remained unified in the face of past protests, including the latest uprising in January, and so far appear to be holding firm under the current onslaught from the United States and Israel. But there may soon be splits within the regime itself as security and political leaders scramble for survival and the reins of power. Such splits or defections could take the form of suing for peace to hold onto a remnant of power or trying to consolidate a hardline core of political, military, and religious leaders committed to riding out the current storm.

One thing seems clear. Any effort by the Iranian people to overthrow what is left of the current regime will have to deal with those who have the guns. No matter how devastating the effect of the US and Israeli attacks on Iran’s military and security structures and leadership, many Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders and rank and file are likely to survive and have a say over how things develop in Iran. The IRGC is deeply embedded in the current regime economically, politically, and militarily. Its remaining leaders, or a portion of them, will need to support any opposition leader or movement if it is to succeed. And for that to happen, remaining IRGC leaders will need to be convinced that the old order can no longer survive and the new regime being envisioned will serve their interests.

So can the Iranian people rise up and overthrow the current regime? Their success in doing so is likely to depend on the emergence of a unifying leader, an effective organization, and the ability of the opposition to gain the support of what remains of the IRGC.

Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He previously served for thirty-seven years at the Central Intelligence Agency covering the Middle East and counterterrorism.

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How the US and its allies can prevent an energy supply crisis in the Strait of Hormuz

David L. Goldwyn, Andrea Clabough — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 18:49:14 +0000

WASHINGTON—After weeks of uncertainty, a seemingly perfect storm has formed in the Persian Gulf—one that energy security analysts and risk assessors have long feared. Amid ongoing joint US-Israeli strikes targeting Iranian senior leadership and critical infrastructure, Iranian regime threats are resulting in an effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

With vessel traffic down 70 percent in the past week, voluntary delays for seaborne vessels, and insurers rapidly recalculating their premiums, matters are tense in the passageway through which more than 30 percent of the world’s seaborne crude oil is shipped. Warnings of unsafe conditions in the strait, in combination with missile barrages throughout the Gulf region, suggest that the situation could intensify and persist for days or even weeks—even if Iranian naval forces cannot shut down the waterway by conventional force alone.

Since the strikes began, prices for crude oil have spiked by more than 8 percent, surpassing seventy-five dollars per barrel, following steady price increases in the lead-up to the US-Israeli strikes on February 28. There are several profound uncertainties at play: the risks to future marine transit, the duration of the disruption, the potential for commercial inventories to replace disrupted supply, the demand response to higher prices, and the behavior of governments. All are top of mind for traders and policymakers alike across the world’s major economies.

Despite the relatively moderate oil price impacts so far, there is a real prospect of further escalation in and around these key oil trading zones. Fresh market volatility on Tuesday underscored traders’ concerns. US leadership cannot afford to wait for the worst-case scenario—major supply displacement that could cause prices to soar into the triple digits per barrel. Working with like-minded allies, Washington should leverage the available tools to address the disruption risks immediately, well before uncertainty devolves into catastrophe.

A history of coordinated responses

Fortunately, a review of relevant history offers a helpful guide. The Arab Oil Embargo of the early 1970s spurred the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974, quickly followed by the passage of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act in the US Congress, which created the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Together, these mechanisms enabled the United States to assert global leadership on crisis supply management and created forums for collaboration and measured responses.

The IEA, for example, required its members to hold strategic reserves of at least ninety days of crude oil supply, to be drawn on under specific circumstances and by consensus, and it facilitated voluntary demand-side response measures. The IEA thus became a cornerstone of a US-led coordinated emergency response mechanism. The defensive system that emerged from this collaborative mindset meant that time could be bought in an emergency: The market could be assured that there would be a bridge until a given crisis resolves, with the ability to substitute displaced oil supplies or release additional stockpiles as needed. This reassurance has helped to prevent sudden, dramatic price spikes that the markets, as well as the the oil and gas industry, cannot possibly respond to before they induce severe economic and inflationary consequences.

The need for speed

But speed matters as much as collaboration. In the past, the United States has sometimes delayed its decision to utilize its SPR, such as during the first Gulf war, when prices spiked 140 percent between July and October 1990. The failure to immediately signal to global markets that additional supplies would be released had real consequences for how oil markets responded.

It is easy to see why: Traders need to know whether a release is coming so they can accurately calculate the amount of anticipated disrupted supply. Traders don’t just consider the given day or week; they look significantly further ahead. Likewise, holders of commercial inventories may not release them if they are uncertain about when a drawdown will occur. The vicious cycle thus feeds itself: Uncertainty creates fear, fear incentivizes protection of available resources, and the potential for a supply crunch elevates prices even if real barrels are not yet displaced.

Today, the prevalence of electronic trading and robust futures markets also means that a quick and significant announcement of available strategic stocks (if needed) can have a multiplier effect in mitigating price spikes or preventing them in the first place. For now, the Trump administration has downplayed any role for the SPR in the current conflict, and it has suggested that markets remain well supplied for now. That may well be true—but it may not remain so should the conflict persist for weeks.

What the US can do

The Trump administration has opted for a preemptive strike on Iran, presumably to preclude a national security crisis. It must now act quickly to prevent an oil security crisis.

First, the administration should immediately reengage the IEA and leverage its influence and coordination authorities to reassure markets. Specifically, the IEA can help galvanize members around a consensus agreement: that if the obstruction of the Strait of Hormuz (either from the lack of insurance coverage or an actual physical risk) is not resolved quickly, then they will implement a maximum drawdown of available crude resources for sixty days to ensure that global markets are well supplied.

After all, oil market traders “buy the rumor and sell the fact.” This proactive approach would ensure immediate price moderation, even if the drawdown never takes place or is not fully subscribed. However, a failure to coordinate quickly risks paralyzing market participants who are trying to ascertain the administration’s posture and the likely consequences—elevating the risk of painful price inflation.

This effort will demand serious and thoughtful diplomacy given the uncertain relationship at present between the IEA and the White House, as well as the lack of notice to allies in advance of the US attack on Iran. But the United States’ fellow members of the IEA will have their own economic self-interest implicated in whatever happens next with oil markets. Importantly, the leadership of the IEA on this effort could offer critical neutral ground for multilateral engagement. Moreover, agreeing to address the economic ramifications of the Trump administration’s attack does not itself constitute an endorsement of that act—a point worth underscoring, as it might help bring any wary European partners on board.

Even those major economies outside the IEA would have incentive to be aligned in spirit with this endeavor. Notably, China has built significant strategic reserves over the years and, as the primary buyer of Iranian crude, has a great deal at stake if Iranian production is wholly shut in or other Middle Eastern cargoes are unable to transit to Asia safely. By engaging in quiet diplomacy and leveraging the IEA’s neutrality and convening power, China might be inclined to tacitly participate in a collective drawdown if a formal decision were made to release strategic stocks.

Hope for the best, expect the worst

The history of international coordination on global energy security offers multiple important lessons for the present moment: One need not wait for a crisis to prepare for a crisis and—ideally—to avoid one. An expeditious and coordinated response may not be sufficient to avoid the full consequences of a spiraling regional war for oil markets. However, it can certainly ease sudden inflationary pressure on available supplies and buy time for markets to respond and adjust, as well as for producers to locate alternative supplies.

Above all, this moment offers a golden opportunity for the White House to demonstrate agility, responsiveness, and a collaborative mindset. None of this is altruism; rather, a skillful management of this moment would reflect a comprehensive understanding of the energy security challenge at hand. It would also help the United States reassure allies that the tools they have leveraged for so long continue to work in the here and now.

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Experts react: How the world is responding to the US-Israeli war with Iran

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 18:11:08 +0000

The US-Israeli war against Iran has now escalated into a regional conflict, and consequences are already extending far beyond the Middle East. After asking our Mideast experts to assess the impacts of the war for nearby countries, we’ve turned to our global network to send us dispatches on how leaders in Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America are reacting to the spreading conflict. Here’s what they reported back to us.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Russia: Not riding to the rescue—again

United Kingdom: Trying to stay out of it

European Union: Caught between defending the rules-based order and aligning with Washington

Ukraine: A sense of schadenfreude—but also new risks

Canada: Calibrated, cautious, and aligned with allies

Argentina: A supportive response colored by a history of terror

Spain: Defiance against the US driven by domestic politics

China: A restrained response borne of a bind

While the war with Iran is not all about China, any analysis that neglects Beijing’s role in the war, or dismisses the great-power competition underlying it, is either incomplete or a deliberate red herring.

China’s own decisions have tied it to Middle Eastern geopolitics. In 2018, it proposed a new regional security architecture. In 2023, it brokered the Iran–Saudi rapprochement and hosted Hamas for mediation talks with its rival Palestinian faction Fatah. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative is presented explicitly as an alternative to the US-led order. Iran has received an economic lifeline from Beijing, secured a berth in the bloc of emerging economies knows as BRICS, and had the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operate within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Today China is the largest trading partner, the largest importer, and one of the largest foreign investors across much of the Middle East and North Africa. There are over 400,000 Chinese nationals in the United Arab Emirates alone. Now that population is subjected to attacks from Iranian drones and missiles that are most likely made with China-sourced precursor chemicals and components.

Yet China’s public response to the war has been characteristically limp: evacuation advisories for citizens near conflict zones and formulaic condemnations of Israel and the United States.

Beneath that restraint lies an impossible bind. Iran is at its weakest, detested by its population at home and an exporter of radicalism abroad, yet it is also Beijing’s most reliable anti-Western bulwark and a source of deeply discounted oil. Meanwhile, China lacks the means to counterbalance US and Israeli military dominance. Oil prices rose by more than 5 percent on Monday and could spike toward one hundred dollars a barrel with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf states, which absorb much of China’s Belt and Road Initiative investment and supply roughly a third of China’s crude, are now coming under attack from Iranian missiles and drones.

The irony is acute. It was US military supremacy in the Iraq war and the shockwaves of the Arab Spring that first pushed Beijing toward a more proactive Middle East policy. Now it has gotten a possible regime change and another war in the region, and it is none the wiser.

The pivot point lies with the Gulf monarchies. If they enter the fight, China would face a situation it cannot finesse. But it would also present an opportunity that neither the United States nor Israel could generate alone: to make China a credible offer to stop propping up Tehran and allow for the development of a more stable and prosperous region in which to do business. Whether China is too blinkered by great-power ideology to recognize that opportunity remains the defining question.

—Tuvia Gering is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a researcher at the Diane & Guilford Glazer Foundation Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

Russia: Not riding to the rescue—again

WASHINGTON, DC—One of the knock-on effects of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran is that they have exposed—yet again—that Russia is an unreliable ally.

Iran’s rulers are now absorbing the same bitter lesson learned by the autocrats of Syria and Venezuela before them. For all its talk of establishing a multipolar world, for all of its bluster about leading an anti-Western bloc of states, Moscow lacks the will and the capacity to come to the aid of its alleged partners.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the third Kremlin-backed autocrat to fall in the past fifteen months. When Syrian rebels ousted Kremlin ally Bashar al-Assad from power in 2024, the Kremlin could only grant the deposed dictator asylum in Russia. Likewise, Moscow was helpless to aid Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro when the United States apprehended him in January.

And as Politico reports, when US and Israeli bombs were pounding Iran on Saturday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov “offered his Iranian counterpart sympathy and promised his—verbal—support.” And after Khamenei was killed, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered Tehran little more than condolences.

Beyond Latin America and the Middle East, the trend of the Kremlin abandoning allies and partners is also evident in the former Soviet space. When Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, launched a military campaign to take Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and 2023, Moscow failed to support its erstwhile ally Armenia.

The cold, hard reality is that the Putin regime is so consumed by its war of aggression against Ukraine that it lacks the bandwidth to defend its geopolitical interests elsewhere.

But while the Kremlin has yet again suffered reputational damage, Moscow still hopes to salvage some benefits from the war in Iran. The resulting higher oil prices will benefit Russia’s depleted war chest. Unrest in the Middle East will distract attention and media oxygen from Ukraine. And should the US-Israeli war against Iran turn into a quagmire, Moscow certainly hopes to be a beneficiary of the chaos. As Chatham House’s Grégoire Roos notes: “Until the situation in Iran is clarified, the keywords for Moscow will be ‘strategic hedging.’”

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

United Kingdom: Trying to stay out of it

LONDON—The overwhelming view here is that military action taken by the United States and Israel on Saturday was not the right thing to do while negotiations were edging forward toward a deal. Comparisons are being made to US President George W. Bush’s catastrophic Iraq invasion and the lasting consequences for the region and interests of the United States and its closest ally, the United Kingdom.

In the United Kingdom, the stock of the Trump and Netanyahu administrations’ foreign policy in the Middle East is not high. The apparently premature abandonment of diplomacy for the military option will not have surprised many and has likely reinforced the view that both leaders are acting more for domestic political reasons and their own narrow interests. Military action does not—at least to British eyes—seem to have followed sufficient careful analysis of the US national interest and the broader interests of US allies.

The British political establishment, media, and public are highly critical and unsympathetic to the Islamic Republic of Iran. There was widespread outrage following the massacre of protesters in January. Nevertheless, what is likely to dominate public discourse in the coming days is the United States’ lack of clear, realizable objectives, a legal basis under international law, or new evidence to justify the rush to war and immediate regional destabilization. Those themes will overwhelm any attempt to justify action as a response to what happened in January and the despotic and brutal Islamic regime.

Some commentators, including former Conservative members of parliament and Reform leader Nigel Farage, have argued that the United Kingdom should prioritize supporting its closest ally, the United States, over debate on the legality of military action or how things reached this point. So far, that argument does not seem to have resonated widely.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer and the Labour government are between a rock and a hard place given their championing of the primacy of international law. The lack of clarity from them on what the United Kingdom should do next adds to the general sense that this is not the United Kingdom’s conflict, and that the country would be wise to stay out of it. Of course, events on the ground (for example, Iran striking UK military assets defending allies in the region) may rapidly overtake this position. How Starmer and his government align over the coming days is likely to be highly significant for UK domestic politics.

—Nicholas Hopton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former British ambassador to Iran.

European Union: Caught between defending the rules-based order and aligning with Washington

BRUSSELS—Europe finds itself in a structurally uncomfortable position, partly because of events and partly because of its own past choices. For years, European Union (EU) policy toward Iran was centered on Tehran’s nuclear program and anchored in diplomacy backed by incremental pressure. The priority was containment through negotiation and de-escalation. That approach has long run its course. A coherent new strategy has yet to emerge.

The current crisis exposes both this strategic vacuum and the EU’s internal divisions. Competing logics are at play throughout the bloc.

Some leaders are prioritizing international law, condemning the US-Israeli strikes as a war of choice. Failing to mention international law risks eroding Europe’s credibility as a defender of the rules-based order, particularly in the Global South where accusations of double standards resonate.

Another logic prioritizes transatlantic cohesion. Openly confronting Washington could carry risks at a moment of geopolitical volatility. Europe was just able to avoid US President Donald Trump’s grab for Greenland. Restraint on the Iran issue therefore seems prudent for some.

A third logic concerns Iran itself. Many quietly hope that the strikes weaken a repressive regime, reduce nuclear-proliferation risks, and curb proxy warfare. At the same time, there is concern that escalation or spillover could produce something worse.

Europe is trying hard to reconcile these three concerns, but finding common ground is difficult. Some, such as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, have attempted to bridge the divide by shifting the debate toward the “day after,” urging coordination with Washington and European partners on what follows. This forward-looking framing may paper over intra-European tensions. But it also risks bypassing the unresolved question of principle at the heart of the debate.

—Roderick Kefferpütz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. The views expressed in this article are his own.

Ukraine: A sense of schadenfreude—but also new risks

KYIV—Iran’s Shahed drones have menaced Ukrainians for more than four years, striking our homes and murdering civilians far from the battlefield. So there was a certain amount of schadenfreude across Ukraine as the United States and Israel hobbled the Iranian regime with airstrikes of their own over the weekend. The display of decisive US force against a key Russian ally may have also applied some psychological pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was once again reminded how devastating US military power can be and may be reflecting on potential scenarios for how that could play out if his own regime came under direct attack. Iran’s response—drone and missile attacks across the Middle East—may also provide an opportunity to showcase Ukrainian anti-drone technology, which may be even more effective than some air defenses currently in the region.

The Iran strikes do pose some risks to Ukraine, too. Russian propagandists will likely have no problem warping the attacks on Iran into a justification for Moscow’s so-called “special military operation” against Ukraine. And retaliatory strikes by Iran place a premium on air-defense interceptors, which are already in short supply and which Ukraine desperately needs for its own defense. Finally, any increase in global oil prices means more revenue for the Kremlin to use to continue its war on Ukraine.

—Major General (ret.) Volodymyr Havrylov is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former Ukrainian deputy minister of defense.

Canada: Calibrated, cautious, and aligned with allies

CALGARY—Ottawa’s response to the US–Israeli strikes on Iran and escalating regional tensions has been cautious, calibrated, and aligned with allies.

Speaking to media from a trade mission to India over the weekend, Prime Minister Mark Carney stated that “Canada supports the United States acting to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to prevent its regime from further threatening international peace and security,” while emphasizing that Canada is not militarily engaged. He coupled that support with a call for civilian protection and renewed diplomacy, signaling continuity in Canada’s position that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are destabilizing.

The Canadian Armed Forces are not participating in combat operations but maintain a regional footprint through liaison and intelligence roles under Operation FOUNDATION in Qatar, Bahrain, and Jordan. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has heightened vigilance amid concerns about potential Iranian cyber or proxy activity, though no specific domestic threat has been identified.

Domestically, the conflict resonates deeply. Canada is home to approximately 280,000 Iranian-Canadians, ranking fifth globally among Iranian diaspora populations after the United States, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany. The community’s response reflects both fear for relatives abroad and apprehension about regional spillover. For Ottawa, the challenge is strategic balance: uphold alliance commitments, safeguard domestic cohesion, and preserve diplomatic space in a volatile Middle East.

—Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, and a former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

Argentina: A supportive response colored by a history of terror

WASHINGTON, DC—It’s no surprise that Argentinian President Javier Milei has been the most vocal supporter in Latin America of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran. Since the attacks began, his foreign ministry has voiced strong support for the actions, calling Iran a “threat” to “long-term international stability and security.” After the killing of Khamenei, Milei put out a presidential statement commending the operation, calling the ruthless Iranian leader “one of the most evil, violent, and cruel individuals that human history has ever seen.”

Much of the rest of the region called for restraint or respect for international law (Brazil and Mexico, for example) or outright condemned the US and Israeli airstrikes (Colombia). Paraguay (whose foreign minister spoke with his Israeli counterpart on Sunday) stands out for joining Argentina in explicitly being supportive of this past weekend’s actions. There has been wider agreement, however, on condemning Iran’s retaliatory attacks on Gulf countries, from Argentina and Brazil to Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama.

Argentina’s firm stance in support of the US and Israeli actions is due not only to Milei’s strong support of Israel but also to the fact that Argentina has experienced the scourge of the Iranian regime firsthand. In the early 1990s, Argentina fell victim to two Iran-linked terror attacks that shook the country. In 1992, Hezbollah detonated a truck packed with explosives at the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing twenty-nine people and wounding more than two hundred others. Two years later, a car bomb detonated at the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association Jewish Community Center building in Buenos Aires. That day marked the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentine history, with eighty-five people killed and over three hundred wounded.

Thirty years later, Argentina’s highest criminal court found Iran responsible for this latter bombing. For Argentina, these heinous attacks will never be forgotten and are a constant reminder of the need to prevent Iran from continuing to pose threats to the world. Many of the people accused by the Argentine justice system of serving as the architects of the attacks have since risen through the ranks of Iran’s security and military services with impunity.

Since taking office, Milei has also made a point of aligning his foreign policy with Israel and the United States, marking them as Argentina’s twin examples to follow. Given Argentina’s increasing economic alignment with the United States, and the sentiments of many in Argentina when it comes to Iran, expect Milei to continue to lead the region in supporting actions to dismantle the Iranian regime.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Spain: Defiance against the US driven by domestic politics

After the US-Israeli strikes on Iran began, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez denied the United States the use of jointly operated Spanish airbases and Trump responded by threatening to cut trade ties with Madrid. Sánchez’s decision to pick another fight with the Trump administration should be seen through the lens of Spain’s domestic politics and the prime minister’s attempt to placate the extreme left of his base. As his popularity wanes, Sánchez knows well that standing up to the United States and Israel will resonate with certain sectors of the electorate, as did his decision last year to make Spain the sole NATO member not to commit to increase defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product. This all plays well with Sánchez’s base as his Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party looks ahead to regional parliamentary elections this year and the 2027 national elections. By citing international law and the legacy of the 2003 Iraq war, Sánchez can prey on lingering passions of the Spanish left to solidify his own weak position.

But Sánchez will also open himself up to political attacks that question the coherence of these actions. Alberto Feijoó, leader of the center-right Popular Party, has already accused Sánchez of sacrificing Spain’s foreign policy credibility to partisan politics. The European Commission released a statement expressing its solidarity with Spain over Trump’s trade threat. But this issue will nevertheless add to a growing suspicion in European capitals about Spain’s reliability as a strategic partner as Europe prepares to act more independently. As calls for a “two-speed” Europe become louder, Sánchez’s decision to self-isolate Spain may give ammunition to those who prefer to leave Madrid in the second tier of any future multi-tier EU architecture.

—Andrew Bernard is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Ukraine’s experience is indispensable in the fight against Iranian drones

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 01:14:09 +0000

UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer says Britain plans to deploy Ukrainian drone warfare specialists to the Middle East as part of international efforts to counter the growing threat posed by swarms of Iranian drones. Amid Iranian airstrikes across the region, Starmer announced on March 1 that Britain would “bring experts from Ukraine to help Gulf partners shoot down Iranian drones attacking them.”

For Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Starmer’s proposal represents long overdue recognition of his country’s status as a military force to be reckoned with. “Ukraine’s experience in defense is, in many respects, irreplaceable,” Zelenskyy commented following Starmer’s remarks. While the Ukrainian leader has yet to commit to a role in the Gulf, he has offered to dispatch Ukraine’s leading anti-drone specialists if regional leaders can first convince Vladimir Putin to pause his ongoing invasion.

Britain’s decision to call on Ukrainian expertise serves to underline modern Ukraine’s remarkable transformation from military backwater to world leader in drone warfare. When the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, decades of post-Soviet neglect had left the Ukrainian military in a sorry state. At the time, Kyiv could only call on a few thousand combat troops and had to rely on a ragtag collection of volunteer battalions to contain Kremlin forces in the east of the country.

A series of ambitious reforms followed, but it was not until the full-scale invasion of February 2022 that the Ukrainian army truly came of age. Faced with the existential threat of Russia’s invasion, the Ukrainian nation rose up to resist. The ranks of the army swelled to include around one million troops, while the country’s stagnant defense industry was soon taking the first steps toward an unprecedented resurgence that continues to this day.

Over the past four years, much of Ukraine’s defense sector growth has focused on new technologies as Ukrainians have sought ways to counter Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of funding, manpower, and conventional weapons. A thriving domestic ecosystem of defense tech startups has emerged, with a particular emphasis on drone production. Ukrainian developers are able to test new ideas almost immediately in combat conditions, leading to a culture of relentless innovation that has turbo-charged the evolution of drone warfare and reshaped the battlefield.

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Ukraine’s prowess has not gone unnoticed, with numerous European partners seeking to benefit from Ukrainian military know-how. In recent weeks, Germany became the latest NATO country to unveil plans for Ukrainian military instructors to train their troops. Ukrainian trainers are also reportedly sharing their drone warfare insights with multiple other European countries including Poland and Britain.

This represents a striking shift in the relationship between Ukraine and the country’s allies. Throughout the period from 2014 until 2022, Western military trainers routinely traveled to Ukraine to provide instruction, while the defense sector discourse in Kyiv revolved around Ukrainian efforts to adopt and incorporate NATO standards. After four years of defending themselves against the biggest European invasion since World War II, it is now Ukraine that is setting the standards, while NATO commanders try to catch up.

Ukraine’s NATO partners have much to learn, it would seem. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that during a spring 2025 exercise in Estonia involving NATO forces and Ukrainian drone crews, the Ukrainians easily overcame a far larger NATO contingent, sparking considerable alarm and much debate. Meanwhile, many Ukrainian soldiers have noted that the military equipment provided by the country’s Western partners is often now redundant due to the lightning pace of the technological advances taking place on the Ukrainian battlefield.

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Ukraine’s emergence as a major military power is a nightmare scenario for Russia. When Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion four years ago, he identified the “demilitarization” of Ukraine as one of his two key war aims. If demilitarization was the goal, the invasion has failed in spectacular fashion. Far from being demilitarized, today’s Ukraine now boasts the largest and most technologically advanced army in Europe.

Across the continent, there is growing awareness that with the United States seeking to reduce its transatlantic security commitments, Ukraine is destined to play a central role in the future defense of Europe. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any European security strategy that doesn’t include Ukraine as a core contributor. A country that spent years fruitlessly seeking an invitation to join NATO is now acknowledged as a guarantor of Europe’s security at a time when faith in the effectiveness of the alliance has fallen to record lows.

Zelenskyy’s proposal to send specialists to the Middle East in exchange for a Kremlin ceasefire should probably not be taken literally, but it does reflect the confidence of a man who knows his country is more prepared than most for the realities of twenty-first century warfare. Zelenskyy clearly recognizes that Ukraine’s unrivaled experience is a valuable commodity. This is particularly true in the current context, with Iranian drones saturating existing air defenses and demanding the kind of cost-effective solutions that Ukraine has spent the past four years perfecting.

The Ukrainian leader also well aware that his country’s military strength represents a major trump card as he seeks to negotiate a settlement that will safeguard Ukrainian statehood and secure the country’s European future. The war unleashed by Putin in 2022 was meant to strip Ukraine of its army, its identity, and its sovereignty. Instead, it has transformed Ukraine into one of Europe’s leading military powers and positioned the country at the cutting edge of global defense sector innovation. This new reality will help define Ukraine’s place in the wider world for decades to come, while serving as a formidable obstacle to Russia’s imperial ambitions.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The Gulf that emerges from the Iran war will be very different

Allison Minor — Mon, 02 Mar 2026 23:58:06 +0000

WASHINGTON—The opening days of the latest Iran war shocked the Gulf to its core. Within the first forty-eight hours of the conflict, Iran targeted all the countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which suffered the brunt of hundreds of drones and missiles, to Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and beyond. Iran did not limit its strikes to US military bases in many of those countries; it also targeted civilian sites, including airports and hotels, followed by major oil and gas infrastructure. Gulf air defenses were largely effective against Iranian missiles, helping prevent catastrophic damage, but Iranian drones proved harder to repel. The casualties and damage from drones to major airports and iconic tourist spots will have lasting consequences on the region’s reputation as a business hub.

In response to Iran’s assault, the GCC states have banded together, demonstrating that even amid a public feud between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Gulf solidarity remains strong. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have made it clear that Iranian attacks crossed a red line, and that they reserve the right to respond.

US President Donald Trump told CNN on Monday that the Iranian attacks on the Gulf were “the biggest surprise” of the conflict so far. The Gulf countries, he said, “were going to be very little involved and now they insist on being involved.”

Regardless of whether the Gulf states decide to respond militarily in the coming days, the events of the weekend will force them to reassess their national security and economic strategies in ways that could have lasting consequences, long after US operations in Iran have concluded.

Shockwaves in the UAE

The overwhelming Iranian assault on the UAE is one of the most noteworthy elements of the initial Iranian response. The UAE suffered almost as many Iranian missiles and drones as Israel in the first twenty-four hours of the war, despite vowing that it would not allow its airspace to be used to attack Iran. Abu Dhabi and Tehran had maintained a longstanding “gentlemen’s agreement” to avoid direct confrontation, based in part on the fact that Iran has considerable financial interests in Dubai. It is not clear why Iran targeted the UAE so aggressively, but Tehran may assume the UAE can pressure Washington to stop the campaign. Iran might also be aware that attacks on Dubai are a major pain point for the UAE, which relies on the city’s reputation as a business and tourist hub.

The UAE spent decades fostering Dubai’s global reputation as an oasis of stability, and that reputation is a keystone of the UAE’s economic approach. Over three quarters of the UAE’s gross domestic product comes from non-oil sectors, and those sectors are the primary source of economic growth. But that reputation is also a considerable vulnerability for a country that sits only several dozen miles from Iran.

In 2019, the UAE decided that the best way to protect its reputation as a business and tourism hub was to pursue de-escalation with Iran. At that time, a series of attacks on ships off the UAE coast convinced Emirati leaders that confrontation with Iran was too risky and US security guarantees were insufficient. They paired a gentlemen’s agreement with Iran with a similar détente with the Houthis in Yemen, winding down a series of ground offensives by UAE-backed Yemeni forces against the Houthis. The UAE’s de-escalation strategy was reinforced by the muted US response to Iran-backed attacks on a major oil site in Saudi Arabia in September 2019, which ultimately led Riyadh to pursue a similar agreement with Tehran.

When the Houthis attacked the UAE in January 2022 with apparent Iranian support, it forced a moment of reflection for Abu Dhabi: While the UAE repelled most of the drones and missiles, the attacks suggested that their gentlemen’s agreement with Iran and the Houthis had proven insufficient. Some Emiratis refer to the 2022 attacks as “our September 11,” because they forced such a profound reckoning for the country. The Iranian assault over the weekend was an exponentially greater assault: over ten times as many missiles and drones, more casualties, and direct hits in the heart of Dubai. If the January 2022 attacks challenged the UAE’s national security and economic approach, Iran’s attacks will likely force a wholesale reassessment of the UAE’s approach.

While US and Israeli strikes have degraded Iranian military capabilities and crippled the regime, Iran continues to pose a threat to the UAE given its proximity and the effectiveness of Tehran’s ample drones in disrupting stability in Dubai. It remains unclear how the UAE will respond to this threat, but Emirati leaders are undoubtedly going to be looking for a new strategy.

The limits of a “friends to all” approach

Another surprising aspect of the Iranian response was that it targeted Oman, a country that has been careful to balance cooperation with the United States with close relations with Iran. Accordingly, the US military presence in Oman is much more limited than in other Gulf countries.

The Omani approach, colloquially known as “friend to all, enemy to none,” has allowed Oman to be a mediator with the Iranians and previously protected the country from the kind of Iranian threats experienced by its neighbors. The fact that even Oman fell victim to an Iranian attack underscores that in the current conflict, all countries in the region are being pushed to choose a side.

An inflection point for Gulf-US military relations

Iran’s stated justification for striking its Gulf neighbors has been the presence of US bases and other military assets in the countries, even if its attacks have not been limited to those sites. Gulf states long believed that the presence of US military bases on their territory would translate into US security support, especially against Iranian and Iran-backed attacks. But as the United States has sought to reduce its military presence in the Middle East, Gulf governments have grown concerned that US forces would not come to their defense in times of need. The US response to the Iran-backed attacks in 2019 reinforced this concern. That concern escalated considerably in August 2025, when Israel struck Hamas personnel in Doha. The Israeli strike suggested that Qatar’s status as a US major non-NATO ally and the presence of the largest US military base in the region in Qatari territory were incapable of shielding the country from attacks.

Iran’s attacks on the Gulf over the weekend—combined with the prospect of sustained instability in Iran—have increased the perceived risks of housing US military bases at a time when Gulf states are also questioning the benefits of such bases. In the face of this shifting cost-benefit analysis, it is critical that the United States undertake a serious dialogue with all its Gulf partners about the future of its military relations in the region.

Riyadh eyes a new era

Saudi Arabia arguably stands to benefit the most from a weakened Iran. Saudi Arabia has long sought to become the dominant power in the Middle East, and Iran has consistently posed the greatest threat to this goal given its military capabilities, network of proxies, and regional ambitions. That threat was dulled following last year’s twelve-day war and the weakening of Iran’s proxy network. Now, the ongoing US and Israeli operations could deal a more resounding blow. Saudi Arabia’s dominant role in the region may explain why Iran initially demonstrated relative restraint: In the first forty-eight hours since US and Israeli strikes began, Iran reportedly conducted just two attacks on Saudi Arabia, compared to more than 150 missiles and five hundred drones against the UAE. Iran may have calculated that Saudi Arabia was the most likely of the Gulf countries to respond militarily, and so refrained from major attacks against Saudi Arabia until it made the decision to elevate its attacks against the Gulf on March 2, at which point it started targeting major oil and gas infrastructure in the region, including Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman appears prepared to seize upon the current opportunity to cement Riyadh’s role as the dominant power in the Middle East, even as Saudi Arabia remains wary about US and Israeli operations. This nuance helps explain the mixed messaging regarding whether Saudi officials were advocating US strikes against Iran. As Saudi Arabia mulls its response to the Iranian attacks, Riyadh will be seeking to gauge how best to shape what comes next in Iran and whether the current operations provide a credible opportunity to durably address the Iranian threat. Inconsistent US messaging on Washington’s objectives for the campaign poses a serious challenge for Riyadh in this regard. And Saudi success is far from guaranteed: A crippled Iranian regime may not be able to compete with Saudi influence in the way it once did, but an unstable Iran could pose a sustained threat to Saudi Arabia and the rest of the region, especially if Iran’s allies in Yemen decide to seize upon the turmoil to break their long détente with Riyadh. As events continue to unfold over the coming weeks, Saudi Arabia’s posture could provide valuable clues to what the coming era in the Middle East may bring.

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Missiles made in Ukraine are bringing Putin’s invasion home to Russia

David Kirichenko — Mon, 02 Mar 2026 23:47:55 +0000

Ukraine conducted a landmark airstrike in late February, using domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles to hit a military production facility deep inside Russia. The strike on the Votkinsk complex, which produces a range of ballistic and cruise missiles for the Russian military, marked the first time Kyiv had successfully targeted a strategically significant Russian defense industry site with long-range missiles manufactured in Ukraine.

Surveillance camera footage and satellite images released following the attack appeared to show evidence of a precision hit that caused extensive damage. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed news of the strike as an indication of Ukraine’s growing capabilities. “We carried out precise strikes with Flamingo missiles at a range of 1,400 kilometers. I believe this is truly a success for our industry,” he commented.

The attack has helped restore the credibility of Ukraine’s Flamingo missile program, which has been subject to much speculation and significant skepticism since first making headlines last summer. The missiles, developed by Ukrainian defense sector startup Fire Point, generated a considerable amount of initial buzz but failed to make any major impact on the battlefield during the second half of 2025. Zelenskyy recently acknowledged that development was delayed by a Russian attack on a production site.

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The emergence of the Flamingo as a credible threat marks a major upgrade in Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. With a reported maximum range of around three thousand kilometers and a payload of over one thousand kilograms, the Flamingo is far more powerful than the drones typically used by Ukraine for strikes inside Russia. While long-range drones have been instrumental in puncturing the myth of Russian invulnerability, their relatively small payloads have meant that damage caused in attacks is often easy to repair. As the recent strike in Votkinsk demonstrated, the Flamingo has the potential to be far more destructive.

Much will now depend on Ukraine’s ability to scale up output and produce enough Flamingos to make a difference. While the February attack on the Votkinsk facility was a success, Ukrainian officials have since confirmed that multiple missiles were required in order for one to hit home. It will therefore be crucial to manufacture entire flocks of Flamingos if the Ukrainians wish to make the most of this new weapon.

The Flamingo initiative is one of a number of Ukrainian missile projects currently under development. Ukraine is pouring millions of dollars into a new domestic “missile market” that aims to replicate the success of its rapidly expanding drone industry. Recently appointed Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov has noted that the government is acting like a venture investor by giving large grants to multiple different local companies active in missile production.

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Ukraine’s emphasis on the development domestic missile capabilities makes strategic sense. The front lines of the war have remained largely static for over three years, with Russia unable to secure any decisive breakthroughs despite holding the battlefield initiative throughout this period. Kyiv’s current plan is to reduce any further Russian advances to a bare minimum while inflicting crippling losses. In parallel, Ukraine aims to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia with an escalating campaign of airstrikes using missiles in combination with drones.

Ukrainian commanders are playing a long game by targeting the Russian oil refineries, energy infrastructure, and military production facilities that support the war effort. This approach is designed to gradually erode Moscow’s ability to generate revenues and fund the invasion. Adding missiles to the mix dramatically increases the challenges facing the Kremlin. As Ukraine’s long-range arsenal expands, Russia’s limited air defenses will be stretched thinner and thinner. The end goal is to transform Russia’s vastness from an asset into a liability.

No single weapon can serve as a silver bullet to stop Russia’s invasion. However, the true significance of Ukraine’s domestic missile program lies in its trajectory. If Kyiv can maintain the current pace of innovation while simultaneously reducing costs and scaling production, this will greatly strengthen the country’s position at the negotiating table.

Putin seems to be well aware of the dangers posed by long-range missiles and has worked hard to prevent Kyiv’s partners from supplying Ukraine with these weapons. When Western leaders mulled lifting restrictions on the use of Western missiles against targets inside Russia in late 2024, Putin warned that this would place NATO “at war” and Russia. More recently, he intervened directly when US President Donald Trump appeared to be on the verge of providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.

There is no denying that Putin has been successful in his efforts to deter Kyiv’s allies, but he cannot stop the Ukrainians from producing their own long-range missiles. If this trend continues, it can help establish a framework for a pragmatic settlement. Many in Ukraine believe a strong arsenal of domestically produced long-range missiles can serve as a meaningful deterrent against future Russian aggression. While Ukrainians have little faith in written security guarantees, they see long-range missile capabilities as something Putin simply cannot ignore.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Europe must not seek Putin’s approval before sending troops to Ukraine

Stephen Blank — Mon, 02 Mar 2026 22:49:46 +0000

European leaders will not send troops to monitor a ceasefire in Ukraine without first securing permission from Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Britain’s Telegraph reports. The news represents a significant political victory for Russia and comes following a coordinated Kremlin campaign of intimidation designed to deter any European military deployment to Ukraine.

This informal Russian veto over European troops in Ukraine places a key element of the current peace process in jeopardy. Ever since the so-called Coalition of the Willing began to take shape in early 2025, participating countries led by Britain and France have been developing plans to send a significant number of troops to Ukraine following a ceasefire in order to monitor adherence and serve as a reassurance force. However, Putin has consistently signaled that he will not agree to a European military presence, with Kremlin officials stating that any European soldiers sent to Ukraine would be “legitimate targets.”

These threats appear to have worked. With the Coalition of the Willing reportedly unwilling to act unless Putin gives them the green light, the entire concept of a reassurance force is now in doubt. This means that a viable and independently monitored ceasefire in Ukraine looks to be unattainable. All Putin need do to block the process is withhold his approval indefinitely.

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Europe’s reluctance to sanction a military mission to Ukraine without Russia’s prior agreement is the latest setback to a faltering peace process. After more than a year of false starts and fruitless talks, many now believe that Russia has no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire and does not genuinely seek peace.

Critics argue that Putin is using the current US-led negotiations to buy time and as an opportunity win over the Trump administration. The Kremlin dictator remains adamant that despite the slow progress of his invasion, Russia will still ultimately achieve its goals in Ukraine. It came as no surprise when reports emerged recently claiming that Russian officials are privately mocking Trump for his naivety about Putin’s true intentions.

With little prospect of progress toward a negotiated peace settlement, Western leaders should be focusing their energies on steps to secure Russia’s defeat in Ukraine. Unfortunately, however, there currently appears to be little chance of this happening. Since 2022, the West has largely wasted Ukraine’s sacrifices while failing to arm Kyiv for victory or impose sufficiently stiff sanctions on Moscow. As the invasion enters a fifth year, there are now some signs of growing European resolve, but much more needs to be done in order to stop Russia.

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Putin’s ability to intimidate European leaders on the issue of troop deployments to Ukraine underlines Europe’s continued lack of credibility in the international security arena. While there has been plenty of talk in European capitals over the past year about the need for greater strategic autonomy, this has yet to translate into concrete action. European governments are still not ready to provide credible deterrence against Russia and suffer from an absence of overall leadership that makes decisive action in the security sphere particularly challenging.

The Trump administration’s efforts to step back from transatlantic security commitments have highlighted the need for increased European defense spending, but Europe remains reliant on the US and has no practical alternative to NATO. It is therefore important to reinvigorate rather than undermine the alliance. Instead, the opposite is happening, with faith in NATO’s collective security commitment presently at all-time lows. This only emboldens Putin. Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump is actually validating European fears by demanding that Ukraine and not Russia make concessions to end the war.

Intelligence agencies and Western government officials increasingly acknowledge that Russia is preparing for a wider European war. This makes it all the more vital to increase backing for Ukraine and integrate the country deeper into Europe’s defense architecture. There are signs this is well understood, with encouraging recent developments including the co-production of weapons in a number of European countries for use in Ukraine.

Putin has long since made clear that he will only negotiate under duress. The Kremlin dictator remains committed to erasing Ukrainian statehood and will not enter into serious talks to end the war until the alternative is defeat. In order to reach that point, Europe must continue to rearm while incorporating the lessons learned on the battlefields of Ukraine and developing the drone capabilities that will define the wars of the future.

Crucially, European leaders must also recover their political nerve and demonstrate to Putin that he cannot hope to intimidate them indefinitely. They can begin by declaring that Russia does not get to decide whether European troops are deployed to a sovereign and independent Ukraine.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The Gulf: Iran is losing credibility with its attacks

The Gulf: Mediation has become unappealing

Iraq: An opportunity to reestablish its sovereignty

Lebanon: Hezbollah’s aims remain uncertain

Turkey: Bracing for impact in security, the economy, and diplomacy

Palestinian territories: Losing the world’s attention yet again

Israel: Echoes of Purim in a diminishing threat

JERUSALEM—Purim, which will be celebrated later this week, is figuring prominently in Israeli renditions of Operation Roaring Lion. The annual festival—which commemorates the deliverance of the Jewish people from annihilation in fifth century BCE Persia—has been invoked by both Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir as a backdrop to the contemporary US-Israeli campaign to precipitate the downfall of Iran’s Islamic regime. Now, as then, hope springs for a happy ending to the story.

All sides to this conflict were witness to an abundance of signals that a reprisal of the June 2025 twelve-day war was brewing. But a fundamental misreading of that landscape by an over-confident Iranian leadership—notorious for its “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” refrains—played directly into the hands of skeptics who believed that no deal would be forthcoming and that Iran’s malign influence could be extinguished only by force of arms.

Having been around this exact same block countless times before, Iranian negotiators approached their discussions with US presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner as a familiar dance with Washington that would unfold, as in the past, through multiple rounds of talks in various international capitals over the minutiae of a bargain. That strategy was ill-suited to US President Donald Trump, however, who, after promising Iranian anti-regime protesters on January 13 that “help is on its way” and also assembling a “beautiful armada” to challenge Iran, could not fathom “why they haven’t capitulated.” Time ran out finally after the administration determined that its genuine offers were “met with games, tricks, [and] stall tactics.”

That same miscalculation led Iranian decision-makers to position their most senior echelon and deploy their resources with apparent complacency, effectively exposing them to a joint Israeli and US attack that had been planned meticulously in advance. (Israeli media reported that the Israel Air Force “eliminated 30 high-level officials in [the first] 30 seconds.”) Since the start of the fighting, Iran has expanded the circle of combatants, targeting infrastructure in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman—thus committing another blunder by antagonizing neighboring countries that otherwise may have been inclined to remain on the fence.

From Israel’s perspective, the stars have never been better aligned for impactful change in Iran. And yet, ultimately, as US and Israeli principals have asserted repeatedly, it will fall to the Iranian public to step up and chart their own future. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take,” Trump said on Saturday. That process, however, could prove tortuous as the regime struggles to retain control and uncertainly prevails concerning the existence of viable (non-Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated) candidates who might mobilize to seize the reins of power. Despite the casualties that Iran is inflicting now on Israel’s home front, Israelis are hopeful, tentatively, that the demise of a belligerent Shia axis—and the ascent of a peaceful, collaborative Middle East—might be within reach.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administrations of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

The United Arab Emirates: Closer to the US-Israeli position than it wants to be

ABU DHABI—Following the joint US and Israeli strikes on Iran, Iran launched retaliatory missile and drone attacks against US military bases hosted in the UAE such as Al Dhafra Air Base, resulting in direct impacts on UAE territory. The attacks soon expanded to civilian sites in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, with hotels, airports, and free zones (Jebel Ali) suffering attacks or damage from intercepted strikes.

The UAE’s air defense systems successfully intercepted several Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. However, debris from these intercepts and potential misses resulted in damage and casualties. At least one individual was killed in Abu Dhabi due to falling missile debris, and several others sustained injuries in locations like Dubai’s Palm Jumeirah.

The UAE has strongly condemned Iran’s missile strikes, calling them a direct violation of sovereignty and international law. The UAE also has condemned Iran’s efforts to regionalize the conflict and reiterated its stance against using regional countries’ territories to settle disputes or expand conflicts. Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, called Iran’s approach irrational and said that, in its unresponsiveness to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) diplomacy, Iran was isolating itself.

The confrontation is forcing the UAE much closer to the US and Israeli position than it wants to be. On the one hand, the UAE remains a security partner of the United States. It quietly aligns with Israel on many regional concerns, especially regarding Iran’s missile program and its network of regional militias. On the other hand, the UAE has heavily invested in building a more stable relationship with Tehran. Trade has grown, diplomatic ties have been renewed, and both sides have been working to prevent escalation in the Gulf.

The recent strikes are undoing these advances. UAE officials asserted the country’s “full right to respond” and take all necessary measures to protect its territory, people, and interests. This includes potential actions to deter further aggression, though no specific retaliatory steps have been announced.

UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan spoke with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman following the events, and both expressed solidarity, warned against further escalation, and called for restraint and diplomacy. This aligns with broader Gulf reactions; countries like Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait issued similar condemnations of Iran’s actions.

But with ongoing strikes on Sunday morning in the UAE, tensions remain elevated.

—Eric Alter is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and the dean of the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi.

The Gulf: Iran is losing credibility with its attacks

DOHA—Iran has made a serious strategic miscalculation by widening its confrontation to include the GCC states, despite their clear and consistent rejection of war. These countries stated unequivocally that they would not allow their territory, airspace, or military bases to be used for operations against Tehran. They chose restraint and diplomacy over escalation, yet they still found themselves directly targeted.

In the recent escalation linked to US-Israeli strikes on Iran, Iranian missiles or projectiles hit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. None of these states launched attacks against Iran from their territory. Their involvement in the broader conflict was neither offensive nor direct. Nevertheless, they became part of a widening cycle of retaliation that they actively sought to avoid.

For Qatar, there is no indication that it has directly joined offensive actions against Iran so far, but by stating that it has the “right to respond,” Doha is leaving its options open—whether that involves diplomacy, defensive actions, or strikes coordinated with allies.

What makes this escalation particularly alarming is that the Iranian strikes were not limited to military installations, despite Tehran’s claims. They affected airports, critical infrastructure, hotels, and residential areas—spaces where civilians live, work, and travel. Such actions extend beyond conventional battlefield engagement. They amount to a serious violation of sovereignty and pose a direct threat to regional stability. The approach disregards international law and undermines the fundamental principles that govern peaceful relations between neighboring states.

Regardless of how the broader conflict unfolds, the impact on Iran’s regional credibility is already significant. Trust, once damaged, is difficult to restore. Gulf states have long supported mediation efforts, particularly those led by Oman and Qatar, to reduce tensions and sustain dialogue. Targeting countries that backed de-escalation weakens those initiatives.

If Tehran believes such actions create leverage, that assessment is flawed. Instead of acquiring more influence, Iran risks deeper isolation and stronger regional alignment against it. The international community must clearly condemn these attacks and affirm the right of affected states to defend their sovereignty and protect their people.

—Khalid Al-Jaber is the executive director of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. He is a distinguished scholar and practitioner specializing in political communication and Middle East and North Africa affairs.

The Gulf: Mediation has become unappealing

RIYADH—Causalities are a tragic inevitability of war, and diplomacy in the region is now one of them. Despite the immense investment in rapprochement over the past years, this war and the unfolding events associated with it indicate that the region has entered a post-rapprochement era and is heading toward calculated militarization.

The Arab Gulf states have been restructuring their respective economies in the hopes of making them more diversified and attractive for tourism and investment. These states knew this could not happen in a turbulent region. Given US reluctance to provide security guarantees for Arab Gulf states, Gulf-Iran rapprochement was necessary.

This rapprochement was a laborious and taxing psychological approach, akin to a psychologist dealing with a traumatized patient with violent outbursts. But there was a genuine conviction that dialogue was the best way of achieving Gulf security. That approach is now upended.

What compounds this dilemma is that both Iran and Arab Gulf states, especially the mediators (Oman and Qatar), believe that mediation has caused more insecurity for them, whether in the form of Israeli strikes on Doha in September 2025 or the strikes on Oman on Sunday or Iran being struck twice as negotiations were taking place. Mediation—particularly involving Iran and Israel—has become unappealing.

A post-Khamenei Iran that will most likely be confrontational is emerging in tandem with the Arab Gulf states recalculating their approach toward Iran. As a result, the mode of diplomacy in Arab Gulf states will be far more proactive in building their deterrence via capabilities rather than alliances.

— Aziz Alghashian is a senior nonresident fellow at the Gulf International Forum.

Iraq: An opportunity to reestablish its sovereignty

A weakened Iran or the fall of the regime provides a dramatic opportunity to alter the course of Iraq, binding it more closely to the West and the region and reducing Iran’s influence. Iraq and Iran remain inextricably linked, with close political coordination between elites, significant economic linkages, and the continued presence of Iraqi militias supported and directed by Iran. An Iran that is less focused on meddling in Iraqi affairs could allow the Iraqi state to reestablish its sovereignty. But this will not necessarily mean that the Iraqi government will take decisions that align with US interests.

Iraq remains a venue for confrontation between the United States and Iran, with Iraq frequently pulled into conflict between the two rivals despite its attempts to navigate a foreign policy that maintains relations with both. In the short term, militia strikes against US or Israeli targets could start a cycle of retaliation that could lead to US strikes against senior Iraqi militia leaders. Thus far, there have been threats from hardline militias like Kataib Hezballah and several militia attacks by a Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhida-affiliated militia on the US base in Erbil. These attacks could increase in coming days following several US strikes in Iraq that killed militia members. At the same time, many Iraqi militias will decide to sit this out, protecting their political and economic interests in Iraq. Under pressure from the United States, a number of prominent militias, such as Asa’ib ahl al-Haq (AAH), have already announced their readiness to disarm—demonstrating the extent to which certain militias have become focused on their interests in Iraq rather than acting as a tool of Iran.

With the strikes on Iran as the new backdrop, Iraq’s Shia Coordination Framework is still paralyzed by the process to select the next prime minister after Trump’s sharp public message opposing former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s third term. US statements suggested that Iran’s support for Maliki’s candidacy was the overwhelming reason to oppose him. The deaths of the supreme leader and other senior Iranian leaders might break the gridlock. However, Maliki will remain a formidable force within Iraqi politics with or without Iranian backing.

—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and a former deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran in the US State Department.

Lebanon: Hezbollah’s aims remain uncertain

BEIRUT—By killing Khamenei and launching a massive air campaign against Iran, with the explicit goal of effecting regime change, the United States and Israel have smashed Hezbollah’s “red line.” However, there was no knee-jerk military retaliation by Hezbollah to the assassination of Khamenei, and even the statements released by Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem mourning the loss of the group’s spiritual leader contained no threats of revenge.

Hezbollah is facing the biggest dilemma of its forty-five-year existence. If Hezbollah attacks Israel, on Iranian instructions, the Israelis would respond with overwhelming force, not only targeting the organization but also potentially striking Lebanese infrastructure such as Beirut airport, power stations, and bridges. In the aftermath, no Lebanese, including Shias, will thank Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into another ruinous war for the sake of a country lying more than five hundred miles to the east for which few Lebanese have much sympathy.

The loss of Khamenei is significant, but theoretically a new supreme leader will eventually be elected—if the regime survives the current onslaught—and the chain of command will continue. The death in September 2024 of former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah carried far more emotional impact for Lebanese Shias than Khamenei’s demise. Therefore, Khamenei’s death alone may not require an overt military response from Hezbollah given that such a response could end up destroying the organization.

On the other hand, if Hezbollah’s leadership chooses to ignore an Iranian instruction to attack, the decision would risk rupturing the material and ideological linkage that binds the party to Iran’s clerical leadership. Qassem appears to be a pragmatist and has been restructuring Hezbollah with an eye on survival in the Lebanese domestic context, while his organization is under enormous pressure to disarm. To that end, he has focused on centralizing control, tightening security, reducing the size of the Islamic Resistance military wing, and promoting figures with more of a political background than religious or military one.

At this stage, it does not appear that Iran has asked for Hezbollah’s overt intervention. But if the order is given, it can no longer be assumed that Qassem would automatically comply. There are, however, many variables. There appears to be some dissatisfaction among military elements within the Islamic Resistance toward the current political leadership. While this scenario is unlikely, it cannot be ruled out that some commanders could conclude that loyalty to the slain Khamenei and the “Islamic revolution,” as well as frustration at not retaliating against Israel’s year-long, near-daily airstrikes against Hezbollah targets, requires action even without formal leadership approval. Furthermore, Iran itself could seek to pre-empt hesitation in Beirut by asserting more direct operational control and deploying the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force to directly command the Islamic Resistance, effectively sidelining party leaders from the decision-making cycle.

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria.

Turkey: Bracing for impact in security, the economy, and diplomacy

Given its 330-mile shared border with Iran and its role as a regional mediator and NATO member, Ankara is currently navigating a high-stakes crisis. The following areas are where Turkey will feel the most impact:

1. Security and border control

Refugee influx: Turkey’s primary fear is a mass migration wave. With over 3.5 million Syrian refugees already in the country, the prospect of hundreds of thousands of Iranians (and Afghans currently residing in Iran) fleeing toward the Turkish border is viewed as an existential threat to social stability.
The Kurdish factor: Ankara is deeply concerned that a power vacuum in Tehran could embolden Kurdish separatist groups. Specifically, Turkish officials worry that the Kurdistan Free Life Party, or PJAK (the Iranian wing of the terrorist-designated Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK) could gain autonomy in northwestern Iran, creating a new security vacuum similar to that in northern Syria.
NATO positioning: As a NATO member hosting the Küreçik radar station and İncirlik Air Base, Turkey is in a delicate position. While it provides critical infrastructure for the Alliance, it has historically refused to allow its territory to be used for offensive strikes against its neighbors. The presidential office announced that Turkey is not allowing the bases to be utilized for the attacks.

2. Economic disruption

Energy security: Iran currently provides approximately 15 percent of Turkey’s natural gas. Any damage to the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline or a halt in exports would cause immediate energy shortages, and spike heating and electricity prices during the remaining winter weeks.
Inflationary pressure: Turkey is already battling significant inflation (roughly 31 percent as of early 2026). A regional war typically drives up global oil prices; as an energy importer, Turkey’s current account deficit could widen and the Lira could face further downward pressure.

3. Diplomatic standing

The “non-aligned” stance: Turkish diplomatic sources have already stated that Ankara is not taking sides in this conflict. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan is reportedly leading a “diplomatic push” to secure a cease-fire and prevent the total collapse of the Iranian state.
Mediator role: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who spoke with Trump on Saturday, has previously proposed a trilateral mediation framework between the United States and Iran. The escalation makes such a role nearly impossible in the short term, but Turkey will likely remain a back channel for any future de-escalation talks.

—Defne Arslan is the senior director and founder of Atlantic Council Turkey Program, leading the Council’s global work and programming on Turkey.

Palestinian territories: Losing the world’s attention yet again

Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank have long had to live on symbolic support. Especially since the Abraham Accords, many Palestinians have seen their cause weakened or abandoned even rhetorically by regional actors. Although many nations criticized Israel’s conduct of the war in the Gaza Strip after Hamas’s horrific assault on October 7, 2023, nothing stopped the killing of over seventy thousand Palestinians and the total destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure. Few effectively came to their defense in the face of US-backed Israeli military power during a war that lasted more than two years. From the perspective of Gazans, Iran and its proxies were the few actors who tried an armed response before meeting superior Israeli and US force and reaching cease-fires with Israel.

This current war represents further loss for Palestinians. They lose momentum for rebuilding their lives. They lose the world’s attention to their plight within the Gaza Strip and land confiscations in the West Bank. Iran may no longer be the vocal supporter of Palestinian self-determination that it has been.

Shortly after the attacks on Iran started, Israel closed all crossings into Gaza. While the Israeli government asserts that Gaza has provisions to last for an “extended period,” both the United Nations and Human Rights Watch flagged in mid-February that aid, medicine, and reconstruction materials were in short supply. Wounded and sick Palestinians are trapped as well. Now that the world’s attention is focused on the Iran war, improvements on any of these fronts is unlikely.

There’s an old saying popularized by blues singers: “If they didn’t have bad luck, they wouldn’t have any at all.”

—Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley is a distinguished fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Malta and as special assistant for the Middle East and Africa to the secretary of state. Her Middle East assignments included election monitoring in the Gaza Strip.

The post Experts react: How the US war with Iran is playing out around the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Don’t worry about the Iran conflict’s impact on oil prices—yet

Landon Derentz — Sun, 01 Mar 2026 21:50:11 +0000

WASHINGTON—Now is not the time to hyperventilate over oil—at least not yet.

The United States should first focus on what matters most: ensuring Iran does not emerge from the conflict unfolding in the Middle East with a viable nuclear weapons program, much less nuclear weapons capability. Energy prices are an important but manageable secondary variable.

Over the period of US operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, crude oil averaged roughly $72 per barrel. Adjusted to today’s dollars, that is north of $100 per barrel. The global economy operated and grew under far higher sustained price levels than what is anticipated in the wake of joint airstrikes by the United States and Israel on Iran as part of Operation Epic Fury.

Energy analysts are now forecasting the potential for a 5–15 percent increase in the prices of crude oil when markets open on Sunday evening, placing international benchmark Brent crude oil in a range of $76-$84 per barrel. This would mean that even with a material disruption to global oil flows, prices are projected to remain $20 per barrel below the inflation-adjusted average during the Iraq War.

The immediate price shock, therefore, is not the primary threat to achieving a nuclear-free Iran. Instead, it’s duration and scale.

Insurers—not Tehran—have temporarily halted coverage for vessels transiting the chokepoint through which roughly 20 percent of global petroleum and liquefied natural gas is shipped. What will determine the economic pressure on the military campaign against Iran is whether maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz resumes within days or remains suspended for months.

A sustained disruption would not only test energy markets. It would also test political tolerance in Washington and among allied governments that are already sensitive to increasing pressures around energy affordability over the past year. As the price shocks of the 1970s demonstrated, higher prices can quickly translate into domestic political constraints.

Importantly, regional infrastructure remains intact. Supply has not been structurally impaired and oil-market fundamentals, which prior to Operation Epic Fury supported supply outpacing demand in 2026, remain strong. Major producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, routinely preposition weeks of inventory around the globe to cushion disruptions. This was clear after the drone attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil field in 2019, and markets should expect similar shock absorption now. Strategic petroleum reserves exist precisely for moments of acute tension like this.

Markets can tolerate a spike. What they cannot tolerate is prolonged uncertainty over trade flows through the Strait of Hormuz. That is the strategic dilemma confronting Washington.

To secure the time necessary to neutralize Iran’s nuclear program, maritime flows must resume. Otherwise, rising price pressure could force a premature end to the conflict before its central objective is achieved.

Military success requires time. Time requires economic stability. Economic stability requires energy to flow. Energy security and the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program are, therefore, not competing objectives, but interdependent ones.

The post Don’t worry about the Iran conflict’s impact on oil prices—yet appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: The US and Israel just unleashed a major attack on Iran. What’s next?

Atlantic Council experts — Sat, 28 Feb 2026 14:09:01 +0000

He went big. On Saturday morning, US and Israeli forces unleashed Operation Epic Fury, what US President Donald Trump called “a massive and ongoing” campaign against Iran. He called on the Iranian people to overthrow the regime once the fighting is done. Iran responded quickly by attacking Israel and US bases in the region. Below, our experts assess the unfolding war and where it goes from here.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Nate Swanson: We know the objective—and little else

Jonathan Panikoff: The Iranian regime is under unprecedented strain, but beware ‘IRGCistan’

Matthew Kroenig: A high-risk, high-reward campaign

Jennifer Gavito: Iran’s retaliation signals that it is not planning to deescalate

Daniel Shapiro: Trump’s order leaves questions for the American people

Danny Citrinowicz: A campaign with an abstract objective and no clear endgame

Thomas S. Warrick: This war will have a home front in the United States

Celeste Kmiotek: This campaign has serious implications for international law

Rob Macaire: The pathway to a stable Iran just got narrower

Alex Plitsas: Iran could be deliberately holding some of its missiles in reserve

Hagar Hajjar Chemali: The operation will only accelerate the Iranian regime’s economic collapse

C. Anthony Pfaff: Previous strikes have followed a pattern toward de-escalation

Michael Rozenblat: The experiment of the Islamic Revolution is done

Nic Adams: Multiple factors led the US and Israel to strike Iran—and they’re pursuing multiple objectives

Andrew Peek: Now the campaign turns on diplomacy, logistics, and opposition forces in Iran

Joe Costa: Sustaining the operation could impact readiness for other priorities

Colin Brooks: The US has a critical interest in what comes next

Tressa Guenov: Iran’s proxy networks are down but not out

Kelly Shannon: Real regime change requires more than bombs

Fast Thinking

Feb 28, 2026

Iran’s supreme leader is dead. Here’s what it means.

By Atlantic Council

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, was killed in a US-Israeli bombing campaign on Feb. 28.

Iran Security & Defense

We know the objective—and little else

By launching a massive joint attack with Israel on Iran, Trump is gambling that that he can inflict enough damage on the Islamic Republic’s core security and political institutions that the regime will fall.

By choosing to initiate this war, Trump has diverged from his past pattern of decisive actions with immediate and pain-free off-ramps. This is an enormous gamble with questionable legal justification. Trump did not outline an imminent threat from Iran, nor a detailed plan for what comes next in Iran if the United States succeeds in decapitating the regime. Trump also acknowledged the significant risk to US troops in the region.

As this operation moves forward, I am looking at three interconnected questions:

Will Iran successfully inflict costs on the United States? Facing a truly existential threat for the first time since the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian regime will likely respond with everything it has, including its full missile arsenal and proxies. How much damage Iran inflicts on the United States and Israel could very well determine the regime’s fate.
Polling consistently shows Americans are deeply opposed to intervening in Iran. If there are significant US casualties or impacts on global energy prices, will Trump stay committed to this campaign?
Trump has defined a successful campaign as one where the Iranian people rise up and end the Islamic Republic. Absent ground troops or an armed opposition, this requires significant defections within Iran’s security apparatus. Is there a plan for how that will come together?

Finally, while I am a deep skeptic of this operation, it is important to acknowledge the depravity of the Iranian regime and my genuine desire to see the Iranian people freed. I welcome the prospect of an Iranian government replaced with one that is a responsible international actor and more responsive to its people. But initiating a major war with a nation of 93 million people, 2,500 years of history, significant retaliatory capabilities, and no clear opposition within the county is a significant risk.

—Nate Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Beginning in 2015, he served as a senior advisor on Iran policy to successive administrations, including most recently as director for Iran at the National Security Council.

The Iranian regime is under unprecedented strain, but beware ‘IRGCistan’

Trump’s decision to launch major strikes against Iranian regime targets goes beyond his promise to protesters that “help is on the way.” This is an extensive campaign designed to kill the leadership, not a few hours of targeted, narrow strikes.

But neither protests nor airstrikes alone are likely to end the regime’s grip on power. History suggests it will require either the varying Iranian security forces stand aside, as happened in 1979, or at least a part of the security establishment to switch sides to the opposition. One of those two results may be more likely than it was previously, however. The breadth of economic pain felt across the country, the water crisis, and the regime’s brutal reaction to the protests, killing thousands—perhaps tens of thousands—makes this moment unique among the Iranian public’s history of protests since the revolution.

Indeed, this time, something fundamental has changed in Iran. And even if the regime does not collapse immediately, it’s critical to remember that the 1979 revolution took a year to unfold. This iteration of protests, therefore, should be viewed as the start of a new era, not another failure to bring change to the country.

But what that new era entails is unclear. The end of the regime is less likely to foster democracy as it is to birth what some are calling “IRGCistan”—a military-controlled state that might offer a new supreme leader as a symbolic token to millions of conservative Iranians, but with power firmly vested in the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Such a result would provide three pathways forward.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

A high-risk, high-reward campaign

Some have argued that Trump has not effectively made his case for US and Israeli strikes on Iran, but this military action became all but inevitable in January. Trump set a redline, warning the Iranian regime not to kill protesters. The clerics ignored the redline and massacred tens of thousands of their own people anyway. Trump’s advisers likely argued that he had to follow through on his threat or risk undermining US credibility. He did not want to follow in the footsteps of former President Barack Obama, who drew a redline over Syrian chemical weapons use only to back down later.

The only remaining question then concerned the target set. In late 2025, it was reported that Israel and the United States were considering strikes on Iran’s reconstituted missile program. Limited strikes on these targets could have made sense, at least as a starting point. Instead, having witnessed the vulnerability of the Iranian regime in January, Trump, his advisers, and regional partners, saw an opportunity to remove the Islamic Republic once and for all.

This path comes with higher risks and a higher potential reward. In past conflicts, like Operation Midnight Hammer last summer, Iran engaged in only token military retaliation, hoping to avoid a massive war with the United States. Now, with their backs against the wall, the clerics have little reason not to hit back with everything they’ve got. On the upside, the Islamic Republic is a card-carrying member of the Axis of Aggressors and has posed one of the greatest threats to US national security for decades. Removing it from the chess board could result in a transformational improvement of the regional and US global security environment.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.

Iran’s retaliation signals that it is not planning to deescalate

Iran’s initial response to what now seems to be a regime-change campaign by the United States and Israel reinforces that the regime believes this to be an existential crisis.  As such, the type of de-escalatory responses that we have become accustomed to in previous conflicts, including last summer’s twelve-day war, are at least for now off the table.  The scope, speed, and scale of Iran’s initial retaliation, including against the Gulf countries (excluding Oman), reinforce the potential for this quickly escalating to wider conflict and widespread disruption. Already, air traffic in the region has ground to a halt and shipping flows through the Strait of Hormuz are slowing.

In these early hours, as the United States and its allies acclimate themselves to the potential for instability and economic disruption, key questions that will shape that trajectory remain to be answered. Chief among them are the intent and preparedness of Iran’s proxies to join the fray. In Iraq, Kataib Hezbollah has indicated it will seek to strike US facilities in Iraq in response to “American aggression,” while the Yemen-based Houthi movement is expected to resume attacks on shipping lanes in Red Sea corridor. And already today, the Lebanese government has warned Hezbollah against dragging the country into conflict, but the terror organization’s response remains to be seen. 

Meanwhile, on the other side of the ledger, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have already condemned Iran’s strikes on several Middle Eastern countries that have killed at least one civilian in Abu Dhabi. A critical indicator of how this may all unfold is whether Middle Eastern countries lift their restrictions on US use of their airspaces to undertake its operations against Iran—or offer even more direct support for the campaign.

—Jennifer Gavito is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. She previously served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Iraq and Iran.

Trump’s order leaves questions for the American people

Many Americans were probably surprised to wake up this morning to discover that the United States was at war in the Middle East. Trump, in his brief statement overnight, as in his recent State of the Union address, described the well-known (and accurate) list of the Iranian regime’s misdeeds: its pursuit of nuclear weapons, its extensive ballistic missile program, its support of terrorist proxies, and its brutal suppression of the Iranian people. What he did not explain is the urgency or the imminent threat that required a war now.

Typically, before launching such major operations, presidents and their senior advisers have explained to the American people the reason major military operations are required, and the strategic objective they are intended to achieve. They also customarily brief Congress, so the people’s representatives can express their view—even authorizing or supporting the operation—and seek allies and partners to join (or at least offer support for) the operation. Except for one briefing for eight congressional leaders, and of course, Israel’s participation, the president did none of these.

For the first time, the president did describe a strategic objective in his statement—to change the Iranian regime. As desirable an outcome as that is, it was a startling declaration for a president who has criticized previous regime-change wars, and had only days earlier sounded content to settle for a nuclear deal (admittedly, one that had little chance of being reached). But he also distanced the United States from responsibility to achieve regime change, calling on the Iranian people to do it. He can now claim he made good, perhaps belatedly, on his pledge to Iranian protesters in January that “help is on the way.” And many protesters may indeed welcome strikes against regime leaders and security organs that crushed the protests. But the linear progression suggested by his statement—US and Israeli strikes on nuclear, missile, and regime targets, leading to renewed protests, leading to the fall of the regime—is far from certain.

Iran’s air defenses, highly degraded in the twelve-day war in June, is no match for the combined power of the US and Israeli militaries. Iran will suffer severe damage, which could well weaken the regime. But Iran will land some blows as well, as it already has on the first day, with missile strikes against US bases and dozens of missiles launched toward Israel. If Iran is able to absorb the punishment, keep launching ballistic missiles, and continue to crush dissent at home, US and Israeli air defenses could soon be stretched and US munitions stocks run down to dangerous levels. So tough decisions may lie ahead, and tough conversations with the American people, if the regime, battered and bruised, manages to outlast aerial attacks, leaving the strategic objective of regime change out of reach with the means the president has employed.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he was the Director of the N7 Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.

A campaign with an abstract objective and no clear endgame

The United States and Israel have launched an unprecedented campaign aimed at creating the conditions for regime change in Iran—through the targeted killing of senior officials, strikes on regime institutions, and attacks against Iran’s strategic military infrastructure.

This is not a classic preventive strike. There was no immediate Iranian threat triggering the operation. Rather, the logic appears to be the exploitation of what is perceived as regime weakness in order to generate profound political change inside Iran.

The campaign is built upon the intelligence and operational advantages of the United States and Israel, as well as unprecedented firepower intended to pressure the regime to such a degree that internal actors—or the broader public—might ultimately move against it.

Despite early tactical achievements, the central question remains unresolved: what is the endgame? Can external military pressure realistically rely on an Iranian public that lacks cohesive leadership, particularly when facing a regime that has operated for forty-seven years under the disciplined control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)?

Complicating matters further is Iran’s apparent preparedness for this confrontation and its determination to preserve retaliatory capabilities over time. The risk of regional expansion is significant—especially following Iranian strikes against US bases in the Gulf and the possibility that Iranian-aligned actors in Yemen and Iraq could enter the conflict more directly.

Yet the greatest danger may be a prolonged campaign that fails to produce dramatic internal change in Iran and lacks a clearly defined termination mechanism, resulting in an open-ended conflict with no visible conclusion on the horizon.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He is also a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. He previously served for twenty-five years in Israel Defense Intelligence. 

This war will have a home front in the United States

Trump announced the goal for this operation only after it started: sustained attacks to weaken Iran’s security and strategic targets, including Iran’s leadership, until the Iranian people overthrow the regime. This represents a gamble not just in the skies and streets of Iran but on the home front as well. The American people, by a significant majority, wanted Trump to focus his second term on domestic affairs, the economy above all. Because he did not seek the support of Congress and the American people in advance, he will own the outcome. If it succeeds, he may receive a mild domestic boost, but he risks a significant setback to his domestic agenda if he fails.

Trump’s postwar plan for Iran appears to rest on an obviously untested proposition: that the Iranian people will be able to overthrow an entrenched, if weakened, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps determined to hold onto power.

But there is another untested proposition: that the United States can resist whatever asymmetric efforts the Iranian regime will try here in the United States. Given Iran’s peculiar sense of symmetry, Trump’s targeting of Iran’s leadership will almost certainly lead to attempts to target Trump and other top US officials. The Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the US Capitol Police will all be tested in the coming weeks and can afford zero failures. Iran will try every cyber trick it can mount, testing the Department of Homeland Security, the private sector, and US cyber defenses. Iran tried in the past, unsuccessfully, to meddle in US elections, and would almost certainly fail to have any impact this time. Even though the United States imports very little oil from the Middle East, energy prices may spike, setting back the US economy.

This war will have a home front, and Trump needs to find ways of broadening support at home.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

This campaign has serious implications for international law

The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is responsible for an untold number of domestic and international human rights abuses and serious violations of international law, including crimes against humanity against the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protesters. Indeed, after Trump promised to “rescue” Iranians who launched the latest round of wide-scale anti-regime protests in January, the IRI responded by massacring, arresting, and executing protesters in the tens of thousands—a scale that is unprecedented in Iran’s history and globally.

However, the US and Israeli strikes on Iran violate international law. Use of force against a state is prohibited under the United Nations (UN) Charter, with exceptions for self-defense and Security Council authorizations. Self-defense must be in response to an imminent threat—and there is no indication such a threat existed to either the United States or Israel. Likewise, there are no Security Council authorizations. As such, this appears to not only violate the UN Charter, but indeed constitutes the crime of aggression as defined by the UN General Assembly and prohibited under customary international law.

US and Israeli strikes against Iran triggered an international armed conflict, and international humanitarian law (IHL) now applies. IHL demands that strikes only target combatants and legitimate military objectives, while taking precautions to limit incidental harm to civilians. Information is still coming in on what US and Israeli strikes hit in Iran, and what Iran strikes hit in Gulf states. Reports that dozens were killed in US or Israeli strikes on a girls elementary school warrant investigation, as do reports of IRI strikes on a hotel in Dubai. If either were hit intentionally or because insufficient precautions were taken to protect civilians, they would almost certainly be clear violations of international law. All parties to the conflict must ensure their actions comply with IHL.

There is much that can be said on the imperative to constrain and hold accountable actors like the IRI, which inflict atrocity crimes against their domestic populations and globally. But flagrant violations of international law against the IRI by the United States and Israel will only continue to erode international norms and further endanger civilians globally.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The pathway to a stable Iran just got narrower

From a European perspective, there is a lot of attention on whether these military strikes are in breach of international law, but that seems not to have been a dominant consideration in the decision process. Arguments about legality would have to focus on the intent of the military action, but the intent remains somewhat obscure. Both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements as the strikes were launched talked about hitting nuclear, missile, and naval capabilities, but also encouraging the Iranian people to overthrow the regime. “This is the moment for action, do not let it pass,” Trump told the Iranians. And he threatened the IRGC and other security forces with “certain death” if they do not lay down their arms. 

But the IRGC alone has some 190,000 active members: it doesn’t seem realistic that the president can kill them all or, indeed, guarantee their safety if they defect from their posts. If the Iranian regime emerges decimated, bloodied but still in power, its leaders will declare survival as victory. But if these attacks are devastating enough to collapse the regime, despite its preparations and resilience, it is possible that the whole authority of the state collapses with it. Either way, the pathway to a stable resolution that ends Iran’s threat to its neighborhood and oppression of its people may have become narrower.   

—Rob Macaire is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He previously served as British ambassador to Iran.

Iran could be deliberately holding some of its missiles in reserve

The joint US–Israeli strikes against Iran mark a decisive escalation designed not merely to punish but to reshape the strategic equation. Trump has stated that the objective is regime change, pursued through sustained US air and naval operations, which are intended to weaken Tehran’s coercive apparatus while empowering protest elements on the ground.

The opening round of strikes appears calibrated toward degrading Iran’s retaliatory capacity and security apparatus: ballistic missile infrastructure, drone production and launch sites, government and military leaders, and key naval facilities tied to potential attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz. There are also indications of decapitation strikes targeting senior Iranian leaders, though battle damage assessments remain incomplete and confirmation of high-level casualties is pending.

The strategic logic is straightforward. Nuclear negotiations had frozen over nonnegotiable redlines. Rather than accept incremental stalemate, Washington and Jerusalem appear to have concluded that altering the players, not merely the terms, was necessary. Force, in this framework, is being used to degrade capability and change the calculus in Tehran.

Iran’s response thus far has been measured and rational. It has targeted major US military installations across the region: the US Navy Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Al Dafra in the UAE, and Ali Al Salem in Kuwait.

Iran was assessed to possess roughly 2,000–3,000 medium-range ballistic missiles, 6,000–8,000 short-range systems, and thousands of drones. We have not yet seen saturation attacks intended to overwhelm layered air defenses. It is unclear if that is due to US and Israeli strikes on missile stocks, Iran holding missiles in reserve, Iran testing defenses, or a combination thereof.

Whether Tehran is deliberately holding reserves, probing defensive responses, or suffering greater degradation than publicly known remains unclear. The most plausible explanation may be a combination of all three.

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

This conflict will only accelerate the Iranian regime’s economic collapse

While many are debating the strategy behind strikes against Iran as it relates to regime change, there is an important overlooked fact: the Islamic Republic of Iran does not have an economic leg to stand on. With or without strikes, this regime was already in the process of financially crumbling. It was headed toward an economic implosion that could have forced the regime’s collapse on its own.

In October 2025, one of Iran’s largest banks—Ayandeh Bank—collapsed. This bank was run by regime elites, it fueled their corruption, and it overspent on lavish projects that failed. The Iranian regime quickly absorbed Ayandeh’s debts and merged it with Bank Melli, the largest Iranian state-owned lender. The regime also mass printed rials, causing the already devalued currency to plummet and inflation to skyrocket overnight, sending shopkeepers into the streets followed by the masses of Iranians who joined them. Ayandeh’s collapse is what precipitated the protests that resulted in the regime’s subsequent massacre of its own people.

At least five more of the largest banks in Iran—including banks Sepah, Sarmayeh, Day, Iran Zamin, and Mellat—are at risk of the same fate. This is according to economists and Iran’s own central bank, which earlier in 2025 warned that eight unnamed banks risked dissolution. And because of years of sanctions and economic mismanagement, the regime does not have the billions needed to offer bailouts nor will its international buddies come to save it. What would follow in such a scenario is not only an exacerbated economic crisis, but major defaults and a breakdown in government-paid services and salaries. That would mean the regime’s security forces could go without pay, and dictators are often only as strong as their militaries are loyal, creating a major vulnerability for the regime’s sustainability.

I cannot guarantee this scenario—it is an assessment of how things in Iran could unfold with or without strikes. But understanding the regime’s economics on top of its other weaknesses since the twelve-day war last June offers insight into what helped motivate the United States and Israel to pursue their operations now. The regime was already standing at the edge of a cliff. This operation likely pushes it over the edge.

— Hagar Hajjar Chemali is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served on the White House National Security Council and at the US mission to the United Nations.

Previous strikes have followed a pattern toward de-escalation

There are two likely outcomes to this recent escalation of the conflict with Iran: the conflict escalates into an asymmetric war with Iran, or, after a series of tit-for-tat strikes, it de-escalates as it has done in the past. Regarding the first possibility, the scope of any escalation is limited by both sides’ inability to settle their differences. For Washington, that entails regime change to one more friendly to the United States, Israel, and the West more generally. For Tehran, that means driving the US military presence out of the region. For both sides, that requires a greater military commitment than either seems willing or capable of giving. While the US may hope that this current round of strikes will mobilize protests capable of toppling the regime, the fact that Tehran’s ability to crack down on protesters remains undiminished suggests that, while worthwhile, that outcome is unlikely. Without a way to eliminate the other side’s ability to resist, all that’s left are asymmetric means such as air strikes and terrorist attacks.

If the above is true, then the second outcome is more likely. In October 2024, for example, Iran conducted a massive ballistic missile and drone strike against Israel in response to Israel’s assaults against Lebanese Hezbollah, including the killing of its leader Hassan Nasrallah.  Israel responded to the Iranian attack by targeting missile production facilities in Iran, underscoring their limited nature. In return, the Iranians downplayed the damage and thus the need to respond. This pattern has repeated itself for some time, going back at least as far as the Iranian response to the US killing Qassem Soleimani in 2020 and the US responses to proxy attacks against its personnel in Iraq. Whether this pattern will continue going forward depends on how expansive the responses are. As long as both sides stick to attacking military targets, de-escalation is more likely. Should, however, Tehran conduct terrorist attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure—more likely if it feels its survival is threatened—then escalation to a larger, regional conflict becomes the only option either side has.  

—C. Anthony Pfaff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs

The experiment of the Islamic Revolution is done

The joint US-Israeli campaign is underway. Until the dust has settled, it will be hard to assess who and what was targeted successfully, and who will remain in Iran after the opening strikes. Reports suggesting that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was targeted at the outset are a good start, hopefully along with the close political and military aides who are key for the regime’s survival. The major figures who carried the regime for decades, accumulating hundreds of combined years in experience, would need to be removed to make way for Iranians to take their fate in their own hands.

With this, the objective for the operation had been marked: hitting the pillars of the regime to a point where its post-war survival would be impossible politically, economically, and militarily.

After years of brutality, corruption, and violation of every right Iranians deserve as humans, they can now see what this regime had come to. The experiment of the Islamic Revolution is done.

Going forward, the pressure on the regime will rise and the groundwork for an opposition to present itself will be laid out. The real question is: Who will take the opportunity to unite the people and present an alternative for this clerical regime—and when?

It’s now time for the Iranian opposition, inside Iran and in the diaspora, to realize this moment. If the regime goes on to survive this war, then it’s hard to see another opportunity for change down the line. However, if the opposition manages to unite around an agreed-upon leader or group of leaders who can claim to be the only legitimate leadership—then Iranians might have a chance at a better future.

—Michael Rozenblat is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, from the Israeli security establishment.

Multiple factors led the US and Israel to strike Iran—and they’re pursuing multiple objectives

The joint US-Israel operation targeting Iran follows nuclear talks in Geneva this past week that failed to produce an outcome acceptable to the United States. Further, the strikes come as both the United States and Israel perceive the Iranian regime to be at its weakest point since its founding in 1979, where stagnant economic conditions and ever increasing brutality exercised by the regime are indicative of a state that is forced to resort to extreme violence to retain control.

Following the October 2023 attacks on Israel and the subsequent military operations that followed, Iran has lost its most important proxy forces in the region, as well as its client state in Syria. That loss of strategic depth, as well as an increasingly forward defensive posture by Israel, likely drove Jerusalem to seize what it sees as a historical moment to end what it views as its last remaining existential threat in the region.

For the United States, the operation is likely designed to achieve several strategic objectives, including the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program and an end to its use of proxies and missile forces to hold its neighbors at risk. It perhaps also saw an opportunity to reshape Iran and the region in such a way that could see the clerical regime in Tehran replaced by something else, though it remains unclear what may follow.

Regional states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE will likely continue to call for de-escalation in the coming days as regional instability threatens their economic development models based on energy exports, tourism, and the attraction of wealthy expats. Already there are reports of civilian causalities in the UAE from falling debris when an Iranian missile was intercepted by air defense systems. But so far the Iranian regime has demonstrated its willingness to strike US targets in Gulf countries, and it will likely increase the intensity of its attacks if it perceives operations by the United States and Israel are designed to topple it.

—Nic Adams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He most recently served as a professional staff member on the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and as senior advisor to Senator John Cornyn (R-TX).

Now the campaign turns on diplomacy, logistics, and opposition forces in Iran

This is the big one. The sustaining elements for Trump’s war against Iran are going to be the diplomacy, the logistics, and the politics on the ground. The diplomacy has broken right, so far. Though US partners such as the UAE have been hit, the immediate aftermath has been positive outreach from estranged regional ally Saudi Arabia, rather than distancing from the US campaign. Compare that to the earlier missile strikes in 2022 against Abu Dhabi, which caused an Emirati softening of policy toward Iran.

The logistics are unknowable to the outside. Patriot and Tomahawk missiles are in demand everywhere, and the production base is slow. But the administration will have been helped by the halting of further Presidential Drawdown Authority tranches in Ukraine and the rolling six-week buildup it has undertaken in the region.

The politics are unknowable to everyone. This is a regime-change war and one that is trying to re-construct basically dormant protests. The most important initial element is to have some area that is relatively free from security forces, where opposition elements can rest and rearm. They’ll also need some weapons to avoid a rerun of January or some tactical link with US air support. They’ll need the opposition to include the upper working class and lower middle class that is the base of support for the regime. And the airstrikes urgently need to remove Khamenei, if he isn’t gone already, and the government’s media infrastructure. Any regime-change struggle is a fight for legitimacy, and that is won by symbols and guns.

—Andrew Peek is the director of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Sustaining the operation could impact readiness for other priorities

Although the United States retains overwhelming conventional military superiority, Iran and its proxies can impose significant costs through missiles, naval mines, drones, fast attack craft, cyber operations, and other asymmetric tools—raising the risk of broader regional instability. Reports indicate Iranian forces have already struck US and allied assets in the Gulf, including in Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan. Some oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz have been suspended, as well.

Containing a sustained regional escalation will require substantial US military resources and could impact readiness for other priorities, including China. A key question is whether the United States has enough high-end munitions and secured sufficient allied support—such as access, basing, overflight rights, intelligence sharing, and logistics—to sustain a prolonged campaign, if necessary, without enormous costs to other global US priorities.

Another central issue is the “theory of victory”—how military action would translate into durable political outcomes. Will this lead to an end of Iran’s nuclear program? In past cases, such as the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, regime change was achieved militarily, but the aftermath proved costly and destabilizing. It’s entirely unclear who would fill the void and whether their views on the nuclear program would dramatically differ from the current regime.

How would the United States manage the consequences of a destabilized or even collapsed Iranian government? These risks must necessarily be weighed against the core national security interest of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. It will therefore be important to understand the administration’s reasoning on these and related questions in the coming days.

—Joe Costa is the director of the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

The US has a critical interest in what comes next

As the world watches unfolding strikes in Iran, it’s clear that the joint US-Israeli military operation not only intends to raze Iranian military capability to the ground, but to actively topple the regime—targeting the Iranian political and security apparatus, past, present and future. What comes next has enormous implications for the region and American interests. 

No one should mourn the passing of a regime that has murdered its citizens, weaponized sectarian and religious identities, fueled terror proxies, armed Russia’s war in Ukraine, and murdered Americans. Iran has consistently served as a driver of instability in the Middle East.  It’s also clear that the regime continued to negotiate in bad faith, unwilling to budge on its nuclear program, ballistic missiles, or support for terrorists. Operation Epic Fury is a welcome development.  

However, the United States and our partners have a critical interest in what comes next. Neither the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MeK) nor the Pahlavi family are panaceas. Our American experience in regime change following the Second World War, to the Cold War, to Chalabi in the Iraq war, has met with uneven, often unpredictable results.   

Assuming the theocracy is toppled, what is America’s role in a post-Ayatollah Iran? What policies should the US adopt? 

It’s clear that previous US-Iran policies of containment, isolation, engagement, or considering the nuclear issue in a vacuum, have all failed to address the challenge. Similarly, with the exception of the Marshall plan, American-led post conflict plans have a fantastic failure rate. Hard-earned lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan should be top of mind for US policy makers. 

While the US must remain clear-eyed about the persistent threat posed by Iranian militias, remnants of the nuclear program, or another hardliner assuming control of Iran, the United States does not need to own the post-conflict Iranian landscape. America should not entertain investing in far flung disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts, consider American troop presence, or place the Iranian of our choice on a pedestal in the palace.  

Instead, the United States should gain consensus with our regional partners on any emerging political leadership, contain instability to inside Iran’s borders, and use economic levers to influence outcomes.

After all, the US retains powerful non-military tools to incentivize the right behavior in any new Iranian government. As we saw in Syria, an existing sanctions framework is a powerful lever to moderate any new government and incentivize change. 

The same is true in Iran. Iran is among the most sanctioned countries in the world.  This framework provides the US and our partners with powerful tools to shape what emerges next. 

— Colin Brooks is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former senior professional staff member on the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Iran’s proxy networks are down but not out

For weeks and according to press reports, security services around the world have been on the lookout for the increased possibility of Iranian asymmetric retaliation via “sleeper cells” or other proxy groups prior to or in response to today’s attack on Iran.

Iran’s complex proxy networks are down but not totally out. Even if senior regime leaders are killed in the strikes, the IRGC and other intelligence components have likely prepared for such a day. Iran could look to conduct attempted assassinations, terror attacks, cyberattacks, kidnappings, or sabotage against civilian or military targets—all of which it has been linked to dating as far back as the 1980s and in countries as diffuse as Albania, Argentina, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Sweden. It could still look to activate Houthi or Hezbollah proxies, for example, or conduct more expeditionary attacks via recruited individuals in Europe, the United States, or elsewhere.

The Iranian regime has a long memory and has been known to pursue targets for decades, including plots and attempted attacks against dissidents abroad and US officials. It is worth noting that Iran did not appear to activate its most extreme tools of disruption in response to the US-Israeli attack last June, although not surprisingly it did employ cyber, drone, and other attacks. But with the regime now facing the most significant physical assault against its leadership, it remains to be seen whether and how that will alter Iran’s longstanding ability to export chaos and harm.

—Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

Real regime change requires more than bombs

The Iranian people have been clear for the past several years that the Islamic Republic must fall. The United States—both the Biden and Trump administrations—could have taken steps to provide meaningful assistance to Iran’s anti-regime movement ever since the Woman, Life, Freedom movement of 2022-2023 but chose not to. Instead, both administrations attempted to revive a nuclear deal with Iran without discussion of human rights, which legitimized the regime and would have offered it a lifeline had the negotiations succeeded.

The Iranian people pressed on alone in their quest to end the regime’s oppression, risking their lives in mass protests in December and January. The regime cut them off from communicating with the world, slaughtered them in the thousands, arrested tens of thousands, and undertook a campaign of terror that has persisted ever since. Trump promising in January that “help is on the way” and then doing nothing as the regime murdered thousands of people with impunity was morally shameful. It also damaged the Iranian people’s trust in the United States. That the Trump administration’s renewed negotiations with the Islamic Republic these past weeks did not include the Iranian people as a point of negotiation was an additional slap in the face for Iranians who have been risking everything for freedom.

The Iranian people are not pawns. Trump and Netanyahu have called on them to overthrow their government. But the United States and Irael are offering only bombs from the sky. Iranians were already rising again this past week, as grieving families expressed defiance in cemeteries and university students clashed with security forces. The outbreak of war forces these protests to stop while Iranians seek safety. Bombing thus makes a popular uprising more difficult to organize. If the United States and Israel are serious about regime change, they must do more than simply bomb Iran.

Successful regime change will require significant material aid to the Iranian people, coordination with dissidents on the ground, and carefully considered plans for what might happen after the regime falls. The Trump administration thus far appears not to have such a plan. If the regime does fall—as it deserves to—it is in the interests of the United States for the Iranian people to succeed in establishing the secular democracy grounded in human rights and the rule of law that they have long desired. But there are other forces at play who would push Iran’s future in a less democratic direction. The question is, will the United States help the Iranian people chart a positive path forward, or will it leave them to the wolves after the bombs stop falling?

——Kelly J. Shannon is a visiting scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University. She is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group.

The post Experts react: The US and Israel just unleashed a major attack on Iran. What’s next? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Regime change in Iran? Here’s why the US should avoid the temptation.

Jennifer Gavito and Bianca Rosen — Fri, 27 Feb 2026 19:26:28 +0000

Below, Jennifer Gavito and Bianca Rosen argue against regime change in Iran. For an alternative view in favor of a major US military campaign in Iran, read Michael Rozenblat’s case here.

Since US President Donald Trump assured the Iranian people on January 13 that “help is on its way” amid nationwide protests—a little over a week after a US operation removed Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro from power—the United States has been on a seemingly steady march to renewed conflict with Iran.

Trump’s State of the Union address this week did little to counter that perception, even as Washington continues to pursue diplomatic negotiations with the Islamic Republic. Both sides are holding firm on their respective redlines regarding Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and the window for a deal seems to be closing quickly. Meanwhile, with the most significant buildup of military assets in the Middle East since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, every day adds to the sense that US strikes on Iran are inevitable, even as the objectives of that potential military action remain frustratingly murky.

But Trump should think twice before ordering a large-scale conflict aimed at regime change. Such an approach would likely create more problems than it would solve.

The march to … what?

The United States is likely considering among several options for strikes. It is difficult to discern which option is either most likely or could be most effective absent a clear articulation of the Trump administration’s strategic goals. It could, for example, launch targeted strikes on Iranian state security buildings and infrastructure belonging to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij militia. It could broaden those strikes to include regime assets such as nuclear infrastructure and advanced weaponry inventories. It could even attempt a regime change operation to remove Iran’s top leadership and disrupt state institutions.

To date, justifications floated for an attack include protecting civilians in the face of January’s brutal crackdown, further degrading Iran’s nuclear program, and, most recently, addressing the regime’s ever more audacious missile program. Iran’s missile program seemed to be the focus of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s February 24 briefing to the “gang of eight,” the select group of US members of Congress who receive classified intelligence briefings from the White House.

Despite some indications the president is wary of embroiling the United States in another prolonged Middle East conflict, Trump and members of his administration have alluded to regime change as a preferred solution to address Iran’s internal dysfunction and provide a pathway to greater regional stability. Trump told Politico on January 17 that it’s “time to look for new leadership in Iran.” When asked explicitly about whether he wants regime change in Iran, he said on February 13 that it “would be the best thing that could happen.” Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), who has emerged as the face of hawkish US foreign policy in the Middle East, took it a step further, warning that stopping the push for regime change in Iran would be the United States’ “biggest mistake.”

To what end?

There is widespread international agreement that the Iranian regime destabilizes the region, enables Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and brutally violates Iranians’ human rights. Despite this, a fundamental transformation of Iran’s political system is unlikely as long as the IRGC remains entrenched in all facets of Iranian society, which makes it hard for any cohesive opposition movement to form and take a stand. A US-instigated regime change operation would thus likely inflict damage on the regime without solving any of those problems. And it could well unleash destabilizing aftershocks across the broader region.

Advocates of regime change often mistake a weakened regime for one on the brink of collapse. Iran’s nuclear progress was indeed set back by the US strikes on the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan sites in June. And Israel’s campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon, coupled with US and UK operations to pacify the Houthis in the Red Sea, also dealt major blows to Iran’s proxy network. But the January 2026 mass protests put the IRGC’s continued grip on display. The IRGC imposed a complete communications blackout and launched a lethal crackdown, massacring thousands. Its tight control of the Iranian military and its in-house paramilitary wing, the Basij, underpin a coercive security apparatus financed by sanctions-busting networks and control of strategic sectors of the economy.

Some, including Trump, have argued that removing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would cut the IRGC off at its knees. In reality, eliminating the supreme leader would at best produce a messy internal power struggle and at worst further embolden the organization. The IRGC is not a pyramid built around a single man; it is a sprawling institution supported by multiple power centers. The supreme leader may be its public face, but he is not the organization’s ventriloquist. The regime has in fact already taken preventative measures to ensure its survival in the event of an attack, including by tapping Ali Larijani, a former IRGC commander and the current head of the Supreme National Security Council, to take the lead on contingency planning. Khamenei has also reportedly named successors for himself and his key military and government appointees to enable smooth transfers of power and ensure the regime’s longevity.

The IRGC’s power is bolstered by the absence of a unified opposition in Iran. Today’s anti-regime forces are a patchwork of labor groups, ethnic minorities, and monarchists. Decades of repression have left them fragmented. Speculation about the return of Reza Pahlavi, the former crown prince currently living in exile, has been fueled in part by Iran’s diaspora and what Haaretz revealed to be a digital influence campaign operating out of Israel. Ultimately, Pahlavi is distanced from conditions on the ground and lacks credibility with both Iranians and US government officials—including Trump, who declined to meet with him last month.

At what cost?

With the concept of “regime change” ill-defined and its objectives not yet articulated, the United States faces considerable risks with little promise of reward. Iran would almost certainly seek to close the Strait of Hormuz as part of an opening salvo against any attack, a move it foreshadowed on February 17 when it shut the waterway for live-fire exercises. Such a closure would jolt global markets, given that the strait is a chokepoint for about 20 percent of the world’s liquefied natural gas exports and around 20 percent of global oil and oil byproducts.

A US-led regime change campaign in Iran could also trigger a number of spillover and destabilizing effects on Gulf countries. This matters deeply for a US administration operating with a business‑centric foreign policy, which is underpinned by strong relationships with the Gulf countries. Trump’s trip to the region in May 2025 yielded announcements of deals that the White House said are worth two trillion dollars, including a $600 billion investment pledge from Saudi Arabia. Destabilizing the region risks disrupting that signature initiative. Gulf countries may also face Iranian retaliation—notwithstanding the fact that the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia barred their airspace from being used for US attacks on Iran. There is precedent for this: During the twelve-day war last year, Iran retaliated against the United States for Operation Midnight Hammer by launching missiles toward US bases in Qatar even after the Gulf state closed its airspace. Moreover, in the medium and long term, the region would struggle to absorb a massive refugee flow from Iran’s population of 93 million—the largest of any country whose territory is located fully in the Middle East.

The deep entrenchment of Iran’s corrupt political system, combined with its strategic positioning in the Middle East, makes regime change a profoundly destabilizing course of action. As Trump approaches yet another self‑imposed deadline to decide his approach to Iran, it has become clear that the ongoing oscillation between nuclear talks, military buildup, and targeted strikes has become the new normal—and, somewhat paradoxically, a form of stability. It is a manageable and oddly sustainable cycle of negotiation paired with limited, surgical confrontation, one that keeps the regime constrained without triggering the far more destabilizing effects of its complete collapse.

Jennifer Gavito is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. She previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of state for Iraq and Iran.

Bianca Rosen is a research associate at the Cohen Group and a member of its Middle East Practice.

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Ukraine’s women may hold the key to the country’s future security

Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, Sofia Kryshtal — Thu, 26 Feb 2026 22:42:55 +0000

Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s ongoing invasion is often framed as a referendum on Western resolve, but the real test is whether the Ukrainians themselves can sustain a credible defense posture over time. As the war enters a fifth year, Ukraine’s long-term security will depend less on promises from abroad than on decisions made at home.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent diplomatic push reflects this reality. Throughout 2025, he intensified efforts to shape a settlement that would not simply freeze the front, but also create a durable security framework. He did so knowing that any peace will be judged by its ability to prevent a future renewal of Russian aggression.

Crucially, peace through strength must mean the strength of the entire nation, not half of it. Ukraine’s security cannot rest on external guarantees alone. It must also be based on national capacity, including a cultural and institutional shift that integrates women as a pillar of defense planning. This is not a social policy argument. It is a force generation argument.

Even in an optimistic scenario, any agreement between Kyiv and Moscow will demand long-term readiness and self-reliance. Ceasefires can be violated. Commitments can erode. What endures is force posture: Trained units, predictable rotation, and the resilience to absorb pressure.

Deterrence is not a document. It is a condition and it rests on how effectively a state mobilizes and prepares its population. Yet Ukraine’s mobilization still reflects post-Soviet assumptions. Men between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-nine are treated as the default defenders of the state, while women are viewed as supplementary. That division no longer matches battlefield realities or Ukraine’s strategic needs.

Since 2024, Kyiv has tightened mobilization rules, expanded enforcement, and narrowed exemptions. These measures have stabilized force levels, but they have not solved the underlying problem: Ukraine is fighting a prolonged war of attrition against a far larger adversary. Pulling more men into the system without changing how the system functions will not produce sustainable results.

One weakness is preparation and allocation. Many men still only receive limited training before mobilization. At the same time, tens of thousands of women with in-demand support skills in fields such as logistics, communications, medicine, intelligence, engineering, IT, and drones, remain outside the recruitment and training pipelines.

The result is inefficiency on two fronts. Front line units are overstretched and denied predictable rotation, while rear area roles are often filled by personnel whose skills are misaligned with their assignments.

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Ukraine does not need to mirror Russia’s mass mobilization model. It needs smarter force management. Women can be systematically integrated into roles currently performed by men far away from the front, including checkpoints, border duties, logistics hubs, training commands, communications and intelligence units, and other rear-area security functions.

In a war of attrition, regular rotation is essential to combat effectiveness. Reallocating personnel this way would relieve pressure on front line units. Over time, it would create a broader preparedness posture in which more Ukrainians have the skills to resist renewed aggression. It would also broaden the pool of people with military experience, which strengthens deterrence long after any ceasefire.

The case for integration is not hypothetical. Ukrainian women have volunteered in large numbers since 2014. Legislation adopted in 2018 granted women equal rights and responsibilities in the Ukrainian armed forces. By 2025, more than 70,000 women were serving in the Ukrainian military, including in drone units, medical evacuation teams, intelligence cells, and logistics chains. Recruiting data from the past year indicates that roughly one in five new candidates entering the pipeline was female.

Despite the growing prominence of women, the Ukrainian military has not yet fully adapted. Legal equality has not translated into institutional integration. Access to training and promotion is inconsistent. Women are still too often treated as volunteers rather than a core element of force planning. Discrimination and sexual harassment persist, while accountability is uneven.

Many barriers are practical. Units often lack properly fitted equipment and uniforms. Separate barracks, showers, and toilets are not universal. Access to gynecological care is inconsistent. Mechanisms to prevent and address harassment and misconduct are sometimes poorly enforced. These are not symbolic deficiencies; they directly affect retention, readiness, and morale.

A modern defense strategy is not built on weapons alone. It is built on resilience. Russia’s theory of victory assumes Ukrainian society will fracture under prolonged pressure. Zelenskyy’s diplomacy aims to deny Moscow that outcome by securing international backing and buying time. But society must disprove Russia’s assumptions in practice.

A whole-of-society defense that mobilizes women across military and security roles sends a strong signal of endurance. It demonstrates that Ukraine is prepared for years of deterrence and reinforces the message that Ukraine is building a modern European state.

This signal will also matter to allies. Western support is increasingly constrained by domestic politics. Ukraine’s strongest argument is not moral clarity alone, but strategic credibility. A country that can sustain defense over time is easier to support than one perpetually dependent on emergency assistance.

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Other states facing serious long-term threats have updated their security cultures. Israel mandated conscription for both genders in 1949. Norway introduced gender-neutral conscription in 2015; Sweden followed in 2018.

Ukraine has taken steps toward modernization. In 2024, it updated defense education curricula in secondary schools. By 2025, pilot programs expanded civilian preparedness. But beyond high school, structured pathways for women to acquire military training remain limited. Lyceums and military academies are still underused as talent pipelines.

The costs of delay compound. Exhaustion erodes combat effectiveness. Poor rotation accelerates burnout, desertion, and casualties. No peace plan, however carefully negotiated, can compensate for a force structure that excludes half the population from systematic preparation.

Whether Zelenskyy’s peace initiative succeeds or stalls, Ukraine will require endurance. The policy agenda should be clear. First, Kyiv should extend mandatory service to women aged twenty-five to sixty for designated non-front line support roles currently filled by men such as logistics, medical support, communications, and administration.

It will be crucial to clearly codify exemptions based on factors including parental and family commitments, along with professional status and medical limitations. This will make it possible to free more male personnel for front line duty while sustaining continuity of operations.

Second, the Ukrainian authorities need to fix the basics that determine retention and readiness. This includes properly fitted uniforms and equipment, adequate facilities, reliable medical and gynecological care, and strict enforcement against harassment and misconduct.

Third, Ukraine should expand training and education pipelines that actively target women, including military higher education. Recruiting data already shows demand; the state should convert that demand into readiness, while civil society tracks progress.

Fourth, Ukraine’s allies should support women’s integration through training exchanges. Western military commanders have decades of lessons to share on integrating women into units and training pipelines.

Finally, Kyiv will need to invest in long-term societal preparation. Ukraine cannot rely on emergency mobilization alone; youth must be educated early for the responsibility of defense. When service is framed as an expected civic duty rather than an abrupt wartime shock, conscription becomes a sustainable pillar of national security.

Security guarantees will shape Ukraine’s future, but guarantees are not substitutes for national capacity. Zelenskyy is right to pursue diplomacy that does not mortgage sovereignty; he is also correct to insist peace must be durable. Durability, however, will be measured in battalions, rotations, and readiness, not in signatures.

Ukraine’s most reliable long-term defense asset is its people: Men and women alike. Mobilizing and integrating women is not about ideology. It is a strategy for victory and long-term security.

Calin Trenkov-Wermuth is the former principal security governance advisor at the US Institute of Peace and co-author of The Future of the Security Sector in Ukraine, published by USIP. Sofia Kryshtal is the former executive coordinator of the USIP Task Force on the Future of the Security Sector in Ukraine.

This is forcing Putin and his generals to rethink. The Kremlin dictator remains determined to extinguish Ukrainian independence and force Ukraine permanently back into the Russian orbit. However, he knows that there is little prospect of achieving his ambitious objectives via the bloody battles currently taking place over the rust belt towns and villages of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

In order to break this strategic deadlock, Russia aims to systematically dismantle the conditions that allow Ukraine to function as a state. This means the continued bombardment of energy infrastructure throughout the country; it is also likely to involve expanded attacks on other crucial public utilities, such as municipal water services and sewage treatment. In parallel, Russia will increase strikes on civilian transport with an emphasis on Ukraine’s logistically vital rail network.

The end goal is to deprive Ukraine of the industrial capacity to defend itself and destroy the basic amenities to sustain even a minimum standard of living. Kremlin officials hope this will break Ukrainian morale and enable Putin to dictate the terms of peace.

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Russia has made no formal declarations regarding its intentions, but the strategic shift toward the bombardment of infrastructure over the past year has been unmistakable. In 2025, Russia launched around 55,000 kamikaze drones at targets in Ukraine, representing a fivefold increase from the total one year earlier. Attacks have sought to deprive individual cities of power while severing Ukraine’s national energy network along the Dnipro River.

The impact of this bombing campaign extends far beyond civilian suffering. By cutting off major power generation assets and disrupting connectivity, Russia is pushing the entire grid into a near-permanent state of emergency. This is placing heavy strain on Ukraine’s defense industry, which is often deprived of the electricity it needs to function. With Kyiv now relying on domestic defense sector output to cover around 50 percent of the country’s military needs, this disruption to production poses a grave threat to national security.

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The coming spring season will be crucial. The next few months of warmer weather should be Ukraine’s window to rebuild and recover lost industrial capacity. However, Moscow will be working hard to slam that window shut with waves of attacks made possible by Russia’s surging domestic drone production.

The continued bombardment of infrastructure targets across Ukraine will also help exhaust the country’s limited air defense ammunition supplies. Every interceptor missile used to defend a Ukrainian city or a power substation is one less available to cover front line positions. This will force Kyiv to prioritize between protecting the civilian population or shielding soldiers in the combat zone.

Another key feature of the war during the first half of 2026 will be escalating Russian attacks on Ukraine’s railways. Recent strikes on key routes linking Ukraine to Poland indicate that this campaign is already well underway. Any major disruption to rail services could cause significant economic damage and prevent millions of Ukrainians from traveling. More importantly, it would leave the army under-supplied and logistically isolated during the height of the summer campaigning season when Russia’s offensive capacity is expected to peak.

It is still not too late to counter the Kremlin’s plans, but the clock is ticking. Kyiv’s partners must urgently enhance Ukraine’s air defense capabilities and provide the country with more systems to protect the expanding list of potential infrastructure targets. Efforts should also be made to fortify strategic sites and anticipate future repair requirements by providing likely replacement components in advance.

Russia’s current strategy should come as no surprise. At the very start of his reign, Putin learned in Chechnya that pulverizing infrastructure was a reliable path to victory in a conflict that conventional military force could not resolve. In 2003, the United Nations reportedly called Chechen capital Grozny “the most destroyed city on earth.”

The Kremlin dictator now plans to secure victory in Ukraine by employing similar tactics. If Ukraine’s electricity grid and critical infrastructure are allowed to fragment further, the authorities in Kyiv may find themselves literally powerless to defend their country.

In Kursk, this advantage proved consequential. Over seven months of fighting, Russian fiber-optic drones helped render Ukraine’s presence in the Kursk region increasingly unsustainable. Ukrainian forces ultimately withdrew back across the border in March 2025.

Open source strike videos published by Russian war bloggers indicate that a disproportionate share of Russian fiber-optic drone attacks from August 2024 to September 2025 took place in the Kursk sector, even though the area represented only a small fraction of the overall front lines of the war during that period.

Strikingly, Russian fiber-optic drone attacks contributed to an unprecedented vehicle loss ratio that saw Ukraine lose 25 percent more vehicles than Russia in Kursk. Many of the vehicles damaged or destroyed were supply trucks and personnel carriers, but targets also included high-value equipment such as Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, systems that Ukraine did not have in abundant supply. In the words of a Ukrainian medic who fought during the Kursk campaign: “Our logistics just collapsed; fiber-optic drones were monitoring all routes, leaving no way to deliver ammunition or provisions.”

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After Kursk, the trend soon spread. Fiber-optic drones began proliferating across other areas of the front, graduating from a niche capability to a staple weapon. Their use has since expanded to such an extent that vast swaths of Ukrainian farmland and forest are now littered with fiber-optic cables shed by drones. Fiber-optic drones have also featured prominently in a series of major battles, including the most consequential fighting of the past year in the Pokrovsk region of eastern Ukraine.

By mid-2025, the fiber-optic drone story was no longer so one-sided as Ukraine moved to replicate and adapt the capability. Domestic production surged thanks to Ukraine’s agile ecosystem of innovative defense tech startups. Within months, more than 80 Ukrainian-designed fiber-optic systems had been approved for use, while the number of Ukrainian companies involved in producing or integrating this category of drones has rapidly expanded.

Ukrainian developers are now pushing the boundaries of range, with the country’s famous Birds of Magyar drone unit fielding a fiber-optic drone model capable of reaching approximately forty kilometers. What began as a Russian experiment has evolved into a mutual innovation cycle in which Ukraine is now leading in certain aspects.

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The rapid emergence of fiber-optic drones has caught the attention of NATO officers. In 2025, countering fiber-optic drones became the central theme of NATO’s Innovation Challenge, with participants from Ukraine and the United States taking the podium.

There is no silver bullet to neutralize the threat posed by these unjammable drones. Countermeasures range from last-resort shotgun blasts and physical barriers to radar tripwires, acoustic sensors, and experimental AI-assisted detection systems. Some are improvisations; others are technologically sophisticated solutions with longer development timelines. As with much of the war in Ukraine, adaptation is continuous and ephemeral; what works today may fail tomorrow.

The rise of fiber-optic drones has implications that extend far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine. Sudanese militias, Mexican cartels, and even the Chinese People’s Liberation Army are already reportedly incorporating fiber-optic drones into their growing arsenals. As drone warfare proliferates globally, the ability to avoid jamming will continue to attract attention wherever electronic interference is common or expected.

Ukraine’s experience suggests that militaries relying exclusively on radio-controlled drones and electronic warfare risk catastrophic disruption at critical moments. Fiber-optic drones may not replace conventional systems, but they have established themselves as a durable component of the modern battlefield toolkit. What began in Kursk as an experiment with a seemingly retrograde technology has now reshaped drone warfare.

Vlad Sutea is head of intelligence at Pravo Ventures and an open source intelligence expert focused on defense issues.

Ukrainians don’t want to be resilient. Putin has given them no other choice.

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 24 Feb 2026 20:57:23 +0000

As the world marks the fourth anniversary of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale Ukraine invasion this week, we can expect to see plenty of praise in the international media for the remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian people. This is thoroughly deserved. After all, whether we’re talking about holding back one of the world’s most powerful armies or maintaining a semblance of normality amid the largest European invasion since World War II, Ukraine has undoubtedly surpassed all expectations.

Nevertheless, there are many in Ukraine who no longer welcome the whole resilience narrative that has taken shape over the past four years. Critics argue that it creates unrealistic expectations while crediting the Ukrainian population with superpowers they do not possess. At a time when Ukraine desperately needs more international support, they warn that endless upbeat talk of Ukrainian resilience risks distracting from the urgency of the situation. At worst, it can serve as a substitute for action or an excuse to do nothing.

Rather than mythologizing Ukrainian resilience, international audiences should be asking themselves what drives this incredible durability and determination. Where do millions of Ukrainians find the strength to carry on amid barely imaginable hardships and trauma? The short answer is that Putin has given them no other choice.

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Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine began with the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Putin was well known for questioning Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent state. Recently declassified transcripts show that in 2008, the Russian leader told US President George W. Bush that Ukraine was an “artificial country.” He was also notorious for promoting an unashamedly imperialistic version of Ukrainian history and insisting that Ukrainians were actually Russians (“one people”).

These trends intensified following the start of Russia’s armed intervention, with Putin becoming openly dismissive of Ukraine’s legitimacy and laying claim to Ukrainian territory. In summer 2021, he took the highly unusual step of publishing a 5000-word history essay that read like a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. At around the same time, the Kremlin dictator began referring ominously to independent Ukraine as an “anti-Russia.”

Meanwhile, Putin’s formidable propaganda machine was busy demonizing and dehumanizing Ukrainians. Anyone who rejected the official Kremlin vision of Ukraine as an “inalienable” part of Russia’s own history, culture, and spiritual space was depicted as a Nazi and a traitor. This extreme anti-Ukrainian rhetoric set the stage for the crimes committed following the onset of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.

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The horrors of the past four years have gone far beyond the death and destruction associated with conventional armed conflicts. In areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, the Russian occupation authorities have launched a campaign of national destruction and set out to completely erase all traces of Ukrainian culture, history, language, and identity. Untold thousands have been detained in waves of arrests that United Nations investigators have branded as a crime against humanity.

Those who remain are being subjected to ruthless russification encompassing virtually every aspect of daily life. Anyone who refuses to accept Russian citizenship faces the prospect of deportation from their own homes. Military age men are liable to be conscripted into the Russian army and obliged to fight against their fellow Ukrainians.

Perhaps the single most shocking Russian war crime committed in occupied Ukraine has been the mass abduction of children, who are sent to Russia for indoctrination in order to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose an imperial Russian identity. In 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Putin in connection with Russia’s large-scale child kidnapping campaign.

These crimes have taken place against a backdrop of genocidal language that is now a routine feature of Russia’s political and media discourse. Kremlin officials and propagandists frequently call for the liquidation of Ukraine and indicate that they intend to extinguish Ukrainian national identity completely. Based on the crimes taking place in Ukraine and the intent on display in Moscow, numerous international experts have concluded that the Russian invasion qualifies as an act of genocide.

Ukrainians are acutely aware of Russia’s genocidal objectives. They know what is happening in the occupied regions of their own country, and are all too familiar with the sickening propaganda emanating from the Kremlin. This awareness is a crucial factor fueling the phenomenon of Ukrainian resilience. Far from being comic book heroes, most Ukrainians are ordinary folk who recognize that if they stop resisting, their country will not survive.

Since 2022, Ukraine’s bravery has captured the imagination of the watching world. But as we marvel at the courage of a nation defying seemingly impossible odds, it is crucial to also act accordingly by increasing international support for the Ukrainian war effort. Too often, vocal cheerleading in Western capitals has not translated into robust backing. This only emboldens Russia and prolongs the war.

As Putin’s invasion enters a fifth year, it is now abundantly clear that Russia aims to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. Ukrainian resilience alone will not be enough to prevent this catastrophe. If Kyiv’s partners fall short, the applause of the past four years will ring very hollow indeed.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

On December 2, 2025, a forum on this topic held at Universidad Sergio Arboleda in Bogotá convened by the Corioli Institute (of which I am the founder and executive director), the Governance, Policies, and Strategic Security Agency, and several other partners, exposed the far more complex reality driving this exodus and the emerging struggle to govern it.

When reintegration fails, military labor moves

One must look beyond the label of “mercenary” to understand why a Colombian soldier ends up in the Donbas. Across the Bogotá forum, veterans, researchers, and officials converged on a shared pattern: professional soldiers with fifteen to twenty years of counterinsurgency experience retire in their late thirties or early forties, only to fail to reintegrate into an economy that has no place for them. Formal transition and retraining programs exist; however, their disconnectedness from labor-market realities leaves veterans without a credible civilian off-ramp.

November 3, 2025, Kyiv, Kyiv Oblast, Ukraine: Maidan Square, Kyiv: Colombian flags pay respect to the almost 350 Colombian volunteers who have lost their lives fighting Russian and affiliated forces in Ukraine in Maidan Square in Kyiv, Ukraine, on November 3, 2025. Of the international Legion’s foreign volunteers, Colombia’s have lost the most men. The US is second with around 100 killed in action. (© Jeremy Bigwood/ZUMA Press Wire)

A typical mid-level officer earns roughly four million pesos (just over one thousand dollars) per month in active service, with that figure dropping to four hundred dollars for rank-and-file soldiers. Upon retirement, income often falls by half. With anemic transition programs and the domestic private security sector saturated, the contrast with Ukrainian frontline pay is stark. Salaries for soldiers in Ukraine participating in combat operations run from $3,000 to $5,000 a month (including any time in captivity and rehabilitation following injury), plus a potential $25,000 signing bonus and a $350,000 death benefit to families in the event the soldier is killed in combat. While language barriers and a multitude of bureaucratic hurdles have resulted in substantive challenges in obtaining death benefits and repatriating fallen soldiers’ remains, the economic arbitrage remains compelling for those feeling functionally stranded between illegal employment and economic exclusion. Ukraine becomes, as one participant of the forum in Bogotá put it, “the first real door that opens.”

Bogotá’s legal turn: Moral framing vs. practical limits

Such structural pressures and their consequences have shaped Bogotá’s response, which has adopted a tone of criminalization and moral condemnation. At the presidential level, the legal turn has been driven by Petro’s broader rhetorical and policy pivot against what he calls mercenarismo. Since 2024, he has described recruitment for foreign wars more broadly as a form of “human trafficking converting men into merchants of death,” arguing that, in the case of Ukraine, commanders treat Colombians as an “inferior race. . . and cannon fodder.” He called on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to free Colombian “mercenaries” from these armies and argued that veterans should not be permitted to, among other illicit activities, put their skills in the service of “other wars abroad” due to the fact that their training had been paid for by the Colombian people.

In December 2025, the Colombian House of Representatives approved a bill with ninety-four votes in favor (with seventeen against) to ratify the 1989 United Nations (UN) Convention against mercenaries. Under that UN convention, a mercenary is defined as a specially recruited person who takes part in hostilities for private gain, is promised material compensation substantially higher than that paid to regular combatants, neither a national nor resident of a party to the conflict, not a member of the armed forces of a party, and not sent on official duty by a state that is not party to the conflict. Colombians fighting in Ukraine’s International Legion—or its army’s regular assault units following the dissolution of the legion in December 2025—are thus not mercenaries according to this definition. They receive the same pay as regular combatants and are members of the state’s armed forces.

Legal experts at the forum warned of the pitfalls of collapsing state military service, private security contracting, and outright mercenary activity into a single category. Blurring these definitional boundaries undermines critical outcomes such as who gets prisoner-of-war status, consular protection, and veterans’ rights. Forum participants described a “witch hunt” that strands hundreds of veterans in a legal gray zone in which they could face prosecution at home for service that is perfectly legal under international law. Meanwhile, the economic realities pushing them to leave in the first place remain completely ignored.

Petro’s reductive framing risks returning fighters to Colombia as stigmatized subjects instead of veterans with recognized needs. Many returning Colombian veterans of the war in Ukraine are simultaneously traumatized, severely wounded, politically delegitimized, and exposed to prosecution. This convergence of stigma and legal peril creates a dangerous reintegration vacuum, one likely to be filled by criminal organizations eager to recruit highly trained personnel who feel abandoned by the state.

Policy priorities for Colombia and its partners

While the forum focused on Colombians’ participation in the war in Ukraine, the scale of Colombian veterans’ movements is global. More than merely joining state-backed armed forces in Eastern Europe, they are also being actively recruited by (and sometimes lured by false promises into) nonstate armed groups across the geopolitical spectrum, from the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan to Mexican cartels. This transnational demand for Colombian combat labor creates a complex threat landscape where the line between lawful military service and criminal activity is increasingly blurred. Any effective response must thus confront illicit and exploitative recruitment networks without mistaking them for the problem itself. Rather, policymakers should address the structural failures that make fighting for foreign forces a rational choice for many veterans. They should also preserve clear legal distinctions so that those who serve through lawful pathways are not further marginalized when they return.

Prioritize the genuine implementation of the 2019 Veterans Law to transform it from a hollow framework into a viable civilian off-ramp. This requires the Ministry of Defense’s veterans directorate to embed financial planning and transition support throughout the military lifecycle. Meanwhile, the Ministries of Labor, Education, and Health must build education and employment pathways aligned with actual market demand to address the governance failures driving veterans abroad.
Establish a permanent interministerial national mechanism and a dedicated Colombia–Ukraine liaison capacity to manage the transnational market for combat labor. Led by the Foreign Ministry (Cancillería) and linking the Ministries of Defense, Justice, and Labour, this body would coordinate veteran policy, regulate recruitment networks, and manage repatriation claims. It would also invest in data systems in collaboration with international partners to distinguish lawful service from illicit trafficking to help protect returnees.
US policymakers and US Southern Command should treat veteran reintegration as a critical node of regional security cooperation to prevent criminal networks from capturing US-trained expertise. US military assistance should match operational training with robust reintegration support to deny cartels access to elite combat and drone skills. This directly supports US priorities on counternarcotics and transnational crime. Force development without credible transition pathways creates downstream security risks.

The growing patch of Colombian flags in Kyiv’s memorial park signals what one veteran at the forum described as a “definitive inflection point.” Colombian combatants will continue to deploy to distant theaters. Unless the structural gray zone of veteran exclusion is addressed, these now globally dispersed front lines will inevitably rebound back home, transforming untreated trauma and economic precarity into fresh, combat-tested, and technologically trained manpower—ideal targets for recruitment by domestic and transnational criminal networks.

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Costa quoted in NBC News article on potential Iranian responses to US strikes

Atlantic Council — Mon, 23 Feb 2026 15:00:00 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On February 23, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Program Joe Costa was quoted in an article from NBC News on Iran’s retaliatory responses to possible US strikes. Costa warns that if the threat becomes existential for the Iranian regime, Iran’s response would be more aggressive.

Staff

Joe Costa

Director

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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Ten predictions for the potential US strikes on Iran

William F. Wechsler — Sun, 22 Feb 2026 03:33:03 +0000

WASHINGTON—Experienced foreign-policy observers in the US capital have long learned never to make public predictions. The world is far too uncertain and the downside risks to your reputation are far too high if you end up well off the mark. It’s clearly advisable to wait until events have already transpired and then claim afterward that you saw them coming all along. This is especially the case when it comes to decisions to go to war.

Yet those who carry the burden of policymaking are forced to make predictions to inform their policies. So even as negotiations continue between the United States and Iran, US President Donald Trump and his advisers are undoubtedly trying to assess what Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will do in the face of the “massive armada” that is in the final stages of being assembled in the Middle East, and Iranian leaders are doing the same.

In rare instances, policymakers are fortunate to possess hard intelligence that provides reliable answers. More often, however, they are making their own educated but fundamentally subjective judgments—and those judgments can be usefully informed by credible perspectives from outside of government. Therefore, experienced foreign-policy observers do a disservice to policymakers when they withhold their own predictions. So, as US strikes on Iran appear ever more likely, here are ten predictions of mine. And since not all predictions are created equal, I’ve also offered a rough assessment of my level of confidence for each.

1. Khamenei will not offer a last-minute strong deal.

HIGH CONFIDENCE

The Iranian regime’s power has sharply declined over the past year and a half, during which Israel successfully conducted military operations in Lebanon and against Iranian strategic air defenses; the Bashar al-Assad regime fell in Syria and the twelve-day war concluded with US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites; the Iranian economy continued collapsing, and nationwide anti-regime protests were only put down through brutal force.

Given this fundamentally changed strategic environment, the minimum-acceptable requirement a deal today must include is an ironclad commitment to zero uranium enrichment in Iran. However, I do not see any evidence that the regime is capable of offering this concession, much less offering any compromises on its arsenal of long-range precision weapons or its network of terrorist nonstate proxies, even if Trump would be willing to offer complete sanctions relief in return.

In the immediate aftermath of the crackdown, Iranian diplomats successfully shifted the focus from the butchery of their own people to a more familiar and comfortable subject: Iran’s nuclear program. These same diplomats then busied themselves in drawing out the discussions through delaying tactics.

2. Trump will not accept a last-minute weak deal.

MODERATE CONFIDENCE

Trump has consistently emphasized that he wants a deal with Iran and, in the past, has signaled his flexibility on the details. The likelihood of Trump accepting a weak deal in his first term, for instance, was quite high. If Khamenei had better understood Trump during his first term, then the Iranian leader would have proposed ripping up the deal he struck with US President Barack Obama and allowed Trump to sign a “better” deal, akin to Mexico’s more astute approach to Trump regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement. Trump likely would have accepted this proposal, overruling his much more hawkish advisers.

As Trump’s second term began, the likelihood of him accepting a deal remained high, given that he excluded and publicly denounced many of those first-term Iran hawks, going so far as to cancel security protection for those Iran was trying to kill. This past April, the administration even signaled that Trump would be willing to accept a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action–lite deal. Yet Tehran has still slow-rolled the negotiations. While Trump is eager to find an acceptable off-ramp to war, and he would likely accept provisions that I would find unacceptable, even that may not be on offer.

Now, given the negative experience of Iranian delay and Iran’s fundamentally changed strategic environment, Trump is likely no longer willing to accept an obviously weak deal. But given his repeated previous inclinations and leaks that continue to hint at shifting US goalposts that would allow some Iranian domestic enrichment, my confidence in this conclusion can only be moderate.

3. If Trump appears willing to accept a weak deal, then Netanyahu will preempt by striking Iran.

HIGH CONFIDENCE

Last June, when many perceived that the United States and Iran were on a path to a new nuclear deal, one that might have even been weaker than Obama’s deal, Israel preempted it by striking Iran. Trump did not give Israel the “red light,” and despite his initial attempt to distance the United States from the Israeli strike, Trump eventually decided to order US strikes on the key Iranian nuclear sites—a decision I encouraged in advance and then applauded afterward.

Given Israel’s tactical successes against Iran and its strategic success that resulted in a complete reversal by Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would likely seek to replicate this approach should my second prediction above prove to be incorrect—especially since this is an election year in Israel. Of course, Trump and his advisers likely recognize that, which adds to the confidence of my previous assessment that in the end Trump will not accept a weak deal.

Alternatively, the United States could give Netanyahu a clear “red light” against any such action. But based on Trump’s previous inclination to hedge, I cannot be confident that he would do so. And even if he did, in the face of a coming election Netanyahu is likely to prioritize his domestic political standing over his relationship with Trump.

4. Trump will be presented with three strategic options: “Enforce,” “Degrade,” or “Remove.”

HIGH CONFIDENCE

I’m not privy to the papers going up to the president these days, but if I were again on the National Security Council staff or in the Pentagon, then I would organize three basic option packages for presidential consideration.

The first, “Enforce,” would consist of a nation-wide campaign of strikes against buildings and other infrastructure of the Iranian state security forces most directly responsible for the violent crackdown against protesters. It would specifically target the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Basij militia. This campaign would likely last only one or two nights, with only modest fatalities expected in comparison to the thousands killed by these forces.

The second, “Degrade,” would involve expanding the target set to include regime assets that most directly threaten the region and US national security interests, notably Iran’s remaining nuclear infrastructure and its missile, rocket, and drone deployments, inventories, and supporting industrial backbones. This campaign would be significantly longer, and it would likely need to be accompanied with a credible threat to repeat it every six to nine months as Iran rebuilt its missile inventories.

The third, “Remove,” would further expand the campaign to seek to decapitate the regime’s political and military leadership, disrupt the regime’s ability to effectively command and control its forces in the short term, and strike symbolic targets associated with the regime’s repression of the Iranian people and its perceived legitimacy to rule. “Remove” would likely acknowledge that there is scant historical evidence in Iran or elsewhere that regime change can be accomplished through air strikes alone, but nevertheless I can’t imagine that any option will be presented to the president that would include US conventional ground forces. Those who advocate for this option would argue, however, that even if the regime doesn’t fall it would be so badly damaged that it could not pose an immediate threat and might open the door to other opportunities, akin to what Israel accomplished against Hezbollah.

While these three options would be presented separately, Trump, like many of his predecessors, would also have the ability to take an à la carte approach to the individual target packages within the three options, mixing and matching as he sees fit.

5. Trump will choose the first option, “Enforce.”

LOW CONFIDENCE

Trump is caught in a trap of his own making, unfortunately. In contrast to the incident back in 2019, when he (correctly) rejected the Pentagon’s strike options designed to retaliate against Iranian forces shooting down a US drone, this time Trump drew a “red line” that the Iranian regime then clearly crossed. Trump openly encouraged the uprising, even promising that US “help is on its way,” and then stood back while protesters were butchered. This is akin to what the United States did to Hungarians in 1956 and to Iraqis in 1991, the low points of the Dwight Eisenhower and George H.W. Bush administrations, respectively. Trump previously mocked Obama’s refusal to enforce his own red line on Syria in 2013, the low point of that administration, and then proudly enforced Obama’s red line himself in 2017 and 2018.

Moreover, the US military assets Trump has amassed can’t stay in place forever. If he orders them to leave without any strikes or deal, then it will be perceived by many, including Tehran, as an embarrassing US retreat. Trump is determined to avoid being perceived as “weaker than Obama.” Therefore, I predict that he will choose to strike.

And yet, everyone I have spoken with who has spent time with Trump over the years discussing the potential for conflict with Iran has come away with the same conclusion: Trump does not want this war. He is, with good reason, extremely concerned with where it could lead. For that reason, if Khamenei is unwilling to offer a deal strong enough to prevent US strikes, and if Trump is now unwilling to accept a weaker deal, then I think he will pick the option least likely to cascade into a full war. Among the three options, that would be “Enforce.” From his perspective, this would likely have the added benefit of shifting the subject of public discussion back to the protests and away from his unsuccessful negotiations on nuclear issues.

In choosing “Enforce,” Trump would almost certainly be disregarding US Central Command’s recommended option, which I assume would be “Degrade.” I am sympathetic to the argument that it would be a missed opportunity not to set the precedent that the United States reserves the right to target Iran’s missiles when it feels threatened, but I don’t think Trump would share this sympathy. I would similarly be surprised if, under “Enforce,” Trump would allow Israel to be an overt part of the operation.

My degree of confidence is merely low for this prediction, however. While Trump is quite consistent and thus predictable over the long term, he has proved to act impulsively and thus unpredictably when presented with immediate decisions. That was the case in early 2020, for instance, when Trump surprised some of his top advisors by quickly choosing the most aggressive of the military options put in front of him by ordering the killing of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. And while many commentators initially predicted worst-case scenarios as a result of this action, in the end this decision turned out to be one of the most strategically beneficial of his first term.

After this, the direction of the conflict will depend on decisions made in Iran—by the supreme leader and by the people.

6. Khamenei will order a fundamentally symbolic response.

MODERATE CONFIDENCE

Assuming my fifth prediction above holds, the Iranian regime will have to decide how to respond. It would be unprecedented for Tehran not to respond at all; the regime typically responds in a manner that appears symmetrical according to its own analysis. Therefore, if Khamenei recognizes that Trump limited his strikes to only enforce his red line, and if he is convinced that Trump wants to end the exchange of fire after one round, then his response is likely to be largely symbolic.

An example of this approach is the performative “attack” his forces made on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar last year in response to the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear program. At that time, the response was designed to de-escalate the immediate conflict while allowing Iran to claim that its number of missiles fired matched the count of bombs used by the United States. This time around, the regime planners won’t repeat the exact same response as before, of course. Therefore, US defense planners should anticipate symbolic attacks on different targets, such as a US aircraft carrier or the fifth fleet headquarters in Bahrain.

Given the scale of US military forces in the area, it would be stupid or suicidal for Iran to choose any other approach than a symbolic attack. So this prediction may appear to be straightforward. However, my confidence in this prediction is not high because Iran’s leaders have made especially poor decisions in the recent past, most notably their foolish choice to strike Israel directly with hundreds of projectiles—twice!—which then led to Iran’s current weakened position. It is therefore possible that Iranian leaders will fail to grasp the dangers they face now, leading to another disastrous miscalculation from their perspective.

Some observers of Iran go further and argue that the eighty-six-year-old Khamenei would prefer to be remembered as a martyr rather than a failure. I have never been convinced by the argument that Iran’s theocratic system structurally produces irrational choices, but my concerns about the quality of its decision making have gone up markedly in recent years.

7. If Khamenei miscalculates, then Trump will escalate to “Degrade”—but he will be willing to cut the operation short.

HIGH CONFIDENCE

Instead of acting to deescalate the conflict after a US strike, Iran might escalate with an attack that goes beyond mere symbolism. This attack might, for example, result in US casualties. If this happens, then Trump will be forced to escalate in turn. The easiest way for Trump to do so would be by ordering the “Degrade” campaign to commence. Israel might also be allowed to join the campaign in this scenario.

That said, I think Trump would then behave just as he did last June. He would prove eager to end the US campaign far short of its designed duration and as soon as he assessed that Iran had been deterred from its escalatory path. Unlike the mistake he made last time, however, I would hope that Trump would demand, as a price to halt the campaign, a commitment from Iran to immediately meet for direct negotiations.

8. The Iranian people will rise up again after the US strikes.

MODERATE CONFIDENCE

It would be completely understandable if the Iranian people were sufficiently cowed by the incredible cruelty of the regime. One should never fall into the trap of criticizing a subjugated people who decide to prioritize self-preservation. Indeed, this typical reaction is why despots throughout history have resorted to brutality; for instance, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s violent repression in the 1982 Hama massacre successfully deterred further uprisings in Syria for three decades.

Nevertheless, I think foreign-policy analysts have an unfortunate track record of underestimating both the willingness of the repressed to rise up against their overlords and the courage of those who are eager to risk death to support revolution. This is especially true in the Middle East, where analysts in the United States have been surprised again and again—by the Iranian revolution forty-seven years ago and the Arab Spring fifteen years ago, and by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s fall in 2011 and Assad’s in 2024. I fear that some analysts in the United States are making the same mistake again now by underestimating the Iranian people’s resolve, notwithstanding how immediate the threat is to those who oppose Khamenei.

In recent years, the Iranian people have repeatedly shown that they will take almost any opportunity available to them to express their widespread opposition. The Women, Life, Freedom protests in 2022 posed a direct threat to the ideological legitimacy of the regime, and the most recent protests further escalated the threat by putting the regime’s survival itself in jeopardy.

In early January, the Iranian people did respond to Trump’s call to the streets, but his pledge of support proved empty. But the next time they will be reacting to Trump’s actions, not his words, and further inspired by their recognition that the United States actually has the forces in place to protect them. If they do, it is likely to become the turning point for the entire confrontation, and I wouldn’t discount the possibility of the people seeing it in those terms and then taking advantage of the best chance they’ve had in forty-six years to rid themselves of this regime.

9. If widespread protests emerge, the regime will murder en masse, again.

HIGH CONFIDENCE

Of course, if Iranians do rise up again in significant numbers, then the regime will assess those protests to be an existential threat. That assessment will be accurate. Iranian security forces should therefore be expected to respond to that threat in the exact same manner that they have done before. Thousands more Iranians will likely be killed, possibly tens of thousands, depending on the scale of the protests themselves and how quickly the regime acts.

10. If Iranian protesters are again massacred, Trump will quickly escalate to “Degrade” and “Remove.”

HIGH CONFIDENCE

In this scenario drawn by these successive predictions, Trump will be confronted with a challenge that will define the legacy of his second term. He will have publicly committed the United States to a “red line” to prevent an enemy’s behavior and then punished that enemy for ignoring his warning and crossing that line—only to then have that same enemy cross the same line again. Few scenarios could be more destructive to US credibility. The president would then have to escalate further.

At this point, the United States and Iran would be in a war that both correctly assess as existential: For Tehran, to the regime itself. For Washington, to its credibility as the world’s remaining superpower. It is impossible to predict the military outcome, since so much depends on the operational and tactical prowess of each side in the first days of a sharp escalation.

If US forces quickly destroy much of Iran’s ability to project force beyond its borders, and if they decapitate the regime’s leadership (likely with Israel’s help), then that will open a window of opportunity for the Iranian people to try to change their regime. Alternatively, if the regime is able to deploy most of the forces available to it, then it would likely direct them against any target that could pressure the United States into stopping its campaign, including targeting US forces, maritime shipping, and civilian population centers in Israel and elsewhere, looking to exhaust the US-Israeli combined stockpile of interceptors. Israel already appears to be preemptively acting to diminish this threat by killing those it believes would be involved in directing Hezbollah’s response.

Even individual tactical successes by Iran could have large strategic implications. For instance, one rocket hitting one high rise in downtown Dubai could damage the United Arab Emirates’ economic model for years to come. Foreign executives proved their willingness to flee that country during the financial crisis in 2008, and they would likely do the same in larger numbers if they believed their lives instead of just their wallets were at risk. Similarly, when Iran was deemed responsible for the attacks on the oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais in 2019, it appeared to intentionally target elements that were readily replaceable, thus limiting the economic consequences to global markets. If Iran were to instead target elements that it knows could take far longer to replace, then the results could be much more damaging. And given the unique role Saudi Arabia plays in the global price of oil, the impact would immediately be felt in the United States.

It is even more difficult to predict the political outcome of such a confrontation. Most experts in my circles believe that the most likely result of regime change in Iran is the establishment of a non-theocratic but firmly anti-US “IRGC-istan” government, which rules over the Iranian people with an even more brutal iron fist. But there are other potential outcomes as well. Some experts predict that the collapse of Iran’s central government would set off a civil war, in which numerous outside actors support different internal elements, some divided along ethnic lines. Some Iran watchers expect the current regime to survive in some form, while still others foresee the restoration of monarchy and the return of Reza Pahlavi. Still others hope for the rise of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, now known as the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Very few experts, however, are optimistic enough to predict a clear path toward Iranian democracy.

I think any prediction along those lines is a fool’s errand. After all, nobody predicted that World War I would end with a small group of Bolsheviks taking over Russia. At this point, it’s impossible to know which faction might ascend to the leadership of Iran in the wake of full war.

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Iran’s regime is suffering from strategic vertigo. Its next misstep may be its last.

Michael Rozenblat — Fri, 20 Feb 2026 19:43:08 +0000

Tehran appears to be suffering from a case of strategic vertigo. As Iranian leaders continue to see their major decisions backfire over the course of two and a half years, a disorienting dizzy spell may be the best way to describe the state of Iranian foreign policy.

Negotiations between the United States and Iran are ongoing, with US President Donald Trump saying Thursday that he expects a resolution within ten to fifteen days, as he also undertakes a massive military buildup for a possible conflict. The talks provide the regime with a rare opportunity—a gift, even—to escape from yet another predicament. The question right now is whether leaders in Tehran grasp the magnitude of the moment and refrain from their old habits of obstinance, or whether they will add another strategic error to their string of missteps—one that could be their last.

With the United States preparing for strikes if negotiations fail, it begs the question of how Iran got to the precipice in the first place.

Blinking on October 7

On October 7, 2023, Hamas achieved a long-held Iranian ambition: it managed to momentarily paralyze the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and effectively hold parts of Israeli territory while Israeli society felt it was facing an existential crisis. Yet in hindsight, this pivotal moment overshadowed another simultaneous failure. With Hamas surprising the entire region, including its allies in Beirut and Tehran, Iran blinked while Israel was at its most vulnerable state in decades. Had Iran ordered Hezbollah—the crown jewel and strongest of its regional terror network—to join Hamas and launch a full-scale invasion of northern Israel, the Middle East’s landscape could have looked very different today.

Instead, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his protégé Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, failed to grasp the magnitude of the event and made their first in a string of mistakes, opting for a limited-intensity conflict to stretch Israel’s capacity to fight on two fronts simultaneously without risking an all-out war that could have led to Hezbollah’s destruction. Thus, Iran and Hezbollah allowed the IDF to regain its footing after the initial shock. By choosing this path, Iran inadvertently gave Israel the space to dismantle Hamas’s military infrastructure in Gaza while systematically degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities in southern Lebanon.

Attacking Israel directly

Iran crossed a new threshold in April 2024, following Israel’s killing of Quds Force General Mohammad Reza Zahedi in Damascus. Mistakenly thinking Israel was still at a low point following October 7, Iran boldly moved its decades-long conflict with Israel from the shadows into full view when it launched a barrage of over one hundred ballistic missiles and roughly two hundred drones and cruise missiles. Backed by a coalition led by the United States along with European and regional allies, Israel thwarted the assault and countered with a strike targeting Iran’s air defense capabilities.

Iran’s decision to directly strike Israel reflected a major shift from its traditional reliance on its proxies for retaliatory measures. In doing so, Iran helped Israel cross a mental Rubicon. By the end of the next round of conflict between the two sides in October 2024, Israel realized that not only can it strike Iran, but contrary to the prior belief within its security establishment, it can do so at a relatively low cost due to its operational superiority.

Choosing defiance in nuclear talks

By early 2025 the strategic landscape in the Middle East had changed and Iran was more vulnerable than its leadership had realized. Its S-300 air defense systems were gone, Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria had fallen swiftly, and Israel managed to drastically degrade the military capabilities of Iran’s primary proxies, Hezbollah and the Houthis. And yet, Iran’s leaders entered negotiations with the United States on the country’s nuclear program in April 2025 thinking they were in a position of power to make demands without being attacked by either the United States or Israel. Presented with a sixty-day deadline by the Trump administration to reach a nuclear deal, Iran chose defiance again. It was the wrong choice.

With Trump’s deadline expiring, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, which led to a joint US-Israeli campaign that paralyzed Iran in a matter of twelve days. Putting decades of planning into action, Israel struck Iran’s nuclear program, missiles, launchers, and air defense systems; precisely targeted its top commanders and nuclear scientists; and destroyed large portions of its defense industrial complex. To top it all, Israel laid the groundwork for the United States to join and carry out Operation Midnight Hammer, its airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.

The regime had long said that the Islamic Republic and its revolution are the answer to the “great satan” and the “small satan”—the United States and Israel, respectively. But when the “satans” teamed up for the twelve-day war, the regime had no answers.

Killing the Iranian people en masse

After years of economic stagnation and hyper-inflation, and without any regional gains that would justify decades of spending billions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and proxy groups, Iranians saw this regime for what it was: an empty shell of a “revolution” ruled by a corrupt clerical elite. Hence, it should come as no surprise that Iranians decided to courageously revolt.

Rather than realizing the major shift needed in policy, the supreme leader doubled down on old habits and ordered the mass killing of his people—effectively showing that he’s trapped in a sunk cost fallacy. Instead of addressing economic problems at home, the regime continues to pour money into rebuilding its proxies abroad. Instead of releasing detained protesters, the regime executes them in the dark of night while calling for Iranians to rally around the national flag and brace for yet another war.

Although these are not the first major protests in the Islamic Republic’s history, this time might be different. With so many killed and the economy in dire shape, growing numbers of Iranians don’t have much to lose right now. “Seeing the mass killing all over the country felt like waking up from a deep sleep with a slap on my face. I am so ashamed to be alive,” one Iranian woman told The Washington Post. “I am also full of rage.” With Iranians clear-eyed about this regime, the crackdowns could well be seen in hindsight as the start of this regime’s downfall.

Arriving at another crossroads

Amid this growing pressure, the current talks mediated by Oman could serve as a vital lifeline for the regime. Trump presented Iran with a golden opportunity to survive and achieve relief from punishing economic sanctions, but once again set a timeline to reach a deal. Iran has to decide whether to make concessions that conflict with its core values and identity or stick to defiance and risk the regime’s survival.

Given the fact that Khamenei has spent over thirty-six years cultivating a legacy of defiance against Western powers, a pivot seems highly unlikely. By now he may be incapable of sacrificing his ideological zealous to extricate Iran from an upcoming war. His public statements indicate that Iran isn’t going to make major concessions in any aspect the United States deems important.

Iran’s leaders appear to once again be choosing defiance. They would rather drag the country into another war than dismantle their nuclear program or put strict limitations on their ballistic missiles.

It is a gamble that could pay off. Iran is certainly capable of inflicting damage on the United States and its regional allies in any military conflict, and the regime won’t easily back down and rush to the negotiation table if it’s attacked for the second time in a year. If the regime somehow manages to withstand another military campaign without collapsing, it would solidify its standing both domestically and internationally.

But more likely, this defiance is a losing bet, as the ayatollahs fail once again to see that the strategic landscape has changed to their detriment. Having lost their balance due to strategic vertigo, they could fall at last.

Michael Rozenblat is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, from the Israeli security establishment. The views in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of any other entity.

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After four years of Russia’s invasion, time to stop underestimating Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Fri, 20 Feb 2026 13:16:48 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is now entering a fifth year and has already lasted longer than the entire conflict between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during World War II.

It was not supposed to be like this. When Russian President Vladimir Putin first gave the order to invade four years ago, he was anticipating a brief and victorious campaign to decapitate the Ukrainian state and extinguish Ukrainian independence. This over-confidence was reflected in the initial Russian invasion plan, with vast armored columns approaching cities along major highways while showing little consideration for the possibility of any serious Ukrainian resistance.

Putin did not seek to mobilize or recruit additional troops for this ambitious undertaking. Instead, he believed an invasion force of approximately two hundred thousand professional soldiers would be more than enough to achieve his objectives. There were even reports of invading Russian units bringing their parade uniforms along, ready for the inevitable victory celebrations. However, it soon became apparent that the Kremlin dictator had fundamentally misread the situation.

Russia’s blitzkrieg attack failed because it was based on a series of false political and military assumptions. In the political realm, Russia’s leaders had long dismissed Ukraine as an artificial state with no unifying national identity. As a result, they seem to have been genuinely shocked by the scale of popular resistance in spring 2022 as millions of Ukrainians rose up to defend their nation.

On the battlefield, the initial stage of the invasion exposed the underwhelming reality behind Russia’s military superpower pretensions. The Russian army may look impressive when marching unopposed across Red Square, but Putin’s commanders struggled to conduct combined arms operations in Ukraine and demonstrated a distinct lack of imagination. Likewise, the Russian air force was unable to establish control of the skies over Ukraine.

Putin’s plans unraveled because he underestimated Ukraine. After years of dismissing Ukrainian statehood as an accident of history and insisting Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people“), he seems to have convinced himself that Ukraine could not possibly demonstrate the national cohesion necessary for a sustained defense. His commanders appear to have been similarly dismissive, and clearly did not think the Ukrainian military was capable of waging a modern war.

These assumptions were largely the product of wishful thinking. They conveniently ignored Ukraine’s significant nation-building progress during the post-Soviet era, and failed to anticipate the impact of the comprehensive military reforms undertaken in the country following the onset of Russian aggression in 2014.

Putin and his Kremlin colleagues were not the only ones to fall into the trap of underestimating Ukraine. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, military and political leaders throughout the West were also queuing up to write off the country.

While individual forecasts differed, there was a broad consensus that Ukraine had no real chance of resisting the might of the Russian military and would be completely overrun by the Kremlin war machine in a matter of days. Instead, Ukraine won the Battle of Kyiv and stunned the watching world.

This remarkable success set the tone for all that has followed. By the end of 2022, Ukraine had liberated around half of the land seized by Russia during the initial stage of the invasion. Since then, Kyiv has managed to decimate the Russian Black Sea Fleet and has forced Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining warships from occupied Crimea. Ukraine is also now increasingly bringing Putin’s invasion home to Russia with long-range drone and missile strikes deep inside the Russian Federation.

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Over the past four years, Russia’s invasion has become the biggest European war since World War II, with a series of game-changing technological advances transforming military doctrine. In 2022, the battlefield was dominated by tanks, armor, and artillery, much as it had been since the early twentieth century. Today, the war is being shaped primarily by drones and small groups of infantry.

The proliferation of these technologies has turned what began as a war of movement into a war of attrition, with a kill zone stretching at least ten kilometers from ground zero on both sides of the front line. Robotic systems can now strike enemy targets on land, in the air, and at sea, and are also being deployed to evacuate the wounded, perform logistics roles, and serve as front line sentries.

Ukraine has proved highly adept at this innovative form of warfare. In many cases, Ukrainian military commanders have sought high tech solutions in order to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower and conventional firepower.

Kyiv has also viewed defense tech innovations as an economically viable way to compensate for often unpredictable flows of military supplies from the country’s Western partners. This approach has helped to minimize any negative consequences following the reduction in direct US aid to Ukraine since the return of Donald Trump to the White House last year.

As a result, Ukraine now boasts a large and sophisticated domestic drone industry, with developers constantly upgrading existing models based of real-time combat feedback. Ukraine’s remarkable defense tech progress since 2022 has positioned the country at the cutting edge of drone technologies. Partner countries increasingly acknowledge this status and are seeking to benefit from Ukraine’s expertise, with Ukrainian soldiers training their NATO counterparts in drone warfare.

As the Trump presidency leads to dramatic shifts in the international security landscape, Kyiv is more generally in the geopolitical ascendancy. With America looking to downgrade its transatlantic commitments, the Ukrainian army is recognized as a key contributor to Europe’s future security. A country once seen as militarily insignificant is now regarded as indispensable for the defense of the continent.

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Ukraine’s emergence as the largest and most innovative military in Europe has enabled the country to stem the tide of Russia’s invasion and prevent any major breakthroughs. While Moscow has consistently held the battlefield initiative since late 2023, the Russian army has only managed to seize around one percent of additional Ukrainian territory while suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties.

Faced with a bloody quagmire on the front lines, Putin has resorted to exaggerating his army’s advances as he seeks to maintain the myth of inevitable Russian victory and discourage further support for Ukraine. This tactic was brutally exposed in late 2025 when Putin repeatedly claimed to have captured Kupyansk in northeastern Ukraine, only for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to visit the city personally and record a selfie video revealing the Kremlin dictator’s lies.

Despite Ukraine’s strong record of military innovation and battlefield success since 2022, there are indications that both Russia and some of Kyiv’s Western partners continue to underestimate the country. Putin’s recent public statements reaffirming his determination to fight on, together with Russia’s increasingly open rejection of a compromise peace, suggest that Moscow still expects the Ukrainian army to collapse.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that Ukraine has “no cards” and should therefore agree to a Kremlin-friendly peace deal. Others in Europe continue to argue that unfavorable military realities make painful Ukrainian concessions unavoidable in order to end the war.

These pessimistic perspectives ignore the lessons of the past four years. The Russian army is clearly not the irresistible force of Kremlin propaganda, while Ukraine is no longer a military minnow and has multiple trump cards in its possession. The most important conclusion of all is that the human dimension still ultimately determines outcomes on the battlefield. It is here that Ukraine truly excels, with an army of skilled, inventive, and highly motivated personnel defending their homes and families.

The grassroots ingenuity of Ukraine’s military and the country’s readiness to embrace defense sector innovation have undoubtedly been instrumental in sustaining the Ukrainian war effort. But while impressive new weapons systems have often grabbed the headlines, it would be shortsighted to attribute Ukraine’s military strength to technological advances alone.

As the war enters a fifth year, the Ukrainian nation as a whole deserves the respect of the world for defying Russia so emphatically and transforming their country into a formidable military power. Nobody knows this better than Putin, who is paying a very high price for making the mistake of underestimating Ukraine.

Syria today is not Libya. The two conflicts emerged from different political systems, unfolded along different timelines, and produced different outcomes. But comparisons persist—not because the cases are identical, but because they share a set of structural risks that Libya exposed with brutal clarity.

There are reasons for cautious hope. Violence has declined from its peak, regional diplomacy has cautiously resumed, and parts of the country are experiencing a degree of stability unimaginable a decade ago. Some refugees are returning. Gulf states are exploring reconstruction and reintegration. Even global observers have begun, carefully, to note signs of improvement; The Economist, for example, pointed to Syria’s relative progress compared with recent years.

But Libya did not collapse overnight either. It drifted—slowly and predictably—into fragmentation when external pressure eased before internal cohesion took hold. Syria now sits at a similar inflection point.

Why Syria is not Libya—yet

Unlike Libya in 2011, Syria is not emerging from a complete institutional vacuum. When Muammar al-Qaddafi fell, Libya’s state effectively collapsed with him. Power had been highly personalized, formal institutions had been deliberately hollowed out, and there was no unified national army, bureaucracy, or political framework capable of absorbing the shock of regime change. What remained were militias, local power centers, and competing claims to legitimacy, with little institutional memory to anchor reconstruction.

Syria, by contrast, retains a battered but functioning state apparatus—administrative structures, defined borders, and a population long accustomed to centralized authority. That difference does not guarantee stability, but it does provide something Libya lacked: an institutional core around which consolidation is at least possible.

This distinction matters. Syria still has something to stabilize around—but it is not a permanent advantage. State institutions that are hollowed out or bypassed by armed actors do not gradually strengthen on their own; they erode in specific and predictable ways. Parallel chains of command emerge. Local militias assume policing, taxation, and dispute resolution functions. Civil servants answer to whoever controls territory rather than to a central authority. Over time, loyalty shifts from institutions to armed patrons, and the state’s claim to a monopoly on force becomes increasingly nominal.

This is why the difference between Syria and Libya is not one of destiny, but timing. Syria’s administrative core buys time, not immunity. If fragmentation hardens before authority is consolidated—if security integration stalls, if militias become permanent stakeholders, and if external actors continue to operate through proxies rather than institutions—Syria’s current advantages will narrow. Once parallel systems of power become entrenched, they rarely unwind peacefully. What remains then is not stability, but managed disorder—the condition that ultimately consumed Libya.

ISIS is weakened, not gone

The territorial defeat of ISIS in March 2019, when Baghouz—the group’s last territorial enclave—fell to the Syrian Democratic Forces with US support, was a real achievement. But dismantling a caliphate is not the same as dismantling a movement.

ISIS today is decentralized and opportunistic, operating through small, mobile cells that exploit gaps between competing authorities. It relies on assassinations, bombings, prison breaks, and extortion in Syria’s ungoverned spaces rather than holding territory outright. The group thrives not on controlling cities, but on the absence of sustained authority.

Libya offers a clear lesson: extremist groups do not require a vacuum everywhere—only somewhere. After the collapse of central authority in 2011, jihadist groups never needed to control the Libyan state as a whole to remain dangerous. Instead, they embedded themselves in neglected spaces—most notably in cities such as Derna and Sirte, in desert transit corridors, and around poorly governed oil and smuggling routes. Even after ISIS lost Sirte in 2016, its fighters dispersed into Libya’s south and into ungoverned border regions, sustaining insurgent activity through assassinations, extortion, and cross-border movement. Fragmentation, not total collapse, proved sufficient to keep extremist networks alive.

Syria’s patchwork of control—particularly in the east and south—presents precisely that risk. ISIS does not need to reconquer Raqqa to be dangerous. It needs only space, time, and unresolved security seams. Those conditions persist.

The risk of fragmentation

Libya’s defining failure was not regime change itself, but what followed: competing armed factions, weak national institutions, and no agreed monopoly on force. Syria remains vulnerable to the same dynamic. Multiple armed actors operate with overlapping jurisdictions, divergent external patrons, and incompatible political visions. Efforts to integrate forces—particularly in the northeast—remain fragile and incomplete.

In Libya, militias did not merely fill a security vacuum; they became political stakeholders with incentives to preserve disorder. Control over territory, checkpoints, and revenue streams translated into leverage, not responsibility. Syria risks a similar outcome if armed groups are tolerated indefinitely as semi-autonomous actors rather than integrated—or demobilized—under a unified national authority.

Whether Syria’s leadership can meaningfully incorporate Druze and Kurdish forces—especially after the degradation of much of the country’s strategic military hardware—will shape whether stability endures or erodes. Progress exists, but it is reversible. Without a credible, unified security framework, stability remains contingent rather than durable.

US patience—and “America First”—has a short fuse

In Washington, a limited troop presence is often described as sustainable. For the US public, it is anything but clear. An Ipsos poll conducted shortly after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 found that only 41 percent of Americans supported keeping US troops in Syria to fight ISIS, while 50 percent expressed the view that Syria’s problems were “none of our business.” The desire to avoid “forever wars” now spans presidential administrations and political ideologies. This restraint reflects hard-earned lessons—but it also creates a dilemma.

Syria does not exist in a vacuum. It competes for attention in an already crowded strategic environment: Ukraine, China, inflation, and border security. That makes Syria vulnerable not because it matters less, but because it lacks a durable domestic constituency capable of sustaining long-term engagement. History suggests that exits driven by political fatigue rather than conditions on the ground tend to be rushed and poorly sequenced. Libya’s descent accelerated when international engagement faded faster than institutions could form. Syria risks repeating that pattern if political will collapses before the groundwork is laid.

Regional states are engaged, but cautious

Middle Eastern powers are not indifferent to Syria’s fate. Gulf states see stabilization as preferable to perpetual conflict. Turkey, Israel, and Arab governments all have clear stakes. But none are prepared to deploy large-scale ground forces to underwrite Syria’s security. Their involvement remains selective, interest-driven, and often conflicting.

Libya demonstrated what happens when regional competition substitutes for national cohesion. After 2011, external actors repeatedly backed rival factions rather than a unified national framework: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia supported forces in eastern Libya, while Turkey and Qatar backed western-based authorities. These competing interventions hardened political and military divisions, undermined United Nations–backed reconciliation efforts, and transformed militias into proxies with external lifelines rather than incentives to integrate into a national state. Instead of converging toward a single authority, Libya developed parallel governments, rival security institutions, and a persistent contest over territory and resources. Regional competition did not stabilize Libya; it locked fragmentation in place.

Europe is focused elsewhere

In 2011, Europe played a visible role in Libya’s intervention but struggled to sustain influence once the fighting stopped. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, European military resources, intelligence capacity, and political attention have been overwhelmingly concentrated on deterrence and support for Kyiv. There is limited appetite for sustained engagement in secondary theaters.

At the same time, Europe’s Libya experience exposed structural limits. European Union member states pursued divergent policies—France and Italy backed competing Libyan actors, while others prioritized migration containment over state-building—undermining the emergence of a coherent European strategy. The result was episodic diplomacy without the sustained security and institutional investment required to stabilize the country. Syria presents a similar risk.

What sequencing actually means

Avoiding a Libya-style outcome does not require “endless wars.” But it does require sequencing—and sequencing is not a slogan. In Libya, withdrawal and disengagement preceded the consolidation of authority, producing a fragmented state defined by parallel governments, rival security forces, and militias that outlived the transition and came to dominate political and economic life. Counterterrorism responsibility became diffuse, borders became porous, and external actors increasingly backed proxies rather than institutions.

A Libya-style outcome, then, is not total collapse but chronic fragmentation: a country with formal political processes but no effective monopoly on force, episodic violence punctuated by cease-fires, and a security environment in which extremist groups exploit gaps between competing authorities. Avoiding that path in Syria requires ensuring that security integration precedes withdrawal, that responsibility for counterterrorism is clearly owned by legitimate institutions, and that regional actors are aligned around containment rather than competition.

Libya’s lesson is not that the West stayed too long. It is that it left before responsibility had truly shifted. This approach does not reduce risk; it transfers it, often to less capable actors and eventually back to the United States itself.

None of this means Syria is doomed. The past year has shown that incremental progress is possible. Diplomacy, reconstruction discussions, and reduced violence matter. But Libya teaches that fragile gains can evaporate quickly when fragmentation hardens and external pressure lifts too soon.

Syria is not a lost cause. It is a conditional one. The warning signs are visible. The question is whether the United States chooses to learn from recent history—or repeat it under a different name.

Kurt Davis Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

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Before striking Iran, Trump should answer these six questions

Nate Swanson — Thu, 19 Feb 2026 23:02:19 +0000

WASHINGTON—With negotiations seemingly headed nowhere, a new conflict with Iran looks increasingly likely, if not inevitable. The United States has gathered the most air power in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq war. A US military operation in Iran would likely be a massive, weeks-long campaign that would look more like a full-fledged war than the early January operation to remove Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro from power.

At this moment, there’s no clarity on whether the United States will strike, what in Iran it would strike, or what might follow. In the absence of answers, it’s all the more important to ask the right questions. Here are six questions that US policymakers should be asking:

1. What is the objective of a military campaign?

The White House has yet to outline what the administration is hoping to achieve in a military campaign. There are three likely options: 1) US President Donald Trump believes an attack will strengthen his hand in nuclear and disarmament negotiations. 2) The administration is seeking to significantly degrade or decapitate Iran’s leadership, potentially including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. 3) Military strikes will largely be symbolic, fulfilling the US president’s promise to support Iranian protesters and responding to his “red line” warning the regime against using lethal force against demonstrators.

If these are the administration’s objectives, there are significant obstacles to achieving them. No matter how weak Iran is, it is highly unlikely that Khamenei will capitulate on key issues, such as Iran’s missile program, as the regime seems to have determined that it would be risker to dismantle its capabilities than suffer a military strike. Ideologically, Khamenei would likely rather die a martyr than be seen bowing to the United States. If regime change or decapitation is the goal, then this presents the obvious challenge of backing a successor. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s sober testimony to Congress on January 28 indicated that he believes a successor would most likely come from within the regime, but there is no clear Delcy Rodríguez figure in Iran. There is also no guarantee that Khamenei’s replacement would be better.

2. What might Iran do in response?

The risk of Iranian miscalculation in determining its response to a new round of strikes is high. In the run-up to this potential conflict, Iran has repeatedly threatened to unleash a regional war on the United States and Israel. But in the past, Iran has mostly calibrated its military responses to foreign attacks to be proportional (in its estimation) to the original attack. Therefore, if Iran perceives that US strikes are primarily symbolic, then it may calibrate its response accordingly. At the same time, Iran is facing a perplexing dilemma that extends beyond this conflict. Tehran cannot win an extended war with the United States (or Israel), but there is a growing perception inside the regime that the military needs to inflict US casualties to restore a measure of deterrence against future attacks.

There is another unknown variable to consider, as well: Iranian proxies. While these groups have largely been absent from Iran’s past response to US and Israeli military strikes, Iran will have to quickly decide whether to seek an immediate off-ramp or, as the regime sees it, try to restore deterrence against future attacks. Otherwise, from Iran’s perspective, the United States and Israel will just continue to target Iran whenever they see fit.

People walk near a mural featuring images of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Tehran, Iran, on February 17, 2026. (Majid Asgaripour/WANA via Reuters Connect)

3. Will Trump face any consequences this time around?

Part of Trump’s rationale for considering another Iran attack is that he likely has concluded that there were no real military or political repercussions for US involvement in Israel’s twelve-day war against Iran in June 2025 or the Maduro operation this past month. Perhaps—depending on the scope of a campaign—this trend continues. However, the Trump administration may find it more difficult to define the scope of a new campaign against Iran compared with the earlier, limited operations in Iran and Venezuela. If Iran does try to hit back, Trump might be compelled to expand his objectives and the trajectory of a conflict. In that case, it will be harder to replicate his pattern of decisive action and equally decisive off-ramps this time around.

4. Is there a feasible diplomatic off-ramp prior to conflict?

Probably not. Iran reportedly has two weeks to show concrete progress toward US red lines, but a new conflict might not wait that long. More importantly, Iran does not seem capable of making the necessary concessions needed for a meaningful deal. So far, Iran has insisted on only talking about its nuclear program, and it appears committed to the “right to enrich” even though it isn’t enriching uranium right now. Iran also foolishly objected to regional foreign ministers joining the talks, and it had to walk back some of its expected concessions (specifically shipping out its 60 percent enriched uranium) before talks even got under way.

More broadly, Iran is trying to negotiate a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 2.0, while what the Trump administration wants is likely closer to an Iranian surrender pact. There isn’t much overlap or a short-term miracle in the offing. A European with regular connections to the Iranian government recently told me that some factions in Iran believe that if the country can survive another attack and inflict some damage on the United States in return, then this might help Iran’s future negotiating position. That’s another potential misperception.

5. How will the Iranian people respond to a military campaign?

After a severe crackdown on Iranian protesters in January, Iran’s security services have regained control of the street. Therefore, the window for “helping” protesters has probably passed. Still, it’s hard to predict how most Iranians will react to a new US military campaign. Nine hundred Iranians reportedly died in the twelve-day war, including many civilians. Most Iranians calling for military intervention now are probably hoping for surgical strikes, not a weekslong campaign that risks more civilian casualties. Strikes that target the security establishment might bring more Iranians back to the streets, but the Trump administration shouldn’t count on this possibility, since Iranians did not respond to outside calls to protest or rise up during the twelve-day war.

6. What role will US regional partners play?

For much of the past month, Arab and Turkish partners of the United States have urged the Trump administration to deescalate and avoid conflict with Iran. Many of those partners also host US troops in their countries and have been targets of past Iranian aggression. As conflict becomes more likely, watching their next steps will be a crucial indicator. Back in 2019, during the US “maximum pressure” campaign, Iran successfully targeted the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, causing significant changes in their respective policies toward Iran. The Iran-Gulf relationship is certainly stronger now, and the UAE and Saudi Arabia have already publicly said that the United States cannot use their airspace for attacks. But the United States’ Gulf partners clearly have an impact on Trump, and the Iranians know it. Will Iran lash out at the Gulf if it can’t deescalate the situation quickly this time around?

On the other side of the region, it is probably fair to assume that Israel will participate in the campaign in one form or another. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been clear about the threat that Iran’s missile program poses to Israel. One indicator that might impact the length of a conflict is whether Israel has sufficient air defense interceptors.

One final point: Americans’ opinions will likely factor in how this conflict plays out, too. Editorials urging Trump not to be like US President Barack Obama probably have an impact on his calculus. On the other side of the issue, 70 percent of Americans oppose military intervention in Iran. Trump is generally sensitive to US polling, and he has consistently campaigned against ending “stupid forever wars.”

Trump will not accept any half measures on Iran—that much is clear. One month after Iran killed thousands of its own people in response to nationwide protests, the US president has narrowly centered his policy options around a new nuclear deal or military action. As the likelihood of the latter increases, the administration hopefully has answers for these and the many additional questions that will arise.

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Ukraine hopes escalating Russian losses will push Putin toward peace

David Kirichenko — Thu, 19 Feb 2026 21:59:44 +0000

As US-led peace negotiations rumble on, both sides in Russia’s war against Ukraine are seeking to shape the narrative. The Kremlin points to incremental front line advances as proof that Russian victory remains inevitable, while Ukraine seeks to focus attention on escalating Russian battlefield losses.

Ukraine’s political and military leaders recognize that they currently lack the military strength for the kind of large-scale offensive operations necessary to liberate the entire country. Instead, the strategic priority for 2026 is to inflict maximum Russian casualties as part of efforts to make Putin’s invasion unsustainable. Newly appointed Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated recently that the goal is to eliminate up to 50,000 Russian troops per month.

Ukraine’s emphasis on increasing the cost of the invasion makes sense. Russia has held the battlefield initiative since late 2023 but has failed to achieve any significant breakthroughs during that time. Instead, the Russian military has paid a very high price for extremely limited gains. Most assessments indicate that Putin’s army has seized less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory over the past two years, while suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties.

The battlefield itself has also changed, with the clearly defined front lines of the early years giving way to a shifting grey zone dominated by ubiquitous drone coverage. As a result, major offensives featuring armored units and massed infantry are now extremely difficult to conduct. Russia has refined its tactics in response to these changes, shifting away from a reliance on human wave assaults toward the use of small infiltration groups that probe Ukrainian defenses while seeking to establish footholds.

With Putin’s commanders under intense political pressure to capture more ground, the impetus is on Russia to continue offensive operations. As the defending force, this places Ukraine in a strong position. According to Ukrainian officials, Russian casualties have recently reached record highs of more than 30,000 per month. For the first time in the war, this means Russia’s losses are now higher than monthly recruitment levels.

The Russian army in Ukraine has recently experienced disruptions to Starlink connectivity, creating further challenges for the coordination of offensive operations. Without stable links between front line units and commanders, Russian forces are likely to become even more vulnerable and easier to eliminate. This has already led to a number of successful Ukrainian counteroffensives and could create the conditions for additional increases in Russian casualty rates.

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Since the onset of the invasion, the Kremlin has been careful to reduce the risk of any backlash over heavy losses in Ukraine. Recruitment has concentrated on Russia’s ethnic minorities and the country’s poorest communities, with prisoners offered amnesties in exchange for military service. For the past few years, the emphasis has increasingly turned to attracting volunteers via large enlistment bonuses and generous salaries. Nevertheless, Russia’s ability to absorb casualties is not limitless. The longer the war drags on, the harder it will be for Moscow to maintain the current tempo, especially if Russian casualties continue to climb.

As part of efforts to maximize Russian losses, Ukraine has established a digital infrastructure to turn drone warfare into a systematic campaign of attrition. Through mechanisms such as the ePoints system, all Russian personnel and equipment losses are logged, verified, and analyzed. Ukrainian commanders can identify which units are most effective and adjust tactics as needed.

Ukraine’s strategy is producing striking results. In December 2025 alone, Ukrainian drone units claim to have hit over one hundred thousand Russian targets, a 31 percent increase compared to the previous month. Russian war blogger Dmitry Rogozin is one of many on the opposing side to acknowledge the effectiveness of this approach, noting that Ukraine is “building a model for the conflict as a long-term project designed to exhaust and exert systematic pressure.”

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The Russian army in Ukraine is already beginning to show signs of strain. According to UK Defense Secretary John Healey, Moscow is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign recruits as Russian commanders lose men faster than they can replace them. “Putin likes to give the impression that they’re making relentless and inevitable progress,” Healey noted recently. “But he’s weaker than he’s been and more reliant than he’s been on foreign fighters.”

Russia’s efforts to attract foreign mercenaries are a clear indication of the country’s mounting manpower challenges. Putin remains deeply reluctant to order a new mobilization due to concerns that this could destabilize the home front and spark a repeat of the exodus of fighting age Russian men that took place in 2022. However, with the Russian economy struggling, paying for new volunteers may become more challenging and lead to budget cuts elsewhere that could also fuel discontent.

If Russian losses continue to outpace recruitment, Putin may find himself with no good options. He could be forced to choose between mobilization, diverting state funds to sustain recruitment incentives, or scaling back offensive operations. All of these choices have the potential to fuel domestic instability. In recent days, there has been widespread speculation that Russian efforts to block the Telegram app may reflect growing Kremlin concerns over the possibility of unrest.

For much of the war, the Russian public has experienced the invasion of Ukraine as a distant conflict. Mounting casualties, particularly if paired with growing economic hardship, may gradually erode this sense of detachment and increase the pressure on the Kremlin. As the war enters a fifth year, Ukraine is hoping escalating Russian losses can finally force Putin to rethink his invasion and seek a meaningful settlement.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

As Russian battlefield losses mount, Putin is turning to Africa for soldiers

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 19 Feb 2026 19:38:58 +0000

At the end of January, CSIS estimated that Russia has suffered approximately 1.2 million casualties during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If accurate, this figure would represent the greatest loss incurred by a major power in any war since World War II. The exact number of Russian soldiers killed and wounded in Ukraine remains hotly debated, but nobody would seriously question the fact that the invasion has led to catastrophic losses.

As casualties continue to mount, Russia is seeking to recruit men from abroad to replenish the ranks of its depleted army. The BBC Russian service recently estimated that around 20,000 men from foreign countries have signed up to join Russia’s invasion, with many recruited from former Soviet republics as well as low-income nations in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.

Foreign recruitment is increasingly popular with the Putin regime as it allows Moscow to avoid another round of politically risky mobilization, which could easily destabilize Russian society. By paying foreigners to fight in Ukraine, the Kremlin is able to shift the war’s bloodiest burden away from Russian households and minimize any potential backlash on the home front.

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Russia’s military recruitment efforts are global in scope and span many countries. The issue of African recruitment has made headlines in recent weeks following the publication of footage showing the apparent mistreatment of African men in the Russian army. A number of videos surfaced on social media in January that appeared to depict the verbal and physical abuse of Africans by their Russian colleagues, who referred to them as “disposables” and mocked one recruit who was seen with an anti-tank mine strapped to his chest.

Russian military recruiters have targeted Africa with particular intensity. More than 1,400 African nationals have been identified as serving in the Russian army, with one in five reported dead. These confirmed figures may only represent a small portion of the overall total. The Kremlin is accused of sending African men to fight in Ukraine after first attracting them to Russia with false promises of ordinary jobs or non-combat military roles. Many survivors have complained of finding themselves on the front lines of the invasion with little to no military training.

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The growing number of African men serving in the Russian military is sparking international alarm, with a number of African nations voicing their concerns. A Kenyan intelligence report released on February 19 claimed that at least 1,000 Kenyans have been recruited to fight for Russia through clandestine recruitment networks. Officials in Nairobi are now moving to shut down an estimated 600 recruiting agencies, and are pushing Moscow to ban the recruitment of Kenyan soldiers.

South African government officials have entered into talks with their Russian counterparts on the issue and are hoping to repatriate 17 of their nationals. These men were reportedly recruited for combat roles in Russia via a scheme involving the daughter of former South African president Jacob Zuma. Nigeria’s foreign ministry has also warned citizens about a rise in illegal recruitment schemes sending fighters to Russia, following reports that two Nigerians were killed in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, women from South Africa and other parts of the continent are reportedly being targeted and tricked into working in Russian drone factories. Most are recruited via social media adverts for jobs in the catering and hospitality industries. The South African authorities have warned citizens about online campaigns promising jobs and study in Russia. As awareness increases across Africa, media coverage is highlighting the dangers facing Africans who seek lucrative employment in Russia.

The Kremlin will likely attempt to enlist more Africans in 2026 as Russia struggles to find sufficient numbers of domestic recruits amid mounting battlefield losses. Around 422,000 Russian nationals signed contracts with the military last year, a 6 percent drop from 2024, according to recent reports. In addition to availability, foreign troops are also cheaper to recruit than Russian citizens, who in many cases now expect unprecedented enlistment bonuses as well as other benefits including salaries far in excess of national averages.

Russia’s growing reliance on African soldiers is a powerful symbol of an invasion that has gone horribly wrong for Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin dictator expected to decapitate and subjugate Ukraine in a matter of days. Instead, as the invasion enters a fifth year, Putin finds himself forced to recruit troops from around the world in order to avoid destabilizing Russia and threatening the survival of his own regime.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Israel needs a fundamental shift in its foreign policy

Amir Asmar — Thu, 19 Feb 2026 02:22:51 +0000

Israel will be there when US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace convenes for the first time in Washington on Thursday, with a splashy pledge of five billion dollars to rebuild the Gaza Strip, as Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar will mingle among leaders from Gulf countries and others who are taking part in this new Trump project.

It may make for a nice visual, but there’s no mistaking the fact that Israel’s international reputation has been tarnished due to its conduct in Gaza since the launch of fighting after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks. This is evident in International Criminal Court indictments and United Nations resolutions, but even in the United States, a stalwart ally. According to Pew Research, 53 percent of US adults reported a negative attitude toward Israel last year, up from 42 percent in 2022.

Nonetheless, the apparent end of the war presents a unique moment for Israel to examine its present status and trajectory.

Building on its presence on the Board of Peace, Israel can begin to address international criticism by funding and leading the reconstruction of Gaza. While the current Israeli government and broader political culture are unlikely to permit serious consideration of such a proposal, a significant change in Jerusalem’s Palestinian policy is needed if it hopes to begin changing the widely held perception that Israel’s military was purposely targeting civilians. It would also demonstrate remorse for the loss of innocent life and property unconnected to militant groups. The obvious precedent here is US-led reconstruction programs in West Germany and Japan after World War II.

But that is just one step Jerusalem should consider to establish itself as a worthy partner to its neighbors and a responsible member of the international community. A closer examination of the past couple years shows how far it has to go.

The problem: Israel’s conduct in the Gaza war

After Hamas’s bloody attack against southern Israel in October 2023 that launched the war in Gaza, Israel targeted and killed Palestinian civilians rather than limiting itself to militants in the Strip, as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have concluded. The Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza estimate of overall numbers killed, now even accepted by the Israel Defense Forces, exceeds seventy thousand as of December 2025, more than 3 percent of Gaza’s pre-war population. Moreover, some 171,000 were wounded as of late November. In addition, since the cease-fire began on October 10, 2025, hundreds of Palestinians have been killed and over a thousand wounded in Israeli attacks. Although the health ministry numbers do not distinguish between militants and non-combatants, civilians in Gaza comprise 83 percent of total casualties, according to a leaked Israeli military estimate.

During its Gaza campaign, Israel killed health care professionals, first responders, aid workers, and journalists. Moreover, the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that, as of mid-July 2025, 875 people were killed while seeking food, including 674 who were targeted near sites of the Israel-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.

The UN estimates that some 92 percent of Gaza’s residential buildings have been damaged or completely destroyed. The Israeli military has also attacked educational, medical, religious, and international facilities in Gaza. While Israel correctly points to Hamas’s use of civilian facilities to conceal weapons caches or operational centers, it is improbable that 92 percent of Gaza’s residential buildings had a militant presence. Even in cases where Hamas operatives had a presence at a civilian site, it remains Israel’s operational—and moral—determination whether to use air power to destroy the entire facility, including its civilian residents, or to target operatives more surgically.

Finally, Israel impeded necessities of life as collective punishment for Gaza’s population—food, water, medical supplies, as well as tents made necessary by the mass destruction. Following the current cease-fire starting October 10, Israel continued to, in the words of Oxfam, “arbitrarily reject” scores of shipments of humanitarian assistance to Gaza. It may never be known how many sick or injured Gazans died or are dying as a result of restricted medications or inadequate nutrition. A team of independent experts commissioned by the UN Human Rights Council concluded that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza.

Other ways Israel alienates the international community

Another reason for Israel’s growing isolation is its behavior elsewhere in the region. In Syria, Israel conducted attacks and captured more territory east of the Golan Heights, despite the absence of attacks against it, alleging that the new regime could become a threat. In Lebanon, Israel has continued attacks despite a cease-fire dating back to November 2024, claiming that strikes are necessary to prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting its capabilities. In both Lebanon and Syria, civilian casualties have triggered accusations of possible Israeli war crimes from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, respectively. A major turning point was Israel’s attack in Doha, futilely targeting the Hamas political leadership with which it was negotiating. The United States correctly perceived the strike as threatening its vision of regional integration and moved to rein in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s adventurism.

On the West Bank, since October 2023, a full military siege has resulted in tens of thousands of Palestinians being forced out of their homes in a pattern that Human Rights Watch characterizes as “war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.” Moreover, with the support of government ministers and protection from the Israeli military, Israeli settlers have conducted nearly three thousand attacks against Palestinians on the West Bank in the past two years, resulting in casualties, destruction of property, and “arrests.”

When settlers attack Palestinian villages, Israeli forces frequently detain Palestinians to restore order, usually without due process. Approximately one thousand Palestinians—including about two hundred children—were killed by Israeli troops and settlers between October 2023 and October 2025 in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem. Israeli officials say their actions are intended to uphold security in the territory where both Palestinian militancy and settler attacks have surged since October 2023. Jerusalem’s recent steps to bring West Bank land sales in line with the process used in Israel—eliminating any distinction between the sale of Israeli and West Bank lands—are likely to lead to increased friction between settlers and Palestinians in the territory.

Israeli soldiers have also been credibly accused of torturing Palestinian prisoners, including sexual violence, beatings, malnutrition, and willful medical neglect. A Physicians for Human Rights-Israel report from November documents ninety-eight Palestinian prisoner deaths due to abuse. The Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem also detailed the abuse of Palestinians in Israeli prisons in a 2024 report. A recent video showed Israeli soldiers executing two Palestinians in Jenin after they seemed to surrender. Israeli official statements denied systemic prisoner abuse as attempts to “demonize” Israel. Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s national security minister—who himself joined Israeli police attacks on the West Bank town of Umm al-Fahm–defended the crimes committed by Israeli guards, soldiers, and settlers, calling the latter “sweet kids.”

The result: Israel’s isolation

Israel is growing increasingly isolated in the most important international forum, the United Nations. In September 2024, 124 nations voted in the UN General Assembly for a resolution calling for Israel to comply with international law, withdraw its military forces from the Occupied Palestinian Territories, cease settlement activity, evacuate all settlers from occupied land, and dismantle the separation wall in the West Bank; only fourteen voted against, with forty-three abstentions.

Israeli leaders, including Netanyahu, have been indicted by the International Criminal Court due to the conduct of the Gaza war. A growing number of countries (145) have recognized a Palestinian state; nineteen countries, including fifteen European states, recognized Palestine in 2024 and 2025.

Two years of the Gaza war with its attendant humanitarian catastrophe have fractured the pro-Israel consensus that shielded the country from international pressure prior to the most recent Gaza war. Growing calls to boycott businesses with ties to Israel, to ban the country from sporting and cultural events, and to cut ties with its academic institutions are gaining traction. Pro-Palestine activists are vowing to keep up the pressure despite the cease-fire. Israel has also begun to lose political support in the United States, having seen its backing from the electoral bases of both political parties decline, particularly with young people.

Netanyahu and Israel’s most extreme parties in the government have dismissed international condemnation, ineffectually characterizing it as anti-semitic. While Jerusalem’s claims of anti-semitism have had little impact internationally, it is possible that those claims were intended primarily to resonate with Israelis and Jews abroad.

The solution: steps to reverse the decline

Rather than expecting the Gulf Arab states to rebuild what it destroyed—something they are reluctant to do without guarantees that Israel will cease its destructive attacks—Jerusalem would demonstrate itself as a responsible regional actor by taking the lead in Gaza reconstruction. It would also demonstrate strategic thinking about the future, including improving Gazans’ quality of life after a devastating war, and the failure of the punishing blockade that Israel enforced against Gaza, with Egyptian support, the past two decades.

Funding Gaza’s reconstruction will not by itself fundamentally change negative international perceptions of Israel’s conduct of the war and broader treatment of the Palestinians. A genuine paradigm shift in Israel’s approach to the Palestinian issue aimed at altering international opinion of Israel would include actions such as cracking down on West Bank settler terrorism, prosecuting soldiers who tortured Palestinian prisoners, committing to never withhold food or medical supplies as collective punishment, and restraining racist policies and incitement to violence in by government ministers including Ben-Gvir, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, and Energy Minister Eli Cohen, among others.

By taking these steps—some of which, like the cessation of incitement, are similar to Israel’s demands of Palestinians—Jerusalem would demonstrate itself to be a more reliable and fair-minded partner to its neighbors. Instead of assuming that Arab states will fund reconstruction or police Gaza, Israel would be taking responsibility for the territories it has occupied since 1967 and demonstrating that the conflict is not against Palestinian civilians. Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip would also represent a form of compensation for the damage Israel wrought to the socio-economic fabric of Palestinian society in Gaza, both through the blockade and the war.

Jerusalem needs to stop being perpetually in conflict with world opinion with regard to military occupation, the conduct of its wars, detentions without due process, treatment of prisoners, and collective punishment. It is unlikely that international norms of warfare, justice, and human rights will be adjusted to accommodate Israel.

The broader outlook

Although none of the prescribed steps would resolve the larger Palestinian-Israeli conflict, they would set Israel up as a responsible player that adheres to international norms, given its critics’ belief that, like Hamas, it targets civilians, imprisons and executes individuals without due process, and incites violence.

US support is not as reliable as it once was, and Israel’s regional integration, including formal relationships with neighboring Arab states, is unlikely to develop further so long as it continues to offend Arab populations with its treatment of the Palestinians. The region’s Arab leaders must take popular opinion into account as they seek to preserve their regimes, as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman did when he rebuffed Trump’s pressure to normalize relations with Israel without progress on Palestinian statehood.

The 2026 Israeli general election may offer a natural transition point for a new Israeli government to adopt new policies that are more conducive to its reintegration into the community of nations. The Israeli body politic and electorate need to consider Israel’s current plight, how it got there, the failure of its recent policies, and the importance of international norms.

Amir Asmar is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an adjunct professor of Middle East issues at the National Intelligence University. He was previously a senior executive and Middle East and terrorism analyst in the US Department of Defense.

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Ukrainian defense tech companies must prepare for export opportunities

Michael Druckman — Tue, 17 Feb 2026 22:18:27 +0000

Ukrainian defense tech companies received the country’s first export permits in early February as Ukraine looks to capitalize on the dramatic recent expansion of the defense sector and boost the wartime economy. The news came days after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed the decision to allow international weapons sales and unveiled plans to establish ten export centers across Europe in 2026.

The move to permit Ukrainian arms exports has been a long time coming, with defense tech companies arguing that they have spare production capacity due to the Ukrainian state’s limited purchasing power. With foreign sales now on the agenda, potential participating companies must make sure they are in a position to make the most of the emerging opportunities.

Since the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine’s defense tech sector has proved itself in the most demanding conditions imaginable. Ukrainian companies, many of them young, resource-constrained, and operating under constant attack, have designed, adapted, and deployed weapons systems at a pace rarely seen in peacetime industries.

Crucially, these firms have been able to produce and refine innovative products in combat conditions based on real-time battlefield feedback. In practice, this has meant development cycles that can often be measured in days or weeks, rather than the multi-year acquisition cycles typical of traditional defense procurement.

The performance of Ukraine’s defense tech industry has generated significant international interest and a spate of early seed investments. As the war continues and the Ukrainian government moves to open up foreign markets, ambitious defense sector companies will need to focus on maximizing their export readiness.

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In the context of the Ukrainian defense tech industry, export readiness refers to a company’s ability to navigate the complex legal, regulatory, and compliance frameworks governing the international sale of defense and dual-use technologies. This includes securing the necessary export licenses from the Ukrainian authorities, understanding and complying with destination country import controls, adhering to multilateral export control regimes, implementing robust end-use monitoring and supply chain security, and demonstrating transparency in ownership and governance to satisfy due diligence requirements of foreign buyers and investors.

For Ukrainian companies, export readiness also means turning battlefield innovation into compliant, scalable products for global markets and converting their tactical advantage into strategic economic growth. The Ukrainian businesses building these weapons systems and the investors backing them must begin this work now, not after the first export opportunity appears. Waiting until a deal is on the table could result in losing momentum, credibility, and valuation.

International defense markets operate under strict and unforgiving rules. Compliance with frameworks such as the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the EU’s Dual-Use Regulation, and related NATO-aligned regimes is not optional.

These rules apply not only to finished products, but also to components, software, technical data, and even the nationality of personnel involved in development. Under the incorporation principle, foreign-origin controlled parts integrated into Ukrainian products can subject the final system to external jurisdiction and re-export restrictions.

Some US export rules allow limited flexibility when controlled components are only a small part of a system. ITAR does not. Even minor integration of ITAR-controlled items can trigger full US export licensing obligations. Companies that treat export controls as an afterthought often discover too late that they have painted themselves into a regulatory corner.

A critical but often underestimated component of export readiness is supply chain integrity. Many modern defense and dual-use systems rely on electronics, sensors, chips, and subcomponents sourced through global markets.

Supply chains with hidden or poorly documented tails that run back to China or other high-risk jurisdictions can quietly disqualify an otherwise competitive product from Western export markets. In some cases, these dependencies can trigger outright prohibitions; in others, they impose licensing requirements so onerous that customers walk away.

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Export readiness also requires institutional maturity inside companies. This includes appointing dedicated export control and compliance officers; implementing comprehensive trade compliance policies and procedures that govern every stage of the product lifecycle from design and procurement to production, marketing, and after-sales support; and building internal capability to identify, classify, and manage controlled items and technologies.

Ukrainian companies need to understand which products fall under which regulatory regimes, which export markets are realistically accessible, and what licensing pathways exist. Filing for licenses proactively, engaging early with national authorities, conducting internal compliance audits, and mapping obligations in advance can prevent costly delays, enforcement actions, and reputational damage that investors, partners, and customers alike are increasingly unwilling to tolerate.

Mistakes can be costly, with the compliance failures or unauthorized exports of a single private company capable of triggering diplomatic incidents, sanctions, or restrictions that jeopardize market access and credibility for Ukraine’s entire defense industrial base. This makes institutional discipline a matter of national security, not merely corporate risk management.

The implications are equally clear for international investors. As capital becomes more selective and diligence more rigorous, shareholder value will increasingly favor Ukrainian defense companies that are compliant, transparent, and forward-looking. Funds that encourage early investment in governance, compliance infrastructure, and supply chain resilience are not being overly cautious; they are protecting downside risk and enhancing upside potential. In future funding rounds and exit scenarios, export readiness will be a differentiator that directly affects valuation.

There is also a broader strategic dimension. Ukraine’s integration into Western defense and industrial ecosystems will depend not only on political alignment, but also on regulatory compatibility. Companies that are export-ready today will be in a position to participate in joint development programs and contribute to trusted supply chains tomorrow.

Ukraine’s defense sector has already demonstrated enormous battlefield credibility. The next phase is commercial and institutional credibility. Companies and investors who act now by auditing supply chains, implementing compliance frameworks, and preparing for regulated exports will be the ones best placed to lead the global defense market.

Michael Druckman is the founder and managing director of Trident Forward.

The promise and peril of Trump’s Board of Peace

Eric Alter — Mon, 16 Feb 2026 17:04:33 +0000

ABU DHABI—The inaugural meeting of US President Donald Trump’s new Board of Peace will be held in Washington, DC, on February 19. Expectations in the White House are high, with Trump announcing on Sunday that the upcoming gathering would unveil five billion dollars in pledged humanitarian and reconstruction aid for Gaza. “The Board of Peace has unlimited potential,” the US president said.

But with the board’s novelty and ambition also comes uncertainty. It would place Gaza’s administration in the hands of a newly created international body while maintaining a significant role for Israeli security concerns. Its transactional approach and selective membership raise questions about the limits of its effectiveness. Instead of ensuring stability, the plan could falter in Gaza and thereby undermine broader commitments to universalist principles in international law.

While the Board of Peace itself is new, what it is attempting to do, broadly speaking, is not. Historical precedents offer several cautionary examples that international oversight in post-conflict environments often struggles or fails when it does not sufficiently involve local populations or when its authority is poorly defined.

Drawing on lessons from the past

The Board of Peace, established and endorsed by United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025, bears similarities to several earlier transitional administrations led by the UN.

The UN established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and took full control of the territory from late 1999 until independence in 2002. The mission had to rebuild government institutions and basic services amid major instability following the violence that accompanied the 1999 vote for independence from Indonesia. UNTAET made significant progress in some areas: it helped restore security, organized elections, established new administrative structures, and laid the groundwork for an independent state that eventually became East Timor.

A girl carrying a baby watches as a Portuguese soldier, part of the first contingent of an estimated seven hundred Portuguese troops serving with the United Nations mission in East Timor, stands guard after arriving at Dili’s Komoro airport February 9, 2000. (REUTERS)

Nevertheless, the mission was criticized for being overly top-down. Decisions were largely made by international staff, with little substantive input from Timorese leaders or communities, especially at the outset. Local participation was limited throughout much of the administration, which frustrated many East Timorese and left the new institutions feeling disconnected from everyday people and traditional modes of social organization.

A similar pattern emerged with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, established in 1999 under Security Council Resolution 1244. Although the mission held a broad mandate to govern the territory and promote self-government, its highly centralized structure, in which international officials retained ultimate control, intensified ethnic divisions, slowed progress toward local rule, and left Kosovo in prolonged uncertainty over its final political status.

Going further back, the League of Nations’ administration of the Saar Territory from 1920 to 1935, established under the Treaty of Versailles, serves as another cautionary example. An international commission administered this coal-rich region as a neutral buffer zone. However, the largely German population strongly resented external rule, and when the promised plebiscite finally took place in 1935, over 90 percent voted to reunite with Germany—even though it was then under Nazi control.

A more recent example is the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq following the 2003 invasion. The US-led authority dismantled the Iraqi army, pushed through sweeping policies that barred many former Baath Party members from government jobs, and attempted to impose new technocratic structures alongside free-market reforms. These decisions played a major role in sparking the rapid rise of insurgency, sectarian violence, and instability that cost hundreds of thousands of lives in the years that followed.

Similar issues appear in other cases. One example is the UN Temporary Executive Authority administration of West New Guinea from 1962 to 1963. The UN temporarily assumed control to oversee the territory’s transfer from Dutch to Indonesian rule, under an agreement between the two countries. The mission focused primarily on ensuring a smooth transition rather than on long-term local governance. However, the rapid transfer and the 1969 “Act of Free Choice” process, widely criticized as heavily managed by Indonesia, left enduring disputes over self-determination among the Papuan population.

The 2003 Road Map for Peace, put forward by the Quartet (the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia) to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, offers another instructive example. Although the plan outlined phased steps toward a two-state solution, including security commitments and institutional reforms, it faced sustained criticism for vague timelines, failure to address core issues decisively, and an inability to halt violence or settlement expansion.

Another relevant case is the post-Dayton governance structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the 1995 peace agreement. International high representatives were given extensive “Bonn Powers” to impose laws, remove officials, and override local decisions when deemed necessary. While these authorities helped bring initial stability and enabled early state-building steps, critics argue that they also deepened ethnic divisions, increased dependence on foreign oversight, allowed local elites to evade genuine compromise, and contributed to recurring political deadlocks through expansive veto mechanisms rather than addressing the underlying drivers of conflict.

To succeed in the present

Taken together, these cases reveal a recurring pattern. When external actors rely heavily on top-down governance or loosely designed institutional frameworks, they tend to displace genuine local ownership and undermine the long-term prospects for sustainable self-government.

The Board of Peace incorporates several distinctive features that could potentially improve upon these earlier efforts. With Trump holding the charter-based permanent chairmanship, the body benefits from high-level direction and a deal-making approach reminiscent of initiatives like the Abraham Accords. The tiered membership structure, in which permanent seats are allocated based on a one-billion-dollar commitment, concentrates participation among states and entities willing to make substantial financial investments in outcomes.

If the board emphasizes high-level diplomacy, investment, and reconstruction oversight, it does so, however, without any Palestinian representation. Similarly, the Gaza Executive Board, which includes overlapping members, has no Palestinians among its appointees.

The structure excludes remaining Hamas factions, which continue to hold influence in parts of northern Gaza.

Day-to-day operations are managed by the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, a separate Palestinian technocratic body intentionally insulated from Hamas influence and current Palestinian Authority leadership. This body oversees routine administrative functions and seeks guidance from international experts. Such institutional separation aims to allow reconstruction priorities, including humanitarian aid distribution, infrastructure repair, and institution-building, to advance without becoming entangled in factional political disputes.

Oversight of the arrangement involves Arab administrative staff, potentially significant Gulf financial backing, and a security framework led primarily by the United States, even though it carries a UN label. The structure excludes remaining Hamas factions, which continue to hold influence in parts of northern Gaza. Meanwhile, the Palestinian Authority remains sidelined pending reforms whose specific details have yet to be finalized.

The charter employs relatively general language. Although UN Resolution 2803 describes the arrangement as a “transitional administration with international legal personality,” the charter itself references only its status as an international organization and does not explicitly define Gaza’s legal status. It establishes no firm deadlines, measurable benchmarks for progress, or clear enforcement mechanisms. This ambiguity could generate prolonged uncertainty and delays, similar to challenges experienced by the UN in East Timor, where the mandate lacked a clearly defined endpoint. Early signs, such as the partial reopening of the Rafah border crossing under EU supervision, indicate that the ceasefire mechanism might, even in a limited and reversible form, provide tangible humanitarian and mobility improvements.

The exclusion of certain political actors, however, may create instability. Marginalizing Hamas elements may resemble aspects of the CPA’s de-Baathification policies in Iraq, decisions that contributed to insurgency and later extremist mobilization in the country. Such exclusions could also reinforce perceptions of inequitable governance, similar to criticisms sometimes directed at the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Past experience indicates that externally driven governance arrangements often face significant challenges when they lack strong local legitimacy. In Bosnia, international oversight halted violence but struggled to bridge deep ethnic divisions. In Iraq, CPA policies contributed to prolonged instability and violence.

The donor-led coalition-of-the-willing model

Legally, the board’s relationship with the United Nations remains ambiguous. Resolution 2803 invokes Chapter VII enforcement authority, yet the open-ended nature of external governance raises complex questions under customary international law concerning Palestinian sovereignty and the application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions governing occupied territories.

The arrangement raises broader questions about the UN Charter’s foundational commitment to equal respect for fundamental human rights. By structuring peacebuilding around donor-led coalitions, an innovative but selective mechanism, the board sidelines less-resourced states. It also risks reducing the influence of neutral institutions such as the International Criminal Court, by centralizing control over territory, aid, and governance, which can obstruct independent investigations, and excluding justice-focused mandates from the peace framework, focusing instead on economic recovery and stabilization without addressing alleged atrocities.

This dynamic could foster the perception that peace is accessible primarily to actors with sufficient financial leverage, potentially weakening principles of self-determination and encouraging unilateral initiatives, including controversial land policies or externally driven regional projects. Over time, arrangements of this nature could also erode established multilateral norms and diminish long-standing commitments to universal fairness.

At the same time, the board’s design attempts to address several common pitfalls. It avoids direct foreign rule by incorporating a Palestinian technocratic governance layer, aims at securing substantial funding from dedicated donors, and promotes active Arab participation to enhance regional legitimacy and sustainability.

Given the increasing fragmentation of multilateral cooperation, this donor-led coalition-of-the-willing model offers a faster-moving alternative to the slower consensus-driven UN mechanisms. By emphasizing results-oriented governance, participating states may help break Gaza’s recurring cycle of destruction and lay a more durable foundation for Palestinian self-governance while also addressing Israeli security concerns.

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Six reasons why Trump should choose the military option in Iran

Michael Rozenblat — Sun, 15 Feb 2026 15:57:01 +0000

The possibility of a military confrontation between Washington and Tehran is on hold, at least for now, as the two countries have begun talks mediated by Oman. However, a strategic breakthrough from these talks—which according to US President Donald Trump should be resolved in the coming month—remains unlikely without substantial concessions by at least one party on topics previously considered out of the scope of negotiations. Iran maintains that its ballistic missile program and the support it provides its regional proxy network are non-negotiable—precisely the areas where the Trump administration demands drastic concessions.

That means diplomacy could stall or break down completely. So what will Trump, who has been steadily building up military forces in the region, do then?

There are two primary pathways he could take for a military strike. The first is a limited coercive strike—i.e. against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij militia compounds—aimed at fulfilling Trump’s red line about killing protesters and forcing Iran back to negotiations from a weaker position. However, such a strike would probably have a limited effect on the regime’s calculus and would not guarantee a manageable military confrontation, as Iran has stated that it is preparing to carry out retaliatory measures following any strike.

The second option would be a larger campaign aimed at achieving fundamental changes in the current regime’s calculus—such as accepting strict limitations on its ballistic missiles and proxies’ activity—or even bringing about regime change. For this scenario to be successful, the United States will need to present a credible threat to the current regime’s survival. This requires a sustained, well-coordinated military campaign supported by regional allies, forcing the regime to choose between “drinking the chalice of poison” for survival or facing a conflict that threatens its very existence.

The pursuit of regime change carries significant risks, including the potential for internal fragmentation into armed factions or even full-scale civil war. Nevertheless, the benefits of fundamentally changing—or even eliminating—the Islamic Republic could outweigh the risks if the alternative is an emboldened, undeterred Iran.

Here are six strategic reasons why a decisive military campaign is the right move:

A unique moment to reshape the Middle East: Iran is at its weakest point since the 1979 revolution after recent protests, June’s twelve-day war with Israel, and the drastic degradation of its terror network. The Iranian defense doctrine—comprised of a nuclear program, conventional power, and regional proxy network—failed to deter Israel and the United States from striking it, effectively exposing the regime as a paper tiger. A decisive campaign against the regime could be the key to advancing US regional efforts that seem stuck at the moment, from regional integration through the Abraham Accords, to bringing Iranian-backed countries like Lebanon and Iraq closer to Western influence.
The moral imperative: Current diplomatic efforts prioritize the nuclear issue while overlooking the regime’s brutal crackdown on protesters, which brought the current tensions to a boiling point in the first place. Reports coming out of Iran are heartbreaking. While official figures claim “only” 3,117 people killed, some estimates are far higher, ranging from over 6,000 to over 30,000 people killed in two days. Trump’s promise to “come to [the] rescue” of the Iranian people shouldn’t be a lip service, but rather a testament to the United States’ moral leadership. Negotiating is a prize to this regime, as talks could provide it with a much-needed lifeline in sanctions easing and improving its domestic and international legitimacy.
The credibility dilemma: Opting against military force may avoid immediate conflict but risks comparisons to then US President Barack Obama’s “red line” in Syria. In 2013, Obama failed to respond militarily after the Assad regime used chemical weapons on its people, which the president had described as a “red line.” If Trump does not respond in this case, it could signal to Tehran that the Washington will blink under pressure as long as Iran remains resolved in its resistance.
The economic stakes for the United States—and China: A different Iranian regime could reintegrate its massive energy reserves—the world’s second-largest gas and third-largest oil deposits—into Western markets. This aligns with the administration’s view of expending US access to energy resources as a key component in its foreign policy. The combination of ousting Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and a regime change in Iran could severely disrupt China’s energy security, as Beijing relied on both countries for as much as 30 percent of its oil imports due to their discounted prices. Complicating China’s economic calculus and shifting its focus could promote other US efforts vis-à-vis China, such as preventing full-scale conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Skin in the game for the United States in Iran’s future: Internal systemic failures brought about by the regime—namely hyperinflation, water scarcity, and widespread corruption—along with recent demonstrations suggest the regime is in a state of terminal decline. However, waiting patiently for the regime to collapse while watching from the sidelines isn’t a sustainable strategy to promote US regional interests. Instead, a hands-on approach utilizing military force could allow the United States to actively navigate the situation, ensuring a favorable post-regime landscape while denying Russia and China the opportunity to exploit a power vacuum in Iran. This is not to say that the United States will necessarily need an ongoing presence with boots on the ground like in Iraq, but rather it should economically and diplomatically support opposition groups that could post an alternative to the current regime, backing them in their efforts to bring about positive change to the country.
The ongoing threat of Iran’s nuclear program: While June’s US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities were essential to stall an immediate Iranian breakthrough toward obtaining a nuclear weapon, they likely only rolled Iran’s efforts back by a few months. Iran has already stated it will continue its nuclear program, and its recent work to fortify underground facilities signals its refusal to abandon its nuclear ambitions. The current lack of monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency could allow the regime to utilize enrichment as a dual-purpose tool: either overtly, to secure diplomatic leverage and deter US military action, or covertly, as an “insurance policy” for regime survival. Trump has consistently affirmed that he will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, and he should act on those words.

Pursuing negotiations at this juncture risks providing the regime with a vital political and economic lifeline at the very moment it is at its most vulnerable. The gap between Washington’s and Tehran’s core positions necessitates the use of force to restore US deterrent credibility and force Iran to make drastic changes or risk the regime’s survival. In the current landscape, a decisive US-led coalition effort aimed at regime change may offer a more sustainable strategic outcome than a protracted diplomatic process that could end with a bad agreement and an emboldened Iran.

Michael Rozenblat is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, from the Israeli security establishment. The views in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of any other entity.

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Vladimir Putin is trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 12 Feb 2026 22:50:16 +0000

More than a year since he returned to the White House vowing to end the Russia-Ukraine War within 24 hours, US President Donald Trump remains upbeat about the prospects for peace. “Very, very good talks today,” Trump stated on February 6 following the latest round of negotiations in Abu Dhabi. “Something could be happening.”

Few in Kyiv share this optimism. While Ukrainian officials are loathe to dismiss Trump’s peace efforts for fear incurring his displeasure, a majority of Ukrainians remain utterly unconvinced that Russian President Vladimir Putin has any interest whatsoever in ending hostilities. A poll conducted by Kyiv’s International Institute of Sociology in late January found that only 20 percent of Ukrainians think the war will end by July, while 43 percent expect fighting to continue into 2027 or beyond.

Such skepticism is easy to understand. Ukraine agreed to an unconditional ceasefire way back in March 2025, but Putin has so far refused to follow suit. Instead, he has spent much of the past year engaging in blatant stalling tactics while constantly moving the diplomatic goalposts in a transparent bid to prevent any progress toward a lasting settlement. This has resulted in what most Ukrainians and many others regard as a phony peace process.

As fruitless US-led negotiations rumble on, Putin has underlined his true intentions by dramatically increasing Russian attacks on the Ukrainian population, leading to a 31 percent surge in civilian casualties during 2025. The most recent escalation saw Russia attempt to freeze millions of Ukrainians in their own homes by systematically bombing critical heating and power infrastructure amid Arctic conditions. Some believe this ruthless winter bombing campaign qualifies as an act of genocide; it is most certainly not the act of a man seeking a compromise peace.

Trump has difficulty reading Putin’s true intentions because he fundamentally misunderstands the motivations behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine. To Trump, the current negotiations are a geopolitical real estate deal, with the Russians playing hardball to secure better terms. In reality, Putin is operating on a completely different wavelength altogether.

The Kremlin dictator is not looking to make deals, acquire additional land, or push the Russian border a few hundred kilometers to the west. Instead, he wants to secure his place in history. Putin genuinely believes he is on an historic mission to reverse the injustice of the Soviet collapse and revive the Russian Empire. In order to achieve this, he has convinced himself that he must erase Ukraine as a state and as a nation.

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For more than two decades, Putin’s Ukraine obsession has shaped his reign and defined Russian foreign policy. His relationship with the West first became openly hostile in the aftermath of Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, which Putin bitterly denounced as a Western plot to destabilize Russia.

Since that watershed moment, Ukraine has been at the heart of virtually every single new crisis in relations between Moscow and the democratic world, from the 2014 seizure of Crimea to the full-scale invasion of 2022. Throughout this period, Putin has repeatedly demonstrated his readiness to sacrifice Russia’s other national interests in pursuit of his anti-Ukrainian crusade.

Meanwhile, he has used the full weight of the formidable Kremlin propaganda machine to poison Russian society against all things Ukrainian and prepare the ground for a war of national extermination. Putin has become notorious for insisting that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”), and has repeatedly dismissed independent Ukraine as an illegitimate state and an artificial “anti-Russia.”

Anyone in Ukraine who dares to disagree with Putin’s claims has been dehumanized and branded a Nazi or a stooge of the West. This hate campaign has proved remarkably successful and has contributed to the almost complete absence of visible anti-war sentiment in today’s Russia, despite widespread public knowledge of the atrocities taking place in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s importance to Putin is twofold. As the largest non-Russian former Soviet republic by population and the closest to Russia in terms of shared heritage, Putin sees Ukraine as the key to undoing the verdict of 1991. If he can end what he regards as the aberration of Ukrainian statehood, this will redeem Russia and reestablish the country’s credentials as a great power.

Likewise, Ukraine’s perceived closeness means that the further consolidation of an independent and democratic Ukrainian state represents an existential threat to authoritarian Russia. As a KGB officer in East Germany during the late 1980s, Putin witnessed firsthand how grassroots movements can topple empires. If Ukraine’s transition from Kremlin vassal to European democracy continues, he fears this could serve as a catalyst for the next stage in a Russian imperial retreat that began in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

This helps to explain why Putin has shown so little interest in the seemingly generous peace terms proposed by Trump. The US leader has indicated that Russia would be allowed to keep the territories it has captured in Ukraine while facing no meaningful consequences for launching the largest European invasion since World War II. At first glance, these terms might appear to represent a major Russian victory, but Putin himself obviously does not think so.

Putin’s reluctance to accept Trump’s offer makes perfect sense when viewed from the perspective of the Russian ruler’s revisionist worldview and imperial ambitions. Crucially, Putin is well aware that any peace deal based on the current front lines of the war would leave 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and free to integrate into the democratic world. That is exactly what he is fighting to prevent.

In line with the present proposals, the Kremlin would retain control over the rust belt towns of the Donbas, but would cede iconic Odesa and sacred Kyiv, the mother city of all Russia, to a hostile neighbor. Most Russians would regard this as a defeat of historic proportions. Instead of being remembered as a new Peter the Great, Putin would be doomed to enter Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine.

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With a compromise peace out of the question, Putin has no real choice but to fight on. Doing so offers some obvious advantages. As long as the war continues, Putin can delay a reckoning over the huge Russian losses in Ukraine and the damage done to the country’s international standing. But as the fourth anniversary of the invasion draws near, it is becoming increasingly difficult to disguise the fact that the war is not going according to plan.

Putin’s problems are most immediately apparent on the battlefield. When he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Putin vowed to “demilitarize” Ukraine. Four years on, Ukraine now boasts the largest army in Europe and has emerged as a world leader in drone warfare.

The radically upgraded Ukrainian military has already defeated Russia in multiple major engagements and is now seeking to gain the upper hand in a grueling high-tech war of attrition. Putin’s army suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties in 2025, while seizing less than one percent of Ukraine. At the current glacial pace, it would take the Russian military decades to conquer the country.

In public, at least, Putin continues to project confidence and insist that the goals of Russia’s invasion will be unconditionally met. However, his boasts of battlefield dominance are now starting to ring hollow. With so few actual victories to cheer, he has recently resorted to inventing imaginary advances.

Putin’s habit of exaggerating Russian gains came back to haunt him in late 2025 when he repeatedly claimed to have captured the Ukrainian city of Kupyansk, only for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to personally visit the city and record a selfie video exposing the Russian ruler’s lies. This embarrassing episode underlined the growing credibility gap between Putin’s bold talk of inevitable Russian victory and the far less impressive battlefield reality of his faltering invasion.

Putin’s other stated war aim was the “denazification” of Ukraine. This is Kremlin code for the erasure of a separate Ukrainian national identity and the imposition of Russian imperial doctrine in every sphere of public life, from education and culture to politics and religion. If this was the intention, it has backfired disastrously.

The war unleashed by Putin in 2022 has fueled an unprecedented consolidation of Ukrainian patriotism alongside a wholesale rejection of all things Russian throughout Ukrainian society. As a result, the entire notion of a pro-Kremlin government in Kyiv is now inconceivable unless propped up indefinitely by Russian bayonets, which would be ruinously expensive for the Kremlin.

This geopolitical divorce is also evident in the international arena. For centuries, Ukraine was widely seen by the outside world as indivisible from Russia itself. Putin still clings to this imperial mythology, but his propaganda slogans of “brotherly nations” now sound absurdly outdated. Instead, today’s Ukraine is widely recognized as an emerging democracy and a member of the wider European community of nations.

It would be extremely reckless to underestimate the Russian military, of course. Russia’s sheer size means that it remains a formidable threat and will likely continue to grind forward in Ukraine. However, after nearly four years of limited progress and staggering losses, it is now difficult to imagine how Putin could achieve the maximalist goals of his invasion on the battlefield.

Many Russians had pinned their hopes on a new Trump presidency, but even the dramatic reduction in US military aid to Ukraine over the past year has failed to produce any significant Russian breakthroughs. Furthermore, US weapons continue to flow to Ukraine via the PURL initiative, with indications that the White House has also relaxed earlier restrictions on strikes inside Russia.

America’s withdrawal from transatlantic commitments also means European leaders are more motivated than ever to maintain their support for Ukraine in the coming years. In a rapidly changing security environment, they are acutely aware that the Ukrainian army is now indispensable for the defense of Europe. With Ukraine’s own revitalized defense industry meeting around half of the country’s military needs domestically, Kyiv looks well positioned to continue defending itself despite the decline in support from the United States.

As the war enters a fifth year, Putin finds himself in an unenviable predicament. He has no obvious pathway to victory but cannot agree to a compromise peace without acknowledging what would amount to an historic defeat and placing his own political survival in question.

Faced with a bloody quagmire on the front lines, Putin will likely seek to break Ukrainian resistance in the coming months by expanding Russian attacks on the general population and making as much of the country as possible unlivable. In parallel, he will continue to play for time on the diplomatic stage, while attempting to bribe the United States with wild proposals and bully Europe into inaction with thinly-veiled threats of escalation.

If President Trump is serious about ending the war, he needs to recognize that his Russian counterpart currently dare not risk any peace that safeguards Ukrainian independence. Putin knows that if Ukraine survives, he loses. A sustainable settlement will therefore only be possible if he comes under significantly more pressure and is confronted with the prospect of a fate far worse than failure in Ukraine.

Putin will abandon his invasion when he begins to fear that continuing the war could threaten the future of his regime and the stability of Russia itself. The current occupant of the Kremlin still dreams of emulating Stalin and Katherine the Great, but he has no desire to become the next Tsar Nicholas II.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The current ban on Russian football teams competing in international competitions was one of many similar measures imposed in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The International Olympic Committee and International Paralympic Committee placed restrictions on Russian athletes, as did the World Athletics Council. Other sports that imposed a full ban on Russian athletes included archery, badminton, baseball, basketball, biathlon, canoeing, ice hockey, rowing, sailing, softball, skating, skiing, taekwondo, and volleyball.

As the war has progressed, some international sports organizations and governing bodies have begun to soften their stance toward Russia. The country’s tennis stars have returned to the sport’s most prestigious tournaments, while Russian athletes in a range of disciplines have been permitted to participate in international events under a neutral flag.

Some sports have opted to lift restrictions entirely. In September 2025, the International Paralympic Committee announced that it would end its ban on Russian athletes, allowing them to participate fully in the 2026 Winter Paralympics. Similarly, in November 2025, the International Judo Federation, the International Sambo Federation, and the European Gymnastics General Assembly all removed bans on Russian athletes.

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Many of those advocating for or justifying the relaxation of restrictions on Russian athletes have done so by insisting on the separation of sport from politics. Others have noted that with the Russian invasion of Ukraine soon set to enter a fifth year, there is no indication that the bans have had any impact on Kremlin policymaking. Instead, they claim, these restrictions have merely imposed unjustified costs on individual Russian athletes and hindered their development.

These arguments conveniently overlook Russia’s long record of routinely exploiting sports for propaganda purposes. Throughout the Cold War, the Kremlin pioneered the practice of generating political capital from sporting success. While the USSR did not permit the development of professional sport, the Soviet authorities invested heavily in sophisticated training programs in a wide range of sports.

This trend has continued into the twenty-first century. Russian President Vladimir Putin spent tens of billions of dollars hosting the 2014 Winter Olympics and the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Both events provided the Kremlin with an opportunity to whitewash modern Russia’s image among international audiences.

Russian sporting successes abroad are also frequently celebrated in Moscow as victories for the country as a whole and brandished as proof of Russia’s standing on the world stage. When Russian hockey player Alex Ovechkin made history in spring 2025 by beating Wayne Gretzky’s record as the US National Hockey League’s all-time goal scorer, the Kremlin propaganda machine was quick to toast a national triumph.

On numerous occasions, Russian athletes have directly participated in Putin regime propaganda, including appearing alongside the Kremlin dictator at public events. The BBC reports that some prominent Russian athletes have direct ties to the Russian military, while others have shared pro-Putin and pro-war content on social media in support of the Russian military.

Efforts to ease restrictions on Russia’s participation in international sports are particularly painful for Ukraine. Russia has killed hundreds of Ukrainian athletes during the current invasion, while preventing countless thousands of young Ukrainian talents from continuing with their training and fulfilling their potential. To many Ukrainians, the entire notion of allowing Russians to return to the international sporting arena amid the ongoing war seems exceptionally unethical.

Any further moves to lift existing international bans on Russian athletes may have consequences far beyond the sporting arena. Welcoming Russia back would risk normalizing the invasion of Ukraine and sending a message that the international community ultimately lacks the resolve to hold major nations to account for acts of aggression. This would be potentially disastrous not only for Ukraine, but for countries across the globe.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council and a freelance journalist covering Eurasian affairs.

I was the commander of the US Air Force’s Air Mobility Command when I issued an order to my command to aggressively prepare for possible conflict in the Pacific. I was grappling with a critical question: How can the United States project power across the Pacific—the largest ocean on Earth—fast enough to deter and if necessary decisively defeat a peer adversary that has geographic positional advantage?

When I took over my post in October 2021, I was given clear direction to go faster in preparing for conflict with China. Air Mobility Command moves nearly everything the US military needs to fight—from troops and fuel to missiles and medical care. I was selected for that role because of my experience in the Indo-Pacific, where air maneuver is the difference between arriving in time and arriving too late.

More than a year into the job, despite progress, the pace of change was uneven. Urgency had not penetrated every level of the force. After a decade watching China up close, I could see that Beijing was still accelerating faster than Washington was adjusting.

The author testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces on July 23, 2024. (US Air Force photo by Chad Trujillo)

In late January 2023, I issued an internal order to force urgency and action. I was deliberately direct. Military orders exist to change behavior and accomplish missions, not to accommodate comfort. Noting that Chinese President Xi Jinping had secured a third term as president and that presidential elections in Taiwan and the United States were coming in 2024, I shared my gut feeling that war between the United States and China could erupt in 2025. I directed my commanders to accelerate their training with specific benchmarks for the coming months. The goal was a “fortified, ready, integrated, and agile Joint Force Maneuver Team ready to fight and win inside the first island chain,” the line stretching from Japan to the Philippines, with Taiwan at the center.

Within hours of its release, the order was stripped of its classification markings and posted on social media without authorization. What had been an internal directive was suddenly public, detached from its context, and portrayed as reckless rhetoric. The US Department of Defense publicly distanced itself from the memo.

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The controversy was less important than what followed. Later that year, my command conducted an exercise called Mobility Guardian. It was not a scripted display or a tabletop drill. It was a rehearsal for how the United States would bring real forces into a contested Pacific theater. Thousands of airmen, hundreds of aircraft, and equipment moved across long distances into an environment where runways were threatened, communications were degraded, and bases could not be assumed safe.

This was not sustainment of an allied force at a distance, as in Ukraine or Israel. It was a rapid surge of US military force into a theater of conflict, appearing quickly and visibly in the Pacific—right on China’s doorstep. US allies saw what was possible. China noticed too and felt the presence of the United States’ uniquely powerful air-mobility capability.

The exercise exposed strengths and weaknesses. Some planning assumptions held, like partner and ally integration. Others failed. Command relationships as well as command and control suffered most. Redundancy mattered. Simplicity mattered. Speed mattered. Readiness mattered. Integration mattered. Agility mattered. The result was a decisive shift from untested, assumption-based planning to valuable rehearsal-based planning.

The Joint Force is capable, but it is not yet as ready, integrated, or agile as it must be for a high-end Pacific fight. Too much planning remains assumption-driven. Too many caveats are managed rather than resolved. Mobility Guardian and exercises like it provide critical insights to rapidly advance on China. Readiness in a contested environment requires more than traditional availability metrics, such as head count and status of equipment. It requires commanders who drive their units hard and units that train, operate, and rehearse like the future of their country depends on it. Because it does.

Beijing continues to expand its military, rehearse large-scale joint operations around Taiwan, and assert control across the South China Sea. At the national level, the real question is operational: Can the United States deliver winning capabilities to the warfighter more quickly than China can? That challenge extends beyond doctrine into areas such as industrial capacity, supply chains, national will, and risk tolerance. The United States is experiencing a rare moment where executive authority and acquisition reform are aligned for speed.

There is nothing more powerful than a US military that believes in itself. That belief comes from preparation and from knowing the nation will deliver what the mission requires. I am glad I was wrong about the timeline for a US conflict with China, because the Joint Force has become more ready, integrated, and agile in the time since I made my prediction. Those gains matter. But the US military still has much more work to do.

The question now is not whether change is possible. It’s whether the US military can change fast enough.

The post I was wrong about fighting China in 2025. But the US still isn’t ready for that fight. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Narco noir: Drugs, gangs and mercenaries in Latin America

Alia Brahimi — Wed, 11 Feb 2026 19:58:42 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 14 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by Dr Vanda Felbab-Brown, a renowned expert on non-state armed groups and organised crime. They begin by discussing the escalation of gang violence in Haiti over the last year, despite the arrival of the American PMC, Vectus Global, which is led by the Blackwater founder Erik Prince. Vanda points out that a recent air campaign weaponizing off-the-shelf drones was intended to decapitate the gangs but, while hundreds of Haitians have been killed, none of them have been significant gang leaders. They go on to explore why governments in the region allow and coopt street militias, the bunkering of fuel by colectivos in Venezuela, Hizballah’s continuing narcotics operations across Latin America, the IRGC’s role in drug trafficking, and how the regime in Iran ends.

“Whether it’s a private security company like Vectus, or whether it’s the UN gang suppression force, they need to be able to hand over to someone. So, the institution-building requirements becomes inescapable.”

Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown, expert on non-state armed groups and organized crime

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About the podcast

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it examines the causes and implications of the increasing use of mercenaries in armed conflicts.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare reveals about the world we currently inhabit, the future of the international system, and what war may look like in the coming decades.

Further Listening

Podcast Jan 30, 2025

“No, really”: American PMCs in Gaza

By Alia Brahimi

Host Alia Brahimi chats with modern warfare expert Andreas Krieg about the sudden deployment of three private military companies to the Netzarim corridor in the Gaza Strip.

Conflict Crisis Management

Podcast Jul 30, 2024

‘I was a Blackwater mercenary in Iraq’

By Alia Brahimi

Host Alia Brahimi is joined by former Blackwater contractor Morgan Lerette to reflect on Loretta’s experience a private military contractor in Iraq.

Conflict Defense Industry

Podcast Dec 11, 2025

“Youth as merchandise”: Iraqi mercenaries in Ukraine

By Alia Brahimi

In Season 2, Episode 13 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by the Iraqi political analyst Mohammed Salih to discuss the legion of Iraqi men turning up on the frontlines of the war in Ukraine.

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Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

The post Narco noir: Drugs, gangs and mercenaries in Latin America appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Putin regime faces mounting pressure but is still far from collapse

Will Dixon, Maksym Beznosiuk — Mon, 09 Feb 2026 11:07:49 +0000

With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine set to enter a fifth year, there are growing indications that things are not going according to plan for Russian President Vladimir Putin. On the front lines of the war, Russia continues to suffer catastrophic casualties while failing to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs. Despite holding the battlefield initiative throughout 2025, the invading Russian army managed to capture less than 1 percent of additional Ukrainian territory.

Putin also has cause for mounting concern on the home front. The Russian economy is showing signs of strain amid sanctions pressure and other negative factors including falling oil prices and declining energy export revenues. Meanwhile, the recent US raid in Venezuela and subsequent seizure of a Russian-flagged oil tanker in the Atlantic Ocean have underlined how the war in Ukraine is diminishing Moscow’s ability to project power internationally.

This deteriorating picture is now fueling debate over how much longer Russia can maintain the current invasion. It is also raising more fundamental questions about the fragility of the Putin regime. Given the Russian state’s multiple twentieth century implosions, such speculation is inevitable. However, there is currently little to indicate that the country is close to repeating the collapses of 1917 and 1991.

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Most studies of autocracies have concluded that the biggest single threat to regime stability comes from existing elites. Putin is apparently well aware of this and has worked hard to minimize the danger of a potential palace coup. While dissent is still possible among Kremlin powerbrokers, Russia’s current ruling class is too closely tied to Putin to mount any serious challenge. One of the Russian ruler’s longstanding allies, Dmitry Kozak, reportedly opposed the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and advocated for de-escalation. But rather than triggering open resistance, this disagreement led to Kozak’s quiet removal from office.

There have also been reports of disagreements within the Kremlin over the handling of the war economy, with diverging opinions on key issues such as financial policy and attracting international investment. However, these differences of opinion have not translated into a serious public split.

The single biggest wartime test for the regime so far came in summer 2023 with the Wagner mutiny. This dramatic episode exposed a potential regime vulnerability, but the uprising ultimately proved short-lived due to a lack of defections from within the Russian military and political establishment.

Crucially, while there was little evidence of any rallying around the flag during the brief mutiny, no major security institutions or regional authorities sided with the Wagner rebels. Instead, most chose to wait rather than commit. Once the initial threat had been contained, Putin was able to reassert his authority. This was widely seen as vindication of the highly personalized style of government established during Putin’s reign, with no rival power bases capable of presenting a direct challenge.

Further opposition from disgruntled military personnel cannot be ruled out, but there appears to be virtually no prospect of a broader anti-regime protest movement emerging within Russia. A number of protests took place during the first weeks of the full-scale invasion but failed to gain momentum. Draconian new legislation is now in place, increasing the penalties for any public opposition to the war. An unprecedented round of mobilization in September 2022 proved deeply unpopular among the Russian public, but most opponents chose to flee the country rather than protest.

The degree of Russian public support for the invasion remains disputed. While polling data consistently demonstrates strong pro-war sentiment, skeptics point to obvious issues regarding the credibility of opinion surveys conducted in military dictatorships. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the organizational capacity for any meaningful opposition in today’s Russia is weak, while the information environment is tightly controlled.

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The Putin regime has been careful to minimize the risk of any backlash over heavy Russian losses in Ukraine. During the last decade of the Soviet era, public anger over the deaths of conscript soldiers in Afghanistan helped destabilize the USSR. Similar processes were also evident during the Chechen wars of the early post-Soviet period.

Putin has tailored his military recruitment policies with this threat very much in mind. Rather than relying on conscripts, he has focused on enlisting men predominantly drawn from ethnic minorities and the prison population. The Russian army also depends heavily on volunteers enticed by the promise of large initial bounties and generous salaries.

Despite the Kremlin’s best efforts, risks remain. Russia’s disproportionate use of ethnic minority troops could lead to a surge in anti-regime moods and separatist sentiment in places like Ingushetia and Dagestan. If current downward economic trends continue, Moscow may also find it increasingly challenging to fund the big payouts necessary to secure a steady flow of new volunteers. The war will inevitably remain Putin’s top priority, but money diverted to the army from other sectors will create the potential for discontent elsewhere.

The same logic could also apply to Russian losses in Ukraine. So far, the huge human cost of the invasion has not sparked a major domestic backlash, but with monthly casualty figures now reportedly reaching record highs, public dismay may yet become a destabilizing factor.

Western policymakers need to be aware that while there is no reason to expect an imminent collapse of the Putin regime, the end could come suddenly. Few were predicting the demise of the Tsarist Empire in 1916, or the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Putin has constructed formidable defenses during his twenty-six years in power and has done much to anticipate any possible sources of internal opposition. Nevertheless, the costs of maintaining this system could spiral out of control amid a fifth year of war, leading to dangerous consequences that he may be unable to contain.

An awareness of the Putin regime’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities should inform the Western approach to the war and help shape the faltering peace process. Western leaders will also likely be guided by concerns that if Putin does fall, this could lead to a future Russia that may be far darker and even less predictable than the current regime.

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Russia’s current attacks on Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure are neither accidental nor isolated. Power plants, transmission lines, substations, and heating systems have been repeatedly targeted throughout the entire country in a methodical manner to inflict maximum damage. These strikes have intensified in recent weeks as temperatures plunged, underlining the Kremlin’s deadly intent. During the coldest months of the Ukrainian winter, heating and power are not mere conveniences; they are essential for survival.

The present talk of a “kholodomor” in Ukraine not only captures the essence of Russia’s winter bombing campaign. This language also consciously echoes the term “Holodomor” (“death by hunger”), which is used to describe the artificially induced famine of the early 1930s that killed at least four million Ukrainians. Then as now, the Kremlin objective was the destruction of the conditions necessary for life in Ukraine.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian analysts and other experts have been warning that history is in danger of repeating itself. By December 2022, humanitarian agencies assessed that 17.7 million Ukrainians would need emergency aid simply to survive the first winter of the war amid the large-scale bombardment of the country’s power grid, a campaign that later resulted in International Criminal Court arrest warrants for the Russian military commanders who orchestrated it.

Putin’s escalating weaponization of winter mirrors Stalin’s use of famine against Ukrainians almost one century earlier. Both atrocities are rooted in genocidal logic that treats the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation as an existential threat to Kremlin imperialism. However, unlike the Soviet authorities during the Holodomor, Putin has made no real effort to disguise or conceal the current targeting of Ukraine’s civilian population. On the contrary, Russian officials and media personalities have praised the destruction of civilian infrastructure and the suffering this inflicts.

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Russia’s winter bombing campaign is not only about depriving Ukrainians of the conditions to sustain life. It is also part of a broader strategy to reshape Ukrainian society and force the country to accept an artificially imposed Russian identity. This goal is most immediately apparent in occupied regions of Ukraine, where schools and social services have been repurposed to indoctrinate the population and erase all traces of Ukrainian identity. Rendering large parts of Ukraine unlivable is the first step; remaking the country on Moscow’s terms is the second.

Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure cannot be dismissed as an example of ordinary wartime brutality. Instead, the current bombing campaign must be viewed as part of a deliberate plot to destroy the conditions necessary for Ukrainian society to endure. Genocide is not defined only by mass killing; it is also defined by the deliberate destruction of the conditions of life required for a group’s survival.

As US-led peace talks continue, it is vital that the international community now avoid repeating the mistake of ignoring Ukraine’s warnings about Russia’s true intentions. In 2014 and 2022, Ukrainians were not taken seriously when they tried to alert the outside world to the danger. They are now once again raising the alarm over calls for Kyiv to cede heavily fortified areas of the Donbas to Russia in exchange for ambiguous promises of peace. Ukrainians warn that this would only encourage Moscow and create the ideal conditions for the next stage of Putin’s invasion.

When Ukrainians speak of facing death by cold, they are not attempting to shock or provoke. On the contrary, they are describing the latest stage in a Russian strategy that is historically all too familiar, and one that has become increasingly apparent since 2022.

The sheer scale of Russia’s current winter bombing campaign makes a mockery of attempts to broker a compromise peace and underlines the Kremlin’s determination to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. While international audiences rightly acknowledge the remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian population, they must also recognize the need to address the sense of impunity driving Russia’s invasion. This impunity has convinced Putin that he can now freeze millions of Ukrainians in front of the watching world. Failure to hold him accountable for this crime will condemn other European countries to face a similar fate.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 led to the emergence of a new social contract between Ukrainians and the state that saw party politics placed on pause. With the survival of the country in question, the Ukrainian public entrusted the government with extraordinary authority, while attention turned to urgent issues of national defense.

In practice, wartime realities meant an unprecedented concentration of power in the office of the president. As a result, the influence of the Ukrainian parliament on policy-making declined markedly. The dangers of this shift did not go unnoticed by politicians and activists alike, but there was a general consensus that such temporary political measures were justified by the existential nature of the fight against Russia’s invasion.

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The unspoken social contract of 2022 finally began to unravel in summer 2025, when the government passed controversial legislation undermining the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture. This was widely perceived as a direct threat to the institutional progress achieved following the country’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity.

The Ukrainian public response was emphatic. Almost immediately, crowds gathered in central Kyiv and in a number of other Ukrainian cities to voice their opposition to the bill. This rapidly escalated into the country’s largest wartime protests. Faced with public outrage and widespread expressions of concern from Ukraine’s international partners, the authorities backed down and introduced fresh legislation protecting the independence of the country’s anti-corruption agencies.

This episode confirmed the underlying strength of Ukraine’s democratic instincts. Even in extreme wartime conditions, Ukrainians were ready to stand up in defense of their democracy. The summer 2025 protests established a clear red line between the temporary delegation of power and the permanent erosion of institutional safeguards.

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A further test of the wartime political status quo came in November 2025, when Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions went public with allegations of systemic corruption within the country’s energy sector and accused numerous senior figures of involvement. The ensuing scandal led to a string of high profile resignations, including multiple ministers and the president’s chief of staff.

This political firestorm has raised fundamental questions about the monopoly of power in wartime Ukraine. While most Ukrainians continue to oppose the idea of holding national elections until a peace deal is in place, the energy sector corruption scandal in late 2025 has led to widespread calls for greater accountability, and has sparked heated debate over the need for changes in the country’s political leadership.

In this dynamic political climate, Ukraine’s parliament has begun to play a more prominent role. In December 2025, parliament voted to establish a temporary investigative commission to examine alleged violations related to corruption, human rights, and the defense sector. Crucially, this move received cross-party support.

An overall picture is emerging of a political system adapting to wartime realities but still very much atuned to core democratic values. Parliament is once again exercising oversight and influencing key political decisions, while anti-corruption institutions, civil society, and the country’s independent media act to expose violations. Meanwhile, Ukrainian society remains ready to defend the country’s hard-won democratic gains.

Most Ukrainians still recognize the need for wartime measures that would be seen as problematic in peacetime. However, the Ukrainian public has also established a number of firm red lines during the past four years of full-scale war. These are boundaries that no Ukrainian politician can afford to ignore, especially as negotiations to end the war progress. In fiercely democratic Ukraine, any potential peace deal must win public approval before it can be successfully implemented.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament with the European Solidarity party.

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If European leaders wish to participate as equal partners in discussions to determine the future security of their own continent, they cannot afford to rule out the deployment of troops to Ukraine. The Coalition of the Willing initiative, which is being led by the UK and France, was conceived in early 2025 as a way of keeping Trump engaged in European security; it is now the most realistic route to securing a European role in the peace process.

European troops could have a meaningful impact in Ukraine without engaging in combat operations. They could perform a range of support and training roles far from the front lines. For example, European contingents could take on much of the burden for monitoring the Ukrainian border with Belarus and the unrecognized Transnistrian Republic in Moldova, thereby allowing Ukrainian units to be used elsewhere. The deployment of European soldiers could also free up Ukrainian forces currently involved in the protection of critical infrastructure such as power plants and logistics hubs.

Boots on the ground in Ukraine could enhance existing training programs undertaken by Kyiv’s NATO partners. From a practical standpoint, it would certainly make military and economic sense to conduct training inside Ukraine rather than requiring large numbers of Ukrainian troops to travel internationally. The presence of European colleagues would boost morale within the Ukrainian army and demonstrate solidarity.

Crucially, a European military presence in Ukraine would undermine Russian efforts to prevent progress toward the implementation of credible security guarantees. While US officials have endorsed the concept of an assurance force to safeguard any peace deal, this is currently recognized as being conditional on Russian permission. However, Putin will not agree to any measures that rule out the possibility of further Russian gains. Deploying troops would send a signal that Moscow cannot define the debate over security guarantees.

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