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Signing ten-year defense partnership agreements with three leading Gulf states is a significant outcome for Ukraine. However, the positive optics that surrounded Zelenskyy’s recent regional tour may have been even more important for the country.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than four years ago, Ukraine has been widely seen as a recipient of military aid and a drain on international resources. Zelenskyy’s visit directly challenged this unflattering and outdated view. For the first time, Ukraine was presented as a potentially attractive security partner with much to offer in terms of unique military experience and innovative defense technologies.

For anyone who has been closely following the Russia-Ukraine War, this is hardly news. Over past four years, Ukraine has built Europe’s largest army and has emerged as a world leader in drone warfare. The country’s formerly stagnant defense industry has expanded exponentially and now produces millions of drones every year as well as a growing arsenal of domestically developed cruise missiles.

This has made it possible for the Ukrainian military to blunt Russia’s offensives along the front lines of the war. At sea, Ukraine has used domestically designed marine drones to chase Putin’s Black Sea Fleet away from Crimea. Meanwhile, Kyiv has brought the war back to Russian territory with a long-range bombing campaign that recently knocked out around 40 percent of Russia’s oil export capacity.

Ukraine’s emergence as a major military force is already transforming the balance of power in Europe and will define Kyiv’s relationships with the wider world for decades to come. Zelenskyy’s tour of the Gulf states has helped to highlight this new geopolitical reality.

The Ukrainian leader’s trip was in many ways a masterclass in wartime diplomacy. By moving so nimbly, Zelenskyy secured vital support for the Ukrainian war effort and laid the foundations for potentially game-changing strategic partnerships with the Gulf states. Crucially, he also debunked negative perceptions of his country and enhanced Ukraine’s global standing as a drone warfare superpower.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Diplomatic dissonance in the Mediterranean

This vision of Turkey as a regional stabilizer sharply contradicts conventional wisdom across much of Europe. In Athens in particular, memories of the 2020 tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean remain vivid. At that time, Turkish Navy warships accompanied a seismic survey ship of Turkey’s national oil company, TPAO, as it searched for oil and natural gas in waters that both Turkey and Greece claim as part of their exclusive economic zones. Tensions peaked in August 2020, when a Turkish and Greek warship collided near Crete. Recent months have seen a resurgence of pointed rhetoric over the countries’ maritime claims. Senior Greek officials have expressed deep skepticism regarding Ankara’s ambitions, with Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias early last month stating that Turkey’s “revisionist agenda” remains a threat to Aegean stability. Greek leadership has specifically raised alarms over Turkey’s rapidly expanding defense industrial sector and its “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) naval doctrine, which calls for Turkey to defend its interpretation of international law on maritime borders and exclusive economic zones. For Greece, Turkey’s strong military is viewed less as a tool for regional peace and more as a mechanism for coercive diplomacy that continues to challenge Greek and Greek Cypriot sovereignty.

The rhetorical attacks have been even sharper between Turkey and Israel, posing a potentially serious challenge to Ankara’s mediation ambitions. Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have regularly accused each other of crimes against humanity.

Growing support for Turkish mediation elsewhere

Despite the reservations of Greece and Israel, interest in Turkish mediation is growing elsewhere. On March 1, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated in a social media post that she welcomes Turkey’s “readiness to mediate and support a resolution” to the Iran war “through peaceful means.” Pakistan, along with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, have now taken the lead in relaying messages between the warring parties in the hope of containing regional chaos.

Most importantly, US support for Turkish mediation also seems to be growing. A key factor is the personal rapport between the US and Turkish presidents. US President Donald Trump has frequently praised Erdoğan, describing him in October 2019 as a “hell of a leader” and a “tough man who deserves respect.” More recently, when asked whether Erdoğan could play a useful mediation role between Ukraine and Russia in October 2025, Trump replied, “Yeah, Erdoğan can. He’s respected by Russia, Ukraine. I can’t tell you about it, but he is respected by the world. And he’s a friend of mine.”

Ankara has indeed taken a balanced approach toward Kyiv and Moscow. On the one hand, Turkey has sustained military-technical cooperation with Ukraine throughout Russia’s invasion and steadfastly supported its territorial integrity. Turkey also prevented Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet via the Turkish Straits in accord with the Montreux Convention of 1936. On the other hand, Turkey has refused to join sanctions against Russia and Erdoğan has maintained a robust communication line with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This evenhanded positioning allowed Turkey to broker, together with the United Nations, the July 2022 agreement between Ukraine and Russia on grain exports via the Black Sea.

Turkey’s behind-the-scenes mediation was also crucial to securing the release of hostages from Gaza in late 2023. While the world focused on Qatar’s high-profile mediation, Ankara quietly leveraged its long-standing relations with Hamas’s political bureau, (a relationship that had irritated both Israel and the United States for years), to facilitate the release of more than twenty Thai agricultural workers who were not part of the primary prisoner-exchange deals negotiated by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt. Hamas credited Turkish mediation with securing the deal.

At the time, then US President Joe Biden made no mention of Erdoğan’s role in securing the Thai hostages’ release, instead crediting trilateral efforts by Washington, Doha, and Cairo. Trump has been more willing to publicly credit Turkey’s mediation role in the Israel-Hamas war. While announcing his twenty-point plan to end the Gaza conflict in October 2025, Trump stated, “President Erdoğan was fantastic. He really helped a lot, because he’s very respected.”

US embraces Turkey’s mediation

Trump’s appreciation for Turkey’s mediation seems sufficiently strong to have prompted his administration to drop the criminal case against Halkbank, a major Turkish state-owned bank. The bank was awaiting a multibillion-dollar fine after its 2019 indictment for money laundering over illicit gold shipments to Iran. Had the United States imposed the fine, Halkbank could have collapsed, possibly sparking a crisis across Turkey’s banking system. For years, the Turkish government argued that Halkbank enjoyed sovereign immunity and the case should be dropped, but as recently as October 2025, the Trump administration refused to express support to the US Supreme Court for Halkbank’s appeal that the case be dropped.

Then on March 6, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) requested that Judge Richard Berman drop the case, citing “extraordinary national security and foreign policy considerations.” The DOJ’s main justification was that Turkey’s assistance was “critical to securing the ceasefire agreement and Hamas’s release of the hostages” that the Trump administration brokered in early 2025.

The timing of the Trump administration’s reversal on the Halkbank case may be telling. Coming a week after the United States and Israel launched their attacks on Iran, Washington’s move may suggest that Trump foresees a role for Turkish mediation in the war. While Netanyahu may balk, Trump may find Ankara’s record of mediation too successful to resist. And indeed, Ankara has already begun playing that mediation role in concert with Pakistan, Saudia Arabia, and Egypt.

Matthew Bryza is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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By alienating its intelligence partners, the US risks losing more than trust

Tressa Guenov — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 15:20:49 +0000

WASHINGTON—In their testimony earlier this month at the annual unclassified Worldwide Threats hearings in the House and Senate, leaders of the US intelligence community barely mentioned allies and partners. The intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, released alongside the hearings, similarly sheds little light on how the United States works with allies to achieve shared intelligence objectives. Yet from protecting US troops to preventing terrorist attacks, the United States has almost certainly relied on—or directly benefited from—the intelligence these networks provide.

The US intelligence community’s scant acknowledgement of these critical connections reflects the current US administration’s often dismissive—and at times aggressive—approach toward foreign partners. In the past two weeks, for example, US President Donald Trump criticized NATO members, as well as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, for not supporting the US-Israeli attacks on Iran and for declining to help secure the Strait of Hormuz.

Treating allies this way, however, is not just corrosive to diplomatic relations. It will almost certainly come at a strategic cost. If the United States continues to alienate key partners, it may soon struggle to sustain and resource mutually beneficial intelligence programs, keep pace with rapid technological change, and defend against determined adversaries such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Even with its skilled intelligence community and vast collection capabilities, the United States simply cannot form a comprehensive global intelligence picture on its own.

Intelligence cooperation often continues quietly and in the shadows, even as diplomatic or trade spats dominate headlines. Intelligence professionals pride themselves on this pragmatic approach to their work. Yet evidence suggests that US allies are beginning to reassess the depth of their intelligence cooperation with the United States. Reporting indicates that the United Kingdom, Colombia, and Canada may have stopped or adjusted intelligence-sharing on suspected drug trafficking vessels in the Caribbean over concerns about the legality of US military strikes. In October 2025, the Dutch military intelligence chief publicly expressed concerns that the United States might use shared intelligence to violate human rights. These signals are not yet a sea change, but they point to an erosion of the most valuable currency in intelligence-sharing: trust.

Even with its skilled intelligence community and vast collection capabilities, the United States simply cannot form a comprehensive global intelligence picture on its own.

In March 2025, the United States briefly suspended vital intelligence support to Ukraine, sparking an international outcry and shocking NATO allies. More recently, in launching Operation Epic Fury against Iran, Trump apparently caught NATO, Gulf, and Asian allies off guard, reportedly providing no advance warning that operations were imminent. This suggests that US-Israeli plans were executed without real-time coordination with allies. Such apparent willingness to bypass allied information-sharing mechanisms introduces unnecessary risk for both the United States and its partners, especially in complex and untested operational environments. By disrupting expectations of reciprocity with allies and potentially placing intelligence professionals and warfighters in more difficult positions to share information, the US administration may therefore undermine its own long-term interests.

It is important to underscore that US intelligence partnerships with allies are not a single program or activity. The eighteen-member US intelligence community has complex relationships with dozens of countries and partner agencies around the world. For example, the Anglophone “Five Eyes” partnership—comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—conducts intelligence cooperation across a range of collection disciplines. The “Nine Eyes” and “Fourteen Eyes” alliances have further broadened the network to include additional partners. On the military side, the US combatant commands often operate joint interagency task forces that benefit from allied and partner joint exercises, intelligence-sharing, and law enforcement support. But intelligence alliances and networks are only as strong as the commitment of their members—and the unpredictability of US actions risks eroding that commitment.

The consequences could be severe. Allies could limit US access to information by prioritizing regional, linguistic, or other organizing principles for their intelligence alliances. Bilateral intelligence relationships could face restrictions on information-sharing that, in the worst case, would degrade the common operating picture during a crisis. Moreover, countries could seek alternatives to US data platforms or methodologies, especially if they fear their intelligence could be used in unlawful or inappropriate ways by the United States. Specialized bilateral relationships between US and allied intelligence professionals could also weaken through reduced exposure and connectivity, especially as the US intelligence community is reportedly losing key expertise to early retirements and staff cuts. All this comes at a time when perennial intelligence cooperation challenges—bureaucratic hurdles, overclassification, system interoperability, and the rapid pace of artificial intelligence and quantum computing development—demand stronger collaboration between the United States and its allies.

Even under optimal conditions, international cooperation is challenging, but today’s security climate forces countries to work through slights and disputes to keep intelligence flowing. Still, allies may come to view this moment as a welcome chance to reform their intelligence communities, increase their independence, and enhance their capabilities. Such an approach would be different from reducing cooperation due to unhealthy breaks in trust. For example, the United Kingdom’s former head of MI6 argued in a March 23 interview that it is time for a refresh in terms of how it approaches cooperation with US intelligence and its reliance on security guarantees from Washington. The most recent US National Defense Strategy urges allies to provide more funding for intelligence, but it is unclear what those changes might entail or who will compel them.

In the meantime, members of Congress and their staff on intelligence, defense, and appropriations committees will need to help safeguard intelligence activities that deliver value to the United States and its allies, as they may be among the few Americans with sufficient clearance and oversight to detect potential problems. More congressional and parliamentary collaboration is needed on intelligence reform, and NATO can offer some collective accountability mechanisms, as well.

For its allies around the world, the United States remains an unmatched intelligence partner—and cooperation with the US intelligence community is key to joint special operations, human intelligence collection, cyber defense, drug interdiction, nuclear deterrence, and more. Yet allies and partners also bring critical capabilities that the United States lacks, including on-the-ground diplomatic experience with Iran, relationships with the Houthis, or the ability to operate credibly in certain cultural contexts. Without their support, the US intelligence picture—much like a Polaroid photo in reverse—will inevitably fade, leaving both Washington and its allies exposed to greater risk.

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Securing cloud infrastructure for AI

Sara Ann Brackett — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 14:00:00 +0000

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Executive summary

Securing artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure requires ensuring the security of the cloud ecosystem. The cloud infrastructure that implements and executes AI workloads presents an opening for adversaries that existing vulnerability management institutions were not designed to cover. This brief examines the mechanisms through which vulnerabilities in cloud infrastructure are discovered, disclosed, communicated, and remediated, and finds them to be inadequate to meet the security demands of an ecosystem in which AI has a growing impact.

Nation-state actors continue to target cloud environments, compressing vulnerability discovery and exploitation timelines. At the same time, public vulnerability data, anchored by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID system and the linked National Vulnerability Database (NVD), faces severe strain. The policy institutions tasked with addressing cloud security face leadership vacuums, funding uncertainty, and competing priorities.

Community and industry driven efforts to respond to these challenges remain fragmented and voluntary, while providers operate without public accountability. Making progress on these urgent challenges requires policy mechanisms to incentivize and mandate clarity and transparency in the cloud ecosystem.

Background

In the United States, several essential cybersecurity authorities and institutions face simultaneous disruption. The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA), passed in 2022, proposed to establish the country’s first mandatory incident reporting regime for critical infrastructure sectors, has seen the publication of its final rule delayed to May 2026. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA 2015), which provides liability and antitrust protections for companies sharing threat indicators with the federal government and each other, lapsed on September 30, 2025 and received only a temporary extension through September 2026, with bipartisan reauthorization efforts stalled in Congress. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) continues to operate without a confirmed director, after the Senate failed to act on the administration’s nominee, and the agency has seen workforce reductions that have diminished its operational readiness. The Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB), which conducted a landmark investigation of the 2023 Microsoft Exchange Online compromise, was dissolved in early 2025.

In Europe, a set of untested regulatory instruments are taking effect. The European Union (EU) NIS2 Directive expanded cybersecurity obligations for 18 critical sectors. The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), adopted in 2024 with enforcement beginning in 2027, will require digital product manufacturers to build in cybersecurity capabilities and provide vulnerability disclosure mechanisms. The United Kingdom (UK) Cyber Security and Resilience Bill is progressing through Parliament with similar objectives.

The US, UK, and EU have also adopted policy approaches and established agencies specific to AI. In the US, the Trump administration’s AI Action Plan outlined goals of exporting the US AI stack abroad. The EU AI Act imposed obligations on AI developers based on the level of risk posed by specific AI models. The US and UK also established AI-specific testing and research organizations, the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) and the AI Security Institute (AISI) respectively.

Cloud computing

Cloud computing describes a model of access to computing resources, where customers specify workloads, or defined sets of tasks, which cloud providers implement and execute. This model of access is an important part of AI development and deployment, and frontier AI companies have partnered with cloud providers to ensure access to cutting-edge compute resources.

Compute and virtualization services allocate processing power and include the orchestration platforms that oversee AI training and inference workloads. Data and storage services comprise the managed databases and object storage for training datasets, model weights, and inference outputs. Observability and logging services collect the telemetry essential to detecting anomalies and investigating incidents. Identity and access management services control who and what can interact with cloud resources.

Layered on top of these foundational services are AI-specific runtimes and serving frameworks (the managed environments in which models are loaded and scaled) as well as the web and API gateways through which users interact with AI systems. Each of these categories presents distinct vulnerabilities. A flaw in a container escape mechanism raises different remediation questions than a misconfiguration in a logging pipeline, yet both can impact the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an AI workload.

Fraying public vulnerability infrastructure

The NVD has served for nearly two decades as an authoritative source for enriched vulnerability data, powering compliance frameworks, automated scanning tools, and risk assessments across both the public and private sectors. Budget constraints and rising submission volumes have degraded its reliability as an operational resource. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) acknowledged in early 2025 that a 32 percent increase in CVE submissions during 2024 meant the backlog was still growing.

CISA maintains the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, which allows the agency to publicly announce vulnerabilities that have been exploited in the wild. As of March 2026, the catalog contains 1,551 vulnerabilities, making it a useful smaller-scale prioritization signal, especially in comparison to the NVD’s 339,010 vulnerabilities. CISA’s ability to update and maintain the KEV database is likely affected by the ongoing partial shutdown of CISA’s parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and the mass layoffs of CISA employees since January 2025.

Meanwhile, despite a clear recommendation from the CSRB’s review of the 2023 Microsoft Exchange incident, cloud providers do not comprehensively disclose security vulnerabilities or flaws within their cloud services that do not require customer action to fix. In 2024, both Microsoft and Google announced that they would issue CVEs for critical vulnerabilities, which are only a subset of the overall vulnerability landscape. Vulnerability scoring and severity evaluations are complex and involve judgement calls, so allowing providers to determine which vulnerabilities they disclose distorts publicly available data on cloud security issues.

Failing to issue a CVE identifier for a security flaw also precludes the vulnerability from being included in the KEV database, limiting the ability of US government agencies to publicly communicate evidence of exploitation. Companies can refuse to acknowledge security incidents or transparently communicate with customers in the absence of policy obligations, as Oracle’s communications around an incident in May 2025 exemplified.

Hyperscale cloud providers operate vulnerability reward programs (VRPs) that incentivize external researchers to report flaws. According to a program website, Google’s Cloud VRP has issued $3,574,399 in awards over the past year. These programs are voluntary, variable in scope and payout, depend on the communications channels offered by the cloud provider, and are not subject to public reporting obligations.

Provider programs are siloed. No mechanism exists for identifying shared flaws across cloud platforms or generating a system-wide view of collective vulnerability data. This limitation is consequential considering research demonstrating that independently developed cloud services can harbor similar security flaws due to shared open-source dependencies or common architectural patterns. The absence of cross-provider coordination means that when a researcher identifies a vulnerability pattern in one cloud platform, there is no systematic process for evaluating whether the same pattern exists in others.

AI services are not immune from these systemic challenges. A July 2025 container escape vulnerability in the NVIDIA Container Toolkit, discovered by Wiz researchers, highlighted that security issues in popular libraries impact customers regardless of their cloud provider.

Community-driven projects have attempted to address the lack of standardized tracking mechanism for cloud security issues. The Wiz-backed Open Cloud Vulnerability and Security Issue Database catalogs publicly known cloud vulnerabilities and flaws, providing researchers and practitioners with a centralized reference for flaws that might otherwise be scattered across notification methods. The ONUG Cloud Security Notification Framework addresses the lack of a common data model for security notifications across providers. While these efforts are valuable, neither possesses the institutional backing to compel provider participation or to generate the kind of systematic accounting of vulnerabilities in cloud platforms which could form the basis of further policy action.

AI changes the risk landscape

As a target, AI infrastructure concentrates extraordinarily valuable intellectual property within cloud environments: model weights, proprietary training data, novel research methods, and fine-tuning configurations, all of which are only as secure as the weakest component of their infrastructure. The scarcity of compute resources specific to AI may lead organizations to deprioritize security requirements in favor of rapid access to processing power. The emergence of AI-focused cloud providers, newer entrants that may lack the mature security operations and vulnerability management programs of established hyperscale cloud providers, creates additional points of systemic risk.

As a tool, AI is reshaping the vulnerability landscape on both the offensive and defensive sides, rapidly accelerating the pace of vulnerability discovery and exploit development. Google’s Project Zero reported 20 vulnerabilities in popular open-source packages, each of which was discovered and reproduced by an AI agent without human intervention. A similar collaboration between Mozilla and Anthropic discovered 22 vulnerabilities in Firefox and crafted partial exploits for each of them. Wiz’s first-ever cloud hacking competition surfaced over 11 vulnerabilities in open-source code comprising foundational layers of cloud infrastructure. Open-source maintainers and operators of bug bounty programs have raised alarm about the increasing volume of AI-generated bug reports, which are of varying quality and require significant effort on the part of developers and maintainers to evaluate.

Recommendations

Government agencies must respond to the changing cloud vulnerability landscape. As experts have warned, failing to keep pace with the rapid rate of developments in offensive cyber risks of AI will have security consequences. Managing the risks posed by AI for vulnerability discovery and exploitation requires recommitting to known best practices, which can serve as a foundation for future policy experimentation and adaptation.

1. Follow through on lapsed and languishing cybersecurity efforts

Congress should reauthorize the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, which remains the foundational legal framework enabling voluntary cyber threat intelligence sharing between the private sector and federal government. Temporary extensions do not provide sufficient assurance and protection to organizations committing to information sharing, and even brief lapses disrupt long-standing collaborations.

Consistent with the AI Action Plan, the federal government should establish a dedicated Artificial Intelligence Information Sharing and Analysis Center (AI-ISAC) to centralize threat intelligence specific to AI systems, model vulnerabilities, and adversarial exploitation techniques. This body could facilitate real-time coordination across industry, academia, and government, led by DHS in collaboration with CAISI and the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD).

Congress should ensure CISA and NIST, as the stewards of the KEV catalog and NVD, receive sustained, adequate resourcing to fulfill their role in the vulnerability management ecosystem.

Congress should re-establish the Cyber Safety Review Board, resolving issues with the original board’s investigation by giving the board both subpoena power and sufficient staff to support critical investigations. Congress should also clarify criteria for incidents reviewable by the board. As recent analysis in Lawfare argued, a review board specific to AI could investigate the role of AI in cyberattacks. An AI-specific body should also be scoped to include cloud security incidents, reflecting the cloud’s critical role as AI infrastructure.

2. Incentivize and disclose high-quality public vulnerability data for cloud computing

ONCD should lead on establishing a comprehensive, government-backed information and data sharing solution to drive more effective vulnerability management across the cloud ecosystem. Policy design in cloud cybersecurity suffers from a lack of high-quality public data on critical and non-critical vulnerabilities; patterns of misconfiguration; and trends in exploitation techniques by threat actors.

ONCD’s leadership on this challenge, as a component of the National Cybersecurity Strategy’s goal to shape adversary behavior, could improve collaboration with the private sector and cloud providers, while avoiding diverting CISA from its core mission of protecting government and critical infrastructure systems.

Greater data transparency and disclosure of vulnerabilities across the ecosystem could serve as the foundation of prioritization processes across the cloud ecosystem, increasing pressure on providers to tackle vulnerabilities and classes of vulnerabilities that have security consequences for government entities and companies worldwide. That prioritization should privilege shared vulnerabilities, architectural flaws, and common weaknesses present across multiple hyperscale providers, which no current mechanism systematically or publicly identifies and addresses.

3. Lead on international coordination

The US government should pursue alignment with the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity and allied governments on cloud vulnerability disclosure norms. The US government’s support of vulnerability databases and coordination efforts creates benefits for other countries. Questions about the stability of that support spur divergent efforts, such as the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity establishing its own database for cataloging cyber vulnerabilities.

Ensuring that AI safety institutions and cybersecurity agencies share information and coordinate on vulnerability management, rather than operating in parallel silos, should be an explicit element of efforts to mitigate the risks of emerging AI for cloud computing security.

The United States and the United Kingdom should begin by harmonizing their own practices and then extend that alignment to the EU. The forthcoming CIRCIA rule and the UK’s Cyber Security and Resilience Bill offer opportunities to embed cloud-specific vulnerability and incident reporting requirements that can serve as reference points for international coordination. Encouraging international allies to adopt the same approach to disclosing vulnerabilities in compute infrastructure can contribute to changing the incentive structure of the AI compute industry, shifting it towards greater transparency from cloud providers.

Conclusion

Trust in cloud computing cannot be sustained without visibility. The physical location of a data center does not determine its vulnerability to misconfigured access controls, unpatched container runtimes, or supply chain compromises. The cloud infrastructure that underpins AI development and deployment is subject to a vulnerability management regime designed for a different era of computing. Cloud-specific security flaws fall between existing institutional mandates, and the organizations building the most consequential AI systems lack the ability to demand transparency from the infrastructure they depend on.

The building blocks for a better approach exist, but the policy architecture to connect them is missing. The United States and its allies and partners possess both the responsibility and the capacity to design an approach to cloud vulnerability management that matches the scale and complexity of the systems it is meant to protect. The question is whether they will do so before the gap between the complexity of cloud infrastructure and the maturity of the institutions overseeing it becomes the defining vulnerability of the AI era.

About the Author

Sara Ann Brackett is an associate director with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Tech Programs. She focuses her work on open-source software security, cloud computing, and software supply-chain risk management within the Cyber Statecraft Initiative’s cybersecurity and policy portfolio.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the Cyber Statecraft Initiative and Atlantic Council Tech Programs teams for their support and guidance throughout this project. Thank you to Trey Herr and Tess deBlanc-Knowles, who provided thoughtful feedback, and to Safa Shahwan Edwards and Jen Roberts, who were instrumental in planning and executing a workshop that informed this paper. Thank you to Nikita Shah, whose feedback shaped earlier iterations of this brief and its accompanying visualizations. The author would also like to thank the workshop participants who shared their expertise and perspectives under Chatham House Rule.

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Ukraine bombs Russia’s Baltic ports as Zelenskyy targets Putin’s oil exports

David Kirichenko — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 10:15:43 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says some of the country’s partners have called on Kyiv to scale down strikes on Russia’s oil sector as global energy prices surge amid the ongoing Iran War. These international appeals underline the impact of Ukraine’s most recent long-range attacks, which have reportedly reduced Russia’s oil export capacity by at least 40 percent.

Zelenskyy did not specify which of Ukraine’s allies had requested a pause in the country’s current air offensive. In recent weeks, the United States has temporarily relaxed some sanctions on Russian oil exports in a bid to ease mounting pressure on international energy markets due to the closure of the logistically crucial Strait of Hormuz.

Speaking on Monday in Kyiv, the Ukrainian leader indicated that he would only stop targeting Russian oil exports if Moscow also agrees to end its attacks on Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. “We are open to discussing any type of ceasefire; a full ceasefire, an energy ceasefire, a food security ceasefire. We have already proposed all of this and we are still open. If the Russians are ready, let them suggest any time frame,” he stated.

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Zelenskyy’s comments come following some of the most significant Ukrainian airstrikes of the entire war. In recent days, Ukrainian long-range drones have repeatedly struck Russia’s main oil export terminals on the Baltic Sea, causing extensive damage and disrupting one of the Kremlin’s most important economic lifelines.

These Baltic drone raids came just as rising global oil prices linked to the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East threatened to produce a major economic windfall for the Kremlin. By hitting the most critical elements of Russia’s oil export infrastructure, Ukraine is seeking to limit Putin’s ability to translate higher oil prices into increased wartime revenue.

This tactic appears to be working. Speaking to the Current Time media outlet, independent oil and gas industry analyst Boris Aronshtein described the recent series of Ukrainian strikes as “the most serious threat to exports of Russian oil” since the onset of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in 2022. “The thoughtfulness, the scale and direction of the attacks, as well as the timing of their execution; all this together produced an effect that I personally cannot recall in the four-plus years of the war,” he commented.

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Ukraine’s recent attacks on Baltic Sea oil terminals are part of a strategic bombing campaign to weaken Putin’s war machine by targeting the ports, refineries, and associated infrastructure that drive Russia’s economically crucial energy industry. This has been made possible thanks to Kyiv’s decision during the initial phase of Russia’s invasion to prioritize the development of domestically produced long-range strike drones and cruise missiles. As more drones and missiles become available, the scale of Ukraine’s strikes is steadily increasing.

Zelenskyy has repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine’s expanding long-range strike capability is critical for the current war effort and equally important as a deterrent against future Russian aggression. While long-range weapons provided by Kyiv’s partners often come with limitations on how they can be deployed, there are no such restrictions on the use of domestically produced drones and missiles.

Kremlin officials have certainly noticed Kyiv’s growing reach. In recent weeks, former Russian defense minister and current Security Council secretary Sergei Shoigu warned that Ukraine’s domestic drone program had now advanced to the point where no Russian region is safe from attack.

Ukraine’s ability to conduct large-scale airstrikes deep inside Russian territory has sparked vocal criticism from within Russia’s influential war blogger community, while also generating widespread concerns over the effectiveness of the country’s anti-drone defenses. Many have questioned how slow-moving drones could pass through multiple Russian regions to hit targets often located more than one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

In fact, the stage for Ukraine’s recent successes was set by efforts to methodically eliminate Russian air defenses and create corridors for long-range strikes. This approach looks set to continue. With much of the Kremlin’s existing air defense capacity already deployed along the front lines in Ukraine or being used to protect major Russian cities along with the palaces of Putin and his cronies, there is now thought to be little left in reserve to counter the growing Ukrainian drone threat.

The scale and frequency of Ukrainian strikes on oil and gas infrastructure will likely continue to increase in the coming months as Kyiv seeks ways to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. The Ukrainian authorities are hoping these attacks can help bring the end of the war closer by depriving the Kremlin of vital funding and threatening the foundations of Russia’s economic stability.

So far, Putin has rejected calls for a compromise peace. However, he may finally be forced to rethink his invasion if confronted with the prospect of dangerous destabilization on the home front. The Kremlin dictator remains determined to achieve his goal of erasing Ukrainian statehood, but he is also haunted by fears of a new Russian collapse to mirror the catastrophes of 1917 and 1991.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The Gulf states

The Gulf states understand this instinctively. For years, some of them pursued a careful balancing act by relying on US security while maintaining pragmatic relations with Iran, even amid accusations that elements within them tolerated or indirectly supported Iranian-linked proxy networks. That strategy collapses the moment infrastructure becomes a target. Ambiguity is a luxury of stability; it rarely survives contact with risk. States whose prosperity depends on uninterrupted energy flows will not tolerate prolonged uncertainty. They will align decisively with the only proven security architecture capable of guaranteeing stability. That architecture is American.

Iran

By contrast, Iran under the current regime risks a historic miscalculation. Its strategy has long relied on asymmetry—pressure without full confrontation, disruption without decisive response. But there is a threshold beyond which such a strategy becomes self-defeating. Targeting the infrastructure that underpins global energy flows is such a threshold. Nations rarely fail because they lack power. More often, they fail because they misjudge the consequences of using power. If Iran is perceived not merely as a regional challenger but as a systemic disruptor of global energy flows, then the response it provokes will not be incremental. It will be structural.

Russia, China, and North Korea

Much has been written about a new alignment among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—an emerging axis opposed to the West. In reality, this has always been more fiction than fact. China depends on stable energy flows from the Gulf. Russia benefits from higher prices but seeks equilibrium, not chaos. North Korea follows but does not lead. When the stakes become real, ideology gives way to interest—and those interests diverge.

Europe

Europe may be another major victim of this situation. At precisely the moment when hard power, energy security, and strategic clarity are required, Europe finds itself largely absent from the field. For decades, it built a model based on external energy, outsourced security, and the belief that economic and normative influence could substitute for geopolitical strength. That model is now showing its weaknesses, and a persistent energy shock could diminish Europe’s geopolitical role further. Without unified military capability or independent energy security, Europe is increasingly reacting to events rather than shaping them. It has shifted, quietly but unmistakably, from actor to arena.

The United States

Beneath all of this lies a deeper truth that has stayed with me for years. During my time at the London Business School, my professor Andrew Scott made a deceptively simple observation: oil and the dollar are the liquidity of the world. He was right. Oil remains the physical liquidity of the global economy. The dollar remains the financial system that prices and stabilizes it. Despite years of discussion about energy transitions, alternative currencies, and new geopolitical alignments, moments like this reveal how little has fundamentally changed. The system still runs on dollar-denominated energy flows. Liquidity, in the end, has no substitute.

There is also a historical parallel worth noting. When US President Ronald Reagan entered office, he defined a small number of strategic priorities. These priorities included restoring economic strength and confronting the Soviet Union. But on everything else, he reacted. That clarity allowed events, many of them unforeseen, to move in his favor. A similar dynamic may be unfolding today. US President Donald Trump did not set out to engineer a global realignment through crisis. But history does not ask whether leaders planned events. It asks whether they were positioned to benefit from them.

If the United States maintains economic strength, energy leverage, and military credibility, then shocks of this kind do not weaken its position. Instead, they reinforce it. Because when the system becomes unstable, the world does not look for consensus. It looks for order. And order requires a guarantor.

This is where one’s legacy is ultimately defined—not in moments of calm but in moments when the system begins to fracture, when uncertainty spreads and decisions become irreversible. Reagan understood this. He did not control events, but he shaped the environment in which they unfolded. History rewarded him for it. Trump may find himself in a similar position. If current dynamics continue, this period may be remembered not as a series of isolated crises, but as the moment when global ambiguity collapsed—and when US power reasserted itself, not by design but by necessity.

In geopolitics, power is measured not by who speaks the loudest, but rather by who cannot be replaced. In a world once again defined by energy, security, and liquidity, the United States remains indispensable.

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Europe needs a 21st-century containment strategy toward Russia

Vytautas Leškevičius, Julia Salabert — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 19:48:58 +0000

VILNIUS and WASHINGTON—February 22, 2026, marked eighty years since US diplomat George Kennan sent the Long Telegram from Moscow, laying the intellectual foundations for a containment strategy against Russia. As Kennan described in a follow-up Foreign Affairs essay that presented his ideas to the public, “the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Two days after this anniversary marked four years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, starkly illustrating the consequences of abandoning Kennan’s core strategic insight in favor of illusions about convergence, dialogue, or historical inevitability.

Europe today faces a familiar temptation: to substitute process for power, engagement for strategy, and institutional continuity for genuine security. The question is no longer whether Russia can be accommodated into a cooperative European order—that experiment has already failed. The question now is whether Europe and its allies are prepared to organize their security around the reality that Russia cannot be accommodated and must be contained.

Europe’s strategic indecision: Why calls for engagement are back

So far this year, several European countries—France, Germany, and Italy among them—have revived calls for renewed engagement with Moscow. Just this month, the Belgian prime minister said that Europe must negotiate with Russia, adding: “In private, European leaders agree with me, but no one dares to say it out loud.” Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, Poland, and some Baltic leaders remain skeptical.

At the surface level, renewed engagement seems to be driven by fears of European marginalization in emerging diplomatic formats, particularly as the United States has engaged in limited talks about Russia’s war in Ukraine, which have now been paused due to the war in Iran. Europeans do not want to wait for a seat at the table in these talks—especially regarding peace in Ukraine and any future security architecture for the continent.

At a deeper structural level, engagement returns precisely when high-end deterrence and defense posture becomes politically costly, and institutional enforcement weakens. Dialogue appears less disruptive than sustained military modernization, sanctions, and forward deployments. But it is also less pertinent.

Limited but persistent European calls to re-engage with Moscow do not amount to a coherent plan to restore stability. They are reactions to the breakdown of the rules-based order—and to Europe’s inherent uncertainty about how to respond. The core fallacy here lies in conflating the existence of the rules-based order with the institutions that once embodied it. When those rules are violated, the question is not how to preserve institutions as they are, but whether they must be reformed, redesigned, or, in some cases, abandoned altogether.

The failure of stand-alone multilateralism

For decades, Euro-Atlantic security rested on the implicit assumption that institutions themselves generate stability by establishing expectations and enforcing adherence to norms. Multilateral diplomacy presumes rational actors and assumes that repeated interaction will gradually encourage restraint. Authoritarian regimes, nevertheless, have repeatedly exploited this logic by using engagement to gain time, acquire undeserved legitimacy, and garner asymmetric advantage. When enforcement erodes, institutions tend to maintain themselves through inertia rather than effectiveness. Processes replace outcomes, and participation becomes an end rather than a means for something more valuable.

Simply being at the table does not produce peace. When detached from military instruments of power, engagement consumes time while aggressors build strength. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) provides a cautionary example. Rather than confronting Russia’s systematic violations, the organization has increasingly prioritized procedural continuity over substance. Russia and Belarus remain formally engaged while openly dismantling every foundational principle of the OSCE. The result is a structure without content—an institution unable to defend itself, trapped in outdated working methods, and unwilling to adapt to strategic reality.

Multilateralism that cannot enforce its own norms ceases to be a safeguard and becomes a liability. But if a full-scale war in Europe has not forced an institutional transformation, what will?

Why neither engagement nor Cold War nostalgia works

Engagement is often framed as the alternative to escalation. History suggests otherwise. The United States did not pacify Europe during the Cold War through talks. Rather, Washington’s containment strategy deterred the Kremlin from aggression against the United States’ European allies. Kennan’s concept rested on sustained counterpressure—political, economic, and military—designed to shape adversary behavior over time.

At the same time, a nostalgic return to Cold War models is neither possible nor desirable. The Cold War–era strategies of “forward defense” and “flexible response” entailed a permanent, large-scale US military engagement in Europe. The era of such US engagement in Europe is ending. Washington has been explicit about this for years: Europe must develop its own capabilities, capacity, and strategic will. NATO’s ongoing command reforms reflect this shift toward greater European responsibility. The Alliance has begun moving toward a new agenda centered on credible deterrence and defense, resilience, scaling up industrial production, and burden-sharing.

Uncoordinated European initiatives to restart dialogue with Moscow risk undercutting this trajectory by weakening NATO deterrence and defense posture before it is fully restored. The real danger lies in drifting into an incoherent middle ground—where deterrence is insufficient to constrain Russia and engagement without the strength to back it up is insufficient to stabilize Europe’s relations with Moscow.

Updated containment: A functional Euro-Atlantic approach

Containment does not lead to escalation. Rather, it is a stabilizing approach that ensures any dialogue takes place within the framework of credible defense. Similarly, escalation and escalation dominance are different concepts. NATO does not seek to escalate conflicts, but it must retain the capacity to respond from a position of strength if escalation occurs. Securing such escalation dominance requires clear red lines, credible capabilities, political will, and courage.

An updated containment strategy for European countries should rest on five pillars:

First, deterrence before dialogue. Credible military posture is not optional—it is the precondition for engagement. Without the ability to deny cost-free aggression, dialogue risks becoming a channel for delay, leverage, and asymmetry rather than a tool for stability.

Second, institutions are judged by function, not sentiment. Structures that cannot enforce norms must be reformed, bypassed, or replaced. Preserving institutional continuity in the absence of enforcement does not uphold order—it obscures its erosion and delays necessary adaptation.

Third, favor regional and functional formats. Where consensus-bound forums fail, coalitions, primarily regional ones, need to come to the fore. Smaller, purpose-driven groupings can act where unanimity-based institutions are blocked, restoring effectiveness without waiting for unreachable consensus.

Fourth, European ownership. Defense industrial mobilization, infrastructure hardening, and sustained support for Ukraine must become permanent features of European security.

Fifth, strategic coherence. NATO must seize escalation management—through large-scale multidomain exercises, robust responses to hybrid attacks, and the explicit recognition that legacy arrangements with Russia no longer apply. Maintaining escalation dominance will also require breaking a long-standing taboo and integrating conventional and nuclear planning.

An updated containment strategy will require closing sanctions loopholes, integrating civil-military logistics, and expanding defense production through state-backed investment. The Kremlin’s allies and enablers will need to be constrained across multiple regions—from the Indo-Pacific to the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Europe’s renewed debate over engagement with Russia reflects a deeper reluctance to accept that the previous security order has already collapsed. Peace is preserved through strategic clarity, credible deterrence, and robust defense capabilities—not through nostalgia for processes that no longer deliver stability. Only a comprehensive policy grounded in strength, combined with a refusal to compromise on core principles, can alter Moscow’s calculus.

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Inside Tehran’s toll booth

Alisha Chhangani — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 18:37:23 +0000

WASHINGTON—There is a lot of attention right now on how Iran is managing access to the Strait of Hormuz—operating a kind of “toll booth” in which it clamps down on commercial flows through the vital waterway while reportedly allowing some vessels to transit for as much as $2 million per voyage or according to particular political and financial conditions.

But an important question has received far less attention: How are Iran and oil purchasers settling their payments under current conditions? What follows is an effort to answer that question, drawing on new GeoEconomics Center research, to shed light on the policy levers Tehran is pulling and the economic-statecraft and technological tools it is employing—as well as the implications for sanctions enforcement.

How Iran settles cross-border payments today

Iran’s cross‑border payments system reflects years of sanctions‑driven adaptation. In 2012, sanctioned Iranian banks were disconnected from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network, which serves as the core infrastructure for global financial messaging. While this did not make all transactions with Iran impossible, it made standard cross-border settlement much more difficult by cutting off access to the main channel for bank-to-bank communication.

In January 2016, following verification steps under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, many Iranian banks were reconnected to SWIFT and some financial sanctions were lifted. But after the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed secondary sanctions, access to formal financial channels narrowed again. This repeated cycle of reintegration and new restrictions made it clear to Tehran that formal dollar-clearing or euro-denominated trade finance was unreliable.

In response, Iran has shifted its cross‑border payments system to a set of overlapping workarounds. Some transactions still move through formal banking channels in jurisdictions willing to absorb sanctions risk. Others are routed through intermediaries that can hold funds, net obligations, or obscure beneficial ownership. Complementing these efforts are state-led initiatives such as the Shetab system. While primarily focused on domestic payments, Iran recently expanded Shetab for cross-border use through a strategic integration with Russia’s Mir payment system. This link connects the national payment switches of both countries, allowing their respective bank cards to be “read” and processed by the other’s banking hardware. There also are several informal networks that settle transactions entirely outside of the banking system. For example, the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has described Iranian “shadow banking” networks that rely on Iran‑based exchange houses and foreign front companies—particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hong Kong, and Singapore—to move billions of dollars tied to oil exports and other activities.

At the base of this structure is hawala, a long-standing, trust-based system that enables value transfer without formal cross-border movement of funds. These networks are anchored in regional hubs such as Dubai, where a large number of Iranian-linked firms operate and provide counterparties for informal settlement. On top of this, Iran uses state-linked intermediaries, including front companies and trading entities, to facilitate transactions tied to oil exports. More recently, Iran also has relied on cryptocurrency to facilitate transactions that can bypass traditional banking rails. For example, the blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis estimated that Iran‑linked crypto activity reached $7.8 billion on‑chain in 2025, with stablecoins increasingly used for settlement and a growing share tied to sanctioned entities. US enforcement actions have increasingly targeted these channels, including sanctions on exchanges and wallet clusters associated with Iranian activity.

For Tehran, formal, semi‑formal, and informal channels operate in parallel, with transactions routed through different layers depending on risk tolerance, counterparties, and the constraints in place at any given time.

How China’s yuan fits in

China is now Iran’s main oil customer, buying over 80 percent of its seaborne exports. In this partnership, Iran trades discounted oil for Chinese investment and goods, with payments increasingly handled in yuan instead of dollars to reduce exposure to US oversight while also advancing the internationalization of China’s renminbi (RMB). Chinese refiners often buy Iranian oil through intermediaries and non‑dollar banks. The money stays in controlled accounts and is mainly used to pay Chinese contractors or cover imports rather than flowing directly into Iran’s banking system.

China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), a clearing and settlement network launched by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) in 2015 to process cross-border renminbi transactions, could be a potential channel for these yuan-denominated purchases of Iranian oil.

GeoEconomics Center analysis of CIPS data shows in the chart below that monthly averages for daily transaction volume remained within a $85–105 billion (600–750 billion yuan) range over the past year. In mid-to-late March, however, daily observations rose to over $130 billion (around 940 billion yuan). The increase in volume is notable in the context of the ongoing Iran war, which began on February 28, but it does not by itself show that Iranian oil payments are moving through CIPS. CIPS handles tens of thousands of transactions a day that reflect a wide range of uses, so the data are best read as a sign of broader growth in renminbi settlement capacity, not as direct proof of Iran-linked flows. Beijing also has widened the mandate of CIPS so it can handle some non‑renminbi currencies and provide broader cross‑border services, making it more flexible as a backbone for regional payments.

The UAE could be emerging as an increasingly important player in this network. First Abu Dhabi Bank joined CIPS as a direct participant in mid‑2025 and was later named an official renminbi clearing bank. Iran has incentives to use RMB in its energy trade with China, while the UAE has long functioned as a hub for Iran’s trade and commercial finance. Given China’s role as the primary destination for Iran’s shipped oil, a Gulf‑based RMB clearing hub could reduce friction in RMB‑denominated trade flows linked to China and support greater regional RMB liquidity. But there is little visibility into how these channels are being used during the current conflict or what is driving the recent uptick in CIPS activity. Any such transactions would likely occur indirectly through Chinese or third-country banks rather than through direct participation on the CIPS network, limiting visibility into how the systems are being used now.

China also could leverage Project mBridge, a cross‑border payments platform designed to enable direct settlement between central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), for purchases of Iranian oil. Originally incubated under the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Innovation Hub, the project brings together the PBOC, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Bank of Thailand, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, and the Central Bank of Saudi Arabia. The project has made more than 4,000 transactions worth $55.49 billion, with China’s digital yuan comprising 95.3 percent of the volume.

In November 2025, the UAE executed its first government payment using the wholesale digital dirham on mBridge, testing readiness for settling energy and commodity trade—sectors in which China dominates. Data on mBridge usage remains limited, as neither the PBOC nor participant banks are required to disclose those details. There is no public evidence yet of Iran-linked usage of mBridge, and Iran is not a member of the system, which remains experimental. In practice, however, the UAE’s banks, exchange houses, and free‑zone shell companies already serve as conduits for Iranian‑linked trade and finance, raising the possibility that mBridge‑linked institutions could indirectly handle Iranian‑linked transactions even if Iran itself is not a participant in the platform.

Conversations that the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics team recently had with policymakers in Europe indicate that Group of Seven (G7) finance officials believe participants may be leveraging mBridge during the Iran war. But the linkages and scale are impossible to know without more information. Given the project’s focus on commodity trade with Gulf countries and China, interest in its potential role in Iranian oil payments is high.

What to watch next

As developments around Iran and its oil trade continue to draw attention, policymakers should focus on several key signals.

First, will renminbi‑based payment infrastructure continue to grow? In particular, will CIPS continue to expand its network in the Middle East, where yuan‑denominated trade is easier to facilitate? Project mBridge remains opaque, with limited public data available. Still, as central banks continue to develop and test wholesale CBDCs, indicators such as new country participation in cross-border projects, energy-related pilot transactions, or spikes in activity during periods of financial or geopolitical stress could point to this technology being used more actively.

Iran, too, is advancing its “digital rial” CBDC, initially a reaction to US sanctions, which could eventually give Tehran an additional channel to steer retail and wholesale payments through digital channels. All founding BRICS countries are testing wholesale CBDCs and continue to push for a more multipolar global currency system. Much of this effort focuses on building domestic digital payment networks while piloting cross‑border applications that enable trade settlement in local currencies. Watch for any signals emerging from the next BRICS summit, planned for September 2026 in India, as well as broader developments in these payment systems—particularly given that India is the second‑largest buyer of Iranian oil.

It is important to note that these systems still do not challenge the dollar’s status as the reserve currency and its prevalence in international transactions. CIPS continues to have a much smaller network than the West’s financial architecture, which includes SWIFT and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). However, these alternative systems do undermine a pillar of dollar dominance: the power of financial sanctions. Especially in this case, they provide Iran with channels to maintain oil revenue and trade flows despite pressure.

Iran has levers it can use to facilitate trade in yuan or other non-dollar currencies. Tehran’s payment landscape, however, remains fragmented. The yuan does not provide Iran with a way out of sanctions, but it may offer a cheaper way through them by reducing dependence on dollar-clearing channels and lowering the compliance and intermediary costs associated with sanctioned transactions.

Perhaps the most important shift to watch, then, is how the routes connecting trade to payment are changing. Are those changes limited to the current crisis? And will they have longer-term implications for cross-border payments outside the dollar?

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How the West lost the post-Cold War era

Brian Whitmore — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

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Three decades ago, the West seemed unassailable. The Soviet Union had collapsed and for the third time in the twentieth century, the United States and its allies had emerged victorious in a global struggle against an authoritarian foe—and for the first time in generations, Western liberal democracy did not have an ideological or geopolitical adversary. It was a giddy moment when anything and everything seemed possible.

Today, that heady optimism feels like a distant dream. Thirty years after the Soviet empire ended, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, the largest land war in Europe since World War II. The liberal democratic model of governance that appeared so triumphant and invincible three decades ago is today beleaguered and on the defensive as populism, xenophobia, and authoritarian attitudes sweep Europe and North America. The world today seems as dangerous, if not more so, than during the long twilight struggle of the Cold War.

So what happened? How did we fall from the heady optimism of 1992 to the peril, malaise, and danger of today? What lessons can we learn from the post-Cold War period? Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, the British historian E. H. Carr published his seminal book The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939, which examined the lessons of the interwar period. Carr argued that this era was a crisis of the international system, resulting from the failure of the old liberal order to adapt to and understand new and emergent political, economic, and military realities.

This report argues that a similar dynamic played out in the contemporary West in our own thirty-year crisis between the end of the Cold War and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The liberal order failed. But how? And why? The author interviewed dozens of policymakers, analysts, and experts in Europe and North America to distill the lessons of the post-Cold War era.

Read the full report

About the author

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington.

He is also the founder and author of the Power Vertical Blog and host of the Power Vertical Podcast, both of which focus on Russian affairs. Whitmore was previously a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) from 2018 to 2020 and senior Russia analyst for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) from 2007 to 2017. Prior to joining RFE/RL, Whitmore worked as a foreign correspondent for the Boston Globe in Moscow and Prague.

He also worked as a graduate lecturer with the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina as a visiting lecturer with the History Faculty at Mechnikov National University in Odesa, Ukraine, and the International Relations Faculty at St. Petersburg State University in Russia.

His work has appeared in the Washington Post, the Atlantic, the New Republic, Foreign Policy, World Politics Review, Newsweek, and elsewhere. He has appeared as a guest commentator on CNN, the BBC World Service, NPR, Bloomberg, and various other media.

A native of New Haven, Connecticut, Whitmore earned an MA in political science from Villanova University in 1987 and BA in politics from St. Joseph’s University in Philadelphia in 1986.

Explore the program

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

The post How the West lost the post-Cold War era appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How NATO can integrate AI to prevail in future algorithmic warfare

Dominika Kunertova — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 09:00:00 +0000

Bottom lines up front

NATO’s competitive edge in the era of emerging and disruptive technologies will come from purposeful integration of AI technologies across the Alliance’s digital backbone.
Military AI does not generate new vulnerabilities in kind, but it creates more room for human error and miscalculation.
Victory in algorithmic warfare requires electromagnetic spectrum dominance.

Executive summary
Introduction
Part one: Military AI tech trends
Part two: The specter of algorithmic warfare
Part three: Future scenarios
Part four: Policy recommendations
Conclusion

Executive summary

Military artificial intelligence (AI) is moving from the margins of experimentation into the core of how NATO will fight, make critical decisions, and deter competitors over the next decade. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept identifies the technological edge to be critical for the Alliance to fulfil its core tasks. Both contemporary warfare and renewed strategic competition suggest that data-driven AI decision-support systems and autonomous battlefield capabilities augmented with AI will define the character of future conflicts. There is a justified focus on evaluating strategic risks associated with such systems.

This report argues that integrating AI into military systems does not generate vulnerabilities that are fundamentally new in kind compared to existing cyber risks. But the difference lies in consequences. Once AI-enabled decision-support systems and autonomous platforms become critical to Alliance operations, interference with data, models, and computing infrastructure may have implications for NATO’s ability to see, decide, and act under pressure. Similarly, the offensive use of AI-enabled capabilities does not, on its own, raise or lower the nuclear threshold. Escalation thresholds in algorithmic warfare will continue to be driven by effects on the ground rather than by whether a system is AI-enabled. Yet the characteristics of AI—the speed, system opacity, and physical infrastructure—create more room for human error, misperception, and miscalculation.

To explore such possibilities, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, in partnership with the NATO Office of the Chief Scientist, conducted a foresight study to clarify how adversaries might counter AI-enabled capabilities and to examine what this means for NATO doctrine, strategy, and deterrence. The research combined horizon scanning and expert interviews, an off-the-record workshop held in Washington, under Chatham House rules, and scenario modeling. The project mapped AI technology trends across decision-support systems and autonomous platforms, identified likely AI vulnerabilities and vectors of attack, and explored escalation dynamics through structured discussion and scenario-based exercises.

This project brought a new perspective into the debate on the impacts of transformative military AI on future warfare for two reasons. First, it is innovative in its comprehensive scope that encompasses both physical and cyber dimensions of algorithmic warfare. Indeed, it foregrounds the AI triad of data, algorithms, and computing power and shows how each can be attacked through cyber, kinetic, and electromagnetic (EM) means. And second, it examines the intersection of AI and nuclear weapons from a different angle: Tailored nuclear weapons are treated as a potential countermeasure against military AI for their electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects.

There are two key findings.

While military AI does not generate “shock and awe” in and of itself, AI can exacerbate existing risk conditions for accidents and inadvertent escalations.

The report finds that the employment of military AI does not make the use of tailored nuclear weapons more likely. Instead, the choice of target, physical damage, and casualties are what matter. Workshop participants ranked responses to a notional AI-enabled drone saturation attack in the Baltic region by their perceived escalatory potential. Diplomatic action and electronic warfare were the most preferred responses, followed by kinetic strikes, cyber operations, and directed-energy weapons (DEW). Tailored nuclear EMP attacks were viewed as highly escalatory and politically unacceptable for NATO to use to repel an attack over NATO territory, even when framed as a tool of “information warfare.”

At the same time, military AI is expected to make the difference in terms of increasing speed, autonomy, scale, and uncertainty. This research, however, revealed that in comparison with all three components of the AI triad, the human remains the most vulnerable element of AI. Humans are routinely exposed to phishing, social engineering, cognitive bias, and already run the risk of deskilling as more tasks are delegated to machines.

Integrating AI into military operations therefore creates dangers along two pathways. First, speed and data are working against their user. Such compressed timelines can create cognitive problems in decision-making. Without safety and quality protocols in place, flooding decision-support systems with noisy or nonpatternable data can further thicken the fog of war for commanders. Second, AI-enabled military systems become increasingly complex and can lead to normal accidents, making foreign interference detection and exposure difficult to distinguish from system failures.

Algorithmic warfare highlights the importance of electromagnetic spectrum dominance.

Digital modernization of defense—the data-centric approach and software-defined capabilities—will make electromagnetic threats more salient. Russia’s war in Ukraine already highlights how GPS jamming, communications blackouts, and electronic warfare shape combat operations. This trend will intensify as NATO begins to lean on AI-enabled and multidomain command and control.

Advances in military applications of AI further strengthen the convergence between the cyber domain of operations (digital code) and the electromagnetic environment (electrons). In a crowded and contested spectrum, where software-defined radios, commercial satellites, and cloud-linked data centers underpin military networks, the distinction between “cyber” and “conventional” attack begins to blur. Further fielding of directed-energy weapons also indicates shifting the center of gravity to energy supplies.

Attacks on AI systems can use several vectors. The adversary can target model weights through espionage and hacking; poison training datasets; blind or spoof sensors on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; disable data relays; or physically damage hardware in data centers, cables, satellites, or uncrewed systems. Cyber operators, electronic warfare units, special forces, and conventional reconnaissance-strike systems may all participate in degrading AI-enabled capabilities. In contrast, the ongoing trend of lowering the cost of warfare will make any requirements for new protection measures, such as shielding or hardening, difficult to implement due to the trade-offs in terms of cost, weight, and endurance.

The report develops three future scenarios, including a fourth baseline case, to identify likely implications of future algorithmic warfare for NATO’s doctrine and strategy: guarded opportunism, brave new world, and minority report.

Guarded opportunism outlines a future in which military AI, despite its transformative impacts, does not require the military to dramatically alter the rules of engagement. Instead of introducing qualitatively new risks or vulnerabilities, the challenges related to military AI remain manageable with disciplined cyber hygiene and resilient power supply. On the risk side, this scenario points to heightened dangers of AI-fueled hybrid warfare below the threshold of armed conflict.
Brave new world is a less likely but more dangerous scenario detailing the conditions for escalation spirals. Transformative effects of AI lead to conventionalizing nuclear weapons. Fielding of AI-enabled military capabilities provokes the adversary to use new nuclear-powered EM weapons. Nuclear EMP attacks are viewed as a legitimate use of nuclear weapons that belong to the specter of algorithmic warfare.
Minority report presents a different take on the possible algorithmic future in which AI technology hype drives strategy. This scenario focuses on cognitive challenges for political and military decision-makers, who tend to overestimate near‑term benefits and discount the long-term risks and compound challenges of AI integration. Instead of improving AI operational implementation processes, countries race to achieve phantom AI advantages that destabilize the international security environment.

For NATO to leverage and maintain the advantage from transformative AI technologies, this report makes seven recommendations for NATO leaders that can contribute to NATO’s future strategy and doctrine adaptation.

Master AI literacy. NATO needs to develop standards for continuous AI skill development for commanders, operators, and policymakers. AI literacy is not just a strategic competency but also an instrument of restraint.
Engineer redundancy. Instead of creating a digital copy of all existing procedures, NATO should prioritize maintaining the ability to transmit information on rehearsed secondary systems.
Coordinate approach to AI tech industry. NATO should develop a code of conduct for AI tech company engagements that addresses the formation of an exclusive suppliers’ group, the knowledge gap in the private sector, and the rules for civilian software engineers in war zones.
Maintain information dominance. NATO should develop a functional framework for operationalizing AI in support of algorithmic warfare that prioritizes military objectives over abstract benchmarks and diversify its early warning systems.
Clarify escalation thresholds. NATO should develop a shared understanding of escalation thresholds for algorithmic warfare, decide on response triggers, and predelegate command authority in time-compressed scenarios to avoid escalation risks and decision paralysis.
Assess the electromagnetic layer with accuracy. Future algorithmic warfare will require NATO to treat electromagnetic spectrum operations as a distinct layer of multidomain operations to protect its strategic initiative and command-and-control superiority. NATO should also update its standards to reflect the changing scope of critical infrastructure as AI becomes a strategic asset to avoid underestimating the EM layer.
Deter by ambiguity. NATO should project resilience while cloaking its sensitive AI assets in a black box unexplainable by adversaries. However, such deterrence by ambiguity should not erode internal accountability of NATO-run AI systems.

Introduction

The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept emphasizes the importance of the Alliance maintaining its technological edge to achieve mission success.¹ But NATO’s ability to ensure military effectiveness and uphold a credible deterrence and defense posture faces challenges in the era of emerging and disruptive technologies. In the context of rapidly evolving warfare tactics and renewed strategic competition, AI-powered decision-support systems (DSS) and autonomous battlefield capabilities are expected to shape future conflicts. NATO’s 2022 Digital Transformation Vision therefore intended to accelerate the adoption of data and AI analytics to unlock new advantages for the Alliance.²

Accordingly, NATO’s AI Strategy encourages strategic foresight activities to help allies achieve a reasonable level of AI readiness.³ It also focuses on anticipating new challenges and risks related to algorithmic warfare from adversarial use of AI. While the military potential of AI is versatile and uncertain, it has nonetheless become difficult to overlook its importance to strategic competition. Countries are racing to develop and deploy AI across their civilian economies and militaries. Russia, the most significant and direct threat to NATO allies, and the People’s Republic of China, a strategic competitor seeking to control key technologies, have widely communicated their intentions to field AI for military purposes.⁴

Research objective

The Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, in partnership with the NATO Office of the Chief Scientist, has conducted a foresight study addressing this crucial topic. This effort seeks to gain more clarity on AI’s transformative military effects over the next decade. This report assesses the vulnerabilities entailed in AI integration into NATO military capabilities in the context of the digital transformation of defense and the growing importance of electromagnetic spectrum operations. Importantly, it identifies ways in which adversaries might counter future AI-enabled capabilities on and off the battlefield. The objective is thus to understand how these developments may affect NATO’s doctrine and strategy moving forward.

This report’s focus on the transformative effects of military AI is highly relevant given NATO’s ambition to conduct multidomain operations.⁵ As outlined in the Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy, NATO political and military leaders intend to use advanced analytics in combination with multimodal data from sensor networks for a consolidated multidomain situational awareness in real time.⁶ While the “digital backbone” is intended to enable command and control across all domains, a broader digital interoperability framework with a secured data-sharing ecosystem will enhance political consultation and decision-making processes.

This report therefore seeks to address the complex question of the likely implications of future military AI countermeasures on NATO’s doctrine and strategy. This means identifying the risks from integrating transformative AI into military systems, examining the vulnerabilities the adoption of AI will create, assessing the severity and probability of corresponding adversarial attacks, and formulating recommendations. Importantly, to limit the dangers of technological determinism, this project examined how political and military leaders and policy planners (at the state level of decision-making) perceive new technologies appearing on the battlefield and craft their responses to escalate or not.⁷

Methodology

In terms of methodology, this report used several data collection and analysis tools. The first phase of the project consisted of horizon scanning and road mapping. Through a structured evidence-gathering process based on desk research of relevant open-source documents and background expert interviews, this report identified the most important drivers of change, as well as the likely future developments at the intersection of AI and the defense sector that are at the margins of current thinking and planning.

In the second phase, the Atlantic Council hosted an off-the-record closed workshop held on an unclassified level in Washington. Through two prescripted discussions, conducted under Chatham House rules, policy and scholarly experts were asked to stress test the assumptions from the first phase. This informed the project on the likelihood of AI countermeasures and conditions for escalation in future algorithmic warfare, as well as to validate recommendations.

The third and last phase of the project centered on future scenario development. This is a useful policy analysis tool that visualizes a set of possible future conditions to help NATO decision-makers to anticipate challenges as they define capability requirements for NATO’s success in future algorithmic warfare.

Structure

This report proceeds as follows. Part One maps AI technology trends and their military applications over the next decade, from the battleﬁeld to the war room. Part Two then proceeds to anticipate the vulnerabilities of AI-enabled systems and to assess the possible vectors of attack to explore escalation pathways in algorithmic warfare; it covers both digital and physical dimensions across the so-called “AI triad” of algorithms, data, and computing power—and adds a human factor.

Part Three outlines three algorithmic futures—guarded opportunism, brave new world, and minority report—based on the likely transformative effects of military AI and their impact on international security. This line of scientific inquiry is highly relevant given ongoing research concerned with the impact of roboticized autonomous systems operating with minimal human supervision on future conflicts.⁸

Part Four discusses recommendations for NATO leaders. Based on the project’s findings, this report raises seven main action points that are categorized into three areas: AI readiness and resilience; military AI doctrine; and deterrence.

Part one: Military AI tech trends

AI is becoming a general-purpose military technology that will sit inside almost every digital system that NATO uses.⁹ Its transformative effects will likely concentrate in two areas. First, decision-support systems will expand the scale of information analytics military commanders can process to make better decisions fast. Second, autonomous and semiautonomous platforms will shift how militaries sense, move, and strike on the battlefield. Together, these developments are driving an AI era of algorithmic warfare.¹⁰

AI can, in principle, be implemented in everything that uses a computer. As defense establishments digitize, AI has never been a single-purpose capability in itself. Rather, AI architecture underpins modern command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, and weapons systems. NATO’s own definitions reflect this evolution. In 1995, NATO described AI as the capability of a functional unit to perform tasks generally associated with human intelligence, such as reasoning and learning. By 2005, it was also seen as “the branch of computer science” focused on building systems that reason, learn, and improve themselves.¹¹ These definitions now apply across a much broader digital ecosystem. Software has become a defining component of many weapon systems and AI is increasingly embedded in sensors, networks, and command-and-control tools.

The overall expectations about AI’s impact on future warfare can be captured in three concepts: speed, scale, and autonomy. Speed refers to faster sensing, processing, and engagement cycles. Scale refers to the ability to handle vast volumes of data and to coordinate large numbers of distributed assets, including swarms of UASs. Autonomy refers to the degree to which AI systems can operate with minimal human supervision. NATO’s challenge will be to harness these three dimensions without sacrificing control, accountability, or interoperability.

From general-purpose enabler to algorithmic warfare

The military applications of AI span relatively low-stakes use cases such as administrative automation and training, operational functions like logistics and cybersecurity, and high-stakes roles in targeting, electronic warfare, and human-machine teaming in combat.¹² From a functional standpoint, experts in defense and military affairs expect AI to matter depending on the AI model type, broadly divided in four categories: generative AI, classification, prediction, and autonomy.¹³ This includes tasks in which large volumes of data must be processed quickly, where patterns are too complex for human perception, where actions need to follow real-time operational intelligence fast, and where simulated environments can meet high training requirements.

Generative AI: Content, coaching, and cognitive effects

Generative AI models create novel content that mimics the statistical properties of the data on which they are trained in response to human prompts. In the military context, these systems are likely to be used as “agents” or virtual advisers that support commanders and staff in alleviating their daily administrative burdens and automating less critical processes, such as drafting routine reports, summarizing long documents, and translating technical information.¹⁴ In training and simulation, generative AI models can serve as simulation tools in war games and exercises. They populate synthetic environments with plausible adversarial actors and behaviors. This role improves scenario realism and generates alternative courses of action.

At the same time, these features can also be weaponized for offensive information operations. Adversaries can use generative AI to run large-scale, low-cost disinformation campaigns. This may involve producing tailored propaganda or impersonating Alliance leaders, journalists, and civil society voices. Generative AI will therefore be a powerful tool in the hands of adversaries seeking to manipulate perceptions and erode NATO’s cohesion.¹⁵

Classification: Noise and signal in a sensor-saturated battlespace

Classification models excel at recognizing patterns in labeled data and assigning new inputs to categories they have learned. Militaries already use such models for computer vision, facial and object recognition, and behavior detection. Computer vision models can identify vehicles, aircraft, ships, and infrastructure in imagery from satellites, aircraft, and UASs against their regularly updated data libraries. Classification tools can become crucial for early warning systems, from detecting stealthy cyber intrusions to flagging irregular troop movements. In sum, over the next decade, these systems are well-suited to sit at the core of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting architectures.

Much is expected from AI-enabled electronic warfare too. In a battlespace saturated with sensors, classification tools can automate filtering of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as distinguishing signal from noise and highlighting anomalous signals that warrant human attention. Furthermore, signal processing algorithms can suggest waveforms to counter hostile signals and thus help overcome adversarial jamming in real time.¹⁶ As the electromagnetic spectrum becomes more contested, the ability to recognize and respond to subtle patterns faster than an adversary will be a critical advantage.

Prediction and data fusion: Scaling decision support

Prediction models analyze historical and real-time data to identify trends and forecast likely future events. In military settings, they underpin decision-support systems (DSS) designed to help commanders cope with complexity and information overload. The transition to multidomain operations underscores the importance of such multimodal data fusion and analytics.¹⁷

This type of AI model is therefore suitable to support battle management, as they fuse information from multiple sources and data streams from land, air, maritime, cyber, and space assets, and integrate them into a single operating picture that is updatable in real time.¹⁸ However, this also means that such data-centric decision-making processes can narrow commanders’ perceptions and constrain their choices.¹⁹

They can also highlight early warning indicators, propose likely adversary courses of action, and flag emerging risks in logistics and supply chains. In logistics, in particular, AI can support predictive maintenance of critical stockpiles; forecast demand for ammunition, fuel, and spare parts; and anticipate bottlenecks in transportation networks.²⁰ Predictive systems can also assist with medical support by estimating casualties and optimizing the positioning of medical resources.²¹

Autonomy: From perception to action

Autonomy involves AI systems that perceive their environment, process real-time data from sensors, and make decisions in pursuit of a mission objective without constant human intervention. In this case, AI models can cause kinetic effects, as they can direct hardware and/or software to react within the physical realm based on the input from the immediate environment.

Onboard AI enables uncrewed aircraft, ground vehicles, and maritime platforms to filter and fuse sensor inputs, navigate in contested environments, and pass the most relevant information back to human controllers. Advances in machine vision, for example, allow drones to compare real-time imagery from downward-facing cameras with stored satellite images and inertial data to determine their position without reliance on global navigation satellite systems. This is particularly important in GPS-denied or heavily jammed environments.²²

Autonomy is also extending to terminal guidance and target recognition. Today, many drones operate on autopilot for parts of their mission, with humans in- or on-the-loop for final engagement decisions. Over time, fully autonomous solutions that combine visual navigation, target recognition, and terminal guidance are likely to proliferate. Seamless data flows, however, are crucial. The Ukrainian forces use a practice that resembles “Uber targeting,” where one unit identifies a target, shares the observation on an encrypted network, and the targeting assignment goes to whichever unit is available, even facilitating joint-strike capability from multiple vectors.²³ AI-enabled systems that can collect, process, and act on information in real time will make such dynamic targeting more common, especially when communications with higher headquarters are degraded.

From incremental adoption to algorithmic warfare

Together, developments in these functional areas point toward the algorithmic future of warfare. Broadly speaking, algorithmic warfare refers to integrating automated, autonomous, and AI technologies into the conduct of war, while decreasing the role of human elements.²⁴ In algorithmic warfare, the military conducts operations through AI-enabled capabilities that collect, analyze, and act on data at speeds and scales beyond human capacity. Artificially intelligent means operate when human warfighters cannot and reduce their exposure to danger. Such AI-enabled autonomous capabilities will especially be assigned tasks at the edge of the battlespace to handle time-critical sensing and response functions without human supervision and with minimum guidance.²⁵

Yet the most transformative effects of military AI are likely to appear in two use cases. First, AI in DSS will expand the scale and speed of information processing, giving commanders a richer but more mediated view of the operating environment. Decision-support tools will not only help humans make better-informed choices but also shape the decision space by highlighting some options and obscuring others. Second, AI embedded in weapons platforms will use speed and autonomy to compress the kill chain, shrinking the time between detection, identification, decision, and engagement.²⁶ This has implications for escalation control, the rules of engagement (ROE), and the role of commanders in supervising rapid, machine-driven engagements.

Drivers of change

Several structural drivers are signaling greater reliance on AI and algorithmic approaches to warfare. These drivers are particularly important for NATO as it implements its Digital Transformation Vision and prepares for multidomain operations.

Digital modernization of defense

First, the broader digital modernization of defense is creating the conditions in which AI can thrive. Modern militaries are upgrading their IT infrastructure and moving to software-defined capabilities that deliver new functionality to existing platforms.²⁷ This also means adopting data-centric approaches to capability development through collaborative digital spaces.

As militaries continue implementing digital modernization of their forces, their dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum is crucial for their new dependencies on sensors, satellites, and networked systems. Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of EM warfare, including GPS jamming and communications blackouts.²⁸ These developments push militaries to design more resilient, autonomous, and decentralized command-and-control structures with better cybersecurity measures. At the same time, electromagnetic warfare in the West has not gotten the attention it needs and is still seen as largely subservient to or stovepiped from cyber.²⁹

Interconnected domains

Second, the move toward multidomain operations (MDO) requires integrating effects across land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace, as well as in the virtual and cognitive dimensions. MDO aims to “[orchestrate] military activities, synchronize non-military instruments of power, and deliver converging effects at the speed of relevance.”³⁰ To make this possible, allies are building a digital backbone that can enable command and control across all domains. However, the effectiveness of this backbone depends on interoperable data sharing, secure and reliable communications, and advanced analytics capable of fusing data into a real-time consolidated multidomain picture. Turning well-integrated AI models into C4ISR systems that enhance situational awareness and support decision-making becomes part of the key conditions for conducting multidomain operations.

Autonomy pursuits

Third, recent and ongoing conflicts are accelerating experimentation with AI-enabled autonomous and decision-support systems. In Ukraine, AI-driven platforms already analyze extensive sensor and signal data to generate real-time targeting suggestions and logistical predictions.³¹ In Gaza, reports indicate that machine-learning systems such as “Gospel” and “Lavender” have been used to support dynamic targeting and terminal navigation by combining multi-source imagery with other intelligence inputs.³² These cases illustrate a shift from isolated, weapon-centric AI applications toward more comprehensive systems that inform planning, targeting, and force deployment at all command levels.

Drones are no longer only agents of remote warfare but are fast becoming agents of algorithmic warfare as well. Demand has surged for battlefield drone footage. Thousands of drone-camera videos depicting successful strikes are used to train computer-vision models, while engineers race to design uncrewed systems that can navigate and coordinate in GPS- and communications-denied environments using on-board processing and limited power.

Two motivations stand out: building “mass for precision” and supplementing shrinking human force structures. Swarm tactics and swarm command seek to saturate defenses and compress reaction times through the coordinated use of large numbers of low-cost platforms. At the same time, demographic trends and recruitment challenges will incentivize greater robotic integration and human-machine teaming. Forward-deployed, uninhabited platforms on standby will increasingly redefine how militaries think about force projection and readiness.³³ For instance, large drone formations can provide the aggressor with an edge in the invasion of foreign territory, highlighting the challenge to the capacity of air defenses.³⁴ Across these trends, AI is fast becoming more than just a technological tool; it is a vital strategic competency,³⁵ and will likely determine which militaries can exploit AI—at scale and under stress. For NATO, understanding where AI is most likely to transform operations, and how adversaries might target the vulnerabilities of AI-enabled systems, is a prerequisite for credible deterrence and effective defense in the emerging era of algorithmic warfare.

Part two: The specter of algorithmic warfare

Militaries have not yet realized the full potential of AI technologies, but it is not difficult to see how AI will shape the strategic environment and wartime paradigms. As the AI race intensifies, potent AI-enabled capabilities will be deployed as part of NATO’s digital transformation and decision-support ambitions.³⁶ This section translates interview insights and workshop discussions into a structured analysis of AI’s core components and their vulnerabilities and the likely vectors of adversarial attack. Two case studies used in the workshop—AI applications in autonomous weapons platforms and in a decision-support system—further informed the analysis of the limits of main AI countermeasures and the conditions under which escalation in algorithmic warfare may occur. This is because the likelihood of an adversary attacking NATO for using AI models for predictive maintenance is comparatively low.

AI triad

Military AI rests on three interlocking components often described as the AI triad: data, algorithms, and computing power.³⁷ Each component has a specific implication for offense-defense parameters. For instance, algorithms imply attacks on model architecture, computing power involves disrupting semiconductors and supply chains, while data concern cyberattacks to poison datasets.

Data refers to information about the focus area of the machine-learning system, collected from sensors and other sources, organized, stored, and made accessible. Algorithms are the series of instructions used to process information; machine-learning algorithms derive insights from datasets and the learnable parameters that encode the core capabilities of an AI model in model weights. Computing power provides the speed and capacity to execute algorithms at scale, train models to determine weights, and run inference offline on deployed systems.³⁸ In practice, computing power includes processors and graphics cards, advanced semiconductors, content delivery networks, power supplies, and cooling. Defense applications often need to run offline on edge devices under strict size, weight, and power constraints, or on government cloud resources with limited GPU availability. Data, sometimes dubbed the new “munition” due to their importance for modern warfare, encompasses issues such as volume, quality, salience, and labeling. The amount of training data strongly influences effectiveness, though collecting the right operational data and labeling it correctly are important for accuracy and alignment. Algorithms feed data into model weights through training, and their resulting internal architecture determines future data analysis in real-time operations.

AI vulnerabilities and vectors of attack

Integrating AI introduces several challenges along the entire triad. Core datasets are massive, models can be opaque, and natural-language prompting expands input surfaces. These characteristics create multiple entry points for adversaries and raise the importance of disciplined processes and safeguards. Adversaries will attempt to degrade NATO’s AI-enabled capabilities by targeting the triad across cyber, electromagnetic, and conventional kinetic dimensions. This section outlines how such attacks would prevent the Alliance from enjoying advantages from AI.

Computing power

Vulnerabilities associated with computing power reflect the physicality of AI infrastructure. This is because advanced semiconductors and specialized chips must be sourced, supplied, and integrated into systems that also require stable energy and cooling. The performance of inference-heavy applications may depend on AI-optimized hardware. These dependencies create risks during material shortages, expose weak points in data centers, and constrain performance at the tactical edge.

Adversaries can exploit material attributes of semiconductors. They can disrupt the supply of specialized AI chips, seed vendor-supplied Trojan backdoors, or manipulate cloud architectures built with commercial technology. They can target the electricity supply of data centers and sabotage their water-cooling systems to cause outages, or damage undersea cables and content-delivery networks to disrupt data flows.

Data

Data is vulnerable across the lifecycle of AI models. Adversaries can poison training datasets through cyber operations that mislabel data or introduce hidden triggers that cause the model to misbehave. Poorly labeled or biased datasets degrade performance, making certain classes of objects invisible to the system or misclassifying them at critical ranges. If the wrong data is collected, or if the right data is corrupted, the entire decision-support chain can lead a model to malfunction and reduce its reliability in the long term.

Adversaries can also interfere with real-life data collection. Because drones and other autonomous systems rely on environmental input, adversaries can tamper with surroundings to impact sensory input and cause abnormal behavior. For instance, blinding sensors on ISR platforms with optical illusions, or adjusting the sensors themselves, and generating spoofing signals can mislead the model into inappropriate responses.³⁹ In addition to onboard perception and planning modules, adversaries can target control interfaces, power management, data relays, and user interfaces used to coordinate connected autonomous systems. Alternatively, disabling low-orbit satellites can also stop real-time input and data sharing.

Algorithms

Incorporating AI into the digital architecture makes the existing systems susceptible to attacks that target the AI model itself. Because model parameters encode internal configuration variables crucial for its operation, compromising weights and biases gives an attacker significant leverage. Adversaries can also try to steal model weights through espionage or proxy hackers, gaining access to the core capabilities of the model for manipulation.⁴⁰
Adversaries can thicken the fog of war for algorithms by flooding AI-enabled DSS with inputs that are inaccurate, uncategorizable, or nonpatternable. They can exploit the rare and unpredictable features of the battlefield, since AI models are mostly trained on either synthetic data or on datasets from previous conflicts that may not quite fit the type and circumstances of the current war zone.

Interviewed experts and workshop participants indicated that the most likely adversarial action against military AI architecture would include:

Blinding sensors on ISR platforms to stop the real-time input of new data.
Spreading misinformation to confuse the algorithms with nonpatternable data.
Physically damaging undersea cables to disrupt data sharing.
Conducting espionage in the suppliers’ private lab facilities.

Surprisingly, however, the most vulnerable component of AI seems to be the human; data and algorithms follow, with the computing power being the least vulnerable of AI components. Such human-related vulnerabilities include personalized phishing, social engineering, cognitive bias, and deskilling.

Countering military AI

Having discussed the vectors of adversarial attacks on AI-enabled military systems and capabilities, this section now briefly comments on the means of such attacks. These AI countermeasures include cyber operations, conventional kinetic attack, electronic warfare, directed energy weapons (DEW), and tailored nuclear weapons with enhanced electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Each has distinct advantages and limitations.

Cyber operations

Cyber operations can interfere with how AI models learn and operate by manipulating ones and zeros. Cyberattacks can degrade the model’s performance or integrity, limit its availability by delaying responses or rendering command-and-control systems inoperative at crucial moments.⁴¹ Integrating AI into military systems increases their vulnerability simply by creating more targets for computer hacking.⁴² These AI vulnerabilities include compromising software libraries, poisoning training data, hijacking AI infrastructure, or stealing sensitive AI properties. Such cyberattacks, however, require prior intelligence to target the right datasets and processing centers. Their effects can be difficult to assess and attribute in real time, which increases the potential for miscalculation.

Conventional kinetic action

Conventional kinetic attacks can target ISR assets including space-based systems, airborne warning and control system aircraft, and other hardware components integral in critical AI infrastructure. Traditional air defenses can target offensive AI onboard small autonomous vehicles with low-cost interceptors, nets, and guns. Kinetic action is tangible but can be escalatory depending on target and context, and it may be expensive or resource-intensive if used at scale against saturation attacks.

Electronic warfare

Electronic warfare uses electromagnetic energy to degrade hostile systems by jamming or spoofing. EW can produce reversible, nonlethal effects, but it is constrained by range, power, antennas, and by the need for detailed knowledge of enemy waveforms and code. Focused jamming and signal spoofing in case of multisensor platforms can confuse AI into analytical errors and lead to wrong reactions. Jamming, however, is possible only in the case of collaborative autonomous platforms that communicate among themselves the adaptive course of their action.

Directed-energy weapons

High-power microwaves and high-energy lasers widen the range of electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO). They can disable or destroy electronics on autonomous platforms using concentrated electromagnetic energy.⁴³ While microwaves are suitable for area defenses and perimeter denial against swarms of drones, lasers with their energy beams perform point defense similar to short-range air defense and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar missions. They have low logistics tails and low cost per shot, but they are power hungry and range-limited. Atmospheric conditions, such as rain and fog, can reduce beam quality and effectiveness, as well as increase fratricide risks. Their applications for space missions look promising given their reusability and the potential to degrade or destroy a satellite.⁴⁴

Tailored nuclear weapons with enhanced electromagnetic pulse

Nuclear explosions of all types—from underground to high altitudes—are accompanied by an electromagnetic pulse. The strength and area coverage of this intense time varying electromagnetic radiation depends on the warhead type and yield, and the altitude of the detonation.⁴⁵ This means that while high-altitude airbursts can have a continent-wide deposition region, for explosions in the atmosphere at altitudes below 30 kilometers, the radius ranges from 5 to 16 kilometers.⁴⁶

Since the 1960s, EMPs, either man-made or natural, have been known to have a potential to disrupt, damage, or destroy a wide array of electrical and electronic systems.⁴⁷ Degradation of electrical and electronic system performance as a result of exposure to the EMP may cause either permanent functional damage or a temporary operational impairment, lasting from seconds to hours.⁴⁸ Computers used in data processing systems, communications systems, and semiconductors belong to the category of devices most susceptible to failure.⁴⁹

While airbursts have little or no fallout and no residual radiation, it is difficult to predict their effects and impact on today’s sensitive electronics, as well as avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties. Together with the difficulty to signal limited nuclear use, since the adversary cannot distinguish low-yield from high-yield weapons, such employment of nuclear EMP weapons remains highly problematic and inherently escalatory.⁵⁰ Experimental exercises over the past decades have identified no assurance that a nuclear strike would remain limited.⁵¹

Escalation and algorithmic warfare

The workshop assessed the salience of AI-enabled lethal operations along an escalatory pathway from minor cyber operations to DEW and nuclear EMP. The following paragraphs summarize the expert participants’ discussion on the conditions under which the use of military AI could increase the risk of escalation.

Escalation is defined as “an increase in the intensity or scope of conflict that crosses threshold(s) considered significant by one or more of the participants.”⁵² Escalation thresholds then depend on retaliation in response to some form of attack. The workshop discussion highlighted the distinction between effects-based and means-based escalation logics. While effects-based logic identifies thresholds depending on the impact that is irrespective of the weapons type, means-based logic emphasizes the qualitative difference between nuclear, conventional, and cyber domains. Some means are regarded as less escalatory than others. For instance, cyberattacks have proven capable of restraining the escalation dynamic and even de-escalating geopolitical crises.⁵³ Similarly, attacks on large drones are less likely to lead to escalation than attacks on inhabited aircraft.⁵⁴

Most researchers studying the AI-nuclear intersection focus on AI amplifying existing risks in nuclear command, control, and communications that can spark accidental nuclear confrontation,⁵⁵ undermining deterrence with AI-enabled conventional systems,⁵⁶ incentivizing first strike,⁵⁷ or exacerbating the proliferation/verification dilemma.⁵⁸ This workshop addressed the concern of a possible deliberate use of nuclear weapons as a warfighting tool designed to produce electromagnetic pulse effects to counter military AI. Previous experimental war-gaming showed that although low-yield nuclear weapons do indeed destabilize international security since they are seen as a substitute for high-yield nuclear use, they do not seem to increase the likelihood of crossing the nuclear threshold.⁵⁹

The workshop scenario described an AI-enabled fast and lethal drone saturation attack into the Baltic region. The scenario listed a number of possible responses:

Diplomatic action.
Economic sanctions.
Cyberattack.
Conventional kinetic response.
Electronic warfare measures.
Directed energy weapons.
Tailored nuclear weapons with enhanced electromagnetic pulse.

The workshop participants ranked responses by their perceived escalatory potential. Diplomatic action and electronic warfare tended to come first and often in parallel. Kinetic action, cyber operations, and DEW followed as second-ring responses. Economic sanctions were seen as medium-term tools, not immediate response levers. Tailored nuclear EMP was considered least probable but most escalatory, with a consensus that its use over NATO territory would be unacceptable. Among the most prevalent concerns against the nuclear EMP use, the participants noted: lowering the threshold for strategic nuclear weapon use; observing the nuclear “taboo,” the response’s proportionality, proliferation of nuclear weapons following nuclear use, and setting a negative precedent.

The follow-on discussion highlighted that adversaries may exploit AI structural risks. Complex AI systems can make attribution and intent assessment harder as AI and autonomy create conditions for plausible deniability. In addition, increased speed and data volumes can work against the user, since time-pressured scenarios increase the risk that decision-makers may rely more heavily on potentially compromised AI outputs, without even understanding the source of unanticipated inputs or system failures.⁶⁰

The workshop confirmed that military AI is not escalatory because offensive AI-enabled capabilities do not meaningfully increase the nature or intensity of a conflict. What matters is the choice of target, the physical damage, and the presence of casualties. At the same time, the properties of AI—speed, autonomy, and opacity—can increase the risk of inadvertent escalation. Despite the fight for EM spectrum dominance, the AI status of an attack does not lower nuclear thresholds—effects on the ground determine response. Ultimately, the vicinity of the adversary’s troops continues to be perceived as more escalatory than an AI-powered swarm attack.

Part three: Future scenarios

Juxtaposing the possible transformative effects of military AI against the threat perception (table A), this foresight study outlines three military AI future scenarios: Guarded opportunism, brave new world, and minority report. The goal is to anticipate long‑haul innovation in countering adversarial attacks on NATO’s AI systems and to inform military research and development decisions.⁶¹

The scenarios are modeled after two variables with a graduated level of likelihood. The first variable concerns the transformative impact of AI: whether countries achieve any strategic advantage from integrating AI into their militaries. And the second variable addresses an adversary’s threat perception: whether integrating AI provokes the development of new countermeasures and/or changes on the escalation ladder.

The fourth quadrant—AI fatigue—represents the most unlikely scenario with no decisive AI advantage and no heightened threat perception. It is less policy‑salient but remains useful as a control for future policy planning.

Scenario I. Guarded opportunism

This is the most plausible future scenario. AI meaningfully transforms military affairs and confers comparative advantage on states that integrate it well, yet it does not worsen adversary threat perceptions. Business continues largely as usual. AI‑enabled decision support and autonomy systems transform the character of warfare through expanded scale and increased operational speed yet without changing the nature of war.

NATO’s digital transformation and integrated AI-enabled military capabilities do not introduce qualitatively new risks or vulnerabilities. These remain familiar to cyberspace and can be managed with disciplined cyber hygiene and resilient power-supply architectures. However, AI may heighten some of the existing threat pathways and security risks. As AI becomes integral to the ability to operate and respond, degraded situational awareness and power outages, for instance, could become more consequential—and a new center of gravity—in digitalized, software-defined defense. Decision‑support systems help commanders filter the noise and frame choices faster, but they do not demand new categories of resilience beyond what Part Two already identified for the AI triad.

Hybrid pressure intensifies below the threshold of armed conflict. Cable cuts, data center intrusions, and information operations become routine. Russia continues sabotaging critical AI infrastructure to disrupt supply chains and cyber and drone intimidation campaigns across Europe.⁶² Yet technology knowledge and investments into resilient computer systems limit these escalation attempts. Better engineering and AI literacy shorten detection and attribution loops and make recovery faster.

Two challenges stand out. The first is the intergovernmental character of the Alliance. NATO relies on its member countries for certain types of cyber operations. This dependence on capitals to act creates latency in time‑sensitive crises and may result in inefficient responses that may not prevent further escalation of hybrid warfare. The second is information warfare targeting the Alliance’s reputation. NATO publics in left‑leaning governments are targeted with disinformation campaigns that frame AI‑enabled capabilities as unethical “killer robots,” arguing that NATO violates its own principles of responsible use of AI. Adversaries are further fueling domestic opposition to reduce tech-sector cooperation.

Still, guarded opportunism is defined by low escalation risks. Algorithmic warfare remains bounded by existing ROE and proportional responses. The only time AI and nuclear fields cross their paths with real-world consequences is in the widespread adoption of small nuclear reactors across the military to power demanding computations of AI models.

Scenario II. Brave new world

In the second scenario, AI is transformative and threat perception worsens. The AI triad delivers a real strategic and operational edge. However, AI-related risks grow with it over time due to insufficient literacy, lack of regular training, lagging skill development, and sloppy implementation of zero‑trust policy across armed forces. Furthermore, rapid and widespread integration of AI models creates new vulnerabilities, stemming from limited human agency, which complicate the cognitive aspects of decision-making.⁶³ The result is an increased probability of flash wars among autonomous robotic systems, in which algorithms interact at such a fast pace that humans would not be involved.⁶⁴

Such a degraded security environment sees multiple escalation spirals. Compressed decision-making times and fully autonomous systems contribute to perceptions of asymmetric disadvantage between Russia and NATO. Russia’s doctrine and force structure amplify the problem. Russia’s revision of its nuclear doctrine in 2024—with its greater emphasis on “aerospace attacks,” explicitly including drones, as one of the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be used—seems to lower the threshold for nuclear use.⁶⁵ This demonstrates that Russia became more reliant on its nonstrategic nuclear weapons after its conventional forces degraded in the war on Ukraine.⁶⁶ This seems to strengthen the Russian leadership’s belief that nonstrategic nuclear weapons are Russia’s “competitive advantage” over NATO.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Russia’s vision of new generation warfare builds upon weapons based on new physical principles, including radio frequency, laser, infrasonic, and electromagnetic. Russia has indeed been developing a precision-strike system built on integration of EW, uncrewed strike and reconnaissance systems, hypersonic weapons, and low-yield nuclear warheads.

In contrast, as NATO’s deterrent power derives from advanced conventional capabilities, this scenario portrays a deeper blurring of conventional and nuclear domains.⁶⁸ Yet NATO struggles to attain superiority in strategic command and control, while avoiding dependencies on commercial clouds and satellites. Large‑scale outages and cascading failures are more frequent. Allies hold regular war-gaming exercises to make sure that the Alliance’s responses remain proportionate even when attacks are AI‑generated. Yet Russia’s asymmetric countermeasures to the multidomain concept keep causing electronic damage to NATO command posts and communications centers.⁶⁹

In high tension, states embrace capabilities that manipulate the spectrum—microwaves, lasers, tailored EMP—seeking to blunt swarms and blind sensors. While EW once seemed unbeatable, jamming lost its teeth against uncrewed vehicles that do not use communication and navigation links. And if autonomy was an antidote to EW, then degrading the electromagnetic environment has become the antidote to AI-enabled military capabilities.

Some governments resume nuclear explosive testing of airburst effects, which contributes to further entangling AI with the nuclear domain. The line between conventional and nuclear war will get more fragile with the proliferation of new classes of EMP weapons. Nuclear proliferation gets out of control as more countries strive to develop their own low-yield nuclear EMP deterrent to counter AI-enabled adversaries. Worse, numerous experts inside and outside Russia believe that a nuclear EMP attack does not need to be governed by the same set of considerations as strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrine.⁷⁰ Nuclear EMP weapons are understood within the category of electronic warfare or information warfare, not nuclear warfare. In this increasingly popular interpretation, an EMP attack is regarded as a legitimate use of nuclear weapons within the specter of algorithmic warfare. Even if nuclear EMP is conceptualized as a form of information warfare in some circles, its use would be profoundly escalatory.

Scenario III. Minority report

In the third scenario, technology hype drives strategy. AI does not deliver decisive comparative advantage for the military, yet threat perceptions grow worse. Exaggerated expectations about the game-changing, transformative, and inevitable impact of AI fuel anxiety about falling behind. The fear of missing out, rather than tangible advantages from AI models, pushes countries deep into the AI race. Such alarmism about phantom AI advantages has a destabilizing effect on strategic balance.

Information asymmetries deepen the problem. NATO militaries and Russian officials tout milestones and “breakthroughs,” while major AI firms speak of revolutionary models. The strategic conversation fixates on what might be developed tomorrow rather than what is fielded today. Decision‑makers overestimate near‑term effects and discount the risks and challenges of AI integration work highlighted in Parts One and Two. As a result, nuclear-armed great powers interpret routine military exercises as cover for preemptive strikes at machine‑speeds and tend to see AI-enabled ISR improvements as a direct threat to their second-strike capabilities.

Escalation pathways in this scenario are cognitive. On the one hand, leaders race to push fully autonomous prototypes forward before safety case evaluations are completed. Miscalculation risk rises not because AI-enabled autonomous weapons systems are unstoppable, but because the decision-makers believe they are. On the other, the adversaries deploy cognitive warfare tactics of “algorithmic amplification” to influence how decision-makers reason, degrade critical decision-making processes, and undermine their sense of security.⁷¹

The Alliance faces the challenge of lowering expectations while preserving its technological edge. However, while allies agreed to coordinate their political objectives of developing AI-enabled armed forces, the lack of national resources and ineffectiveness of their national AI strategies to achieve them weakened NATO’s cohesion.⁷² Leading AI countries are reluctant to institutionalize transparent metrics for AI readiness that separate laboratory promise from operational proof.

This scenario points to the need to move beyond the polarizing hopes-vs-fears dichotomy of AI in order to translate technological potential into military advantage through a sound implementation strategy.⁷³ This scenario reminds policymakers and defense planners to budget for the cognitive dimension of technological competition. Publics and markets react to hyped narratives faster than to scientific results. Adversaries will try to exploit this gap with rhetoric about their AI leapfrogging, announcing the winner of the AI race.

Across all three futures, NATO faces distinct challenges posed by future algorithmic warfare. NATO’s advantage from AI models rests on speed, scale, and autonomy delivered by a resilient AI triad under close human oversight. Guarded opportunism is the most likely scenario and highlights AI vulnerabilities in the light of hybrid and information warfare. Brave new world is less likely but the more dangerous of the three futures. In this algorithmic future, NATO is constantly on the cusp of spirals of escalation and de-escalation and points to the dangers from rapid and widespread integration of AI models without correspondingly fast doctrinal adaptation. Minority report, meanwhile, outlines the destabilizing effects of AI hype in the context of lacking safety and transparency standards.

Part four: Policy recommendations

NATO’s advantage in algorithmic warfare will depend on converting AI’s speed, scale, and autonomy into reliable military capabilities while avoiding inadvertent escalation. This report suggests that the Alliance should focus on three lines of effort. First, it must build AI readiness and resilience across the Alliance. Second, it must refine military AI doctrine to preserve information dominance and to clarify response triggers under compressed timelines. Third, it must develop a deterrence strategy for its strategic AI-enabled DSS. These policy recommendations address the AI vulnerabilities and attack vectors identified in the report’s earlier sections, providing practical steps for NATO leaders implementing the Digital Transformation Vision and preparing for multidomain operations. Each recommendation is intended for near‑term adoption to set conditions for long‑term advantages from AI.

I. AI readiness and resilience

NATO should anchor its AI strategy in two core principles—literacy and redundancy—and reinforce those principles through a coordinated approach to the AI tech industry. Such an approach will help NATO avoid the risks of stale knowledge and deskilling.

Recommendation 1: Master AI literacy

AI literacy should be treated as a strategic competency for commanders, operators, and policymakers rather than as a niche topic confined to chief information officers. NATO should integrate AI education into professional military education, operational exercises, and staff development programs so that leaders understand both the promise and the limits of current AI models. AI-literate armed forces are less likely to succumb to tech-centric thinking and automation bias in future strategy and doctrine development.

NATO should also educate wider publics and political elites so that strategy debates do not become hostage to hype. Clear explanations of how models are evaluated, how data shape military performance, and how human judgment remains central are key for preparing policymakers at all levels to make informed AI-related decisions.⁷⁴

Recommendation 2: Engineer redundancy

Maintaining the ability to transmit information is essential for coordinated actions. NATO should assume that outages and system failures will occur. The Alliance needs to exercise capabilities in communications‑degraded electromagnetic environments and design robust and rehearsed secondary systems. This involves mapping cyber and physical dependencies to avoid single points of failure.

The Alliance should pursue controlled geographic decentralization of data centers to improve resilience of its AI architecture. This will require lawmakers to align national legislative requirements on strict data standards and protocols for insider-outsider threat detection. Vetting the data that goes into AI-enabled DSS, together with delineating clear boundaries between training periods and operational deployment of AI models, will improve the ability to isolate “poisoned” data and contain their spread. Training a team of experts to ensure human oversight of AI workings can limit the consequences of system malfunctions, while limiting the number of people with authorized access to base model parameters, can reduce the risk of sabotage and espionage.

Investment priorities should include research programs that work on future novel materials for shielding and protection of high-speed digital computers against EM interference. Given that the adversaries are likely to invest heavily in spoofing and dazzling hardware capabilities, the Allies should consider hardened interfaces against exfiltration. Lastly, NATO should invest in resources for continuous active defenses that constantly look for evidence of deception and run malfunction diagnostics.

Recommendation 3: Coordinate approach to AI tech industry

NATO should develop a code of conduct for private-sector engagements. The code would require AI companies developing products for decision-support systems and autonomous platforms to adhere to safety and ethical standards. The Alliance should create a trusted group of commercial suppliers and establish clear rules for civilian software engineers and technicians deployed in war zones. To prevent adversaries from achieving tech superiority, the Allies should examine their technology dependencies, “friend-shore” supply chains, and tighten export controls of critical components.

The Alliance should try to address the knowledge gap that exists in the private sector on how EMPs affect computer-based systems. NATO should partner with space tech organizations that have experience with the most advanced research into electromagnetic disturbances. As part of coordinating government–industry unclassified information sharing, NATO could also facilitate partnerships between traditional military hardware providers with software developers so that commercial capabilities can be deployed on military‑grade platforms. Lastly, NATO should encourage forward thinking. Routine, joint red‑teaming and data‑poisoning drills with industry will expose weaknesses. Regular brainstorming on risks from new EMP weapons and postquantum cryptography should feed into the life-cycle design of current systems.

II. Military AI doctrine

Doctrine must convert technical possibility into operational advantage while reducing the pathways to inadvertent escalation. Three recommendations on doctrinal adaptation can contribute to preserving NATO’s advantage from AI.

Recommendation 4: Maintain information dominance

NATO should develop a functional framework for operationalizing AI in support of algorithmic warfare that prioritizes military objectives over abstract benchmarks. Commanders should measure success in terms of effects—such as optimized asset‑to‑target allocation on defense—rather than in terms of statistical thresholds.

Investments should focus on early warning systems, electromagnetic warfare capabilities, and a layered counter‑UAS architecture that combines continuous passive radars, electronic warfare, DEW, and point defenses.

Maintaining information dominance also requires the ability to distinguish routine probing in the form of hybrid air denial operations from preparations for larger operations using drone saturation attacks. Exercises should therefore include ambiguous data, degraded sensors, and adversarial attempts to manipulate inputs so that the troops learn to question AI outputs without losing their operational tempo.

Recommendation 5: Clarify escalation thresholds

Compressed timelines will produce decision paralysis unless allies agree on response triggers and predelegate command authority to avoid escalation risks. NATO allies should develop a shared understanding of escalation thresholds for algorithmic warfare, including thresholds defining the strategic effects of adversarial AI-enabled attacks, as well as of attacks on NATO’s own AI architecture.

NATO also should have clear protocols in place for attribution and proportionality regarding the Alliance’s responses. For instance, would poisoning an adversary’s data count as an offensive cyber operation? NATO allies also need to make sure there are clear rules of engagement for autonomous and semiautonomous response systems. In anticipating the adversary’s deniability claims in the event of AI-enabled attacks, such as “accident” or “loss of control,” NATO should not be adjusting its red lines between subthreshold manipulation and armed attack.

Recommendation 6: Assess the electromagnetic layer with accuracy

The electromagnetic spectrum should not be an afterthought. NATO defense planners need to take the electromagnetic spectrum into consideration at the beginning of warfare planning and develop a spectrum plan with assigned frequencies. Future algorithmic warfare may require NATO to update its standards for survivability (STANAG 4145) to reflect the reality that modern critical infrastructure includes data centers and commercial satellites in addition to traditional command facilities.
In planning for EM-contested environments, NATO allies should preposition shielded assets—power, fuel, generators, and communications equipment—in forward locations to avoid logistical shortages during compressed timelines. They could also invest in software‑defined or reconfigurable radios and optical/laser communications. They should also explore the use of UAS or balloon‑based repeaters to restore the ability to transmit information when ground infrastructure is compromised. Treating the spectrum as a distinct layer of multidomain operations will protect the strategic initiative and the superiority in command and control that NATO seeks to maintain.

III. Deterrence

As AI‑enabled systems underpin strategic command‑and‑control functions, NATO must develop a deterrence strategy based on black box ambiguity without locking itself into a rigid declaratory policy.

Recommendation 7: Deter by ambiguity

NATO should project resilience while keeping the internal architecture of sensitive AI systems opaque to adversaries. Black box AI would also deprive adversaries of the ability to assess the real costs of potential attack. At the same time, the Alliance must maintain the diagnostic capacity to distinguish foreign interference from technical failure in case of system malfunctions, so that ambiguity does not erode internal accountability.

Building and demonstrating resilience—technical, organizational, and informational—will enable NATO to signal confidence and control. Its strategic communication should make clear that deliberate interference with decision‑support systems could carry serious consequences, even if precise thresholds and responses remain undisclosed. Taken together, these seven recommendations translate the analytical sections into concrete actionable items. Literacy keeps humans in charge under compressed timelines. Redundancy and industry coordination make the AI triad more trustworthy. Doctrine secures the informational high ground and clarifies action in crisis. Finally, deterrence by ambiguity protects the Alliance’s AI advantage without inspiring its adversaries into building new countermeasures. Implemented in parallel, these steps position NATO to enjoy its AI advantage in algorithmic warfare on terms that contribute to a stable security environment.

Conclusion

NATO’s competitive edge in the era of emerging and disruptive technologies will come from treating AI as a general-purpose enabler embedded across the Alliance’s digital backbone, rather than as a stand-alone “wonder weapon.” AI-enabled decision support and autonomy do not create vulnerabilities that are different in kind from cyber risks, but they raise the stakes by tying mission-critical effects—speed, scale, and autonomy—to software-defined systems that adversaries will target. Escalation will continue to be governed by effects and targets, not labels, while cognitive factors complicate judgment under time pressure. The practical implication for NATO is clear: invest in literacy, engineer redundancy, clarify doctrine, and project resilience with measured ambiguity.

This report addresses NATO’s ambition to protect its AI technological edge while digitalizing defense. Part One showed how AI will matter most in two intertwined areas: decision-support systems that compress time and expand the scale of information processing, and autonomous or semiautonomous platforms that accelerate sensing, movement, and strike. These advantages rely on the secured AI triad of algorithms, data, and computing power. Part Two mapped where adversaries will try to turn those strengths into liabilities—poisoning data, spoofing sensors, stealing model weights, interrupting cloud access and cable backhaul, and attacking the AI physical infrastructure. The analysis emphasized that while attempts to degrade AI-enabled military capabilities will resemble cyberspace operations, the consequences of failure are amplified when AI is made responsible for situational awareness at the core of command-and-control decision-making.

Parts Three and Four translated those findings into future forecasting and recommendations. The foresight scenario exercise underscored that the most likely near-term pathway is one of guarded opportunism—AI improves productivity and tempo without changing the nature of war—while the most dangerous pathway blends real AI advantage with worsening threat perception, making EMSO and directed-energy tools more salient in crisis. The most deceptive pathway is driven by hype: Threat perceptions rise even when fielded capabilities do not correspond to exaggerated predictions. Across all futures, effects, targets, and collateral risk determine algorithmic warfare dynamics.

Crucially, military AI systems do not introduce vulnerabilities that are categorically new, yet the consequences of foreign interference can be greater. If AI-enabled systems are integral to a unit’s ability to operate and respond, then successful attacks on those systems may warrant responses that are more escalatory than tit-for-tat cyber exchanges. Timing matters as well. Loss of real-time situational awareness in a crisis reduces clarity about what happened and who is responsible, raising the probability of misperception and inadvertent escalation. In practice, this report calls for disciplined deployment of decision-support systems that can only rely on rehearsed secondary systems.

The study also clarified the relationship between EMSO and nuclear restraint in the context of tailored, nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Means-based analysis sheds light on how emerging technologies shape modern escalation dynamics. Rather than making technology-centric estimates, this report highlights systemic risks related to AI: How leaders perceive risk under pressure remains decisive.

Literacy is therefore more than a training agenda; it is an instrument of restraint. Educated policymakers, commanders, and publics are less likely to treat AI as “cyber pixie dust” or to confuse reversible electronic effects with strategic attack. They will be better able to choose the right mission for the AI-enabled capability. In parallel, designating data centers, cables, AI labs, and commercial satellites as critical infrastructure and strategic assets will help align strategy and doctrine with the realities of a software-defined force.

This study contributes to AI literacy by stripping away hype and clarifying where algorithmic warfare introduces new challenges. For NATO leaders implementing the Digital Transformation Vision, the immediate tasks are practical: align skill development programs, harden the AI triad, codify response triggers, and show resilience without over-specifying red lines. Doing so reduces the risk that exaggerated expectations about new technology will drive strategy.

The report’s findings point to a future research agenda that looks into how tactical actions can engage strategic effects. AI-enabled autonomy and speed can magnify the psychological impact of hybrid campaigns, especially where the cost of interceptors is high and the pace of exchange is machine-driven. Routine “gray zone” activities are already redefining the baseline of normalcy across Europe.⁷⁵ Such threshold uncertainty permits plausible deniability, keeping the adversarial action away from Article 5 territory.

Open questions remain. How robust is the “firebreak” in escalation theory when algorithmic systems increasingly shape perception and timing? Can allies maintain recognizable qualitative distinctions between domains when effects propagate across them in multidomain operations? And where, precisely, do we draw escalation thresholds when nonkinetic actions in the electromagnetic spectrum generate strategic consequences? Answering these questions will require continued red teaming, transparent metrics for AI readiness, and joint experimentation that links tactical vignettes to strategic decision-making fora.

The Alliance has long excelled at military hardware. In a data-centric, software-defined approach to defense, advantage will come from systems engineering and smart innovation adoption choices. If NATO invests in AI literacy and redundancy, elevates the EM spectrum within the multidomain operations concept, and projects resilience with measured ambiguity, it can protect its AI edge and defend against adversarial attacks. That is the path to credible deterrence and effective defense in the emerging AI era of algorithmic warfare.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the interviewed experts and workshop participants for their generosity in sharing their time and knowledge, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative staff for making a home for this project, and the NATO Office of the Chief Scientist for choosing to fund this project as part of its 2025 grants program.

About the author

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Dominika Kunertova

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Artificial Intelligence Central Europe

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

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61 Alexander Kott, and Philip Perconti, 2025, “How Accurate Is Forecasting of Military Technologies?,” NATO Defense College, Hindsight Series Paper no. 6, https://www.ndc.nato.int/how-accurate-is-forecasting-of-military-technologies/.

62 Charlie Edwards and Nate Seidenstein, 2025, “The Scale of Russian Sabotage Operations against Europe’s Critical Infrastructure,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, August 19, https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2025/08/the-scale-of-russian–sabotage-operations–against-europes-critical–infrastructure/.

63 Avi Goldfarb and Jon R. Lindsay, 2022, “Prediction and Judgment: Why Artificial Intelligence Increases the Importance of Humans in War,” International Security 46, no. 3: 7–50, doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00425.

64 Paul Scharre, 2018, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, 1^st ed. (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company).

65 Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024, “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” per Russian Presidential Order no. 991, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/.

66 Liviu Horovitz and Lydia Wachs, 2024, “Russian Nuclear Weapons in Belarus? Motivations and Consequences,” Washington Quarterly 47, no. 3, 103–29, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2024.2398952.

67 Jacek Durkalec, 2025, “Counterforce at the Regional Level of War: A European Perspective,” in Counterforce in Contemporary U.S. Nuclear Strategy, ed. Brad Roberts, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 152–167.

68 Wilfred Wan and Gitte du Plessis, 2025, “Blurring Conventional–Nuclear Boundaries: Nordic Developments, Global Implications,” SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2025/blurring-conventional-nuclear-boundaries-nordic-developments-global-implications.

69 Katarzyna Zysk, 2023, “Struggling, Not Crumbling: Russian Defence: AI in a Time of War,” RUSI, Commentary, November 20, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/struggling-not-crumbling-russian-defence-ai-time-war.

70 Peter Vincent Pry, 2017, “Foreign Views of Electromagnetic Pulse Attack,” Report to the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, http://www.firstempcommission.org/uploads/1/1/9/5/119571849/foreign_views_of_emp_attack_by_peter_pry_july_2017.pdf.

71 Frank Hoffman, 2025, “Assessing ‘Cognitive Warfare,’ ” Small Wars Journal, November 14, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/14/assessing-cognitive-warfare/#_ednref3.

72 Dominika Kunertova and Olivier Schmitt, 2024, “Assessing NATO’s Cohesion: Methods and Implications,” International Politics 62: 1097–1110, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-024-00641-1.

73 Andreas Graae, 2023, Servers before Tanks? Defence AI in Denmark, Defense AI Observatory, DAIO Study 23|18, https://defenseai.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/daio_study2318_servers_before_tanks_andreas_graae.pdf.

74 Sophia Hatz et al., 2025, “Local US Officials’ Views on the Impacts and Governance of AI: Evidence from 2022 and 2023 Survey Waves,” PLOS ONE 20, no. 10, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0332919.

75 The Atlantic Council has defined the gray zone as “the space in which defensive and offensive activity occurs above the level of cooperation and below the threshold of armed conflict.” See “Adding Color to the Gray Zone: Establishing a Strategic Framework for Hybrid Conflict,” a Forward Defense project, Atlantic Council, December 23, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/scowcroft-center-for-strategy-and-security/forward-defense/adding-color-to-the-gray-zone-establishing-a-strategic-framework-for-hybrid-conflict/.

The post How NATO can integrate AI to prevail in future algorithmic warfare appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ten lessons from the first month of the Iran war

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 27 Mar 2026 22:02:18 +0000

One month ago, US and Israeli forces launched a military campaign against the Iranian regime that has had profound, globe-spanning consequences ever since—from energy markets to the global economy, and from the Gulf and broader Middle East to Romania, Sri Lanka, Russia, and China.

With scenarios for the conflict’s next phrase ranging from diplomatic off-ramps to military escalation, we asked Atlantic Council experts to identify their biggest takeaways from the war so far.

What we’ve learned about . . .

The Iranian regime

The Trump doctrine

The Iranian opposition

The Gulf states

Israel

The global economy

Global energy markets

Russia and Iran

China and Iran

The Iranian regime

One month into the Iran war, the Iranian regime is bruised, battered, and (perhaps irrationally) bullish about its future. The regime’s apparatus has withstood the decapitation of its leadership and more than 15,000 strikes on its capabilities and infrastructure. At the same time, the regime has executed a premeditated and effective response that has imposed significant costs on US Gulf allies and energy infrastructure. The de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been its most potent weapon, inflicting significant pain on the global economy that has netted the regime unilateral concessions from the United States to relieve stress on financial markets.

Internally, the regime appears stable. The Islamic Republic has proven to be much larger than any one individual. There has not been any significant domestic uprising to date. Most notably, there have not been any defections among political and security elites. The most hardline voices within the system have been empowered. All these factors have led many within the regime to believe it is winning the war despite the conditions of the battlefield.

Yet there are significant challenges ahead for the regime that extend beyond the war. It’s increasingly clear that after rejecting talks with the United States, Iran has no clear plan for what comes next. A reported US offer was nowhere near viable, but the rejection of that offer increases the likelihood of US ground troops invading Iranian territory. A messy situation looks primed to get much worse.

Assuming the Iranian regime does survive the war, it still faces a long-term existential crisis. The regime cannot provide the economic or political opportunities its population craves. To stay in power, Iran will either need to consistently and systematically repress dissent or make significant changes to the Islamic Republic’s core ideologies. Those changes seem unlikely to happen in the short term. Therefore, surviving this war will only delay the next crisis.

—Nate Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Beginning in 2015, he served as a senior advisor on Iran policy to successive administrations, including most recently as director for Iran at the US National Security Council.

A man holds a poster with the image of Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, during an anti-US and Israeli rally in Tehran, Iran, on March 22, 2026. (Majid Asgaripour/WANA via Reuters)

US military capabilities

The United States can execute fast, precise, and integrated multi-domain operations at scale, but it can’t sustain this kind of high operational tempo over time.

Headlines have highlighted new technologies, such as the US military’s use of LUCAS (Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Aircraft Systems), PrSM (Precision Strike Missiles), and an artificial intelligence–driven battle management system.

The real story, however, is the joint integration of these and other capabilities across at least six combatant commands and thousands of soldiers. The United States is delivering coordinated strikes faster than ever while simultaneously working with allies and partners to effectively defend against Iranian attacks. No other military in the world has demonstrated this level of proficiency. Adversaries can acquire new technologies, but they can’t buy talent and the type of command-and-control culture that empowers US soldiers to act together seamlessly.

Sustaining these capabilities, however, is a perennial challenge. Demand for munitions exceeds available supply, and as Diana Maurer of the US Government Accountability Office noted in her testimony this month: “DOD has been unable to sustain its weapon systems to meet its goals across all domains and faces challenges providing logistical support to US forces, especially in contested environments.”

This is why it’s a national security imperative to invest in domestic capacity. The United States must be able to sustain its military in a longer high-end fight—a topic of Forward Defense’s ReForge Commission.

—Joe Costa is the director of the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans and posture in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Trump doctrine

One month into the war with Iran, Trump’s actions have us rethinking his “peace through strength” doctrine. Until this point, it was pretty clear that Trump was okay with short, sharp, decisive actions like we saw with the strike to eliminate Iranian IRGC general Qasem Soleimani in the first Trump administration; Operation Midnight Hammer, which targeted Iranian nuclear sites; and Operation Absolute Resolve, which removed strongman Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela. We also know that Trump is uncomfortable with long, drawn-out military campaigns with no end in sight, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine.

So while I am not surprised by the airstrikes against Iran, I am surprised by the scale of the campaign and by the fact that it now appears Trump is on the verge of sending in ground forces. Some commentators had previously remarked that we were never going to see Trump send the 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East. But that’s exactly what he did this week.

It is still my prediction that, consistent with Trump’s “peace through strength” doctrine, the US president will ultimately declare victory and end the conflict soon rather than allow himself to get into an extended military quagmire.

—Matthew Kroenig  is vice president for geostrategy and fellows and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The Iranian opposition

Amid conflicting messages from the Trump administration about the goal of continued US and Israeli military strikes on Iran (is it for regime change or to only weaken the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and ballistic-missile capacity?) the Iranian opposition has found itself needing to urgently define the path forward.

This weekend, a group of hundreds of ideologically diverse opposition activists are meeting in London as part of the Iran Freedom Congress to discuss Iran’s future and a pluralistic vision for guiding a transition. Critically, they are not positioning this as a challenge to any other opposition figure, including Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah. Rather, it is intended to “broaden the tent” to ensure that diverse voices are represented in any democratic process moving forward. Pahlavi has also made efforts in recent weeks to expand his reach by holding meetings with a wider set of activists and bringing Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Iranian jurist Shirin Ebadi on to chair a transitional justice committee. Ebadi’s involvement is significant not only for her deep global reach and connections to figures leading transitional justice processes in other countries, but also for the fact that she once supported the 1979 revolution that unseated Pahlavi’s father.

While this show of unity was celebrated by some, it has also been critiqued by others who have even called for Ebadi to be stripped of her Nobel (which is a technical impossibility). Meanwhile, still others contend that no movement for human rights and democracy can move forward without an immediate cease-fire, that the bombs only weaken the civil society that is seeking an end to this regime, and that a meaner, harsher regime may be left standing once the strikes end.

In short, much is yet to be determined but will become clear over the next few weeks—including in light of reports from some on Pahlavi’s team that Iranians have organized a ground game that will be activated soon.

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and a board member of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

The Gulf states

However the Iran war ends, it will not eliminate all of Iran’s attack capabilities. The Iranian regime’s apparent resilience and resolve suggest that the war will not change Iran’s intent to terrorize the region and assert leverage over the Strait of Hormuz either. The United States and Israel may feel comfortable with the dent the war has put in Iran’s long-range missile capabilities and nuclear program, especially as Trump seeks an exit that will quell global markets and relieve political pressure at home. But the threat to Iran’s Gulf neighbors will remain.

Iran’s attacks on all six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provide an unprecedented opportunity for its member countries to deepen their diplomatic, security, and economic integration in ways that could profoundly strengthen their resilience. GCC solidarity in the immediate aftermath of the attacks demonstrated the potential of such unity, including a historic UN Security Council Resolution.

One month in, however, longstanding fissures are re-emerging, including around how and when to end the war and what the region should look like after the bombs stop. And it appears there is still a rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that will jeopardize Gulf unity going forward.

Gulf countries do not have a simple solution for navigating heightened security and economic threats after the war. While there may be frustration with the United States, Russia and China’s responses to the war make it clear that there is no replacing US security support. And while the war’s disruption to oil and gas production reinforces Gulf countries’ efforts to diversify their economies, the disruption to air travel, shipping, and investor confidence underscores that no sector is completely safe.

The Gulf solution to these threats is likely to be intense diversification: deepening security partnerships with a range of different partners, reducing strategic redundancy through new trade and energy corridors, and embracing a range of industries that are less vulnerable to disruptions to the movement of goods and people, such as advanced technology.

—Allison Minor is the director of the Project for Middle East Integration with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. She previously served as US deputy special envoy for Yemen and as director for Arabian Peninsula affairs at the National Security Council.

Israel

While US and Israeli forces engage in an unprecedented, combined military campaign in Iran with considerable operational achievements—a high point in bilateral military cooperation—views on the conflict diverge considerably among the American and Israeli publics.

In contrast with US polls that indicate around 60 percent opposition to the war, support for the war effort began and remained high in Israel, with initial polls indicating well over 80 percent support, and over 90 percent among Jewish Israelis. More recent polling suggests slight slippage, as four weeks of being sent to bomb shelters by missile attacks wears on the population, but an overwhelming majority still support continuing the war. That steady backing is understandable, considering the Iranian regime’s long-held and oft-stated commitment to Israel’s destruction, and its hostility expressed in sponsoring terrorist organizations, attacks on Israel with ballistic missiles, and pursuit of a nuclear program that could enable Iran to possess a nuclear weapon.

The global interests that animate so much of the American debate around the war—the fear of overstretch in regime-change wars, the global economic shock caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the impact on strategic competition with China and Russia—feature far less prominently in the Israeli discourse.

While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains a divisive figure in Israeli politics, his political opponents have nearly universally expressed backing for the campaign in Iran. They have echoed his hope that the campaign will weaken the regime to the point that the Iranian people will overthrow it. But that consensus has not translated into a meaningful boost for the prime minister in polls ahead of a crucial election later this year. In a sense, the Israeli consensus, surrounding the need to strike a dangerous foe at its weakest point and take advantage of the opportunity presented by Trump’s willingness to join the fight, exists alongside, and distinct from, Israel’s longstanding polarized politics.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017 and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.

The global economy

We’ve learned two connected things about the global economy in the month since the Iran war started. The first is that the markets matter for the military. Strikes have consistently ramped up on Friday evenings and over the weekend, while statements about deescalation have often coincided with Sunday evening (when Asian markets open) or Monday morning. This is not a coincidence. There is a direct line of communication between the White House and Wall Street. But Tehran understands this dynamic as well: Many Iranian statements have been crafted precisely to sow confusion in markets at key moments.

But neither market sentiment nor media rhetoric can overcome the hard reality of oil and gas not being transited through the Strait of Hormuz. Time and again, the reality of the closure has rippled throughout the global economy. In the first week, gas prices dominated concerns. In the second, it was helium, a key component for chip-making throughout the world. In the third week, it was fertilizer and the potential strain on the global food supply. Just like the COVID-19 pandemic, the war has reminded us that for all the discussion about resiliency and artificial intelligence, the global economy is still incredibly reliant on a few strategic chokepoints, and the Strait of Hormuz is one of the most vital.

—Josh Lipsky is the chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council and the senior director of the GeoEconomics Center. He previously served as an advisor at the International Monetary Fund.

Global energy markets

Geopolitical risks are and will remain an enduring feature of energy markets, but the next energy crisis could dwarf even the Iran war.

In recent history, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sent world energy and food prices soaring, further amplifying inflation already triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic’s effects on global supply chains and revenge consumption. In 2026, the US–Iran war could become the world’s largest energy crisis in living history, with the head of the International Energy Agency warning that the current supply shock could outstrip the two oil crises of the 1970s combined.

While energy-related geopolitical risks are inherently unpredictable, they are generally not unforeseeable. The COVID-19 pandemic was sui generis, but Russian President Vladimir Putin credibly threatened a full-scale military action in Ukraine in early 2021, and analysts have been warning about Iran’s ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz for decades.

Another, greater foreseeable geopolitical risk looms over global energy markets. If the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attempts to coercively absorb Taiwan, probably via quarantine or blockade, Beijing will likely trigger the greatest geopolitical and energy crisis in history. Both the United States and the PRC are nuclear-armed, of course, but both also hold critical leverage over global energy supply chains.

If the PRC initiates hostilities, Beijing would use its monopoly across critical minerals, including graphite for batteries and possibly petrochemicals, while potentially exploiting cyber vulnerabilities embedded in its energy exports. The United States would seek to constrain the PRC’s imports of crude oil, iron ore, and other commodities, although Beijing is assiduously mitigating its Malacca Dilemma and reducing oil-import exposure via electric vehicles and other measures.

Just as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz were foreseeable risks, a cross-Strait crisis, while not inevitable, must be prepared for—starting now.

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report.

Russia and Iran

Russia has largely been a beneficiary of the war for several reasons. First, US and global attention has shifted from Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine to the war in the Gulf. Second, the United States’ need for weapons in the Middle East may reduce stocks available for Ukraine. Third, the predictable jump in oil prices prompted by the war led Washington to suspend its sanctions on Russian oil, providing a substantial, immediate income boost to Russia’s stumbling economy.

But not every consequence of the war works in Moscow’s favor. The Gulf countries’ air defense, which is heavy on expensive US weapons, has not been fully up to the task of protecting against Iranian drones and missiles, and has prompted some of these countries to make deals with Ukraine for both drones and help in establishing a layered air defense system. This provides money for Ukraine’s growing drone and defense industries, which means more production not just for the Gulf Arab states but also for Ukraine to use against Russia. This has also improved Ukraine’s standing in the Middle East, where many states had leaned in Moscow’s direction.

There is one more important issue related to Russian policy in this war: Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to provide Iran with drone components and intelligence that Tehran can use to target US forces, Israel, and the Gulf Arab states. Iran’s drone supply to Russia after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was critical to its campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure and civilians. Russia not only used those drones in its war on Ukraine, but also took the prototype and started improving the drones and producing them in large numbers. Iran has been a beneficiary of these improvements.

Moscow’s aim is clear: To prevent a US victory in Iran, or at least to slow it down and make it more expensive. It also wants the suspension in oil sanctions to continue as long as possible. The perplexing thing here is the Trump administration’s efforts to ignore or explain away this unpleasant fact. While criticizing US allies for not being more supportive in the Middle East—a fair criticism—it lets Russia off the hook for aiding Iran’s attacks on US servicemembers.

This situation is not likely to hold. Washington’s inaction on this matter may be encouraging Russia to provide additional help. According to Western intelligence, Moscow may now be sending drones to Iran. If a Russian drone or an Iranian drone with Russian components strikes and kills US soldiers, that may prompt the Trump administration to take strong measures to force Putin to knock it off. One such step would be to provide Ukraine the weapons it needs to take out Russia’s massive drone factory in Tatarstan.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

China and Iran

One month into the war, Beijing increasingly views this conflict as a strategic opportunity. On the energy front, it is less dependent on imported oil than many of its neighbors and has massive stockpiles that it can use to offset near-term shortages. It is in Iran’s interest to keep the oil payments from China flowing, so Tehran is carefully avoiding firing on China-flagged tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Those ships are among the few passing safely through, with Iran’s blessing.

Thus far, the downsides for China are minimal, and Beijing is focusing on a major upside: This war is forcing the United States to draw down military assets in the Asia-Pacific region. For China, that is a massive strategic win, and well worth any near-term disruptions to global energy markets. China has long complained about the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antiballistic missile system stationed in South Korea. Now, for the first time since its deployment in 2017, the United States is moving some of those interceptors to the Middle East to deal with Iran’s retaliatory strikes.

Across the board, the US military is already running low on munitions, forcing it to consider pulling assets away from Ukraine as well. That will further embolden Russia, which is yet another win for China given that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said Beijing needs to ensure Russia does not lose that conflict. The Chinese foreign minister told his European counterparts that Beijing benefits when Russia’s actions toward Ukraine keep the United States tied up in that war and unable to focus on China. The Iran conflict is delivering an even bigger distraction from China than the war in Ukraine.

Chinese analysts do not expect the Iranian regime to fall or the United States to achieve its objectives. Instead, they anticipate that the United States will become mired in a protracted war that further drains US resources. One of China’s leading think tankers recently published a piece framing the war as a “strategic opportunity” for China. China’s censors quickly pulled that article down, most likely to avoid angering Iran or undermining Beijing’s message of outrage over the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But make no mistake: That is the inside view. China sees the United States as dropping a rock on its own foot, becoming (yet again) entangled in the Middle East in ways that will make it exponentially harder for the United States and its allies to counter China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.

—Melanie Hart is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. She previously served as senior advisor for China in the Office of the Undersecretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment at the US Department of State.

The post Ten lessons from the first month of the Iran war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Deterrence in a two-peer world requires prudence

Kingston Reif — Fri, 27 Mar 2026 16:50:37 +0000

Bottom lines up front

US nuclear strategy must now account for a rapidly expanding Chinese nuclear force alongside a modernizing Russia.
Whether the current US nuclear force is sufficient depends on unresolved questions about China’s nuclear plans, US objectives, and Russian and Chinese doctrines.
Arms control should be pursued now rather than waiting for a buildup that offers the US no near-term bargaining leverage.

Washington’s plans to rebuild its nuclear arsenal conceived in the early 2010s assumed a world in which Russia was not an acute threat, China maintained a modest nuclear deterrent, and arms control constrained US and Russian nuclear forces. None of those conditions remain.

Today, China’s extensive nuclear buildup and increasingly assertive foreign policy, Russia’s continued modernization and nuclear saber-rattling, and the erosion of arms control define a new era. These trends are prompting a reexamination of US nuclear strategy not seen since the Cold War’s end. What conflict scenarios must be anticipated? How large and diverse should the arsenal be to deter both Russia and China simultaneously? And can arms control contribute to US security amid deepening tensions?

Washington faces the challenge of preserving credible deterrence and reassuring allies against two potential nuclear peers—possibly acting together—without fueling dangerous instability or draining resources from other defense priorities. This will require a balanced approach: continuing modernization and hedging against uncertainty, while avoiding counterproductive arsenal growth and pursuing arms control to reduce risks.

The new nuclear threat environment

Nuclear weapons are increasingly salient in international politics. China’s quest to become a world class nuclear power amid rising tensions with the United States is the most striking development. The United States projects China will field about one thousand operational warheads by 2030 and potentially fifteen hundred by 2035—up from roughly two hundred in 2020. Beijing’s construction of hundreds of new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, focus on increasing launch readiness, and pursuit of more flexible response options reflect a posture aimed at enhancing survivability, countering US advantages, and improving its ability to control the escalation of a nuclear conflict.

Russia continues to modernize its forces, broaden the role of nuclear weapons in its doctrine, and use nuclear bullying to deter Western support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, the arms control framework that once bounded the US-Russia nuclear relationship has effectively collapsed. The last pillar of this framework, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expired in February with nothing to replace it.

Longstanding US nuclear strategy has been that credible deterrence of nuclear attack against the US homeland and extended deterrence to US allies and partners requires several elements. These include:

Maintaining sufficient survivable forces in the event of a large-scale strike on un-alerted US forces;
Retaining nuclear counterforce capabilities “to reduce potential adversaries’ ability to employ nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies” (aka damage limitation) to the extent practicable if deterrence fails and;
Ensuring the availability of graduated response options against potential adversary attempts to escalate out of failed conventional aggression.

The United States previously had to deter only one nuclear peer and could treat China as a lesser threat. Now Washington must prepare to face Russia and a far more formidable nuclear China. Russian and China could even coordinate, or one could act opportunistically while the United States is engaged with the other.

Some former government officials and experts warn this shift presents fundamentally new challenges. Ignoring the challenges would leave Washington and its allies vulnerable and would signal waning resolve. The bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission concluded in its October 2023 report that the current US nuclear modernization program is inadequate. It recommended urgent preparations to upload reserve warheads after New START’s expiration, develop additional limited‑use options, and plan for a larger force in the longer term.

The Biden administration acknowledged that deterring multiple nuclear adversaries might soon require a bigger and more diverse deployed arsenal, but deferred any decision to the Trump administration. Whether the Trump administration will revise US force requirements to address China’s nuclear transformation remains to be seen. The administration’s National Defense Strategy, released in January, stated: “We will modernize and adapt our nuclear forces accordingly with focused attention on deterrence and escalation management amidst the changing global nuclear landscape.”

Nuclear force sizing considerations

Strategic forces

China is the primary driver of the concern that the current US arsenal—1,550 deployed warheads and seven hundred deployed delivery systems—is insufficient, particularly Beijing’s recent construction of more than 300 new silo-based ICBMs. Advocates of increasing the deployed arsenal to hold these targets at risk argue that doing so is necessary to fulfill US nuclear employment objectives, including the damage limitation objective, against both Russia and China simultaneously.

These advocates are correct that there is nothing magical or sacrosanct about 1,550 warheads and that New START was negotiated in a world that has changed markedly over the past fifteen years. Yet other considerations are relevant to the question of whether an increase is needed.

First, analysis conducted during President Barack Obama’s second term concluded that core US targeting objectives could still be satisfied with roughly one‑third fewer deployed weapons than New START allowed. If the US arsenal is more than enough for deterrence against Russia, that suggests some available headroom to address growth in China’s force, at least in the near term.

Second, if a US decision to grow the deployed force triggers offsetting responses from Russia and China, that could erase any relative advantage Washington might have gained from an increase.

A third consideration is why an increase is necessary on a day-to-day peacetime basis, as the deployed force can be generated and uploaded to higher levels in a crisis or escalating war. (A counter to this argument would be that there might not be enough lead time to upload in these scenarios.) Moreover, excessive uploading of warheads could reduce the operational flexibility of the arsenal.

Even if growth isn’t required in the near term, a point might come when it could be necessary if China builds up its warheads and launchers to the high end of current projections—or beyond them. But if Beijing levels off at one thousand warheads, the case for holding steady would be stronger.

Geopolitical risk is not the only challenge facing the US nuclear enterprise. Practical constraints loom large. The ongoing modernization program will yield fewer delivery systems on submarines than today’s arsenal, as the new Columbia‑class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will carry eight fewer missile tubes than their Ohio-class predecessors. The program also faces mounting cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance issues, which could force difficult trade‑offs with conventional modernization priorities.

Near‑term options to expand US strategic forces are limited to reactivating four missile tubes per Ohio‑class SSBN deactivated under New START and uploading additional warheads to deployed delivery systems from the reserve stockpile. New delivery systems beyond existing modernization plans cannot begin to be fielded until the mid- to late-2030s, and their acquisition would further increase costs, depending on the scale of expansion. (Modification of some existing systems to make them more capable could potentially be achieved sooner.)

The confluence of the above geopolitical and modernization transition risks means any uploading to address one of the risks would reduce the ability to address the other—as well as any unforeseen technical problems affecting the functioning of a type of delivery system or warhead, or any operational risk caused by advances in adversary capabilities.

Nonstrategic forces

There is also a debate about whether US nonstrategic nuclear capabilities are sufficient in a two‑peer environment. One argument is that Russia and China believe their theater nuclear forces provide coercive leverage and escalation management options that Washington’s lower-yield air‑ and sea‑based weapons cannot match. (The United States fields a small number of B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe but has not housed dedicated theater nuclear forces in the Indo-Pacific since the end of the Cold War.) Some allies also worry this asymmetry could undermine US resolve and capacity to defend them.

Russia’s excessive reliance on nonstrategic nuclear weapons (it is believed to possess one to two thousand such weapons) seems to be driven by its perception of a conventional imbalance vis-à-vis the United States and NATO more broadly. According to the 2025 US intelligence community’s annual threat assessment, “Russia’s vast arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons helps it to offset Western conventional superiority and provide formidable escalation management options in theater war scenarios.” The Defense Intelligence Agency added that “Russia almost certainly seeks to avoid direct conflict with NATO because it assesses it cannot win a conventional military confrontation with the alliance.”

New US theater capabilities with different military characteristics—such as a new sea-launched nuclear-armed cruise missile—would give the president additional options to respond to limited Russian nuclear use. But if Russia’s theater weapons are intended to counter NATO conventional superiority, it’s not clear that additional US theater capabilities would have a significant impact on Russia’s threshold for nuclear use beyond existing US and Alliance options. According to Michael Kofman and Anya Loukianov Fink, two experts on Russian nuclear strategy: “One of the misperceptions about Russian nuclear strategy is that it takes advantage of lower-yield nuclear weapons that the United States does not have. This appears nowhere in Russian military writings or deliberations.” Meanwhile, the best way to deter Russian limited nuclear use is to perpetuate Russia’s perception that a conventional war with NATO would be unwinnable for Moscow so that it doesn’t start such a war in the first place.

The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses, “China probably seeks lower-yield nuclear warhead capabilities to provide proportional response options that its high-yield warheads cannot deliver” for its theater-range delivery systems such as the DF-26 missile. A dedicated regional nuclear capability in the Pacific would give Washington a response option it doesn’t currently have. Yet whether China is pursuing low-yield options to gain a coercive edge over the United States in a conventional conflict or to offset perceived US advantages in nonstrategic arms remains uncertain. The answer matters for determining the degree to which a dedicated US option would strengthen deterrence.

Any potential benefits of extra US nonstrategic weapons should be weighed against the potential risks. These hazards include the unintended escalation risks of adding nuclear options to existing or planned conventional ground- and sea-launched missiles (adversaries could assume any dual-capable missile launch as nuclear) and reduced availability of launchers to fire conventional weapons.

An additional consideration is that Washington might face conventional inferiority in one theater in a multi‑peer conflict, forcing it to consider increased reliance on nonstrategic nuclear options for war fighting. But US first use would carry high escalation risks and could require scores—if not hundreds—of additional warheads, a number likely beyond the near‑term capacity of the US nuclear production base.

Key questions

Where one falls on the sufficiency question depends greatly on what conflict scenarios the United States and its allies need to be prepared to deter and respond to, as well as the associated nuclear employment objectives, posture, and force structure one believes is required for deterrence in these scenarios. Reasonable people can disagree on these determinations and how much risk is prudent to accept given competing priorities.

As the Trump administration grapples with the “how much is enough” question, additional analysis would be beneficial for identifying the available option space in the new strategic landscape. Key questions include the following.

Does the United States need to achieve a similar level of damage limitation against multiple adversaries simultaneously? Or would the ability to limit damage from one adversary while inflicting a lesser, though still intolerable, level of damage on the second adversary be sufficient?
Do Russia and China perceive gaps in US nuclear capabilities at both the strategic and regional or theater levels?
How would augmented strategic nuclear capabilities—alongside improved long-range conventional strike and missile defenses—be expected to enhance deterrence, and what potential adversary responses and stability implications should be considered?
What are the potential benefits and risks of additional dedicated US theater nuclear capabilities for shaping adversary decision-making during crisis and conflict, and how might they affect escalation dynamics, intra-war deterrence, and conflict termination?
What are the current and future geopolitical, transition, and operational risks the nuclear enterprise needs to hedge against? What are the options to mitigate them?
Are there nonnuclear alternatives that could meet deterrence objectives, especially considering rapid advances in technology?

Arms control considerations

After returning to office, President Donald Trump wasted little time in calling for negotiations with Russia and China to “denuclearize . . . in a very big way.”

A year later, the president decided not to accept or counter Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer to continue observing the New START limits for one year beyond the treaty’s expiration. Instead, senior administration officials have doubled down on the need to pursue multilateral arms control that includes additional types of nuclear weapons and both Russia and China.

Russia has indicated it will continue to observe the treaty’s central limits on warheads and delivery systems so long as the United States does. Given there is no immediate need for the United States to expand the deployed arsenal—and even if there were, uploading would take time—the Trump administration should not give Russia a reason to build up. At the same time, the administration should push for the resumption of a dialogue on strategic stability, risk reduction, and a successor agreement to New START. The discussions should address strategic and nonstrategic weapons not captured by New START.

Such steps would preserve at least informal limits on Russia’s strategic forces while Washington reviews requirements to address China, restore communication on nuclear issues, and increase diplomatic pressure on Beijing. In addition, this approach would be consistent with the National Security Strategy’s call to “reestablish strategic stability with Russa.”

As the administration pursues its goals for arms control in the new security landscape, it is important to remember that arms control is a tool and not an end in and of itself. It is a means to manage competition and enhance US competitive advantages. And it is a tool that retains considerable value.

There is value in verifiable weapon ceilings, transparency about weapon holdings, counteracting the potential peril of emerging technology, and addressing particularly destabilizing types of weapons such as the placement of strategic weapons in space. There is value given the limitations on the US ability to keep up in a nuclear competition, due to the constraints on its ability to build new weapons. And there is value in demonstrating US leadership and exercising the skills of a waning US arms control enterprise.

Some analysts assert a nuclear buildup would create leverage for future negotiations. But US-Russian arms control history suggests a more complicated story. Building new strategic systems beyond current plans isn’t possible for another decade and thus offers no near‑term bargaining value. Whether uploading reserve warheads would influence Moscow or Beijing depends on how they factor these warheads into their threat assessment. Decades of US nuclear superiority did not persuade Beijing to negotiate, and Russia conditions discussions of its exotic strategic delivery systems (e.g. Skyfall and Poseidon) and nonstrategic weapons on limits to US missile defenses and advanced conventional strike capabilities.

It remains to be seen if meaningful progress on arms control is possible so long as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and China’s unwillingness to get off the arms control sidelines continues. But if a process does get underway, several issues will likely arise.

If the Trump administration is open to another bilateral accord on US and Russian strategic forces, what the administration proposes to Moscow is likely to be influenced by an assessment of what is needed to deter China. That assessment could yield a proposal to Moscow with higher limits on deployed strategic weapons than New START, as well as a shorter duration, to hedge against uncertainty over China’s buildup. This would reverse the trend of progressively lower limits in previous agreements. But that does not mean there wouldn’t be value in such an arrangement in terms of stability, predictability, and transparency, especially compared to an alternative with no agreement. (Such an agreement also wouldn’t require the United States to operate at the height of those limits on a day-to-day basis.)

Missile defense will inevitably feature in any negotiation, especially one seeking limits below or beyond New START. Trump’s interest in enhancing US homeland defenses via Golden Dome has prompted unsurprising criticism in Moscow and Beijing, but pursuing arms control need not be in conflict with missile defense. Workable compromises exist if both sides are willing to bargain. Washington can both augment its missile defenses and use them as a lever for securing significant Russian and Chinese concessions.

Non‑strategic nuclear weapons are often viewed as essential to any New START successor. But as Michael Albertson of the Center for Global Security Research notes, the Trump administration should weigh potential benefits against complexity and cost. Given US concerns about Russia’s potential limited use of nuclear weapons if it is losing a conventional war, even cutting Russia’s nonstrategic arsenal in half would not resolve the issue. Greater value could come from data exchanges, notifications, on‑site inspections, and consolidating storage sites.

It remains unrealistic to expect China to immediately join a trilateral agreement with the United States and Russia that limits nuclear weapons. A more achievable near-term approach is to begin a bilateral conversation on risk reduction topics such as crisis management and guardrails at the intersection of emerging technology and nuclear risk, which could later be broadened to a multilateral conversation. If momentum can be generated, seeking a better understanding of China’s arsenal composition and plans should be a high priority. If the United States knew, for example, that China had an end point in mind for its buildup, that would provide much-needed confidence and predictability and help to avoid worst-case planning.

Conclusion

The US response to the new strategic environment must be based on more than just a reconsideration of numbers and types of nuclear weapons. By aligning prudent military planning with purposeful diplomacy, the United States can preserve deterrence, prevent dangerous competition, and strengthen the foundations of global security in an era of unprecedented nuclear complexity.

This issue brief is part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Great nuclear debate series, a curated anthology of perspectives on arms control, force sizing, and missile defense from leading experts.

About the author

Kingston Reif is a senior international and defense researcher at RAND. From 2021 to 2024, he served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for threat reduction and arms control.

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Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

The post Deterrence in a two-peer world requires prudence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why US strategic nuclear forces must expand after New START

Paul Amato — Fri, 27 Mar 2026 16:49:34 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The United States needs a nuclear force larger than today’s and flexible enough to influence adversary decision-making at all stages of crisis and conflict.
A US strategic deterrent capable of delivering roughly 2,400 operationally deployed warheads in the near term should be sufficient to meet US strategy requirements.
Force attributes and flexibility matter as much as numbers, though.

Now that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty has expired, the debate begins over what the United States should do next regarding its nuclear posture. The recently released National Defense Strategy (NDS) sheds little light on the Trump administration’s plans; it does not even mention New START. Instead, the NDS largely eschews details on US nuclear policy and capabilities, noting only that the United States “will modernize and adapt our nuclear forces accordingly with focused attention on deterrence and escalation management.”¹ What this means for US force size and posture will play out over the coming months and years, likely beginning with submission of the president’s annual budget request later this spring.

In anticipation of this debate, many commentators urge caution, suggesting that any expansion in US force size (even in response to actions by China and Russia) could prompt an uncontrolled arms race.² Others argue that the United States has time to prepare for the emerging threats it faces so there is no need to panic, suggesting that adjustments can wait until the country gets closer to the end of the existing modernization program of record.³ Still others contend that the United States already has enough nuclear weapons and that force growth would be expensive and counterproductive.⁴One specific argument points to a 2013 Obama administration assessment that the US nuclear force could be reduced by up to one-third, claiming this extra one-third today provides sufficient headroom to manage China’s emergence as a nuclear peer.⁵

While much of this debate focuses on numbers alone, policymakers and military officials must also account for the attributes of the deployed force necessary for effective and credible deterrence. The question of “how much is enough” is not solely a matter of numbers, but of force size and the overall capabilities of the warheads and delivery systems the United States deploys. US force posture must be capable of deterring a diverse array of nuclear-armed adversaries and, if deterrence fails, must enable the achievement of national objectives against one or more of them. In general terms, national objectives include: restoring deterrence and managing escalation; limiting damage to the United States and its allies and partners; and imposing unacceptable damage on an adversary.⁶ The capabilities needed to achieve these objectives vary from adversary to adversary. They require not just an appropriately sized force, but one with the attributes needed for the array of objectives that US nuclear forces might need to achieve against each.

Given the evolving security environment and growing demands on US strategic deterrence, a force larger and more diverse from that fielded today is needed as a matter of priority—one that provides capabilities responsive to the deterrence challenges now confronting the United States.

New START’s expiration is good news for US security

Despite the New START treaty (NST) now being in the rearview mirror, it is worth revisiting why its expiration enhances US security. First, today’s security environment is significantly more dangerous than when NST was ratified—or even when it was extended in 2021—a conclusion repeatedly documented by the US government over the past decade. In 2010, Russia was viewed as a potential strategic partner of the United States and NATO, and great-power conflict was widely seen as unlikely.⁷ Since then, both Russia and China have demonstrated a willingness to use force to advance geopolitical aims—Russia in Ukraine and China by expanding its territorial sway in and around the South China Sea. And Russia continues to brandish its nuclear capabilities to coerce Ukraine and the West.⁸ Great-power conflict is no longer a remote possibility.

Second, in 2010 China’s nuclear posture was not central to US deterrence planning. China’s nuclear force was often treated as a “lesser included” component of the Russian threat, meaning a force sufficient to deter Russia would also suffice for China. This assumption no longer holds. As two senior Biden administration officials responsible for nuclear strategy observed in 2025, “After decades of maintaining only a minimal nuclear capability, China is on pace to nearly quintuple its 2019 stockpile of some 300 nuclear warheads by 2035, in a quest to attain an arsenal equivalent in strength to Russia’s and the United States.’”⁹ China’s growth places greater demands on the US nuclear force, due not only to the anticipated size of its future arsenal but also to the quandaries it presents for US military planners who must account for crisis or potential conflict with more than one nuclear adversary.

Third, in 2010 the Obama administration still harbored hopes of negotiating a denuclearization pathway with North Korea regarding its then nascent nuclear program. By the mid-2000s, however, North Korea was already pursuing a breakout capability intended to “directly hold the United States at risk.”¹⁰ Today, North Korea possesses a more robust nuclear arsenal capable of striking the United States and its regional allies.¹¹ In fact, to date, the second Trump administration has not restated the 2018 policy (later adopted by the Biden administration) that any North Korean nuclear use would lead to the end of the Kim Jong-Un regime. This omission might reflect a reassessment of that policy’s feasibility in light of North Korea’s expanding capabilities.¹²

Fourth, in 2010 there was little apparent evidence of cooperation among rogue or revisionist actors. Today, such cooperation, if not outright coordination, is evident.“¹³ Few in 2010 would have envisioned North Korean soldiers fighting in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf.¹⁴ It would be dangerously naïve to assume conflict with one adversary would not elicit support from one or more of the others, whether direct or indirect. Simply put, Russia, China, and North Korea all being armed with nuclear weapons means that any crisis or conflict with one risks a nuclear crisis or conflict with one or both of the others. Credibly deterring all three—even if engaged in conflict with only one—requires a force larger than NST permitted and that is tailored to the distinct deterrence and targeting requirements for each.

Fifth, while NST only addressed strategic systems, the urgent need for the United States to develop and field theater-focused capabilities (so-called non-strategic or theater nuclear weapons) was a reason to allow NST to expire. Russia possesses a far larger theater-focused arsenal than the United States, a disparity NST did nothing to mitigate.¹⁵ Other adversaries similarly see value in developing and fielding such capabilities.¹⁶ While the United States is beginning to address this gap by developing a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, that system remains a decade away and is likely insufficient by itself. Moving beyond NST allows the United States to field additional strategic capabilities to help offset this imbalance, even if imperfectly.

In short, NST was “the wrong treaty for the current time.” Getting out from under its constraints will enable the United States to prepare in earnest for contemporary deterrence challenges—focusing not only on numbers, but on the force attributes required for credible and effective deterrence against a diverse group of nuclear-armed adversaries.¹⁷

The current US strategic nuclear force is inadequate

The ability to deter an adversary from taking extreme actions is not simply a matter of having a nuclear weapon that can be delivered to a target. As a senior US Strategic Command deterrence thinker has observed, deterrence is “an intentional act or set of actions aimed to influence adversaries’ decision-making, so that [they] choose restraint over aggression.”¹⁸ Because deterrence is directed at a decision-maker’s perceptions, deterrence planners “must assess our capabilities relative to the doctrine, exercises, statements, threats and behavior of potential adversaries.”¹⁹ In other words, the United States must be able to influence different adversaries differently. This approach requires maintaining tailored and flexible strategies, plans, and capabilities that can be leveraged effectively across a spectrum of adversaries and contexts. Simply retaining a force structured and sized consistent with NST would limit this flexibility in important ways.

First, US nuclear forces must be able to support multiple objectives depending on circumstances presented. While there are different ways to articulate these requirements, they generally include:

deterring an adversary from initiating a nuclear attack;
deterring further use if nuclear weapons have already been employed;
and rendering an adversary incapable of continuing large-scale nuclear strikes.²⁰

A force capable of achieving all this requires flexibility and options. This is not a new concept. As the secretary of defense’s fiscal year 1975 annual report noted, to be “credible and hence effective over the range of possible contingencies deterrence must rest on many options and on a spectrum of capabilities . . . to support these options.”²¹ This requires the ability to apply the right force at the right time against the right target or set of targets, consistent with policy guidance and the law of armed conflict.

Numerous factors go into determining how best to service a particular target with a nuclear weapon, factors that multiply with a large adversary target base.²² In a simpler two-party context, planners must carefully examine the resources at their disposal and the characteristics of the specific targets identified to develop specific approaches to meet national objectives.²³ But all US nuclear weapons are not interchangeable. Among other factors, planners must consider the types of weapons available, the phase of conflict for which they are needed, their flight characteristics, their yield, their range, their time to target, the desired effect on a particular target, and long-standing policy guidance to achieve objectives at the lowest level of damage possible and to minimize unintended effects. Today and in the coming years, moreover, they need to make such plans recognizing that other nuclear-armed adversaries might be poised to exploit US distraction to pursue their own geopolitical objectives.

A nuclear force constrained in size and composition by a 2010-era treaty does not provide sufficient flexibility to effectively manage these factors across all potential adversaries. As an example, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are viewed as the most prompt US capability. But the need for prompt options applies to each US nuclear-armed adversary, and the United States might need to retain such prompt options for other targeting priorities that might arise as a contingency unfolds. In this context, targets that require prompt options could exceed the number of ICBMs available. Similarly, efforts to avoid overflight of one nuclear-armed state while striking another can further restrict ICBM options, increasing escalation risk or undermining mission success.

Other examples include yield and range. Policy directs achieving objectives at the lowest level of damage possible. But if only higher-yield weapons are available to the president at a given stage of conflict, presidential options narrow and escalation risks rise. Simply uploading additional warheads onto existing or future delivery systems like Minuteman III or Sentinel, moreover, is not a panacea, as increased payloads can impose range restrictions that reduce flexibility and further constrain planners.²⁴

Given considerations such as these, force adequacy cannot be measured by aggregate numbers alone. Even if the total number of delivery systems and warheads is numerically sufficient on paper to service the required targets, a force constrained by the legacy NST structure would leave little ability to offer the president meaningful options for a force that must be postured to manage a multiple adversary environment. In practice, when facing such an expanded target base, there might be only one or two approaches to a given target set, especially when facing simultaneous or sequential crises or conflicts, sharply constraining presidential decision space.

Second, the US nuclear force must account for operational limitations. For example, analyses that cite bomber payload capacity often ignore attrition that is inevitable in a high-intensity conventional conflict.²⁵ Whether B-52s, B-2s, or B-21s, some will be destroyed while flying conventional missions, bringing into question how many will be available if and when strategic bomber strikes are needed.²⁶ Losses to bombers or critical enablers such as aerial refueling tankers could significantly reduce available nuclear options. Similarly, ballistic missile submarines must periodically return to port for replenishment, and strategic bombers cannot remain on alert indefinitely.²⁷ Moreover, emerging threats spanning from quantum sensing to unmanned systems could further affect availability of strategic platforms in unknown ways.²⁸ Advocates of a size-constrained force often overlook these risks.

Third, simultaneous or sequential crises dramatically increase complexity. Planners might be required to generate deterrence options across multiple theaters at distinct stages of conflict in support of different political and military objectives, and against adversaries that might be coordinating their actions.

Complexity grows as the number of strategic adversaries increases, their level of coordination deepens, and the range of their escalation options expands. In crisis or conflict, this complexity manifests as a high level of uncertainty regarding potential escalation pathways that the United States must consider and seek to influence.²⁹

Further, this complexity can evolve over multiple pathways. Deterrence requirements will differ markedly depending on whether a crisis or conflict originates with Russia, China, or North Korea. Where and against whom a crisis begins will impact the mix of capabilities upon which the United States will lean most heavily because US plans necessarily rely on different mixes of capabilities in each case to deter or to achieve objectives.

What should US strategic force posture look like?

The United States does not need a force equal to the combined arsenals of Russia and China. And China’s nuclear growth alone should not dictate US posture. Rather, a decision on the precise nuclear force mix “will depend largely on the choices adversaries make and on how much risk a president is willing to accept in both the most plausible and worst-case nuclear scenarios.”³⁰

So far, the Trump Administration has not directly addressed nuclear force size. The NDS signals an intent to “adapt [US] nuclear forces,”³¹ and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has similarly pledged to develop “additional options” to support deterrence and escalation management.³² While these statements suggest an openness to nuclear force expansion, it is impossible to divine the Trump administration’s intent at this time.

In the absence of more detail, the administration could be guided in future posture decisions by recommendations from the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission and other commentators, pursuing options in the short-term that include: uploading additional warheads on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); reopening SLBM tubes that were capped as part of NST; and restoring nuclear capability to the full B-52 fleet.³³ Retaining a number of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines as long as technically and operationally feasible could also help, as could potentially re-operationalizing and loading the 50 ICBM silos that were taken offline as part of NST. In the medium and longer-term, accelerating the nuclear modernization program of record where possible and, eventually, increasing the number of new systems fielded as part of the modernization program would also provide opportunities to increase flexibility.

Of these options, the precise mix will ultimately be determined by Trump administration and military officials based upon classified analysis.³⁴Still, the foregoing considerations indicate the need for a force exceeding that previously permitted by NST—an operationally relevant force that is large and flexible enough to influence adversary decision-making at all stages of crisis and conflict, and that is capable of achieving national objectives against more than one nuclear adversary if it becomes necessary.

Specific posture decisions regarding each triad leg bring with them multiple variables that make direct comparisons difficult.³⁵ Still, given the current trajectory of adversary nuclear force developments, a US strategic deterrent capable of delivering of roughly 2,400 operationally deployed warheads in the near term should be large and flexible enough to meet US strategy requirements.³⁶ These increases should be spread across all three triad legs, further diversifying the weapons and delivery platforms available to planners – and to the president – when confronting potential crisis or conflict in today’s multiple adversary environment.³⁷

This posture would ensure the United States retains a capability, if needed, to target either Russian or Chinese nuclear forces and have a credible capacity available to deter or if necessary achieve national objectives against the other; provide the president more options to deal with multiple adversaries in simultaneous or sequential contingencies, thereby expanding decision space and increasing his ability to manage escalation; account for potential attrition to US nuclear forces in conflict; and provide the capability to deal with North Korea should that threat manifest, either before or during a crisis or conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary.

This uptick would represent a reasonable increase over NST levels and would set the stage for a more comprehensive assessment of US nuclear capabilities in the longer-term—whether less capability is needed as Russia and China show interest in meaningful arms control engagement, or more is needed if the security environment fails to improve. But today, arbitrarily adhering to limits designed for a different time and a different security environment is not in the US national interest and would stand in the way of fielding the force necessary to maintain credible and effective deterrence.

It’s not 2010 anymore

US strategic nuclear force levels that made sense in 2010 no longer suffice in 2026. The challenges facing planners today are more diverse and complex—and will only grow more so. To maintain credible deterrence, the United States must be able to deter and must be more capable of achieving national objectives against each nuclear-armed adversary individually or in combination, in both simultaneous and sequential scenarios. A force constrained by legacy NST decisions risks undermining that capacity and inviting the very conflicts US nuclear forces are intended to deter. A larger, more diverse force than the United States fields today is needed to afford the nation the flexibility it needs to maintain credible and effective deterrence in the coming years.

About the author

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Paul Amato

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Missile Defense Nuclear Deterrence

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1 U.S. Department of Defense, 2026 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 23, 2026), https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF.

2 Mark Trevelyan, “Explainer: What Is the New START Nuclear Treaty and Why Does Its Expiry Matter?” Reuters, January 30, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-new-start-nuclear-treaty-why-does-its-expiry-matter-2026-01-30/.

3 Rose Gottemoeller, “Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on an ‘Arms Race 2.0,’”US Senate, December 10, 2025, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/f44409cc-cc99-f286-066b-1283777d682b/121025_Gottemoeller_Testimony.pdf.

4 “Expiration of US-Russia Agreement Could Trigger Rapid, Dangerous Nuclear Arms Race, New Report Warns,”Union of Concerned Scientists, January 12, 2026, https://www.ucs.org/about/news/nuclear-agreement-expiration-could-trigger-rapid-arms-race.

5 Kingston Reif, “Earlier this month Sam Charap and I published an op-ed on where the United States and Russia should try to go on arms control in the near-term. Among our recs: the sides should agree on a…” LinkedIn, June 15, 2025, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kingston-reif-982a2053_earlier-this-month-sam-charap-and-i-published-activity-7340111754321944576-UrkW?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAFRSmgBZ9X59om6OMkni6whIn4mpEHSAHQ.

6 Each president has historically provided classified guidance to the Department of Defense on his nuclear employment objectives, referred to herein as national objectives. As one commentator points out, historically unclassified or previously declassified literature suggests four such objectives. Pat McKenna, “Counterforce Strategy versus Counterforce Targeting” in Brad Roberts, ed., “Counterforce in Contemporary US Strategy,” Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 2025, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2025-05/2025-0529-CGSR-Occasional-Paper-Counterforce-In-Contemporary-US-Nuclear-Strategy.pdf. Three of those objectives are the focus of this article. The fourth, according to McKenna, is “managing risks that are inherent to a highly dynamic geopolitical environment.”

7 Reid J. Epstein, “Kerry: Russia Behaving Like It’s the 19th Century,” Politico, March 2, 2014, https://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-now/2014/03/kerry-russia-behaving-like-its-the-19th-century-184280.

8 Alexander Smith, “Trump Calls Russia’s Missile Test ‘Inappropriate’—But Is Putin’s Nuclear-Powered Weapon Actually a Threat?” NBC News, October 27, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/world/russia/russia-burevestnik-missile-trump-putin-test-inappropriate-ukraine-rcna239984.

9 Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi, “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age: National Security in a World of Proliferating Risks and Eroding Constraints,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-new-nuclear-age-narang-vaddi.

10 “North Korea Military Power: A Growing Regional and Global Threat,” Defense Intelligence Agency, October 15, 2021, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/NKMP.pdf.

11 Daniel M. Gettinger and Mary Beth Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs,” Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10472.

12 Paul Amato, “Unsettling Allies, Emboldening Pyongyang,” RealClearDefense, January 29, 2026, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/01/29/unsettling_allies_emboldening_pyongyang_1161599.html

13 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment: Report to the United States House of Representatives Arms Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,” Defense Intelligence Agency, March 25, 2025, https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2025_dia_statement_for_the_record.pdf?utm_source; Amy Hawkins, Andrew Roth, and Helen Davidson, “Xi, Putin, Kim and the Optics of a New World Order,” Guardian, September 6, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/news/ng-interactive/2025/sep/06/xi-jinping-vladimir-putin-kim-jong-un-optics-new-world-order.

14 Jared Martin, “The Second North Korean Wave in Ukraine: What Next as Pyongyang’s Troops Arrive on Russia’s Front Lines?” Modern War Institute, August 8, 2025, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-second-north-korean-wave-in-ukraine-what-next-as-pyongyangs-troops-arrive-on-russias-front-lines.

15 2024—Report to the Senate on the Status of Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons Negotiations Pursuant to Subparagraph (a)(12)(B) of the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty,” US Department of State, February 25, 2025, https://www.state.gov/2024-report-to-the-senate-on-the-status-of-tactical-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons-negotiations-pursuant-to-subparagraph-a12b-of-the-senate-resolution-of-advice-and-consent-to-ratification-of/.

16 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025,” US Department of Defense, December 23, 2025, https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF. (“The PLA is probably pursuing nuclear weapons with yields below 10 kilotons. Such weapons address long-held PLA desires to be able to conduct limited nuclear counterstrikes against military targets and control nuclear escalation.”)

17 Eric S. Edelman and Franklin C. Miller, “No New START: Renewing the U.S.-Russian Deal Won’t Solve Today’s Nuclear Dilemmas, Foreign Affairs, June 3, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/no-new-start.

18 Kayse Jansen, “New Strategic Deterrence Frameworks for Modern-Day Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 112, January 2024, https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=joint-force-quarterlyhttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=joint-force-quarterly.

19 Terri Moon Cronk, “Policy Official: Posture Review Emphasizes Capabilities, Deters Use of Nukes,” US Department of Defense, February 16, 2018, https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1444722/policy-official-posture-review-emphasizes-capabilities-deters-use-of-nukes/.

20 See, for example: McKenna, “Counterforce Strategy versus Counterforce Targeting.” Greg Weaver, “Alternative Deterrence Strategies for a Two-Peer Environment,” in Roberts, “Counterforce in Contemporary US Strategy,” describes different US historical objectives for deterrence, assurance, and achieving objectives if deterrence fails. See: Jansen, “New Strategic Deterrence Frameworks for Modern-Day Challenges.”

21 “Annual Defense Department Report: FY 1975,” US Department of Defense, March 4, 1974, 38, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1975_DoD_AR.pdf.

22 Michael Elliot, “Turning Presidential Guidance into Nuclear Operational Plans“ in Charles Glaser, Austin Long, and Brian Radzinsky, eds.,“Managing US Nuclear Operations in the 21st Century,” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/books/managing-u-s-nuclear-operations-in-the-21st-century/.

23 Ibid.

24 That is, ballistic missiles that are deployed with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

25 Col Mark A. Gunzinger, USAF (Ret.), “The B-21 Bomber: A Cost-effective Deterrent for a Multi-polar World,” Mitchell Institute, September 2024, https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/app/uploads/2024/09/The-B-21-Bomber-A-Cost-effective-Deterrent-FINAL.pdf.

26 Northrop Grumman corporation, the maker of the B-2 and B-21 bombers, is a sponsor of the Atlantic Council’s work on strategic forces issues.

27 “Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines—SSBN,” US Navy, last updated February 27, 2025, https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169580/fleet-ballistic-missile-submarines-ssbn/; Oriana Pawlyk, “Putting Nuclear Bombers Back on 24-Hour Alert Would Exhaust the Force, General Says,” Military.com, April 22, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/22/putting-nuclear-bombers-back-24-hour-alert-would-exhaust-force-general-says.html.

28 Paul Amato, “In Defense of the US Maintaining a Balanced Nuclear Triad,” Atlantic Council, September 29, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/in-defense-of-the-us-maintaining-a-balanced-nuclear-triad/.

29 Jansen, “New Strategic Deterrence Frameworks for Modern-Day Challenges.”

30 Narang and Vaddi, “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age;” Edelman and Miller, “No New START.”

31 U.S. Department of Defense, 2026 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.

32 “Remarks by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at the Reagan National Defense Forum (As Delivered),” US Department of Defense, December 6, 2025, https://www.war.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4354431/remarks-by-secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-at-the-reagan-national-defense-forum-a/.

33 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, DC, October 2023), https://ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/A/Am/Americas%20Strategic%20Posture/Strategic-Posture-Commission-Report.pdf; Narang and Vaddi, “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age”; Edelman and Miller, “No New START

34 Admiral Charles Richard, USN (Ret.), Hon. Franklin C. Miller, and Robert Peters, “Nuclear Deterrence vs Nuclear Warfighting: Is There a Difference and Does it Matter?” National Institute for Public Policy, April 15, 2025, https://nipp.org/information_series/admiral-charles-richard-usn-ret-hon-franklin-c-miller-and-robert-peters-nuclear-deterrence-vs-nuclear-warfighting-is-there-a-difference-and-does-it-matter-no-623-april-15-2025.

35 For example, the number of warheads that are available to be delivered by US SSBNs is a function of how many boats are operational; how many are at sea at a given time, how many operational launch tubes are available, and MIRV configuration.

36 This estimate draws from public sources. See Hans M. Kristensen, MattKorda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, “United States nuclear weapons, 2025.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 13, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2024.2441624. This estimate uses NST bomber counting rules (~60 airframes); a rough doubling of deployed ICBM warheads (~900 total); and a one-third increase in SLBM warheads (~1440 total), the latter two of these deployed on either the existing or an expanded number of delivery platforms.

37 To this end, the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM in conjunction with policy makers will need to assess the optimal mix of platforms and warheads to maximize the necessary flexibility and operational relevance.

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Only additional pressure can push Putin toward peace

Kira Rudik — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 21:19:03 +0000

After more than a year of US-led talks to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is little sign of progress toward peace. Instead, Moscow is now reportedly aiding Tehran as Iranian drones target United States bases and American allies across the Gulf region. New approaches are clearly needed in order to prevent a further descent into international insecurity.

When US President Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025 and began efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine via diplomacy, many Ukrainians were not overly optimistic. This skepticism was rooted in their own bitter personal experience of broken Russian promises over the past few decades.

Since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Russia signed a long list of treaties and agreements obliging Moscow to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and refrain from acts of international aggression. These commitments did not prevent Russian President Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine in 2014 or launching a full-scale invasion eight years later. Understandably, few in Kyiv now believe Putin can be trusted to respect future deals.

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Over the past year, it has become evident that Russia is using US-led negotiations to stall for time and divide the transatlantic alliance. Putin has refused to join Ukraine in accepting an unconditional ceasefire and continues to insist on maximalist goals that would mean the end of an independent Ukrainian state. Meanwhile, the Kremlin underlines its lack of commitment to peace by sending low-level delegations led by figures such as presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky, who is best known for penning radically anti-Ukrainian history textbooks.

On the battlefield, Russia’s intentions are equally clear. Despite suffering catastrophic losses over the past four years, the Russian army remains on the offensive and continues to recruit tens of thousands of new troops each month to fill the depleted ranks of Putin’s invasion force.

In parallel, Russia is escalating attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population. During the recent winter months, millions of Ukrainians found themselves without access to heating and electricity amid Arctic temperatures due to a strategic bombing campaign targeting critical civilian infrastructure that aimed to freeze the country into submission. According to UN data, 2025 was the deadliest period of the war for Ukrainian civilians since the first months of the invasion, with the number of civilian deaths rising by 31 percent compared to the previous year.

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With the Kremlin ignoring calls for a compromise peace, the only way to advance negotiations is by putting more pressure on Putin. Failure to do so could have disastrous consequences that would be felt far beyond the borders of a subjugated Ukraine.

The current Russian plan is to drag out negotiations indefinitely while grinding down Ukraine’s resistance and sowing division among Kyiv’s international allies. Moscow seeks to entice the United States with promises of lucrative economic cooperation, while supporting populist political forces across the EU in a bid to weaken European support for Ukraine. If this strategy succeeds, Ukraine may at some point become unable to defend itself.

The collapse of Ukrainian resistance would not bring peace to Europe. Instead, a victorious Russia would take control of Ukraine’s formidable military and the country’s rapidly expanding domestic defense industry. Putin would then command the two most powerful armies in Europe, with unrivaled combat experience and knowledge of drone warfare. In such circumstances, it is dangerously delusional to think that Russia would not seek to go further. At the very least, European governments would be forced to increase defense budgets to levels that would dwarf the current cost of supporting Ukraine.

The steps necessary to secure peace through strength are no secret. First and foremost, this means adequately arming Ukraine. Trump suggested in 2025 that if Russia continues to reject peace efforts, he may provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles. This would be a welcome and meaningful step. Other partners including Germany have also spoken of increasing Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Now is the time to do so.

In parallel, sanctions measures targeting Putin’s war economy must be expanded and tightened. This should include steps to increase the costs for international customers who continue to purchase Russian oil and gas exports, thereby funding the Kremlin war machine.

Western leaders have always had the tools at their disposal to counter the Russian threat. Unfortunately, however, they have so far failed to demonstrate the political will necessary to deploy these tools effectively. This excessive caution is counter-productive and only serves to embolden the Kremlin. Moscow believes it is already at war with the West and treats calls for compromise as signs of weakness. If Kyiv’s partners are serious about stopping Russia, they must abandon appeasement and increase the pressure on Putin.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party and a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Drone superpower Ukraine is an ideal tech partner for the Gulf states

Anatoly Motkin — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 20:43:08 +0000

In recent weeks, the Iran war has shone a spotlight on Ukraine’s emergence as a drone superpower. Kyiv’s decision to help defend the Gulf states against Iranian attack drones by deploying teams of Ukrainian specialists is now highlighting the scope for broader tech sector cooperation between Ukraine and the region. This potential for partnership was underlined by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Saudi Arabia on March 26.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, few analysts predicted that the outgunned Ukrainians would soon fundamentally alter the global understanding of unmanned systems warfare. Yet that is precisely what has happened. From improvised FPV drones strapped with grenades to the long-range naval strike drones that have forced Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to retreat, Ukraine has demonstrated that asymmetric drone warfare can neutralize conventional military advantages in ways that expensive Western defense systems never quite anticipated.

What distinguishes Ukraine’s drone program is not simply its scale, but also the speed and adaptability of its development cycles. Ukrainian engineers, often operating in basements and converted workshops, upgrade drone designs in a matter of days rather than the year-long processes typical of conventional defense procurement. Software updates are pushed out overnight. Lessons from the morning’s combat inform the afternoon’s engineering innovations. The Ukrainian battlefield has become the most demanding product testing environment in the world.

This lean, decentralized, and ruthlessly practical model has not gone unnoticed in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and their Gulf region neighbors. All have been studying the Ukrainian experience carefully. For countries that have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in conventional military hardware only to find themselves operating in a world where a commercially available drone can threaten a warship, the Ukrainian approach represents both a warning and an opportunity.

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The Gulf states are not passive observers of technological change. The UAE’s Vision 2071, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, and Qatar’s National Vision 2030 all share a common ambition to transform their economies from hydrocarbon dependency into diversified, knowledge-based societies where technology plays a central role.

Defense and security technology, long imported wholesale from the United States, United Kingdom, and France, is increasingly identified as a sector where these nations want enhanced domestic capacity. This is not merely a matter of patriotic pride; it is increasingly recognized as a strategic necessity.

For now, ambition and execution remain some distance apart. The Gulf states have capital in abundance and a genuine appetite for technology transfer. What they have found harder to cultivate organically is the specific combination of engineering talent, risk tolerance, regulatory flexibility, and competitive urgency that drives genuine innovation. This is precisely where Ukraine’s wartime technology ecosystem presents an intriguing counterpart.

The case for deeper Ukraine-Gulf technology cooperation rests on synergies that are easy to overlook amid the noise of geopolitics. Ukraine possesses what the Gulf states most covet: Battle-proven engineering expertise; a deep talent pool in software, electronics, and materials science; and a development culture forged under conditions of extreme pressure.

Meanwhile, the Gulf states can offer what Ukraine most urgently needs: Capital, global commercial networks, and the ability to provide a stable platform for technology commercialization at a time when much of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and economic base remain under threat.

Drone technology sits at the most visible intersection of these complementary strengths, but it is far from the only area for potential cooperation. The ecosystem that has made Ukraine’s drone program so formidable is built on broad technical foundations including robust software engineering, AI-assisted target recognition, electronic warfare countermeasures, and sophisticated logistics platforms. Each of these capabilities has substantial civilian and commercial applications in areas that match the priorities of the Gulf states.

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Any deepening of Ukraine-Gulf technology ties must navigate a complex geopolitical landscape. The Gulf states have, with varying degrees of success, sought to maintain working relationships with both Russia and Ukraine throughout the current war.

This studied neutrality is a potentially valuable asset in fostering Ukraine-related technology cooperation. Some Ukrainian companies might prefer partners who can operate without the political complications of deeper NATO engagement, while Gulf-based joint ventures offer a flexibility that Western partners often cannot.

At the same time, the Gulf states maintain active ties with both Russia and China, creating potential risks for Ukraine’s battle-tested tech to travel further than intended. EU and US sanctions packages have repeatedly flagged UAE-based entities for supplying military and dual-use goods to Russia, including microelectronics and UAV components. The threat of Ukrainian defense IP migrating toward Beijing or Moscow through a Gulf intermediary is not theoretical. It is a structural problem that any co-production framework would need to resolve before NATO partners could endorse it.

Western governments are watching these dynamics carefully. There is a legitimate concern in Washington and Brussels about the dual-use nature of drone and AI technologies amid alarm that capabilities developed by Ukraine could, if commercialized through Gulf intermediaries, find their way into the hands of hostile actors.

These concerns will require careful management. But they should not obscure the more fundamental point that technology partnerships between Ukraine and the Gulf, conducted transparently and within a clear governance framework, could potentially serve the strategic interests of both parties and of the broader rules-based international order.

Ukraine’s drone program is the most dramatic expression of a broader technological transformation that the country has undergone since the Euromaidan Revolution of 2014 and, with accelerating urgency, since 2022. The war with Russia has in many ways turbo-charged Ukraine’s tech sector, driving engineers toward defense applications with the same creative energy previously directed at consumer software.

For the Gulf states, engaging with this ecosystem means potentially accessing not just drone know-how but a broader pipeline of technology talent and startup energy. A deliberate focus on Ukrainian technology companies, whether through direct investment, co-investment structures with Ukrainian state entities, or technology accelerator partnerships, would represent a logical extension of existing Gulf region investment strategies.

Transforming this potential into reality requires deliberate institutional architecture. At the governmental level, the frameworks for technology and investment cooperation between Ukraine and the Gulf states remain underdeveloped compared to those with EU member states or the United States. Bilateral investment treaties, technology transfer agreements, and joint venture frameworks need to be negotiated, or existing agreements updated, to reflect the current reality of Ukraine’s technological capabilities and the investment priorities of individual Gulf states.

At the industry level, dedicated platforms for technology matchmaking are needed. Existing tech sector events are useful, but a more targeted mechanism such as an annual Ukraine-Gulf technology forum could provide the sustained attention that one-off exhibitions cannot. Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation and the country’s tech industry associations have the institutional capacity to anchor such an initiative from the Ukrainian side.

At the financial level, the structure of Gulf investment in Ukrainian technology will need to be carefully designed to account for the realities of war, reconstruction, and regulatory complexity. Special purpose vehicles, escrow arrangements, and the use of third-country holding structures may be necessary to provide Gulf investors with the governance certainty they require.

The interest that Gulf region governments and investors are showing in Ukraine’s drone capabilities is, at one level, simply pragmatic. But this interest, if properly cultivated, could serve as the entry point for a much broader and more consequential relationship.

Ukraine needs to rebuild its economy, attract sustainable foreign investment, and establish itself as a technology hub that can thrive in the postwar era. The Gulf states need to accelerate their technology transitions, diversify their strategic partnerships, and develop genuine domestic innovation capacity rather than simply buying capabilities off the shelf from Western defense contractors. These are not competing objectives. They are, in important respects, the same objective approached from different directions.

The drones are the headline. But behind the headline lies the possibility of a durable, mutually beneficial technology partnership between two of the world’s most dynamic and consequential technology stories of the current decade. Whether that possibility is realized will depend on the vision and initiative of policymakers, investors, and entrepreneurs on both sides. The ingredients for something significant are present. The question is whether those involved will have the strategic clarity to combine them.

Anatoly Motkin is president of the StrategEast Center for a New Economy, a non-profit organisation with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, developing the knowledge driven economy in the Eurasian region.

As Iran attacks, the US should provide air defense for Iraqi Kurdistan

Yerevan Saeed — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 19:49:50 +0000

The deadliest single attack on Kurdish security forces since the onset of the war in Iran arrived on March 24, when six Iranian ballistic missiles struck Peshmerga bases in the Soran highlands north of Erbil. The attack resulted in six fatalities and thirty injuries. Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani described the incident as “direct hostile aggression,” while the Peshmerga ministry condemned it as “a hostile act and treachery.” This event represents the latest escalation in a campaign that has significantly altered regional dynamics.

But it was hardly the first escalation. The day the United States and Israel attacked Iran, February 28, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and allied Shia militias launched the most sustained barrage of missiles and drones the Kurdistan Region has ever absorbed. In the first seventy-two hours, more than seventy projectiles struck or were intercepted over Erbil. Targets included Erbil International Airport, the newly opened US consulate general (the largest US consulate in the world), Peshmerga headquarters, and the Harir Air Base. On March 12, a Shahed drone killed French Chief Warrant Officer Arnaud Frion and wounded six soldiers at a coalition training base. A separate strike hit an Italian military installation, prompting Rome to temporarily pull its personnel. By late March, over four hundred separate strikes had hit the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The Khor Mor gas field preemptively shut down gas supplies, triggering electricity blackouts across multiple governorates.

These incidents are part of an established pattern that predate the current war. Throughout 2025, Iranian-backed militias conducted a sustained drone campaign targeting Kurdish energy infrastructure. In February, a kamikaze drone struck Khor Mor during critical energy negotiations with Baghdad. In July, drones targeted the Sarsang oil field shortly before its American operator was scheduled to finalize a new agreement, resulting in a halt of its production of 30,000 barrels per day. In November, another attack on Khor Mor destroyed a newly completed liquefied natural gas facility and reduced electricity generation by nearly 80 percent. The targeting is systematic and intentional, conveying that Tehran can jeopardize Kurdish economic stability, disrupt Western energy partnerships, and impose costs without facing significant consequences.

The sovereignty that isn’t

Baghdad typically responds to proposals for direct US air defense assistance by asserting that such measures would violate Iraqi sovereignty. However, sovereignty is meaningful only when a government can effectively protect its territory and population. Baghdad lacks sufficient control over its federal territory to prevent Iranian missile strikes on Erbil, ongoing proxy drone campaigns against Kurdish energy infrastructure, or attacks on coalition facilities. The government has not established a monopoly on the use of force, as Iran-aligned militias operate both within and outside formal state structures without restriction. Regardless of these distinctions, the outcome remains unchanged.

Following the February strikes, Kurdish leaders Masoud Barzani and Bafel Talabani urged Baghdad to implement substantive measures to halt militia attacks, emphasizing that their restraint was not unlimited. While Baghdad issued condemnations, it did not intercept any attacks. When a government repeatedly fails to fulfill its duty to protect its territory, the legitimacy of its sovereign veto over external defensive assistance is undermined. The primary violation of Iraqi sovereignty is not the potential deployment of a US-supplied shield in Erbil, but rather Tehran’s accurate assessment that it can strike Iraqi territory without consequence.

The Taiwan precedent

The United States has established a precedent for addressing similar challenges. The Taiwan Relations Act obligates Washington to provide Taiwan with defensive arms and to maintain the capacity to resist coercion. Since the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Taiwan has been treated as a de facto Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) for the transfer of defense articles and services. The KRI presents a direct parallel: It is a self-governing entity where the recognized sovereign claims exclusive control over defense, faces a hostile power employing both conventional and proxy tactics, and is unable to acquire necessary defense systems due to its lack of sovereign status. If the United States were to designate the KRI as an MNNA for air defense, it would provide the KRI priority access to foreign military sales, streamline the US review process for arms sales to KRI, and circumvent the bureaucratic obstacles imposed by Baghdad’s procedural veto. This approach would not alter Iraq’s borders but would acknowledge the existing reality.

What the shield looks like

The goal is not to duplicate Israel’s layered air defense architecture, but rather to develop a credible deterrence system tailored to the specific threats faced in northern Iraq: armed drones, loitering munitions, short- and medium-range rockets, and the ballistic missiles deployed by the IRGC in January 2024 and 2026. A US package should include counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar systems, counter-drone platforms, Shahed-type devices, integrated radar, hardened command-and-control infrastructure, and the selective deployment of Patriot batteries at critical locations.

The events of February demonstrated the effectiveness of existing US air defenses in Erbil, which intercepted most incoming projectiles and minimized damage to US facilities. However, these systems do not provide comprehensive coverage for the broader Kurdish population and infrastructure. The fatal March 24 attack highlighted this gap, as Peshmerga bases in Soran remain outside the US defense perimeter. Establishing a Kurdish air defense layer constitutes an extension of force protection, particularly as the KRI now hosts the majority of US forces in Iraq following withdrawals from other Iraqi bases.

How to get there

Legislative mechanisms are available to address these needs. Section 1266 of the fiscal year (FY) 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the Pentagon to develop a plan to equip and train Peshmerga forces, including air defense provisions, but both deadlines were missed. The FY2026 NDAA, enacted in December 2025, allocates $343 million to the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund for partner forces in Iraq and Syria, which could be adapted to support site defense, radar, and short-range intercept systems for the Peshmerga. The SPEED Act, included in the same legislation, reduces Pentagon acquisition timelines from eight hundred days to approximately five months and facilitates the deployment of commercial and military-off-the-shelf systems. Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act grants the president drawdown authority for unforeseen emergencies, a mechanism previously used for Ukraine and Taiwan. Congress should establish a KRI-specific air and missile defense line item in the next appropriations package, with notification to Baghdad but without granting Baghdad veto power.

Washington faces a choice: continue to defer to Baghdad’s procedural objections while Iran conducts unimpeded strikes on Kurdish territory or acknowledge the strategic reality and take decisive action. The former approach results in inaction, while the latter helps establish deterrence. The recent missile strike on the Peshmerga’s 7th Division has eliminated any remaining ambiguity. Washington should send a message to Tehran that Erbil is no longer a vulnerable target and to Baghdad that sovereignty entails responsibility rather than an unconditional veto. Where this responsibility has not been met, Washington should be prepared to act.

Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Saeed is the Barzani scholar-in-residence in the Department of Politics, Governance & Economics at American University’s School of International Service, where he also serves as director of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace.

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The Anthropic standoff reveals a larger crisis of trust over AI

Tess deBlanc-Knowles — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 17:14:05 +0000

WASHINGTON—The recent standoff between Anthropic and the Pentagon over terms of use for the company’s artificial intelligence (AI) models has thrust the role of AI in military and intelligence operations into the national dialogue. As the Pentagon’s contract negotiations with Anthropic broke down and it designated the company a supply chain risk earlier this month, the episode exposed the fraying social contract among leading AI companies, the federal government, and the American public over responsible AI use.

How Americans view AI

Anthropic’s red lines in the negotiations centered on two issues: the use of its models for the mass surveillance of US citizens and in autonomous weapons. Both topics resonate with an American public that remains deeply skeptical of the technology. A 2025 poll conducted by Gallup and the Special Competitive Studies Project found that 60 percent of Americans distrust AI somewhat or fully. This stands in contrast to much of the rest of the world. According to Stanford’s annual AI Index, large majorities in China, Indonesia, and Thailand (75-80 percent) believe AI-powered products offer more benefits than drawbacks. In the United States, that number is a meager 39 percent.

Several factors drive this skepticism. Safety concerns, including fears related to AI-driven psychosis and AI-enabled teen suicides, feature prominently in public discourse, as do worries about the technology’s environmental footprint and its impact on jobs. Search “AI and water” on Instagram and you’ll be flooded with posts from influencers calling on followers to boycott AI over the energy and water demands of the data centers powering it. Recent mass layoffs, such as fintech company Block’s decision to cut 40 percent of its workforce due to the integration of AI into the company’s workflows, have amplified fears around broader workforce contractions. Some studies have extrapolated from initial data around AI adoption to suggest that the technology will create more jobs than it eliminates, but much of the public discussion has focused on the prospect of significant job losses on the horizon, raising anxiety among white-collar workers.

This unease with AI is increasingly visible in politics. More than 1,500 AI-related bills have been introduced in state legislatures in 2026 alone, many focused on protecting consumers and minors from AI-related harms. AI skepticism has come from both sides of the aisle. Data centers have drawn criticism from left-leaning environmental advocates and from deep-red communities alike. A study found that twenty data center projects were blocked in the second quarter of 2025 due to local opposition, representing $98 billion in stalled investment. This year, Democratic and Republican lawmakers have begun backing away from data center investments that they recently championed. At least six Democratic governors used their state of the state addresses to announce plans to roll back incentives or impose new regulations on data centers. And Democratic lawmakers in New York and Maine, as well as Republican lawmakers in Oklahoma, are calling for temporary bans.

The Trump administration’s approach to AI

The second Trump administration has made AI a national priority from the outset. Just three days after his inauguration, US President Donald Trump issued the first of seven executive orders related to AI released in 2025, which signaled the administration’s intent to “sustain and enhance America’s global AI dominance in order to promote human flourishing, economic competitiveness, and national security.” The order set the tone for the administration’s follow-on actions, including a foundational AI Action Plan that positioned the United States as going all-in on AI against the backdrop of a rising global competition with China. So far, the administration has expanded AI education opportunities, worked to harness AI for science, accelerated permitting for data center construction, and attempted to prevent states from passing laws regulating AI.

Yet, even before the Anthropic-Pentagon controversy, tension between the administration’s position on AI and its own political base were surfacing. Upon the release of the AI Action Plan in July 2025, former US Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene issued a pointed rebuke. She warned that “competing with China does not mean become like China by threatening state rights, replacing human jobs on a mass scale, creating mass poverty, and resulting in potentially devastating effects on our environment and critical water supply.” The administration’s push to preempt and pause future state laws regulating AI was defeated twice in Congress prior to being advanced by executive order in December 2025. The original congressional campaigns incurred widespread pushback from across the political spectrum, including a request to remove the legislative provision, which was signed by seventeen Republican governors.

Recent announcements suggest the administration is beginning to recognize public resistance. In his State of the Union address, Trump introduced a ratepayer protection pledge that calls on technology companies to commit to covering the cost of increased energy production to support the build-out of data centers. This is intended to prevent those costs from being passed on to local communities. Seven of the largest players in AI have since signed on. A National Policy Framework on AI released at the end of last week reaffirms this push and lays out the administration’s legislative priorities for the technology, including enhanced safeguards for children, increased action to combat AI-enabled scams, and protections for individuals against unauthorized distribution of AI-generated voice or image likenesses.

Despite these moves, the administration’s handling of the Anthropic standoff has intensified debates in public and within the tech sector around the dangers of AI and the necessity of building guardrails for responsible use. The administration’s maximalist position that contracts with AI companies should provide flexibility for the government to employ AI for “all lawful uses” runs counter to US public opinion. Indeed, 80 percent of US adults believe the government should maintain rules for AI safety and data security, even if doing so slows development.

Public distrust on display

Following OpenAI CEO Sam Altman’s announcement on February 27 that the company had signed a deal with the Pentagon that it claimed contained the same provisions that Anthropic had been fighting for, public and private reactions were swift, with many skeptical of the company’s claims. Uninstalls of the ChatGPT app jumped 295 percent overnight and a #QuitGPT campaign gained steam on social media. Some OpenAI employees publicly criticized their company’s stance and OpenAI’s hardware lead resigned in protest.

Anthropic, meanwhile, filed suit, contesting the Pentagon’s designation of the company as a supply chain risk following the inability of the company and the Pentagon to reach an agreement on contractual terms. The case has attracted amicus briefs from a wide range of groups, including tech sector workers, Catholic theologians and ethicists, and the American Civil Liberties Union. A brief signed by a group of almost forty employees from Google and OpenAI, including Google’s chief scientist, affirmed a shared belief in the risks underpinning Anthropic’s contractual red lines. Their brief noted the dangers to US democracy posed by AI-enabled surveillance and warned that today’s AI systems are too immature to be relied on for use in lethal autonomous weapons.

While the immediate controversy may be fading, the episode has already provided a revealing window into US sentiment around AI and the ongoing litigation will keep the issue in public focus. A poll conducted by NBC News this month after the standoff found that 57 percent of registered voters believe the risks of AI outweigh its benefits.

That number should command attention. For the administration’s and the tech sector’s AI ambitions to translate into the economic growth and national security gains that policymakers and CEOs envision, it will take a concerted effort to rebuild the social contract with the public on AI. Treating public skepticism as noise to be managed rather than a signal to be heeded risks causing rapid political polarization on AI. This, in turn, could cause a self-imposed slowdown in the United States’ ability to realize AI opportunities at home and compete effectively abroad, stifling government and industry AI initiatives alike.

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What Iran’s attacks on Turkey reveal about NATO’s future

Ali Mammadov — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 17:12:23 +0000

The US-Israeli war against Iran has not bypassed Turkey. Since the beginning of the conflict, NATO air defenses intercepted three ballistic missiles fired from Iran toward Turkish airspace, according to Turkish officials. This included an incident that produced an explosion near Incirlik Air Base. Turkey has asked Tehran for clarification, while Iran has denied deliberately targeting Turkish territory. The result is a strategically sensitive reality: A NATO ally has found itself exposed to direct spillover from a regional war it is trying hard not to enter.

The implications extend well beyond Turkey. These incidents are testing NATO’s credibility under modern conditions, where threats often fall into the gray zone between peacetime nuisance and full-scale armed attack. In such cases, the Alliance faces a genuine strategic dilemma. It must reassure an exposed ally and preserve deterrence while also avoiding an impulsive response that could widen a regional war and create a far more dangerous confrontation. Turkey’s current predicament shows that the future of NATO will be shaped not only by whether its members can fight together in a worst-case scenario, but by whether it can respond credibly to dangerous cases that fall short of one.

At first glance, the obvious question is whether this is an Article 5 moment. But Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was never designed to operate as a mechanical trigger. The treaty states that an armed attack against one ally shall be considered an attack against all, while also leaving each ally to take “such action as it deems necessary.” NATO’s own explanation of collective defense and Article 5 makes the same point: Solidarity is firm, but the form of assistance remains up to member states’ political and strategic calculations rather than being automatically triggered. That is why Alliance leaders were able to keep Article 5 off the table after the first incident without suggesting indifference to Turkey’s security.

That should not be read as passivity. Turkish officials said explicitly that NATO air defenses shot down the missiles, with the interceptions carried out by Alliance assets in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara also announced on March 10 that the Alliance reinforced Turkey’s air defenses by deploying a US Patriot system near the Kürecik radar site in Malatya, a key NATO facility for missile tracking and early warning. These steps show that the Alliance is already doing what modern deterrence increasingly requires: Reinforcing defenses, reducing vulnerability, and containing escalation before it gets out of hand.

Still, restraint by itself does not fully answer the credibility question. Alliance credibility today cannot rest only on treaty language or quiet military measures. It also depends on whether exposed allies and potential adversaries can see that attacks affecting NATO territory produce visible political seriousness. If repeated incidents on allied territory are met in a way that feels too muted, too improvised, or too private, uncertainty begins to grow around what solidarity actually looks like in practice. NATO does not need to escalate militarily every time a missile or drone crosses into allied airspace. It does, however, need to show more clearly that pressure on member territory is noticed, discussed, and answered with coordinated resolve.

Turkey is an especially important test case because it sits on NATO’s southern flank, where Alliance challenges have often looked different from those on the eastern flank. Much of NATO’s recent debate has focused, understandably, on Russia’s war against Ukraine and the defense of eastern Europe. But NATO has long insisted that its commitment extends to threats “from all directions” under a 360-degree approach. If that language is to carry strategic weight, the Alliance has to show that the security of a southern ally under regional pressure is treated as part of the same collective credibility problem, even when the source of danger is different.

Turkey’s own behavior also deserves careful attention. Ankara has not sought Article 4 consultations, and Turkish officials have signaled that they do not want to be pulled more deeply into the Iran war. That caution is understandable. A government can view an incident as serious while still deciding that a formal Alliance process is not the wisest next step. This is precisely what makes the Turkey case so revealing. Modern Alliance management depends not only on what NATO is willing to do, but also on what an exposed ally wants NATO to do, and when. At times, an ally may prefer reinforcement and quiet coordination to a dramatic collective declaration. However, even if Turkey demurs from direct requests or consultations, NATO offering these things still benefits the Alliance’s reputation in Ankara and among the general public in Turkey.

At the same time, caution should not obscure a larger institutional lesson. Turkey has turned to NATO consultation mechanisms before during regional crises, especially in 2012, when violence spilling over from Syria led Turkey to seek Article 4 consultations and later prompted NATO’s deployment of Patriot batteries to help protect Turkish territory. The current moment therefore fits into a broader pattern: Turkey periodically reminds NATO that the southern flank can become a front line with little warning, and NATO periodically rediscovers that credibility is not only an eastern-flank question. The difference today is that the surrounding international environment is even more polarized, making calibrated responses more difficult and more important.

This is also part of a wider pattern of pressure on Alliance boundaries. In recent years, Russian drones and missiles have repeatedly entered or threatened NATO airspace, prompting calls for a more coordinated response. Alliance commanders have argued that firm responses to Russian incursions have helped deter further violations. The pattern is becoming clear: NATO is increasingly being tested not only by invasion scenarios, but by limited, ambiguous, and politically complicated actions that probe its thresholds without crossing them in the clearest possible way. Turkey’s experience with Iranian missiles now belongs in that same category of Alliance stress test.

For NATO, the challenge is to prevent these gray-zone incidents from producing a credibility gap. If every incident below the level of a major attack is treated as too minor for a serious political response, adversaries may conclude that there is broad space to pressure Alliance members without triggering meaningful consequences. If, on the other hand, every such incident is treated as a trigger for dramatic escalation, deterrence risks becoming recklessness. The future of the Alliance depends on avoiding both errors. What is needed is a stronger middle ground, one in which NATO pairs strategic restraint with visible solidarity, rapid consultation, and practical defensive action.

That is why the Alliance now needs a clearer framework for military incursions that fall short of open war. Drones, missile overflights, limited strikes, airspace violations, and similar coercive acts no longer belong to the margins of Alliance security. They are becoming part of its daily strategic environment. NATO should therefore develop more explicit procedures for what happens when members’ territory is exposed to repeated sub-threshold attacks. Such a framework would not replace Article 5, nor would it commit the Alliance to automatic escalation. It would instead clarify the menu of responses available below that threshold: immediate consultations, public statements of solidarity, temporary defensive deployments, intelligence coordination, air and missile defense reinforcement, and clear diplomatic signaling toward the source of the incident. In today’s security environment, credibility requires that allies and adversaries alike understand that NATO has a plan not only for full-scale war, but also for the increasingly common forms of aggression that fall below it.

That means several steps should now be considered. NATO should become more comfortable using consultation mechanisms quickly and flexibly when allied territory is repeatedly exposed to missile, drone, or airspace incidents, even when Article 5 is not under discussion. The Alliance should make defensive reinforcement more visible, especially on the southern flank, where reassurance has often been quieter than on the eastern one. It should also improve public signaling. Even where NATO chooses restraint, it should communicate that limited attacks on allied territory are neither being normalized nor ignored. These steps would not make the Alliance more escalatory. They would make it more credible.

Turkey’s recent missile incidents therefore reveal something important about NATO’s future. The Alliance’s credibility in this challenging period will not be judged only by whether it can invoke Article 5 in the most dramatic scenario. It will also be judged by whether it can handle repeated, dangerous, sub-threshold challenges without appearing passive, divided, or uncertain. In that sense, the attacks affecting Turkey are not just a regional security story. They are a warning that NATO’s next great test may come not from a single unmistakable attack, but from the accumulation of smaller crises that force the Alliance to prove that prudence and credibility can still go together.

Ali Mammadov is a PhD researcher at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government focusing on global stability, alliance formation, and rising powers. You can find him on X.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Israeli settler terrorism demands a tougher US response

Cleary Waldo — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 16:12:32 +0000

WASHINGTON—Under the cover of the Iran war, lawless violence has exploded in the West Bank.

On February 27, extremist Israeli settlers attacked two left-wing Israeli activists near Nablus, sending them to the hospital . Three days later, extremist Israeli settlers shot and killed Muhammad and Fahim Taha Muammar after the Palestinian brothers confronted the group for destroying an olive grove near the village of Qaryut and reportedly attempting to enter private property. On March 8, extremist Israeli settlers raided the northern village of Khirbet Abu Falah, killing three, bringing the total number of Palestinian civilians killed in the West Bank in the past month to six. On the evening of March 21, Eid al-Fitr, more than one hundred extremist settlers launched at least twenty attacks in the West Bank, setting fire to cars and homes, vandalizing property, and beating Palestinian residents.

To protect the victims of this violence, gain Israeli government cooperation in preventing it, and preserve broader US diplomatic priorities, the United States should draw on a key counterterrorism tool: the designation of perpetrators as specially designated global terrorists (SDGTs).

Although there has been a surge in extremist settler violence since the war with Iran began on February 28, attacks have been steadily increasing for far longer. According to data released by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Shin Bet in January, extremist settlers perpetrated 867 attacks against Palestinians and Israeli security forces in the West Bank in 2025, a 27 percent increase from 2024. According to this data, severe incidents of nationalistic crime (which Israeli national security entities acknowledge as terrorism) increased more than 50 percent from 2024 levels, more than doubling since 2023. In November, after a particularly intense period of attacks against Palestinian civilians, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself acknowledged the unacceptability of the violence and the stain with which such activity threatens to mark the “large community of law-abiding, loyal settlers.” IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir also warned at the time that should “anarchists . . . set the area aflame,” Israeli military resources would need to be “immediately diverted” from other fronts.

Zamir’s characterization of extremist settlers as anarchists (terminology echoed by others, including head of the Israeli Central Command Avi Bluth) highlights a double standard in the IDF’s definitions: Although it classifies “severe incidents” as terrorism, it does not define those who perpetrate those acts of terrorism as terrorists, citing a lack of organizational coherence compared to Palestinian terrorist groups. This distinction, however, is arbitrary, and the IDF’s online materials regarding Palestinian terrorism show no compunction against applying the deed to the individual, calling lone wolf terrorists a “huge challenge.”

Extremist Israeli settler violence readily meets both the academic and policy definitions of terrorism: the deliberate creation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of a political objective (with no organizational threshold). The perpetrators destroy Palestinian property, deface buildings (including houses of worship), and kill and steal livestock. They also harass, injure, and kill Palestinian civilians. These acts are often done with the express goal of instilling fear in the civilian population as a means of securing permanent Jewish sovereignty over the West Bank. As extremist settler violence has climbed, the IDF has had increased tactical success in thwarting Palestinian terror attacks in the West Bank, weakening the claim that Israeli terrorism is merely a reaction to Palestinian provocation. The stark contrast between the IDF’s efficacy against Palestinian as opposed to Israeli terrorism also demonstrates that settlers’ impunity is a product of prioritization and political will, not capacity.

The Trump administration has an appropriate tool at its disposal to prevent such violence: the SDGT designation. As outlined in Executive Order 13224, the secretary of state, in consultation with the secretary of the treasury and attorney general, may designate individuals as SDGTs for having committed or posed a risk of committing acts of terrorism that would adversely affect US national interests.

An SDGT designation would give Netanyahu the political cover to aggressively combat the escalating settler terror threat while sticking close to Trump during this election season.

Designating the individuals behind this violence would be legally sound, since the violence falls not only under widely accepted scholarly definitions of terrorism but also the State Department criteria for an SDGT designation. The designation would similarly be strategically justified in light of the 2025 uptick in terrorist settler attacks and the Israeli government’s increasing willingness to acknowledge the violence’s corrosive impact on Israeli security.

The decision to designate an entity is also a political one, and US policymakers consider much more than the legal criteria for designation when taking such a step. It may seem unlikely that Trump would move to designate extremist Israeli settlers (especially after rolling back Biden-era sanctions on Israeli extremists on day one of his second administration). However, there is clear policy utility for this move, which Trump would have unique political latitude to pursue. Trump has enormous credibility with the Israeli public, thanks to his role in the return of the hostages that remained in Hamas captivity and his participation in strikes against Iran. He also has unprecedented leverage over Netanyahu and thus would be largely insulated from the political repercussions—both in the United States and Israel—that his predecessors would have faced had they attempted this step.

Although a third Intifada did not erupt in the West Bank as many feared after the attacks on October 7, 2023, extremist settler violence has helped keep the territory at a dangerous simmer. It also imperils broader regional progress, including Trump’s own efforts to preserve the cease-fire in Gaza and expand the Abraham Accords and other regional integration mechanisms. Such violence can weaken support for the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, should Ramallah be seen as ineffective in preventing terror against the population. Hamas, on the other hand, benefits politically from this violence. As the administration attempts to disarm and dismantle Hamas in Gaza, it should similarly work to buttress the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. An SDGT designation would thus not only be a blow to the extremist settlers perpetrating terrorism against Palestinians; it would also be a blow to Hamas and, critically, the group’s political future beyond Gaza.

The administration recognizes the risks that the situation in the West Bank poses. In October, Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio criticized the Knesset’s vote to formally annex all West Bank settlements, calling the vote an “insult” and “political stunt,” and beginning a period of so-called “Bibi-sitting” by US officials. Three weeks later, after a vicious round of attacks during the height of the olive harvest, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee condemned the violence as terrorism, a particularly significant characterization considering Huckabee’s usual pro-settler positioning. The timing of these officials’ comments, immediately following the Gaza cease-fire deal and as the administration worked toward a United Nations Security Council Resolution, suggests a keen awareness that West Bank activity could torpedo US efforts.

The war with Iran has brought a surge of incidents and reshuffled political incentives for Trump and Netanyahu, together making designation both more necessary and feasible. For Netanyahu, domestic pressure on this issue has been mounting. In a speech this month on the Knesset floor, Yesh Atid Party MK Meirav Cohen lambasted Netanyahu for excusing extremist settlers’ actions, arguing that the egregiousness of recent incidents has broken “the entire facade of denial.” Prominent opposition politician Yair Golan recently warned that “extremist ministers” backing “Jewish terrorism” in the West Bank amounts to an “abandonment of Israel’s security.” Even with war raging overhead, mainstream Israeli media has extensively covered the recent spate of attacks, criticizing the prime minister’s (and other senior political and military officials’) unwillingness to forcefully confront the issue.

Netanyahu is well aware of the incendiary effect of continued terrorism against Palestinians in the West Bank: Last week, even as Iran retaliated and Israelis routinely rushed to shelters, the prime minister held a security assessment at the headquarters of the IDF Central Command, which has responsibility for the West Bank. On Monday, the IDF announced that an infantry battalion previously bound for Lebanon had been diverted to the West Bank, the day after Zamir told Northern Command officers that the fight against Hezbollah “has only begun.” And on Tuesday, Channel 12 Chief Political Analyst Amit Segal reported that after pressure from the Trump administration, the Israeli government is expected to establish a Ministry of Defense unit responsible for combating violence by the “hilltop youth,” the term used to describe the predominantly young men perpetrating the overwhelming majority of the violence.

However, settler terrorism continues not because Israel lacks the resources to combat it, but because laws are simply not enforced. The fact that private pressure from Washington leads to such milquetoast, red-herring steps from Jerusalem underscores the need for public and tangible US policy shifts to truly move the needle.

An SDGT designation would give Netanyahu the political cover to aggressively combat the escalating settler terror threat while sticking close to Trump during this election season. And, it will lower the temperature and lessen the likelihood of a third Intifada, in the service of both Israeli national security and US regional interests. The designation (if coupled with aggressive Israeli action) would also send an important signal to Riyadh of Washington and Jerusalem’s continued commitment to work toward eventual normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Annexation legislation in the Knesset and civilian-perpetrated violence are separate issues, but they reveal the same underlying dynamic. The Israeli government’s official acts threaten to inflame tensions not only due to the confounding new realities they generate on the ground, but also because of the more fundamental problems they signal about Israeli government intentions. Having acknowledged the prevalence of extremist settler violence, rhetorical condemnation without repercussions for perpetrators implicitly expresses actual Israeli policy and intentions.

The same logic applies to US policy: Anything less than a full-throated condemnation of settler terrorism will be interpreted as tacit acceptance of the untenable status quo—a status quo that has resulted in the deaths of nine US citizens since 2022. When the war with Iran ends and Washington attempts to pick up where it left off on its prewar priorities, the situation in the West Bank could be the difference between a fragile postwar moment of opportunity and yet another crisis.

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After Maduro: Latin America’s policy community reassesses the US-China balance

Santiago Villa, Thayz Guimarães, Parsifal D’Sola — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 15:39:53 +0000

The US capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, coupled with the support the White House has given Maduro’s successors, has significant implications for China’s position in the region. Although Venezuela has been a frustrating partner for China—largely due to prolonged debt repayment delays and corruption-marred joint projects—Beijing has repeatedly stressed its commitment to the bilateral relationship. The day before Maduro’s capture, China’s special envoy for Latin American affairs, Qiu Xiaoqi, visited Miraflores Palace to review more than six hundred bilateral agreements and to express support for the regime amid US operations against Venezuela-linked oil tankers.

Although Maduro has been removed from office, his second-in-command Delcy Rodríguez now leads the same regime, prompting a recalibration of how China’s key bilateral relationships in the hemisphere are understood in light of US intervention in Venezuela. This piece examines whether Latin American policymakers and analysts view China’s reaction to Maduro’s ouster as evidence of a shift in Beijing’s regional diplomatic strategy—and whether this episode is influencing how other countries in the region weigh their US–China relationships.

We interviewed thirteen influential sources across diplomatic, military, and academic circles in Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic, spanning a wide range of political perspectives. While this is by no means a representative sample, respondents with different political views were aligned on key aspects of the new playing field in Latin America as it relates to both China and the United States.

After providing a general overview of how US and Chinese actions are interpreted across the region, we turn to Brazil, China’s largest trading partner in the region, and Colombia, the country most directly affected by developments in Venezuela.

Latin America feels a seismic shift

Most of our sources, both left and right leaning, agree the US intervention in Venezuela is a game changer and it will likely modify the power dynamics in the region. They see it as a hard blow to China and a strengthening of US influence in Latin America. For example, Ernesto Samper, former president of Colombia (1994–1998) and former secretary general of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, 2014–2017)—who has been close to the region’s left-wing leaders—doesn’t believe the US intervention in Venezuela was meant to combat drug trafficking or strengthen access to oil revenues. Instead, he sees it as a geopolitical strategy. The intervention represents an attempt to weaken alliances between Latin American governments and external powers, particularly China. The objective is to consolidate what might be termed a Monroe Doctrine 2.0, reasserting US hegemonic control over Latin America. Venezuela is a symbolic target in a wider approach that seeks to assert regional dominance in the face of China’s growing influence. “This catches the Latin American region in its worst moment. We had never been so disconnected,” Samper said. “We’re very divided because part of [Donald] Trump’s diplomacy is not having relations with states, but with governments.”

Yet Samper warns against reading this rapprochement as a definitive realignment. Chinese economic penetration in Latin America, he argues, has already reached a point of near irreversibility—China is now the primary trading partner for most South American countries, and its infrastructure investments are deeply embedded in the region’s development strategies. For most major Latin American economies, China is either the largest or second-largest trading partner. The United States doesn’t have the capacity to replace China economically in the region. “The Chinese have a lot of experience in something Trump simply does not have, which is patience,” Samper said. “And I believe they have been penetrating Latin America to the point where those advances should be considered irreversible.”

Carlos Calderón, researcher and defense expert at the military-run Colombian War College, whose views are more aligned with the center-right than Samper’s, nonetheless has a similar take: “‘Operation Southern Spear’ and Maduro’s capture, ‘Operation Absolute Resolve,’ no doubt send tectonic waves throughout the region, and are meant to signal the United States is back and wants to have a stronger influence than China in the region. Events are too recent to say that Latin American countries are reorienting their relations with China, but I’d say it’s very likely that relations with China will be restructured.”

Behind closed doors, according to Calderón, military leaders in Colombia and neighboring countries that struggle with organized crime networks are welcoming the change in US tactics—not necessarily because they agree that operations such as blowing up drug boats in the Caribbean and Pacific are appropriate, but because they signal what they feel was a needed change in the status quo. They welcome a United States that is more assertive regarding its military presence in the region. “Behind closed doors, military leaders are glad about Operation Southern Spear,” Calderón said. “They wanted a government, either Democrat or Republican, that doesn’t matter to them, that would kick the chess board, so to speak. We’ve been at that [war on drugs] two decades and no pieces have been moved, then we need a reset. Sometimes you have to introduce a little bit of chaos to make a situation more dynamic.”

As the United States assumes this hard-power stance, China’s lack of such power is starker. Maurício Santoro, a political scientist specializing in Brazil–China relations, said the US operation in Venezuela revealed China has limited capabilities when projecting military power in the Western Hemisphere. China is economically vital to Latin America but is not a strong and effective military actor in the region.

A senior Brazilian source familiar with the matter, who asked to remain anonymous, said Chinese officials had privately expressed concern about how the lack of a Chinese military response after Maduro’s removal might be interpreted in Latin America. According to this source, Chinese officials asked whether the region would view China as weak or unable to defend its political partners against unilateral US actions.

Paulo Filho, a retired Brazilian Army colonel who holds a master’s degree in defense and strategy studies from China’s National Defense University, said China’s leadership is still “learning how to be a superpower” in the sense of projecting power beyond its traditional zone of influence. Retired Colonel Rafael Almeida, who is also a graduate of China’s National Defense University, said that the crisis had produced a “reality check” for the region. He summed this up in a single phrase: “China is economically indispensable, but the United States remains politically central.” Almeida also said the episode stressed the urgency of reassessing security concerns and drove home the idea that aligning with either the United States or China has become dangerous and strategically costly.

Caribbean observers, in the meantime, have their eyes on Cuba and are anxious to determine if there will be a domino effect that will cause the decades-long communist regime to follow a path similar to that of Venezuela. “Dominicans are hopeful that Cuba will have a similar outcome for the best, and that Venezuela’s developments lead to improvements,” said Campos de Moya, former assistant to the vice president of the Dominican Republic and former ambassador assigned to the Foreign Ministry. “There are some voices that don’t agree with this view, but the way the situation has unfolded leads most Dominicans, politicians and business leaders, to support what the US is doing in Venezuela and Cuba.”

De Moya says there were concerns in the region that US action against Venezuela and Cuba could spark a wider military conflict with China and Russia, but recent developments signal that won’t happen. He further suggests it’s a good moment for the United States to pressure the Dominican Republic to flip its diplomatic recognition once again from China to Taiwan. “The business community in the Dominican Republic is very upset with China and everything is in place for the country to step back from that relationship,” de Moya said. “The possibility of flipping back to Taiwan is even stronger now.”

One of our few sources who had a different view and didn’t believe the US removal of Maduro is a game changer for regional diplomatic relations was Ricardo Ferrer, fellow at the Center for Secure Free Society and former national director of criminal intelligence for the right-wing Javier Milei government in Argentina. Ferrer doesn’t think China’s position in Venezuela has meaningfully weakened because Beijing’s influence is structural. Ferrer notes that China’s influence in Venezuela is rooted in telecommunications, digital governance, logistics, data systems, and opaque contracts that persist across leadership changes. As an example, he cited Huawei’s extensive role in telecom infrastructure and ZTE-linked databases tied to citizens’ IDs as forms of durable leverage that shape political control through technology. He thinks China’s muted response follows its long-standing strategy toward the hemisphere: avoid direct security competition with the United States while maintaining embedded commercial and infrastructural influence. “There is absolutely no sign of a decline in Chinese influence, which in Venezuela is not solely determined by the economic situation,” Ferrer said.

Brazil: Adapting to a new context and diversifying

Brazil publicly condemned the bombings of alleged drug boats and Maduro’s removal through an official statement that characterized the US action as a “grave affront to Venezuela’s sovereignty,” a highly dangerous precedent, and a violation of international law that threatens Latin America’s long-standing aspiration to remain a “zone of peace.” President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva echoed this position on social media, calling the events unacceptable and urging a robust response through the United Nations. Collectively, these messages reaffirm Brazil’s emphasis on multilateralism and the principle of non-intervention.

Some recent Lula administration initiatives suggest defense issues are garnering greater attention—at least behind the scenes—following the Venezuelan crisis. This has prompted discussions on budget strengthening, deterrence stances, and expanding the institutional role of the armed forces in Brazil’s national strategy. According to high-level sources, the crisis and the volatile regional environment have emphasized the need to strengthen defense capacities.

Rather than a departure from the country’s diplomacy-first tradition, Brazilian decision-makers are framing this readjustment as an adaptation to a new era of major-power competition in which non-intervention norms are weakened. The US operation has renewed fears that it will apply intervention and unilateral coercion whenever its interests are at stake.

The context of the US intervention also caught Brazil in a sensitive position. Brazil had just resolved its own dispute with the Trump administration, which began on April 2, 2025, when Trump imposed a 50-percent tariff on Brazilian imports in retaliation for the prosecution of his political ally, former President Jair Bolsonaro, over an attempted coup d’etat. The tariffs were suspended on November 14, 2025, after several rounds of diplomatic negotiations.

Against this backdrop, Brazil and the European Union (EU) formally signed the EU–Mercosur agreement on January 17, 2026, concluding more than two decades of negotiations. The agreement, which will need ratification by the European Parliament and national legislatures before entering into force, is described as creating one of the world’s largest bilateral free trade areas, covering roughly 700 million consumers and giving Brasília an additional avenue to diversify trade and investment partners amid heightened uncertainty. The timing suggests an effort to increase economic resilience and reduce strategic vulnerability by deepening ties with other players besides the United States and China.

Colombia: Getting closer to the United States

Colombia’s Ministry of Foreign Relations rejected US military intervention in Venezuela and issued a statement that echoed Brazil’s stance, describing the intervention as “actions that have placed at risk the territorial integrity and political autonomy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.” It called for the issue to be taken to the UN Security Council and treated multilaterally. The day of the attack, the Colombian government also sent thirty thousand troops to patrol the border at several crossings, from northern Guajira to Arauca.

In the days following the capture of Maduro, President Gustavo Petro—whose left-wing politics are aligned with Lula’s—received threats from Trump, who hinted at conducting a similar operation in Colombia. As part of a deescalation approach, Petro sought an urgent one-on-one meeting with Trump in the White House to discuss the US intervention, oversight of Venezuela, and the role Colombia could play, signaling Colombia was willing to work with the United States.

No press was allowed in the room but statements from each side offer a glimpse into the conversation. Petro said they discussed counternarcotics operations targeting transnational kingpins (and that he gave Trump a list of names), skepticism toward the effectiveness of sanctions against Venezuela, ways to reactivate the Venezuelan economy (including energy projects), having the United States mediate tensions between Colombia and Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa, declassifying US intelligence related to violence in Colombia, and diplomatic optics such as inviting Trump to Cartagena and reframing Trump’s slogan as “Make the Americas Great Again.” Trump and the White House said the meeting went well, emphasized counternarcotics cooperation as the main focus, and characterized Trump’s approach as preferring diplomacy.

The rapprochement follows a deeply confrontational 2025 between Trump and Petro. In September, the Colombian president’s US visa was revoked, and in October, he and several members of his family were placed under Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions, despite the absence of any US indictments against them. According to Calderón, one objective of the visit was to persuade Trump to lift those sanctions before Petro leaves office in August. Securing their removal would not only ease personal and political constraints on Petro’s final months in power but also signal a partial normalization of bilateral relations after a year marked by open hostility.

Although the immediate outcome of the US intervention in Venezuela has been a reset in US–Colombia relations, Calderón also noted that, in recent years, the Colombian military has felt a need to diversify its partnerships, including in security cooperation and arms procurement. “We can’t help but see that countries such as Brazil and Peru cooperate tightly with the US, but that doesn’t stop them from also talking and establishing security relations with China or Russia . . . They buy Chinese aircraft and Russian helicopters,” Calderón said.

The end of strategic ambiguity

The removal of Maduro should not be read primarily as a Venezuelan event, nor as a narrow bilateral episode between Washington and Caracas. It was a stress test that clarified the real distribution of power in the hemisphere.

On one hand, the episode exposed the asymmetry that has long structured great-power competition in Latin America. The United States retains escalation dominance and the capacity to shape outcomes through force, while China’s influence remains concentrated in finance, infrastructure, trade, and institutional penetration rather than in deterrence. On the other hand, Maduro’s ouster does not signal the collapse of Chinese influence in the region. It reveals the limits of China’s ability to translate rhetorical commitments about sovereignty into material responses when confronted with hard-power realities. What unfolded was not the unraveling of China’s regional presence, but a clarification of its priorities, its risk tolerance, and the boundaries of its foreign policy reach in the Western Hemisphere.

The operation also clarifies that China’s preferred tools of influence are largely irrelevant in moments of kinetic disruption in the region. Years of loans, political backing, diplomatic cover, and rhetorical alignment did not translate into leverage when the core issue became one of coercive force. This matters because much of the current debate on foreign influence assumes a continuity between influence and power. Venezuela shows that this continuity breaks down under pressure.

Latin America’s apparent conditional tolerance of US intervention does not stem from ideological realignment with Washington, but from exhaustion. The United States had not carried out an overt military intervention in South America in modern times, and the last comparable interventions in the hemisphere occurred more than three decades ago in much smaller Central American and Caribbean states. Given the region’s long historical memory of US interference, one would have expected sharp and unified backlash. Instead, the reaction has been restrained and, in some cases, openly appreciative. That alone signals how disruptive Venezuela had become.

Maduro was no longer simply an authoritarian outlier. Venezuela had turned into a sustained source of regional instability, driving mass migration, facilitating organized crime networks, and deepening cross-border insecurity. Even governments publicly critical of US power were privately aware that the status quo had become untenable. The controlled response to Washington’s action reflects a hierarchy of priorities that has become harder to ignore.

Economic development remains central, and this is where China’s role is most visible. But dealing with migration pressures, drug trafficking, transnational criminal networks, and border security have become immediate political imperatives. In those domains, cooperation with the United States remains indispensable. The convergence of security interests that emerged around Maduro’s removal is therefore significant, but it is also narrow and contingent. It reveals less about renewed faith in US leadership than about the degree to which Venezuela had become a destabilizing force that governments felt unable to manage on their own.

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Kroenig published in The Wall Street Journal on rogue states

Atlantic Council — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 13:39:34 +0000

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 25, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was published in The Wall Street Journal on the Trump administration eliminating rogue states.

Mr. Trump is on the verge of eliminating the world’s rogue states just as new threats emerge, from the return of great-power rivalry to a disruptive technological revolution.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

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From drones to rocket fuel, China and Russia are helping Iran through supply chains

Kimberly Donovan and Emily Ezratty — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 20:59:35 +0000

WASHINGTON—As the US-Israeli war with Iran continues, some commentators have speculated about why China and Russia appear to be keeping their distance from the conflict. Neither appears eager to intervene militarily to support Iran. Moreover, China is reportedly hesitant to send arms to Iran, while Russia is benefiting from the global oil supply shock caused by the conflict. Some rhetorical support aside, many commentators predict that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping will not get meaningfully involved in Iran.

But such conjecture misunderstands the economic relationships and motivations behind the “Axis of Evasion,” the network of US adversaries that coalesce to circumvent Western economic restrictions. Specifically, it misunderstands how Beijing and Moscow enable Tehran to continue its violence across the Middle East through supply chains.

The war with Iran is not solely a challenge posed by Iran. To bring about an end to the war and prevent Iran from rebuilding its military capacity, US President Donald Trump will need to confront Xi and Putin about their support for the Iranian regime and their schemes to evade sanctions and export controls.

How the Axis of Evasion works

China enables Russia and Iran by importing their sanctioned oil and selling them sophisticated dual-use technology. Over the past few years, we in the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center have proposed the term “Axis of Evasion” to describe the complex networks these countries use to evade and bypass Western sanctions. Our research has focused, for example, on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, as well as on alternative payment systems, money laundering schemes, and the barter trade. The current war with Iran has brought attention to yet another system or tactic of this Axis: integrated supply chains.

Trade and technology transfer between China, Russia, and Iran—and the associated supply chains—are the result of geography as well as significant Western economic pressure. Due to restrictive export controls and sanctions, these states cannot easily access Western technology and components directly from the United States and other Western countries. Because trade among the Axis of Evasion occurs outside of the Western financial system and, therefore, the reach of Western economic restrictions, these integrated supply chains are more resistant to sanctions and export controls enforcement.

Iran has been subject to extensive and comprehensive US sanctions and Western restrictive economic measures for decades. In October 2021, the United States announced the first export controls specifically targeting unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production. Since then, the Department of Commerce, Department of State, and the Treasury have also restricted third-party countries from exporting US-origin technologies to Iran. Despite the intensity of these restrictions, Western components continue to feature in Iranian drone designs. Often, these components come from China.

China has supplied Iran with drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and the components thereof, to aid in its aerial and maritime defense capabilities. In other instances, China directly supplies Iran with Western or Chinese technology components that are found in Iranian drones used against US military installations and economic interests in the Gulf, as well as on Russia’s battlefield in Ukraine. Treasury and Commerce actions targeting Iranian sanctions evasion schemes frequently identify and designate Chinese individuals, entities, and addresses that are used as shell or front companies and transshipment hubs. This cooperation extends beyond trading goods, but helps partners to develop and improve their own technological capabilities.

Drones

Iran’s drone program offers the clearest example of how the Axis of Evasion uses localized supply chains to circumvent restrictive economic measures and enhance military production. Iranian UAVs, such as the Shahed series, rely on an ecosystem of imported electronics, engines, navigation components, batteries, and semiconductors. While many of these parts originate in the United States, Europe, and Japan, procurement networks frequently route them through Chinese distributors or trading companies before they reach Iranian manufacturers. Chinese dual-use exports to Iran spiked in January 2024 when the two states formalized a strategic partnership emphasizing defense and security cooperation. Likewise, Chinese exports rose after Trump signed a memorandum restoring maximum pressure on Iran and again in June 2025 after the US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Russia further reinforces this system through wartime cooperation with Iran. Since 2022, Moscow and Tehran have exchanged drone technology and production know-how, allowing both countries to expand manufacturing capacity. In February 2023, Russia established a drone production facility supported by Iranian technology and expertise at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia. As part of a deal, Iran transferred 600 disassembled Shahed-16 drones, components for 1,300 drones, training, and technical expertise to Russia to assist in its war in Ukraine. By 2025, Moscow had moved roughly 90 percent of Shahed assembly to Russia. Meanwhile, Russia developed the Garpiya-3, a modified and improved version of the Shahed, with the help of Chinese specialists and a reported Russian drone factory in China.

This partnership now appears to be coming full circle. Recent comments by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reveal that Russia is now supplying Iran with Russian-made Shahed drones to use in attacks against the United States and Israel. What began as a sanctions-driven workaround has evolved into a self-reinforcing production network, fueled by Western components, Chinese procurement channels, and Russian manufacturing capacity.

Navigation systems

In another example of these integrated supply chain networks, China facilitates the transfer of both Chinese- and Western-made navigation technology to Iran. Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly sharing satellite imagery and modified Shahed drone technology to improve navigation and targeting based on Russia’s experience of using drones in Ukraine.

Chinese electronics markets and distributors play a critical role in this process. Components originally manufactured for civilian applications—such as inertial sensors or satellite navigation modules—can be purchased through Chinese intermediaries and integrated into Iranian weapons systems. Russia’s experience adapting commercial electronics also feeds into this innovation ecosystem.

Some experts believe that Iranian drones and missiles incorporate Chinese satellite navigation systems to target US and Israeli military assets. In February 2025, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese front companies that were supplying gyro navigation devices to enhance Iranian-made UAVs. In November 2025, a separate network connected to Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company was accused of using shell firms to acquire Chinese sensors and navigation equipment.

In 2021, China gave Iran access to BeiDou, the global positioning satellite system owned and operated by the China National Space Administration. Since the start of the war with the United States and Israel, Iran has used BeiDou to produce decoy signals to confuse threat analysis and conceal actual Iranian military movements.

Chemical precursors

Iran’s ability to sustain missile and explosives production depends on access to chemical precursors and industrial materials. Although these substances are subject to Western export controls, and the US Treasury has sanctioned individuals and entities in Iran and China for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients, enforcement is more difficult when production is distributed across multiple jurisdictions. Chinese chemical companies—many of which operate in sprawling industrial clusters—have repeatedly been linked to shipments of dual-use materials to Iran as well as Russia. Another recent report suggests that Iranian shadow fleet vessels sailing from China contain precursors for rocket fuel.

For Iran, these imports provide critical inputs for solid rocket fuels, propellants, and explosives used in missile systems and other weapons systems. By purchasing precursor materials through intermediaries or reexport hubs, Iranian procurement networks obscure the destination of shipments and exploit gaps in global export-control and sanctions enforcement. The scale and diversity of China’s chemical industry make it particularly difficult for regulators to monitor the end use of every exported compound.

What to do now

China, Russia, and Iran continue to work together to circumvent and evade Western sanctions and export controls. Meanwhile, the United States has been inconsistent in implementing economic restrictions. After the last Trump-Xi summit in October 2025, Washington suspended the Bureau of Industry and Security Affiliate Rule in exchange for China’s lifting of export controls on critical minerals, effectively revealing how much leverage Beijing retains through its dominance in rare-earth supply chains. Additionally, Washington is easing oil sanctions on Moscow and Tehran in response to rising energy prices and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, exposing the precise issues on which the US is willing to compromise.

As the White House diverts its attention toward the Middle East, the Trump-Xi summit, originally scheduled for next week, was postponed until May. However, a productive push on China could also advance the US position in the Iran conflict. In his meeting with Xi—if not sooner—Trump should confront China’s role in enabling these supply chains, tightening scrutiny of Chinese exports and intermediaries that facilitate sanctions evasion. The White House must make stronger export control enforcement, expanded entity listings, and greater transparency requirements for Chinese distributors involved in dual-use trade central to the agenda.

But pressure on China alone is not enough. Iran’s procurement networks depend on a web of transshipment hubs and trading companies that move controlled technologies across jurisdictions before they reach their destination in Iran. These networks often rely on distributors and logistics firms in third countries to obscure the origin and destination of sensitive components.

The United States should therefore expand its focus beyond direct exporters and identify the intermediaries and transshipment hubs that repeatedly appear in Iranian procurement chains. With targeted sanctions, enhanced export control enforcement cooperation, and intelligence sharing with partner governments, the United States can help disrupt the flow of dual-use goods before they reach Iran’s defense sector.

This increased enforcement should be paired with incentives. Many countries that serve as transshipment hubs are not politically aligned with Iran but lack the regulatory capacity or economic incentives to fully enforce export controls. Such third countries have also been hit hard by US tariffs, pushing them toward US adversaries purely due to economic incentives. In deploying incentives to encourage stronger compliance, the United States can cooperate with countries willing to strengthen export-control enforcement. In addition to incentives, capacity building programs, including customs modernization, export-control training, and industrial diversification could also enable firms in these jurisdictions to comply with Western restrictive economic measures.

Despite the severity and consistency of US sanctions and export controls targeting Iran’s drone acquisition, Iran maintains the technical knowledge, mature production lines, and continued access to dual-use components necessary to rebuild its drone stockpiles. Cooperation with adversarial states—predominantly China and Russia—further reinforces these capabilities by distributing supply chains and insulating production from Western pressure.

A failure to confront this Axis of Evasion across its networks allows it to continue enabling the flow of dual-use technologies among its members, which will allow Iran to rebuild and expand its drone and missile arsenals both during and potentially after the current war.

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How ISIS and its affiliates might capitalize on the Iran war

Morgan Tadych — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 20:57:48 +0000

WASHINGTON—In the March 5 edition of Al-Naba, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS’s) global newsletter, the group portrayed the ongoing US-Israeli war against Iran as a “divinely sanctioned” war among the disbelievers on both sides. This should surprise no one, as ISIS has long condemned Iranian Shia Muslims as following a “rejectionist” brand of Islam and labeled the United States and Israel as “infidels.”

What might be more unexpected, however, is that ISIS seems poised to exploit this moment of regional instability to its advantage. Specifically, ISIS appears eager to attract new followers, inspire attacks, and consolidate territory amid the chaos caused by the Iran war and by the security situations in Syria and Afghanistan.

Targeting the West

ISIS views itself as the protector of Sunni Islam, and its adherents have cheered the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei even as they condemn the US and Israeli strikes against Iran. ISIS’s preferred outcome in the Iran conflict would be the downfall of both sides, but it’s not waiting for that outcome. It is instead seizing the initiative by expanding its messaging directed at its followers in the West.

The Islamic State manages a number of regional affiliates under a single umbrella, and these affiliates often share resources such as personnel, training, and funding, enabling the movement of people and expertise across borders. Part of this larger umbrella includes the group’s messaging operations, of which Al-Naba is just one output. Through the internet, including on mainstream social media sites such as TikTok, ISIS distributes messages targeting Western youth to gain traction beyond the Middle East and South Asia.

In particular, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), the Afghanistan-based affiliate, has demonstrated its skill at reaching youth online, including developing a growing network of teenagers in Europe, some of whom were involved in a 2024 plot to conduct simultaneous attacks across several cities in Central Europe. Should a European nation, for example, become involved in the conflict against Iran, then an ISIS-inspired cell or individual might use that as an excuse to conduct an attack there.

Concerningly, there have already been two ISIS-inspired attacks in the United States since the Iran conflict began. Although investigations into both events are still ongoing, preliminary details suggest that, in one of the attacks, the young men used ISIS’s online how-to guides to build improvised explosive devices. The two teens who staged an attack outside of the home of New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani on March 7 had accessed ISIS materials online in the weeks prior to the attack, according to investigators. Some analysts have suggested that they had communication with, and coaching from, ISIS leadership overseas. In the second attack, a known ISIS supporter killed a military officer at Old Dominion University in Virginia. The attacker had previously been convicted of attempting to provide material support to ISIS. The timing of these attacks suggests that ISIS supporters may be seeking to take advantage of the global distraction created by the war, targeting locations and events that they perceive as “infidel.”

Gaining territory in South Asia

ISIS-K is perhaps the Islamic State’s most capable affiliate, and it has demonstrated its ability to conduct and inspire attacks far from Afghanistan over the past three years. A confluence of factors, when combined with the global distraction caused by the Iran conflict, raise the possibility of an ISIS-K attack against Western interests in the medium term.

But ISIS-K is not only focused on its efforts abroad. In addition to the Iran war, the group stands to benefit from the crisis emerging between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In late February, Afghanistan and Pakistan escalated the long-simmering conflict against each other, with Pakistan accusing Afghanistan of harboring the Pakistani Taliban. Much of the fighting so far has concentrated on the ungoverned border areas between Afghanistan and the tribal areas of northern Pakistan.

Historically, ISIS-K has struggled to hold territory in this region due to pressure from the Afghan Taliban. But with the Taliban preoccupied with the fight against Pakistan, the conflict may provide ISIS-K with an opening it could exploit to seize and hold territory in northern Afghanistan. Securing territory can, in turn, provide the group with space to plot further attacks and messaging.

Regrouping in Syria

Similarly, ISIS has leveraged the devolving security situation to gain territory in Syria. Since fall 2025, there has been a notable uptick in the number of ISIS attacks inside Syria, and the group recently declared jihad against President Ahmad al-Sharaa. ISIS perceives al-Sharaa as a puppet of the United States and not sufficiently committed to Sunni Islam. The recent uptick in attacks by ISIS emanating from the Syrian desert indicates that it is likely regrouping in that area, where the Syrian government struggles to maintain security and control.

In addition to increased freedom of movement in Syria, ISIS is also benefiting from an influx of fighters who recently escaped from prison camps in northern Syria. Earlier this year, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) came under pressure from Damascus to relinquish control of the territory it held to the central government. The SDF, which fought alongside the United States in the fight against ISIS, had for years guarded the Al-Hol prison camp, which held tens of thousands of ISIS fighters and their families. When the SDF retreated in January in the face of a Syrian government offensive, the camps were left unguarded, leading to a major prison break. US intelligence agencies estimate that as many as 20,000 people, including family members of ISIS fighters and the group’s affiliates, are at large. These ISIS-linked individuals, many of whom are combat veterans from the Syrian civil war, are expected to increase ISIS’s experienced manpower. Regional reporting indicates that at least some of these individuals are Afghan nationals. If these individuals return to Afghanistan, then ISIS-K could leverage their fighting experience for operations or training.

At present, the Iran war commands the headlines. But it is nonetheless critical to continue monitoring ISIS. The group has already demonstrated its ability to exploit conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria to gain territory. It may have recently added an influx of former prisoners. And it has shown its ability to enable ISIS-linked or inspired attacks in the West. None of these threats disappeared when the Iran war began.

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Amid the Hormuz crisis, an Iraq-Jordan-Egypt oil pipeline can no longer wait

Maisoon H. Kafafy — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 20:28:22 +0000

In the summer of 1983, with Iranian missiles turning Gulf shipping lanes into something resembling a free-fire zone, Saddam Hussein’s government sat down to solve a problem that has never really gone away. Iraq’s oil, the lifeblood of its wartime economy, was moving almost entirely through the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow corridor that an emboldened adversary regularly threatened to close.

The solution his planners devised was elegant in its simplicity: a pipeline running southwest from the oil fields of Basra, through the Jordanian desert, terminating at the Red Sea port of Aqaba. From there, Iraqi crude could reach global markets without passing through a single contested chokepoint. The project was announced, studied, negotiated over, and quietly abandoned. It has been revived since but derailed at different moments by war, occupation, insurgency, and internal Iraqi politics. This cycle repeated itself, with remarkable consistency, for four decades—and the Basra-Aqaba pipeline was never built.

Now the bill for that failure is coming due. This time, Aqaba is not the end of the answer. So long as the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz remain similarly volatile, a pipeline that stops short of Egypt and the Mediterranean trades one vulnerability for another.

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A warning unheeded

When Iran moved to close the Strait of Hormuz following the outbreak of conflict with the United States and Israel, Iraq had to face what its planners had known since 1983: that an estimated 90 percent of its crude exports flow through a waterway it has no power to protect. The consequences cascaded almost immediately. Baghdad began shutting production at its largest fields—Rumaila and West Qurna 2—making the deepest cuts in a generation, not because of any direct military threat to the fields themselves, but because southern storage facilities (designed for operational throughput rather than long-term holding) simply ran out of space. In the absence of viable alternative export pipelines, estimates suggest that Iraq is losing between $260 million and $280 million in revenue each day.

Despite over a decade of talks, construction on the Basra-Aqaba pipeline never meaningfully advanced. The failure to advance the project had no single cause: It can be attributed to the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, the US invasion, ISIS’s territorial expansion, and even resistance by pro-Iran Shia factions in Baghdad, who opposed the pipeline on the grounds that it would bring Iraqi oil into proximity with Israel.

Now, Baghdad is improvising. After acrimonious negotiations—and a formal threat of legal action from Baghdad accusing Erbil of breaching the Iraqi constitution—Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government struck a deal on March 17 to restart crude flows through the long-dormant Iraq-Turkey Pipeline to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. Exports resumed at an initial capacity of 250,000 barrels per day, with the two sides agreeing to form a joint committee to oversee operations and return revenues to the federal treasury. That figure is a rounding error against the roughly 3.5 million barrels Iraq was exporting daily before the crisis.

With output from Iraq’s main southern fields having already plunged 70 percent, the northern pipeline restart, even if volumes climb in coming weeks, recovers only a fraction of lost export capacity. The Basra-Aqaba pipeline, had it been completed to its phase one capacity of 2.25 million barrels per day, would have offset the majority of what the Hormuz closure took offline, providing a genuine and immediate alternative without the dormancy, the standoff, or the frantic eleventh-hour diplomacy. A second phase, running from the Iraqi city of Haditha to Aqaba with an additional capacity of one million barrels per day, would have brought total corridor capacity to 3.25 million barrels—nearly matching Iraq’s pre-crisis export volumes in their entirety. Instead, with the northern pipeline restart, Iraq is celebrating a partial fix to a problem that should never have been left unsolved.

Egypt’s compound exposure

There is a dimension of this crisis that has received far less attention than it deserves, and it runs through Cairo. When the Basra-Aqaba pipeline discussions gained momentum in 2016, Egypt was formally brought into the conversation with the longer-term vision of positioning Cairo as an active hub in a land-based Gulf energy corridor reaching Mediterranean and global markets. The original Basra-Aqaba proposal, designed to terminate at Jordan’s Red Sea port, had by then been expanded to include Egypt—extending the corridor’s ambition westward to the Mediterranean. That vision was soon shelved along with everything else. Egypt now finds itself absorbing the costs of the current crisis from every direction at once, with none of the structural revenues that corridor integration would have provided.

The picture is one of compounding fragility. Suez Canal revenues, which had been projected to recover toward eight billion dollars in 2026 following the Gaza cease-fire, are once again under pressure as major carriers weigh the risk calculus of Red Sea routing against the longer but safer passage around the Cape of Good Hope. At the same time, Israel has halted natural gas flows from the Tamar and Leviathan fields to Egypt, a supply that the country had come to rely on for both domestic consumption and liquefied natural gas (LNG) re-export revenues. Egypt’s budget for this fiscal year was calculated assuming oil at seventy-five dollars per barrel, a figure that now bears little relationship to market reality, forcing the government to chase spot LNG cargoes at elevated premiums it can ill afford.

Meanwhile, Egypt faces $27 billion in external debt service due in 2026 against roughly $53 billion in international reserves. An estimated two billion to six billion dollars in foreign holdings of Egyptian government debt instruments has already exited the market, renewing pressure on a currency that took years of painful International Monetary Fund–guided adjustment to stabilize.

Against this backdrop, Egyptian Mediterranean ports have quietly become an improvised transit lifeline, with cargo being offloaded and moved overland to Red Sea ports for onward delivery to Gulf destinations. Egypt is already performing the corridor functions that a formal Basra-Aqaba-Egypt pipeline architecture would have institutionalized, only now it is doing so informally, without the infrastructure investment, long-term agreements, or revenue arrangements that would make the role sustainable. The country’s geographic value is being recognized in a crisis that its economy is simultaneously struggling to survive.

A foundation without a roof

The corridor logic, however, has never been purely theoretical—nor has it lacked institutional foundation. Since 2019, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan have convened a series of trilateral summits under the Amman-Baghdad-Cairo framework, with energy integration and pipeline connectivity among the agreement’s explicit pillars. The precedent runs deeper than recent diplomacy. During the Iran-Iraq War, Jordan served as Iraq’s primary import-export conduit while Egypt supplied over a million laborers to fill jobs vacated by Iraqi conscripts—making Iraq, at that moment, Egypt’s single largest source of remittances. These three countries have an economic interdependence that keeps reasserting itself in moments of regional stress, and they have been trying, with the tools available to them, to give it permanent form. The summits exist. The framework exists. And the political will among the three governments, however constrained by Baghdad’s internal divisions, Amman’s fiscal limits, and Cairo’s institutional pressures, has proven more durable than the results suggest.

Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt should build the pipeline, extend it through Egypt to the Mediterranean, and treat it as the strategic infrastructure it has always been. The financing question, which has too often been regarded as a reason to delay rather than a problem to solve, is more tractable than it appears. It is the politics, not the funding, that has always been the harder obstacle. Iraq has already allocated federal budget funds for the first leg and structured the second phase for private investment. The missing ingredient is the sustained engagement of international partners—Gulf sovereign wealth funds, multilateral development institutions, and Western governments with a direct interest in regional energy stability—willing to bring the institutional weight that transforms a framework agreement into a pipeline in the ground.

Every year the Basra-Aqaba-Egypt corridor remains unbuilt is a year in which the region’s most crisis-tested economic relationships remain hostage to infrastructure that was never completed. Iraqi planners understood the problem in 1983. The pipeline that they all agreed was necessary has still never been built, and the region is paying the price. Until it is, the next crisis will find the same vulnerabilities in the same places.

Maisoon H. Kafafy is a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, where her work focuses on Middle East and North Africa security, regional cooperation strategies, and geoeconomics.

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Wilkening quoted in Indo-Pacific Defense Forum on hypersonic threats

Atlantic Council — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 19:02:13 +0000

On March 25, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Dean Wilkening was quoted in an Indo-Pacific Defense Forum article, titled “Indo-Pacific allies join to counter hypersonic threats.” Wilkening discussed the impacts of hypersonic capabilities on air and missile defense systems, highlighting the capability enhancements needed to counter these threats.

Fellow

Dean Wilkening

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Technologies Missile Defense

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Kroenig quoted in The New York Times on NATO, Trump, and Iran

cbertrand — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 18:50:08 +0000

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 25, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in The New York Times on NATO Secretary General Rutte’s praise of the war in Iran, arguing that Rutte openly criticizing President Trump would undermine the alliance.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

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Negotiating an EU-US biometric information-sharing agreement

Kenneth Propp — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 18:00:00 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The US and EU are negotiating a biometric data-sharing agreement to allow DHS access to EU member states’ fingerprint and other biometric databases.
The EU has never before agreed to provide a non-EU country large-scale access to Europeans’ personal data for purposes of the foreign country’s border security.
The EU aims to secure limits on bulk data collection, human oversight of automated decisions, and reciprocal access to US databases.

The Trump administration has taken adversarial and unconventional approaches with European allies on subjects ranging from trade to content moderation, but in another important area the United States is proceeding more traditionally. The subject is politically controversial: biometric information sharing for purposes of border security. In late January, European Union officials flew to Washington to start low-key formal talks with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) aimed at an international agreement. Despite the sensitive nature of the endeavor, EU member states and the European Data Protection Supervisor have endorsed it.

Why is the United States taking a consensual approach with Europe on border security information sharing, and why is the European Union so far willing to accommodate? Why is this agreement on a fast track in Washington and Brussels when law enforcement initiatives such as the projected EU-US CLOUD Agreement have been paused by the Trump administration? Is the border security information-sharing effort a one-off or could it be a harbinger of a return to traditional transatlantic legal diplomacy?

DHS seeks enhanced border security partnerships

DHS operates an international biometric information-sharing program to assist in “assessing the eligibility or public security risk of individuals seeking an immigration benefit or encountered in the context of a border encounter or law enforcement investigation related to immigration or border security issues,” according to the department’s privacy impact assessment (PIA). The program entails “automatic comparison of the fingerprints collected by DHS or a foreign partner on international travelers, suspected criminals, asylum seekers, irregular migrants, refugees, [and] applicants for visa and/or immigration benefits,” the PIA states. Biometric identifiers potentially include facial and iris scans and DNA, as well as traditional fingerprints.

In 2022, DHS decided that all forty-three countries that benefit from visa-free entry to the United States through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) must conclude agreements, dubbed enhanced border security partnerships (EBSP), enabling DHS to screen their biometric records for immigration or border security purposes. When DHS queries a name against a foreign state’s identity records and it yields a match, DHS automatically receives the responsive biometric data. Other identity information also could be conveyed by the foreign state. In the absence of a match in the foreign database, no fingerprints or other biometric information would be supplied to DHS.

Shared competence: EU and member-state roles

Twenty-four of the EU’s twenty-seven member states (all but Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Romania) participate in the VWP; they comprise more than half of all VWP members globally. Each EU state maintains its own national biometric information records for border purposes. Thus, DHS could take an important step toward fulfilling the overall EBSP goal by reaching biometric information-sharing agreements with these EU countries.

The EU, for its part, also has two relevant responsibilities: setting rules protecting personal data transferred outside its territory, per Article 16(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); and setting common policy on visas and external border checks, per Article 77(2) TFEU.

As popular sentiment for stricter border controls has swelled across Europe in recent years, the EU’s policymaking role in this area has become more prominent. In the past year, it has finalized a Pact on Migration and Asylum, a new set of rules on managing migration and asylum applications. In addition, new systems for tracking the entry and exit of foreign travelers and collecting the personal data of those entering EU territory on a visa-free basis are being put in place. These new systems show the EU moving in a similar direction as the United States in collecting information on foreign visitors.

DHS’s demand for biometric information-sharing agreements with EU member states thus touches on an area of “mixed” competence, i.e., one shared between the EU and its member states. In such a situation, the EU and its member states had to decide who would be responsible for negotiating with the United States.

The question took time to resolve. Only in 2024 did the Council of the European Union—which comprises the member states’ national ministers—invite the European Commission to develop a mandate for an international agreement at the EU level. Member states reportedly were eager to bring the collective negotiating strength of the EU to the table with the United States, rather than facing Washington individually.

A year passed before the Commission presented its draft negotiating mandate. It did so based on the understanding that the agreement sought by the United States related to the VWP and thus fell within the EU’s visa policy competence. Negotiations between the Council and Commission on the final contours of the mandate ensued during the second half of 2025.

Finally, in December 2025, the Council adopted a decision authoring the negotiation of an EU-level “framework” agreement with the United States. The framework would provide an overall legal structure for EU member states to conduct bilateral information exchange with DHS, setting the general conditions under which EU member states could provide biometric information to the US border agency. Each eligible member state subsequently would conclude an implementing agreement or arrangement with DHS identifying its relevant databases and operationalizing the data transfers.

Other relevant EU-US agreements

Over the past two decades, the EU has entered into a series of law enforcement and security information-sharing agreements with the United States—ranging from airline passenger name records (PNR) data to financial messaging data (via SWIFT) to mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. DHS is the principal beneficiary of PNR data sharing; the US Department of the Treasury receives SWIFT data used in tracking terrorist finance; and the Department of Justice manages information exchanged for criminal investigations and prosecutions. The United States and the EU also have concluded an agreement elaborating the data protection safeguards that must accompany transfers for law enforcement purposes, the so-called Umbrella Agreement.

In addition, DHS already enjoys access to foreign biometric and biographic data for purposes of preventing and combating serious crime (referred to as PCSC agreements), under a separate negotiating program that commenced in 2009. This earlier generation of agreements assists DHS in border encounters with persons suspected of terrorism and other serious offenses, but they do not apply to all foreign persons seeking to enter the United States.

The EU at that time had also sought to negotiate a PCSC agreement collectively on behalf of its member states, but DHS rebuffed Brussels and instead chose to negotiate individually with each EU member, believing the agency would have better leverage that way. The first two PCSC accords were concluded with Greece and Italy, and eventually all the European participants in the VWP program reached agreements as well.

An EU-level agreement on broad-scale border security information-sharing cooperation with the United States would represent a novel departure for Brussels. “It would be the first agreement concluded by the EU implying large-scale sharing of personal data, including biometric data, for the purpose of border and immigration control by a third country,” the European Data Protection supervisor has observed.

This time, DHS appears to have appreciated the relative speed and efficiency that comes from negotiating one uniform set of access conditions that will apply to all EU VWP participants. The EU and its member states, meanwhile, seem to have reached a sensible division of labor that respects member states’ prerogatives for controlling their own biometric information databases and for managing technical interactions with DHS.

EU negotiating goals

One major EU ambition in setting the rules and procedures governing DHS queries is to preclude generalized processing of all travelers’ data. A Commission press spokesman emphasized the “non-systematic nature of the information exchange and that the exchange is limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve the objectives of this cooperation.”

The EU mandate further stresses that the EU seeks an agreement that would be reciprocal in nature, enabling member states’ border authorities to query corresponding DHS databases. A leaked Council presidency working paper suggested that a monitoring mechanism should ensure reciprocity in implementation: “Information on member states’ citizens should be exchanged under the framework only if the U.S. exchanges information on American citizens.”

It is not clear that the United States and the EU are entering into these negotiations with entirely congruent views on the scope of the framework agreement. DHS envisages checking the biometric databases of travelers from VWP countries on a routine basis. However, the European Commission, as noted above, views the information exchange as “non-systematic.”

In addition, the US international biometric information-sharing program envisages access to foreign databases “in the context of a border encounter or law enforcement investigation related to immigration or border security issues,” according to the DHS Privacy Impact Assessment (italics added). The EU mandate, by contrast, concentrates on security screening and identity verification at the border, with subsequent law enforcement data access to be exclusively governed by other bilateral agreements.

The EU’s data protection rules are its main tool in ensuring that information conveyed to DHS pursuant to the EBSP agreement remains targeted. For example, the negotiating directive insists that processing of personal data be limited to what is “necessary and proportionate in individual cases.” Necessity and proportionality is a key concept in EU data protection law, including in the Schrems jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, albeit one that is hard to define a priori.

The EU also seeks to include other traditional data protection safeguards in the EBSP agreement with the United States, according to press reports. One reported provision would require human involvement in decisions having significant adverse effects on individuals, rather than permitting entirely automated decision-making. Another would allow for the transfer of “special categories” of personal data—such as sensitive data regarding political opinions, religion, and sexual orientation—only when necessary and proportionate to prevent criminal or terrorist offenses, and with additional protections that limit the universe of individuals who may access it and the duration of retention. Onward transfers of foreign-supplied biometric data to third countries would require the explicit consent of the country from which the data originated.

According to the European Commission version of the negotiating mandate, the EU also seeks to limit DHS retention of transferred personal data to cases of “travelers in respect of whom there is objective evidence from which it may be inferred that there is a continuing risk to public security or public order.” In other words, DHS would not be permitted to store fingerprint data supplied by EU VWP countries on a generalized basis; it could do so only if it has reason to believe that the person would continue to be a threat—a difficult prediction for a security agency to make at the time of the initial border encounter.

The European Data Protection supervisor stated in his opinion that he “largely supports” the proposed approach with the United States. At the same time, he pointed to certain information-sharing constraints the EU would face. Two important EU data repositories prohibit sharing of information with third countries: Eurodac, which contains biometric information on persons who have applied for refugee status in an EU member state or otherwise have migrated irregularly, and ECRIS, which links together member-state records of third country nationals with criminal convictions within the EU. However, the member states themselves regard the exclusive focus of negotiations with the United States on national databases as “without prejudice to any further reflections on the possibility for information exchange with selected third countries from EU databases,” the leaked Council presidency document suggested.

Finally, the EU mandate also seeks the right to an “effective remedy” for persons whose information has been transferred to DHS. This principle, enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, consistently has proven very difficult to resolve in past EU information-sharing agreements with the United States.

Major issues and possible solutions

The existing web of EU-US information-sharing agreements offer valuable precedents for the latest negotiation on access to biometric data for border security purposes. The PCSC agreements, for example, can provide a template for structuring technical interaction between DHS and EU member-state databases. Equally, the types of data protection provisions contained in the law enforcement Umbrella Agreement could be mirrored in the EBSP agreement, even if the former cannot directly be applied to the border security context.

Remedies for misuse of information likely will prove more difficult to resolve. The Data Privacy Framework (DPF), which offers safeguards against illegal US intelligence agency access to personal data transferred from Europe in the commercial context, provides redress in the form of a special tribunal established within the US Department of Justice. Europeans may not petition an ordinary US court if they believe a US intelligence agency has improperly used their data, however. The Court of Justice of the European Union has yet to decide if this specialized form of recourse meets EU fundamental rights standards.

By contrast, the EU did secure US judicial redress for EU citizens whose information is exchanged for law enforcement purposes, under the terms of the EU-US Umbrella Agreement. It took a US statutory change, through the adoption of the Judicial Redress Act, to extend such a right to foreign persons. (The US Privacy Act otherwise limits the right of judicial redress only to US individuals.) Extending this right to Europeans’ whose biometric data is transferred to DHS for the purposes of border security—as opposed to law enforcement—likely would require a further US statutory amendment. Persuading Congress of the necessity of such a change would be challenging.

The necessity and proportionality concept in EU fundamental rights law serves as a legal technique for balancing data protection rights with legitimate public order and public security interests. In the DPF, the United States accepted explicit reference to the EU’s necessity and proportionality standard—in a sensitive context dealing with potential intelligence agency access to personal data. Incorporating this concept in the border biometric information-sharing setting could similarly assure the EU and its member states that DHS is not engaged in mass data collection.

Legal and political dynamics

DHS faces a complex legal situation in pursuing negotiations involving both the EU and its member states. It is consistently difficult for a US government negotiator to be certain where a particular responsibility lies within the EU’s confederal system. In this case, the task is complicated by the cumbersome division of competences for visa and border policy.

In addition, since DHS seeks information for not just border security but also related law enforcement purposes, it must engage with two separate and varying sources of EU data protection law. Data protection rules for immigration control and visa policy are governed by the General Data Protection Regulation, while the rules for protecting law enforcement data fall under a separate directive.

Political factors in Europe also could slow completion of the agreements with the United States. Some members of the European Parliament who belong to the liberal Renew parliamentary group wrote to the European Commission in January, stating: “Looking at the current geopolitical context, we consider it undesirable for the European Commission to start or continue such negotiations.” Although the European Parliament does not have the power to stop the negotiations, it must approve any international agreement that the EU reaches with the United States.

The Trump administration’s removal of Democratic members serving on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PLCOB) and on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have undermined confidence in European privacy circles in US institutions charged with privacy protection. Moreover, DHS’s proposed rule requiring visitors to the United States to supply five years of details on their social media activity has generated widespread outrage abroad. Although this initiative is formally separate from the VWP program, the European public might well conflate the social media and biometric information demands of the United States.

DHS’s goal of wrapping up both the EU framework agreement and, subsequently, the twenty-four implementing agreements with EU member states by the end of 2026, as has been reported, will likely prove overly ambitious. A more achievable ambition would be to complete the EU framework by that date, with the necessary member states implementing agreements afterward. (The leaked Council presidency document sternly states that it considers “Member States’ commitment to refrain from bilateral negotiations with the US while material discussions on the framework are ongoing to be of critical strategic importance.”)

Nevertheless, there is reason for optimism that the US-EU engagement on border security biometric information sharing will yield success. Both sides appear to have entered talks pragmatically, the EU and its member states by agreeing on a sensible division of labor between themselves, and the United States by accepting the practical benefits of negotiating with both Brussels and member-state capitals. Each is impelled by a desire to have greater control of its borders and sees reciprocal information sharing as a promising approach. However, flexibility on both sides will be indispensable to overcoming divergent positions on issues such as remedies.

Further, by winning support in principle for the framework agreement from the EU’s data protection supervisor, the EU already has shown its commitment to achieving a broadly acceptable agreement. Europe’s collective approach to these negotiations also reflects a sober appreciation of power realities. EU citizens value the ease of visa-free travel to the United States, so member states ultimately will do what is necessary to retain VWP status, within the confines of fundamental rights.

Finally, the EU’s decision to take a leading role in the EBSP negotiations reflects its increased institutional maturity and importance in the field of border security. DHS’s willingness to pursue a framework agreement with the EU may show a corresponding recognition of Brussels’ growing role in this area. As popular sentiment has converged in Europe and America on more tightly controlling borders, there is now an opportunity to achieve a balanced transatlantic agreement on sharing information to that end.

about the author

Kenneth Propp is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, an adjunct professor of European Union law at the Georgetown University Law Center, and a senior fellow with the Cross-Border Data Forum. His prior experience includes serving as legal counselor at the US Mission to the European Union in Brussels and in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the US Department of State.

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Toplines: Deterring Putin’s aggression against NATO

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 17:34:22 +0000

Top three

If Vladimir Putin can’t win a clear victory in Ukraine, he will seek one elsewhere; a clear victory in Ukraine would embolden Moscow to further aggression.
Europe must prepare to meet these threats with less American support.
The lowest risk option for Moscow—and therefore the threat Europe needs to prepare for most urgently—is Russian forces occupying Norway’s Svalbard archipelago.

worth a thousand words

Five places where Russia might test NATO resolve through aggression against Alliance territory.

The Diagnosis

The strategic context: The rise of autocratic regimes worldwide poses an alarming challenge to the global community of democracies, leading to an international system marked by instability and increasing fragmentation. Debates over how to approach the threat have divided the community, with traditional alliances and coalitions under increasing strain. Further, the current US administration’s response to these challenges is strikingly different from those of past administrations. Over time, the US presence in Europe is likely to decline, and Europe must rapidly increase its defense capabilities in response.

The threat: Despite its losses in Ukraine, Russia is reconstituting its forces and continues to pose a formidable military threat. The Russian economy has rebounded from 2022’s historic sanctions and looks unlikely to collapse in the near term. Further, there are no political checks within Russia on Putin’s desire to re-establish dominance in Eurasia.

The risk: NATO isn’t ready— militarily, intellectually, diplomatically—to confront Moscow’s determined testing of the Alliance’s resolve. Should Moscow actually seek to enact one of these scenarios, the Alliance is at risk of fracturing–nothing short of a robust Article 5 response from the Alliance would be sufficient to credibly reset allied deterrence against any further provocations against NATO territories by Russia and thereby preserve the alliance itself.

The prescription

expand active and reserve forces to divisional strength
establish a combined Baltic corps with NATO enablers
fortify key terrain and infrastructure
pre-position supplies
rehearse rapid multinational reinforcement to deter or defeat a Russian push toward Kaliningrad.

Bottom lines

By themselves, none of the Nordic or Baltic countries can deter or fend off Russian aggression in any of these five scenarios. At this time, NATO is not postured to do so either. To deter these scenarios, here are the first steps:

Place NATO brigades in the Nordic-Baltic region, as promised at the Madrid summit in 2022.
Create a comprehensive exercise schedule building on or similar to BALTOPS, specifically for Svalbard and Åland, to demonstrate capability to rapidly move in and defend the territory.
Mobilize the NATO alliance and Europe writ large to provide the Baltic states with critical financial assistance beyond what already exists, to a level that has not been forthcoming to date.
Accelerate the preparation of the populations of these countries for the reality of the risk of Russian aggression. While this is primarily a responsibility for the national governments, NATO can and should have a role to play.

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Report

Feb 12, 2026

Putin’s next move? Five Russian attack scenarios Europe must prepare for

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Whether emboldened by victory in Ukraine or motivated by a loss to pursue success elsewhere, Russian president Vladimir Putin is likely to continue his campaign of aggression. The Nordic and Baltic region, already subject to a campaign of intimidation, is in the Kremlin’s crosshairs—with these five places at greatest risk.

Defense Policy Eastern Europe

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Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

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Europe & Eurasia National Security

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Rosenstein quoted in Indo-Pacific Defense Forum article on hypersonic capabilities

Atlantic Council — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 17:27:44 +0000

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On March 25, Forward Defense assistant director Jonathan Rosenstein was quoted in an article from the Indo-Pacific Defense Forum on “Indo-Pacific allies join to counter hypersonic threats.” Rosenstein highlighted the unique advantage that hypersonic weapons present for operational capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater.

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Jonathan Rosenstein

Assistant Director

Defense Policy Israel

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How the Iran war could change the US relationship with Gulf states

Abram Paley — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 16:47:59 +0000

WASHINGTON—The next phase of the Iran war will be defined by uncertainty. At the moment, there is uncertainty over whether the United States, Israel, or Iran will escalate the conflict further. This phase could end abruptly if the conflict does escalate, or it might persist for some time, since even a lull in attacks or a deal might not sustainably address the fundamental issues that led to the outbreak of conflict. What is known, however, is that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states sit at the center of this uncertainty. It is those states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—that Iran would likely target with even more drones, missiles, and potentially further asymmetric attacks if the war intensified. And, more importantly, it will be those states that will share their neighborhood with the Iran that emerges from this conflict.

Prior to the current conflict, many in Washington viewed GCC countries as holding the keys to resolving widespread concerns about Iran in ways short of war. I saw firsthand over the years the ways in which the Gulf’s diverse relationships helped advance US interests. Oman, for example, has long served as a quiet mediator between the United States and Iran, including when I served as acting US special envoy for Iran from 2023 to 2025. Oman has continued this role right up to the current crisis. Qatar too maintained channels with Iranian leadership that facilitated negotiations for the release of US hostages in Iran and deconfliction efforts between Washington and Tehran in the region and beyond. Saudi Arabia, while maintaining deep suspicions about the regime in Tehran, had taken tentative steps to rehabilitate its relationship with Iran through a series of high-level meetings following years of effort by the United States, other regional countries, and ultimately China to broker a reconciliation that stabilized the region. And the UAE maintained economic ties with Iran that stretched back decades and served both to tighten sanctions pressure on Tehran and hold out hope of potential economic incentives if the Iranian regime changed its worst behaviors.

But as the war continues, these dynamics that had served the interests of the Gulf states and, in many cases, the United States are shifting, and US policymakers need to be attuned to these changes. This begins with asking the right questions. What the war will ultimately mean for Gulf countries and for the US relationships with them turns on answers to a handful of still-open questions. Five of the most pressing of these questions are explored below. The answers could determine how successful the United States is in securing its interests in the region going forward, both in finding an off-ramp for the conflict and in its broader regional objectives. Iran, too, is likely asking many of the same questions as it seeks to exploit opportunities to shape the Gulf to its own ends.

Will the “new normal” stick?

Since it began its retaliation, Iran has targeted GCC oil and gas infrastructure and commercial interests. Its goal has been to pressure Gulf states to lean on the United States and Israel to cease their strikes. In its more recent and consequential strikes on Qatar’s Ras Laffan Gas Facility, Tehran has shown that it could potentially expand the scope of its attacks, increasing the economic pain on Gulf states and the global economy. Iran can potentially wield this threat to its advantage, but the approach also carries risks. It is dangerous, for example, to assume that Iran can continue to calibrate its strikes to avoid unintended escalation. Iranian forces might strike Gulf economic interests that, whether intentionally or not, would dramatically widen the war. And even without a dramatic incident, experts and advisers have suggested that global companies and even the Gulf countries themselves are considering what the “new normal” in the region looks like, given the lingering impacts and uncertainty from the current conflict and the fact that even a weakened Iran could threaten its neighbors.

Will the Houthis join the fight?

There is an immediate concern that the Houthis in Yemen, either for their own interests or at Iran’s behest, will enter the conflict. If the group does get involved, then it would likely be by restarting attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb Strait—threatening the flow of an additional 12 percent of international seaborne oil transits and 8 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade. For shipping companies, these attacks would add to the already rising costs from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the higher shipping prices as a result of rerouting still occurring from Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in late 2023. These dangers and the costs associated with them would also affect global markets and, even more immediately and profoundly, Saudi Arabia and other GCC member states, given their proximity and the security implications of a re-escalation of the conflict in Yemen.

Aware of the threats the Houthis pose to global shipping and regional security, the US military could continue to carry out new strikes to weaken the group. But regardless of how Houthi actions play out in the coming weeks, Yemen’s instability and entrenched domestic conflict will undoubtedly endure, as it has for over a decade, threatening to amplify instability in the Gulf region in unpredictable ways. As Yemen director at the National Security Council during the outbreak of fighting with the Houthis more than a decade ago, I witnessed firsthand how the conflict in Yemen reordered Gulf security and economic priorities—and over time even led to fissures between GCC member states. Against the backdrop of a worsening conflict with Iran, a second front of fighting in the region might threaten Gulf and US interests in unpredictable ways.

Will GCC unity fracture?

As the conflict drags on, Iran may increasingly try to fracture GCC unity. It could, for example, seek to exploit the differences in interests and perspectives between Gulf countries, each of which has different relationships with Iran, the United States, Israel, and each other. While the GCC does not traditionally have the same rigorous organizing principles as, for example, the European Union, Gulf member states have benefited when they act in unison. To date, there has been a noticeable “rally around the flag” dynamic in the face of Iranian attacks that has papered over differences among Gulf countries. While Iran has engaged with the GCC as a group in prior instances, it has had more success pursuing and maintaining its individual relationships with member states. Iranian leaders likely believe there is value for them in fracturing the group, in the same way that Iran has sought to exploit differences in interests and values between the United States and its other traditional partners and allies.

Memories are both short and long in the region, and GCC member states have not forgotten the Gulf rift that occurred during US President Donald Trump’s first term. Then, years of simmering criticism and concern ignited an escalation of mutual accusations leading Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain to sever relations, close airspace, and enforce a blockade on Qatar, for what they said was Doha’s funding of terrorism, fomenting regional unrest, and ties to Iran. I saw the direct implications for US interests as the head of the political section at the US embassy in Riyadh at that time.

GCC unity will also likely be a factor in how this conflict ends. At times in recent weeks, some Gulf nations have reportedly urged the United States to find an off-ramp. At other times, some have advised escalating strikes to destroy the Iranian regime. These conflicting preferences among Gulf countries augur a worrying trend. The ability of the GCC to maintain a unified voice, which Iran will actively work to divide, will affect the group’s ability to support an end to the conflict that advances the stability of the region as a whole rather than their own parochial interests—as well as its ability to work collectively to advance economic, political, and security goals beyond the Iran war.

Will domestic instability increase in the Gulf?

Since the war began, there has been little news about domestic instability in the Gulf countries, which aim to continue projecting confidence and stability to the wider world. However, the longer the conflict drags on, the more that it could affect each nation in various ways. This in turn could lead the Gulf states to respond in ways that might be antithetical to US interests and values.

Three points are worth considering here. First, citizens and residents’ economic opportunities and physical security have been, and will continue to be, affected by this conflict. If the fighting gets worse, it could reach a tipping point where there is greater public outcry to end the conflict. Second, economic duress will affect nations’ residents and migrant labor populations more acutely than their citizens, given many Gulf states’ economic systems. If this pressure becomes too much, it could lead to wide-ranging and long-lasting human rights and economic issues. Third, in the past few decades some Gulf countries have at times viewed minority populations with suspicion, accusing certain individuals, especially Shia and other minorities, of receiving support, training, and backing from Iran. As Iran’s grip on its proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen weakens, Tehran might seek to take advantage of any preexisting relationships with these Gulf minority populations. At the same time, Gulf states might use such rumors and fears to quell domestic unrest with potentially devastating consequences.

Will Gulf states turn toward China and Russia?

In the current phase of the war, Gulf countries will undoubtedly try to reinforce their security through closer partnerships with the United States. But depending on the outcome of this conflict, some Gulf countries may develop concerns about US reliability as an economic and security partner. Gulf leaders might, for example, fault Washington for an inability to control the conflict or for failing to find an off-ramp at an appropriate time. If this happens, some GCC countries might then choose to reinforce their partnership options beyond the United States by strengthening ties with Russia and China—perhaps economically at first, but potentially also strategically. This in turn could make it more difficult for the United States to pursue its interests in the region, not only in terms of its security goals and Iran policy, but also longer-term strategic partnerships on issues as varied as advanced technology, artificial intelligence, and nuclear energy.

Gulf countries have long proven that they maintain their own relationships with Iran and other groups to advance their own interests, much in the same way that many European countries do. These channels have proven useful to convey messages over the years, but the Trump administration should not underestimate Gulf countries’ ability to use the same channels to take steps with Iran that might undercut US interests and long-term goals if Washington is unable to find a suitable off-ramp that serves GCC interests. Similarly, Iran might try to take advantage of its relationships with China, Russia, and the GCC in ways that run counter to US interests, even if the current conflict has created suspicion in Iran’s relationship with its neighbors.

Mitigating these potential end states will be a long-term project that will require the focused attention of the Trump administration even after a resolution to the immediate conflict.

The Trump administration and GCC countries share an interest in finding a resolution to the current conflict that leaves the region more stable than it was before the launch of Operation Epic Fury. But despite the tactical victories of the US and Israeli campaign against Iran, the war appears to have opened the door to a new wave of uncertainty in the Gulf, which might threaten the very regional stability and economic prosperity it is meant to ensure.

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Kafafy for Foreign Policy: Empty Words Don’t Open Straits

Atlantic Council — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 13:19:09 +0000

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Russia bombs Ukrainian UNESCO site as Putin escalates terror tactics

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 24 Mar 2026 21:35:39 +0000

Russia bombed a UNESCO World Heritage site in the historic heart of west Ukrainian city Lviv on March 24 as Kremlin efforts to target Ukraine’s civilian population continue to escalate. The rare daytime drone strike hit a residential building close to the Bernardine monastery complex, causing extensive damage and leaving two people seriously injured. The area has featured on the UNESCO World Heritage Site List since 1998 as part of Lviv’s historic architectural ensemble.

Ukrainian officials condemned Tuesday’s attack on the bustling downtown district of Lviv and called on the international community to react. “Russia brutally struck the center of Lviv, a city of exceptional cultural value and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. I urge the UNESCO Director General to immediately respond to this crime in the strongest terms,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha. “Russia is doing exactly what the Iranian regime is doing in the Middle East, but in the middle of Europe.”

Video footage of the bombing appears to show a Russian drone flying unimpeded into the building in central Lviv, indicating a targeted airstrike. This was the latest in a series of similar Russian attacks on Ukrainian heritage sites that have fueled accusations of a deliberate campaign to erase the symbols of Ukrainian culture and national identity. In response to these repeated Russian attacks, UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee has already added three Ukrainian sites located in Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa to the UN agency’s official List of World Heritage in Danger.

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Many Ukrainians saw Tuesday’s attention-grabbing airstrike on a non-military target in central Lviv as part of Kremlin efforts to terrorize the civilian population and break Ukrainian society’s will to resist the ongoing Russian invasion. “This is how Russia tries to make normal life impossible,” commented Ukrainian member of parliament Inna Sovsun.

Over the past year, Russian attacks of civilian targets have risen sharply. According to United Nations data, 2025 was the deadliest period for Ukrainian civilians since the initial months of the full-scale invasion, with the number of deaths rising by 31 percent compared to the previous year.

Many of these civilian deaths came as a result of an escalating bombing campaign made possible by the dramatic expansion of Russia’s domestic drone production capacity. Whereas aerial attacks in 2023 and 2024 typically involved dozens of drones, it is now common for Russia to launch hundreds of unmanned bomber drones at targets across Ukraine in a single day. For example, Tuesday’s strike in central Lviv was part of a nationwide attack involving almost one thousand drones over a 24-hour period. The sheer scale of these bombing raids means that Ukrainian air defenses are often overwhelmed.

The recent winter season saw Russia’s most extensive bombing campaign against the Ukrainian civilian population of the entire war, with a coordinated air offensive targeting critical heating and power infrastructure amid Arctic temperatures. This apparent attempt to freeze millions of Ukrainians into submission in their own homes ultimately failed, but it did serve to underline Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin’s readiness to employ terror tactics as he seeks to increase the pressure on the Ukrainian authorities and push Kyiv toward capitulation.

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Moscow’s mounting attacks on Ukrainian civilians have come against a backdrop of growing battlefield frustration for the Kremlin. Despite enjoying the military initiative throughout 2025, Russia managed to seize less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory while suffering catastrophic losses.

This underwhelming military performance has continued in recent months. For the first time in more than two years, Ukraine actually liberated more land during February 2026 than Russia was able to occupy. The Russian army’s inability to achieve a decisive breakthrough is now causing rumblings of discontent on the home front, including among Russia’s vocal pro-war blogger community.

Despite his army’s lack of progress on the battlefield, Putin shows no signs of a willingness to compromise on the maximalist goals of his invasion. Instead, he continues to insist on peace terms that would leave postwar Ukraine isolated, defenseless, and completely at his mercy.

The Russian ruler knows he cannot afford to settle for anything less. After all the sacrifices of the past four years, a negotiated peace that left 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and firmly anchored in the Western world would be viewed in Moscow as a defeat of historic proportions.

With no obvious route to military victory in Ukraine, Putin finds himself trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end for fear of weakening his grip on power and tarnishing his place in Russian history. So far, he has responded to this dilemma by increasing attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population.

There is very little evidence to suggest this approach is working. On the contrary, recent polls indicate that the bombardment of civilians has hardened Ukraine’s resolve to fight on rather than accept peace terms dictated by the Kremlin. Nevertheless, Russian attacks on civilians are likely to expand further in the coming months as Putin lacks credible alternatives to revive his faltering invasion.

Russia’s decision to bomb a heritage site in the middle of a major Ukrainian city in broad daylight was a signal of intent that points unmistakably toward a coming escalation. Putin is clearly struggling to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, but he remains committed to extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and is prepared to ruthlessly target the civilian population in order to break the current deadlock and force the country’s surrender. Tuesday’s attack on a UNESCO site in the heart of Lviv sent a chilling message that nobody and nowhere in Ukraine is safe.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Lukashenka’s decision to release 250 detainees was widely welcomed. Many of those freed had been in prison since the crackdown that gripped Belarus following the country’s 2020 presidential election, which sparked unprecedented nationwide protests amid allegations of massive voter fraud. The released prisoners included Valiantsin Stefanovich and Marfa Rabkova of Belarusian human rights group Viasna, along with journalist Katsyaryna Andreyeva.

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Under President Trump, the United States has sought a thaw with Minsk. These efforts have so far led to the release of hundreds of political prisoners and an easing of US sanctions against Belarus.

Increased engagement between the US and Belarus represents a significant change in strategy following years of growing tensions between Minsk and Western capitals. Western governments have expressed alarm over Lukashenka’s repressive domestic policies, along with his involvement in Putin’s hybrid war against Europe and his complicity in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Trump administration initiative to reengage with Lukashenka has brought clear humanitarian benefits and has had a life-changing impact on released prisoners along with their families. Nevertheless, concerns remain that the current US approach risks creating incentives for the Belarusian authorities to imprison more domestic opponents.

Despite a number of large-scale releases over the past year, human rights groups claim there are still almost one thousand political prisoners in Belarus, with new names regularly being added to the list as arrests continue. Activists have likened this process to a “revolving door” of repression, with new political prisoners regularly detained as others are pardoned and released.

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Beyond the humanitarian dimension, the US diplomatic outreach to Minsk is seen as an attempt to counter Lukashenka’s near complete dependence on Moscow. Since the 2020 protest movement that almost ousted the Belarus dictator, he has been heavily reliant on Russia for his political survival. In exchange for its support, the Kremlin has sought to expand its grip on neighboring Belarus. This has led to what some have labeled as a “creeping annexation.”

Trump has sought to restart dialogue with Minsk against a backdrop of faltering US-led peace efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine War. So far, however, there is little indication that Lukashenka may be prepared to downgrade his backing for Putin’s invasion or offer any assistance to advance negotiations.

The Belarusian ruler has been a key Russian ally throughout the invasion. This support has included allowing Putin to use Belarus as a gateway for Russia’s initial attempt to seize Kyiv in 2022. More recently, Lukashenka has agreed to host Russian nuclear weapons. He is also accused of aiding Moscow’s drone attacks on Ukraine and partnering with China to produce ammunition for the Russian army.

Lukashenka may now be on track to join Putin among the criminal suspects wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. On March 12, the ICC officially opened an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed by Lukashenka and his security apparatus against political opponents. In March 2023, the ICC issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest in connection with his alleged involvement in the large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children.

The latest Belarusian prisoner releases are an indication of improving relations between Washington and Minsk. However, it remains to be seen whether the benefits of this diplomatic outreach will extend beyond humanitarian goals and lead to broader gains in the security sphere. Lukshenka is no doubt ready to offer more pardons in exchange for economic incentives, but he has yet to demonstrate a willingness to decrease domestic repression or distance himself from the Kremlin.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Could Russia use fake separatists to destabilize Estonia and discredit NATO?

James Rice — Tue, 24 Mar 2026 20:31:17 +0000

In recent weeks, references to a pro-Russian separatist movement in neighboring Estonia have begun appearing with increasing frequency on social media. The so-called “Narva People’s Republic” clearly echoes the “People’s Republics” established by the Kremlin in eastern Ukraine during the early stages of Russia’s invasion in spring 2014. However, not everyone is convinced that this virtual movement is worthy of serious attention.

Estonia’s Internal Security Service, which has earned considerable respect in recent years for a string of high-profile counterintelligence successes, has dismissed the “Narva People’s Republic” initiative as an information operation. Meanwhile, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service doubts any direct Russian government involvement.

A journalist from the Estonian newspaper Postimees recently managed to infiltrate a Telegram chat group and expose the “Narva People’s Republic” as a tiny operation being run by someone likely outside Estonia with apparent ties to St. Petersburg. Given the small scale of the campaign, there is a lively debate in Estonia and across social media over whether highlighting it is a sensible precautionary measure or counterproductive.

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Many have inevitably drawn comparisons with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the role played by fake separatist movements created by the Kremlin to justify Moscow’s expansionist agenda in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. When separatist propaganda about “People’s Republics” first began appearing in Ukraine in the years prior to the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, it was not initially taken seriously.

Recent references to a “Narva People’s Republic” appear to refer to the entire Ida-Viru County in northeastern Estonia rather than the city of Narva alone. Like Ukraine’s Donbas, Ida-Viru County was subject to an extended period of russification. During the Soviet occupation following World War II, large numbers of Russian-speakers from various parts of the Soviet Union were settled in Narva and in newly built Soviet industrial cities in the region.

With a current population that remains dominated by Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians, this would seem to make Ida-Viru County ripe for the Kremlin’s influence operations and grievance politics. However, the Estonian government has invested significantly in the region’s economic development and cultural integration.

Also, the fact that many residents of Estonia’s northeast have family links to Russia means they are well aware that they currently enjoy a far better standard of living than most people across the Narva River in the Russian Federation. With Estonia, like Ukraine, one must avoid the fallacy of conflating language with loyalty.

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The fact that a grassroots separatist movement is unlikely to develop in Ida-Viru County will not necessarily prevent Russia from using the separatist narrative to advance its agenda. When efforts to cultivate a local separatist movement in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine proved insufficient in 2014, the Kremlin sent in Russian citizens and military personnel without insignia. Soon after, they were followed by an undeclared invasion force.

Russia’s goal in Estonia might not be military conquest. It is often suggested that Moscow could aim to test NATO’s collective security commitments and discredit the alliance by launching a relatively minor incursion and claiming a small chunk of Estonian territory on the pretext of protecting compatriots. This would be much easier said than done, however, given Estonia’s heavily monitored border, where even the smallest infraction is noticed quickly. In such a case, Estonia would not wait for NATO to respond.

Estonian officials can be prickly about any portrayal of their country as particularly vulnerable or overly reliant on others for security. Since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, there have been endless articles asking “is Narva next?” This framing has been met with strong push back from Estonian security experts.

Similarly, war games exercises resulting in a quick Russian takeover of the Baltic region have been criticized by Estonian officials as lacking understanding of the Baltic states’ own security posture to the point of being insulting. In common with nearby Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania, Estonia employs a whole of society “total defense” concept that should not be underestimated.

Due to the enormous losses it is sustaining in Ukraine, Russia’s military is currently thought to be in no position to launch an invasion of Estonia. In its annual report for 2026, Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, while clear-eyed about the Kremlin’s expansionist ambitions, assessed that Russia has no intention of militarily attacking Estonia or any other NATO member state in the present year, or likely the next.

It is no wonder that Estonia’s foreign and defense policy has been focused on marshaling support for Ukraine as it confronts Russian aggression. It is also easy to understand why elements in Russia would like to create the impression of a looming threat to Estonia. So far, Estonia’s reaction to social media chatter about a supposed separatist movement has been typically phlegmatic. As this narrative has drawn media attention, we can expect to see it pushed further and recycled. Estonia’s NATO allies should follow Tallinn’s lead and react by remaining alert but calm.

James Rice is a doctoral student at the Institute of World Politics and former legislative director for US Senator Chuck Grassley.

Frederick Kempe — Mon, 23 Mar 2026 21:33:00 +0000

This article was updated on March 23 at 5:33 p.m. ET.

The newest edition of the Economist puts it this way: “The conflict ravaging the Middle East may best be understood as two parallel wars. One is the campaign of American and Israeli air strikes against the Iranian regime; the other is Iran’s war on the global economy.”

If US President Donald Trump fails to address both simultaneously and successfully, he risks turning what has thus far been a tactical military success into a strategic failure with longer-term consequences for international stability.

The first war is one of missiles, drones, and Israel’s targeting of Iranian leaders, now entering its fourth week. By most measures, Iran is losing that war, as the United States and Israel reduce Iranian conventional military capabilities more every day. Nevertheless, Washington thus far has underestimated the Iranian regime’s resilience, dispersal of critical weaponry, and ability to continue attacking its neighbors.

That brings us to the second conflict unfolding in shipping lanes, in energy markets, and among political leaders. In its war on the global economy, Iran maintains dangerous leverage. Tehran’s moves to halt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow artery in the global energy economy’s circulatory system, have produced shocks to the global system.

Trump’s ultimatum to Iran over the weekend to fully open the strait within forty-eight hours or suffer attacks on its power plants vividly underscored the linkages between these two wars. The president’s five-day postponement of those strikes on Monday to provide space for talks with Tehran could provide a pathway to ending these wars. But Trump will have failed if these negotiations don’t remove Iran’s capabilities to inflict destruction on its neighbors, Israel, the United States, and the global economy.

How Iran claims ‘victory’

Geoeconomic weaponry will be as critical as military materiel in determining the outcome of this two-front conflict. Iran can’t defeat the United States and Israel militarily, but it may not need to. It only needs to ratchet up the cost of military action to a level that fractures American political will. Iran’s relatively inexpensive tools—missiles, drones, proxies, mines, even just the fear of the use of these tools—can disproportionately disrupt systems built on predictability.

Conventional wisdom holds that Trump must decide which war to prioritize because he can’t win them both. Some argue, for example, that to relieve the economic pressure Iran is applying, Trump should bring his military efforts to a rapid close even if the mission isn’t yet complete. Nothing, however, could be more short-sighted than leaving a vengeful and still formidable Iranian regime in place—one that can further rebuild its military capabilities over time and conduct terrorist attacks, after achieving the “victory” of countering the United States and Israel through asymmetric means.

For Tehran, regime survival would be sufficient triumph. It will tell its people, its proxies, its partners China and Russia, and the wider world that it absorbed the blows of the world’s greatest military power and exposed its vulnerabilities. That narrative will travel far beyond Iran, serving as a playbook that other US adversaries will employ.

How the US emerges victorious

For the United States, winning the two-front war doesn’t mean an open-ended military campaign with maximalist goals. What it would require is something that has been difficult to discern so far: a concerted strategy by the Trump administration that recognizes the larger stakes of this moment for the United States and its still-hedging allies.

What would such a strategy look like in practice? It would start with US forces stepping up their targeting of the missile, drone, and maritime capabilities that underpin Tehran’s asymmetric strategy, weakening them to the point that they are an occasional nuisance but not an ongoing threat. The United States also must decisively break Iran’s ability to hold the global economy hostage, beginning with opening the Strait of Hormuz. This step can be taken together with Gulf allies that now have no remaining doubt that their adversary is Iran, not Israel. These countries will proceed to structure their militaries and defense plans accordingly.

Beyond opening the strait, Trump will need to reach into his familiar geoeconomic toolkit if he hopes to win the economic war with Iran. As the Atlantic Council’s Josh Lipsky has written in the Wall Street Journal, such tools—from shipping insurance to asset seizures—used to be far more commonplace in conflict. On Friday, Trump temporarily waived sanctions on Iranian oil in order to calm global markets, but that was a defensive economic move rather than a proactive one. The United States possesses not only the world’s strongest military but also its largest economy. As his tariffs have shown, Trump is not afraid to leverage that power.

Israeli forces, for their part, should continue targeting the Iranian regime, particularly leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Undermining the IRGC would have the additional benefit of weakening Iran’s regional proxy networks, which have done so much harm over the past half century. If the IRGC remains strong after this conflict is over, it would allow the Iranian regime to regenerate its coercive power—both within Iran and across the region.

Even if the US and Israeli campaign does not result in regime change in Tehran, it should aim to produce a changed regime that lacks capacity to seriously threaten its neighbors, the United States, and the global economy. It may have been wishful thinking for Trump to call on Iranians to rise up against their despotic leadership, particularly after the regime killed as many as 30,000 demonstrators earlier this year. However, the more that the United States, Israel, and its partners defang Iran’s regime and its enforcers, the greater the chance of the regime’s eventual collapse.

His administration also must focus on building what comes after the war: a more resilient and robust Gulf security architecture in which Saudis, Emiratis, and their neighbors join in common cause despite their inevitable differences. Given the economic and strategic significance of the region, the United States will need to join with European allies and Asian stakeholders, including China, to share the burden and responsibility of safeguarding the world’s economic lifelines.

Many US allies opposed the Trump administration’s decision to go to war alongside Israel in Iran. Some supported it. But particularly as the war continues across two fronts, one aimed at the global economy, all have a stake in its outcome. The Trump administration now must stay the course to win both aspects of this war. As it does so, Washington would do well to rediscover the neglected value of coalition-building and alliances in managing a world where continued volatility will require every friend the Trump administration can muster.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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The Iran conflict exposes the new cost curve of war

Nic Adams — Mon, 23 Mar 2026 21:06:41 +0000

“Shock and awe” was the term of art when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. That conflict saw the United States bring to bear overwhelming military force backed by superior technology in the form of precision-guided weapons, stealth aircraft, and satellite technology, as well as a finely tuned military force built on sound doctrine, world-class training, and a professional cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers. In many ways, the initial strikes on Iran resemble this dynamic—a world-class military with superior weapons and training engaging a weaker foe, aiming to achieve a lightning-fast military victory in service of political aims.

A closer look, however, reveals a shift in the battlefield dynamic over the past twenty years that often gives weaker militaries more tools to offset stronger adversaries. Cheap drones, open-source satellite imagery, and cyber tools give weaker states such as Iran new ways to hold superior militaries at risk, while forcing them to expend munitions and resources at far greater cost. And despite deep capital markets, a strong innovation base, and a growing defense tech sector in the United States, costs remain high and development timelines remain long due to an ornery requirements process, misaligned acquisition incentives, and bureaucratic inertia. The Pentagon’s challenge is to rapidly field innovative, lower-cost technologies alongside its exquisite capabilities, ensuring each is used where it delivers the greatest advantage.

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Consider the overwhelming firepower with which the United States initiated combat operations in 2003. Joint Direct Attack Munitions, aircraft carrier strike groups, and stealth bombers remained out of reach for Iraqi defenders. US bases in the region were also largely untouchable; while Iraqi Scud missiles inflicted serious damage in the first Gulf War, US missile defense systems proved highly effective during Operation Iraqi Freedom, leading to a decisive end of initial combat operations after just a few weeks of fighting, the following insurgency notwithstanding. Much has changed since then, especially with the proliferation of low-cost drone technology, at which Iran has become adept. By producing and exporting the Shahed-136 drone to Russia for use in Ukraine, Iran has refined both the technology and doctrine behind these systems.

The result is a weapon that forces the United States to intercept $30,000 drones with $2-million defensive systems—while still inflicting casualties in the opening salvos of a conflict. Iran’s combination of ballistic missiles and low-cost drones threatens to swiftly deplete defensive systems, leaving US, Arab, and Israeli targets vulnerable to attack. Additionally, Iranian-aligned groups in the region, such as the Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq, or even the much-weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon, can employ much of the same low-cost weapons to stretch and harass American and Israeli troops, broadening the battlespace across the region and striking civilian traffic and infrastructure to impose global costs to a growing conflict.

While the United States will continue to enjoy unquestionable military overmatch, both the United States and Israel enjoy another advantage over the terrorist regime in Tehran and its regional proxies: a deep pool of innovation, capital markets, and industry ready to produce in support of national security and defense. While there will always be a place for exquisite weapons systems and precision munitions, cheaper and more attritable weapons systems must be part of the fight to both adequately and economically defend against some of the systems being employed by Iranian forces, as well as weapons the United States might encounter in a future Pacific conflict. The Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS) drone is one example of the United States leaning into more cost-effective weapons, a rare case of reverse-engineering the Iranian Shahed. Other novel and emerging technologies changing the battlefield today include autonomous ground systems, artificial intelligence-driven counter-drone weapons, and energetics (such as propellants and explosives) for artillery strikes.

For example, autonomous ground vehicles armed with counter-drone weapons or sensors could be cheaply and effectively deployed across the Middle East to defend US bases as well as civilian oil infrastructure, allowing soldiers and civilians to take cover while autonomous systems remain exposed and engage incoming drones. This would obviate the need for expensive missiles to take down low-cost drones, allowing the United States to keep its high-cost systems in reserve for bigger targets that may yet be on the way.

In addition to hardware, the United States has a strong advantage over Iran in big data, computing power, and software. US systems are far more networked than they were twenty years ago. Intelligence collection and analysis is now supported by artificial intelligence. Open-source imagery solutions provide the United States with more options to locate enemy capabilities and stockpiles.

Supported by deep capital markets and institutional investors, the United States dominates the defense tech landscape—and will continue to do so. That means it’s up to the Department of Defense and the services to send a strong demand signal. Unless leaders are willing to employ proven innovative systems at scale, the United States will continue to rely on older, slower, and far more expensive weapons systems both in this fight and in the next.

From Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine to Iran, drones and loitering munitions have repeatedly demonstrated how inexpensive systems can reshape the battlefield. Now the United States must adapt in order to remain the world’s premier fighting force. The technology is already here. The question is whether policymakers have the vision and the flexibility to deploy it.

Nic Adams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He also advises frontier technology firms on strategic communications, business development, and government relations. He previously served as a professional staff member on the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and as a commissioned US Army officer.

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What Romania’s role in the Iran war reveals about its diplomatic positioning

Alex Șerban, Kirsten Fontenrose — Mon, 23 Mar 2026 18:55:38 +0000

BUCHAREST and WASHINGTON—Recent diplomatic tensions involving Iran and Romania reveal more than a temporary geopolitical episode. They illustrate the increasingly complex strategic environment facing NATO allies on Europe’s eastern flank. Romania’s decision to authorize additional US military capabilities on its territory reflects a long-standing commitment to the transatlantic alliance. But it also highlights the delicate balancing act Bucharest must perform: reinforcing its strategic partnership with Washington while maintaining cohesion with European partners that are navigating a more uncertain transatlantic relationship.

The developments began when the United States requested temporary access to Romanian military infrastructure to support operations in the Middle East. Romania’s Supreme Council of National Defense approved the US request to deploy several capabilities, including aerial refueling aircraft and satellite communication systems serving a defensive role. Romania’s Parliament then endorsed the decision, reaffirming the legal framework that governs US access to Romanian bases under bilateral agreements and NATO commitments.

Soon after the approval, the first visible signs of this deployment appeared. According to Romanian media reports, three US Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft landed at the 90th Air Base near Otopeni. While these aircraft are not combat platforms, they are among the most critical enablers of modern air operations. By allowing fighter jets and surveillance aircraft to refuel midair, tanker aircraft extend operational range and endurance, effectively expanding the geographic reach of allied airpower. Their presence in Romania strengthens the logistical backbone supporting US and NATO operations across multiple theaters.

Iran’s reaction followed quickly. A spokesperson for the Iranian foreign ministry warned that allowing US forces to operate from Romanian territory could be interpreted as participation in military aggression. Bucharest responded to Tehran’s threats with notable restraint. Romanian officials emphasized that the country is not involved in any conflict with Iran and reiterated that the deployment of US assets is defensive and conducted under existing bilateral agreements. The Romanian foreign ministry also stressed that the missile defense infrastructure hosted by Romania serves purely defensive purposes and operates within NATO’s collective security framework.

When Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei warned that hosting US aerial refueling tankers would make Romania a participant in military aggression, he was not making a legal argument so much as a threat intended to deter US partners. Tehran’s objective is to ensure that each US partner—including Romania, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom—concludes that the risk is not worth bearing alone and quietly declines. If enough partners hesitate, then the coalition Washington is trying to consolidate never fully materializes, improving Iran’s strategic position without requiring direct military confrontation.

Iran has pressed Gulf states and European partners separately, issuing warnings calibrated to each country—threatening Gulf states with strikes on energy infrastructure while warning European governments of legal consequences and damage to bilateral ties. The logic is consistent: Make the cost of cooperation feel personal and isolating, in the hope that no partner feels confident enough in collective backing to hold firm. The approach works when partners deliberate alone; it is far less effective when they coordinate openly and signal unity.

Romania has strong grounds to hold firm on its position. The 2005 US-Romania Defense Cooperation Agreement established the framework for US military access to multiple joint-use facilities, including the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base. Together with the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and the 2011 Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century, this creates a comprehensive legal basis for US operations on Romanian soil—one that has been ratified by the Parliament and upheld consistently for two decades. Iran’s invocation of potential damage to bilateral relations underscores the limits of its leverage. Romania-Iran ties are sufficiently limited that their deterioration carries minimal strategic cost for Bucharest.

The energy dimension reinforces this asymmetry. Iran does not export natural gas to Romania and has no infrastructure or contractual mechanism through which it could exert pressure. Meanwhile, Romania’s energy sector is expanding, positioning it to become a major European gas producer. Tehran therefore lacks meaningful economic leverage over Bucharest in the energy domain.

On the military side, Romania has approved the deployment of support assets rather than strike capabilities. After weeks of sustained military pressure on Iranian infrastructure, Tehran’s ability to project force into southeastern Europe is constrained, though not eliminated. More importantly, US forces are present on Romanian territory. Any direct attack on facilities such as the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base would involve US personnel, raising the stakes significantly and triggering a bilateral response that would not depend on full NATO consensus.

However, Iran has a documented history of covert operations across Europe, and Romania’s role as a host for US forces increases its exposure to malign activities. While real, this threat remains limited by Iran’s current operational constraints and the escalation risks associated with targeting a NATO member hosting US troops.

That said, Romania’s position also brings into focus one of NATO’s most sensitive strategic assets: the ballistic missile defense installation at Deveselu. Operational since 2016, the Aegis Ashore system forms part of NATO’s broader missile defense architecture designed to intercept ballistic threats originating outside the Euro-Atlantic area. While the system is purely defensive, its presence places Romania at the center of ongoing geopolitical debates and makes it a frequent target of criticism from both Russia and Iran.

Asked about Iran’s warnings on March 19, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte emphasized Alliance unity, stating that “Romania is safe; we will defend every centimeter of allied territory,” while highlighting Romania’s key role in strengthening security on the eastern flank. This reassurance reflects the broader strategic importance of Romania within NATO’s deterrence posture, particularly in the Black Sea region.

Even more recent developments—including Iran firing missiles toward the Diego Garcia military base and threatening to attack power generation across the Gulf—point to the regime’s willingness and capability to strike beyond its immediate neighborhood. In recent days, several European countries have put their security services on heightened alert. Reports by the Romanian news site HotNews that Iran may be activating operational networks in Europe have increased the relevance of NATO’s missile defense shield. The Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu increasingly represents not only a defensive buffer but a front line in the protection of major European capitals against evolving ballistic threats.

At the same time, the episode highlights a broader debate within the Alliance. While Romania continues to rely heavily on the United States as the cornerstone of its security guarantees, discussions in Europe increasingly emphasize strategic autonomy. Proposals such as expanding France’s nuclear deterrence to cover European allies reflect concerns about the long-term reliability of US security commitments. Romania’s response has been cautious: open to deeper European cooperation but firmly committed to NATO as the central pillar of deterrence.

Meanwhile, the current tensions among NATO allies over the Iran war may ultimately strengthen allied cohesion despite short-term turbulence. As Iulian Chifu, a former advisor to the president of Romania on strategic affairs, put it, the war has “exposed the limits of unilateral action, forcing the United States to rediscover the strategic necessity of allied coordination and reinforcing NATO as the central framework for collective security.”

Navigating this environment requires careful diplomacy. Romania’s challenge is not to choose between Washington and its European partners, but to reinforce both pillars simultaneously. Clear coordination and collective messaging among allies will be essential to counter efforts to fragment the coalition. In an era of intensifying geopolitical competition and evolving transatlantic dynamics, Romania’s ability to maintain that balance may prove to be one of its most important strategic contributions to the Alliance.

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Kroenig quoted in The Economist on war in Iran

Atlantic Council — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 19:27:03 +0000

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 19, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in The Economist on US action in Iran, arguing that President Trump is weakening a regime hostile to the United States.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

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Demand destruction has begun: What Sri Lanka reveals about the global energy crisis

Phillip Cornell — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 16:04:40 +0000

GALLE—For the past two years, I have been based largely out of Sri Lanka, closer to Asian clients, while still working regularly from Washington and London. The experience has been an education in emerging market resilience. This is a society in recovery from conflict and natural disaster that remains exposed to external shocks, challenged by entrenched interests, and subject to the influence of larger neighbors. Forged in this crucible, Sri Lanka’s tightly knit communities are highly adept at managing uncertainty. But over the past two weeks, that resilience has been tested in ways that are both familiar and deeply alarming.

Since the US and Israeli strikes on Iran, Sri Lanka has been an unlikely subject of headlines. It provided emergency rescue to Iranian sailors after the US torpedoed their ship off the coast near the city of Galle, where I live. It also gave refuge to a second crew and impounded their vessel in a remote port to keep it away from sensitive commercial traffic around Colombo. A relatively new popular government is desperate to remain neutral and focus on the reforms it was elected for. Yet painstaking economic recovery is now colliding with a massive energy crisis and its immediate effects.

The disruption to flows through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one fifth of global oil and shipped gas transits, has triggered a rapid and systemic shock to energy markets. Prices have surged and availability has tightened severely. A crippling shortage of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) means there is little fuel for cooking. Restaurants and small businesses are shuttering. The lack of fertilizer shipments is thwarting the critical March planting season in this heavily agricultural country. Petrol stations faced strain initially from panicked hoarding behavior (memories of the 2022 crisis are still fresh), and, more recently, from restricted distribution.

Sri Lanka is just a small example of the energy havoc spreading around the world. Within days of the conflict’s outbreak and the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, much of South and Southeast Asia have moved from price pressure to physical constraint. Asia is particularly reliant on oil and gas from the Gulf, with around 60 percent of its crude oil imports and nearly a third of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) moving through the strait. Almost all countries in the region import most of their fuel and gas, and some only have enough supplies to last a few more weeks. Several Southeast Asia–based refineries, including facilities in Singapore and Malaysia, have cut back ‌output due to constrained crude availability. Panic fuel-buying has spread to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Household reliance on imported LPG is on another scale altogether in India, where hundreds of millions of customers wait for days to replace canisters.

This is what a real energy shock looks like on the ground.

Governments are now scrambling to secure supply, drawing on limited reserves, issuing emergency tenders, and in many cases trying to reduce demand.

In recent days, the Sri Lankan government has taken extraordinary steps. It introduced a four-day workweek, and it began moving schools to remote learning on Wednesdays. Transport and public services are being curtailed. On March 15, the government reintroduced a mandatory petrol rationing program that saw millions of subscribers crash the registration website. These are emergency responses to address a fuel-import dependent system under stress.

Lines form to purchase gas near Galle, Sri Lanka, on March 17, 2026. (Phillip Cornell)

Sri Lanka is not alone. Across Asia, governments are implementing emergency measures. Countries are prioritizing household LPG over commercial use. Industrial activity in sectors such as petrochemicals is being curtailed. The Philippines has shortened the workweek. Pakistan has closed schools. Myanmar introduced mobility restrictions.

Air travel is highly sensitive to fuel prices, and airlines are now cutting routes as jet fuel prices rise sharply. This is compounding the air travel chaos caused by closed airspace over the major Gulf “superconnector” airline hubs, with direct impacts on Asian tourist destinations. Across southern Sri Lanka, hotel bookings have dried up.

The latest pressures have been on the power system in Sri Lanka. The Ceylon Electricity Board is a traditional integrated utility; less than 10 percent of its generation is from liquid fuel. But fuel still provides key flexibility, and local diesel generators are common. After a dry season that reduced hydroelectric capacity, and labor disputes in the face of critical power sector reforms, the fuel shortage is adding to existing system stress. Rolling curtailments and power outages began in earnest this week, forcing hotels and critical services like hospitals to draw further on diesel stocks to feed emergency generation.

The economic effects of these various price and supply shocks are quick to materialize. Higher fuel costs are feeding through into transport and food systems, contributing to inflation and growth pressures. Prices for daily goods at our local markets have already gone up as shopkeepers anticipate supply chain disruptions. Economies like Sri Lanka are particularly exposed due to weaker currencies, limited fiscal space, and dependence on imports. The International Monetary Fund has warned that sustained increases in energy prices could raise inflation and reduce growth globally, with emerging markets especially exposed.

Perhaps the most important development is that demand destruction is already underway. The Financial Times, citing JPMorgan analysis, shows that refined fuel shipments in Asia have fallen by 30 to 35 percent, while global oil demand could drop by around one million barrels per day as a result of both price increases and policy measures. The speed of adjustment makes the current crisis unique. During the 2022 energy shock following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, the effects unfolded over months as supply chains reoriented. In this case, disruption to a central maritime artery has compressed the timeline. Physical shortages, policy responses, and economic contraction are occurring in rapid succession.

Rationing and demand suppression can provide temporary relief, but perceptions and expectations of duration are already causing changes in behavior. Business owners are contemplating risk-mitigation investments such as solar panels and batteries. A neighbor has become the local agent for Sri Lankan–built electric three-wheelers to replace the classic tuk-tuk. There is a real sense of preparing for a structural change.

Motorists line up to purchase gas near Galle, Sri Lanka, on March 17, 2026. (Phillip Cornell)

Resilience is a word often used to describe technical systems, but it is ultimately about people. Sri Lanka has endured considerable hardship in recent decades, but a very real sense of community and shared responsibility provide informal social safety nets that kick into action during tough times. Even as only a guest of the country, I have felt embraced by the community. Invitations to communal iftar dinners, shared use of barbecues or microgrids, and conviviality during hour-long waits for petrol are just small examples of a community solidarity that feels different.

In developed economies, economic disruption is often framed in terms of price increases and inflation. In markets where the impact on daily activities such as cooking, transport, and work is immediate and tangible, disruption becomes a test of crisis behavior.

Sri Lanka is not an outlier but an early warning, and a reminder that the global energy system remains deeply vulnerable to disruption, especially for those who depend on it most.

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Zagorodnyuk in Foreign Policy: Four years of war in Europe

Atlantic Council — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 15:28:01 +0000

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Vershbow in RealClearDefense: Why we must not ignore Havana Syndrome

Atlantic Council — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 15:24:05 +0000

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Temnycky in Forbes: How Ukraine’s youth organizations have been impacted by Russia’s war

Atlantic Council — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 15:19:43 +0000

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Aquatic Tiger: How long-range submarine drones could play a role in a Taiwan conflict

Fri, 20 Mar 2026 15:11:51 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The Aquatic Tiger wargame explored how long-range autonomous underwater vehicles (LRAUVs) could help the US deter or counter Chinese military action against Taiwan.
LRAUVs showed promise for pre-conflict surveillance, mine countermeasures, and swarming attacks in chokepoints, but showed vulnerabilities in the shallow, constricted waters of the Taiwan Strait.
LRAUVs would be useful contributors—not decisive—if deployed in large numbers, with advance planning, and integrated into broader US and allied military operations.

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Introduction

According to the Pentagon, “[China’s military] continues to refine multiple military options to force Taiwan unification by brute force. Those options include, most dangerously, an amphibious invasion, firepower strike, and possibly a maritime blockade.”

To address this threat, the new National Security Strategy unveiled in late 2025 declares that “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority” and emphasizes, to this end, “reinforcing U.S. and allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan. The new National Defense Strategy of January 2026 further reinforces the goal to establish a “strong denial defense along the First Island Chain” and the need to “supercharge the defense industrial base.”

For this approach to succeed, the United States and its allies must rapidly field new military systems to counterbalance China’s military buildup. To offset China’s tremendous rate of military production, US defense thinkers and policymakers are increasingly focused on unmanned systems—particularly those far cheaper and faster to produce than the most advanced manned warships and aircraft. Such low-priced unmanned systems would be a key element of accelerating a buildup of US military capability to deter or defeat Chinese aggression against Taiwan at a feasible cost.

As Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, told the Washington Post: “I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities so I can make their lives utterly miserable for a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything.”

Thanks to both sides’ mass use of unmanned aircraft in Russia’s war against Ukraine, this quote might bring to mind swarms of flying drones dropping munitions or ramming into targets. But Ukraine is largely a land war, and a fight to control Taiwan would be a different kind of warfare. Undersea drones could play a critical role in defending Taiwan, particularly if they could be produced relatively cheaply and paired with AI that would allow them to operate autonomously while submerged and maintain communications silence to preserve their stealth. Given the long distances involved in the Indo-Pacific region and the distance of US bases from Taiwan, such drones could be particularly useful for the US military in a Taiwan conflict if they had a range of over 1000 kilometers. This led to the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI)’s interest in exploring, through wargaming and analysis, the potential of US LRAUVs in a Taiwan contingency. This issue brief is the result of Aquatic Tiger, an initial two-day wargame and post-wargame analytic effort conducted by IPSI, using the expertise of former US military, intelligence, and defense officials, along with non-government scholars and industry experts. This wargame, conducted over two days in November 2025, was the first of its kind with publicly available results, and is summarized below from the perspectives of a range of participants.

Aquatic Tiger’s initial results suggest that additional analysis, wargaming, modeling, technical experimentation, live exercises, and simulation on key issues related to such LRAUVs are warranted, including: how units of such drones would be best organized and employed by the United States, Taiwan, and US allies in such a contingency; whether such LRAUVs could be produced at a low enough cost and in sufficient scale to be effective; what tactical-level synergies these LRAUVs would have operating in concert with other manned and unmanned platforms; and the potential efficacy of various Chinese countermeasures.

LRAUV capabilities: A submariner’s perspective

The LRAUVs employed in Aquatic Tiger are systems still in development that have not been fielded in large numbers or used in combat. For the purposes of Aquatic Tiger, we made assumptions about the capabilities they would have in the next few years. The LRAUVs for Aquatic Tiger were uncrewed, extended-duration, multi-mission submersible platforms controlled by AI. Due to communications limitations imposed by the need to remain submerged and minimize the risk of detection when approaching their targets, they relied heavily on mission planning, programmed autonomous action, and post-mission data recovery. They were modular and configurable to various mission roles such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), seabed survey, mine countermeasures (MCM), electronic warfare (EW), and maritime kinetic effects (high-explosive warhead) delivery. For the purposes of Aquatic Tiger, we also assumed that they would have an austere deployment capability, meaning they could be launched directly from the back of a truck or dropped from a ship or aircraft.

LRAUVs reduce personnel risk and are low cost, expendable, and less attributable than crewed submersibles. However, they lack the speed, endurance, mission versatility, stealth and survivability, payload, and real-time situational awareness and decision-making capability of crewed platforms like US attack submarines.

Compared to unmanned aerial systems (UAS), LRAUVs benefit from longer range and time on station, underwater concealment, and reduced exposure to the adversary’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, particularly sensors and missiles. However, LRAUVs are also much slower, lacking the rapid deployment and potential wide-area coverage of UAVs, while their limited communication capabilities preclude the same level of immediate dynamic tasking and constant sharing of situational awareness with other platforms.

Wargame director’s overview of Aquatic Tiger

To explore LRAUVs’ potential in a near-future Taiwan scenario, we conducted the two-day Aquatic Tiger wargame with three teams including former US military, intelligence, and defense officials, along with non-government scholars and industry experts. The Blue Team representing the US military, including notional LRAUV capabilities, was led by a former US Defense Department senior executive with extensive experience with East Asian issues. The Red Team, representing China, was led by a former senior defense intelligence analyst whose career focused on China’s military. The control team planned and ran the wargame, adjudicated the results of player actions, and addressed the roles of countries other than the United States and China as needed. It consisted of former US government and military leaders with experience running wargames and tabletop exercises—including one retired US Navy officer with extensive experience directing wargames on undersea warfare—and a distinguished scholar bringing academic rigor to the analytic methodology.

Road to crisis and first turn: Chinese pressure on Taiwan building

To provide a starting point for the scenario, we began with a notional crisis, set a few years from now, in which China’s military placed unprecedented military pressure on Taiwan to convince its people to seek reconciliation with Beijing and oppose further defense budget increases. As tensions rose, a Chinese military aircraft crashed after a collision with a drone from Taiwan. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-controlled media claimed several members of the aircrew were killed, and Chinese fighter jets soon shot down three more drones. CCP leadership threatened further escalation, warning that a “wrong decision” would trigger “decisive military action.” For its part, Washington announced stiff new economic punishments against China, warning they would remain in place until Beijing agreed to “maintain peace and to renounce aggression.” With that, the scene was set for a confrontation.

Figure 1: Turn one of the Aquatic Tiger wargame

The Red Team, simulating China, initiated the wargame planning to keep the Taiwan situation “an internal matter,” using an air and sea quarantine to pressure Taiwan while keeping out the US military and preparing for a potential armed conflict. China’s priorities included

enforcing a quarantine of Taiwan framed by the CCP as a domestic law-enforcement action (attempting to force all air and sea cargo to Taiwan to be routed via air and seaports on China’s mainland for inspection);
enhancing defensive military posture, including surveillance assets to detect potential US military intervention; and
conducting a messaging campaign targeting the populations of Taiwan, the United States, and the international community, along with diplomatic actions around the world to underscore that the goal is a peaceful resolution.

The Blue Team’s overall concept at the outset was to “flood the zone” to signal resolve and deter escalation. Its priorities included: surging ISR assets, including LRAUVs, into the area around Taiwan; increasing military posture, including with LRAUVs; and engaging allies and partners for support.

During the first turn of the wargame, US military-operated LRAUVs, along with small numbers operated deniably by the US government and others operated by non-government research entities and private contractors, successfully deployed into key areas to conduct surveillance and support public release of information on Chinese activities—though non-LRAUV assets proved to be more effective collectors of images compelling for public release. Beijing’s calculus and plans were ultimately unaffected. The information campaign built some international support and sympathy, but China leaned into its narrative and US key allies and partners ultimately remained hesitant due to risks and costs.

Second turn: China escalates and the United States responds

Figure 2: Turn two of the Aquatic Tiger wargame

In the second turn of the wargame, the situation rapidly escalated as Chinese coast guard vessels attempted to enforce the quarantine and Taiwanese coast guard vessels moved to escort incoming ships. Chinese military vessels intervened, with a People’s Republic of China (PRC) frigate sinking one of Taiwan’s coast guard vessels. A short time later, this frigate exploded and sank quickly, apparently hit by a torpedo or unmanned underwater vehicle.

The Red Team escalated under the premise that China would “prepare to achieve a resolution to the Taiwan question.” China declared a full blockade of Taiwan and, shortly thereafter, conducted limited joint firepower strikes on Taiwan bases. To stifle international opposition and justify its position, Beijing simultaneously conducted a strategic messaging campaign targeting the international community.

The Red Team’s pivot from pressuring Taiwan to use of force was a major and rapid escalation and a reaction to perceived US direct intervention. China was trying to impose costs to compel the United States to back off, not hesitating to destroy LRAUVs and other “interference” in the Taiwan Strait, while assuming US involvement in LRAUV operations and the sinking of the frigate. The Blue Team’s posture adjusted to provide broader military options and complicate PRC efforts beyond the vicinity of Taiwan, while leveraging allies and partners. LRAUVs were augmenting, but not replacing, a wide range of other surveillance assets and saw some limited use for counter-mine operations.

Third turn: Military conflict to control access to Taiwan

Figure 3: Turn three of the Aquatic Tiger wargame

At the start of the third turn, the Red Team continued wanting to convince the Taiwan government to come to the negotiating table. But it shifted to primarily focus on defeating (but not destroying) US military operations supporting Taiwan, while still attempting to avoid an all-out war with the United States and its allies. The PRC approach included three main elements.

Prevent US/allied military interference and support to Taiwan: Conduct A2/AD focused on chokepoints south and northeast of Taiwan in order to keep the US military at bay and impose costs on Washington, while warning the United States that China has deployed portions of its nuclear triad.
Defeat Taiwan’s forces with standoff attacks: Conduct joint firepower strikes on Taiwan’s military and infrastructure targets in order to damage logistics, disrupt command and control, and reduce Taiwan’s ability to resist.
Control the Taiwan Strait: Reinforce China’s control of the Taiwan Strait in order to deny US support and unity of action, and to enable cross-strait access for an amphibious assault, if needed.

The Blue Team’s overall concept, meanwhile, was to “throw Taiwan a lifeline” by securing access corridors east of Taiwan while countering and complicating PRC military efforts to threaten Taiwan. This included three main elements.

Stop the blockade: Attrit Chinese forces in the Taiwan Strait, continue mine countermeasures, and degrade Chinese blockading forces.
Increase US posture: Neutralize Chinese control of the South China Sea and demonstrate counter-invasion capabilities and rehearsals south and east of Taiwan.
Support Taiwan: Resupply and reinforce Taiwan, prioritizing mine countermeasures, anti-ship weapons, and beach defenses.

China successfully established clear maritime superiority in the Taiwan Strait despite some US LRAUVs entering. The control team, based on analysis of China’s countermeasures, adjudicated that China was able to take advantage of the geographic constriction and relatively shallow waters of the strait to detect, disable, and destroy the LRAUVs through various means faster than replacement LRAUVs could enter the strait through the passages at its north and south ends. China was also able to disrupt and interdict much of the air and maritime traffic coming into Taiwan from the east, particularly given the limited east coast port capacity.

The conflict began to coalesce around four key geographic areas prioritized by Blue Team forces.

The northern end of the Taiwan Strait: China achieved clear air and surface superiority in this area. LRAUVs were the primary US capability directly contesting Chinese control of this area, due to the Blue Team’s unwillingness to risk losing any of its relatively small number of high-value attack submarines.
Ryukyus, including Okinawa: In this area, the United States and Japan established a clear advantage by employing aircraft and warships supported by land-based assets and LRAUVs. China did not attempt to contest US control of this area but was content to block movement toward Taiwan by US and Japanese forces in this area.
The Luzon Strait: This area was heavily contested, including by air, surface, and subsurface forces engaged in intense combat with high attrition on both sides. US LRAUVs were a significant contributor to this fight, swarming and sinking Chinese surface vessels as they attempted to move through the strait.
South China Sea: The United States kept its carrier strike groups in this area well protected and away from the Chinese mainland, which limited China’s ability to find and strike them. There was little role for US LRAUVs in this area.

The wargame concluded with the conflict escalating and no end in sight, with all three teams having learned some important lessons. Observations from key members of the Red Team, Blue Team, and Control Team follow.

Red (China) Team leader’s perspective

For Beijing, managing the Taiwan issue in this type of scenario encompasses three principal components. The first is to convince Taiwanese authorities that actions opposing Beijing’s desires will be punished. China does this by demonstrating the capacity to ratchet up military or paramilitary pressure at points around the island. The second is to convince Taiwanese authorities that they have no realistic hope of decisive support from outside powers. These efforts primarily leverage the suite of US-focused A2/AD capabilities the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been developing for more than two decades. The third is to ensure that China retains a credible capacity to take control of the island by force.

LRAUVs present some, albeit limited, opportunity to impact each of these components.

The platform presents some utility to provide enhanced warning of PRC pressure operations or intent to use violence to impose Beijing’s will. China has been posturing kinetic assets for a short-notice use of force against Taiwan for decades. There has been a marked increase in their coercive posture around Taiwan in recent years. A transition to violent resolution could begin within days, or even hours, of receiving an order from Beijing. With the ability to loiter in place (unlike low-earth-orbit satellites or aircraft), LRAUV swarms in surveillance positions in the Taiwan Strait and off PRC marshalling points could augment national technical means to help differentiate between ambiguous and unambiguous warning.

The platform has the potential to shape PLA operations but not to deter them. The decision whether to use armed force to compel Taiwan to submit to CCP control will be a political decision, with relative military postures being only one of several considerations. Once the decision is made to place military force in the leading role, the PLA will calculate optimized campaign operations designed to mitigate the effect of Taiwanese or US resistance, including the already anticipated presence of LRAUV platforms. Platforms with counter-mine payloads could complicate blockade operations that include mining Taiwan’s ports. Swarming attacks by LRAUV platforms against PRC support vessels or capital ships could complicate PRC countermeasures. Thus, LRAUV platforms might have effect at shaping, but not deterring, PRC military operations.

LRAUVs’ contributions to defeating PRC blockade operations or an invasion will be a function of numbers of platforms, payload types, and their integration into larger US or Taiwanese systems of systems. PLA War Control theory and Systems Warfare doctrine emphasize warfare that is highly intense but also highly focused on carefully defined objectives. The result is a hybrid of maneuver and position warfare fought in a resource-intensive, and therefore potentially highly attritive, manner. PRC emphasis on optimization of military operations includes the ability to adapt to unforeseen battlefield developments. For these reasons, the impact of LRAUV platforms on PRC operations will be closely linked to volume and flexibility.

Strategic level

PRC military and paramilitary elements play a supporting role at the strategic level. Beijing’s objective at this level is to shape political thinking, primarily in Taipei and Washington. This is true even in more extreme strategies such as quarantines or blockades. Military coercion is more central in these strategies, but the objective remains to shape political thinking.

The utility of LRAUVs at the strategic level is less straightforward than at the operational level. It will probably be limited to shaping the choice and execution of China’s military operations to implement its strategy.

LRAUV platforms will likely be ineffective at providing enhanced strategic warning. A PRC decision to turn to armed force to resolve the Taiwan issue will almost certainly be rooted in CCP leaders’ political assessments that peaceful (albeit coerced) unification is no longer possible. LRAUVs are not positioned to monitor political decisions—only their operational manifestations.

These platforms will also likely be ineffective at deterring PRC strategic action. Although LRAUVs, in concert with other systems, have the potential to impose costs on China for military action, PRC leaders will almost certainly calculate that these platforms will be unable to deny them the achievement of key political objectives.

LRAUV platforms will not prove decisive in defeating a PRC strategy to resolve the Taiwan issue by use of military force—but they could play a role in shaping the course of the conflict. The CCP uses military force to drive political outcomes. The theory of victory underlying a blockade or invasion of Taiwan will be based on shaping political dynamics, not strictly military outcomes. By complicating certain types of operations, such as minefield components of blockade operations, LRAUV platforms could—in concert with other systems—help shape PRC military strategies so that Chinese leaders seek offramps from conflict rather than pursue complete domination of Taiwan.

Contextual limitations and political considerations

China has developed a wide range of military tools to deal with a Taiwan conflict scenario. Only those tools that operate in the maritime domain appear to be susceptible to LRAUV influence. This leaves significant elements of China’s toolkit unaffected. Notably, these include the mainland-based ballistic missiles, long-range artillery, and aircraft that would constitute the major part of a joint firepower strike designed to put logistical, communications, psychological, and political pressure on Taiwan’s leadership. Similarly, the majority of the A2/AD tools China has developed to hold potential US or third-party intervention at risk also operate predominately from PRC territory and are therefore beyond the influence of LRAUVs.

It is worth noting that the ways in which LRAUV kinetic payloads shape PRC operations will probably vary significantly depending on which party employs them. LRAUVs or shorter-ranged underwater platforms employed by Taiwan will almost certainly generate a different response than those employed by US forces. China will likely see Taiwan’s use as staying within the confines of a domestic conflict. Under its Active Defense doctrine, China might seek to avoid striking US targets—which would likely draw the United States into the conflict as a direct combatant—unless the United States has already struck PRC targets. Kinetic employment by US forces against PRC targets would likely escalate to a larger exchange of fires between the two sides. Depending on the scope and scale of escalation, this could increase PRC perceptions of the need to project larger amounts of military force across the Taiwan Strait earlier in the conflict, in an effort to compel resolution before the United States could posture forces for open-ended conflict.

Blue (US) Team leader’s perspective

From a US Blue Team perspective, Aquatic Tiger highlighted both the potential value and the inherent limitations of LRAUVs in a plausible China-Taiwan conflict. For Blue Team planners, the appeal of LRAUVs rested less in their ability to deliver decisive military effects than in their capacity to operate persistently and at scale, with comparatively low political and operational risk, in highly contested maritime environments. The wargame demonstrated that LRAUVs could support Blue Team objectives during selected phases of a crisis, while also revealing how quickly their utility narrowed as conflict escalated and China accepted higher levels of military risk.

Blue Team objectives and strategic logic

Across the turns of the wargame, the Blue Team pursued three consistent objectives: deterring further PRC escalation, maintaining access to the Western Pacific—particularly east of Taiwan—and preserving alliance cohesion while managing escalation risks with a nuclear-armed peer competitor. Blue Team decision-making was shaped by concerns related to attribution, proportionality, and alliance politics, which constrained both the timing and visibility of military actions.

Within this framework, Blue Team force posture prior to hostilities served two distinct purposes. The first was signaling—demonstrating resolve to deter PRC aggression, reassure allies and partners, and support diplomacy and strategic messaging with third parties. The second was positioning—quietly placing forces to gain an operational advantage should conflict occur. Aquatic Tiger demonstrated that LRAUVs were far better suited to the latter than the former.

Pre-hostilities posture and strategic messaging

LRAUVs’ low detectability, while operationally advantageous, limited their utility as signaling tools. Unlike air or surface platforms that can be employed deliberately for visible demonstrations of presence, LRAUVs operate largely outside public view. As a result, they contributed little to strategic messaging with allies, partners, or the broader international community.

During the wargame, strategic messaging and diplomatic efforts were more effectively supported by other assets, particularly those capable of generating clear, shareable imagery and data. Although contractor-operated concepts were discussed as a means of increasing volume, LRAUVs remained ill-suited to strategic messaging due to their limited fields of view and constrained sensor outputs. In short, their primary value before hostilities lay in positioning rather than persuasion.

ISR: Tactical value and strategic limits

LRAUVs contributed to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance during the wargame, but Aquatic Tiger underscored clear limits to their ISR utility from a Blue Team perspective. These systems did not provide the strategic or operational indications and warning that Blue Team decision-makers would prioritize in a Taiwan contingency, such as detecting large-scale mobilization of PRC amphibious forces, munitions, or logistics.

Instead, LRAUV ISR proved most relevant at the tactical level, supporting localized awareness for operators already engaged in contested environments. In this role, LRAUVs complemented rather than substituted for airborne, space-based, and other ISR platforms, which proved more effective for broad-area coverage and early warning. The wargame reinforced that LRAUVs should not be viewed as primary ISR platforms for strategic or operational warning, but as contributors to tactical awareness once hostilities were imminent or under way.

Employment across escalation phrases

As the scenario progressed into the second turn and China declared a blockade, Blue Team objectives shifted from deterrence toward complicating PRC operations and imposing costs. LRAUVs were employed to augment ISR, support counter-blockade efforts, and contribute to mine countermeasures and maritime awareness. These contributions were incremental rather than decisive. LRAUVs enhanced the Blue Team’s ability to contest the blockade at the margins but did not alter the underlying balance of forces in the Taiwan Strait.

By the third turn, once China adopted a more explicit A2/AD posture along the First Island Chain, the constraints on LRAUV utility became more pronounced. Attrition increased rapidly as PRC forces demonstrated a willingness to destroy autonomous systems with limited concern for escalation. In the Taiwan Strait itself, LRAUVs were lost faster than they could be replaced, reinforcing the conclusion that constricted waters close to the mainland favored PRC countermeasures, including unconventional approaches.

In contrast, LRAUVs proved more effective in geographically differentiated areas such as the lower Ryukyus and portions of the Luzon Strait, where Blue Team and allied forces enjoyed greater standoff advantages, and where LRAUVs could complement land-based and maritime capabilities.

Blue Team leader perspectives on LRAUV capabilities in the Aquatic Tiger wargame

Within the wargame, the LRAUV system capabilities in the Blue Team’s inventory resonated with Blue Team planners because they reflected attributes aligned with their team’s operational needs—including long endurance, modular payloads, and forward deployability—without placing personnel at risk. These characteristics made such systems suitable for early deployment and for missions emphasizing persistence and access in contested environments.

At the same time, the LRAUV systems employed by the Blue Team during Aquatic Tiger proved not to be decisive platforms. Limited payload size and maneuverability constrained individual kinetic effects, while relatively slow transit speeds required advance planning and careful positioning. Once PRC decision-makers assumed Blue Team ownership of LRAUV operations, the political advantages of ambiguity diminished and kinetic employment risked escalation.

Kinetic employment and the access problem

During the wargame, the Control Team expressed skepticism regarding the kinetic utility of the LRAUVs in the Blue Team’s inventory, particularly against high-value targets such as large surface combatants or invasion force transports. Concerns focused on warhead size and maneuverability, leading to an adjudication that kinetic effects of individual LRAUVs would be limited.

Subsequent reflection suggests that this assessment might have undervalued the role LRAUVs could play in addressing one of the central challenges of a Taiwan contingency: gaining kinetic access inside heavily defended, shallow-water environments dominated by PRC A2/AD systems. In such environments, the principal constraint on Blue Team operations was often the ability to deliver kinetic effects at scale, rather than targeting information.

Viewed through this lens, the limitations appear less constraining than initially assumed. Employment as a form of point defense or a limited, mobile minefield aligns with the operational reality that adversary forces—particularly invasion and transport elements—must move through predictable maritime approaches. While individual warheads might be insufficient against large platforms, employment at scale could generate meaningful aggregate effects, consume PRC decision-maker bandwidth at multiple echelons, complicate PRC operations, and impose costs in areas otherwise inaccessible to Blue Team kinetic forces.

Constraints and integration challenges

Several clear constraints emerged from a Blue Team perspective. First, scale mattered. Individual LRAUVs had limited impact and were mission constrained by their pre-planned payloads. Only through numbers and pre-positioning could they influence PRC operations, and even then primarily at the tactical level. Second, command-and-control and integration challenges limited effectiveness. In this first iteration of wargaming, LRAUVs were considered largely as a standalone capability, fully leveraging neither the operational benefits of collaboration between and among LRAUVs at scale nor of teaming LRAUVs with other manned and unmanned systems.

Third, geography was decisive. LRAUVs were most useful in areas where PRC land-based sensors, aircraft, and missile forces constrained Blue Team air and surface operations, but least effective in narrow waters where maritime militia and other countermeasures could be employed. Attrition, while expected, raised questions regarding sustainment and replacement under combat conditions.

Strategic implications for the Blue Team

From a Blue Team perspective, Aquatic Tiger suggests that LRAUVs should be regarded as enabling capabilities rather than decisive instruments of deterrence or warfighting. Their greatest value lies in pre-hostilities and early crisis phases, where they can support positioning, access, and selected tactical effects at relatively low risk to personnel. As conflict escalates, their role narrows and must be integrated carefully with broader joint and allied operations.

The wargame also underscored the importance of allied and partner considerations. LRAUVs’ employment by third parties, including Taiwan and regional allies, could complicate PRC political and military calculations in ways distinct from their employment exclusively by Blue Team forces, particularly given Beijing’s sensitivity to legitimacy and escalation dynamics.

Bottom line for Blue Team planners

The Blue Team perspective emerging from Aquatic Tiger indicates that LRAUVs could occupy an important, but bounded, role in a Taiwan contingency. When employed with disciplined expectations and integrated into a broader operational framework, they can improve access, complicate adversary planning, consume adversary decision-maker bandwidth, and reduce risk to personnel. They cannot substitute for robust force posture, alliance coordination, or timely Blue Team strategic decision-making. Their value lies not in decisiveness, but in enabling options in environments where other capabilities face prohibitive risk.

Technical and tactical limitations

A number of technical and tactical considerations arose during the wargame that are relevant to consider in terms of potential challenges to the effectiveness of the small, autonomous, expendable LRAUVs employed in Aquatic Tiger, including limitations on intelligence collection, difficulties in attacking moving targets, and potential countermeasures.

ISR limitations

The collection of optical, electromagnetic, and sonar data by sensors on a small LRAUV is limited by the size of sonar carried and the low height of optics and collection antennas. The high density of maritime traffic along the Chinese coast—particularly of military vessels during a crisis—creates an extremely cluttered environment in which acoustic sensors with limited range and aperture, and lacking accurate positional information, offer limited insight. Small, lightweight, electromagnetic spectrum sensors and limited on-vehicle processing capability offer similarly limited capability to provide intelligence-quality electromagnetic spectrum data. Wide-area collection of limited-quality data can be leveraged to contribute to maritime domain awareness in general, but is more applicable to tracking commercial vessels of interest or sanctions enforcement than supporting military operations. A mast height of about one meter offers limited visibility in open ocean environments, where swells of 1–2 meters are common, offering significant periods of obstructed observation and difficulty ascertaining range, target angle, and vessel identification at more than a few nautical miles.

Target detection, classification, identification, localization, tracking, engagement, and assessment

Many of the challenges to intelligence collection are also relevant to completing a “detect to engagement sequence” or “kill chain” for an LRAUV to attack a target with its onboard warhead. Acoustic sensors for individual vehicles offer limited directional discrimination and require robust communications among swarms to reduce errors by taking directional readings from multiple vehicles. Detecting a potential target in a likely target-rich environment is not necessarily difficult, but the other steps to determine how effectively a target can be engaged pose different challenges depending on whether they are based on acoustic, optical, or electromagnetic sensing. The difficulty ascertaining range makes a decision to start a “run in” especially problematic because LRAUVs have only a limited amount of battery power to make a high-speed run to a target. They must also be close to have reasonable potential to intercept a fast-moving target, or even to chase down a slower target from behind.

The wargame did not explore the specifics of how decisions to authorize individual autonomous lethal attacks would be made. The decision to conduct a kinetic attack autonomously also could add considerable complexity to the planning aspect of the mission. Current US Department of Defense restrictions on autonomous lethal engagement might be difficult to satisfy without communications between a weapon release authority and the LRAUV. The workaround of having a contractor operate the vehicle might not eliminate this complication. These policy restrictions could also affect the viability of foreign military sales. Assuming policy issues can be worked out, aspects of international law (e.g., The Hague Convention on mines) require restrictions on location of use and notification of third parties that complicate planning and operational employment of “indiscriminate attack” by lethal autonomous systems.

Potential countermeasures

A number of potential counters to small LRAUVs were raised in Aquatic Tiger, ranging from broad sweeping using modified minesweeping or fishing gear, localized use of such sweeps to “clear limiting lines of approach,” the use of obstructions (nets, modified oil containment equipment), intervening lower-cost vessels to guard flanks of transit lanes, use of “hunter-killer” unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and UAVs alone or in conjunction with the above (vulnerability while snorkeling/surfacing might be exploitable). Defensive barrier modifications and active defense systems on ships themselves are possible in analogous fashion to those on tanks for aerial drones. Double-hulled vessels are fairly resilient to contact explosions and are used to sweep areas as attractors. Reviving the historical use of torpedo nets in various configurations could prove effective. The development of torpedoes that ran at depth and exploded under the keel rendered such nets ineffective, but they could effectively counter UUVs impacting the hull at slow relative speed, particularly against ships at anchor or in port.

Recommendations for Congress

Autonomous systems broadly provide US and foreign forces the benefit of ambiguity of attribution and deployed intent. LRAUVs can particularly shine, given their potential oceanographic and environmental use, which might obfuscate the purpose, to be deployed at or before the first sign of indicators or warnings at the strategic level. However, to be effective, the systems must be better resourced and included in existing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs or through more creative export means such as encouraging co-production or direct commercial sales.

Oversight and acquisition follow-through: Congress should consider how LRAUVs can be used across theaters. Due to technical requirements, LRAUVs perform best in calmer waters, including in littorals and inland seas such as the Black Sea. Congress has already recognized the importance of such systems and included them in the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (FY 2025 NDAA), Section 1032, which defines LRAUVs as systems that exceed one thousand nautical miles in range and are capable of operating completely submerged at sea with modular payloads. Section 1032 further requires competitive demonstrations of these systems for the services. Congress, however, has not yet passed follow-up legislation on these competitive demonstrations or on the acquisition of LRAUVs. In the medium term, Congress should follow up on the required competitive demonstrations outlined in Section 1032 of the FY 2025 NDAA and solicit immediate feedback from the services on next steps for LRAUV development.
Export controls and dual-use framing: Congress should consider leveraging the oceanographic and environmental uses of LRAUVs with modular capacity to reclassify such systems for export from the more-restrictive ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) list to the less-restrictive EAR (Export Administration Regulations) category. By encouraging the sale of the LRAUVs separate from specific advanced kinetic and electronic effects, the United States can enhance the credibility of such systems for environmental and oceanographic use and encourage further indigenous modular innovations. To support such efforts, Congress should direct the Department of Commerce to consider additional support for the export of US LRAUVs to countries of interest. It should also consider a pilot program for a special license exemption for select countries purchasing such systems for environmental purposes.
Further analysis of LRAUVs’ impact: Congress should encourage more research and wargaming on the utility of LRAUVs as the technology develops. While this report posits that the strategic and operational effects of these systems are presently limited, continued technological development and the integration of LRAUVs into larger frameworks—such as regional maritime surveillance and interdiction—might yield higher-tier effects. Providing further encouragement—and, importantly, appropriations—toward analysis of LRAUVs is essential to maintaining a qualitative edge in this frontier technology and realizing its potential as a contributor to deterrence and war preparedness.

Key findings

The Aquatic Tiger Wargame and follow-on analysis led the authors to a set of key findings.

These types of LRAUVs are uniquely suited to forward deployment into sensitive areas during a crisis prior to hostilities, when US senior leadership is likely seeking to minimize escalation risks and conserve resources for a potential conflict. The lack of personnel placed at risk, along with LRAUVs’ low cost and low signature, could allow these platforms to conduct surveillance for extended periods to provide situational awareness and warning of impending attack. Their long-range capability could also equate to a long dwell time in a target area during an extended, open-ended period of crisis, meaning they offer a lower risk of burnout than other types of surveillance platforms. Their deniable, unclear national origin is also an advantage in terms of limiting the risk of crisis escalation. However, this lower risk profile, deniability, and ambiguity also mean that China could attack or interdict US LRAUVs prior to the outbreak of hostilities (including with unconventional means like fishing nets) with a relatively low fear of uncontrolled escalation.
Geography is a key consideration for LRAUV employment, and chokepoints can be a double-edged sword. US LRAUVs could be deployed into areas—including into constricted areas north and south of Taiwan—where PRC land-based sensors, surface-to-air missiles, aircraft, surface ships, and missile strike forces and sensors make air and surface operations high risk and high cost. Though constricted waters advantage Chinese countermeasures against LRAUVs moving through such areas, maritime chokepoints can also be excellent places for LRAUVs to loiter and detect vessels, as well as a good location to mass large numbers of LRAUVs to conduct swarming ambushes against surface vessels moving through the area. For sustained combat operations in the Taiwan Strait itself, the wargame’s results suggested it would be far preferable to have autonomous underwater vehicles deployed directly from Taiwan’s west coast into the strait rather than attempt to sustain a presence of LRAUVs in the strait by moving them via chokepoints where they could be more easily interdicted.
Sufficient numbers of platforms and sufficient advance planning are key factors for successful LRAUV employment. The limited payload size and relatively slower speed of LRAUVs require advance planning to ensure the right mix of payload capabilities is in the right place at the right time. Swarming capability and multiple types of LRAUV payloads could provide synergy, particularly to better position for attacks against fast-moving military vessels. Though attrition of LRAUVs will likely be high, large numbers of LRAUVs sustained over time could have a great impact.
Alternative uses for LRAUVs discussed in the wargame after-action discussions could dramatically increase their cost efficiency in a conflict if the United States is willing to operate them across an area much broader than the vicinity of Taiwan, particularly against slower, non-military vessels. Use against military targets and in constricted areas close to China could be effective, but this is probably not the most efficient use of such LRAUVs. They could instead be used, for example, to shadow high-value Chinese merchant and transport ships moving through the region to support China’s war effort—selectively signaling the US ability to put these ships at risk to influence Beijing’s calculus and then disabling or sinking them to hamper China’s war sustainment effort. LRAUVs could also be used to block access in and out of China’s mainland ports from a distance, as a sort of maneuverable minefield. LRAUVs could also be used in a conflict to bog down Chinese naval, paramilitary, and commercial vessels in areas north and south of Taiwan as part of a maritime insurgency approach.
The results of this initial Aquatic Tiger wargame suggest that additional analysis, wargaming, modeling, technical experimentation, live exercises, and simulation on key issues related to such LRAUVs are warranted. Subjects to consider include: how units of such drones would be best organized and employed by the United States, Taiwan, and US allies in such a contingency; whether such LRAUVs could be produced at a low enough cost and in sufficient scale to be effective; what tactical-level synergies these LRAUVs would have operating in concert with other manned and unmanned platforms; the potential efficacy of various Chinese countermeasures; and China’s potential employment of its own LRAUVs.

About the authors

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and was the wargame director for the Aquatic Tiger wargame.

Nicholas Takeuchi is a retired US Navy submarine officer and was a Blue (US) Team participant in the Aquatic Tiger wargame.

Joe Costa, Theresa Luetkefend, and Moss Gillespie, — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 13:33:32 +0000

Tracking US military assets
in the Iran war

What is the US military committing to the war in Iran? And what does that mean for a potential conflict with China?

Last updated: 5:30 p.m. (ET), 03/27/2026

Operation Epic Fury is stressing military capabilities—aircraft carriers, bombers, missile defense systems—in ways that will have an impact in other theaters around the world. That includes US efforts to credibly deter Chinese aggression and prevail against China in a future conflict. Monitoring the military assets that are relevant to US strategy in the Indo-Pacific and currently deployed to Iran offers insight into how the war might affect the US military’s readiness to meet the threat posed by Beijing—the most consequential challenge the United States faces.

Actual numbers of US inventory and deployment data are classified. This tracker, developed by the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense team, provides estimates for a subset of assets where open-source information is most reliable. It will be regularly updated and expanded with new data and expert context.

Key takeaways as of March 27, 2026:

Aircraft carriers: One of four available US aircraft carriers—the USS Abraham Lincoln—is deployed to support Operation Epic Fury. The second carrier deployed to the war, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), arrived March 23 at Naval Support Activity Souda Bay in Greece for repairs after an internal fire.
- The USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) is certified to deploy and is reportedly being considered to join Operation Epic Fury. It is still in the Atlantic. Two destroyers assigned to the George H.W. Bush carrier strike group, the USS Mason (DDG-87) and USS Ross (DDG-71), left their homeport this week to join the USS Bush, indicating that the group is getting closer to deployment. The Navy has not yet announced where the strike group will be deployed.
- The USS Nimitz (CVN-68) was set to be decommissioned in May 2026, decreasing total US inventory to ten. However, in March 2026, the US Navy decided to extend the Nimitz’s service life to March 2027, with unclear impacts on its readiness.
- The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) has finished maintenance, is training off the coast of San Diego, and is preparing for imminent deployment to a location not yet publicly disclosed.
Mine countermeasures: It is unclear if there are any ships with mine countermeasure capability involved in Operation Epic Fury.
- The US Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Manama, Bahrain, has three littoral combat ships (LCS) outfitted with mine countermeasures mission packages. In the week of March 15, the Navy confirmed that two are currently in Singapore for a “scheduled maintenance and logistics stop,” with the third reportedly in the Indian Ocean—presumably to avoid Iranian attacks.
- LCS are modular and can be outfitted with a variety of mission packages. Only four of the twenty-eight LCS have been equipped with the mine countermeasures mission package, according to the Navy.
- The Navy decommissioned four of its eight Avenger Mine Countermeasure ships assigned to the US Fifth Fleet, in September 2025. The four remaining Avengers are homeported in Sasebo, Japan.

Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) and Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD): One of the three ships available from the LHA and LHD classes—the USS Tripoli (LHA-7)—is committed to Operation Epic Fury as part of the deployment of an amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit (ARG/MEU), with another one, the USS Boxer, reportedly on the way to relieve the Tripoli.
- The USS Tripoli, previously stationed in Japan, was in port at Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, en route to the Middle East, on March 23.
- The USS Boxer (LHD-4) amphibious ready group reportedly deployed to the Middle East from San Diego on March 18. It is unclear if it completed all its deployment certifications before deploying, or if sailors were recalled from leave. A premature deployment could negatively impact sailor readiness and disrupt the ARG/MEU deployment cycle.
- The only other known deployed LHD is the USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7) in the Caribbean.
- A 2024 GAO report noted that LHDs suffer from a high rate of maintenance issues.
- Following the July 2020 fire and the eventual decommissioning of the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), LHA and LHDs are not able to meet the Navy and Marine Corps’ goal of having 80 percent of the force ready to deploy.

Amphibious transport dock (LPD) and dock landing ships (LSD): The USS New Orleans (LPD-19) arrived with the USS Tripoli ARG/MEU at Diego Garcia. The USS San Diego, which was previously operating with the group, is in port in Sasebo, Japan.
- The lack of a second LPD/LSD reduces the group’s operational effectiveness.
- The USS Boxer ARG contains the USS Portland (LPD-27) and USS Comstock (LSD-45).
- The Government Accountability Office assessed in 2024 that nine out of ten LSDs were in “poor material condition.”

Analysis: Amphibious ready group deployments

The USS Boxer amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit (ARG/MEU) reportedly deployed to the Middle East from San Diego on March 18, joining the USS Tripoli amphibious ready group currently at Diego Garcia, and the USS Iwo Jima amphibious ready group currently in the Caribbean. The deployment of a third ARG/MEU—typically comprising an LHA/LHD and a combination of two LPD/LSD—matches Marine Corps Commandant General Eric Smith’s plan for three forward-postured ARG/MEUs. However, under current maintenance and training realities, deploying the USS Boxer ARG/MEU now is a surge of US capabilities and does not signify a true achievement of the commandant’s goal. Deploying the USS Boxer early could limit the availability of ARG/MEUs in the future and prevent the United States from achieving a sustainable and ready three-forward-postured ARG/MEU plan. Unless the United States builds more ships for ARG/MEUs, the overextension of this limited capability will have significant long-term readiness implications.

Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: An estimated 24 percent of the entire available destroyer class is deployed in Operation Epic Fury.
- Arleigh Burke-class destroyers spend an average of nine years, 27 percent of their thirty-five-year service life, in maintenance.

B-1 bombers: Nearly half of the mission-capable B-1 fleet is conducting strikes as part of Operation Epic Fury, with all operating from RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom.

B-2 bombers: B-2 deployments are highly classified. An estimated 26 percent of the entire available fleet could be deployed for Operation Epic Fury.
- B-2 bombers take an average of 119 maintenance hours per flight hour following a bombing mission. This indicates that at least the four B-2s used in the early phases of Operation Epic Fury might be currently unavailable, along with an unknown number of the seven B-2s that flew in the June 2025 strikes the United States and Israel conducted against Iran (Operation Midnight Hammer) and an unknown number currently under programmed depot maintenance.

E-3 AWACS aircraft: An estimated 66 to 75 percent of the total available E-3 AWACS are deployed in Operation Epic Fury.
- In 2024, slightly more than half of the Air Force’s AWACS fleet was assessed to be “mission capable”—able to carry out at least one of the platform’s key missions, which includes air surveillance—and the aircraft is in the process of being retired.
MQ-9 Reaper: The total number of MQ-9s used in Operation Epic Fury is not known.
- The United States rotates MQ-9s in “orbits,” in which several of the airwing are loitering over enemy airspace at a given time. MQ-9s are capable of sustained day-long loitering missions.
- Open-source reporting indicates that the United States has lost twelve MQ-9s since the start of Epic Fury, building on an estimated loss of ten percent of the fleet since 2023.
- MQ-9 losses in Epic Fury could cost the United States from $192 million to $678 million.

KC-135 Stratotankers and KC-46 Pegasus: An estimated 33 percent of mission capable KC-135s and KC-46s are involved in refueling missions in Operation Epic Fury. These planes are critical to supporting sustained air missions.

Patriot missile batteries: An estimated 7 to 11 percent of available Patriot batteries are in the Middle East.
- Open-source reporting indicates that there is at least one Patriot battery in Saudi Arabia and one in Qatar, and four batteries were transferred to the region in spring 2025.

THAAD systems: An estimated 29 to 43 percent of available US THAAD systems are committed to Operation Epic Fury.
- Out of an estimated five operational THAAD systems that are outside the continental United States, two to three of them are in the Middle East. One is in Jordan and one is in Israel. It’s unclear if the second THAAD battery deployed to Israel in spring 2025 remains in place. The other two are permanently deployed in Guam and South Korea.
- In March, the United States also reportedly moved up to 48 THAAD interceptors from the THAAD launchers in Korea to the Middle East.

About the authors

Joe Costa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Initiative.

Theresa Luetkefend is an associate director with the Forward Defense Initiative.

Moss Gillespie is a young global professional with the Forward Defense Initiative.

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Federal agencies under pressure need smarter systems, not tougher people

Caitlin Thompson — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 20:28:04 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The institutions charged with keeping the United States secure operate under chronic strain that can make them prone to failure.
Many current efforts to fix this focus on helping individuals operate effectively within flawed systems.
But it’s only by redesigning the flawed systems that the US government can create the readiness on which national security depends.

The hours are long and the pace rarely eases, including shifts of twelve to fourteen hours that inevitably erode family and social life. In theory, there are guardrails. In practice, the approval processes meant to limit overwork can become a formality: the reality of excessive hours reduced to a signature on a page, without changing the workload or capturing the extent of the time burden. The culture reinforces it. Leadership may say the right things, but the cycle doesn’t break, and in some corners of the institution, burnout is even treated as a point of pride. The quiet signal that this has become normal: the organization celebrates the 2 a.m. email. People are mentally drained, but stepping back to recover can feel professionally risky because there’s a persistent sense that if you can’t do it, someone else will, and asking for help can damage your credibility.

The above vignette is a composite scenario, drawing on multiple examples raised by participants—national security practitioners, psychiatry and health experts, and think tank experts on individual resilience—across a series of roundtables conducted by Atlantic Council researchers in 2025 and held under the Chatham House rule.

The roundtables focused on an underappreciated problem: The institutions charged with keeping the United States secure—including US military services and combatant commands, the intelligence community (e.g., CIA, National Security Agency), the Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department—operate under chronic strain that can make them dangerously prone to failure in moments of crisis. Many of the “resilience” efforts created to address this problem—wellness training and mindset workshops—focus on helping individuals operate within flawed systems.

Only by adapting those systems can the US government deliver long-term readiness enabling reliable performance under stress that US national security requires. Other key takeaways included:

Individual resilience is not the solution to chronic strain in national security institutions. It is a signal that reveals where systems, incentives, and workload assumptions are misaligned with human limits.
In national security roles, moments of surge, uncertainty, and high-consequence decision-making are frequent. When these moments arise, systems need more than just extraordinary individual effort; they need built-in buffers and redundancies.
Many resilience initiatives are designed to expand coping tools and wellness support programs yet leave the stressors themselves—tempo, staffing, and decision bottlenecks—unchanged. While certainly well-intentioned, these initiatives unintentionally shift the responsibility to overcome the stressors back on the individual. Other incentives then reinforce this overextension as the operating model. A credible systems approach requires measurable leadership accountability, usable leading-indicator data, and explicit trade-offs about tempo, mission scope, redundancy, and availability norms. The goal is sustained readiness and reliable performance under stress.
Leadership behavior is key. Ideally, leaders would express their own vulnerabilities by openly expressing uncertainty, acknowledging moments of strain, and modeling both recovery and the soundness of seeking help. This could increase trust among team members, as well as the likelihood that risks are addressed early.

Resilience is an attribute of systems

Building individual resilience has become a default response to strain across national security institutions. As organizations confront sustained operational tempo, recurring crises, and prolonged uncertainty, resilience is routinely invoked as a way to preserve individual performance under pressure. In practice, however, the term is often used in ways that misidentify both the source of strain and the locus of responsibility.

This issue brief argues that resilience—which the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative defines as “the ability of individuals, societies, and systems to anticipate, withstand, recover from, adapt to, and bounce forward from shocks and disruptions”—is not primarily an individual attribute. It is a property of systems that shape, support, and sustain individual resilience over time. Individual resilience matters, but not because it can be strengthened indefinitely or relied upon to compensate for structural misalignment. Human adaptation and resilience do have limitations, and through insights from research and roundtable discussions with national security leaders, practitioners, and subject-matter experts, we have underscored the need for a more deliberate systems design in national security institutions.

People do not enter national security roles with identical baselines, nor do they experience or recover from stress in the same way. Those differences are important, because prolonged exposure to ambiguity, moral complexity, and high-stakes decisions can be a relentless strain on attention and judgment. These demands cannot be carried indefinitely, regardless of an individual’s motivation or commitment. It is simply a matter of human limits.

Many institutions appear resilient, often because of highly committed individuals whose extended availability and personal sacrifice can compensate for system strain in the short term. Over time, however, that compensatory model becomes unsustainable, and the earliest cracks often show up in decision-making. Attention narrows, teams become less flexible in how they think through options, and risk judgment becomes less calibrated. Those effects can accumulate quietly over time, until an organization is less adaptive precisely when adaptation is most needed.

The strategic costs of system strain are significant. In national security work, one frequently sees surge conditions, leadership transitions, and external shocks as recurring features of the operating environment. Systems that depend primarily on individual efforts and resilience often lack the buffers needed to respond effectively when those stressful moments arrive. When an individual starts to feel that inevitable burnout, their performance falters precisely when resilience is most needed. The appropriate response is not to ask people to absorb more. Rather, it is to relocate responsibility from individuals to institutions themselves; to overhaul systems so that they operate within human constraints, protect sound judgment, retain expertise, and remain effective over time.

Where current “resilience models” fall short

The concept of resilience is now embedded in the language of national security institutions. Here, “national security” refers to the interconnected ecosystem of defense and security organizations that plan and execute operations, generate intelligence, manage crises, and sustain readiness, as well as the enabling systems that support that work (including the military health system and other readiness services). In these settings, the day-to-day reality is high-consequence decision-making under uncertainty, persistent time pressure, constrained staffing pipelines, and recurring exposure to morally complex and emotionally salient material—including, increasingly, remote operations such as unmanned aircraft systems.

Faced with persistent crises, extended operational tempo, and mounting uncertainty, leaders routinely invoke resilience as a way to sustain performance. In many cases, however, resilience functions less as a strategy than as an expectation: that individuals will adapt to conditions the system itself does not adequately address.

Most contemporary resilience efforts rest on a quiet assumption that personnel are broadly interchangeable and capable of absorbing increasing demands if given the right tools or training. From this perspective, resilience becomes a personal skill set, something that can be strengthened through workshops, coaching, wellness programming, or mindset interventions. These efforts are often well-intentioned. They are also insufficient in environments where strain is chronic and the stakes remain high.

The predictable result is compensation, where highly motivated people bridge structural gaps through personal sacrifice. They devote longer hours, defer recovery, and suppress their own distress, all in service of the mission. For a time, this preserves output and the system appears functional. But the apparent stability is misleading. It requires extraordinary effort from a finite group of people, while quietly depleting the attention, judgment, and recovery that sustained performance depends on.

The evidence increasingly reflects this pattern. Burnout is a recurring occupational risk among military personnel, with documented links to work environment factors (e.g., workload and shift work), psychological strain, and downstream consequences that matter for readiness and mission effectiveness. Within the Military Health System, burnout has also been associated with adverse health outcomes and reduced retention—exactly the kind of expertise loss that “individual resilience” programming cannot offset on its own. And concern about chronic psychological risk is not limited to traditional deployment patterns: Recent defense policy has directed the Department of Defense to study mental health impacts among military drone pilots, underscoring the growing recognition that remote and high-tempo operational roles can carry meaningful mental health burden.

When depletion shows up, it often does not look like a dramatic failure. It can appear first as degraded decision quality, with narrower thinking, reduced creativity, lower tolerance for ambiguity, and less willingness to challenge assumptions. It can also surface as interpersonal strain, reduced patience, and a diminished ability to adapt quickly when new information changes the picture. These shifts are consequential in national security contexts because the central work of these institutions is making sound judgments in real time, under uncertainty, with high consequences.

Many resilience initiatives inadvertently reinforce the conditions that require resilience in the first place. When the organizational answer to overload is “be more resilient,” the system signals that overload is expected and adaptation is the solution. This normalizes strain and diverts attention away from the real drivers of chronic demand, including sustained operational tempo, understaffing, unclear priorities, and incentives that reward constant responsiveness. It can also create a double bind: The system continues to demand extraordinary individual effort, while the individual is expected to treat strain as a personal shortcoming to be managed privately.

This brief takes a different view of individual resilience. It is not irrelevant, nor is it the solution. Instead, it should be treated as an important signal. Properly understood, levels of individual resilience give leaders a clearer read on how the system is functioning, where strain is coming from, and what needs to be redesigned. Used this way, resilience does not justify asking individuals to absorb more. It clarifies where institutions are demanding too much and why.

This is the point where individual resilience becomes a critical tool, not as a mandate for people to adapt indefinitely, but as a way to see how systems’ choices interact with human limits and where redesign is most urgent.

Individual resilience is context-dependent, shaped by the relationships, communities, and institutions we are embedded in.

–Roundtable participant

Why individual resilience should force system overhaul

Resilience is ever evolving: It is shaped long before individuals enter national security roles and continues to be influenced by the environments in which they operate. Biology, early development, and cumulative stress exposure contribute to how individuals tolerate and recover from pressure. The point is not to pathologize normal human responses to sustained strain. The point is to be honest about variability and limits.

Institutions typically treat individual variability in one of two ways. Either they ignore it, designing for an “average” person who does not exist, or they attempt to manage it primarily through individual interventions. Both approaches miss the core insight. Individual resilience is not primarily something systems can manufacture. It is something systems must account for and nurture within people. Thinking seriously about individual resilience makes the system’s assumptions visible, including the ones baked into missions, tempos, staffing models, career pathways, and leadership expectations.

People bring vastly different resilience profiles into roles that demand sustained judgment, adaptability, and high-quality decision-making. Some tolerate prolonged stress with fewer immediate effects. Others experience faster depletion of cognitive reserves. These differences are not moral failures or character defects. They are simply predictable variations in human functioning. The systems that assume each person has the same capacity is, in essence, baking inequality into its performance expectations, and then treating individual differences as deficits.

The more consequential issue, however, is not baseline variability. It is the cumulative effect of depletion and what it does to decision-making over time. National security environments place sustained demands on attention and judgment. Under chronic load, the first changes are often subtle: Thinking narrows. People rely more heavily on familiar patterns. Uncertainty becomes harder to sit with. Teams may lock in on a conclusion too early or simplify complex choices. They may default to routine when adaptive thinking is required. Over time, judgment can become more rigid and less reliable, with people either narrowing or widening their threat interpretation in ways that are not well matched to the situation. The work still gets done, but the quality of analysis and the ability to adjust course can quietly erode, leaving the system less adaptable precisely when conditions shift.

This is why the individual resilience conversation matters, but only if it is used correctly. Individual resilience research does not tell institutions to teach more coping skills and declare success. On the contrary, it tells institutions that the operating environment is placing sustained demands on people in predictable ways, and that these effects compound. If leadership does not manage cumulative demand, decision quality will degrade regardless of how committed individuals are.

Some institutional responses can become counterproductive. Institutions often try to “select for resilience” by screening, hiring, and promoting those who appear to handle stress well, but that does not eliminate human limits. Even the most capable people struggle under sustained load; the difference is the timing and visibility of their strain, not immunity to it. Similarly, short recovery windows do not solve the problem if baseline demand remains high. Recovery is not only about time off. It is about whether systems allow genuine disengagement and whether demand is paced in a way that permits replenishment.

The implication is straightforward: Systems that rely on constant availability, chronic overload, and surge-as-normal operation are not built for long-term effectiveness. They not only put decision-making at risk, but they also erode readiness, retention, trust, and institutional memory over time. Individual resilience should be treated partially as a signal about how the system is functioning and where strain is being generated. Taken seriously, it should drive a rethinking of what “systems approaches” to resilience actually mean in practice. In addition to programs that train individuals to cope, it means redesigning the conditions of work (workload, staffing, priorities, and decision processes) so sustained performance is built into the institution. It also means clarifying decision rights and escalation pathways, and protecting recovery time, so the system is not dependent on extraordinary individual sacrifice.

If individual resilience helps identify where strain accumulates, the next question is why many systems approaches fail to correct it. Participants at the three Atlantic Council roundtables pointed repeatedly to a familiar pattern: Even when supports are added, the underlying drivers and incentives remain unchanged.

How systems approaches often fail

Many systems approaches to resilience fail because they stop short of redesign. They add support without changing assumptions. They layer resources without recalibrating expectations. In practice, they still rely on individual adaptation to keep the system running.

This is the central weakness of many resilience initiatives: They look like systems interventions but function as burden-shifting by making chronic demand more tolerable rather than making demand sustainable. Too often, they treat coping as the solution by expanding training, wellness resources, and self-management expectations, while the structural drivers of overload, including tempo, staffing, and decision bottlenecks, remain unchanged. Roundtable participants described this dynamic directly: The organization “puts resources forward,” but the underlying cycle doesn’t change, and resilience becomes a required module to complete rather than a redesign of how the work is structured.

Incentives then reinforce the underlying dysfunction. Leaders may endorse sustainability while still rewarding constant responsiveness, and organizations may speak about boundaries while promoting those who violate them. In practice, incentives foster behavior or action more quickly than policies, and they can lock in a model of success that depends on continual overextension.

The result is a system that appears robust but is structurally fragile. It performs because individuals compensate, stretching time, attention, and availability to keep the mission moving. Over time, the costs show up in quieter but consequential ways: Decision-making becomes less reliable, teams lose range, and experienced personnel disengage or leave, taking hard-won knowledge with them. When surge conditions, leadership transitions, or external shocks hit, there is often little remaining slack to absorb the shock, and systems without real buffers struggle to adapt quickly enough.

True systems resilience is not achieved by adding more support to an unchanged structure. It requires making deliberate choices about how demand is created, prioritized, and resourced, including how tempo is set, how work is handed off, where redundancy is built in, and what leaders are rewarded for. The goal is not comfort. The goal is sustained readiness and reliable performance under stress.

What an overhaul requires

If resilience is to be treated seriously in national security contexts, then systems approaches must be overhauled, not layered. This begins with acknowledging that many current efforts focus on helping individuals operate effectively within flawed systems rather than redesigning those systems.

First, institutions must address cumulative demand directly by treating operational tempo as a design choice, not a fact of life. That means defining what qualifies as a true surge, setting guardrails so that surge mode does not become the baseline, and building real slack into staffing and schedules. High-tempo periods should then be absorbed by the system rather than by individual overextension. Leaders can put this into practice through workload triage and explicit lists of things employees should stop doing during a period of high demand. They can set clearer thresholds for what gets paused during surges and lead routine after-action reviews that examine not only operational outcomes but the cost in capacity. The goal is straightforward: Create pacing, redundancy, and decision space so readiness is protected even when the environment remains demanding.

Second, leadership accountability must extend beyond crisis performance to include sustainability, which must be measurable. Leaders should be evaluated on whether they manage workload and tempo responsibly, protect decision space, and retain and develop talent over time. That means making incentives explicit: rewarding leaders who build redundancy, delegate authority, and normalize handing off work and scheduling time for recovery. Alternatively, it is essential to correct leaders who rely on constant responsiveness and chronic overextension as their operating model.

In addition, leadership behavior matters in a more human, immediate way than institutions often acknowledge. Roundtable participants emphasized that when leaders are willing to show up as humans, including naming uncertainty, acknowledging strain, and modeling both the action of seeking help and recovery without stigma, it can reset the temperature of an entire team. That kind of credible vulnerability builds trust, widens the space for honest upward feedback, and makes it more likely that problems are surfaced early rather than managed privately until they become crises. In practice, it is one of the fastest ways leaders can shift culture without launching a new program.

Third, training should be used to reinforce sound system design, not to compensate for its absence. Institutions can keep resilience training, but they should pair it with concrete changes that reduce avoidable strain. Training should focus on the skills that improve team and mission performance under stress. Examples of these skills include communication under pressure, decision-making in uncertainty, escalation and delegation norms, and how leaders recognize early signs of overload (aided by data, as discussed below) and make appropriate changes. Most importantly, training should come with a feedback loop. What trainees report about friction points and recurring strain should be treated as operational data that informs redesign, not as an individual coping gap.

Fourth, measurement needs to shift from documenting damage to preventing it, and the roundtables made it clear that good data is one of the few levers that reliably alters behavior. Attrition and burnout rates are lagging indicators. By the time they move, the system has already been drawing down its people and its capacity for a while. A more serious approach is to track leading indicators of strain that leaders can act on, including workload distribution, surge frequency and duration, after-hours expectations, backlogs, approval bottlenecks, vacancy and coverage gaps, and the amount of time teams are operating in “urgent” mode.

Equally important, though, is the usability of data. Leaders need a small set of metrics that can be reviewed routinely, not an elaborate dashboard that no one trusts or uses. The goal is to make strain visible early and tie it to decision points. When surge becomes the baseline, something needs to be paused, rescoped, or resourced. When bottlenecks appear, authority and process need to be adjusted. When certain roles show chronic after-hours load, something needs to be redesigned such as staffing, handoffs, and coverage.

In addition, measurement should be paired with accountability and action. Teams should be able to surface what the data means in plain language, and leaders should be expected to respond with a corrective plan, not a wellness reminder. Over time, this creates an institutional habit of using data to manage tempo and protect readiness, rather than using data only to explain why people are leaving.

Finally, institutions should make trade-offs explicit and operationalize them, rather than leaving them implicit and pushing the costs down to individuals. A genuine overhaul requires leaders to define what “sustainable tempo” means for their mission sets, establish thresholds for when work is rescoped or paused, and build redundancy as a deliberate design feature in critical functions. It also requires resetting norms around constant availability by clarifying what truly constitutes an emergency, creating predictable coverage and handoff models, and rewarding teams that protect continuity without relying on chronic overextension.

The practical question is not whether the work is important. It is how the institution will prioritize, resource, and pace the work so that readiness is preserved when conditions tighten. When those choices are made openly, organizations can align expectations with capacity and reduce the hidden risk created by always-on operating models.

Conclusion

National security institutions will always operate in environments defined by uncertainty, periodic surge, and high stakes. The question is whether those institutions treat resilience as a personal expectation or as a systems responsibility. The next step is to choose a small set of measurable indicators, align accountability to them, and redesign the points of highest friction, where chronic strain is generated. Done well, this shifts resilience from a story we tell people to a capability that institutions strengthen.

Caitlin Thompson spent over a decade at the Department of Veterans Affairs, where she served as the executive director’s Office of Suicide Prevention. She holds a PhD in clinical psychology from the University of Virginia and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative.

This issue brief draws on a series of three Atlantic Council roundtables with national security practitioners, experts in psychiatry and health, and think tank experts on individual resilience to identify what national security institutions must redesign to sustain readiness under chronic strain.

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Caitlin Thompson

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Shedd in the Washington Times: Baltic Security Initiative an investment in US defense

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 20:16:10 +0000

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Putin is counting on Western disunity to hand him victory in Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 20:14:13 +0000

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine recently entered a fifth year and has now been underway for longer than the entire cataclysmic conflict between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during World War II.

This historical comparison does not flatter Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has turned veneration of the fight against Hitler into an unofficial state religion. While Red Army troops played a key role in the Nazi defeat and managed to advance thousands of kilometers from Stalingrad to Berlin, today’s Russian army is in many cases still stuck within walking distance of their positions when the invasion first began in February 2022.

Despite this lack of progress on the battlefield, Putin has so far demonstrated zero interest a compromise peace. Instead, he continues to insist on maximalist demands during negotiations that would destroy Ukraine as an independent state and as a separate nation.

This uncompromising stance makes perfect sense when viewed from Putin’s perspective. After all, the invasion he unleashed in 2022 has cost countless Russian lives and plunged the country into a new Cold War. Putin knows that only total victory can justify these sacrifices.

If Putin accepted the peace terms currently on offer, this would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine free and beyond Kremlin control. Most Russians would regard that as a disastrous defeat. Putin’s dreams of entering Russian history alongside Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Stalin would be shattered. Instead, he would be condemned as the man who lost Ukraine.

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In a very real sense, Putin is caught in a trap of his own making and has no real choice but to fight on. At the same time, however, it would be wrong to suggest that the Kremlin dictator is merely seeking to postpone the inevitable. On the contrary, he remains convinced that the goals of the invasion are still achievable and is now counting on Western disunity to hand him victory in Ukraine.

Putin’s low opinion of the democratic world is based on personal experience. Time and again throughout his reign, Russia’s aggressive actions have sparked vocal condemnation from Western capitals followed with indecent haste by calls for a return to dialogue and “business as usual.”

Western leaders loudly condemned Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, but were soon queuing up to reset relations with the Kremlin. The same lack of resolve was on display following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, with minimal costs imposed on Moscow and multiple European countries actually increasing their dependence on Russian energy exports.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Putin treats the proclamations of his Western counterparts with thinly veiled contempt. While he has been unpleasantly surprised since 2022 by the scale of support for Ukraine, the Russian leader’s own dealings with his Western counterparts have encouraged him to conclude that this unity will prove temporary. As the war grinds into a fifth year with no end in sight, Putin believes he can ultimately outlast the West.

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Shifts within the Western alliance over the past year are fueling confidence in Moscow that current levels of support for Ukraine will not last forever. Since returning to the White House in January 2025, US President Donald Trump has cut military aid to Ukraine and sought to reposition the United States as an intermediary in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

This has placed the burden of supporting the Ukrainian war effort firmly on Europe. According to recent Kiel Institute data, Ukraine’s European partners have done a good job of filling this gap. However, the majority of aid is now coming from a relatively small group of nations including Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain. This places Ukraine’s war effort on fragile foundations.

Meanwhile, a ninety billion euro financing package agreed by EU leaders remains blocked by Hungary. This is part of long-term pattern that has seen Hungary’s pro-Kremlin Prime Minister Viktor Orban repeatedly obstruct or delay efforts by the European Union to strengthen Ukraine or increase pressure on Putin.

With far-right populist parties currently riding high in the polls throughout Europe, Putin also has good cause for optimism over the possible imminent appearance of more Orban-style allies. This could help the Kremlin in its efforts to divide and weaken Europe from within.

Broader geopolitical developments are also placing new strains on Western unity and threatening to undermine backing for Ukraine. The US-Israeli joint operation against Iran is currently causing unprecedented tension among NATO allies, with European countries reluctant to participate in efforts to safeguard the Strait of Hormuz. This has highlighted a growing transatlantic divide that could seriously weaken Ukraine’s position.

Putin cannot risk a compromise peace in Ukraine, but he remains confident that time is on his side. While the Russian army has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, Putin is prepared to wait until Western disunity leaves the Ukrainians stripped of support and at his mercy. While this would not mean an immediate end to the carnage, Putin believes a dramatic decline in Western support would finally allow Russia to pummel an exposed and abandoned Ukraine into submission.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Kaluderovic in Foreign Policy: The drone attrition tap

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 20:12:51 +0000

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Kaluderovic in Fox News: Trump’s strike on Iran deals a major blow to Putin’s war machine in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 20:09:30 +0000

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Why the Iran war energy shock is different

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 19:53:05 +0000

JUST IN

Call it a crude awakening. On Thursday morning, the price of Brent crude shot past $115 per barrel, up roughly 50 percent in the past month. This latest surge followed an Israeli strike on Iran’s South Pars gas field and an Iranian attack on a major Qatari gas hub, which raised fears that attacks would spread to other critical energy infrastructure in the region. All told it’s been a rollercoaster week for financial and energy markets, as Iran has maintained its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz and the conflict in the region has spread and shown no signs of ending. Below, Atlantic Council experts identify the throughlines in the ups and downs—and forecast what to expect next.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Landon Derentz: (@Landon_Derentz): Vice president for energy and infrastructure at the Atlantic Council and former director for energy at the White House during the first Trump administration
Lisa Basquel: Program assistant for European energy security at the Global Energy Center and former staffer with the Delegation of the European Union to the United States
Khalid Azim: Director of the MENA Futures Lab within the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and former global capital markets banker
Josh Lipsky: (@joshualipsky): Chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council and former International Monetary Fund advisor

What’s happening?

The Wednesday attacks on facilities at Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City—a site that accounts for roughly 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply—“have heightened market concerns that the conflict could spiral into a structural supply disruption,” Landon says. “Such a scenario would carry lasting consequences for global energy affordability, rather than proving a transitory shock that subsides once hostilities end and the Strait of Hormuz reopens.”
The disruptions resulting from the extensive damage to Ras Laffan are hitting “just as Europe begins its critical summer storage refill season,” Lisa adds. There’s little prospect for prices to come down as long as Qatari supply remains offline and Europe and Asia compete for limited LNG cargos, she explains.
“From a market perspective, the issue is uncertainty, both around the path forward and the duration of the shock,” Khalid tells us. “When the fear of loss outweighs the prospect of gain, capital starts to come off the table. Expect fund managers to lock in gains and increase hedges in the absence of clearer policy direction.”
Khalid points to warning signs coming from leveraged private credit markets. “The risk is not the shock itself, but the point at which it forces adjustments across the most leveraged parts of the financial system,” he tells us.
Yet markets are not in freefall. Josh interprets that reaction as many investors continuing to believe that Trump will find a way to resolve the crisis, possibly looking at his pullback from high tariff levels last year and resolution of the Greenland dispute this year as examples of the president’s nose for an offramp. “But it is also possible markets are mistaking geopolitical resilience for immunity,” he adds.

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What’s different about this energy shock?

Since the 1970s, the world has experienced an energy supply shock at least every decade. But Josh offers one explanation for why the rise in energy prices is more severe now than during past shocks: “The concentration of energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz” is coinciding with “ongoing disruptions from Russia’s war in Ukraine,” which has prompted efforts to limit Moscow’s oil and gas exports.
“Markets are starting to realize that a greater share of global energy production is involved in these conflicts than at any time since World War II,” Josh says.
The eleven countries directly involved in the Iran war and the war in Ukraine, Josh notes, account for 51 percent of global crude oil production and 56 percent of global gas production—a larger share than during the first Gulf war.

What can be done?

“Reopening the Strait of Hormuz is the single most consequential step coalition forces can take to stabilize energy markets,” says Landon. “Achieving this will require neutralizing Iran’s stockpile of anti-ship cruise missiles and its asymmetric drone capabilities—the latter also posing a significant threat to regional energy infrastructure.”
Israel and the United States, Landon adds, are targeting drone-production sites and military installations along Iran’s coastline as they “seek to curtail Tehran’s ability to strike critical energy assets in the Gulf and disrupt international shipping through the strait.”
With Gulf states already reducing oil production, Khalid notes, JPMorgan estimates that supply cuts could reach twelve million barrels of oil per day by the end of the week, accounting for around 10 percent of global demand.
The adjustment mechanism for such a supply shock is reducing energy consumption, says Khalid. But in the short term “energy demand is highly inelastic.” Meaningfully reducing demand “requires a structural shift in consumer behavior,” he explains. And that, in turn, “takes time.”

Read more analysis on the Iran war’s energy and economic impact from Landon, Lisa, Josh, and Khalid.

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Gongadze in Ukrainska Pravda: “Europe at war.” Friends of Europe’s warning shot

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 19:17:13 +0000

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Wartime Ukraine offers global lessons on the future of cyber resilience

Oleksandr Bakalynskyi, Maggie McDonough — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 17:58:46 +0000

The twelve years of cyber warfare that have accompanied Russia’s escalating invasion of Ukraine have transformed the country’s digital environment into a proving ground for modern conflict. Persistent cyber attacks against government systems, critical infrastructure, energy networks, media outlets, and the financial sector have become a defining feature of Ukraine’s wartime reality. Amid this sustained pressure, Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to defend itself and has developed a degree of cyber resilience that is now embedded in the digital state.

Russian aggression in the cyber sphere has forced Ukraine into rapid and often improvised defense. Coordination mechanisms have emerged across government agencies, volunteer networks, and private sector IT firms, with operational responses conducted under constant pressure. Permanent mobilization, however, is not sustainable. Instead, the goal is to codify the next phase of reform in Ukraine’s evolving cyber security strategy.

For Ukraine, the strategic objective is no longer limited to repelling cyber attacks. It is to ensure continuity of state functions even when attacks succeed. This requires a national cyber resilience framework that encompasses government, business, and civil society. It demands continuous professional training along with strengthened legislative and risk management frameworks. It also implies a culture of cyber hygiene at the citizen level. Together, these measures represent a shift from episodic defense to durable digital statehood.

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Ukraine’s experience over the past twelve years underscores a central truth of cyber defense: People play a decisive role in cyber security. Since 2014, thousands of professionals from the private sector, volunteer networks, and academia have mobilized to defend Ukraine’s digital front. Sustaining this momentum requires institutional support and a long-term talent strategy.

Priority areas include integrating cyber education across schools, universities, and military institutions. Partnerships between industry and academia should undergo expansion through education and internships. Workforce development is not merely a labor market issue; it is a pillar of cyber sovereignty and continuity of government. It is also crucial to establish a national cyber reserve supported by access to cyber ranges and allied training platforms.

Wartime conditions have already accelerated innovation in Ukraine. Cloud-based backups, relocation of critical data to secure environments abroad, and decentralized platforms for citizen services are now routine. These practices must be institutionalized to endure beyond the war. Priorities include embedding innovations into permanent government processes and establishing applied cyber research centers at universities.

The convergence of academia, defense institutions, and the technology sector in wartime Ukraine is enabling a distinct national cyber security model to emerge rooted in operational experience and continuous adaptation. It is a model that complements existing frameworks while reflecting Ukraine’s realities. As a result, Ukraine has become an integral actor within the Euro-Atlantic cyber ecosystem.

At the international level, cooperation with the EU, NATO, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan has evolved from ad hoc assistance to structured partnerships. Core focuses include joint threat intelligence-sharing mechanisms; harmonization with EU and NATO standards; participation in multinational exercises; and the development of a shared resilience space in which national resilience contributes to collective defense. Ukraine’s expertise positions it not only as a recipient of assistance, but increasingly as an exporter of operational resilience models to partners confronting hybrid threats.

Ukraine’s progress demonstrates the importance of embedding cyber resilience in institutional architecture rather than treating it as a reactive function. A resilience-by-design model entails distributed system architecture to reduce single points of failure. It requires adoption of open standards and transparent protocols, along with continuous training and simulations embedded in institutional life cycles.

Psychological resilience training for cyber professionals operating under sustained pressure and information warfare conditions is also crucial. This should position cyber security as a governance principle, framing Ukraine not only as a state under attack but as a testing ground for next generation digital resilience.

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Since the onset of Russia’s invasion in 2014, Ukraine has become the world’s most consequential real-time laboratory for cyber resilience. The country’s experience demonstrates that effective cyber security is an integrated system encompassing governance, education, law, diplomacy, and economic resilience. Institutionalizing these lessons into a durable national cyber resilience ecosystem will underpin postwar recovery and long-term digital sovereignty.

For partners, Ukraine’s experience offers much more than a narrative of resistance. It represents a practical plan for collective security for the coming decades of international military conflicts, each of which will have a mandatory digital component.

As Ukraine develops its forthcoming National Cybersecurity Strategy 2.0, several priorities should guide the next phase of institutional reform. First, Ukraine should expand the doctrine of active cyber protection, enabling defensive operations that proactively detect, disrupt, and neutralize threats before they impact critical systems.

Second, the continued Euro-integration of Ukraine’s cyber regulatory framework will be essential. This should include alignment with EU directives such as NIS2, the Critical Infrastructure Resilience framework, and the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), ensuring interoperability with European cyber governance standards.

Third, Ukraine should actively participate in the development of a European cyber shield. The goal should be a collective resilience architecture built on shared threat intelligence, joint incident response mechanisms, and coordinated defensive capabilities across the continent.

Fourth, long-term resilience requires sustained investment in cyber workforce development aligned with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0. This should include standardized training pathways, public-private talent pipelines, and the expansion of national cyber reserve capacities.

Fifth, strengthening cyber security capacity at the regional administration level across Ukraine will be vital. This can help ensure that local governments and regional critical infrastructure operators possess the operational capabilities and resources necessary to implement national cyber resilience policies effectively.

Finally, Ukraine’s next cyber strategy should also define a clear wartime framework that establishes legal authorities, operational coordination mechanisms, and public–private responsibilities for defending national digital and operational infrastructure during periods of armed conflict or hybrid attack.

With each subsequent international conflict, the digital component will grow in importance and become an increasingly critical part of the battlefield. This is already becoming clear in the current context of revolutionary progress in robotics, the development of AI, big data, parallel computing, and ever-accelerating data transmission technologies.

In this evolving environment, success will no longer depend on greater human or conventional military resources, but on an innovative, flexible, and progressive approach toward the development and use of the latest technologies. In these conditions, cyber resilience is not only a security strategy but also the foundation of freedom.

Dr. Oleksandr Bakalinskyi is a Senior Researcher at the G. E. Pukhov Institute for Modeling in Energy Engineering at the National Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. Maggie McDonough is the Senior Vice President and Chief Innovation Officer at the Baltimore Development Corporation. She was previously affiliated with the Purdue Applied Research Institute (PARI) and Purdue’s Center for Education & Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS), where she served as a technical advisor on global cyber security resilience programming.

Charai for The National Interest: Why Iran Was Always a Threat to the US

Atlantic Council — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 21:08:46 +0000

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Six strategic risks the Trump administration should evaluate in the Iran war

Nathan Freier — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 20:58:13 +0000

WASHINGTON—War is a serious endeavor. And, make no mistake, Operation Epic Fury is a war. Its current scale and the scope of its desired outcomes render the suggestion that it is anything less than war implausible.

Epic Fury features the largest concentration of US military power in the region since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Though subject to different official narratives, the conflict seems focused on eliminating—or inspiring an end to—Iran’s current regime, neutralizing the coercive structures that enable it, and destroying Iran’s capability to threaten US interests. Epic Fury’s conduct, ongoing impacts, and strategic outcomes are globally significant. And finally, the Iranian regime seems to perceive Epic Fury as an existential threat and is fighting as though this is the case. This all adds up to a real war, and US officials should not consider it anything less.

In practical terms, preparing for a war means that US policymakers should have performed thoroughgoing strategic risk assessment before hostilities and apply similar risk logic to adapt their approach as they proceed. As policymakers, we have lost sight of this fact before. Moving forward, it would be wise to ensure we not do so again.

How to think about risk

As a defense and military strategist with experience advising senior leadership in a wartime theater and, most recently, as a Pentagon official from 2022 to 2024, I know there is one aspect of conflict and rivalry that cannot be ignored: War is an exercise in risk management. Risk connects wartime objectives, the ways and means to pursue them, and preferred strategic outcomes. Moreover, wartime strategic risk assessment should be clinical—avoiding preference, and instead using facts and reasonable assumptions to consider the likeliest, the most dangerous, and the most disruptive outcomes.

At its best, risk-informed strategic planning focuses on one animating question: What is the likelihood that the chosen approach will deliver the desired outcomes at acceptable cost? Given how Epic Fury has unfolded so far, it is unclear how much this question informed prewar decision-making and, even now, ongoing US actions. This operation may have been judged as high-risk, high-reward and, therefore worthy of pursuit. But inadequate risk assessment of an endeavor this complex and this consequential can make it a gamble.

Six “gray rhinos”

Experience suggests that war has far fewer of author Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s “black swans,” or high-impact and unpredictable events, than it does author Michele Wucker’s “gray rhinos,” or highly probable, high-impact yet neglected threats. The latter are foreseeable, prone to derail the best intent, and core to strategic risk assessment. Here are six important strategic risk factors US policymakers should consider to remedy any earlier oversights.

The war is being conducted by a coalition of two—the United States and Israel—and they may not be pursuing the same ends against a rival that has so far chosen the only version of “total war” within its reach. Iran’s “mosaic defense” strategy—which prioritized decentralization and asymmetric warfare—might not be an operational war winner. However, it may just be enough to outlast the US-Israeli coalition strategically. Iran’s continued resistance—potentially ultimately made more complex by future political destabilization and civil conflict—may extend US and Israeli commitment longer than either preferred or anticipated. It may also create irreconcilable asymmetries between the two governments’ approaches to terminating the war.
The war is rattling troubled US alliances. Washington reportedly did not meaningfully consult its partners before US-Israeli strikes began on February 28, and the war is having a profound and unanticipated impact on many of them. Given the latest US national security and defense strategies, many NATO allies in particular are already adapting to an emerging US strategy perceived as transactional and hostile to their interests. Downstream, US allies also know that they may have to enter hostilities without the benefit of prior consultation just to protect their own interests and defend against or contain escalation. In combination, these factors complicate already tenuous foreign partnerships, both making them less secure and undermining relationships that the United States relies on to solve many other consequential security challenges. In short, Epic Fury may only widen the “rupture” in trust recently described by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney.
The war offers US rivals opportunities for strategic mischief. Many US rivals, too, did not see Epic Fury coming (at least not as it has unfolded) but they are certain to avail themselves of any advantages it might offer. US commitment in Iran is an open invitation for rivals to materially tie down and deplete US power. Under circumstances where US activism matters most (especially, in Ukraine/Europe and the tense Indo-Pacific), postwar US exhaustion (material, political, and moral) may engender US self-deterrence to their benefit. Finally, another US Middle Eastern war opens doors for rival military and economic opportunism contrary to US interests. The usual suspects are important to watch here: China, Russia, and North Korea.
Both the scope and consequences of the war are expanding. Iran’s regime will try to open new threat vectors against the United States whether precision strikes end in days, weeks, or months. The Iranian regime’s goal is survival. Therefore, it is likely to try and make the United States’ problem bigger and more costly. It has already closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked targets regionwide.

Iranian allies, proxies, and customers can also be useful extensions of its “mosaic defense,” which employs a decentralized military strategy to help ensure battlefield continuity. Though the United States is currently on the offense against Iran, its proxies, allies, and customers are vulnerable to US offensive action, too. However, they might also perceive exploitable opportunities in the war, as well. They can support Iran directly or free ride on the war for their own purposes. Either way, they complement Iran’s war aims with active resistance or latent threats. For example, a Hezbollah-Israeli second front along the Lebanese border already exists, and Shia militias have attacked US interests in Iraq. The Houthis in Yemen are a wild card. While they have been quiet so far, they are capable of threatening the Red Sea, Israel, and the Arabian Peninsula.

Finally, the US homeland itself may not be safe from direct retaliation from Iran or its sympathizers via kinetic proxy military strike, cyberattack, and terrorism. The United States has been mostly immune to the effects of foreign conflict since the immediate post-9/11 period. But save for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States has not presented an existential threat to any capable rival since. Iran’s perception of total war in an existential fight portends unique approaches to dislocate US security and sentiment. Iran’s threats to the US homeland may not be either credible or materially strategic, but that does not necessarily limit their psychological value.
The war has induced a shock on commerce and the global economy. There are enormous direct military costs that will trigger substantial postwar defense investments to reset the Joint Force. However, the big story is Epic Fury’s global economic disruption. Like US partners and rivals, markets were hit by Epic Fury with little warning. The private and public sectors were not prepared to buffer their assets against sharp but ephemeral adjustment (in the best case) or a structural disruption extending across multiple sectors over time (in the worst case). The war’s unexpected economic costs will have global impacts, and their scope and scale are highly dependent on the war’s duration.
The war is unpopular. Less than a month into the war, more than half of Americans oppose it, according to recent polling, and history shows that many conflicts lose support over time. While unpopular wars are not necessarily unjustified, favorable public opinion is the currency of continued military freedom of action. Failure to turn it around will affect the United States’ ability to fight now and, perhaps, more importantly, later, when the stakes are higher and the interests more compelling.

The work ahead

Wartime strategic risk calculation is homework that separates success from failure. It balances the downstream impacts of military action against the nation’s broadest strategic objectives. Risk does not decide. Risk informs. High-risk is not a stop light. It is a warning sign. Leadership heeds and acts on risk—or ignores it, often at the expense of desired outcomes and the safety of those in harm’s way.

My experience suggests significant working-level risk assessments occurred prior to Epic Fury. However, it is not apparent that work drove US leadership toward meaningful risk mitigation. The six factors above are among the key areas of strategic risk that would have benefited from the prior attention of senior US officials. They certainly merit attention now, as well.

Going forward, future wars will engender new strategic hazards. Then, like now, decision makers should put consequential risk-related insight at the center of their most consequential decisions about war and peace.

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Attacks on desalination plants in the Iran war forecast a dark future

Ginger Matchett — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 19:27:31 +0000

WASHINGTON—The ongoing conflict in Iran has focused global attention on surging energy prices caused by supply-chain disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. As devastating as these oil and gas constraints are to both the Middle East and global markets, the war also poses a threat to another critical resource that keeps the Gulf afloat: water. Several limited attacks on desalination plants in both Iran and Bahrain in the past two weeks offer a glimpse at the potential danger if this infrastructure were intentionally and systematically targeted. Either in this war or a future Middle Eastern conflict, water resources could prove an attractive target for anyone seeking to cause harm and destabilize communities.

On March 7 and 8, desalination plants in Iran and Bahrain were targeted in the ongoing conflict. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi accused the United States of attacking a desalination plant in Iran, while Bahrain’s interior ministry said that its plant was struck by an Iranian drone. The damage to the Bahraini desalination plant reportedly affected water supply in as many as thirty villages. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also reported missile-related damage to desalination plants during the conflict. Though it is unclear if Iran deliberately targeted all of these plants, this infrastructure is critical to Gulf states and within a short striking distance of Iran. It could become a tempting target for Tehran if the conflict persists.

Countries in the Middle East face arid conditions and frequent water shortages, often relying on desalination infrastructure to turn saltwater into freshwater. Without such technology, which removes salt through reverse osmosis, roughly 100 million individuals in the Middle East would have no regular access to drinking water. There are around five thousand desalination plants across the Middle East, more than four hundred of which are in the Gulf. And a smaller number of plants are responsible for a large share of the output. More than 90 percent of the Gulf’s desalinated water, for example, comes from just fifty-six plants. This concentration and proximity to Iran makes the Gulf’s desalination infrastructure particularly vulnerable as the exchange of missiles and drones intensifies.

In Kuwait and Bahrain, desalinated drinking water accounts for around 90 percent of the countries’ supply, along with roughly 86 percent in Oman, 80 percent in Israel, about 70 percent in Saudi Arabia, and 42 percent for the UAE. In Qatar, it is upwards of nearly 99 percent.

A deliberate series of strikes on desalination plants could deepen regional instability and trigger further humanitarian disasters or migration crises in the Gulf.

If Iran successfully destroyed the Gulf’s desalination infrastructure, then the consequences could be devastating. The effects of a significant strike would likely ripple across cities, disrupting water supplies to local and state-operated public facilities, businesses, houses, hotels, and agricultural operations. This infrastructure is also integrated into national electrical grids, meaning damage could cascade into city-wide power outages or necessitate calls for complete evacuations.

Though not as dependent on desalination plants as some Gulf countries, Iran, too, is experiencing a water crisis. The country is currently in its fifth year of drought, and strikes on Iran’s currently operating plants would likely cause far-reaching pain. This would be made worse by Iran’s constraints on repairing and building additional desalination plants due to international sanctions and rising energy costs.

Moreover, the Gulf’s reliance on desalinated water is only projected to grow. The accelerating effects of climate change are increasing the value of this water source as shallow groundwater supplies—the only renewable water source in the Gulf region—dry up. Saudi Arabia, for example, has announced plans to invest around $80 billion in building additional plants in the coming years.

To date, international humanitarian and water laws haven’t safeguarded civilian water infrastructure, as demonstrated by attacks on targets vital to water supply in Ukraine and Gaza. The Gulf itself has suffered attacks on desalination plants in the past. During its invasion in 1990 of Kuwait, for example, Iraq targeted desalinations plants. It took Kuwait years for the country to restore the infrastructure. More recently, the Houthis in Yemen attacked plants in Saudi Arabia in 2022. The toll is often quick and the consequence potentially long: US intelligence reports have indicated that striking water infrastructure and critical equipment in Gulf states could cause them to lose the majority of their drinking water in days and face national water crises lasting months.

Since 2006, Gulf countries have invested at least $53.4 billion in developing desalination infrastructure. They have also created contingency plans to defend the plants with pipeline networks, massive storage reservoirs, and protective barriers to shield intake valves. Currently, the strategic resiliency capacities of Saudi Arabia and the UAE are significantly greater than Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait.

The consequences of a full-scale water war would extend beyond the Gulf, as the region supplies 40 percent of the world’s desalinated water. As the Gulf’s population grows, continues to rapidly urbanize, and consumes increasing volumes of water, a natural resource crisis there could lead to water scarcity in communities throughout the Middle East and beyond. Studies indicate that by 2030, there could be a 40 percent global shortfall in freshwater resources while demand increases by more than 20 percent, making desalination technology all the more essential. Many threats to water supplies need to be considered, including climate change, pollution, agricultural production, and ecosystem degradation. But safeguarding water supplies also requires investing in the defense of water infrastructure and technologies. Perhaps most urgent are anti-drone capabilities.

As the Iran war continues, there is a serious risk that a deliberate series of strikes on desalination plants could deepen regional instability and trigger further humanitarian disasters or migration crises in the Gulf. All parties to the conflict should avoid escalating what is already a regional war into an even deeper conflict over the Gulf’s water supply.

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Europe should help in the Gulf to serve its own interests, regardless of Trump’s demands

Daniel Fried, Jörn Fleck — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 19:27:26 +0000

WASHINGTON—The Iran war wasn’t their idea, and they may not like the way President Donald Trump is conducting it. But despite bullying rhetoric from Trump, the United States’ European allies might consider what they can reasonably do to support security around the Gulf rather than reject White House demands for it out of hand.

Building a coalition and preparing the battlespace for military action takes time and effort, especially when the conflict is in the Middle East. The United States sought and received significant military help from its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite sharp political differences; help that grew over time. Failure in Afghanistan, mixed success in Iraq, and popular frustration over both wars have not made it easier for the United States to get help this time with Iran. The Trump administration’s approach has hurt too: Trump has swung from initially keeping allies in the dark about the operation to demanding allied military support, to then spurning such help as unneeded. The United States started out from behind after Trump’s public attacks on those allies who did fight alongside US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, Trump has denigrated Ukraine’s actual offers of drones and drone specialists to Gulf countries—a field in which the embattled country is arguably the world leader.

Trump’s March 17 social media post was another sharp rejection of European help: “[W]e no longer ‘need’, or desire, the NATO Countries’ assistance – WE NEVER DID!” That post also included another attack on NATO as a “one way street – We will protect them, but they will do nothing for us.” Given all this, it would be understandable for Europeans to slam Trump for starting a war without consulting with them, only to demand their military support when things start to look complicated.

Nevertheless, European allies would be better advised to consider what they can do to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz and defend Gulf states under attack by Iran. They should do so not to assuage Trump or to help him out of a self-induced jam, but because Europe’s own critical interests are at stake in this conflict.

Why Europe should act

The spiking price of oil hurts the entire free world and has sent European governments scrambling for short-term fixes at the gas pump. Parallel surges in oil and gasoline prices have worsened an already bleak outlook for European industry, its competitiveness, and economic growth. At home, rising costs could cause political instability and benefit pro-Russian challengers on the right and left. Abroad, the price spikes in oil could create an estimated three to five billion dollars in additional revenue by the end of March for Russia, Europe’s most aggressive adversary, whose war against Ukraine remains the defining threat to the continent’s own freedom and security.

That windfall from energy-price shocks risks giving Russia a boost, just as Moscow’s position on the battlefield and the prospects for its war economy were deteriorating. Until the present moment, Russia’s position was weakening , thanks primarily to Ukraine’s bravery, grit, and sacrifice, but also because Europe stepped up to provide the financing needed to keep US weapons flowing to Kyiv over the past fourteen months.

European weapons stocks and production are a well-documented problem, but Europe’s stronger engagement in the Gulf could also present important openings in the defense space. The continent’s defense companies have been among the most effective and nimble partners for Ukraine’s battle-tested drone start-ups, and together they could bring new and more cost-effective means for Gulf allies to defend themselves against future attacks from Iran or other actors. That could achieve multiple European-Ukrainian objectives at once: It would preserve much-needed high-end interceptors that Ukraine needs—and Europe would buy from the United States—to defend against Russian ballistic missiles. It would expand cooperation and build new trust in Europe-Gulf relations. And it might shift the position of Gulf countries that have long sat on the fence when it comes to Russia’s war in Ukraine. It would accomplish all of this while avoiding further deterioration in transatlantic relations.

European leaders, therefore, have plenty of reasons to engage constructively with the United States and partners in the Gulf. Speed matters here. How quickly European countries move in pursuit of their own interests sends an important signal to Washington and adversaries in Moscow and Beijing alike. It matters almost as much as the movement itself.

What Europe can do

Some Europeans had already figured this out. On March 1, a day after the start of the military action, a joint statement by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom declared:

“We will take steps to defend our interests and those of our allies in the region, potentially through enabling necessary and proportionate defensive action to destroy Iran’s capability to fire missiles and drones at their source. We have agreed to work together with the US and allies in the region on this matter.”

That statement suggested a willingness to attack Iranian drone and missile sites. An experienced former senior Pentagon official pointed out to the authors that the United Kingdom and French navies could support the United States in protecting Gulf terminals and cities from Iranian attacks and, possibly, help with escorting ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Ukrainian know-how combined with European resourcing and production, from air defense to drone-based mine-hunting, could make important differences as well. If Trump’s language has made it politically complicated for European leaders to help, then these leaders could arrange to respond to requests from Gulf states or other countries affected by the war.

Trump’s social media posts are unlikely to last; responding to them as they are written risks locking in their bluster and threats. The US military is apt to be a steady partner in figuring out practical details of how European forces can fit into defensive operations intended to limit the war’s damage to the world economy and regional countries. Even if European capabilities are limited, they could free up some US assets elsewhere.

NATO is probably not the institution to organize such operations and, at this point, gaining Alliance-wide consensus might prove too complex. But individual NATO countries working together could offer military support for Gulf states and safe(r) passage through the strait, structured in a way to be most politically acceptable to domestic audiences. European leaders could even make that offer on the understanding that the United States would continue, and even increase, its support for Ukraine, as Finnish President Alexander Stubb has suggested.

It is neither pleasant nor glorious to respond constructively to Trump’s bullying rhetoric. But finding a way forward that meets European interests and avoids damage to transatlantic ties may be the best of a bad deal.

Trump himself could help, as a start by thanking Ukraine for pitching in and calling on Europeans to follow that example and do what they can. Some, for their own reasons, might take him up on it.

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The unspoken yet growing synergy in Turkey–Spain relations

Riccardo Gasco & Samuele C. Abrami — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 19:21:14 +0000

In recent weeks, amid the turmoil sparked by the US-Israeli war against Iran, Turkey-Spain relations have gained unusual visibility. Turkish and Spanish government accounts have posted about the two countries’ “brotherhood” on social media, Turkish journalists have closed their news programs by thanking the Spanish government, and state TV has aired videos highlighting bilateral ties.

Beneath this public-facing layer, however, lies a more consequential trend. Turkey and Spain have been consolidating a pragmatic form of political alignment that is increasingly underpinned by security cooperation. It is shaped less by ideology than by a shared view that their strategic and security environments are becoming more fragmented.

That logic became especially visible after two ballistic missiles launched from Iran entered Turkish airspace and were intercepted by NATO air defenses stationed in the Mediterranean. In Ankara, the episode reinforced the perception that allied reassurance can still be tangible at a time when the credibility of security commitments is being tested. For Spain, whose forces have contributed to NATO’s air and missile defense posture in Turkey for more than a decade—and whose Patriot battery detected the Iranian missile that NATO air defenses shot down on March 9—the incident highlighted how sustained operational cooperation can translate into political capital and strategic trust.

Turkey and Spain are operating under a dual-track approach in which Madrid continues to endorse democratic standards and the rule of law as the normative horizon of Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) while deepening defense and security ties with Ankara.

The optics matter here. Spanish President Pedro Sánchez’s outspoken opposition to the US-Israeli war on Iran, widely framed in Turkey as being on the right side of history, has reinforced Madrid’s image as a principled yet pragmatic European interlocutor. In other words, although several political and structural constraints limit further progress within the traditional EU accession process framework, Spain’s approach suggests that pragmatic defense cooperation with Turkey can advance even in the absence of political integration. And this cooperation could help normalize Turkey as a security actor within the Euro-Atlantic perimeter.

A relationship shaped by trust and the absence of vetoes

Often overlooked in debates on Turkey–Europe relations, Spain has nonetheless emerged as one of Ankara’s most pragmatic security partners. And this deepening cooperation comes at a moment when Russia’s war in Ukraine, Middle East volatility, uncertainty over US commitments, and Europe’s rearmament are reshaping the strategic landscape. Turkey has already penetrated Europe’s defense market through bilateral deals and is increasingly discussed as a potential contributor to EU-adjacent instruments such as Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and the European Defense Fund. Yet political constraints remain decisive: Vetoes from some EU member states, low alignment on common foreign and security policy, and the absence of a formal EU–Turkey security framework continue to block meaningful institutionalization. Spain’s approach, therefore, illustrates both an opportunity and its limits. Bilateral defense cooperation can deepen and help normalize Turkey as a security actor. But on its own, this cooperation is unlikely to lead to significant enhancements in EU-Turkey defense cooperation at the broader EU absent changes to the current accession process.

Much of the bilateral relationship hinges on a seeming paradox: The geographical distance between Spain and Turkey has often translated into greater strategic room for convergence on security and defense. Unlike Greece and Cyprus, Spain has no territorial disputes with Turkey. Unlike France, it has not positioned itself as a geopolitical competitor in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Middle East. Unlike Germany or Austria, Spain’s domestic politics are not shaped by large Turkish diaspora communities. Finally, both countries have faced separatist challenges in different forms, a shared experience that can bring their security outlooks closer in some respects. Thus, the relationship is largely depoliticized and insulated from domestic pressures, making it easier for any Spanish government to adopt a relatively favorable posture toward Ankara.

This absence of friction has translated into a high degree of institutional trust. From Ankara’s perspective, Spain is not associated with a priori vetoes against Turkey in European forums. From Madrid’s perspective, Turkey is not a rival—either geopolitically or in the military-industrial domain—but a capable partner whose strategic relevance has increased in a more fragmented security environment. This mutual perception has allowed cooperation to deepen without becoming hostage to broader political tensions.

Spain’s diplomatic posture has reinforced this trust. During periods of heightened tension between Turkey and the EU, Madrid has favored mediation and de-escalation over sanctions and confrontation, as in the case of Eastern Mediterranean energy disputes. Successive Spanish governments, regardless of political orientation, have also maintained a broadly pro-enlargement stance toward Turkey, even as expectations surrounding accession have diminished. Like Italy, Spain has never challenged the EU consensus on Turkey directly but has consistently worked to keep engagement viable and to frame Ankara as a partner rather than an outlier.

Ultimately, despite significant domestic differences, Turkey and Spain have found themselves politically aligned on a critical set of issues, representing among the most critical voices against the war in Gaza and the US-Israeli war against Iran. While this certainly does not suggest ideological alignment between the two governments, it underscores a similar perception of changing global dynamics, paving the way for more direct, constructive engagement.

Strategic convergence under NATO’s umbrella

All this helps explain why defense and strategic cooperation could expand relatively smoothly once geopolitical conditions made such cooperation more necessary. Such convergence can be traced to certain concrete actions within NATO since 2015. As regional instability intensified after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Spain assumed a sustained role in Turkey’s air defense by deploying Patriot air and missile defense systems on Turkish territory under NATO command. Since then, this presence has been continuous, involving multiple rotations and thousands of Spanish military personnel at Incirlik air base.

Over time, this interaction came to assume significance beyond its immediate operational function. It created dense networks of cooperation between their armed forces, strengthened interoperability, and generated political capital in Ankara by demonstrating Spain’s willingness to assume tangible responsibility for Turkey’s security.

This NATO-based convergence also reflects a deeper alignment on strategic priorities. Spain has long resisted a narrow focus on NATO’s eastern flank, warning against the risk of neglecting the Alliance’s southern neighborhood. Madrid has consistently emphasized the security relevance of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa—regions in which Turkey plays a central role as a frontline NATO ally on the southern flank. The appointment of Javier Colomina as the NATO secretary general’s special representative for the southern neighborhood demonstrates Spain’s insistence on “operating equally” on both flanks and is therefore naturally aligned with Turkey’s security priorities.

From strategic alignment to material cooperation

As operational trust consolidated within NATO, Spain–Turkey relations shifted from political coordination to material cooperation, especially in the defense industry. The logic was straightforward: Spain wanted to modernize and internationalize its defense base, but budget constraints and limited political appetite for reaching NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product benchmark for military spending pushed Madrid toward partnerships that can deliver faster and more flexibly than some European-led consortia. The Franco-German dispute surrounding Future Combat Air System fighter jets is a reminder of how slow, costly, and politically rigid intra-European industrial cooperation can become. As one military observer we spoke with put it, Spain needs external partners to accelerate programs, expand exports, and avoid overdependence on larger European defense players.

Turkey’s defense industrial rise has positioned it to meet this demand. Over the past decade, Ankara has moved from supplier-dependence to producing NATO-relevant platforms at scale, with defense exports topping $10 billion in 2025. For Spain, Turkey is less a competitor than a complementary industrial actor—one that brings speed, production capacity, and increasingly interoperable systems.

The bilateral track has also favored coproduction over one-off sales. Navantia’s cooperation with Turkish shipyards on TCG Anadolu established an early template of technology transfer and joint work, now feeding into debates on naval innovation, including drone-enabled concepts. More recently, the relationship has evolved into greater interdependence: In December, Spain finalized a deal to acquire Hürjet to replace its aging F-5s, which will deepen integration in the training and aviation ecosystems. Turkey’s acquisition of Eurofighter Typhoon jets—partly assembled in Spain—links industrial interests, jobs, and production lines. Early talks between Indra and Otokar on land systems point in the same direction. The question is whether this bilateral momentum can be translated into a broader European framework or if it will remain confined to ad hoc cooperation.

Pragmatism under EU constraints

This deepening bilateral cooperation is unfolding against the backdrop of a congested and largely stagnant EU–Turkey relationship. Spain has consistently supported a values-based and institutionalized EU–Turkey horizon, and, more recently, aligned with Josep Borrel, a former EU High Representative from Spain, in advocating a “positive agenda” on common issues. At the margins of the 2024 Madrid bilateral summit, Sánchez emphasized the “exceptional state of bilateral relations,” referring to “Turkey and Spain [as] friends, partners and allies with important cultural, social and economic exchanges.” The numbers seem to confirm this, as the two countries’ bilateral trade reached $20.6 billion in 2025.

This has not prevented Spain from taking public positions on domestic developments in Turkey. Sánchez, especially compared to other European leaders, has been notably vocal on the case against Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, signaling that Spain’s push for a constructive relationship does not imply silence on democracy and the rule of law. Rather, it reflects a compartmentalized approach in which normative conditionality and security engagement proceed on separate tracks.

This dual-track logic comes to the fore on EU defense initiatives. On paper, instruments such as the European Defense Fund and the SAFE program offer frameworks for cooperation with third countries. SAFE allows for limited non-EU procurement projects, suggesting that Turkish industrial participation is not excluded by design. Spain has also expressed openness to Turkey’s possible inclusion in mechanisms such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a framework aimed at deepening defense cooperation between EU members, but which has also included the United Kingdom since 2022. Yet, Madrid has not been able to leverage its position to convince other EU members to grant Turkey access to the project. Under these conditions, bilateral defense cooperation becomes a means of preserving strategic interdependence when institutional integration remains blocked.

Strategic convergence in an era of uncertainty

The broader geopolitical environment has reinforced incentives for this form of pragmatic engagement. The Trump administration’s foreign policy has heightened concerns over the unpredictable and transactional nature of US security commitments, accelerating a shift toward selective partnerships among middle powers. In this context, states with significant regional exposure are increasingly seeking to reduce risk through flexible coalitions and defense‑industrial linkages that are not fully dependent on Washington.

Finally, the Spain–Turkey partnership raises the question of whether such bilateral pragmatism can resonate in Brussels. Spain can help normalize Turkey as a security actor within the Euro-Atlantic perimeter and keep a “positive agenda” politically viable. Uncertainty over the international order and the fragmented nature of the European security backdrop can help Spain–Turkey relations stand as an example for how strategic convergence can shape and be shaped by political alignment.

Riccardo Gasco is the foreign policy program coordinator at IstanPol Institute and a doctoral researcher at Bologna University.

Samuele C. Abrami is a research fellow at the Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB) and a former Mercator-Istanbul Policy Center fellow.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Now that the Iran war is here, the US must complete its mission

Frederick Kempe — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 11:00:00 +0000

What frustrates senior Gulf officials, as Iran aims missiles and drones at their citizens and countries, is that too many in Washington are making the war a matter of US domestic politics and President Donald Trump. For them, what’s at stake is whether the Middle East moves in a uniquely positive direction or reverts to a more familiar, uglier one.

Over the past two weeks, I have spoken with a number of Gulf officials to better understand how leaders in the region view this ongoing war. The conversations have been strikingly consistent. For many of them, this conflict was not a matter of if, but when. One senior Gulf official told me that his country has long known its greatest danger lies in Iran and not in Israel—a reality made obvious in recent days.

The war’s inevitability was not due to any one factor, the officials told me. Rather, it was a cumulative consequence of a revolutionary regime that for nearly half a century built its power through murderous proxies, deadly missiles, nuclear aspirations, and relentless intimidation. Another senior Gulf official told me that his country had long argued to US negotiators from Democratic administrations that they were wrong to think that containing Iran’s nuclear capabilities was sufficient, as that failed to address the missiles and proxies that posed threats to its neighbors.

In the telling of Gulf officials, the region has been living in a form of shadow war for years. Proxy conflicts, cyberattacks, and military strikes on energy infrastructure were part of a sustained campaign designed by Iran to test and erode the Gulf’s security architecture. Look at Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and increasingly Riyadh. They reflect a degree of religious tolerance, political moderation, and economic modernization that contrasts sharply with Iran’s theocracy.

A regime down but not out

Some officials in these countries argued privately against Trump’s decision to go to war alongside Israel. Others argued in favor. But none of those I spoke with now want the United States to cut and run before the job is done. Even those Gulf officials wary of escalation (and that includes most of those I spoke to) see this war as the culmination of a long trajectory that required a response at some point—before the balance of power tilted irretrievably in Iran’s direction.

That doesn’t mean Gulf officials favor regime change in Iran, as no one can accurately calibrate how to pull that off. That needs to be a job for the Iranian people. However, it does mean, in their view, that the United States, Israel, and other willing partners should continue eroding the Iranian regime’s destructive capabilities—particularly as it now will be left in a vengeful state.

Their bottom line: If Iran comes out of this neutered and defanged, it’s better for everyone, even if the regime can’t be fundamentally changed from one that’s run through some combination of theocratic and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders. Put more diplomatically, a senior Gulf official told me: “If Iran is incapable of inflicting harm and exporting instability to its neighbors, that will be a good thing.”

As for Iran’s leaders, they likely are betting that US domestic politics will save the regime from total collapse. For decades, the Iranian regime has believed that its 1979 revolution, including the taking of American hostages, embarrassed US President Jimmy Carter, weakening his political support and costing him the next election. Iranian leaders probably think that they can impose similar political pain on Trump through a drawn-out conflict and elevated gas prices. If that costs Trump’s party control of Congress in the country’s upcoming midterm elections, it would be Tehran’s “own form of regime change,” as the Atlantic Council’s Alex Plitsas put it to me.

The pivotal weeks ahead

My conversations with Gulf and US officials in recent days have reinforced many of my own views regarding the significance of this moment. There are plenty of pessimistic assessments of the war right now, but they obscure a historic opportunity. The conflict with Iran may prove a true inflection point. It could neutralize the Middle East’s greatest destabilizer over the past four decades, creating new openings for regional security and prosperity. And it could splinter the emerging Axis of Aggressors comprised of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. The White House estimates that Iran, through its direct actions and proxy networks, has been responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Americans—including US service members, diplomats, and civilians—since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

So how can the United States get from here to there? Through military resolve, strategic patience, and diplomatic cunning. Above all, the United States should not end its military campaign early. That could inadvertently strengthen the position of a weakened Iranian regime. And the regime is weak; its attacks on its neighbors are more the desperate flailing of a failed regime than the resurgence of the revolution. Even now, it will be years before Iran can rebuild its navy and missile capabilities, or again aspire to a nuclear-weapons arsenal. But the next two to three weeks will be critical, as the United States continues to target Iranian capabilities.

“The good news is that the US military is on course over the next few weeks to achieve the stated objectives to destroy or severely degrade Iran’s missiles, drones, the associated industrial base, navy, and nuclear program,” Plitsas, a former Pentagon official, told me. What’s most likely to result in “failure to complete the military operation in Iran is ending it early due to economic pressure from the risk-based closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which is Iran’s objective.”

That is why the United States and its partners must get control of the strait, enable freedom of movement, and prevent economic damage that could give Iran greater leverage.

US officials have told their Gulf partners that they have made progress in bringing together a coalition of countries to escort ships through the strait, despite several countries publicly refusing to contribute to that effort. More US military assets are arriving in the region to provide protection for shipping while continuing to strike at Iran’s ability to disrupt that traffic.

Even as US forces pursue these objectives, Americans should not lose sight of the larger opportunity. This past week, one Trump administration official spoke to me about a longer-term vision harbored by some in the White House of a Middle East where not only moderate Arab and Israeli leaders normalize their relations—as they have done through the Abraham Accords—but a new Iranian government and Arab leaders eventually do so as well, ultimately leading to Israeli-Iranian normalization.

At this time of war without an obvious end, that vision sounds fantastical. But it is seemingly impossible developments like this one that could become reality, serving both US interests and those of its regional partners, if the Trump administration sees through the mission in Iran that it has set out for itself.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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How the Iran war could trigger a European energy crisis

Lisa Basquel — Tue, 17 Mar 2026 16:22:41 +0000

WASHINGTON—With the conflict in the Gulf well into its third week, a difficult reality is setting in across Europe: Even if a cease-fire were agreed today, the continent is likely already heading toward an energy crisis.

The ongoing US-Israeli strikes on Iran, along with Tehran’s retaliation across the Gulf, have produced one of the most severe disruptions to global energy markets in decades. At the center of the crisis is the Strait of Hormuz, the most critical chokepoint in the global energy trade. Before the current conflict, roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil supply transited the strait each day. The looming threat of Iranian sea mines and missile attacks has brought commercial tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to a near standstill, as some operators opt to anchor outside the waterway rather than risk passage.

While the effective closure of the strait has sent shockwaves through global oil markets, Europe’s immediate vulnerability lies elsewhere: liquefied natural gas (LNG). Approximately 20 percent of global LNG trade passed through the strait before the current conflict, much of it originating in Qatar, the world’s second-largest LNG exporter. There is no viable alternative export route for this LNG.

For Europe, the timing could scarcely be worse.

Preparation for winter starts now

Europe is entering the critical period when underground gas storage must be replenished ahead of winter. Yet European countries are beginning this process in one of the weakest positions in years. Refilling these reserves now depends heavily on LNG imports, following Europe’s rapid shift away from Russian pipeline gas following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. According to the Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory database, European storage levels are currently below 30 percent, a five-year low. A colder-than-average winter, combined with increased gas burn in the power sector, pushed European gas demand up nearly 7 percent since the start of the year. At the same time, pipeline year-over-year exports from the European Union (EU) to Ukraine surged more than tenfold, further accelerating withdrawals.

Under EU regulations, storage levels must reach at least 90 percent capacity by December. Given current conditions, Europe will need to inject nearly 60 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas during the upcoming refill season just to meet this target. For context, that translates to about 586 terawatt-hours (TWh) of energy—enough to power around 57 million US homes annually, based on average household consumption data from the US Energy Information Administration. Crucially, not all gas imports can be directed into storage; much of it must first satisfy ongoing daily consumption. Even before the escalation in the Gulf, Europe’s depleted storage position was forcing it to plan record LNG imports in 2026.

Further squeezing the LNG market is the March 2 Iranian drone strike on QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan facilities, which forced an immediate shutdown of production. Two days later, the company declared force majeure, meaning that QatarEnergies is temporarily suspended from its contractual commitments of LNG shipments to customers. This declaration has added significant uncertainty to the timeline for restoring Qatari output. Even if the conflict were to end today and the strait were to reopen, full restoration of production could take weeks or even months. Markets know this: QatarEnergy’s announcement triggered an abrupt spike in European gas benchmarks, with prices jumping by more than 50 percent on March 2. It was the largest single‑day increase since the 2022 energy crisis following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing disruption of Russian pipeline flows. These market pressures affect far more than just Europe; they risk reigniting competition between European and Asian importers for scarce LNG cargoes.

Between Asia and Europe

In the past, Asian importers dominated global LNG markets through long-term contracts with exporters, while Europe relied heavily on pipeline gas from Russia. When those flows collapsed after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, European buyers drove LNG prices sharply higher, drawing cargoes originally contracted for Asian markets toward European terminals. This dynamic characterized the 2022 energy crisis, when Europe repeatedly outbid Asian buyers for flexible supply. The current crisis, however, may reverse that pattern. As the loss of Qatari supply tightens global LNG markets, Asian buyers may be willing to outbid Europe for available cargoes—particularly the four major East Asian economies of China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Together, these four accounted for approximately three-quarters of all LNG imported across Asia in 2025, according to data sourced from Kpler. China alone relied on Qatar for 29 percent of its LNG imports in 2025, making it the world’s top LNG importer that year.

Early signs of this dynamic may already be emerging, with reports in recent days that a US LNG tanker originally bound for Belgium changed course toward China—a potential signal that this competition for cargoes is one Europe will likely lose on cost. US LNG exports have become one of Europe’s most important diversification tools since 2022, but even if US producers increase output, it is unlikely to fully offset the loss of Qatari supply in the near term. US liquefaction facilities are already operating near capacity, and the JKM–TTF spread, the price differential between Asian and European LNG markets, has fluctuated sharply in recent months. The spread could significantly widen as Asian buyers compete for alternative supply.

The scale and cost of this supply gap are further amplified by Europe’s decision to phase out Russian pipeline gas and LNG imports by the end of 2027. The EU is set to ban short-term Russian pipeline contracts beginning in June of this year, with all remaining long-term flows required to cease by the end of September 2027. While Russian LNG accounts for a relatively small share of Europe’s supply, it remains a meaningful component: In 2025, the EU imported roughly 17 bcm of Russian LNG, representing approximately 13 percent of total gas imports. European policymakers had anticipated replacing this volume primarily with US LNG, but given the ongoing Middle East conflict, Europe’s plans to fill this gap are increasingly fragile, placing immense strain on both supply security and cost.

Back where it was in 2022

Brussels has yet to offer a meaningful solution for the energy shock. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has indicated that the EU is exploring measures such as the expanded use of power purchase agreements, temporary state aid mechanisms, and potential gas price caps. During the 2022 crisis, proposals for a gas price cap faced strong opposition from Germany and the Netherlands, which argued that artificially limiting prices could undermine Europe’s ability to attract scarce LNG cargoes and allow Asian buyers to outbid European importers. Today, too, similar measures are likely to face contention and stoke further divisions among the EU member states.

The current crisis has reignited a debate that emerged in 2022 regarding Europe’s energy strategy and dependence on external suppliers. From 2022 to 2024, Europe undertook an ambitious push to diversify its energy mix and accelerate the deployment of nuclear and renewable capacity. However, these efforts were partially overshadowed by reliance on US LNG and related trade negotiations, in effect trading one dependency for another. Analysts have long cautioned against this pattern of dependence, yet after years of shutting down continental energy projects, most notably the near-complete collapse of German nuclear energy, Europe now finds itself back where it was in 2022: heavily reliant on US LNG, exposed to global price competition, and bringing a policy knife to a global production gun fight. To break this cycle, Europe would need to invest more in its own production capacity. But further deployment of clean energy infrastructure or nuclear development is a multi-year process, and thus it is not a solution to the current crisis.

The Russia question

The energy shock has also reopened the question of Russian sanctions. Notably, the United States appears to be signaling a change in tone. Last week, the White House temporarily loosened restrictions to allow India to import Russian crude oil stranded at sea—a shift from what was agreed to during US-India trade negotiations in February. On March 12, the administration went further, issuing a broader temporary exemption in permitting the sale of Russian seaborne oil currently in transit. The administration’s rationale was that this will help ease pressure on global energy prices. Though framed as a short-term measure, the move underscores how quickly sanctions policy can shift under acute energy market pressure. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent further justified the measure by arguing that Russia taxes production rather than sales, so licensing completed shipments therefore does not provide significant financial benefit to the Kremlin. This argument is difficult to sustain: Since February 2022, Moscow has repeatedly restructured its oil and gas tax regime to maximize state revenues, and there is little reason to believe it would not do so again.

The Group of Seven (G7) price cap could tell a similar story. The mechanism works by using Western control over global shipping insurance and finance as leverage: tanker operators and insurers who want access to Western financial services must certify that the oil was sold below a set price ceiling, forcing buyers to demand a discount from Moscow. When the cap was set at sixty dollars in 2022, it was just below the market price for Russian oil. But Russian crude has since fallen well below that level, meaning the cap no longer constrains prices. In response, the EU and the United Kingdom lowered their ceiling to around forty-seven dollars to restore its bite, but the United States declined to follow, creating a gap that operators can exploit, and particularly undermining the EU’s move. The Trump administration has never been enthusiastic about the mechanism, and a decision to stop enforcing it entirely cannot be ruled out. If that happens, then one of the few remaining tools limiting Russian energy revenues effectively collapses.

So far, European leaders have mostly remained firm in their commitments to diversify away from Russian energy. On March 11, von der Leyen warned that returning to Russian energy would be a “strategic blunder” that increases Europe’s vulnerability. At a recent meeting, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni joined other Group of Seven (G7) leaders in rejecting calls to ease sanctions despite the turmoil in global oil markets. Merz has also publicly criticized the US decision to temporarily lift sanctions, calling it “wrong.” However, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever broke openly with the EU’s agreed position this past weekend, arguing that Europe “must normalize relations with Russia and regain access to cheap energy.” He added that European leaders privately agree with him but are unwilling to say so publicly. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán remains another strong European voice publicly urging a reconsideration, though his position carries little weight among his peers because of his long-standing alignment with Moscow.

Could the EU extend the window of continuing Russian supply past the current deadlines? Perhaps, but doing so would require reopening a complex political and legislative process between the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council. Even under accelerated or emergency procedures, such a move would be politically fraught. In practice, this would mean revisiting the sanctions architecture that has been painstakingly constructed since 2022. Beyond the legal and institutional challenges, such a move would undermine the EU’s geopolitical strategy and effectively finance Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine. For Brussels, this option remains politically untenable. But pressure from individual member states may continue to intensify if prices rise sharply.

The European dilemma

What this conflict has made clear is that while higher oil prices will raise energy costs globally, Europe’s more immediate challenge is securing sufficient LNG cargoes to refill its depleted gas storage. Toward this end, the calendar is working against European importers. With the refill season running from April to November, losing even two months to a Qatari production halt means forfeiting roughly 25 percent of the injection window before a single additional cargo arrives. European countries could attempt to suppress demand for gas through conservation measures and reduced industrial energy consumption, though the scale required would be politically and economically difficult to sustain.

More realistically, European buyers will be forced to wait until Asian demand is satisfied, and then pay whatever price remains. Unlike emerging market economies, which may be priced out entirely, Europe has the financial depth to outbid most competitors. But that calculation carries its own cost: securing supply at any price means passing that cost onto households and industry, with all the economic and political consequences that follow.

Ultimately, the crisis reduces to a binary—scarce cargoes mean physical shortages; available but expensive supply means an extraordinary price shock. An obvious release valve—importing Russian pipeline gas once again—remains politically toxic. Reopening that faucet would undercut two years of painful European energy diversification, hand Moscow a significant revenue stream at a moment when the war in Ukraine remains unresolved, and reintroduce precisely the strategic dependency that left Europe exposed in the first place. Either way, this episode has exposed structural weaknesses in Europe’s energy supply chain. Finding a way out of this dilemma will dominate the continent’s political and economic agenda for months to come.

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The Iran war is good for the Russian economy but bad for Putin’s prestige

Maksym Beznosiuk, Will Dixon — Tue, 17 Mar 2026 15:50:23 +0000

Two weeks since the outbreak of the Iran war, commentators around the world are already declaring Vladimir Putin the winner. It is easy to see why so many seem to believe that the Russian President will emerge as the main beneficiary of escalating hostilities in the Middle East. After all, from energy exports to the invasion of Ukraine, Putin clearly has much to gain.

The Russian economy has been showing signs of severe strain in recent months as the combined toll of international sanctions, Ukrainian airstrikes, and ballooning defense spending negatively impact the Kremlin coffers. The Iran war now threatens to transform this picture in Moscow’s favor.

With energy prices already spiking and the Strait of Hormuz blocked, the world is entering a fuel crisis that could reinvigorate Putin’s war economy. The United States has already relaxed sanctions on the Kremlin in a bid to ease energy pressures elsewhere. If the current conflict becomes a prolonged campaign, Moscow may be able to repair much of the economic damage done over the past four years.

The Iran war could also provide a more direct boost for Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. With the Trump administration now firmly focused on the Middle East, the Kremlin will face significantly less diplomatic pressure to engage in US-led peace talks with Ukraine, while Kyiv will struggle to keep Russia’s invasion high on the international agenda.

Crucially, the US is expected to prioritize the supply of air defense interceptor missiles to the Middle East over Ukraine. With limited numbers of missiles produced annually, this means Ukrainian air defense crews might soon find themselves short of the ammunition required to defend their cities and infrastructure against Russian ballistic missiles. The consequences for the civilian population could be disastrous.

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Despite these potential advantages, there is little sign of celebration in the Kremlin. While Russia appears well-positioned to benefit economically and militarily, the US-led war with Iran has also served to highlight Russia’s declining international influence and has underlined Moscow’s limitations as an ally.

Since the onset of hostilities at the end of February, the Kremlin has restricted itself to a limited number of statements and has largely refrained from any strong condemnation of the United States. While reports indicate that Moscow is providing Iran with military assistance including targeting data and drone warfare expertise, the Russian response has been strikingly muted and has fallen far short of America’s very public support for Ukraine following Putin’s 2022 invasion.

Putin’s cautious reaction is particularly noteworthy in light of the support Iran has provided to Russia over the past four years. Since 2022, Tehran has supplied Moscow with large quantities of drones, missiles, and ammunition. This backing proved especially important during the early stages of the war, before Russia was able to expand domestic production and diversify its lines of supply.

Despite much speculation over an emerging “Axis of Autocrats” including both Russia and Iran, Putin has so far proved unwilling or unable to repay Tehran for its earlier backing. While Russian and Iranian officials hailed the signing of a “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement” in January 2025, this has not translated into significant Russian aid since the current conflict erupted.

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Russia’s failure to robustly support its Iranian allies is the latest in a series of similar geopolitical setbacks since the beginning of the full-scale Ukraine invasion more than four years ago. In late 2022, Kremlin credibility was dented by Moscow’s inability to prevent a renewal of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, leading to the collapse of Russia’s traditional security role in the South Caucasus. US President Donald Trump has since stepped into the void to lead peace efforts in the region.

The fall of Kremlin-backed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was to prove an even more humiliating blow for Putin. For almost a decade, Moscow had invested significant military and diplomatic resources to keep Assad in power. This engagement was touted by Moscow as proof of Russia’s return to great power status. However, when the Assad regime began to rapidly unravel in late 2024, Russia was unable to intervene. Instead, the Kremlin limited itself to offering the ousted Syrian leader asylum.

Likewise, Russia proved powerless to assist Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro when he was captured by the United States in early 2026. Moscow was seen as a key strategic partner of Maduro and had provided Caracas with a wide range of financial and security backing. Days before the American operation, Russia was still voicing its “full support” for Venezuela. However, the Kremlin ultimately took no action when US forces swooped.

From Armenia and Syria to Venezuela and Iran, Moscow’s obvious inability to aid its allies in times of crisis has seriously damaged Russia’s reputation as a global power. While the Kremlin is still capable of supplying weapons and spreading propaganda, these limited tools are no substitute for the kind of substantial security support that potential partners seek.

For Putin, this matters. Throughout his reign, he has carefully cultivated a strongman image and sought to reassert Russia’s claims to superpower status. However, the world’s leading powers do not maintain their influence through rhetoric alone.

Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s repeated failure to defend its international allies has revealed the underwhelming reality behind Putin’s posturing. This loss of prestige has very practical implications for Moscow’s ability to attract partners and project strength on the world stage. Putin hoped that by conquering Ukraine, he could return Russia to the dominant role it occupied during the Cold War. Instead, he has become bogged down in an invasion that has ruthlessly exposed modern Russia’s geopolitical limitations.

William Dixon is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute specializing in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.

Atlantic Council — Mon, 16 Mar 2026 19:00:00 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 16, Forward Defense Director Joe Costa published an article in the Washington Post on the impacts of the war in Iran on US military readiness. Writing alongside Ely Ratner of the Marathon Initiative, Costa argues that the threat to readiness runs deeper than depleted stockpiles—deferred maintenance, equipment cannibalization, and broken dwell-to-deploy thresholds threaten US force projection and combat-credible readiness.

Staff

Joe Costa

Director

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Deputy Director, Realign for Palestine

The post Costa in the Washington Post on military readiness in Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Reconstructing Gaza starts with giving Palestinians financial agency

Melanie Robbins — Mon, 16 Mar 2026 17:56:56 +0000

Bottom lines up front

Any credible reconstruction plan for Gaza has to account for how households and businesses pay for daily necessities.
Palestinians are dependent on Israeli banks for cash and access to the financial system, and Jerusalem has floated the possibility of cutting off that access.
This means aid organizations may not be able to pay their local staff and, combined with stringent new Israeli regulations on humanitarian organizations, risks further reductions in aid.

Financial agency for Palestinians is the missing piece in most proposed plans to rebuild Gaza after the destruction of the post-October 7 war. Gaza has historically been a primarily cash-based society and economy, but under the current financial system, Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank are dependent on Israeli banks for cash and access to the global financial system. Today, inside Gaza, civilians navigate collapsing markets, shrinking access to goods and services, and an economy increasingly mediated by whoever controls distribution and cash. In the West Bank, fiat currency surpluses have caused alarm and chaos. This all continues while reconstruction proposals, ceasefire sequencing, security arrangements, and donor pledges are discussed at the highest political echelons, without meaningful Palestinian representation.

Economic exclusion is known to fuel instability. More political rhetoric cannot resolve it. Just as employment needs to be central to Gaza’s security strategy, Palestinians need access to reliable, dependable, and readily available monetary systems. The absence of jobs and ready access to methods of payment to buy daily necessities leaves a vacuum that will continue to be filled by patronage networks run by Hamas or other armed actors.

Because the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not a country, their financial institutions don’t issue currency. Transactions within the Palestinian territories occur in the new Israeli shekel (NIS). Palestinian banks thus depend on corresponding Israeli banks to clear their transactions. The Israeli government has passed laws designed to prevent the financing of designated terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, so those Israeli banks need a waiver from the government to do business with the Palestinian banks. This gives the Israeli government significant leverage over money and how the flow of value and exchange is controlled.

Under these circumstances, there will always be new recruits for armed struggle. This is why the mechanics of exchange—the microeconomics of daily life, including the ability of ordinary Palestinians to receive, hold, move, and spend money safely—are central to any path forward for Gaza and the Palestinian national project.

A systemic choke point

Today, the Palestinian economy stands on the brink of systemic financial collapse. For over a year, Palestinian banks and the Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA) have raised the alarm. Palestinians in both occupied territories (Gaza and the West Bank) have access to banking services that depend on Israeli banks providing correspondent banking relationships, and that relationship is at a breaking point.

All Palestinian shekel settlements, shekel cash repatriation, and a large share of trade-related payments rely on two Israeli banks, Bank Hapoalim and Israel Discount Bank. These correspondent banks operate under an indemnity waiver issued by Israel’s Ministry of Finance. The indemnity waivers shield the banks from legal or regulatory exposure when processing Palestinian-linked transactions (including transactions for the Palestinian Authority). These relationships allow Palestinian banks to clear shekel transactions, repatriate excess cash, process trade-related payments, and maintain access to international transfers and cross-border payments through SWIFT messaging and international bank account number codes—the core financial tools for international transfers between banks.

Cumulatively, this reliance on Israeli indemnity waivers for correspondent banking, dependence on Israeli central bank decision-making, and Palestinian’s inability to manage their own financial sector has resulted in the current absurd state of affairs for the Palestinian economy: West Bank banks hold a growing number of physical shekels while their digital balances in Israeli correspondent accounts are depleted—threatening trade settlement and clearance payments—while there is also insufficient cash in Gaza for everyday transactions.

As early as 2024, Israeli banks were raising various concerns about the future of the indemnity waivers. Throughout 2024, the United States and others urged the Israelis to maintain the indemnity. However, by mid-2025, Israel’s finance minister, the right-wing politician Bezalel Smotrich, ordered the cancellation of the waivers, though they were later temporarily extended amid quiet diplomatic pressure.

The most recent renewal of this temporary status was for two weeks and was last issued on February 12. Smotrich meanwhile had been arguing that the entirety of the Palestinian banking system rides on the profit of the Palestinian Authority’s reported practice of issuing payments to Palestinians convicted of terrorist offenses and to the families of those killed carrying out terrorist attacks (often called its “pay for slay” policy in Israeli politics). Despite Finance Ministry demands, the Bank of Palestine did not agree to de-bank the Palestinian Authority, even as its Israeli correspondent bank was only two weeks away from being forced to cease its correspondent banking operations due to the expiring indemnity coverage.

How we got here

The Israeli banks providing services to the Palestinian economy, either directly to the Palestinian banking industry or to Jordanian banks operating in the Palestinian market, are the only linkage to the traditional international banking and fiat currency systems.

To understand the scale of the Palestinian banking industry today, however, consider that in 2023, Palestinian banks reported processing approximately NIS fifty-three billion through Israeli banking channels. Clearance dependence means that all remittance or donation transfers, as well as the ability of millions of Palestinians to access savings held in Palestinian banks, rely on the renewal of these indemnity waivers, underscoring one of the many reasons that Palestinians need to be able to transact with the international banking system, and have equitable access to its fiat currency, for the territories’ future stability.

Palestinians’ structural dependency on the shekel was established under the 1994 Paris Protocol on Economic Relations, which designated NIS as the central medium of exchange. That agreement established the Palestine Monetary Authority to perform central-bank-like functions, though without control of the issuance or settlement of currency. The Paris Protocol also established the Palestinian-Israeli Joint Economic Committee as a mechanism to oversee implementation of the agreement; however, the last meeting on record was in September 2009, according to EU records, meaning the structure has been effectively dormant for more than sixteen years.

In Gaza, major humanitarian organizations rely on Palestinian banking channels to distribute digital cash assistance and pay operational expenses. Cash scarcity and disrupted physical aid routes have increased reliance on digital transfers, a model that has also proven more transparent and auditable than any other aid model over the years since October 7, 2023.

The humanitarian and financial crises are linked

The weakening of the already fragile banking system continues to unfold in parallel with a significant expected reduction in humanitarian aid and access. Recent reporting indicates that Israel has imposed new registration requirements to continue operating in Gaza on dozens of international nongovernmental organizations, including the requirement to disclose more information about NGO staff. Several prominent organizations have refused, including Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam, and others, which initially raised the threat of these major aid organizations being fully denied access to Gaza and the West Bank by the end of February. The Israeli Supreme Court’s temporary injunction delayed implementation of the new rules, pending its hearing and ruling.

The indemnity waiver also allows aid organizations to pay their local staff; therefore, an end to indemnity waivers would collapse aid organizations’ capacities, hobbling the broader Palestinian economy. Such a scenario would be absolutely devastating and have lasting, disastrous consequences for the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian economy, and especially the people it would impact directly.

As the US-assembled Board of Peace raises its own $10 billion without clarifying where it will be directed to, and is applauded in Washington, the entire Palestinian economy faces the potential of restricted access to the international financial sector. Gaza, especially, faces the prospect that even the minimal aid that was and is being delivered, including medical care, is set to cease, with no clear plan to replace it.

Today, the Israeli government effectively has executive authority, especially through the Finance Ministry led by Smotrich, over whether to bank the West Bank and Gaza. Furthermore, the ministry oversees access to Palestinian tax income sources; since 2019, the ministry has continued to withhold billions of shekels in tax revenues from the Palestinian Authority.

The question for policymakers is whether Israel would allow Smotrich to leverage this power in a move that, given its wide-ranging implications, would inevitably further destabilize the region.

Digital wallet growth is a sign of resilience

Over the past year, digital wallet adoption has expanded significantly, with platforms such as PalPay and JawwalPay now functioning as core transaction methods, amid a shortage of physical cash. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), RedRose, and others have partnerships with digital wallet providers, which have strengthened this digital financial solution in response to the liquidity crisis and decreasing access to physical aid. Still, the majority of these wallets are tied to banking systems for account settlement, and PMA data indicate that cash withdrawals still dominate wallet transactions, underscoring the crucial role of physical cash, even with digital wallet adoption at scale. A recent report, however, provides evidence that many recipients in Gaza have been able to retain their assistance in digital form and transact for their needs accordingly.

This has been a year of market transition toward digital transactions and the active use of e-cash via digital wallet platforms. The Palestinian system has now had substantial adoption. In 2023, it began with about 684,000 active Palestinian e-wallets holding over $32.3 million, including almost 18,000 affiliated merchants, 4,100 authorized agents, and 2.15 million transactions completed. By 2025, reports show wallet usage nearly tripling over the first six months of the year, from processing $40 million to $115 million, and nearly 800,000 active wallets. The PMA’s own digital payment system in 2025 reportedly saw 2.8 million transactions exceeding $550 million.

The recent announcement by the Board of Peace of an initiative to introduce a stablecoin to the Palestinian economy, alongside increased digital infrastructure for Gaza, is a much-needed step toward a short- or medium-term solution. In the long term, however, this solution remains tethered to the same banking systems subject to external control through Israeli banks.

New beginnings for Palestinian financial sovereignty

A new vision of Palestinian financial sovereignty must provide individuals with access to reliable, secure, and readily available transaction mechanisms. For example, this would include a monetary environment with predictable settlement capabilities, diversified banking relationships, accessible international digital financial corridors, integrated standards for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and compliance mechanisms, and an infrastructure that enables microenterprises to safely store value and grow.

Financial sovereignty for Palestinians does not imply secession from central-bank monetary systems, but rather a principled, human-rights-based approach to (re)creating a Palestinian economy. Continued failure to provide access and lawful options, however, leaves average Palestinians behind with their existing informal broker networks—often charging fees between 20 percent and 40 percent—and a cash payment structure in which Hamas patronage thrives. It provides another example of Hamas’s financial power and ability to raise and move funds existing in the places where the formal (financial) systems fail.

Economic resilience requires financial sovereignty and market access, which can enable peace and conflict resolution through economic development, resilience, stability, job creation, and more. Every person should have the ability to pursue and have reasonable access to financial inclusion and market stability. This is in part why many developing economies have supported and integrated digital assets, including stablecoins, into their markets. Stablecoins are also paired with new technology for tracking and oversight, such as services like Chainlysis or other providers offering software for investigation, compliance, and risk-management services for on-chain transactions.

True financial sovereignty for Palestinians remains a diplomatic challenge that will only be fully resolved with state-level negotiations and agreements.

Yet, in the meantime, Palestinians can develop pathways to financial agency while accounting for Israeli security needs. For example, there can be new efforts to develop industry-standard AML/CFT networks compliance, without putting Palestinians at personal added risk, including putting KYC (“know your customer”) information on blockchain and other new innovations now available in the field.

Technology as a stabilization tool

There are several emerging models that demonstrate that compliant digital infrastructure and aid rails can operate without undermining international financial regulatory systems. Humanitarian platforms such as Red Rose and UNDP demonstrate that transparent, rules-based digital distribution and transactions are possible, even in the most fragile economic environments.

Though these efforts have proven successful, these digital-cash-distribution projects still rely on Palestinian banking and, therefore, Israeli bank clearing. They nevertheless demonstrate the adaptability of these tools in creating digital aid rails and cash-settlement opportunities, with embedded compliance screenings and point-of-sale integrations, in an extremely constrained context. These models of cash distribution still provide protections, auditability, and accountability for regulations on anti-money laundering and sanctions compliance.

Other futures are possible

A humanitarian crisis is brewing that Israel has a unilateral opportunity to either prevent or exacerbate. Much of this power is centralized with Smotrich and depends on Israeli political decisions, and therefore, it is ever more critical to build financial inclusion, autonomy, and resilience for Palestinians.

Israel and the international community have very real security needs when it comes to Palestinian banking and finance due to the sophisticated use of crypto, cash, and international shell companies by Hamas and its core funder, Iran. Yet, ordinary, civilian Palestinians have very real financial needs. These are not zero-sum.

There are methods for the Palestinian economy to be granted reasonable access to financial inclusion and transaction models that are not dependent on Israeli banking.

While the options to preserve correspondent banking access, restart shekel repatriation, and other solutions are priorities in the immediate term for the Palestinian financial sector, in the medium and long term, Palestinians and their allies can and should be supported in efforts to build both new, accessible, and low-cost economic models and transmission rails, using innovative fintech, which are interoperable with international financial actors, compliant with international regulations, and secure.

A credible plan for Gaza and the future Palestinian state must account for financial agency at the household and small enterprise levels. The “last mile” for Gaza will not rely entirely on physical infrastructure or even on the military defeat of Hamas; it will be its financial future and the corresponding financial infrastructure. Now is a moment when Palestinian tech entrepreneurs, economists, and business leaders can begin moving toward a future free of dependence on Israeli political decisions or external central bank infrastructure.

About the author

Staff

Melanie Robbins

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs

Civil Society Extremism

Melanie Robbins is the deputy director of Realign for Palestine, a project of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs.

Explore the program

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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Inside Trump’s economic strategy, with EXIM Bank’s John Jovanovic

the Atlantic Council — Mon, 16 Mar 2026 16:19:17 +0000

Amid a war in Iran, a slowdown in shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and tariff uncertainty, host Christoph Hodel brings you a conversation with John Jovanovic, chairman and president of the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM). In conversation with the Atlantic Council’s vice president for energy and infrastructure, Landon Derentz, Jovanovic stresses the importance of supply chains that are “free, fair, and functioning,” the need for US companies to be competitive, and the role EXIM plays in strengthening those supply chains. He also offers a behind-the-scenes look at Project Vault, a new initiative to create a strategic critical mineral reserve.

Listen to The AC Front Page Podcast wherever you get podcasts

About the podcast

The AC Front Page Podcast, hosted by Juliette Matos, brings you exclusive conversations with heads of state and government, senior US officials, CEOs, and global decision maker—recorded live at the Atlantic Council’s headquarters in Washington, DC, and on stages around the world. From geopolitics and national security to technology and the global economy, this podcast will keep you updated and informed on the policy debates driving today’s headlines.

Listen wherever you get your podcasts. Full videos and transcripts of our events are available at AtlanticCouncil.org/ACFrontPage.

AC Front Page Podcast

Newsmakers. Big ideas. Global impact. The AC Front Page Podcast delivers high-level conversations with global leaders shaping the global agenda.

Explore the series

AC Front Page harnesses the convening power and expertise of the Council’s sixteen programs and centers to spotlight the world’s most prominent leaders and the most compelling ideas across sectors. The premier platform engages new audiences eager for nonpartisan and constructive solutions to current global challenges. This widely promoted 45-minute program features the Council’s most important guests and content serving as the highlight of our programming.

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The coming compute war in Ukraine

Cate Hansberry — Mon, 16 Mar 2026 16:00:00 +0000

March 16, 2026

The coming compute war in Ukraine

Why compute infrastructure will decide the next phase of the conflict

By Clara Kaluderovic

It’s May 2026 in the Kharkiv sector of Ukraine. A Ukrainian commander launches eight hundred autonomous drones—a coordinated swarm of air and ground systems programmed to suppress enemy air defenses, identify and strike artillery positions, and exploit gaps in Russian lines. The operation depends on real-time coordination: sensors feeding targeting data to strike platforms, movement algorithms synchronizing advance rates, and machine learning systems adapting to Russian countermeasures.

Eighteen minutes into the mission, Russian electronic warfare assets sever the swarm’s tactical ground uplinks to Western cloud infrastructure.¹ The swarm doesn’t abort—it continues operating on preprogrammed instructions. But it can’t adapt. Russian forces rapidly move their artillery and air defense systems. Ukrainian sensors detect the movement but can’t retask strike drones without cloud connectivity. The algorithms that would normally coordinate sensors with shooters can’t execute. What should have been a precisely synchronized operation devolves into hundreds of individual platforms executing obsolete instructions against targets that have already moved.

This scenario hasn’t transpired yet. But the conditions that could make it inevitable are already in place.

The war in Ukraine is often described in the language of weapons: air defense systems, artillery pieces, drones, and munitions. Yet a less visible element will shape the next phase of the conflict just as decisively as any piece of military hardware: the infrastructure to create and harness computational power, or compute.

From state preservation to warfighting speed

For four years, Ukraine has executed a strategically sophisticated digital strategy: protecting state continuity by migrating critical data and services from vulnerable domestic servers to Western cloud infrastructure.² By mid-2022, just months into the invasion, more than ten petabytes of data—from ministries, universities, private firms, and individuals—had shifted to the cloud.³ This ensured continuity of government operations, supported remote learning, and reduced the risk that a missile strike could erase essential records.

That migration was brilliant crisis management. It preserved the Ukrainian state under fire. But state continuity is not warfighting. As combat evolves toward mass deployment of unmanned systems, algorithmic control of targeting processes, and increasingly autonomous operations, Ukraine’s computational requirements are changing fundamentally. The challenge is shifting from keeping systems online to enabling decisions at machine speed—despite Russian efforts to sever access to the infrastructure that makes machine-speed decisions possible.

The question is no longer whether Western cloud providers have sufficient storage and compute capacity. They do. The question is whether Ukraine can reliably access that capacity fast enough to sustain operations when Russia is actively denying the connection.

What is emerging is a war over compute capability itself: a contest over which side can sustain the fastest operational cycles—sensing, deciding, striking, adapting—while spectrum and infrastructure come under both kinetic and electronic attack.

The bandwidth wall

In peacetime, cloud computing feels abstract, almost invisible. In war, it becomes concrete and existential. Remote data centers accessed via networks become critical infrastructure. Designating cloud systems as critical infrastructure in the Ukrainian context unlocks vital resources, ensuring these facilities receive prioritized air and cyber defenses, guaranteed energy provisioning, and international reconstruction funding.⁴ When those links degrade, the cloud doesn’t just slow down—it vanishes.

Ukraine’s 2022 migration solved one vulnerability (domestic servers vulnerable to Russian missile attacks) while creating another: total dependence on contested network pathways now central to warfighting capability.

In peacetime, cloud computing feels abstract, almost invisible. In war, it becomes concrete and existential.

Drone swarms are often discussed as an artificial intelligence (AI) challenge—computer vision for target identification, autonomy for independent navigation, and coordination algorithms for multiplatform synchronization. In practice, the first constraint is bandwidth. A Carnegie Mellon University study found that a single high-definition (HD) drone video feed at twenty-five frames per second consumes approximately ten megabits per second (Mbps).⁵ While a commander wouldn’t stream video from every platform in a massive swarm, even pulling just a handful of feeds for operator control and target designation—combined with the constant telemetry data, encryption overhead, and packet retransmission required to coordinate the remaining hundreds of drones—creates an operational bottleneck.⁶

Because continuous human-in-the-loop control doesn’t scale gracefully in Ukraine’s contested electromagnetic environment, the operational logic is unforgiving: Forces must either process data locally at the edge—transmitting only highly compressed targeting summaries upstream—or accept that cloud-dependent systems will fail when links are degraded.

Satellite connectivity via Starlink has significantly strengthened Ukraine’s communications resilience. As a proliferated low earth orbit (pLEO) constellation, Starlink is inherently difficult to jam at the orbital level, making it an assured command and control (C2) backup to terrestrial fiber. However, even advanced pLEO architectures introduce constraints at the tactical edge. Uplink bandwidth (10 to 30 Mbps per terminal) and latency (25 to 60 milliseconds) create bottlenecks for high-volume operations. A single HD video feed can consume most of a terminal’s uplink budget, and the ground terminals themselves remain highly vulnerable to localized Russian electronic warfare.⁷

More dangerously, Starlink has become a single point of failure. If these tactical uplinks were effectively denied—whether by Russian terminal jamming, cyberattacks aimed at user networks, or corporate policy shifts—Ukraine would possess no terrestrial or satellite alternative capable of sustaining its current command tempo. If the link goes down, the current architecture of warfighting would collapse within days.⁸

When Russia induces intermittent denial through jamming or cyberattack, cloud-centric architectures don’t just degrade—they fail.

The arithmetic is merciless. Ukraine is producing drones at industrial scale—well over three million annually across aerial, ground, and maritime categories toward a projected seven million in 2026.⁹ As autonomy spreads throughout this ecosystem, bandwidth requirements will outstrip available connectivity by orders of magnitude unless Ukraine fundamentally restructures how and where computation occurs.¹⁰

The infrastructure asymmetry

Ukraine operates approximately fifty-eight data centers compared with Russia’s 251.¹¹ This disparity matters profoundly. More facilities mean greater resilience against kinetic strikes, sovereign control over critical workloads, and capacity to convert domestic energy into computational advantage. Ukraine has compensated through Western cloud access—a genuine strategic asset that Russia cannot easily match. But external dependence creates a ceiling that becomes visible as autonomy scales and adversaries systematically target the links.

The energy dimension compounds this vulnerability. Compute infrastructure requires massive electrical power. Data centers are power-conversion facilities as much as they are computing facilities. Ukraine’s electrical grid has been under sustained Russian attack since October 2022. Strikes have destroyed approximately nine gigawatts of generating capacity—roughly half of prewar levels.¹² Millions of Ukrainians face rolling blackouts lasting up to four days.

This energy crisis has exposed critical fragility. Attacks have decimated thermal power plants, which provide critical load-balancing, while the largest nuclear facility, Zaporizhzhia, remains under occupation and offline. This places extreme strain on the remaining active plants, like the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant, to sustain baseload power.¹³

This strain creates a strategic trap: Russian attacks degrade Ukraine’s domestic power generation, which reduces capacity for domestic compute infrastructure, which in turn increases dependence on external cloud services accessed via networks that Russia can interdict. Ukraine needs compute infrastructure to fight effectively, but the same threats that create that need also are destroying the energy systems required to sustain domestic computing capability. This forces a difficult data localization trade-off: Keeping data within national borders ensures sovereign control and reduces latency, but relying on infrastructure outside of Ukraine’s borders trades that sovereignty for unparalleled physical security against kinetic attacks.

Russia, meanwhile, is pursuing computational sovereignty. Moscow is deepening AI cooperation with China, investing in domestic data-center capacity, and expanding energy infrastructure specifically to support compute-intensive operations. Russia announced a 200 percent increase in military spending for 2025-2026, with significant portions allocated to domestic technology development and infrastructure hardening.¹⁴

This strategy doesn’t mean Russian capabilities are superior; to the contrary, Western cloud infrastructure remains far more advanced, boasting superior hyperscale efficiency, next-generation AI accelerators, and deeper integration of cutting-edge foundational models. But Russia is building resilience through sovereign control and redundancy, accepting lower performance in exchange for systems that can’t be easily severed by adversary action. Ukraine cannot fully mirror this approach given resource constraints and the ongoing attacks on its energy grid. But it must complement cloud reliance with domestic and forward-deployed compute nodes to sustain rapid decision cycles when connectivity degrades or fails.

The interior of one of the apartments in a residential multi-story building is damaged as a result of a Russian strike drone hit in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, on February 26, 2026. (Photo by Dmytro Smolienko/Ukrinform/NurPhoto).

The architecture of warfighting compute

What Ukraine needs—and what any military force will need for autonomous operations at scale in the future—is a layered computational architecture.

The first layer is cloud-scale compute for strategic functions, hosted primarily in allied nations outside of Ukraine. This handles large-scale data aggregation, AI model training, pattern analysis across theater-wide sensor networks, and long-term intelligence processing. This will remain vital and leverage Western technological advantages that Russia cannot match.

The second layer consists of domestic data centers for operational workloads that cannot tolerate cloud latency or link vulnerability. These support theater-level coordination, regional sensor fusion, command and control systems, and logistics planning. These facilities need hardening against kinetic strikes and cyberattacks—such as zero-day exploits or data-wiping malware designed to paralyze command and control. They also require redundant power supplies and geographic distribution to prevent single points of failure.

The third layer involves forward-deployed compute nodes at brigade and battalion levels. These are rugged servers in mobile containers or hardened facilities that can execute tactical coordination, sensor-to-shooter integration, and autonomous system management even when higher-echelon networks are degraded or severed. These nodes need enough processing power to manage hundreds of autonomous platforms simultaneously, updating targeting data, coordinating maneuver, and adapting to enemy actions—all without requiring constant capacity to access and employ cloud infrastructure.

Finally, edge compute on platforms themselves provides the last line of resilience. These are processing capabilities embedded in drones, ground vehicles, and sensor systems that enable basic autonomous functions—obstacle avoidance, target recognition, and formation keeping—without any external connectivity.

This is not hypothetical. New interceptor programs scaling in Ukraine in late 2025 operate on exactly this principle.¹⁵ These systems utilize optical navigation modules that cost less than a smartphone but possess sufficient edge processing to visually lock onto Russian drones. Once locked, they cut their radio link entirely, rendering Russian electronic warfare useless because there is no signal to jam. The drone effectively becomes a flying, disconnected server that solves a single terminal problem: collision.

Each layer serves a different function and operates under different connectivity assumptions. Cloud computing assumes reliable high-bandwidth links and optimizes for processing power and data scale. Edge computing assumes zero connectivity and optimizes for survival of individual platforms. The layers in between—domestic and forward-deployed nodes—are what enable operational effectiveness when conditions fall between those extremes, which in modern combat will be most of the time.

The cost implications are significant but manageable. A forward-deployed compute node with sufficient capacity to manage battalion-level autonomous operations might cost two million dollars, with a total cost of five million dollars when you include hardening, redundant power, and cooling systems. This is expensive relative to individual drones, but modest compared to traditional armored vehicles or artillery systems. More importantly, these nodes are force multipliers: A three-million-dollar compute node that enables effective coordination of five hundred autonomous platforms represents a far better return on investment than three million dollars spent on additional uncoordinated platforms.¹⁶

Current Western aid to Ukraine has focused overwhelmingly on kinetic systems: artillery, air defense, and armored vehicles. Very little has gone toward computational infrastructure. This made sense when the primary challenge was state survival and maintaining basic military capability. As the war evolves toward autonomous operations, however, aid priorities need to evolve accordingly.

What Russia is learning

Russia’s approach to the compute challenge differs fundamentally from Ukraine’s. While Ukraine has leveraged Western cloud superiority, Russia has pursued what might be called “computational autarky”—accepting lower performance in exchange for independence and resilience.

Russian domestic data-center capacity, while less sophisticated than Western equivalents, provides sovereign control over critical military workloads. While Russian military planners face less risk from radio-frequency jamming of satellite uplinks due to their reliance on hardwired domestic fiber-optic lines, they trade one vulnerability for another. To sustain their operations, they must aggressively defend these physical nodes against kinetic strikes—as proven by air domain attacks like Operation Spiderweb—and targeted cyber operations aimed at paralyzing specific computing centers. While completely severing Russia from its compute power is exceedingly difficult, degrading its critical operational nodes is a highly viable threat.¹⁷

More concerning is Russia’s deepening cooperation with China on AI and computing. This isn’t just about purchasing Chinese technology—though that matters. It’s about access to Chinese expertise in autonomous systems, sensor processing, and algorithmic targeting. China already supplies roughly 80 percent of the critical technologies used in Russian drones, and engineers from both nations are collaborating closely on technology development and battlefield adaptation.¹⁸ China leads the world in certain AI applications, particularly computer vision and pattern recognition. Russian access to Chinese AI capabilities could narrow the technological gap with Western systems faster than most Western analysts currently anticipate.

Russia is also learning operationally. Ukrainian drone strikes on targets inside Russia—reported almost daily throughout early 2026—force Russian air defenses to process massive volumes of sensor data, coordinate response across multiple systems, and adapt to Ukrainian tactics in near-real time. These aren’t just kinetic exchanges; they’re competitions in computational speed and algorithmic effectiveness. Russia is building institutional knowledge about autonomous operations under fire at operational tempo, not in peacetime exercises.

The Russian approach has significant weaknesses: lower-quality infrastructure, dependence on Chinese cooperation that may not survive geopolitical shifts, and vulnerability of domestic data centers to long-range Ukrainian strikes. But Russia has thought systematically about computational resilience in ways that Ukraine, focused on survival and leveraging Western support, has not yet fully addressed.

The compute war: Speed vs. resilience

The coming compute war will test whether Ukraine can preserve something that may be even more critical than state continuity: the speed of its learning and decision cycles.

Modern warfare increasingly resembles software development more than industrial production.

Modern warfare increasingly resembles software development more than industrial production. Ukrainian drone units update software and tactics continuously—a technique that works on Monday may be countered by Russian forces by Friday and adapted again by the following Monday. This operational tempo demands computational infrastructure that can support experimentation, rapid prototyping, large-scale testing, and instantaneous deployment across thousands of platforms simultaneously.

Victory will not hinge on who possesses the most servers in aggregate. It will hinge on who can keep computation, coordination, and adaptation functioning under active denial—when spectrum is contested, networks are degraded, and time itself becomes a weapon.

The paradox is that speed and resilience often conflict. Cloud computing optimizes for speed: massive processing power, global data access, and rapid scaling. But it assumes reliable connectivity. Autonomous edge computing optimizes for resilience: operation under denial, degraded communications, and individual platform survival. But it sacrifices coordination, learning, and adaptation that require centralized processing.

The side that solves this paradox—building systems that maintain speed while surviving denial—will have a decisive advantage. And all of this requires not just technology but operational art: understanding what computation must happen when and where, what can be prepositioned before links fail, what decisions can be delegated to autonomous systems, and what must remain under human control even when that means accepting slower execution.

A soldier from the Taifun Special Forces UAV Unit, who participates in combat missions in the Kharkiv region, carries an aerial reconnaissance drone recovered upon landing, Ukraine, February 22, 2026. (Photo by Viacheslav Madiievskyi/Ukrinform via ZUMA Press Wire)

The implications for the United States

There is a second lesson here that extends far beyond Ukraine. For the United States, this conflict is a preview of a fundamental shift in what constitutes strategic infrastructure.

Federal, state, and local governments in the United States still regard data centers primarily as commercial real estate—involving zoning questions, permitting challenges, and local economic development. The Ukraine war suggests a radically different framework: Sustaining compute under attack is a national security imperative, as critical as shipbuilding capacity or semiconductor production.

If the next phase of warfare is shaped by learning cycles and distributed autonomy, then the defense industrial base is no longer only steel and shells. It includes electrical grid capacity, cooling infrastructure, secure facilities, and resilient compute systems that can convert data into operational advantage faster than adversaries can disrupt the process.

Furthermore, because the United States projects power globally, it will face severe distance and latency challenges in any future conflict. A secure data center in Virginia cannot command a drone swarm in the Indo-Pacific at machine speed. This geographic reality dictates that the United States must possess forward-deployed, allied-hosted compute architectures to mitigate the immense latency constraints of expeditionary warfare.

This shift has immediate policy implications. First, grid resilience for computing infrastructure is paramount. Data centers require enormous electrical power: A large facility can consume as much electricity as a small city. In the continental United States, these facilities depend on a grid that was designed for efficiency, not resilience against military attack. Strategic data-center locations need hardened power supplies, backup generation capacity, and rapid restoration capabilities that current commercial facilities lack.

Second, the United States needs mandated geographic distribution of computing capacity. Commercial cloud providers optimize for efficiency, often concentrating computing capacity in specific regions with favorable power costs and network connectivity. From a national security perspective, this approach creates vulnerabilities. Geographic distribution ensures no single region or facility becomes a strategic single point of failure.

Third, the nation should consider a strategic compute reserve. The United States maintains strategic reserves of petroleum, grain, and medical supplies. A similar approach to dormant but maintained data-center capacity would allow activation during crisis, providing surge computing capability when commercial systems are disrupted or need to prioritize military workloads.

Fourth, technology export controls must expand. The United States restricts the export of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to adversaries. It should consider similar controls on data-center technology, cooling systems, and high-performance computing architecture that could help adversaries build resilient computational infrastructure.

Finally, NATO computational resilience must be addressed. While NATO has already acknowledged that severe cyberattacks can trigger the Article 5 collective-defense pledge, the Alliance must go further to explicitly include computational infrastructure in its joint defense planning. Allied nations need assured access to computing capacity during crises even when their domestic infrastructure is under attack. This might require treaty-level agreements on computing resource sharing, protection of undersea cables connecting allied data centers, and prepositioned computational capability in forward-deployed locations.

These aren’t theoretical concerns. Ukraine is living this reality now. Ukrainian commanders are making life-and-death operational decisions based on whether they can access computational resources through contested networks. The United States and its allies would face these same challenges in any high-intensity conflict with a peer adversary capable of targeting networks and infrastructure.

The advantage the United States currently enjoys is time to prepare, though that may be running out. Ukraine is solving these problems under fire, improvising solutions while fighting for its very survival. The United States can—and must—solve them expeditiously, investing in resilience before conflict makes that investment impossible and focusing on enhanced deterrence to make such conflict unlikely.

What must happen now

For Ukraine, the immediate requirement is diversification of computational architecture. This doesn’t mean abandoning Western cloud access, which remains a critical advantage and asset. It means complementing that access with:

Hardened, bunker-grade domestic data centers in western Ukraine, away from front lines but close enough to support operational tempo. These facilities need redundant power from multiple sources, physical hardening against missile strikes, and cyber defenses against Russian intrusion. International assistance should include funding for this infrastructure, which will likely need to be established through robust public-private partnerships.
Forward-deployed compute nodes at the operational and tactical levels. These don’t need to match cloud-scale processing power, but they do need sufficient capacity to manage autonomous operations when higher-echelon networks degrade, with enough redundancy that destruction of individual nodes doesn’t collapse the entire system.
Redundant nonradio communications to ensure reliable connectivity to drones, a core issue. Therefore, investment in redundant physical links is as vital as the computing layers. This capacity includes fiber-optic tethered drones that are physically immune to jamming and free-space optical (laser) links that can transmit high-bandwidth data between “mother” drones and forward nodes without creating a radio signature.
Bandwidth prioritization and compression algorithms that reduce data transmission requirements. If raw video from one thousand drones requires ten Gbps but processed targeting data requires only one hundred Mbps, the system becomes sustainable on available networks.
Energy infrastructure specifically designated for computing, including small modular reactors, solar arrays with battery storage, and protected generator facilities—power sources that can sustain computational infrastructure even when the broader grid is under attack.

For the United States, the requirement is recognition that this isn’t just a Ukrainian problem—it’s a preview of US challenges in future conflict. That recognition should drive Department of Defense investment in distributed computing architecture designed for operation under denial, not just peacetime efficiency.

It also should include mandating “endpoint autonomy” in acquisition. The Department of Defense must shift acquisition requirements to favor systems capable of fully disconnected execution. Rather than treating weapons solely as kinetic effectors dependent on off-board data, future programs must define them as self-contained edge compute nodes. Critical kill chain functions—target identification, discrimination, and terminal guidance—must reside on the platform’s own hardware. This ensures that a loss of a link during the terminal phase does not result in mission failure, treating connectivity as an enhancement for coordination rather than a prerequisite for operation.

A whole-of-government strategy for computational resilience is required, including the Department of Homeland Security for grid protection, the Department of Energy for energy infrastructure, the State Department for international agreements on undersea cables, and the Department of Commerce for export controls. Simultaneously, professional military education must treat computational infrastructure as seriously as logistics, fires, or maneuver. Commanders need to understand bandwidth constraints, latency implications, and trade-offs between centralized and distributed processing, just as they currently understand fuel consumption or ammunition expenditure rates.

Finally, experimentation and exercises must specifically test performance under degraded connectivity. While the US military has increasingly integrated assured C2 into its operational exercises, the depth and scale of these denied-environment simulations must rapidly expand. Exercises need to consistently simulate complete network denial, test autonomous operations under severe communications loss, and identify failure modes before those failures occur in combat.

For NATO and allied nations, the requirement is collective computational resilience as part of collective defense. This includes protected undersea cables connecting allied data centers with the same defensive priority currently given to sea lines of communication. It requires prepositioned computational infrastructure in forward locations, similar to prepositioned stocks of equipment but focused on enabling command, control, and autonomous operations. Information-sharing agreements must specifically address access to computational resources during crisis to ensure smaller allied nations aren’t disadvantaged by lack of domestic infrastructure. Joint investment in energy infrastructure is also critical to sustain allied computing requirements, recognizing that electrical power for computation is as strategically important as fuel for vehicles.

What’s at stake

The technology is already here. Ukraine is producing autonomous drones at industrial scale. Algorithmic targeting is becoming increasingly operational. Machine-learning systems are adapting to Russian countermeasures in real time. What’s missing isn’t technology—it’s the infrastructure to sustain use of that technology under deliberate adversary denial.

If this problem is solved correctly, autonomous tactical units will collapse the coordination overhead that currently limits military effectiveness. New algorithmically piloted systems will enable operational realities built on machine-tempo, combined-arms synchronization. Commanders will delegate bounded execution to formations that self-synchronize sensors, fires, and maneuver, exploiting fleeting windows faster than adversaries can respond, while retaining ultimate responsibility for intent, constraints, and actions taken.

If this problem is solved incorrectly—or not solved at all—autonomous systems will become liabilities rather than assets. Platforms that depend on cloud connectivity will fail when an adversary severs that connectivity. Operations that assume reliable networks will collapse when those networks degrade. The side that builds autonomous capability without building resilience will discover that sophisticated technology without infrastructure becomes inert hardware.

Ukraine’s cloud migration preserved the state under fire. The coming compute war will test whether Ukraine can preserve the speed of its decision cycles—and whether the West understands that speed without resilience is fragility waiting to be exploited.

The United States and its allies have been given an extraordinary gift: the opportunity to learn these lessons while someone else is paying the cost in blood and treasure. Ukraine is the laboratory. The experiments are ongoing. The data is available. The question is whether Western militaries and policymakers will learn quickly enough, and whether they will invest in computational resilience before the next conflict removes that option.

It is imperative to get this right—and get it right first. The autonomous transition will not wait. Neither will the United States’ adversaries.

about the author

Clara Kaluderovic is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, a former Schmidt Fellow at the Special Competitive Studies Project, and a member of the Aspen Strategy Group’s Rising Leaders Class of 2026. Kaluderovic is co-founder and CEO of Mental Health Global, a nonprofit partnered with the Ukrainian Armed Forces to deliver AI-enabled mental health support in conflict zones, and co-founder of ex2, an AI nonprofit developing large language models for underrepresented languages including Kurdish.

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1 Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine,” Royal United Services Institute, May 2023.

2 Emma Schroeder and Sean Dack, “A Parallel Terrain: Public-Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment,” Atlantic Council, February 2023.

3 Amazon Web Services (AWS), “Safeguarding Ukraine’s Data,” AWS Public Sector Blog, June 2022.

4 Tianjiu Zuo et al., “Critical Infrastructure and the Cloud: Policy for Emerging Risk,” Atlantic Council, July 2023.

5 Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science, “Bandwidth-efficient Live Video Analytics for Drones via Edge Computing,” IEEE/ACM Symposium on Edge Computing, 2018.

6 Carnegie Mellon, “Bandwidth-efficient Live Video Analytics.”

7 Ookla Speedtest Intelligence, “Starlink Performance in Europe,” Q3 2024.

8 “Ukraine Says Starlink’s Global Outage Hit Its Military Communications,” Reuters, July 25, 2025; and “Starlink Crackdown Cripples Russians—but American Engineer Warns Ukraine Is Just as Vulnerable,” Euromaidan Press, February 6, 2026.

9 “Ukraine on Track to Produce 3 Million Drones in 2025,” Kyiv Independent, December 2024.

10 See “Data Centers in Ukraine” and “Data Centers in Russia,” Cloudscene Market Directory, Cloudscene, 2024.

11 International Energy Agency, “Ukraine’s Energy Security and the Coming Winter,” 2024; and Financial Times, “Russia Has Taken Out Half of Ukraine’s Power Generation,” June 2024.

12 Energoatom Official Statement; and Al Jazeera Staff, “Mapping Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,” Al Jazeera, September 2022.

13 “Ukraine’s DefTech at the End of 2025: From Drone Mas s to Systems Warfare,” New Geopolitics Research Network, December 2025; and “Ukrainian Company Reveals Its New Drone Interception Control Technology,” Pravda, January 2026.

14 Michael Newton, “How are Drones Changing War? The Future of the Battlefield,” Center for European Policy Analysis(CEPA), November 3, 2025.

15 David Kirichenko, “Ukraine’s AI Drones Are Reshaping Modern Warfare as Precision Strikes Outpace Traditional Artillery,” Milwaukee Independent, October 24, 2025.

16 General James E. Cartwright and Jags Kandasamy, “Operationalizing Artificial Intelligence and the Edge Continuum for Joint All-Domain Dominance,” Atlantic Council, August 2023.

17 “How Fiber Optic Networks Resist Signal Interference,” Fiber Optics Explained, May 2, 2025.

18 David Kirichenko, “The Booming China-Russia Drone Alliance,” CEPA, June 4, 2025.

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Kroenig interviewed on CNN on US action in Iran

Atlantic Council — Mon, 16 Mar 2026 14:04:48 +0000

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 13, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on CNN on US action in Iran, arguing that President Trump is weakening the axis of aggressors and has clear strategic vision.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

China Defense Policy

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UN: Putin’s deportation of Ukrainian children is a crime against humanity

Peter Dickinson — Sat, 14 Mar 2026 12:10:22 +0000

Russia’s mass deportation of Ukrainian children is a crime against humanity, a new United Nations investigation has found. Published this week by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the report concluded that following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Kremlin officials “at the highest level” have overseen large-scale deportations from occupied regions of Ukraine targeting thousands of Ukrainian children.

The report provides fresh insights into Russia’s comprehensive wartime program of child deportations. Moscow is accused of abducting tens of thousands of Ukrainian children since 2022 and forcibly transferring them to Russia as part of a “carefully organized plan” coordinated at the highest levels of the Russian Federation state apparatus. Many victims are reportedly subjected to ideological indoctrination designed to strip them of their Ukrainian identity and impose Russian nationality. This process often includes name changes and adoption into Russian families.

Despite extensive campaigning and humanitarian efforts by Ukraine and the international community, only a relatively small number of abducted children have so far been rescued. The plight of Ukraine’s deported kids has made global headlines and has attracted the attention of US First Lady Melania Trump, who has reportedly sought to help facilitate the return of victims by engaging directly with the Kremlin.

The new UN report noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s direct involvement in the mass deportations has been “visible from the outset.” This tallies with existing criminal charges against Putin brought by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. In spring 2023, ICC officials issued an arrest warrant for Putin for his personal role in Russia’s child abduction program. This warrant has since prevented the Kremlin dictator from attending a number of international summits due to fears that he may face arrest for war crimes.

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This is not the first time United Nations investigators have accused Russia of committing crimes against humanity during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A spring 2025 UN probe concluded that the large-scale detention of Ukrainians in occupied regions of the country represented a “systematic attack against the civilian population” that qualified as a crime against humanity. In areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, Moscow is accused of conducting a Stalin-style terror campaign of mass arrests targeting thousands of civilians including elected officials, journalists, civil society activists, religious leaders, cultural figures, and military veterans.

Similarly, a more recent UN investigation into targeted Russian drone strikes against the civilian population in three front line regions of southern Ukraine determined that these aerial attacks amount to a crime against humanity. The killings are clearly intentional, United Nations investigators concluded, with Russian troops reportedly using video-guided drones to hunt down individual victims. Terrified locals refer to Russia’s drone strikes on civilians as a “human safari.”

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The Kremlin’s ongoing program of child deportations and accompanying anti-Ukrainian indoctrination are viewed in Kyiv as elements of a broader Russian plan to erase Ukrainian national identity entirely. Throughout occupied regions of Ukraine, the Russian authorities are ruthlessly eradicating all traces of Ukrainian statehood, history, language, and cultural heritage. Meanwhile, local residents are being forced to accept Russian citizenship. Anyone who refuses to cooperate risks being denied access to basic public services or deported.

Moscow’s efforts to forcibly Russify thousands of abducted Ukrainian children have been widely cited as evidence of the genocidal intent underpinning Russia’s invasion. This is hardly surprising. The 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention specifically identifies “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as one of five internationally recognized acts of genocide.

Russia rejects United Nations claims that it is committing crimes against humanity in Ukraine and has consistently denied allegations of mass child abductions. Instead, Kremlin officials maintain that the large-scale transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia is a routine wartime safety measure. However, nobody in Moscow has been able to explain why it is necessary to indoctrinate children against their native Ukraine and force them to adopt a Russian national identity in order ensure their safety.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

PRC commentary does highlight a real contradiction in US AI governance.

First, a throughline in many of the PRC sources surveyed is that the conflict between Anthropic and the Department of Defense has laid bare some of the fundamental bargains that US AI companies have made as they have sought to strike a delicate balance: They seek to position themselves and their technologies as core to US national security while also trying to uphold high ethical standards with regard to the development and deployment of AI. In the view of many commentators, US policy has come to increasingly frame AI as a strategic national security capability. As they seek advantageous market position, favorable regulatory policy, and government partnerships, tech companies have argued that there is a need to protect and develop US AI capabilities against Chinese encroachment. As Chinese academician Gao Lingyun put it, the episode shows that “so-called ‘national security’ has become a political tool aimed at making enterprises serve its own interests.”

Much of the Chinese commentary on the Anthropic dispute aims to highlight the consequences of this framing. In the view of several commentators, US technology firms such as Anthropic promote national security narratives to demonstrate their strategic importance; however, those same narratives in turn strengthen the state’s claim to control the technology. In the view of several commentators, Anthropic in particular has embraced narratives that have contributed to the securitization of AI. For example, Anthropic founder Dario Amodei once said that selling high-end chips to China would be like “selling nuclear weapons to North Korea.”

In pushing these national security narratives, these analysts claim, companies such as Anthropic are now victims of their own success, as they are facing demands for full military access to their technologies. That a US firm is now facing a supply-chain risk designation—a provision once only applied to firms located in countries that are considered foreign adversaries—illustrates for many analysts in China the fundamental truth that as national security categories expand, governments will seek to assert greater sovereignty over advanced technologies. As one commentator put it, the dispute shows that the US government is “redefining the boundaries between technology and power within its AI national security framework.” One commentator similarly argues that the dispute “strips away the veil of so-called ‘technology neutrality,” showing that as AI capabilities grow, governments will increasingly deploy state power to integrate these systems into military operations.

More broadly, Chinese commentary examined the growing structural tensions between state power, corporate ethics, and AI militarization. Many commentators argued that the incident reveals a fundamental incompatibility with AI designed to curb its capabilities to not harm humans—as in Anthropic’s “Constitution” for its large language model Claude—while also claiming that developing the same technology for use in military applications is a determining factor in the “race for AI dominance.” In modern warfare, they argue, AI has become essential to intelligence analysis, targeting, and decision cycles, making its development and deployment a matter of strategic necessity, with corporate safeguards subsumed under the will of the state. In other words, when technology enters “efficiency-driven state machinery,” corporate restrictions become unsustainable. Companies may choose whether to participate in defense programs, these commentators argue, but they cannot dictate how militaries employ advanced technologies.

Some commentators pointed to Anthropic’s February announcement of a change in its Responsible Scaling Policy, in which the company would no longer pause training on new models whenever capabilities reached predefined danger thresholds, as evidence that in a battle between company ethics and state priorities, the latter always wins. Firms such as OpenAI and Anthropic, which once shaped global digital platforms and had broad leeway to operate as they saw fit, now face increasing pressure to align with state security priorities or face penalties.

In a bit of irony coming from PRC commentators, several analysts argued that this securitized language allows governments to redefine risks and obligations depending on their own strategic priorities. According to researcher Gao Lingyun, when national security definitions become “arbitrarily defined,” they lose moral authority as policy justifications. This argument mirrors criticisms that the United States has long directed at Chinese technology firms. US policymakers frequently warn that Chinese companies are compelled to assist PRC government authorities, including military and intelligence services, under existing legal frameworks such as the National Intelligence Law and the Data Security Law. PRC analysts have turned this criticism back on the United States, asking how much trust to put into AI technologies if governments possess the legal authority to compel access to them (and to US citizen data to enable surveillance, if Anthropic’s accounting is accurate).

Ultimately, PRC commentary on the Anthropic-Pentagon dispute reveals how the Chinese political apparatus is seeking to frame the incident internally for Chinese audiences. It behooves the PRC to present the US AI governance ecosystem as chaotic and to heighten the perception of risk around US military use of AI. However, PRC commentary does highlight a real contradiction in US AI governance. If US AI firms promote trust, safety, and independence as core advantages over their competitors, how durable are those claims in the long run when national security authorities intervene? And how does this impact the competitiveness and trustworthiness of US systems writ large? As AI systems are becoming increasingly central to military and economic competition, the answer to these questions will shape global perceptions of technological trust and jurisdictional risk beyond this dispute and the context of US-China competition.

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Romania’s drone and energy plans with Ukraine make Europe stronger and more secure

jcookson — Fri, 13 Mar 2026 19:47:55 +0000

BUCHAREST and WASHINGTON—“We must not hide that historically there was distrust between our countries,” Romanian President Nicușor Dan said to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on March 12 in Bucharest. However, Dan continued, “This distrust evaporated at the beginning of the war in 2022, and today is a moment when the two countries assume mutual trust in what they can do together, assume common responsibility for this part of Europe, for its citizens and for the entire region.”

Zelenskyy’s visit to Bucharest marks a politically and strategically significant moment for Romania’s regional role. It is the Ukrainian president’s second visit to Romania since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, but the first under Dan, who took office in May 2025. In this sense, the visit also signals that the initial adjustment period of the new Romanian presidency has effectively ended. Romania is now moving from a phase of positioning and signaling toward one of policy implementation, particularly in areas related to regional security and defense cooperation.

The timing of the visit is particularly relevant. Just one day earlier, Romania’s Parliament approved the deployment of additional US military capabilities on Romanian territory, including aerial refueling aircraft and satellite communication systems with a defensive role. Taken together, the two developments highlight how Romania is consolidating its position on NATO’s eastern flank: strengthening its security relationship with the United States, including support for US operations in the Middle East (Romania also offered its support in Gaza) while simultaneously deepening strategic cooperation with Ukraine.

The Strategic Partnership Declaration that Dan and Zelenskyy signed in Bucharest formalizes a relationship that has been intensifying since the start of the war. The framework covers defense cooperation, energy interconnection, economic collaboration, education, and minority rights. These areas suggest that both governments are seeking to anchor their partnership in long-term strategic interests rather than temporary wartime coordination. The progress made on sensitive issues such as minority rights also suggests that both capitals increasingly view their bilateral relationship through the lens of regional security.

The most strategically consequential outcome of the visit is the agreement on joint drone production in Romania, financed through the SAFE program with an estimated allocation of around €200 million. The logic of the project reflects a new model of cooperation: Ukraine contributes battlefield-tested technological know-how developed during the war, while Romania provides NATO territory, industrial capacity, and access to European defense funding. In practice, this represents a shift from traditional military assistance toward co-production of defense technologies, integrating Ukraine’s wartime innovation into the European defense industrial ecosystem.

Energy cooperation represents another structural dimension of the agreements announced on March 12.

Since late 2022, when Russia began to systematically target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure as part of its military strategy, Romania has been one of Ukraine’s most important European energy partners. It has, for example, advocated within the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, known as ENTSO-E, for greater power exports to Ukraine. It has also scrounged Romania’s system for spare parts that could be used for grid and generation repair, and it has leveraged Romania’s long history with civilian nuclear power to support the heroic efforts of Ukraine’s nuclear operator, Energoatom, to maintain safe operations under the most severe stress imaginable.

Romania is likely to become one of the main operational gateways for reconstruction projects and postwar economic cooperation.

In parallel, Ukrainian companies are increasing their footprint in Romania, illustrating how the country’s private sector is adopting an increasingly European focus. For instance, DTEK*, Ukraine’s largest private energy company, is growing its renewables portfolio through new build and acquisitions in Romania’s wind and solar sectors, aiming for a one-gigawatt portfolio by 2030. Projects in this effort include the 60-megawatt Ruginoasa wind farm, the 53-megawatt Glodeni I solar park, and the 126-megawatt Vacaresti solar farm commissioned this past December. Metinvest, DTEK’s sister company, has acquired ArcelorMittal’s Tubular Products plant in Iași, near the Romanian border with Moldova. This cluster of energy and metals investment will now be complemented by defense industry—and in any post-conflict scenario the role of Romanian ports and rail in supporting Ukrainian logistics will grow exponentially.

Meanwhile, Romania’s longstanding support to Moldova—whose grid is umbilically tied to Ukraine—has played an indispensable role in helping both countries to weather four winters of Putin’s energy war and the end of Russian gas deliveries to Transnistria. Plans to accelerate electricity interconnections—such as the Suceava-Chernivtsi line—and to expand cooperation on gas routes and storage capacity point toward a deeper integration of Ukraine into the regional energy network.

Romania is also playing a leading role in advancing the commercial understandings necessary for the Vertical Corridor, a planned gas route from Greece to Ukraine. This effort is opening opportunities for increased US liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the region, and it helps position southeastern Europe for the European Union’s 2027 phase-out of all Russian gas. Meanwhile, Romania’s status as the European Union’s largest gas producer—anchored in the offshore Neptun Deep project—points to the future role of Black Sea resources in helping to replace gas formerly sold by Russia. Strategically, this would strengthen Ukraine’s resilience while reinforcing Romania’s ambition to position itself as a regional energy hub linking Ukraine and Moldova with European Union member states.

But Zelenskyy’s visit also showed how the Vertical Corridor is about much more than energy molecules. The discussions in Bucharest point to a broader role for Romania beyond wartime support, with Bucharest increasingly preparing to assume a key role in the reconstruction of Ukraine, particularly in ports, infrastructure, logistics, and cross-border economic integration. With its geographic proximity, access to European Union funding mechanisms, and growing strategic partnership with Kyiv, Romania is likely to become one of the main operational gateways for reconstruction projects and postwar economic cooperation.

Bucharest is steadily moving from a supportive neighbor to a strategic enabler in shaping the security architecture of the Black Sea region and NATO’s eastern flank.

Note: DTEK’s parent company, System Capital Management, is an Atlantic Council donor.

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So what’s the strategy for Iran?

the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security — Fri, 13 Mar 2026 14:58:17 +0000

In this episode, host Matthew Kroenig is joined by Alex Gray, a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center, to discuss the ongoing war with Iran and how to understand Washington’s strategy for victory. Alex was chief of staff at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration and was in that role when US President Donald Trump oversaw the military operation that killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani.

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About the podcast

Host Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, sits down with senior US and allied officials and leading experts to explore the strategies shaping today’s most pressing global security challenges. Inspired by General Brent Scowcroft, who famously asked his team “So what’s the strategy?” the series dives into how leaders think about power, policy, and the decisions shaping the future of international security. Watch and listen wherever you get your podcasts.

So What’s the Strategy Podcast

The strategies behind the world’s toughest security challenges, explained by the leaders shaping them.

Transcript

Read the full episode transcript below

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Alex Gray:

Strategically, what I would say is I think the president has a much grander vision of how that limited operation fits into American grand strategy. My sense is what the president’s looking at here more holistically is he’s tired and he’s tired of having his successors potentially forced into an endless whack-a-mole game with the Iranian regime.

Matthew Kroenig:

Welcome to, “So what’s the strategy?” I’m your host, Matthew Kroenig. In today’s episode, we’ll focus on the US military campaign in Iran. Does the Trump administration have a coherent strategy? To discuss this topic, we’re very fortunate to be joined by Alex Gray. Alex is a non-resident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council. He’s also the CEO of American Global Strategies. And in the first Trump administration, Alex served as chief of staff to the National Security Council staff where he oversaw the daily operations of the National Security Advisor’s office and provided critical guidance as the president sought to respond to major security crises. The security crises, of course, also included policy toward Iran and Alex was at the NSC at the time that the Trump administration conducted the military operation to take out Iranian general Qassem Soleimani. So Alex is an ideal guest to help us understand how the Trump administration is likely thinking through its current strategy toward Iran.

Matthew Kroenig:

Former National Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft used to challenge his team with a simple question, “so what’s the strategy?” What do you want to do and how are you going to do it? That’s the focus of this show on So what’s the strategy? We talk with senior government officials and leading experts about the strategies for addressing the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. Let’s get started.

Matthew Kroenig:

Alex, welcome to “So what’s the strategy?”

Alex Gray:

Thanks for having me, Matt.

Matthew Kroenig:

So we’re here today to talk about strategy for Iran with the US military ongoing military campaign. And unlike most of us, you spent time in the Oval Office with President Trump, including during some pretty tense moments with Iran. You were in office at the time of the Soleimani strikes. So I think you probably have insights into Trump’s strategy that maybe the rest of us don’t have. And it seems like the prevailing media narrative has been that Trump doesn’t have a strategy, that the administration’s messaging is inconsistent and the president’s not quite sure what he’s trying to achieve. Is that right? Or if not, what is the strategy for Iran?

Alex Gray:

Yeah, I definitely disagree with that presumption that I’ve heard quite a bit of in the media. I think we have to look at this in a couple of different dimensions. I mean, the first dimension is I think post Iraq war, there was this kind of unhelpful binary in the US foreign policy conversation that essentially said either you go in with an overwhelming ground force and you nation build and you topple regimes and you spend many years doing counterinsurgency or you do nothing. And there was the straw man that was kind of built into all of our foreign policy debates. And the president, I think being the least ideological commander in chief we’ve had in a very long time, the most pragmatic, just rejects fundamentally the idea that there is these two just totally artificial polar strawmen in the foreign policy toolkit. And so what he’s opted to do is this, what I would call a very surgical, bounded, limited duration operation with what I think are three specific operational objectives, right?

Take out the terrorist proxies, nuclear program, and the missile program. And strategically what I would say is I think the president has a much grander vision of how that limited operation fits into American grand strategy. My sense is what the president’s looking at here more holistically is he is tired and he’s tired of having his successors potentially forced into an endless whack-a-mole game with the Iranian regime. We are sixteen years on Matt from Hillary Clinton’s pivot to Asia speech. I think most of us acknowledge that ultimately the century will be defined by what happens in the Indo-Pacific. If we keep playing whack-a-mole with the Iranian regime for the next twenty years, that pivot will never operationalize. And I think the president has changed the paradigm here for use of force with the purpose of finally ending the whack-a-mole and being able to disengage from the region that he’s pretty eloquently said is not our key priority, but we can only do that if we can take out the head of the snake.

Matthew Kroenig:

Well, that was a clear and comprehensive way to start, and I want to dig into several items there. And so first on the objectives. So you said the objectives are degrading the nuclear program, the missile program, the terror proxy network. And if you do go back to the first speech the Saturday after the operation started, the president did mention all of those things. So I’m like you a little puzzled that people keep saying we don’t know what we’re trying to achieve, but what about regime change? Is governance of Iran and new government in Tehran part of the president’s goals or because he has talked about that, he’s talked about how the supreme leader’s son is not acceptable. How do you see domestic governance in Tehran fitting into the strategy?

Alex Gray:

Yeah, I mean this is where I think the president’s left himself a good deal of wiggle room and I think it’s a helpful strategic ambiguity. The p resident I think understands that the operational focus that you and I have laid out, navy drones, missiles, nukes proxies, that’s very important. But ultimately capability is less important than intent. And ultimately, as long as you have the clerical regime or a supreme leader and an inner coterie who are committed to reconstituting those capabilities, ultimately we play whack-a-mole again. So I think with the president, I like to say the president I think is personality agnostic. He’s somewhat regime agnostic as long as the people who follow Ayatollah Khamenei are people who are willing to play ball with the United States. I think it’s on a kind of grander scale. I think what the president’s looking for is something approximating the Delcy Rodriguez strategy in Venezuela where you find whether it’s someone that we would want to do business with, I’m sure it will not be, but if it’s someone who is able and willing to restrain themselves from the worst parts of the regime’s past behavior, I think the president’s left himself enough flexibility to accept whatever that outcome looks like.

Matthew Kroenig:

I think you’re right. He has mentioned the Venezuela model as a possible model for Iran and a different government with a different set of intent as you put it, I think would be seen as an improvement. What about, although the United States does have limited ability to dictate those outcomes, so what about a worst case scenario where it is essentially IRGC in charge or this supreme leader’s son manages to consolidate power and it is still hostile to the United States, but the capabilities would still be badly degraded. Is that still a success you think in the president’s mind, or is getting that policy change in Tehran also necessary?

Alex Gray:

Yeah, look, I think that foreign policy, as we both know, is never about the perfect. It’s about getting the best option with the resources we have with the other threats we have to balance against. And I think in a perfect world, you get a Venezuela option where you get someone who is willing to change behavior at least in the shortened medium term, and you have significantly degraded capabilities that take a long time to reconstitute. I think it’s also very possible, not ideal, but possible that you of course are going to see the degradation of the capabilities that’s already well in hand and maybe you have a leadership that’s less malleable and there’s a desire to reconstitute, but that reconstitution is certainly going to take time. And we bought ourselves additional breathing room to refocus on other things, to reorganize our defenses, to work with our Gulf allies to harden our capabilities in the region and their capabilities. So I mean, I think either of those outcomes is certainly a preferable instate from where we started. It’s just a question of I think how the president defines victory. And as I said, the president has done a really good job in my view, Matt, of defining, being very clear about what the operational prerequisites are here, but giving himself a little bit of breathing room on the broader strategic constitution of victory so he can be flexible with real world events. And I actually think that’s a very smart place for us to be.

Matthew Kroenig:

People point to his talk about regime change in the opening speech, but it seems to me that he was pretty clear that he wasn’t saying that’s a necessary goal for the United States, but that this is an opportunity for the Iranian people if they want to take it. I’m guessing you see that statement the same way.

Alex Gray:

Yeah, I think ultimately one of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan is you can’t want a Democratic transition more than the people themselves. And that really to me is twenty years of Iraq and Afghanistan has catalyzed the fact that you have to have a group of people on the ground in these countries who are willing to do very difficult, very painful, very dangerous things for their own freedom and to do it over a long period of time. And if the Iranian people are willing to do that, more power to them, ultimately that’s going to serve the interests of the United States. But again, I think the president has given him himself the flexibility that he’s not unfortunately like President Bush did, he’s not committed to a specific outcome that’s based on the actions of people over whom we have no control. The president, I think, has given himself that flexibility that we can pivot to what are the core interests of the United States in this scenario, and that’s what gives me confidence that I don’t think this is going to become a prolonged quagmire as some of the fevered media commentary has suggested.

Matthew Kroenig:

Another narrative I’ve heard is that the president is betraying his supporters, that his base voted for him because he promised not to get into wars and now he’s getting into wars. So why are you so confident that this isn’t going to be a quagmire, and is the president betraying his political base?

Alex Gray:

Well, on the first question, I don’t think it’s going to be a quagmire because quagmires, in my reading of history, Matt, quagmires happened when you leave overly open-ended objectives and you allow too much inflexibility in what you’re trying to accomplish on the ground, I think the president has been very clear that he has a couple of things that are not going to change nukes, missiles, proxies, maybe drones and the Iranian Navy. But otherwise, I think the president is willing to flex to the reality that we’re facing and to put it into a broader geopolitical and geo-economic context, that level of flexibility, the lack of what I would say is in previous wars like in Iraq, the lack of a willingness to adjust to the facts on the ground, I think that that gives me confidence. We’re not going to go down that quagmire route. In terms of the president’s commitment to the base and where his core voters are, I think what people fundamentally misunderstand, Donald Trump was never an isolationist.

MAGA America-first voters are not isolationists. They are not averse to the use of force. They are not adverse to the use of American military power to achieve strategic objectives. What they’re adverse to is open-ended conflicts that don’t seem to have a purpose, don’t have a core American interest at stake that are focused on ideology, that are focused on kind of Wilsonian universalist values, which this very much is not. Those are the things that his base detests. I would argue that this is perfectly in keeping with a reaganesque Jacksonian, Theodore Rooseveltian kind of tradition that MAGA, I think is the inheritor of all of those traditions in some sense, and I think this is perfectly consistent. As someone who supported the president since 2015, I would say this is perfectly consistent with how the vast majority of people who share my support for him, how we view this tradition of foreign policy that he’s leading.

Matthew Kroenig:

He has this peace through strength doctrine, and I think it’s often misunderstood. If it’s about peace, then how is he using force in Venezuela and Iran and elsewhere? But I think you’re right, it’s about he’s very comfortable with short, sharp, decisive uses of force, but he’s very skeptical of long drawn out military campaigns with no clear end inside. And so I’m pretty confident that this isn’t going to be a long drawn out quagmire. It’s about using force, achieving the goals and then getting out. And so do you see it the same, and what is your prediction, I guess, about how much longer we have? The president has said recently that we’re nearing the end, but then he’s also said three or four weeks. Any projections about timeline?

Alex Gray:

Yeah, I see it the same, and I don’t think the president, one thing I know from having worked for him, the president doesn’t do timelines. I mean, the president’s not going to have anyone dictate to him, advisors, media allies, no one’s going to tell him that this is over in a week or a month. He’s going to use his judgment on when we’ve accomplished the objectives that he has in his mind. And then I think he’s done a pretty good job of telling the American people what those are. I think General Caine has been really effective at messaging the operational successes that we’ve had. I think that the piece here that we’re not seeing in the public is the effort that I’m sure is being made to try and align those operational successes with changes in the regime’s behavior and trying to get a sense that whoever is following the former supreme leader, his son or anyone around him, figuring out if they are going to be responsive to the behavioral changes that we hope this operational success is going to have. That’s where I think I have no doubt there’s probably some conversations going on through intermediaries and otherwise, and I think that that is what we’re waiting for. I don’t know that there’s a significant amount of additional operational success that’s needed. It’s how much operational success is going to be needed to translate into that behavioral change. And if it looks like that’s not going to happen, I think you’ll quickly see the president say, we’ve done what we came here to do. It’s time to recalibrate what constitutes strategic success and move on.

Matthew Kroenig:

Really insightful and of course determining strategic success not only up to Washington. This is a operation alongside our partner Israel. And people have said that maybe there’s a difference in goals between the United States and Israel, that for Israel maybe regime collapse or regime change is an essential objective. Is there a gap between Jerusalem and Washington, and if so, how do you think the Trump administration’s going to manage this?

Alex Gray:

I have a feeling there probably are elements of the Netanyahu government where there may be a gap in objectives, but Prime Minister Netanyahu’s a very savvy strategic operator, and I think he understands better than anyone intuitively that he cannot allow a gap to grow between the United States and Israel. On the strategic question here, Israel has, they have incredible capacity, but they’re not going to be able to effectuate the type of sustained military operation without US support. And I think that Prime Minister Netanyahu is not going to allow the war aims to diverge in such a way that it would create further friction between the two sides. I think he understands where Israel’s capabilities start and stop, and that even if in a perfect world from an Israeli strategic standpoint, this campaign was pressed further, I think he gets that that would ultimately be counterproductive for Israel’s strategic interests if it meant drawing a wedge between the United States.

Matthew Kroenig:

That’s a good point. Israel’s foremost strategic objective is maintaining that relationship with Washington. So in your opening, you already got to the bigger geopolitical implications. So I do want to come back to that now because I’ve heard two things. One, that this is kind of a brilliant bank shot by taking out Iran. This is going to weaken China and allow the United States to prioritize and focus on China. But I’ve also heard the opposite that we’re wasting munitions, we’re wasting readiness on Iran. If Taiwan kicks off tomorrow, we’re not going to be ready. How do you see the action in Iran contributing to us bigger goals, including Indo-Pacific, which was highlighted as a priority in the national security strategy and in the National Defense strategy?

Alex Gray:

Well, let’s be clear, we don’t have enough munitions. I mean, that is 100 percent true, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the solution to not having sufficient munitions, which is an underinvestment issue in a defense industrial base issue that goes back twenty years, that doesn’t necessarily mean that we have to shoot ourselves in the foot in other theaters because we’ve made a defense industrial base series of defense industrial based mistakes. I think it just further highlights the need for essentially a peacetime mobilization to ensure that we do have those capabilities. Look, the reality is president is I think, very correct in the sense that we will never get out of the Middle East without making some sort of, you said bank shot. I would say kind of a moonshot. We will never get out of the Middle East without taking an extraordinary effort to change the paradigm.

We know how this ends, Matt. I mean, we will continue to constantly go in kind of an Operation Northern Watch style, just endless policing action in the Middle East, unless we try and fundamentally change some of the facts on the ground. I don’t think that requires an invasion. I don’t think that requires some sort of democracy agenda. I think it requires pretty much what this operation is, which is a more ambitious series of kinetic actions than we’ve done thus far, but still firmly grounded by kind of a relatively limited set of objectives, but objectives that have realized will finally free us up to be able to get away from this endless policing action. And that’s really what the last twenty-five-plus years have been is an extended Middle Eastern, north African policing action that goes on regardless of who’s in the White House, regardless of what presidents run on.

And unless we kind of flip the script, it’s just going to keep going on in perpetuity and we’ll never be able to prioritize the Indo-Pacific, which everyone seems to agree is the predominant theater for our future. And so I think, Matt, where we’re at right now is the president has this unique opportunity. The president made some comments essentially reminding Xi Jinping in my interpretation that he’s going to have a lot of leverage going into their meeting in April in Beijing that Xi Jinping is not the only one who has access in leverage to strategic resources. The United States is changing the energy calculus for the Chinese, and I think the president is very much reminding him that two can play this geo-economic supply chain game.

Matthew Kroenig:

Well, that’s well put. And it struck me that a lot of the coverage hasn’t seen the forest for the trees. A lot of focus on which administration officials said what, when. But zooming out to the bigger picture, I mean, Iran has been one of the greatest threats to US national security since the revolution in 1979. Most of the bad activities in the Middle East can be traced back to Iran one way or another. They are working more closely with China and other adversaries. And so it does seem to me like removing that piece from the chess board or significantly weakening it for years to come is overall a brilliant strategic move. And whether the administration’s talking points are always aligned or not, I think is missing the point.

Alex Gray:

I really think this may be the best chance that we have had in a long time to effectuate this rebalance or pivot that’s been talked about for over fifteen years now. The president, as we all commented on at the time, the president put the Middle East relatively far down his list of priorities in his national security strategy both times frankly, but most recently last year. That doesn’t mean the Middle East isn’t important, and obviously it’s significant because he just committed to a significant military operation there. But from a larger strategic standpoint, the president was making a key point in the NSS. He was saying that the American interest over the medium and long term is not a long standing presence in the Middle East. It’s the hemisphere, the homeland, and the Indo-Pacific. And the president, I think, has come to the conclusion that the only way to make that a reality, take it out of rhetoric, take it out of strategy documents, how do you operationalize that?

You do it by taking away the distraction of the Iranian theocracy. As you said, that since 1979 has been at the center of most of the chaos and most of the destabilization in the Middle East that continuously drags us in. I’ve told people when I was National Security Council Chief of Staff, I sat there one day and we had just done a major Indo-Pacific focused action, and the next day I said, you know what? I’m going to go and check how much of the intelligence, the paper, the inputs that go to the National Security Advisor on this random day after we’ve just done something significant on the Indo-Pacific. How much of the incoming today is focused on the Middle East? It was over 70 percent of everything that went to the Senior National Security Leadership at the White House on that random day. It was on the Middle East, and that is a reflection of the way the Iranians have played games with us in the region for so long and have continuously dragged us into this slow burning. I would argue this is the quagmire, this endless policing action with Iran. That is the quagmire. The president is setting us up to potentially be able to cut the cord and finally do the rebalance.

Matthew Kroenig:

Well, Alex, it’s been a terrific discussion and we’ll have to have you back on soon and see where we end up on this. But I think you’ve given our listeners a lot of insight into how Trump is likely thinking about his strategy right now at this important moment, biggest US military campaign in decades. And so thank you very much for joining us on. So what’s the strategy?

Alex Gray:

Thanks so much, Matt.

Matthew Kroenig:

Well, that was an interesting discussion, and I think Alex and I are largely on the same page that the Trump administration does have a clearer strategy than they’re getting credit for. They’ve been clear and consistent throughout that the objective is about degrading Iran’s military capabilities, and they are making a lot of progress there. I suspect it’ll take another couple of weeks or so for the United States to completely degrade Iran’s ballistic missile manufacturing capability and drone manufacturing capability. But at that point, I could imagine the president declaring victory. I don’t think this is going to become a quagmire when it comes to Iran’s governance. I think the Trump administration would prefer a more cooperative regime internationally that respects the human rights of its own people. But I think that’s largely in the hands of the Iranian people, and that’s how the Trump administration sees it, not something that they can easily dictate from Washington. This concludes our episode. Thank you all for listening. Be sure to subscribe to, so what’s the strategy wherever you get your podcast, and we look forward to seeing you all again soon.

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Charai for The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: JD Vance and the Strategic Logic of Trump’s Foreign Policy

Atlantic Council — Fri, 13 Mar 2026 14:43:20 +0000

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What Rob Jetten’s new minority government means for Dutch and European defense

Elmar Hellendoorn — Fri, 13 Mar 2026 12:54:11 +0000

UTRECHT—When you narrowly beat your primary election foe but can’t form a majority coalition to govern, what do you do? Can you still steer your country through some of the most significant geopolitical realignments since 1945 with a minority government? How Rob Jetten, the Netherlands’ youngest-ever prime minister, and his new government coalition answer these questions may serve as an acid test of minority governance in a highly fragmented political environment.

To form the new government, which was sworn in on February 23, three coalition parties negotiated for nearly four months. The result was a document, titled “Getting started,” which outlines the coalition’s agenda. Maintaining this coalition is one challenge; another is advancing the government’s agenda because the coalition lacks a majority in either chamber of parliament. The minority government’s success in implementing its agenda, including its plans for European security and defense, is likely to have implications well beyond the Low Countries.

Putting the coalition together

The new coalition consists of Jetten’s progressive liberal Democrats 66 (D66) party, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), and the centrist-liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Out of 150 seats in parliament, this coalition holds only sixty-six seats, ten short of a majority. Its shortfall is even more pronounced in the Senate, where the coalition holds just twenty-two of the seventy-five seats. To enact any new laws or ratify any new international agreements, therefore, Jetten’s minority coalition will need to find compromises with opposition parties.

The Dutch parliament contains no less than seventeen parties, and the new government will need to be creative in finding ways to assemble assorted groups to pass legislation. The main opposition party is the progressive eco-socialist PvdA-Groenlinks (Labour-Green-Left) with twenty seats. Geert Wilders’ anti-immigrant Freedom Party (PVV) disintegrated after losing the elections and a subsequent internal row; its position has been halved from thirty-seven seats before the election to just nineteen now. On the right flank, Right Answer 21 (JA21) has nine seats, and Forum for Democracy and Group Markuzower (a PVV splinter group) each have seven seats.

European pattern and prospects

As the European Union’s (EU’s) fifth-largest economy and one of NATO’s most capable middle powers, the Netherlands often signals broader trends within Northern Europe. If successful in moving legislation forward in parliament, the new government’s foreign and European policy agenda could contribute to larger shifts in overall Euro-Atlantic diplomatic and security relations. At the top of the new government’s security agenda is the ambition of moving toward a European pillar within NATO. At the same time, the government will need to remain fiscally prudent and avoid proposing radical legislative changes to ensure support.

The relative weakness of the new Dutch government coalition, its minority rule, and the fragmented parliament fit squarely within a wider pattern in European politics. While the constructively pro-European orientation of The Hague may in the short run help support other European centrists, in the longer run, Europe’s structural political problems persist. Together with European partners, the new Jetten government should therefore publicly address the more profound issues facing European liberal democracies, moving beyond the usual technocratic policy analysis. Doing so includes fostering a continental debate about Europe’s future as a civilization underpinning Western values.

In terms of foreign and security policy, the Netherlands under Jetten and his Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen, a former Christian Democrat member of the European Parliament, seek to strengthen European defenses and strategic autonomy while remaining close to the United States. The coalition document spells out this balancing act, explaining that “the Netherlands must pursue a realistic foreign policy in which Dutch and European interests take precedence. NATO constitutes the cornerstone of our collective security. The United States is the global power with which we share the greatest number of interests. At the same time, our future and prosperity are inextricably linked to a strong Europe.”

What this means in practice is the Netherlands taking steps to strengthen the European pillar within NATO. This requires some notable changes, as demonstrated recently when the Dutch government announced that it would join French-led discussions on European nuclear deterrence. Such nuclear diplomacy is a key indicator of The Hague’s strategic realignment. Historically, the Netherlands was highly skeptical about any European nuclear deterrence initiatives, preferring to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. Also notable is the new coalition’s ambition to create a European equivalent to the Five Eyes intelligence partnership.

Defense acquisition is another major aspect. There will also be an effort to set up a “European Defence Mechanism” for the joint European acquisition of military equipment and common military standard setting. The Hague aims to acquire 40 percent of its defense purchases jointly with European partners. And 50 percent should be procured from Dutch and/or European industry.

Notwithstanding these Europeanization efforts in defense policy, the Netherlands remains committed to its ties with the United States, not in the least through the bilateral nuclear sharing agreements and its F-35 air fleet. Toward this end, the coalition government has proposed a law to enshrine a commitment to spending 3.5 percent of gross domestic product on defense, ensuring a long-term, sustained defense effort. The Netherlands also continues to be a major financial contributor to Ukraine’s war efforts, spending 1 percent of Dutch gross domestic product in support of Ukraine.

Geopolitical and financial challenges

In financial and economic policy, it is notable that Finance Minister Eelco Heinen of the VVD party remains in place. Heinen faces a “geofinancial challenge”: to strike the right balance between financial policy and geopolitical exigencies, including the search for greater European strategic autonomy. Under his stewardship, fiscal prudence will remain a key theme. In light of the 3.5 percent defense spending pledge, this prudence is already leading to sharp discussions about social welfare reforms.

In the European context, the Netherlands remains opposed to financing other member states’ national debt, or “eurobonds,” reflecting a longstanding Dutch preference for fiscal discipline in the eurozone. Nonetheless, The Hague looks favorably at common European debt-financed instruments like the Defence Fund, SAFE, and the European Investment Bank. This stance befits a broader trend in the Dutch outlook on European debt mutualization. Furthermore, the new government views implementation of the recommendations of both Enrico Letta’s 2024 report on the future of the European single market and Mario Draghi’s 2025 report on EU competitiveness as crucial. And the Netherlands is a frontrunner in the deepening of Europe’s savings and investment union, previously known as the capital markets union.

The Dutch debate reflects a broader, structural European question: Can a more strategically autonomous Europe emerge not merely from institutional and bureaucratic coordination, which is constrained by a fragmented democratic base, but from a deeper recognition of a shared political destiny? Whether the Jetten government can realize its ambitious European agenda depends on its ability to assemble parliamentary majorities in one of Europe’s most fragmented political systems. The deeper challenge Jetten faces, like other European leaders, is therefore whether he can convincingly give a more profound meaning to his European agenda. His persuasive power may thus ultimately rest on how he approaches Europe: as a civilization underpinning Western values or as an institution for technocratic governance.

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Iran war highlights Ukraine’s rapid rise to drone superpower status

David Kirichenko — Thu, 12 Mar 2026 21:00:19 +0000

Ukrainian drone warfare experts arrived in the Middle East this week to defend the region against Iranian attack drones. Teams of Ukrainian specialists will help coordinate air defense operations in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and will also reportedly work alongside American colleagues to protect US military bases in Jordan.

News of these landmark deployments came also exactly one year after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s infamous Oval Office meeting with US President Donald Trump, which saw the US leader tell his Ukrainian counterpart, “You don’t have the cards.” Twelve months on, it would appear that Zelenskyy does in fact have some trump cards of his own.

The Iran war has sparked a sudden surge in international demand for Ukraine’s unique drone warfare expertise. As hostilities have spread across the Gulf region, more and more states are now looking to Kyiv for support as they seek to counter swarms of Iranian attack drones that are threatening to overwhelm or exhaust conventional missile-based air defenses.

Nobody is better equipped to address this challenge than Ukraine. Since 2022, the Ukrainians have gained unrivaled experience defending their country against massive Russian drone attacks on an almost daily basis. They have learned to do so in a cost-effective and sustainable manner by employing a wide range of tools including cheap interceptor drones, sophisticated monitoring systems, electronic warfare equipment, and helicopter gunships.

Since the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, Ukraine has signaled a readiness to share its drone warfare experience with the United States and its Gulf region allies. Kyiv’s offer has been readily accepted. As a result, the Ukrainian drone defense crews currently deploying to the Middle East are likely to be the first of many. Others are also taking note. Berlin confirmed plans this week to have Ukrainian experts train German troops, while Romania unveiled a major joint venture to co-produce drones together with Ukraine.

This is having a profound impact on Ukraine’s international image. Until recently, Ukraine was widely regarded as a country with little leverage that was heavily dependent on the West for survival. In light of recent developments, a radically different picture is now emerging of Ukraine as a valuable security partner and a major military power in its own right.

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Ukraine’s rise to drone superpower status has been remarkably rapid. The country first began experimenting with the use of drones on the battlefield in the wake of Russia’s initial invasion in 2014. However, major breakthroughs would not take place until the full-scale invasion of 2022.

In the space of just four years, Ukraine has gone from defense tech startup to global leader in the art of drone warfare. This remarkable progress owes much to Ukraine’s vibrant prewar tech sector and the country’s strong entrepreneurial spirit, which have combined to turbo-charge the wartime development of a domestic drone manufacturing sector. The existential nature of the Russian threat has also played a key role, providing local producers and government officials with all the motivation they need to remove potential roadblocks and maximize domestic output.

Ukrainian officials recognized early in the war that they could not rely on Western partners to supply the necessary weapons and ammunition on time and in sufficient quantities. Prioritizing the mass production of comparatively cheap drones was identified as Ukraine’s most realistic strategy as the country sought to counter Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower and conventional firepower. The results speak for themselves. When the full-scale invasion began, Ukraine only had a handful of drone producers. In 2026, domestic output is expected to reach seven million drones.

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Ukraine’s strategic emphasis on drones has transformed the war on land, in the air, and at sea. Around three-quarters of all Russian battlefield casualties are now inflicted by Ukrainian drones. Meanwhile, a drone-dominated kill zone stretching for over ten kilometers either side of the front lines makes any major offensive operations fraught with danger for the attackers. As the Russian invasion enters a fifth year, Ukraine’s “drone wall” is now the key to the country’s defensive strategy.

At sea, Kyiv has used domestically developed naval drones to break the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and neutralize around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet. Following a string of naval humiliations, Putin was forced to withdraw the remainder of his warships from Crimea to the relative safety of Russia itself.

Ukraine’s naval drones are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Some recent models have been armed with anti-aircraft missile capabilities, while others have served as mini aircraft carriers for smaller drones. This creative use of maritime drone technologies has made it possible for Ukraine to gain the upper hand in the Battle of the Black Sea, despite not having a conventional navy to speak of.

Ukraine’s growing drone arsenal also includes long-range drones that have made it possible to strike targets deep inside Russia. In recent years, Kyiv has escalated attacks on military and industrial sites located over one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. This has expanded the geographical scope of the war and brought Putin’s invasion home to Russia in ways that the Kremlin propaganda machine is unable to censor.

Ukraine’s new friends in the Gulf region are primarily interested in Kyiv’s interceptor drone technologies. These weapons have been developed in response to Russia’s own innovative use of attack drones. Since acquiring the blueprints from Iran during the early stages of the war, Russia has significantly upgraded its fleet of Shahed drones to make them bigger, faster, and more maneuverable. Moscow has also dramatically increased production, enabling far larger nightly attacks on targets throughout Ukraine.

The Ukrainian authorities have responded to this escalating Russian bombardment by developing a series of interceptor drones that can be mass produced for a fraction of the cost of traditional air defense missiles. Customers including oil giant Saudi Aramco are reportedly now queuing up to acquire these Ukrainian interceptors.

When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he expected an easy victory and vowed to “demilitarize” the country. With Ukrainian drone specialists now training NATO forces while guarding Gulf petrostates and US military bases, it is safe to say that this attempted demilitarization has backfired in spectacular fashion.

Rather than leaving Kyiv disarmed and defenseless, the war unleashed by Putin four years ago has transformed Ukraine into a drone superpower. This newfound status is already changing outside perceptions of the country and looks set to further strengthen Ukraine’s geopolitical standing as more countries seek to benefit from Kyiv’s drone warfare expertise. Zelenskyy clearly holds plenty of cards and is prepared to play them.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

In other words, they were not designed to be part of a battlefield.

As a result, energy security in the region has often been treated primarily as a corporate security problem managed by national oil companies, rather than as an integrated civil-military planning challenge. That assumption has come increasingly into question since the 2019 strikes on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais facilities. Iran’s attacks this month only underscore the point.

How should Gulf states respond? Two recent conflicts—one involving a major energy exporter and the other a country fighting to keep its power grid running—offer useful lessons. Iraq provides lessons for maintaining export flows—pipelines, terminals, and maritime routes that allow oil to reach global markets despite persistent sabotage. Ukraine illustrates the challenge of domestic resilience: how a national electricity system can continue functioning even while large portions of the grid are repeatedly struck. For Gulf states, which are both export heavyweights and share a regional electricity network through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Interconnection Authority, the challenges that Iraq and Ukraine have faced—and their responses, both successful and not—are worth studying.

Iraq and export resiliency

Iraq provides one of the clearest examples of how an energy exporter adapts when infrastructure becomes a sustained target. Following the US invasion in 2003, insurgent groups quickly discovered the vulnerability of Iraq’s energy system. To this day, the country remains on a road to resiliency, and its path in recent years has been far from smooth. Pipeline sabotage has remained frequent, and the security forces tasked with protecting energy infrastructure—including the pipeline police—have struggled with corruption and uneven training. Yet the country still produced several practical ideas that other energy exporters may find useful. Three lessons in particular stand out:

1. Dedicated pipeline protection forces

Following the 2003 invasion, coalition authorities and Iraqi ministries created specialized units to protect energy infrastructure. These units include an Oil Protection Force comprising roughly 14,000 guards responsible for pipelines, pumping stations, and export facilities. While these units faced challenges related to corruption and the quality of their training, the institutional principle remains important: Protecting energy infrastructure requires dedicated forces organized specifically for that mission rather than general military units temporarily assigned to infrastructure protection.

2. Drone surveillance and thermal monitoring of pipeline corridors

In late 2025, Iraq’s Energy Police Directorate announced the deployment of nearly fifty drones to conduct daily reconnaissance and transmit real-time data to a central command center in Baghdad. Officials also reported the installation of thermal cameras along parts of the pipeline network in cooperation with the Military Industrialization Authority. These systems help detect abnormal heat signatures associated with leaks, fires, or potential sabotage and allow operators to identify suspicious activity along infrastructure corridors that are difficult to patrol continuously.

3. Offshore loading buoys that create alternative export pathways

Iraq has expanded its maritime export capacity through a network of buoys known as single-point moorings (SPMs), which are connected to subsea pipelines. These buoys allow large tankers to load crude oil several miles from shore without docking at fixed terminals. These floating loading points function as distributed export nodes. If major port terminals come under attack or are forced offline, tankers can still load through offshore moorings.

These adaptations did not eliminate attacks on Iraq’s energy sector. Northern export infrastructure—particularly the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline to the Mediterranean—has been repeatedly sabotaged. Iraqi oil exports continued largely because both production and shipments shifted through the country’s southern maritime export system in the Gulf near Basra. Multiple terminals and offshore loading buoys allowed tankers to continue loading crude even when parts of the system were disrupted.

Ukraine’s lessons in keeping the lights on

If Iraq offers lessons in protecting energy exports, Ukraine provides a stark illustration of how governments can keep domestic energy systems running even while infrastructure is under sustained attack.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s power grid has faced sustained missile and drone attacks against generation plants, substations, and transmission infrastructure. Yet despite widespread damage and recurring blackouts, the system has continued operating under extreme strain.

The war has produced several practical ideas about how governments can keep national energy systems operating during sustained strikes. Four lessons in particular stand out:

1. Hardening critical grid infrastructure

Ukrainian operators have reinforced substations and transformers with protective barriers and blast walls. In some locations, particularly vulnerable equipment was relocated or buried underground.

2. Rapid-repair brigades and pre-positioned spare parts

Ukrainian grid operators developed specialized teams capable of quickly restoring electricity after strikes. These brigades travel across the country replacing damaged transformers and reconnecting transmission lines—often restoring service within hours or days.

3. Cross-border grid integration and emergency electricity imports

Ukraine accelerated synchronization with the European ENTSO-E electricity network in March 2022, allowing electricity imports from neighboring countries when domestic generation capacity was damaged.

4. Cross-border gas diplomacy and reverse-flow supply routes

Ukraine has strengthened energy resilience by expanding cross-border gas connections with European partners. For decades, most pipelines in Central and Eastern Europe were designed to carry Russian gas westward through Soviet-era transit networks. After Russia’s gas disputes with Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, European countries began modifying these systems so gas could flow in the opposite direction—allowing supplies from European markets to move east toward Ukraine. Finally, a growing north–south transmission route linking liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals in Greece with pipeline networks through Bulgaria, Romania, and Central Europe—often referred to as the Vertical Gas Corridor—is further expanding the region’s ability to move non-Russian gas to Ukraine during the war.

Ukraine’s experience highlights a harsher reality about infrastructure resilience in modern conflict. Preventing damage entirely is rarely possible. The more realistic objective is to limit disruption and restore service quickly enough for the system to keep operating.

What Gulf governments can learn

Drawing on lessons from both cases, several priorities emerge for Gulf planners, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

1. Conduct vulnerability mapping and pursue “low-tech hardening”

Gulf governments should conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments across oil, gas, and electricity systems to identify the most critical infrastructure nodes and the most likely points of attack. Above-ground pipeline segments, exposed substations, and single export corridors represent predictable vulnerabilities. Gulf states should prioritize simple physical protections that reduce infrastructure vulnerability at relatively low cost. Burying exposed pipeline segments, reinforcing pumping stations, and installing protective structures around substations can significantly reduce damage from drone or missile debris.

2. Institutionalize cross-ministry energy protection procedures and establish emergency operations centers

Energy protection should not rely solely on corporate security departments or temporary military deployments. Gulf governments should establish dedicated structures to coordinate defense ministries, energy agencies, and infrastructure operators. These structures should include 24/7 emergency coordination and monitoring cells focused specifically on energy infrastructure during conflict or crisis, linking civilian energy operators with military authorities, police, fire services, and other government agencies.

3. Expand monitoring of pipeline corridors and remote infrastructure

Energy infrastructure in the Gulf spans thousands of kilometers of terrain that cannot be guarded continuously. Governments should deploy drone surveillance, thermal sensors, and fixed monitoring systems along pipeline routes and critical infrastructure corridors. These systems help detect abnormal heat signatures associated with leaks, fires, or sabotage and allow operators to identify suspicious activity along infrastructure corridors that are difficult to patrol continuously.

4. Pre-position strategic spare parts and repair capacity

Gulf governments should pre-position critical spare parts—including transformers, control systems, and pipeline components—and maintain specialized repair teams capable of restoring operations under emergency conditions.

5. Expand offshore loading infrastructure to create alternative export pathways

Expanding offshore loading infrastructure—particularly SPMs connected to subsea pipelines—can create additional export pathways. Because SPMs are smaller and located offshore, they are harder to target than large terminals and allow tankers to load crude offshore—often up to ten miles away—providing additional distance and warning time from drone or missile attacks. (It is worth noting that this SPM option does not exist for LNG exports, which require specialized liquefaction plants and cryogenic infrastructure to cool gas to roughly –162°C before shipping.)

6. Pursue “grid diplomacy” through deeper regional electricity integration

Cross-border electricity interconnections should be treated as strategic infrastructure. The Gulf already possesses a regional power network through the GCC Interconnection Authority linking Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. Expanding contingency power-sharing agreements within this network could allow Gulf states to support one another during infrastructure disruptions.

With the norm of not attacking civilian energy infrastructure seemingly eroded in modern conflict, governments must take a proactive and whole-of-society approach to energy security.

For Gulf states at the center of global energy markets, resilience will depend on protecting both domestic energy systems and the export infrastructure that connects them to the world. In future conflicts, the ability to keep energy flowing may prove just as decisive as the ability to defend territory.

The post Energy under attack: What the Gulf can learn from Ukraine and Iraq appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Costa quoted in AFP article on US interceptor stocks in the conflict with Iran

Atlantic Council — Thu, 12 Mar 2026 18:09:38 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 2, Forward Defense director Joe Costa was quoted in an AFP article on US air defense interceptor stocks. Costa cautioned that a sustained conflict with Iran could impact the availability of these capabilities for other global priorities.

Staff

Joe Costa

Director

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The post Costa quoted in AFP article on US interceptor stocks in the conflict with Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkey has weathered regional instability before. But the war in Iran poses greater risks to Ankara than past conflicts.

Grady Wilson — Thu, 12 Mar 2026 15:51:22 +0000

Despite Turkey’s hopes and efforts to mediate prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Ankara is being increasingly drawn into the US and Israeli war against Iran. Turkey aimed to publicly distance itself from the conflict as much as possible in its initial statements, condemning both the strikes on Iran as well as Tehran’s strikes against regional countries. Notably, Turkey was not included in the long list of countries targeted in Iran’s retaliatory strikes early on despite housing US forces at the Incirlik Air Base in the country’s south. Turkish officials were quick to underline that Turkish airspace and assets in the country were not to be used to attack Iran.

However, on Wednesday, March 4, two developments shattered the illusion of Turkey’s ability to steer clear of the conflict. First, NATO shot down an Iranian ballistic missile “directed at Turkish airspace.” Second, there was widespread reporting that the CIA was working to arm Kurdish forces to foment rebellion in Iran.

It was unclear what the Iranian missile was targeting or even whether it was aimed at Turkey or elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as Cyprus. But even if it was aimed in error, Turkey takes violations of its airspace very seriously. Simply ask Russia, whose jet Turkey shot down in October 2015 after straying into Turkish airspace during a Russian bombing campaign in Syria.

Turkey limited its response to the violation from Iran to formal diplomatic channels, summoning the Iranian ambassador in Ankara and holding a private call between the two nations’ foreign ministers. Meanwhile, public pronouncements from Turkish government officials underscored the state’s commitment to protecting its sovereignty. There was no indication that the missile would trigger NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause—Alliance officials quickly poured cold water on the notion and it’s not clear Turkey would even want or seek it in this circumstance.

But on March 9, NATO intercepted a second Iranian missile over Turkey, creating new complications for Ankara. The debris of the second missile fell over the inland province of Gaziantep, in contrast to the first, which hit Hatay, located on the coast. The second missile strike to breach Turkish airspace is therefore less easily explained as an error than the first, and it is likely that one or both of them were aimed at Incirlik.

US intelligence appears to be lining up behind this assessment. On Monday, the US State Department raised its warning for southeast Turkey, the region nearest the Iranian border, to “do not travel,” the highest risk level. And nonessential staff were ordered to leave the US consulate in Adana. The second missile also led to a more direct and targeted rebuke from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who said Tehran continues to take “wrong and provocative” steps and that Turkey has issued the necessary warnings to Iran.

Meanwhile, the news that the CIA was arming Kurdish forces to combat Iran set off alarm bells in Turkey, which has been burnt badly by previous partnerships between the United States and auxiliary Kurdish ground forces. Most notably, there have been Turkish tensions with the United States over US support for the People’s Defense Units (YPG), a Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and Turkey. With US support, the YPG was effective in combatting and curtailing the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) starting in 2014, but the group also precipitated a diplomatic crisis with Turkey that the US-Turkish bilateral relationship is only now beginning to recover from. The prospect of a similar scenario repeating itself in Iran was raised at a recent event the Atlantic Council’s Turkey program hosted on US-Turkey cooperation in Syria.

Moreover, the emboldening of the transnational Kurdish nationalist movement in Syria also played a key role in the breakdown of the peace process between Turkey and the PKK in 2015. Now in 2026, Turkey is once again moving toward resolving the PKK issue, under the “terror-free Turkey” initiative. Regional spoilers or irritants to this very delicate and choreographed process could once again threaten to derail the conclusion of the almost fifty-year conflict between Turkey and the PKK, which has claimed the lives of tens of thousands.

Fortunately, based on US President Donald Trump’s messaging over the weekend and signals that the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq was not keen to put itself more into the crosshairs, it looks as if Turkey’s fears of a Kurdish uprising in Iran aligned with the PKK will be avoided.

But the fact that support for such an insurgency was being considered underscores the lack of clarity on the goals and endgame of the conflict, which is particularly concerning for states like Turkey that neighbor Iran. Given its experiences with the Syrian civil war and the war in Iraq, Turkey is deeply averse to the potential of regional disintegration and power vacuums at its border. The specter of terror organizations with freedom to operate on its border is something Turkey cannot help but be vigilant against, as would any country in its position.

In this context, Turkey is adopting a delicate balancing act, seeking to protect its territory, security, and economic interests. Despite significant concerns over the war in Iran, Turkey has invested heavily in its outreach to the Trump administration, working to turn its bilateral relationship with the United States around from historic lows. Thus far, Turkey has crafted public messaging aiming to avoid criticizing the United States and drawing Trump’s ire.

But much in the same way Turkey approaches Russia, Ankara views Iran as a fact of life to be managed simultaneously through cooperation when possible and competition when it is not. An irony is that Turkey has been one of the largest beneficiaries of the severe degradation to Iran and its regional proxy network wrought mainly by Israel since the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Since then, Turkey’s influence in Syria, the South Caucasus, and Iraq has increased while Iran’s has decreased.

But when it comes to the US and Israeli war against Iran, the risks are greater and the outcomes more uncertain. Any actions Turkey considers taking to respond to Iran’s missiles or to protect its borders are calibrated against the inevitability that it will need to deal with whatever Iran is left standing after the conflict ends—and the regional fallout that results. For now, that means Turkey is, to the extent possible with war raging next door, seeking to avoid escalating in both kinetic and rhetorical terms.

Grady Wilson is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Kroenig in NPR on Straight of Hormuz and global shipping

Atlantic Council — Thu, 12 Mar 2026 14:48:07 +0000

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 12, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on NPR about how Iran’s offensive actions in the Straight of Hormuz impact global shipping.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

1. Is the US accomplishing its goals in the war?

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in NPR on Straight of Hormuz and global shipping appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Twenty questions (and expert answers) about the Iran war

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 20:37:41 +0000

The US and Israeli militaries are hammering Iran for a second week. Iranian forces and proxies are striking back across the Middle East. Global financial and energy markets are full of volatility. And questions abound about the future trajectory of this conflict and its wider consequences.

Below, Atlantic Council experts pierce the fog of war with clarifying answers to twenty of the most pressing questions about these fast-moving events.

Click to jump to a question

2. Is Israel achieving its aims in this conflict?

3. Will the US put boots on the ground in Iran?

4. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the Iranian regime?

5. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the US?

6. What do we know about Iran’s new supreme leader?

7. What happens if the Iranian regime collapses?

8. How is the Iranian opposition responding to the conflict?

9. Is Iran’s nuclear stockpile a danger?

10. What threat does Iran pose to the US homeland?

11. What impact is this war having on US weapons stockpiles?

12. What’s the economic impact on Americans?

13. How is this conflict changing global energy markets?

14. What happens if Kurdish groups launch an armed resistance in Iran?

15. What impact will this conflict have on China?

16. What impact will this conflict have on Russia?

17. Will the Houthis in Yemen get involved?

18. How will this conflict impact Gaza?

19. How will the war impact US-Gulf relations?

20. What other countries could get involved if this war expands?

1. Is the US accomplishing its goals in the war?

Washington’s stated goals have included degrading Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, navy, drones, and control of its terror proxies. The United States is well on its way to achieving these objectives. All of these capabilities are badly degraded with, for example, more than fifty Iranian naval vessels resting on the sea floor. Going after remaining missile and drone manufacturing capabilities will likely take a couple of more weeks, at which point US President Donald Trump will be able to declare victory.

A better government in Iran that is more cooperative internationally and that respects the human rights of its people is also desirable, but that outcome is largely in the hands of the Iranian people.

Regardless of who governs next, Iran will be much weaker for years to come and less able to threaten the United States.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president for geostrategy and fellows and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

2. Is Israel achieving its aims in this conflict?

Israel almost certainly has set as a strategic objective the collapse of the Iranian regime. That is an expansion of initial goals following the June 2025 twelve-day war. In that conflict, Israeli and US strikes significantly set back the Iranian nuclear program. But some Iranian ballistic missile attacks also managed to penetrate Israeli and US missile defenses. Given the limited stockpile of interceptors, and Iranian ambitions to ramp up production of ballistic missiles that could reach Israel from roughly two thousand to ten thousand—meaning that they could overwhelm Israeli defenses and pose a strategic threat—Israel was prepared to strike at this threat later in 2026.

But that changed following the popular protests against the regime in January, when it appeared that the Islamic Republic’s internal weakness matched the damage to its nuclear program and deterioration of its regional position and proxy network over the past two years. So in addition to degrading the missile threat by striking launchers, storage sites, and production facilities, Israeli targeting since the beginning of the war has included regime leadership (starting with the supreme leader and others in the conflict’s opening minutes), state security organs that participated in the crushing of the protests (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Basij militia, and police), and oil storage tanks in Tehran described as essential to the regime’s war machine.

It is understandable that Israelis would seek the demise of the regime. For decades, they have lived with a major regional player openly and ideologically committed to Israel’s destruction, seeking strategic weapons to advance that aim, and arming and funding proxy terror groups that have spilled no small amount of Israeli blood. Tens of thousands of rockets and missiles have been launched against Israeli civilian targets over the past twenty years by Iran and its proxies. Seeing an opportunity to change this reality, which much of the world has taken for granted, has broad appeal in Israel. So far, with a few deadly Iranian missile attacks but Israel’s defenses otherwise holding, the campaign seems to most Israelis to be both necessary and being conducted at a tolerable price.

What is less clear is how well the Israeli goal of regime change matches the United States’ objectives, or if it does, how long that will remain the case. Trump and his administration have offered inconsistent explanations of the war’s strategic objectives, but at least some of those calls—for “unconditional surrender” and creating the conditions that allow the Iranian people to take over their institutions—are consistent with Israeli goals. But as oil prices spike, markets dip, shipping and supply chains are disrupted, and Iran continues to find gaps in its Arab neighbors’ air defense and cause economic and infrastructure damage, it is possible to imagine Trump seeking an earlier off-ramp with a claim of having significantly defanged the regime. Further, the prospects of regime collapse followed by chaos, civil war, instability spilling over into neighboring countries, and refugee flows is of potentially far greater concern to the United States and its Arab partners than to Israel. If such a gap between Israeli and US goals opens up, expect Trump to be the determiner of when the war ends and to impose that endpoint on Israel, even if it is short of regime change.

3. Will the US put boots on the ground in Iran?

The United States is not mobilizing conventional ground forces either in the region or in the United States. Iran is a massive country with very difficult topography and would require hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy. Any use of ground forces would likely be limited to special operations forces for specific missions. Trump has espoused military objectives that are achievable through air and sea power without the need for a ground invasion. The military can seed the conditions for regime change by accomplishing its objectives, but a transition to an organic protest movement that the military doesn’t control or a negotiated settlement with the current regime is a political objective.

Looking back to the Iraq war, Trump has cited the deployment of conventional ground forces and the disbanding of the Iraqi army and government as the reasons the United States became ensnared in a costly insurgency. He is seeking to avoid that by not deploying ground forces and preferring to work with a member of the existing government—if the regime is willing to change its approach. If those conditions come together, Trump can achieve his military objectives and leave at a time of his choosing without a transition to a new government.

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and leads the initiative’s Counterterrorism Project. He previously served as chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

4. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the Iranian regime?

There is an assumption among some in Washington that Iran will stop fighting when Trump and Israel want to end this war. This is the same reasoning that led the Trump administration to assume Iran would capitulate in nuclear talks and not respond forcefully to the war that Trump and Israel initiated on February 28. This is a very different conflict than the twelve-day war in 2025 or other conflicts in which Iran rapidly de-escalated.

The Iranian regime perceives that it is in an existential conflict, and it does not appear to be interested in an immediate off-ramp. From Iran’s perspective, a cessation of hostilities would merely be a temporary respite, before the United States or Israel restart the conflict once they have replenished their military supplies.

Therefore, a slow, protracted, war of attrition is probably Iran’s intended outcome. Iranian leaders are calculating that their country is more willing to take casualties and absorb pain than either the United States or Gulf countries. Therefore, if Iran retains the military capability (including asymmetric threats) to inflict pain on the United States and the Gulf, as well as keep energy prices high, then Iran is more likely to determine the end of the conflict than the United States is. In fact, Iran may only accept an off-ramp if it ensures there is not another near-term war. This would likely entail compelling Trump to enforce a cease-fire that Israel adheres to. This type of belligerent approach is a risky gamble for Iran, as it increases the chances that the United States doubles down on the war and that it draws in the Gulf, but it is also probably a risk the remnants of the regime are willing to take.

5. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the US?

The United States is going to come out ahead in this war in almost every conceivable outcome. The president has smashed Iran’s missile capabilities, supported the destruction of some additional nuclear facilities, and killed scores of Iran’s top leaders. Tehran was unwilling to trade its uranium enrichment capability and has never countenanced negotiations on its missiles or proxies. Now it has less of all three.

Iran, of course, also has a vote on ending the war, but once the threat to the regime is gone—and it looks like it’s receding—Iran will eventually return to business as usual. It could keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, but that would require continuing to expose itself to attack and pressure, and it does need oil revenue, too. Israel could conceivably continue the war alone but would likely scale down—think Gaza—once the United States indicated its desire to stop.

Perhaps the only unacceptable outcome for the war is if a sustained opposition movement emerges and either suffers more brutality on the streets of Tehran or manages to liberate some territory and then is violently suppressed by the regime. The conditions required for a US win also change if there is a mass casualty terrorist attack at home or overseas directly related to the war, which the United States would need to justify with a more acute strategic objective. If the regime thus wanted to inflict harm on the United States, it might well strike at the homeland, goad Washington into making a sustained effort to replace it, and then try to make the United States suffer further as a result.

—Andrew L. Peek is the director of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He was previously the senior director for European and Russian affairs at the National Security Council and the deputy assistant secretary for Iran and Iraq at the US Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

6. What do we know about Iran’s new supreme leader?

Iran’s new supreme leader, fifty-six-year-old Mojtaba Khamenei, is the son of the recently deceased Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Many analysts believe that Mojtaba will be a continuation—and potentially more extreme version—of his father. However, less is known about the younger Khamenei, as he rarely speaks or appears in public.

What we do know is that the new supreme leader was trained by a string of hard-line, anti-Western clerics, played a prominent role in past repression of protesters, and was recently embroiled in a corruption scandal. As a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and an active participant in Iran’s intelligence and defense, he was reportedly the IRGC’s favored candidate. However, his selection is controversial even within the remnants of the Islamic Republic. According to reports, his appointment contravened his father’s written wishes and was opposed by senior political figures in Iran. In this sense, Mojtaba Khamenei’s selection is about more than just succession. It is about stabilizing a system at a moment when uncertainty poses a strategic risk to the regime.

Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, attends a rally in Tehran, Iran, on May 31, 2019. (Hamid Forootan/ISNA/WANA via Reuters Connect)

In the short term, Mojtaba Khamenei will likely be focused on Iranian defense, ensuring relative domestic stability, and power projection. Israel and the United States have already expressed opposition to his ascension, leaving open the possibility—perhaps even likelihood—that he will be targeted in future US or Israeli military actions.

—Nate Swanson

7. What happens if the Iranian regime collapses?

The end of the regime is less likely to foster democracy as it is to birth what some are calling “IRGCistan”—a military-dominated state in which the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamanei, is a partner but not the final or ultimate authority, as his father was, and with power firmly vested in the hands of the IRGC. Such a result would provide three pathways forward.

An IRGC-run Iran could initially be a bigger regional and domestic threat, staking out even harder-line stances in seeking to consolidate power and focused on ensuring no other insider can outflank it. Second, it could seek to quickly gain the support of the Iranian people by showing greater flexibility for a deal with the United States in exchange for an economic boost in the form of sanctions relief. Third, it could lead to a period of confusion and jockeying for power in which Western states will have to decide how much to try to jump into the fray and influence the outcome.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Dispatches

Feb 28, 2026

Experts react: The US and Israel just unleashed a major attack on Iran. What’s next?

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts assess the unfolding Operation Epic Fury and where it goes from here.

Conflict Iran

8. How is the Iranian opposition responding to the conflict?

Many in the Iranian opposition both inside and outside of Iran had welcomed targeted military strikes on regime officials and targets in the lead-up to the war. The thinking was that there was no other way to dislodge a violent regime that over forty-seven years had resisted international pressure, sanctions, and multiple internal nationwide anti-regime protests. The war’s opening salvo in killing then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and top regime officials was celebrated widely in Iran and seen as an optimistic start to what many believed would be certain regime change. But with Israel’s strikes on oil depots in Tehran that sent a black smoke cloud over the sky in the second week of the war, along with the destruction of cultural heritage sites, moods have started to shift. Some question how much they are willing to sacrifice for a free Iran and whether the regime—which so far has proved resilient—will actually fall, or whether all the war did was replace one Khamenei with another Khamenei who is thirty years younger.

But bright spots remain. Many Iranians say there is no turning back now and that the regime has to go or else it will emerge more brutal than ever before. There are reports of people organizing to take to the streets once the bombing stops. Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah, continues to offer to act as a transitional leader for Iran to guide the country to free and fair elections and has attracted new key constituencies to broaden his tent. Inside Iran, seventy opposition activists have joined to form a new group called the Strategic Council of Republicans Inside Iran. Their names have not been declared publicly, but they have made their leadership known to Western governments. And outside Iran, opposition figures are meeting to discuss core transitional issues and encourage pluralistic politics.

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and a board member of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

9. Is Iran’s nuclear stockpile a danger?

Since Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow in June 2025, it has been difficult for experts to assess how much of Iran’s nuclear stockpile remains accessible and potentially dangerous. Prior to those attacks, Iran’s stockpile had been estimated at about 440.9 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the existing stockpile is “mainly” at Isfahan, while other parts of the stockpile may have been destroyed last year. Some experts believe that the stockpile is largely inaccessible and buried underground. After receiving a briefing from the Trump administration, US Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL) raised concern that the administration “never had a plan for that nuclear stockpile of enriched uranium—to destroy [it], to seize it, or to put it under international inspection.”

If the nuclear stockpile is still accessible, then its future may parallel the political future of Iran; a regime that is compliant with US requirements may wish to take measures to safeguard the stockpile and could even allow inspections to resume. However, if the regime feels that it remains under threat, then it could be more motivated to rebuild military and nuclear weapons capabilities. Additionally, if Iran devolves into political chaos and civil war, then the stockpile could fall into the hands of rogue elements with nefarious purposes.

—Jennifer T. Gordon is the director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

10. What threat does Iran pose to the US homeland?

Iran’s long history and experience in asymmetric warfare—including being a state sponsor for terrorism and perpetrator of cyberattacks—suggests that the kinetic portion of this conflict could be just a start. In retaliation for the death of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020, for example, Tehran sought to murder both Trump and then National Security Advisor John Bolton. While no specific threats have been identified, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appear to be on high alert. Press reports indicate that the DHS warned of potential lone wolf attacks, which are notoriously difficult to identify in advance, in response to the conflict.

Iran’s proxies across the Middle East are another arrow in Tehran’s quiver. Tehran has cultivated, armed, trained, and financed a network of non-state armed organizations operating across the region with links to Africa and parts of Latin America. These groups include Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian militant organizations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, and Yemen’s Houthi movement. Together and individually, they enable Iran to project influence, deter adversaries, and retaliate asymmetrically while preserving a degree of paper-thin plausible deniability.

Currently, Iran’s proxy network remains operational, although increasingly constrained. Hezbollah retains significant military capabilities, though persistent Israeli attacks and the potential that Lebanese authorities work to limit the group’s activities could challenge its efforts to mount a campaign. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias wield influence yet risk nationalist backlash and sanctions. The Houthis have demonstrated reach but face sustained military pressure.

—Ingrid Small is the deputy director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. She previously served as a senior analyst and analytic methodologist in the US intelligence community for over three decades.

11. What impact is this war having on US weapons stockpiles?

The problem of prioritizing near-term requirements over long-term priorities is not new. This is why the recently released National Defense Strategy rightly called for being clear-eyed about available military resources and emphasized a ruthless prioritization on homeland defense and China, along with rebuilding the US defense industrial base.

But now the Iran war is degrading US military readiness for homeland defense and China.

While the cumulative readiness impacts of this decision are difficult to quantify in the near-term, the war in Iran will likely drain inventories of critical munitions and parts, with knock-on effects across the force from training schedules to unit strength.

Major assets employed for the war in Iran that are also relevant to homeland defense and/or China include air defense systems, long-range standoff weapons, naval vessels, strategic airlift and aerial refueling, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets. Moreover, military planners must consider the resources required to monitor, deter, or fight North Korea, Russia, and China simultaneously in the event they join a Pacific conflict or a worst-case homeland defense scenario.

How quickly the United States can regenerate readiness for homeland defense and great power competition remains an open question and will depend both on the Trump administration’s decisions and factors outside the administration’s control.

—Joe Costa is the director of the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans and posture in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

12. What’s the economic impact on Americans?

Most Americans are likely to feel the war in two ways—gas prices and groceries. Nearly 20 percent of the global oil supply transits through the Strait of Hormuz and right now movement is at a standstill. It’s true that the United States is far less reliant on energy imports than it was during the previous two Gulf wars, but the nature of the energy market is that a price spike quickly impacts everyone around the world. And that’s exactly what has happened.

After some wild swings, the price of oil as of Wednesday is sitting at about ninety dollars a barrel—up from sixty dollars in December. Many Americans are driving by gas stations and seeing a first number starting with a “3.” It may not be long before that becomes a “4”—and it could get worse, depending on how long the crisis lasts. This is something that will be particularly painful for Americans who already list cost of living as one of their top concerns in surveys. The administration is taking a series of actions to try and relieve the pressure: It’s coordinating with allies to put more oil on the market. It’s providing shipping insurance to convince tankers to make the passage. And it’s even temporarily relieving some sanctions on Russian oil. But none of those steps will stop prices from surging higher as long as transit remains blocked and oil production in the Gulf continues to be a target of Iranian drones.

High gas prices would be bad enough, but expect the cost of other items to tick up, too. Everyday grocery items could soon become more expensive as goods transited across the country on trucks face higher diesel fuel costs.

All of this creates a headache for Trump’s choice to chair the Federal Reserve, Kevin Warsh. Up until the start of the conflict, inflation pressures had been cooling. But if the war continues and Warsh is confirmed, he will face a president who wants lower interest rates but an economy facing price pressures. That means all those looking for relief on mortgage rates and car loans may have to wait a little longer.

13. How is this conflict changing global energy markets?

The conflict is forcing energy markets to price in geopolitical risk that, until recently, was largely theoretical. For years, governments have assessed the energy security vulnerability posed by the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint responsible for roughly one fifth of global oil and gas flows. Today, that vulnerability is no longer a contingency exercise. Even in an otherwise well-supplied market, traders are confronting the real consequences of supply chains tied to a region capable of removing millions of barrels per day from the global market. Oil may be relatively fungible, but the world cannot quickly replace a sudden loss of fifteen million barrels per day. As the conflict persists, the economic knock-on effects compound, and Tehran may be gaining a new layer of deterrence if even the threat of short-range drone or missile attacks can trigger geoeconomic disruption by intermittently halting traffic through Hormuz.

Natural gas markets are even less flexible. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) export infrastructure takes years—often more than a decade—to move from concept to first cargo, leaving Europe and East Asia structurally exposed. Emerging economies may increasingly forgo planned gas buildouts in favor of alternative energy sources. At the same time, upstream capital may pivot toward the Western Hemisphere—particularly the United States, Guyana, and Canada—where geopolitical risk is perceived as lower. That shift could further entrench North America as a global energy powerhouse while simultaneously accelerating political support in vulnerable capitals for technologies less dependent on Hormuz, including solar and battery storage.

—Landon Derentz is vice president, energy and infrastructure, senior director, and Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. He previously served as director for energy at the White House National Security Council.

14. What happens if Kurdish groups launch an armed resistance in Iran?

The Kurdish coalition’s entry into the war could hand Tehran a political opening even as it creates a military problem. Kurdish fighters might stretch Iranian forces and expose weak control in the northwest. But Tehran could also use the specter of separatism to rally Persian nationalism, split the opposition, and frame the war as foreign-backed dismemberment rather than domestic revolt, giving itself a justification for mass arrests and violence against Kurds inside Iran.

If Kurdish forces receive sufficient support, they could serve several strategic purposes. They might pin down Iranian security forces in the west, giving space for unarmed protesters in major cities to demonstrate without being massacred. They could stretch the regime’s resources thin and reduce pressure on the Gulf states and Israel. And if the Kurds were to take and hold territory in northern Iran, they could create a buffer zone beneficial to Israel and the West.

For all these reasons, any support for the Kurds should go beyond military backing. It must include political support for Kurdish autonomy in a post-regime Iran, so that the Kurds do not end up being used once again as expendable forces.

—Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Dispatches

Mar 6, 2026

How would a Kurdish offensive change the war in Iran?

By Atlantic Council experts

Our experts explain the goals of the various Kurdish groups the United States is reportedly backing for an attack against Iran and how their involvement could impact the wider war.

Conflict Defense Policy

15. What impact will this conflict have on China?

Beijing is in wait-and-see mode. China was Iran’s major oil buyer, but that dependence was mainly one-way: China was buying around 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports, but those purchases accounted for less than 15 percent of China’s total imports.

Chinese leaders have always known that, as a net oil importer, the straits of Hormuz and Malacca (two narrow sea lanes that ships must traverse to deliver oil from the Middle East to China) presented a major energy security risk. Beijing has long feared that Washington would target Chinese oil tankers in a future US-China crisis, and it has been working furiously to reduce those risks. Today, due to that contingency planning, China is less dependent on imported oil than many observers realize. China is working to electrify the nation’s auto fleet and making shocking progress (electric vehicles can run on coal-fired power, which China has in abundance). And Chinese leaders took advantage of the past few years of low oil prices to go on a buying spree, beefing up their domestic reserves to plan for a future supply crisis such as the one they are now facing.

Overall, China is perhaps more prepared than any other major economy to face the energy crisis that could emerge from the situation in Iran. And Chinese leaders are very good at strategic planning. They will be looking for ways to turn this situation into an opportunity. Already, for example, the United States is reportedly moving some of its most advanced missile defense units from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East—removing systems that, in Beijing’s view, directly threatened China’s security interests in the region. It is impossible to overstate the degree to which those movements are a massive win for Beijing. And if the United States ends up stuck in another Middle Eastern quagmire that cedes the Indo-Pacific to China, the wins will keep coming.

16. What impact will this conflict have on Russia?

The conflict in the Middle East is already playing into Russia’s hands.

The war in Iran has created global anxiety around the supply and availability of crude oil coming out of the Gulf. Earlier this week, oil prices surged to the highest they have been since 2022. To quell oil market fears, the Trump administration eased sanctions on Russian oil. Last Thursday, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a general license to allow for the delivery and sale of sanctioned Russian oil to India for thirty days. Meanwhile, reporting indicates that the administration is considering additional sanctions relief for Russia to enable the sale of Russian Urals.

This is a win for Russia. Russia’s economy has been in a steady decline since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Low oil prices combined with significant Western economic pressure including sanctions on oil majors and shadow fleet vessels as well as the oil price cap, reduced Russia’s energy revenue. US sanctions relief helps Putin sell Russian Urals, generating income for Moscow’s war machine.

It’s important to note that US sanctions relief does not equate to sanctions relief from the United Kingdom, the European Union, or other Western partners. If the United States eases sanctions on Russian oil but its partners do not, then there could be significant confusion in the compliance space. Financial institutions and the private sector will have to navigate a complex sanctions landscape and may risk exposing themselves to British or European sanctions if they facilitate the sale of Russian oil. Hopefully, the US administration is considering these challenges and coordinating its decisions with its coalition of partners that have sanctioned Russia in response to the war in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Qatar’s LNG capacity remains offline. Russian LNG is not sanctioned, and Russia remains a global supplier of LNG. If the Middle East conflict continues and Qatar is not able to restart its LNG infrastructure quickly, then we could expect to see Russia increasing its LNG exports in attempts to fill the gap and generate income.

—Kimberly Donovan is director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She is a former senior Treasury official and National Security Council director.

17. Will the Houthis in Yemen get involved?

Coming to Iran’s defense does not provide the Houthis with the same domestic and reputational benefits that their involvement in the Gaza war did. It also carries new risks, particularly related to the detente the Houthis have had with Saudi Arabia since 2022. The Houthis could still decide to get involved in the Iran war, especially if they calculate that it makes sense to break that detente as Saudi Arabia doubles down on its support to the Houthis’ main rival inside of Yemen, the internationally recognized Yemeni government.

There are three scenarios for Houthi involvement:

Limited strikes on Israel to demonstrate solidarity with Iran;
Limited strikes on Red Sea shipping as they seek to test whether this is a new red line for Saudi Arabia or extract new concessions, given that Riyadh is depending on the Red Sea to maintain some oil production with the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed; or
Widespread Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, Saudi Arabia, and/or ground offensives inside of Yemen aimed at finally seizing Yemen’s oil and gas resources. This third scenario risks reigniting the Yemen war after years of calm and opening up a major new front in the region.

MENASource

Mar 10, 2026

Will the Houthis join the Iran war?

By Allison Minor

Houthi involvement in the Iran war could reignite the Yemen war after four years of relative calm, with significant implications for Yemen and the region.

Conflict Iran

18. How will this conflict impact Gaza?

Hamas would not have been what it is over the past twenty years without direct financial and material support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, which turned the terror group into one of its chief proxies, given its presence at Israel’s doorstep. Despite differences in religious orientation and doctrine between the Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and the primary Shia force in the world, Tehran has effectively used Hamas to ensure that there wouldn’t be peace or long-term stability between Palestinians and Israelis, prolonging the conflict, which is foundational for the theocratic regime.

Iran helped undermine the Oslo process of the 1990s, militarize the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, and turn post-2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza into a “resistance” citadel. Thus, the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and Gaza’s subsequent decimation would not have occurred without cumulative Iranian involvement. Furthermore, the regime is constantly meddling in the West Bank, supporting rogue Palestinian militants and plots to destabilize the Palestinian Authority and encourage heavy-handed Israeli military actions, hoping this could trigger chaos and a “Third Intifada.”

A severely weakened regime in Tehran that lacks financial means and reach will likely roll back Iran’s involvement in the Palestinian issue and minimize meddling and sabotage by IRGC agents and officers. This would have various political implications, making groups like Hamas much more vulnerable and unable to rely on Iranian support for armed resistance, while weakening the pro-Iran faction within the group’s politburo.

Alternatively, there is a small but not insignificant risk that the battered and angry remnants of the regime may deploy its limited resources in support of extreme terror activities in Israel and Gaza and the West Bank by using Palestinian elements either sympathetic to Tehran’s cause or purely lured in by financial incentives. Nevertheless, Iranian-aligned elements of Hamas and other Palestinian groups will experience significant setbacks that compound the calamity faced by the Palestinian national project in the aftermath of October 7, further strengthening Israel’s position in the conflict and bolstering its desires for how Gaza’s future trajectory and prospects should unfold.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib leads Realign For Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse and develops a new policy framework for rejuvenated pro-Palestine advocacy.

19. How will the war impact US-Gulf relations?

The war will have lasting impacts on US-Gulf relations, but those impacts are still evolving in the war’s second week. In the near term, Gulf countries will seek stronger US security support, including munitions and other air defense support to help defend against Iranian attacks. They will also want clearer US security guarantees over the long term. How the United States responds to these requests will shape Gulf countries’ calculus as they grapple with whether the benefits of housing US military bases are worth the growing risks those bases bring.

Another critical factor will be what the Iranian threat looks like after US operations conclude and the degree to which the United States coordinates with its Gulf partners as it concludes its operations. Early signs suggest the Iranian regime will prove resilient, and Iran has demonstrated that it can terrorize its neighbors with low-cost drones and disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz that are difficult to eliminate with an air campaign alone. Alternatively, regime collapse and a civil war inside Iran could have lasting consequences for Gulf security. If the Iran that emerges from this war poses a long-term threat to Gulf national security and economic growth, and if Gulf countries assess that the United States is not doing enough to help them combat that threat, then it will create a crippling strain on US-Gulf relations.

—Allison Minor

20. What other countries could get involved if this war expands?

While the United States and Israel are leading operations against Iran, it is Arab Gulf countries that have found themselves on the front lines. The vast majority of Iranian missile and drone attacks have targeted Gulf countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Gulf countries are weighing how best to deal with the Iranian threat both now and in the long term, but it remains unclear if they will choose to confront Iran militarily, pursue targeted actions to restore a degree of deterrence, or seek to negotiate a new detente with Iran. Thus far, the Gulf countries have not responded militarily to Iranian attacks and have refuted claims suggesting otherwise. The UAE is reportedly considering non-kinetic means to restore deterrence with Iran, while Oman is actively pursuing negotiations.

Lebanon and Iraq are also being pulled into the conflict: Israel launched a major campaign in Lebanon following attacks from Hezbollah that included airstrikes in southern Beirut and an expanded Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government sees the campaign as a threat to its efforts to navigate Lebanon out of an economic and political crisis and is actively pursuing negotiations with Israel and the United States while demonstrating that it is willing to crack down on Hezbollah in new ways.

The United States is conducting strikes on Iran-backed militias in Iraq in response to attacks on US bases and diplomatic facilities inside the country, and the stoppage of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has forced Iraq to halt oil production. All this comes as Iraq navigates difficult government formation negotiations and threatens to disrupt an era of relative stability in the country.

—Allison Minor

The post Twenty questions (and expert answers) about the Iran war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Three lessons from Libya for the war in Iran

Frank Talbot — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 14:36:13 +0000

Debate over the US and Israeli intervention in Iran is already settling into a familiar frame: will Iran become “another Libya”? While the United States and its partners carried out sustained air campaigns inside both countries that led to the killing of their longtime leaders, there are obvious differences. Iran and Libya differ in size, institutional strength, regional position, and military capability. Treating the Libya intervention as a simple precedent risks drawing the wrong lessons.

The NATO campaign in Libya in 2011 is often remembered as a case of operational success followed by political collapse. But that framing misses the deeper problem. The campaign did not fail because NATO airpower was ineffective. It faltered because military success was never clearly connected to a viable political end state. Libya’s experience highlights three intervention design challenges that remain relevant as policymakers assess the trajectory of the Iran campaign.

Define the political end state

The Libya intervention is an example of how quickly strategy can drift when political goals are unclear or evolving during a campaign. NATO’s mission began under the objective of protecting civilians, authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. However, as the operation progressed over seven months, the campaign increasingly aligned with the objective of removing Muammar al-Qaddafi from power. Protecting civilians, coercing a regime into negotiations, and enabling regime collapse all have unique strategic designs. A coercive campaign aimed at bargaining might focus on limited military pressure and political off-ramps. A campaign that anticipates regime collapse must plan for the far harder task of establishing political authority after the conflict to ensure a degree of stability.

In Libya, that distinction was never fully resolved. Once Qaddafi fell, the coalition had no shared strategy for how Libya’s political transition would be organized, how security would be restored, or which institutions would carry the state forward. Authority quickly fragmented across militias, regional actors, and weak interim governments, leaving the post-revolutionary state unable to consolidate control.

The lesson for the Iran war is not about regime change itself. It is about clarity of purpose. If military operations aim to coerce Iran’s leadership, policymakers must define the conditions under which pressure stops and negotiation begins. If military action risks destabilizing the regime more fundamentally, then the question of political succession and institutional continuity cannot be treated as an afterthought. Then Major General David Petraeus’s dictum during the Iraq war, “Tell me how this ends,” remains an appropriate question to consider.

Align the coalition’s goals

Coalition politics can shape the trajectory of an intervention as much as military capability. In Libya, NATO presented a unified front during the air campaign, but participating states held different views about the campaign’s purpose and limits. Some governments treated the intervention as a narrowly defined civilian protection mission, while others saw it as a pathway toward removing Qaddafi.

These differences did not prevent military coordination, but they complicated strategic alignment. Coalition members pursued different lines of effort, and responsibility for planning Libya’s political stabilization remained diffuse. Regional endorsement from the Arab League helped legitimize the intervention, yet the endorsement did not resolve disagreements among intervening powers about the campaign’s long-term goals.

For the Iran intervention, coalition management extends beyond military interoperability. The United States, Israel, and any supporting international partners must align on what success actually looks like. If one actor seeks deterrence, another seeks coercive bargaining, and another hopes the campaign weakens the regime beyond repair, strategy will inevitably drift.

Control escalation

The Libya campaign also illustrates both the power and the limits of airpower. NATO air strikes were effective in halting Qaddafi’s advances and shifting the battlefield balance toward opposition forces. From a purely operational standpoint, the campaign achieved its immediate objectives. Yet tactical success did not produce a stable political outcome. In Libya, the military campaign accelerated regime collapse without establishing a credible framework for what would replace it.

Interventions that rely heavily on airpower also face a familiar escalation dilemma. Once outside powers intervene, the logic of the campaign often shifts toward securing decisive outcomes on the ground. As intervening powers relied on Libyan rebel forces to sustain military pressure on the regime, those actors gained leverage within the coalition’s strategy. External support strengthened particular militias and factions, shaping the political trajectory of the conflict.

The central question for the Iran intervention is whether military operations are embedded in a strategy that manages escalation and defines credible stopping points. Without clear political limits, even a limited campaign can expand beyond its original objectives.

Designing the Iran intervention

Libya’s central lesson is not that intervention inevitably leads to instability, nor that airpower is strategically ineffective. The deeper lesson is that military effectiveness cannot compensate for weak intervention design and understanding of politics. When outside powers use force to shape political outcomes, they inherit broader strategic responsibilities and unstable politics. They must define the political end state they seek, align coalition partners around a shared strategy, and establish credible escalation controls while considering how military pressure will interact with the political institutions that must ultimately sustain order.

The current debate about Iran would benefit from focusing on those questions. Whether Iran resembles Libya is ultimately beside the point. What matters is whether policymakers have absorbed the intervention design lessons from the Libya experience. Military operations can alter the trajectory of a conflict, but without a strategy that connects military pressure to political order, tactical success can quickly give way to strategic uncertainty.

Frank Talbot is a nonresident senior fellow with the North Africa Program within the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He previously served as the Middle East and North Africa team lead in the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and managed the economic/sanctions file for the State Department’s Libya Desk.

The post Three lessons from Libya for the war in Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Beirut: Is this Hezbollah’s ‘last war’ with Israel?

Nicholas Blanford — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 14:35:16 +0000

BEIRUT—Following the inconclusive end of the month-long Hezbollah-Israel conflict in 2006, Hezbollah fighters began referring to the “last war with Israel,” a climactic future confrontation in which there would be no restrictions on the use of force and from which only one winner would emerge. When Hezbollah launched its conflict with Israel on October 8, 2023, there was an initial fear in Lebanon that this was the beginning of the long-awaited “final war.” After nearly a month of border clashes, then Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah made it clear in his first speech that the “support front” for Hamas in Gaza was but one battle “on the road to Jerusalem” and not a final confrontation.

However, the ongoing US-Israeli attacks on Iran and the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have changed the calculus. Hezbollah is now embarking on what fighters and others close to the organization describe as the “last war,” and the group is fully committed to a long and painful confrontation with Israel. “There won’t be another one after this. Either we win or they win,” a veteran Hezbollah source told me.

Hezbollah entered the war in the early hours of March 2 by firing several rockets from an area north of the Litani River, targeting an Israeli military base near Haifa. Curiously, there is a growing conviction that the decision to join battle was not made by Hezbollah’s political leadership. Instead, it may have been coordinated directly between the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Islamic Resistance, Hezbollah’s armed element. This was confirmed to me by several people close to and inside Hezbollah.

According to a diplomatic source, as soon as reports of the initial rocket fire spread, a senior Lebanese official contacted Hezbollah’s political leaders and asked if they were responsible. The response was a hesitant “maybe.” The official urged Hezbollah to issue a statement denying responsibility. Hezbollah agreed, wrote a statement, and sent it to the official for approval. But by the time the official returned the statement, Hezbollah informed him that it was too late and that the Islamic Resistance had released its own statement confirming responsibility for the cross-border attack. The anecdote indicates that Hezbollah’s political leadership may have been unaware in advance of the rocket attack into Israel.

The decision to strike

Although Khamenei’s assassination in the opening hours of the war on Iran was a shock for Hezbollah, there was no indication that it was planning an imminent retaliation. Even Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem’s statement mourning the loss of Khamenei contained no threats of revenge, only pledges to follow the supreme leader’s path.

Emerging differences between the Islamic Resistance and Qassem, who was elected secretary-general in October 2024 following the death of Nasrallah, have been growing more apparent for some time. Before the latest US-Israeli operation in Iran, Qassem seemed to want to steer Hezbollah in a more Lebanon-centric direction. He had, for example, focused attention on restructuring Hezbollah, centralizing the decision-making process, and tightening security. He had also taken steps to reduce the size of the Islamic Resistance, sideline officials who were close to Nasrallah, and promote figures with more of a political than religious, security, or military background. In part, these efforts were an attempt to streamline an organization that has grown too large and unwieldy, and thus vulnerable to penetration by Israeli intelligence. Another reason was to strengthen Hezbollah’s domestic position at a time of unprecedented pressure due to the battering it received in the 2023–24 conflict and the Lebanese government’s decision this past August to have Hezbollah disarmed.

My Hezbollah source emphasized that Qassem is a pragmatist who seems to adhere more closely to the line of Imam Hassan than his younger brother Imam Hussein, both of whom are historical figures revered by Shias. The description requires a brief history lesson to understand its import. Imam Hassan was the second caliph after the assassination of his father, Ali. He struck an agreement with his enemy Muawiya, the governor of Syria, in which he relinquished the title of caliph to Muawiya in exchange for a treaty intended to preserve the peace. Shia tradition interprets Imam Hassan’s decision as a strategic and moral choice to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. The agreement outlived Imam Hassan and Muawiya but was breached by the latter’s son, Yazid, spurring Imam Hussein to launch his doomed uprising that culminated in his death and that of his companions at the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD.

Comparing Qassem to Imam Hassan suggested that the Hezbollah leader might have preferred to avoid entanglement in a war with Israel that would prove highly destructive for Lebanon. Hezbollah’s Shia support base in Lebanon would likely bear the brunt of any major conflict, and it could prove existential for the organization as a viable political, let alone military, entity.

Much of this is now moot; Hezbollah has entered the conflict and will have to let the chips fall where they may. The reaction of the Lebanese government to the launching of rockets into Israel came quickly. The cabinet held an emergency meeting within hours and banned all Hezbollah’s military and security activities. Implementing this decision is another matter, and any serious moves in that direction may not occur until the current conflict is over. Nevertheless, the unprecedented step underlined the government’s sense of frustration and anger that Lebanon has been dragged into a fresh conflict not of its choosing.

“An existential battle”

In his first comments on entering the war, Qassem, setting aside any presumed private misgivings, played down the linkage to the war on Iran and the assassination of Khamenei. Instead, he said Hezbollah’s actions were the result of its patience being exhausted after fifteen months of Israeli occupation in parts of south Lebanon, and as Israeli forces continue near-daily air strikes against his organization’s cadres and facilities. Qassem added that war was “an existential battle” and that “surrender is not an option.”

Sources within and close to Hezbollah tell me that the organization has committed as many as thirty thousand fighters to the battle, some of them drawn from the elite Radwan unit currently deployed in south Lebanon. They are well trained, motivated, and eager to fight. Many fighters had grown frustrated at Hezbollah’s policy of “strategic patience” by turning the other cheek to Israel’s repeated attacks. The existential nature of this conflict for the Iranian regime and possibly for Hezbollah has helped galvanize ideological and religious sentiment to drive the fighters onwards. A letter addressed to the fighters this past week from the leadership of the Islamic Resistance was filled with references to “Karbala” and “jihad” to inspire the cadres. The letter urged the fighters to battle “the tyrants of this age—the killers of prophets and saints, the ‘Great Satan’ America and the cancerous tumor ‘Israel,’” and to fight their enemy “like the self-sacrificing fighters of Karbala.”

So far, Hezbollah’s operations are following a similar pattern to the 2023–24 conflict: confronting Israeli troops on the ground in southern Lebanon, and firing rockets, precision-guided missiles, and suicide drones across the border at targets in Israel. In the previous confrontation in 2023–24, Hezbollah fought with one hand tied behind its back because the Iranians refused to allow the organisation to employ its full arsenal of precision-guided missiles in sufficient numbers to have an effect, a source of great bitterness among the cadres at the time. However, in this battle, there are believed to be no restrictions on the weaponry and tactics that can be used. On March 9, Hezbollah said that it had fired a barrage of precision-guided missiles at a satellite communications station belonging to the Israeli army’s Cyber Defense and Communications Division in the Ella Valley, ninety-five miles south of the border. Two of the missiles struck the site and caused significant damage, judging from footage on social media, in what was Hezbollah’s deepest ever attack into Israel.

At this stage, it is unlikely that Hezbollah is considering cross-border raids into Israel, a tactic for which the Radwan Brigade had trained but is today far harder to achieve given the Israeli troop presence inside Lebanese territory.

Hezbollah’s strategy, likely in coordination with Iran, appears to be to inflict as much pain on Israel for as long as possible in the hope that a settlement is reached between the warring parties that essentially leaves the regime in Tehran in place. Where that result would leave Hezbollah remains to be seen.

The response from Israel

This past week, Israel issued large-scale evacuation warnings for dozens of towns and villages in south Lebanon, both north and south of the Litani River, as well as for the southern suburbs of Beirut. The latter evacuation order on March 5 caused panic and massive traffic jams across Beirut as tens of thousands of residents attempted to flee ahead of a series of Israeli air strikes. Initial Israeli ground operations suggest an intention to deepen an existing buffer zone the army maintains adjacent to the Blue Line, the United Nations term for Lebanon’s southern border.

Whether the Israelis push further into Lebanon, possibly as far as the Litani River, remains to be seen. Such a step would require a significant military effort and risk an increase in casualties. The area is too large for Israel to occupy for any length of time, which suggests that it may prefer to employ airpower and artillery to destroy populated areas rather than deploy ground forces in large numbers. After all, in the previous conflict in the so-called Sixty-Six-Day War in October and November 2024, the Israeli military was modest in its territorial reach. Mainly special forces units ventured no further than five miles into Lebanese territory, moving on foot, with tanks playing fire-support roles. These operations concentrated on dynamiting villages immediately adjacent to the Blue Line. The geography of south Lebanon, with its steep hills and wooded valleys, is not advantageous for armored columns, as the Israelis have learned to their cost in the past. This lesson could now weigh against a more ambitious push into Lebanon.

It is far too soon to predict with any certainty when and how this war will end. Its fate is intertwined with the convolutions of the ongoing conflict with Iran. But even if the Iran war draws to some form of closure, the Hezbollah-Israel front may well continue until Israel is satisfied that Hezbollah can no longer exist as a military force.

One thing is for sure, however: the Hezbollah that emerges from this war will not be the Hezbollah that entered it.

The post Dispatch from Beirut: Is this Hezbollah’s ‘last war’ with Israel? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Is Syria on the right path?

Asaad Sam Hanna — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:37:45 +0000

In the year since the ouster of the Assad regime in December 2024, Syria has undergone a massive transformation. It could hardly be otherwise, given how the dictator and his loyalists had locked the country into a dystopian mosaic of radicalization, isolation, and violence. There is no clear road map for rogue states to reenter the international system—only imperfect paths to travel. How has the experiment played out so far?

Violence in 2025 in the coastal region and Suwayda put the world on alert, testing the control of new authorities. Did anyone expect that those who lost influence with Assad’s fall, such as Iran, Russia, and their proxies, would sit idle and do nothing disruptive during the transitional period? External pressures would certainly challenge the establishment of a “normal” Syrian government.

Domestic pathologies abound after many decades of dictatorship: Sectarian mobilization, torture, corruption, and external patron relationships were tools to undercut potential resistance within the society. Under Assad, intelligence agencies and the Ba’ath party were instrumental in decision-making, operating beyond the reach of formal government institutions. After fifty years of authoritarian rule, and a dozen years of civil war, the country was governed by factions within the security services, power brokers tied to the Assad family, and increasingly by Assad’s foreign backers. This ad hoc but long-standing power structure fell apart in 2024 when Assad fled to Russia on December 8, leaving a power vacuum with no easy fix.

Lack of mandate

Put simply, the current Syrian government inherited an exceedingly complex and dire set of challenges from the Assad regime, both within the country’s borders and beyond. The fact that the most unified and potent military force in the country did not have a broad political mandate caused concern amid the general rejoicing that Assad was gone. The new government in Damascus assumed office upon taking control of the capital and appointed individuals from within Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, or HTS) to key positions to manage the transition, driving international concerns over continued extremism and the lack of representation. The announcement of a more diverse transitional government in March 2025 was a good sign, as were President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s negotiations with Kurdish and Druze factions, but the potential for inclusive governance remains far from being realized.

Internationally, Syria has been under painful and wide-ranging sanctions since the 1980s, isolating the banking system, restricting trade, and limiting import-export activities. The December repeal of the Caesar Act—which was a US response to war crimes under the Assad regime—lifts nearly all sanctions on Syria and is an important step in both unlocking the investment needed for the nation’s reconstruction and improving economic conditions. However, the scale of needs is immense, with conservative reconstruction estimates exceeding $200 billion.

President Trump’s “peace through prosperity” policy, implemented under the leadership of Ambassador Thomas J. Barrack Jr., is pushing Syria to be open to the West and its allies, a big shift from sponsorship by the likes of Russia, Iran, and China. European and American engagement has brought focused attention from international firms—especially US and Turkish companies. Google and Apple have resumed service in the country, ending what has been called “a digital siege,” while the US Chamber of Commerce has seen strong interest in its new Syria program. Turkish firms engaged in energy, construction, and other critical stabilization sectors have flocked to their southern neighbor.

Trump’s influence

Trump’s return to the White House played a crucial role in creating an opening for positive change in Syria and its relations within the region for two key reasons. First, his excellent relationship with President Erdogan enabled diplomatic coordination and top-level trust during the final eleven days of the Assad regime and the immediate aftermath of its fall. “Erdogan is somebody I got along with great. . . . He’s built a very strong, powerful army,” Trump said on December 16, 2024. He added: “Right now, Syria has a lot of, you know, there’s a lot of indefinites . . . I think Turkey is going to hold the key to Syria.”

Second, Trump’s strong pro-Israel stance and unrivaled popularity among Israelis gave him unique standing to press back on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he called for action in Syria to deter Turkey and weaken the grip of al-Sharaa. Trump’s admonition “you have to be reasonable,” regarding Turkey in Syria, lowered the temperature a few degrees at least, buying important breathing space for the new government to try and stabilize a fragile situation.

Following the appointment of former HTS head al-Sharaa (nom de guerre Jolani) as interim president, the United States initiated the removal of sanctions, including those that had been in place since 1979 This action was prompted by Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa in Riyadh on May 14, 2025, brokered by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. This meeting provided hope for the Syrian people and offered an opportunity for their future reconstruction; it also gave the international community a sign of normalizing engagement with the newly created regime in Damascus.

A key focus has been the unity of Syria. The United States, Turkey and the Syrian government have consistently emphasized the need for Syria to stay united with a central government in Damascus. This stance is crucial in countering the narratives and demands of advocates for decentralization, including Kurdish groups in the northeast, which advocate for a federal system, and the Druze aligned with Hikmet al-Hijri in Suwayda, who seek independence. Damascus has refused both while insisting that differences should not be overcome “through blood.”

Internal dynamics with minorities

The Kurds and the Druze received a lot of press over the summer months in 2025, but lingering problems in predominantly Alawite areas pose another challenge to successful stabilization. Following Assad’s ouster, the coastal area, once the primary base for Assad’s loyalists and a major source of volunteers for the Syrian army, transformed into a haven for former army and intelligence officers. Tensions boiled over into a significant cycle of atrocities when Assad loyalists attacked the new government forces, killing hundreds. The Syrian army responded with overwhelming force, leading to clashes that claimed numerous lives—and atrocities against civilian communities described by the United Nations as “widespread and systematic.”

A Syrian investigative committee acknowledged provocations and atrocities by both pro- and anti-government forces, and the Syrian government committed to accountability on all sides. International scrutiny and concern grew, however, when Druze and Bedouin fighters in Suwayda engaged in another round of attacks and atrocities, resulting in hundreds of casualties. By late summer there had been no new major incidents to add to the list of 2025 armed uprisings, reprisals, and atrocities, but the general impression of fragility and low trust persists.

Incidents likes these prompted some Washington-based observers to oppose removal of sanctions. Others argued that isolating or punishing the new authorities in Damascus would not moderate them, though engagement and incentives might. In the end, much of the international community, and most critically Trump and Barrack, chose to support relief and engagement with al-Sharaa.

A year-end deadline for the March 2025 agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), long backed by the United States, and the SDF’s associated Democratic Union Party (aka PYD), came to naught: The Kurdish side faced a stalemate as they refused to take any trust-building steps and persisted in their demand for “federalism.” The American side, led by Barrack, committed to a political solution and held multiple talks in Damascus, Erbil, and northeast Syria, but these efforts yielded no tangible results.

On January 16, al-Sharaa issued a presidential order granting Syrian citizenship to Syrian Kurds. This decision, which had been denied by the Assad family for decades, included other privileges such as recognizing Nowruz, marking the first day of spring, as a national holiday and allowing the Kurds to use and teach the Kurdish language.

This presidential order came in response to clashes between the Syrian government and Kurdish groups in Aleppo that lasted for two days and resulted in the evacuation of those groups to northeast Syria.

Following further clashes, the Kurdish-led forces withdrew from the Aleppo countryside, which served as the front line for the PYD against the Syrian government. This withdrawal led to a rapid domino collapse, resulting in the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from Raqqa and most of Hasakeh province. This allowed the Syrian government to seize control of the oil resources and liberate two major cities overnight.

In an attempt to salvage what could be salvaged, Mazloum Abdi, the head of the SDF, flew to Damascus to meet with Barrack on January 18, 2026. Abdi announced that a new agreement had been reached with Damascus, allowing the SDF to be integrated into the Syrian army and interior ministry. Additionally, the Syrian government would receive control of the oil wells and all governmental institutions, including prisons. After Sal-haraa and Abdi signed a revised implementation agreement on January 30^th, fighting subsided and substantive, though preliminary and fragile, reintegration began.

Fragile ideological middle

Al-Sharaa has gone through a massive personal transformation that may presage the political transformation envisaged for Syria. He removed his military attire and addressed the Syrian people in a suit, adopted a conciliatory approach to various communities within Syria, and sent a clear message to the international community that Syria would be governed by a president rather than the military or religious councils of some sort.

This transformation faced—still faces, to a degree—challenges from his own base. Al-Sharaa wasn’t the only leader in HTS and other opposition movements, and some who shared his objective of defeating Assad advocated a more theocratic vision as the endpoint of revolution. This placed al-Sharaa in the fragile ideological middle: He needed to avoid a clear breach with more radical elements to gain their acquiescence to a governance model far different than that applied in Idlib during the war, one rooted in pragmatism and good relations among Syrians and with neighboring countries.

At the same time, the interim government must balance Turkish-Israeli competition, repatriation of refugees, and a massive reconstruction challenge. Will the path al-Sharaa publicly advocates—moderation, integration, balancing—succeed in managing the various pressures and challenges? It is too soon to say, but nearly a year after Assad’s fall, al-Sharaa is clearly on the right path. Continued pressure from Israel, internal challenges from Syrian hard-liners, the difficult path to reintegrating Druze and Kurds amicably, and immense reconstruction challenges mean that al-Sharaa remains at a critical juncture. Failure on any of these files could undermine faith in his leadership at home and abroad to a degree that momentum in stabilizing Syria would stall. Yet for now, al-Sharaa remains the indispensable man: The lack of alternatives may be his surest safeguard for staying on the path and keeping key domestic and international backers on board.

Asaad Sam Hanna is an intelligence analyst specializing in conflict resolution, regional security, policies, and strategic affairs.

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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.

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Q&A with Rep. James Walkinshaw (VA-11)

Atlantic Council Turkey Program — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Congressman James Walkinshaw is a first-term representative of Virginia’s eleventh congressional district. The Defense Journal of the Atlantic Council Turkey Program recently interviewed Rep. Walkinshaw covering US-Turkey relations, the Caucus on US-Turkish Relations and Turkish Americans, and Congress’ role in foreign policymaking.

This interview was conducted on January 26, 2026 and has been lightly edited for style.

DJ: We’ve heard that you have agreed to join the Caucus on US-Turkish Relations and Turkish Americans—great news for the bilateral relationship and those interested in it. Can you tell us a little bit about the role of congressional caucuses in general and why we need a Turkey Caucus?

Walkinshaw: I served as chief of staff to the late Rep. Gerry Connolly for nearly a decade. During that time, Rep. Connolly was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and served as a co-chair of the bipartisan Caucus on US-Turkish Relations and Turkish Americans. In my capacity as chief of staff, I supported his leadership on the caucus and, in response to constituent engagement and the strategic importance of the US–Turkish relationship, chose to join the caucus myself.

Congressional country caucuses can play a constructive role in strengthening bilateral relationships, while also providing a bipartisan forum to raise concerns and address areas of disagreement. Rep. Connolly understood the importance of maintaining a strong diplomatic relationship with Turkey, but he was also clear-eyed and outspoken about President Erdoğan’s persistent efforts to consolidate power and suppress political dissent. He used his position as co-chair to consistently sound the alarm about the erosion of democratic norms in Turkey.

I spent years supporting Rep. Connolly’s work in this space, and I intend to use my role on the caucus to continue advocating for a stable, prosperous, and democratic Turkey, and a strong US-Turkish relationship.

DJ: Turkey plays an important role in several major foreign policy priorities for Washington: ending the war in Ukraine, stabilizing Syria, finding a better way out for Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza, and forging a lasting peace in the South Caucasus. And despite the prevailing polarization in US politics, there have been encouraging signs of bipartisan approach in these areas—illustrated by the trip of Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, a Democrat, and Rep. Joe Wilson, a Republican, to Syria and the region last August. How hard is it to work across the aisle on foreign policy matters in the current environment?

Walkinshaw: US foreign policy is framed through bilateral ties, diplomatic and security agreements, treaties, and international organizations with guiding principles to promote democracy, ensure stability, and to invest and work with partners while deterring escalation or military action by adversaries.

It requires balancing the three D’s: defense, diplomacy, and development. Congress may not always agree on how the three D’s should be best implemented, but it’s important to acknowledge that one should not exist without the other and that’s the balance we are always trying to strike when working on foreign policy matters in Congress. Nevertheless, my approach is to identify a path to “yes.” Effective governance requires bipartisan engagement and a willingness to work constructively with colleagues across the aisle. Even in such a polarized environment, I am pleased that Congress worked on consequential issues such as reunifying families separated after the Korean War by passing the Korean American Divided Families National Registry Act, repealing the 1991 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force, and reestablishing the program at the US State Department to support the Ukrainian government in tracking Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. While significant work remains, these efforts underscore that there are serious foreign policy challenges where Congress can, and must, continue to act in a bipartisan manner.

DJ: How do you see the role of Congress—both houses—in shaping US foreign policy and interacting with the executive branch? What is the right balance between oversight/checks and balances on the one hand and “divisions stop at the water’s edge” on the other?

Walkinshaw: Congress is the preeminent branch of government, with broad powers outlined in Article I of the Constitution. What we have seen over the last twenty years, when the White House and Congress are controlled by different parties, Congress finds its Article 1 powers, and when the White House and Congress are controlled by the same party, Congress loses sight of its Article 1 powers. Article 1 of the US Constitution states clearly that Congress has the power to declare war, to lay and collect taxes and duties, and regulate commerce with foreign nations. President Trump is running roughshod and Congress has the responsibility to assert its authorities under the Constitution. President Trump illegally invaded Venezuela with no congressional authorization, putting US service members’ lives at risk, has implemented tariffs unilaterally and illegally, and recently foolishly threatened to purchase or invade Greenland.

Congress must reassert its powers under Article 1 in a bipartisan manner. I’ve supported War Powers resolutions to withdraw troops from hostilities that haven’t been authorized by Congress and voted to terminate the president’s misuse of International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorities to implement tariffs on long-standing US allies. This is a consequential moment in modern American history. President Trump has repeatedly undermined the postwar, rules-based international order and pressured long-standing US allies. Congress possesses clear constitutional authorities to act as a check on this behavior. The challenge is not a lack of power, but a lack of political will among some members to exercise it in the face of partisan pressure and potential political retaliation.

DJ: Your district is one of a handful in the Congress that have massive intrinsic interest in foreign policy and foreign affairs—because of a significant foreign-born population, businesses with foreign interests, and constituents involved with foreign policy and defense. Do you get a lot of input from constituents in your district about foreign policy?

Walkinshaw: I’m proud to represent such a diverse district: 31 percent of the residents in my district are foreign-born. VA-11 is home to a vibrant Korean American community, Uyghur community, South Asian community, and many other immigrant communities that enrich our civic life. VA-11 is also home to more than 50,000 federal employees, many of whom bring national security, foreign policy, and public service experience shaped by our proximity to Washington, DC, and the Pentagon. As a result, my constituents are deeply engaged, highly informed, and passionate about international affairs and US foreign policy.

I value that engagement and actively seek input from constituents, welcome substantive dialogue on their priorities and concerns, and work to ensure their perspectives inform the actions I take in Congress. Representing this district carries both a responsibility and an opportunity; to listen, to lead, and to translate constituent expertise into effective policymaking.

DJ: The US-Turkish relationship has traditionally been focused on defense and security and followed the ups and downs of regional crises. Is it possible to broaden that scope a bit through people-to-people ties, parliamentary exchanges, and greater business cooperation? Is there a role for Congress to play in catalyzing that sort of growth?

Walkinshaw: It is possible to broaden and deepen the US-Turkish relationship, and Congress can play a constructive role in catalyzing that progress. Increased people-to-people ties, parliamentary exchange, and greater business cooperation can and should play an important role in advancing the dialogue around the benefits of civil society and democracy.

DJ: Your predecessor, Congressman Connolly, was a co-chair of the Turkey Caucus, and you were a major support to him during your previous work. Is there unfinished work for the caucus, and what do you see as the best priorities for it after several years of being relatively quiet?

Walkinshaw: The late Rep. Connolly was a steadfast advocate for democratic governance and the rule of law in Turkey. He forcefully condemned the 2016 coup attempt and was equally clear-eyed about President Erdoğan’s subsequent consolidation of power and erosion of democratic institutions. I share those concerns.

At the same time, it is important to recognize Turkey’s significant diplomatic role in a volatile region. Owing to its geostrategic position at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus, Turkey has at times served as a key intermediary, including through its role in brokering the Black Sea Grain Initiative and supporting US efforts to secure a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.

Moving forward, my approach is to uphold democratic principles while engaging with strategic realities.

DJ: What are your greatest concerns regarding US-Turkish relations currently, and what (if any) advice would you have for leaders in both countries to address those?

Walkinshaw: My primary concerns regarding US-Turkish relations center on President Erdoğan’s consolidation of power and his continued engagement with US adversaries. His suppression of political dissent and pursuit of closer alignment with blocs such as BRICS raise serious questions, particularly given Turkey’s status as a NATO ally.

A stronger and more durable US-Turkish relationship ultimately depends on shared democratic commitments. Reaffirming respect for free and fair elections, the rule of law, and the expressed priorities of the Turkish people would not only strengthen Turkey’s democratic institutions but also improve trust and cooperation with the United States and our allies. With respect to President Trump, his record reflects a disregard for democratic norms and the postwar rules-based international order. While his tenure is limited, Congress retains an enduring responsibility to assert its constitutional authorities. I remain confident that Congress will be positioned to more effectively reassert its role, restore oversight, and serve as a meaningful check on executive overreach in the near future.

Congressman James Walkinshaw is a first-term representative of Virginia’s eleventh congressional district. Congressman Walkinshaw serves on the influential House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, on the Military and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, and on the Committee on Homeland Security. He is the Founder and Co-Chair of the Federal Workforce Caucus, launched alongside Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) and Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.)

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Ankara and Washington can build on recent groundwork to improve relations and stability

Murat Yeşiltaş — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Turkish-US relations have long been overshadowed and stymied by crisis: S-400 sanctions, the People’s Defense Units (YPG) and YPG influence in Syria, F-35 defense procurement, competitive alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the normative divisions created by regional conflicts. Despite these complex problems, after President Donald Trump returned to the White House, 2025 became a transitional year in which these problems were not solved but did not paralyze bilateral relations; moreover, the relationship was carried forward by increasing areas of compromise. Therefore, as we move further into 2026, the fundamental question is not whether there will be a major break or rapprochement but whether the two countries transform the pragmatic groundwork laid in 2025 into a more permanent working arrangement and make areas of compromise the main axis driving the relationship.

In this context, compromise should be viewed not as romanticism but as a geopolitical necessity and a cost-reduction mechanism. The interests of Turkey and the United States do not coincide one to one but, when they clash, the costs paid by both sides increase. Therefore, the emerging picture can be summarized as the two countries moving toward greater coordination in areas where they cannot replace each other and managing their disputes by compartmentalizing them. The return of leadership diplomacy, coordination aimed at producing results on the ground in Gaza, the window of opportunity for cooperation in post-Bashar al-Assad Syria and the Middle East, signals of controlled normalization in the defense sector, the institutional leverage created by the July 2026 NATO Summit, and Trump’s visit to Ankara beforehand all lead to the same conclusion: the relationship can progress not only through crisis-producing issues but also through crisis-preventing areas of agreement.

Leadership diplomacy

The first practical result of leadership diplomacy was the reactivation of that crucial channel with President Recep Erdoğan’s visit to Washington in 2025. The critical implication of this is that most of the problems in Turkish-US relations are political, not technical; even those that appear technical carry the burden of domestic politics, bureaucratic resistance, and intra-Alliance bargaining. Leader-level diplomacy does not eliminate this burden, but it does two things. First, it removes a deadlock from being a permanent obstacle; second, it produces the political authorization that makes technical negotiations possible. What is needed to expand areas of compromise in 2026 is to anchor this momentum in institutional channels: regular strategic dialogue, coordination between defense and foreign affairs channels, and rapid contact mechanisms that can be activated in times of crisis. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s functional contribution on Syria and Gaza in 2025 serves as proof for the White House of improved Turkish-US relations.

Gaza: Despite differences in rhetoric, results-oriented cooperation on the ground

The Gaza issue in Turkish-US relations can be positioned as an important example of compromise in 2025. Although Turkey and the United States have different discourses and priorities regarding the region, it was possible to produce results on the ground in areas such as establishing a ceasefire, access to humanitarian aid, practical implementation mechanisms, and diplomatic coordination. This stands out as a model in which compromise means producing the same result rather than establishing the same discourse.

In 2026, the strategic value of the Gaza file is twofold. First, it demonstrates that a joint crisis management capacity can be developed despite the long-standing normative divergence in Turkish-US relations. Second, this capacity is not just a momentary agreement. If it evolves into a process that can be sustained through multilateral formats, it creates a common output area that reduces regional costs for both countries. But the lesson of 2025 is clear: harmony is not absolute; it is sustainable when it is functional and goal oriented. Despite Israel’s objections, the White House’s support for Turkey’s participation in the International Stabilization Force and Ankara’s willingness to participate are among the most promising recent developments on the Ankara-Washington front. More importantly, the Turkish foreign minister’s presence as a signatory—standing alongside Trump at the inaugural meeting of his Board of Peace in Davos—underscores the weight Washington assigns to Turkey in addressing the Gaza crisis and highlights the potentially constructive role Ankara could play on the ground.

Syria and the Middle East after Assad

The Syria issue has long been a source of tension in Turkish-US relations. However, the past year has shown that the post-Assad era offers an opportunity to reframe this issue. The survival of the new order, the country’s territorial integrity, the establishment of central authority, the easing of sanctions, and the start of reconstruction processes create broad common ground between Ankara and Washington.

The key point that makes compromise possible here is this: for Turkey, stability in Syria means not only increasing border security but also preventing the risk of fragmentation and ensuring that terrorist threats are not reproduced. For the United States, a stable Syria is an outcome that limits the risk of regional wars spreading and reduces the need for costly military engagement. Therefore, in 2026, Syria might cease to be an area where the two countries pursue the same goal with different means and instead evolve into a partial convergence of means.

The file on the YPG and the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is not completely closed; however, with the SDF withdrawing from areas it had long controlled in the face of advancing Syrian forces, Ankara-Washington ties appear to be entering a new phase in terms of Syria. In particular, US Ambassador Tom Barrack’s remark that the conditions on the ground—and thus the perceived need for the SDF in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—have changed could be read as a historic turning point in Turkish-US relations. The critical element that will increase reconciliation in 2026 is verifiable progress on the ground in the post-SDF era: an integration timetable, security arrangements, the alignment of local administrations with the central state, and the limitation of moves by external actors that undermine stability. When this happens, the Syria file could transform from an unsolvable crisis to a manageable transition in the relationship. Furthermore, Washington’s goal is both to align with Ankara on the SDF/YPG issue and to play a role in bringing Israel to an understanding with Syria. Washington and Ankara are on the same page regarding Turkey’s political and military role in Syria providing security for Israel. When considered alongside the constructive and reasonable progress on the Gaza file, this could put the United States, Arab states, and Gulf countries on the same page—and, in turn, create an opportunity for Washington to renew its image as a Middle East peacemaker. This is a new historical threshold and allows for a restructuring of the Middle East regional security architecture that produces security for everyone. With its diplomatic capacity and crisis resolution capabilities, Turkey stands out as a key country in such a process. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s evolving defense pact—and the ongoing talks on Turkey’s potential participation—constitute a noteworthy development, signaling that regional security is shifting from ad hoc responses toward a more institutionalized architecture.

The issue of Iran—one of the critical topics in Turkish-US relations in the Middle East—stands out as an area to be managed (rather than to seek full agreement). Before the conflict broke out, Turkey pursued a cautious approach based on regional balance, economic interaction channels, and border security and cautioned against the military option.

Ankara and Washington share many interest vis-à-vis Iran, including preventing instability by Iranian proxy networks, securing maritime trade routes, limiting Iran’s nuclear program, and ensuring the resilience to shocks of regional energy and connectivity projects. However, Turkey’s security concerns related to potential outcomes of regime collapse and a power vacuum take precedence in policymakers decision-making.

Nevertheless, the United States and Turkey need to stay closely coordinated to prevent fallout from the conflict creating shocks to bilateral relations. Turkey is also poised to play a role in an eventual deescalation and resolution, in tandem with other regional countries.

Defense cooperation

Defense cooperation in Turkish-US relations is both the most fragile and the highest strategic lever. Throughout 2025, signals of normalization and controlled progress at the rhetorical level in the defense sector are coming to the fore: the F-35 issue becoming renegotiable, the emergence of more flexible language on US sanctions on weapons and military systems subject to the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, the F-16 procurement and modernization process advancing to a certain stage, and Turkey continuing its air force modernization with different options. Ankara’s Eurofighter initiative is a striking example of this.

It would be wrong to interpret this table as an immediate solution, but to say that there is no solution at all would miss the mark for 2026. In the defense sector, compromise is achieved not through a single major decision but through a series of complementary, small steps: technical working groups, oversight and transparency mechanisms that address compliance and security concerns, supply chain and subsystem cooperation, joint production, and modernization packages. In particular, the emergence of Turkey’s need for critical components such as domestic fighter jets and engines presents an opportunity to shift the relationship from the crisis files of the past to the capacity partnership of the future. Real compromise could grow in 2026 as the parties shift from the language of maximum demand to the language of feasible packages.

NATO and European security

One of the most important topics to emphasize in bilateral relations is Turkey’s hosting of the 2026 NATO Summit. This is not a protocol detail in terms of bilateral relations; it is a strategic framework opportunity. NATO is the historical backbone of Turkish-US relations. When the backbone is strengthened, the management of side issues also becomes easier.

Washington’s approach in 2026, which pushes Europe to take on more responsibility and pressures it to share the defense burden, increases Turkey’s value within the Alliance. For Ankara, this opportunity is not just about rehashing the rhetoric of strategic importance—it is about institutionalizing coordination through concrete agendas: southern flank security, Black Sea balance, defense industrial capacity, readiness levels, and new threat areas. If the summit process is well managed, Turkish-US relations could enter a more predictable trajectory over the next year, fueled by a common Alliance agenda rather than scattered crisis headlines.

Russia-Ukraine and the Black Sea

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine War, Turkey’s mediation and balancing policy is seen by Washington as a complementary diplomatic role. This area offers one of the most realistic forms of compromise: not complete alignment but a division of labor. There are differences between the US approach and Turkey’s concerns about Black Sea balance, but both sides acknowledge the strategic value of keeping diplomatic channels open and striving to manage the war in a controlled manner. Trump’s frequent references to Turkey’s mediation capacity on Ukraine is more than a normative position; it is an indication that Turkey’s military diplomatic capacity is understood.

What will increase consensus in 2026 is the institutionalization of this division of labor: preventing escalation in the Black Sea, managing trade and maritime security risks, and maintaining concrete mechanisms such as prisoner exchanges and humanitarian mechanisms could make Turkey a burden reducer from Washington’s perspective. Success in this area will be measured less by declaring a common position and more by operating a common crisis management capacity.

South Caucasus

The capacity for compromise in Turkish-US relations can be interpreted as a quiet coordination that manifests itself in the Middle East, the NATO axis, and the South Caucasus. Although Washington and Ankara’s perspectives on this region do not always fit within the same conceptual framework, the common ground between the two capitals is clear: strengthening lasting stability in the South Caucasus, ending cycles of conflict, and preventing the region from becoming a fierce proxy arena for external power competition. For this reason, the Caucasus could form a constructive agenda in the Turkey-US relationship, one that does not generate major headlines but makes the relationship more predictable.

The logic of this compromise takes shape on two levels. First, it supports normalization and peace processes (e.g., between Armenia and Azerbaijan). Progress toward regional peace is consistent with Turkey’s goals of security and connectivity in its immediate neighborhood, while also contributing to the erosion of Russia-centered security dependencies. Second, a security approach that enhances the capacity of regional actors but does not encourage conflict requires a more measured form of engagement aimed at deterrence and stability without completely overwhelming the field with military competition.

In these early days of 2026, there is another reason for addressing the Caucasus as a separate point of agreement in Turkish-US relations: this region is a rare area in which the two countries’ interests often produce complementarity rather than competition. Turkey’s proximity to the region, its political influence, and its capacity for connectivity—combined with the United States’ diplomatic weight and its ability to generate international legitimacy—increase the likelihood of producing a solution file rather than a crisis file. Of course, there are vulnerabilities. The slowdown of peace processes, disruptive moves by external actors, and internal political fluctuations could turn this area back into a source of tension. However, precisely because of these risks, the Caucasus will be an important testing ground in 2026 for what compromise means in Turkish-US relations: not complete alignment in rhetoric but coordination that enhances stability on the ground.

Conclusion

In 2026, Ankara and Washington can create strategic breathing room in their relations through well-designed compromises. The common character of these compromises is cost-reducing functionality rather than ideological convergence. This includes results-oriented coordination on the ground in Gaza, common ground for the sustainability of the post-Assad order in Syria and the Middle East, a shift from crisis to process management in the defense sector, a strengthened institutional backbone within the NATO 2026 framework, and a division of labor in the Black Sea. They all point to the same thing: the future of the relationship lies not in denying disagreements but in accumulating enough common ground to prevent disagreements from holding the relationship hostage.

If these areas of compromise are linked to shared timelines, verifiable steps, and regular consultation mechanisms, Turkish-US relations could make a real leap from controlled fragility to institutionalized pragmatism. And this leap would produce what both sides need most in today’s stormy international environment: predictability.

Murat Yeşiltaş serves as director of foreign policy research at the Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, a policy think tank based in Ankara and also known as SETA. In addition, he is a professor of international politics at the Social Science University of Ankara.

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Foe or friend? US-Turkey bilateral relations seem set to improve as interests align

Rich Outzen — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Few alliance relationships generate as much public drama as US-Turkish ties. In the roughly seventy-five years since Turkish accession to NATO there have been ups and downs between Washington and Ankara, with the past twenty years marked by particularly sharp differences over regional policy and frequent bouts of public criticism and recriminations. President Trump’s second term has brought a positive turn in tone and optics—but there are still widespread perceptions in both capitals that the “other” ally is at best unreliable and perhaps more foe than friend.

Mutually antagonistic narratives have served domestic political purposes in both countries and have become something of a staple in the age of populist democracy of the twenty-first century. Yet the two countries rely on each other extensively in matters of trade, diplomacy, and security. State-to-state relationships are sometimes smoothed over in public but fractious in practice; the US-Turkish dyad is the rarer obverse: disagreeable in public for domestic audiences while resting on a high degree of alignment and collaboration.

Where do bilateral relations go when trust is low, mutual perception negative, but operational collaboration frequent? The answer depends less on rhetoric or polemical discourse and more on alignment of practical interests: We therefore must clear away the smoke of domestically motivated rhetoric to instead focus on mutual benefit. If two states pursue compatible goals and interests, room remains to balance internal political benefits with geopolitical cooperation in a form of complex interdependence. Whether that is the case for the United States and Turkey is a matter of substantial interest, given the weight that both have in the international system and the substantial number of crises and international matters that affect them.

Rorschach test

Articulating interests is more of a political than an academic exercise. It also presents something of a Rorschach test: If you ascribe ideological frames as determinative of status for Ankara (e.g., neo-Ottomanism, Muslim Brotherhood Islamism, reckless aggression) it brings you to one implied set of Turkish interests. If you accept declarative policy as the whole story you get another implied set. It is similarly the case for the United States: If you assume hegemonic interests are the primary driver, it takes you down a certain path; however, that road shifts significantly between and sometimes within presidential administrations. American interests as viewed by Trump differ significantly from those of his predecessor. Yet pattern analysis over time—observed behaviors and statements toward particular goals—tell us how specific a US president and his Turkish counterpart actually perceive the degree to which their interests overlap.

As an imperfect but useful generality, we can ascribe the following traits to Turkish foreign policy: multiaxial engagement and balance-seeking, nationalistic, hard power/realpolitik, traditionally but conditionally attached to the status quo. For decades, Ankara has sought to maximize autonomy while pressing for positive coalitions, where possible. For most of the current century, the United States has focused on maintaining a privileged or primary position in the international system, leavened increasingly with a dose of parsimony and pragmatism, but resting on what might be called enduring counter-revisionism (still in the tradition of US naval strategist and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan).

Ankara and Washington have demonstrated a generally cooperative approach across numerous regional and global issues in recent decades because their top-line approaches are compatible: one a retrenching-but-potent leading power, the other a rising middle power, both disinclined to establish imperial arrangements or to allow others to do so. A brief review of these issues illustrates this general (if imperfect) alignment by assigning numeric values reflecting relative alignment of strategic and diplomatic approaches between the two. Any such numbers game comes with attendant risk of overgeneralizing and missing some context, but statecraft and policy analysis at the higher levels of abstraction unavoidably entail some risk in this regard. So the numbers below are presented as suggestive rather than determinative.

In the table below, full interest alignment equals 1, partial interest alignment 0.5, neither alignment nor friction 0, friction -0.5, counteralignment -1. Descriptions of the cases follow the table.

Table 1: Sizing up US-Turkish alignment and friction on sixteen issues

Regional matter	Turkish position	US position	Assessment	Score
Ukraine/Black Sea	Ukraine survives	Ukraine survives	Full alignment	+1
Caucasus	Peace/prosperity deals	Iran, Russia lose influence	Full alignment	+1
Central Asia	Middle Corridor/ Organization of Turkic States	Russia, China influence limited	Full alignment	+1
Africa	Greater engagement	Russia, China influence limited	Full alignment	+1
Syria	Stable, unified	Stable, unified	Full alignment	+1
Iraq	Stable, unified, not under Iranian control	Stable, unified, not under Iranian control	Full alignment	+1
Gaza	Peace/Israel out	Peace/Hamas out	Partial alignment	+0.5
Energy	Diversify supply	Diversify supply/ marginalize Iran and Russia	Partial alignment	+0.5
US global leadership	US leadership conditional	US leadership but with counterbalances	Partial alignment	+0.5
Trade/defense trade	Autonomous Turkey, sales both ways	Turkey buys more/ doesn’t compete with US firms	Partial alignment	+0.5
European Union	Key trade partner, accession woes	Key trade partner, perceived as exploitative	Alignment but not cooperation	0
Eastern Mediterranean	Greater role for Turkey	Protect Greece	Friction	-0.5
Iran	Deterred but engaged, stable	Regime replaced or weakened	Friction	-0.5
Sanctions	Only multilateral	Multilateral and Minilateral	Friction	-0.5
Israel	Constrain Israel	Fully support Israel	Friction	-1
Venezuela	Engaged	Deterred/punished	Unalignment	-1

Black Sea/Ukraine: Both sides wish to see the war end with Ukrainian independence intact; neither recognizes Russian claims over Crimea or Donbass, though Washington has signaled willingness to negotiate the status of territories Russia partially or fully occupies at present. Some differences exist regarding Black Sea access: The United States might like to have access for its own ships and more broadly for a NATO presence and routine access, while Turkey has preferred littoral NATO states do the lifting and a strict interpretation of the Montreux Convention; but neither wants a Russian conquest of Ukraine’s coastline. For a Trump administration interested in some compromise deal with Moscow, the Turkish position is complementary.

Caucasus/Russia: While the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) offers wins for the region and the United States, the Armenian position is a wildcard with elections approaching. Should Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan get the boot in parliamentary elections (to be held no later than mid-June 2026), the United States may tack back to a position that pressures Azerbaijan and marginalizes Ankara. Russian and Iranian pushback on a deal that opens the region to trade on US-friendly terms can be expected. Interest alignment here between Ankara and Washington is solid, though the prospects for realized gain uncertain.

Central Asia: The TRIPP shows US interest in opening up more trade to Central Asia and balancing against outright domination of the region by Russia or China. The Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States both have value in this regard—and have generated more interest from the Trump administration than its predecessor. Central Asia has not traditionally been an area of high investment for the US government; however, energy companies are interested, so having an ally be more engaged is an advantage.

Africa: US investment and engagement in Africa has lagged, but Washington has concerns about Chinese or Russian influence on the continent. Meanwhile, Turkey has dramatically increased its diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Africa over the past two decades. In countries like Somalia and Libya, Turkish presence has lent heft to US diplomatic and counterterror initiatives. Africa demonstrates the complementarity of having compatible goals but varying levels of commitment.

Syria: Trump has made clear his policy that Syria will be stabilized and maintained as a unitary state and that Ahmed al-Sharaa is an acceptable figure to lead. This comports with Turkish policy, despite Israel’s objections. The assignment of Trump confidant Thomas J. Barrack Jr. as special envoy and positive statements from the US-Turkish working group on Syria have shown close convergence on Syria policy, a remarkable turnaround from the previous decade. The January 2026 agreement to reintegrate northeast Syria with the Syrian Transitional Government was a sign that this alignment was proving determinative on the ground.

Iraq: Washington wants a stable Iraq that is: not dominated by Iran; oriented to Western energy markets more than Iranian or Chinese; and working amicably with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Iraq may not fulfill all those interests, but Ankara shares them, and the Development Road project to foster Eastern trade with Europe provides a vehicle for all three countries to earn profits while tightening Baghdad’s ties to Western economies. The presence of PKK fighters in northern Iraq remains a point of friction, but ongoing negotiations to disarm the PKK – and US support for those talks – has taken helped reduce that friction.

Gaza: Washington and Ankara both pressed Israel and Hamas, respectively, to accept a ceasefire deal, return of hostages, and military withdrawal from Gaza in return for disarmament. While the truce remains shaky as of late 2025 and the end state Trump and Erdoğan have in mind may differ somewhat, the coordination on diplomatic efforts has been unambiguous.

Iran: There is divergence here between the hard line taken in Washington toward the Islamic Republic and the modus vivendi approach in Ankara. While Ankara may not want regime change in Tehran, and wants to protect trade with its neighbor, the Turkish government has no illusions about Tehran’s destabilizing regional behavior and shares an interest in deterring it. Ankara has tightened enforcement of multilateral sanctions on the Iranian nuclear program—partially redressing a long-standing US grievance with Ankara. The launch of Israel-U.S. Operation Epic Fury to destroy Iran’s power projection and nuclear capabilities has driven fears of instability and chaos along the Turkish border, turning this from an area of some overlap into an area of friction.

Energy: Ankara’s energy diplomacy has sought to position the country as a hub for multidirectional energy transit and major new gas, oil, and nuclear deals have been signed with Washington. US pressure to decrease oil purchases from Russia has created some strain, as Ankara cannot shift to alternate suppliers as quickly as it can with gas.

US global leadership: American leadership that cooperates with Ankara on key strategic objectives, praising in public and transacting in private, plays like music to the ears of Turks. This contrasts greatly with the constraining approach Turkish leaders called for regarding perceived American overreach in Iraq, Syria, and other regions over the past two decades, including demands to reform the United Nations to lessen the power of the five permanent members. Still, this middle power and the great power have imperfect but positive alignment at present.

Trade/defense trade: The relatively light 15 percent tariff levied on Turkish goods and the $100 billion shared goal for bilateral trade are clear indicators of positive intentions. But defense trade is thorny, with a congressional role and some competition between rising Turkish defense players and US prime defense contractors.

European Union: Ankara and Washington remain at odds with Brussels ideologically and stylistically, while maintaining strong strategic and trade ties with numerous members states. Yet the tensions stem from different sources: Turkish desire to enter the bloc and the American administration’s desire to end what it perceives as the EU’s exploitative trade and security practices.

Eastern Mediterranean: The continuing friction between Greece and Turkey redounds against US-Turkish bilateral relations—a problem that continues to play out in the region and in Congress.

Sanctions: The divergences are clear regarding imposition: Ankara supports multilateral but generally not unilateral sanctions and enforcement, whereas the Turkish track record looks spotty from Washington’s perspective.

Israel: Ankara and Jerusalem pursued a rapprochement in the months before October 7, 2023; since then, rancor, acrimony, and mutual suspicion have become the norm. While regional competition over Syria, the Palestinians, and other issues can be managed, related tensions spill over into US-Turkish bilateral relations in a major way—and that seems likely to persist.

Venezuela: Erdoğan’s quixotic friendship with President Maduro had its roots in terms of oil sales and multipolarity theory, but was a clear point of policy divergence as Trump upped the pressure level on Caracas. With the early 2026 arrest of Maduro and muted response from Ankara, this seems likely to be a decreasing source of tension in U.S.-Turkish relations.

A clear trend and policy takeaway

In conclusion, this assessment sketch of sixteen complicated cases of regional and global policy matters yields eleven that demonstrate substantial bilateral alignment, four with significant unalignment, and one somewhere in between. The aggregate score by the simple rubric of “words and deeds reflect alignment” was positive (+4.5 – with the caveat that these numbers are illustrative but rooted more in subjective alignment rather than formal quantitative criteria). An honest critic might quibble with individual ratings and the framing of the cases or argue for the salience of other matters. Yet sixteen is a reasonable sample size, the thought exercise is revealing, and the trend clear: more alignment than friction overall.

The policy takeaway is equally clear: maintaining a working relationship is vital for both countries. Those arguing for punitive approaches (by the United States) or hedging (by Turkey) disregard potential mutual benefits as well as both opportunity costs and implementation costs. Managing differences and satisfying domestic sentiment require an adaptive response from policy elites in both countries, but the record of cooperation in 2025 indicates that the pragmatism of both presidents fits the moment—and the alignment.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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Navigating change: US-Turkish defense relations in 2026

Atlantic Council Turkey Program — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Foreword

As we enter the second year of the Trump Administration, US-Turkish relations and developments in regions critical to both have been dramatic and fast-paced. Events in Syria and Libya are trending towards state consolidation and strategic opportunity for both Washington and Ankara, while the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine at NATO’s doorstep, the volatile situation in Gaza, and the unfolding war in Iran present challenges both sides seek to navigate in complementary ways.

Technological and geopolitical developments have increased the need for close consultation between the NATO allies, and bilateral coordination has been evident across a range of issues. Yet strategic cooperation remains constrained by a variety of factors. This issue of the Defense Journal takes up several of the regional, military-technical, and policy issues of interest to readers in both countries and to those tracking US-Turkish relations. In an era of positive relations between the two countries’ presidents, parliamentary relations and policy influence also carry great weight—and in this issue we are pleased to have interviews with US Congressman James Walkinshaw and the chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Turkish Parliament Fuat Oktay to add the legislative perspective to bilateral strategic ties.

Rich Outzen and Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council Turkey Program co-managing editors

Articles

Foe or friend? US-Turkey bilateral relations seem set to improve as interests align

By Rich Outzen

Is Syria on the right path?

By Asaad Sam Hanna

Q&A with Rep. James Walkinshaw (VA-11)

By Atlantic Council Turkey Program

Q&A with Turkish Member of Parliament Fuat Oktay

By Atlantic Council Turkey Program

Ankara and Washington can build on recent groundwork to improve relations and stability

By Murat Yeşiltaş

As Ankara rethinks its Libyan policy, the Haftar family stands to gain

By Karim Mezran and Alissa Pavia

Air defense in the age of saturation: Europe after the post-Cold War peace dividend illusion and Turkey’s Steel Dome

By Can Kasapoğlu

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council Turkey Program‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International and Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council; former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Assistant Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Permanent Representative to NATO

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Under Secretary of Defense

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Q&A with Turkish Member of Parliament Fuat Oktay

Atlantic Council Turkey Program — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Fuat Oktay is the chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s (Türkiye’s Parliament) Foreign Affairs Committee. He previously served as a vice president of the Republic of Türkiye. The Defense Journal of the Atlantic Council Turkey Program recently interviewed Oktay, covering US- Türkiye relations, the Turkish defense industry, and NATO.

The interview was conducted on February 18, 2026 and has been lightly edited for style.

DJ: Recent developments in Syria appear to have removed a long-standing elephant in the room in US–Turkish relations. Washington and Ankara now seem aligned on preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and on the primacy of a centralized government in Damascus under President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s leadership. How do you assess this convergence, and what does it signal for the future of US–Turkish security cooperation?

Oktay: It is true that Türkiye and the United States have converged in recent years on a number of foreign policy issues. This convergence is visible not only in Syria, but also in efforts to end the war in Ukraine, support a durable framework in Gaza, and encouraging progress in the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process, among other areas. This convergence is for the establishment of sustainable peace and stability in our region. Our region is tired of conflicts and war. The issues in our region should be solved through dialogue and not through armed clashes and war.

In Syria, Türkiye has been supporting the unity and territorial integrity of this country since the very beginning. Now both Türkiye and the United States support Syria’s territorial integrity and unity and recognize the importance of a centralized and effective government in Damascus. A united, stable, inclusive, and prosperous Syria is, first and foremost, in the interest of the Syrian people. It is also in the interest of the broader region.

This convergence reflects a realistic reading of regional dynamics and a mutual understanding that sustainable solutions require regional actors and inclusive diplomacy.

It is the right time to reinforce the positive momentum in Türkiye–US relations to a resilient, future-oriented, principled relationship, grounded in mutual respect and strategic responsibility.

DJ: Do you see this more constructive atmosphere on Syria translating into movement on bilateral defense ties? In your view, what should both sides do to enhance the defense portfolio? And to follow up, what are the odds of Türkiye’s eventual return to the F-35 program in the near to medium term?

Oktay: Defense cooperation should be viewed in the wider context of the overall relationship. One of the main drivers of a more constructive atmosphere has been the direct and cordial dialogue between President [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan and President [Donald] Trump. Strong engagement at the leadership level has generated momentum across multiple areas of cooperation.

Economically, our bilateral trade volume is approaching $40 billion, and we share the objective of reaching $100 billion. Major items—such as Turkish airline companies’ aircraft purchases, long-term LNG [liquefied natural gas] arrangements, and potential future cooperation in civil nuclear energy—can further deepen our economic ties.

In this spirit, defense cooperation should mirror the positive trajectory in our bilateral relations, as well as the growing convergence on regional policy issues. For this reason, it is important to overcome the existing restrictions affecting Türkiye in the defense industry domain. Restrictions between allies are, by definition, inconsistent with the spirit of alliance and partnership.

At present, there are efforts at the governmental level in both countries to identify a workable path forward, including on the question of Türkiye’s access to the F-35 program. In February, as the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, we visited Washington, DC, and held constructive discussions with our counterparts in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. We conveyed our view that it is neither coherent nor sustainable to maintain such restrictions among partners and allies. We hope to see tangible progress at the congressional level to strengthen defense industry cooperation.

DJ: Türkiye’s defense industry has undergone a remarkable transformation over the past decade. Where do you see Turkish defense industrial capabilities today, and what do they represent for both Türkiye and the NATO Alliance? Looking ahead, what should be Ankara’s strategic priorities in this domain?

Oktay: Türkiye’s defense industry has achieved significant and sustained progress over the past two decades. During this period, we have transitioned from an import-procurement model toward a high-volume domestic design and production model, with a growing export dimension.

The share of local and national production in the defense industry has increased from around 20 percent to more than 80 percent, and we expect this rate to reach 85 percent in the near future.

Today, Türkiye is producing manned and unmanned fighter aircraft, such as the Kaan and Kızılelma jets, warships, armored vehicles, missiles, and rockets, as well as advanced sensors and related systems. At the same time, Türkiye is increasingly localizing critical electronic subsystems, including avionics, data links, communications, and mission computers, as well as smart munitions. Defense exports have now surpassed $10 billion annually. Turkish defense industry exports and cooperation cover 185 countries covering all continents, including such NATO members as the US, UK, Spain, and Italy.

In summary, Türkiye has become an important global producer of advanced defense technologies. These capabilities—both in production scale and technological innovation—represent a valuable contribution to NATO’s collective security, and particularly to European security. In this context, the inclusion of Türkiye in European defense industry initiatives is essential in order for both NATO and Europe to fully benefit from Türkiye’s achievements in this field.

DJ: The KAAN fighter program is widely viewed as a cornerstone of Türkiye’s future force structure. What vision do you associate with KAAN, both in terms of operational capabilities and Türkiye’s broader ambitions for defense cooperation and access to new defense markets?

Oktay: KAAN is among the most advanced fifth-generation fighter projects currently under development. It reflects core fifth-generation design requirements such as low observability, sensor fusion, and network-enabled operational concepts.

KAAN will represent a significant capability enhancement for the Turkish Air Force and will strengthen NATO’s southeastern flank. In addition, the program is a major driver of innovation for Türkiye’s broader aerospace ecosystem, with spillover effects across engineering, production, and advanced systems integration.

A number of countries have expressed interest in acquiring or co-producing KAAN. Last year, an agreement for forty-eight KAANaircraft was signed with Indonesia, and several other countries remain in close contact with Türkiye regarding potential cooperation.

DJ: The next NATO summit will be hosted in Ankara. What does this mean symbolically and strategically for the Alliance and for Türkiye? How do you assess Türkiye’s role within NATO today—and NATO’s importance for Türkiye?

Oktay: We look forward to hosting NATO’s next summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026. The summit will be an important opportunity to review progress in implementing the Hague commitments and to take decisions that further strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defense posture.

As the war in Ukraine has heightened Europe’s security concerns and uncertainty is affecting transatlantic relations, the Ankara Summit will be a critical meeting. Key issues will be discussed, and major decisions will be taken on the future direction of the Alliance.

Türkiye has always played, and continues to play, a vital role in the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. Türkiye holds NATO’s second-largest army and remains among the top contributors to NATO operations and missions, supporting both the Alliance’s southeastern and eastern flanks. We have already exceeded the 2-percent benchmark in defense spending, and we remain committed to further strengthening our contributions.

As we are committed to the security of our allies, we likewise expect them to be fully committed to Türkiye’s security and defense.

DJ: Türkiye’s influence across the Turkic world has grown, particularly through the Organization of Turkic States. How would you characterize Ankara’s strategic vision in this space, and what does the geopolitical horizon suggest about Türkiye’s long-term role across this geography?

Oktay: Türkiye has deep historical and cultural ties across the Turkic world. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is today the principal political framework for multilateral cooperation in this space. It reflects a shared vision to deepen integration and promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity. The OTS also functions as a catalyst for stronger regional ownership, and with the establishment of multiple sub-institutions, it is evolving rapidly into a more structured and specialized organization.

In parallel, the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TÜRKPA) serves as the main platform for strengthening parliamentary cooperation among Turkic states and supporting broader integration efforts. At the parliamentary level, we have also developed a mechanism for bringing together the Foreign Relations Committees of the Parliaments of Turkic States. The first such meeting took place in Azerbaijan, and the second meeting was held in Istanbul last year.

Through these institutions—along with strong bilateral relations—Türkiye is expanding cultural, political, and economic cooperation and coordination among Turkic states, with the objective of promoting peace and prosperity across Central Asia and the Caucasus.Bottom of Form

Fuat Oktay is the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Türkiye. He served as the last Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry between 2016 and 2018. In the first cabinet of the Presidential Government System, he served as Türkiye’s first Vice President between 2018 and 2023.

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As Ankara rethinks its Libyan policy, the Haftar family stands to gain

Karim Mezran, Alissa Pavia — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Libya remains mired in a protracted civil conflict that has divided the country between rival factions in the West and East, each attracting foreign military and economic support. Ankara, which had strongly backed one side, recently modified its foreign policy to pursue rapprochement with neighbors in the region, which has significant implications for Libya and its own influence in a shifting landscape there.

For years, Turkey has backed the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, which is recognized by the United Nations as Libya’s legitimate authority. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, have long supported the eastern faction, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by warlord and former CIA asset Khalifa Haftar. Interestingly, Turkey and the Tobruk-based LNA have entered a chapter of significant engagement after being sworn enemies for much of the last decade.

Turkey, for its part, seeks to expand influence over the entirety of Libya for economic and geopolitical gains, wanting to gain access to Libya’s vast oils fields in the eastern zone and aiming to impose its stance in an ongoing maritime dispute with Greece and Egypt over the Eastern Mediterranean, where both countries claim maritime territory. Meanwhile, Haftar and his sons seek recognition from regional powers such as Turkey to legitimize the family’s rule and become the de facto leadership of Libya.

Why this matters

These developments represent a significant shift in domestic and regional dynamics. Domestically, it strengthens Haftar’s LNA as it vies for that prime governing role. The LNA is contending for greater international recognition than the GNU, and a buy-in from a powerful actor like Turkey would surely tip the scales, granting the LNA a level of international legitimacy that could surpass that of the GNU.

The international community (as expressed through the UN) sees the GNU as the legitimate force, but will have to come to terms with Dbeibah’s weakened political hand. Dbeibah himself is well aware of the stakes involved, and while publicly he has endorsed what he sees as Turkey’s “backing of Libya’s stability,” it would be naïve to think he welcomes such efforts. Additionally, it will embolden the Haftar family to continue pursuing an aggressive push for regional integration under its command, potentially leading to de facto unification, albeit under leadership with an abysmal human rights record and dubious allegiance to the West.

Why the LNA welcomes Turkey’s support

In 2019, when Haftar launched his military offensive to gain control over Tripoli, the capital city, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent military support to the GNU, including troops, ships, drones and advisers, for its defense, signaling Turkey’s strong commitment to the Western-backed government. Today, however, Turkey’s goal of repositioning itself regionally spurred a strategic cost-benefit calculus. Isolated after attempting to become a regional hegemon, Turkey has sought to reestablish itself in the region through strategic reengagement with countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

For its part, the LNA stands to benefit considerably from Ankara’s strategic repositioning. First, a potential defense partnership between the LNA and Turkey is quickly taking shape, and it stands to deliver substantial benefits to the Haftar family. In April 2025, Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa and deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan Ground Forces, met Turkey’s general chief of staff, Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu, to discuss a mutually beneficial defense agreement which would include joint military training, capacity building, information sharing, and the procurement of weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Earlier that month, Saddam Haftar paid an official visit to Ankara, marking a new chapter in relations between the nation and the Libyan faction. A subsequent visit by a military delegation from Libya’s eastern forces to Turkey confirmed that this shift is underway, and soldiers from Haftar’s LNA have recently begun training at bases in Turkey, as forces associated with the government in Tripoli have done beginning of 2020.

Secondly, Ankara is looking to deepen its energy ties by investing in gas exploration over disputed water with Libya’s eastern faction. In 2019, Ankara signed an exploratory agreement with Libya’s western faction in Tripoli, but the agreement failed to take off due to eastern opposition. Today, Libya’s eastern powerbrokers look poised to sign it—if, that is, they are granted oversight control over the outputs, after complaining for multiple years of being excluded from key revenue streams and leadership opportunities. If signed, the explorations could provide significant financial benefits to Libya’s eastern area, which suffers from recurring fuel shortages due to its lack of refining capacity. It would also help boost Haftar’s legitimacy by aiding him with key supplies for the local population under his control, strengthening his position both domestically and internationally.

Third, a rapprochement with Ankara would give the Haftars valuable leverage with Russia and Turkey, enabling them to extract greater concessions from both nations. The Haftars have long been supported by the Russians, especially since their Tripoli offensive in 2019; in turn, they’ve allowed Russian Africa Corps troops to run wild in parts of the country, furthering Russia’s footprint on the continent. While Russia once held greater leverage over the Haftars, this dynamic shifted after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in January 2025, which prompted Moscow to withdraw its military equipment there and seek new military footholds in Libya. Now, with the Haftar family having the upper hand, the family can try to leverage this renewed position of strength to expand its alliances without fearing repercussions from Russia, Turkey’s long-standing rival in the region. It also can hope to exact concessions from both parties, extracting both economic and military benefits which would help consolidate domestic authority.

Implications for the Eastern Mediterranean

The engagement between Libya’s eastern faction and Turkey will likely have ripple effects across the region. First, it could sour the relationship between Egypt and Turkey over the disputed maritime zone agreements. Currently, Egypt rejects the maritime zone set between Ankara and Tripoli, considering them an infringement of Egyptian maritime sovereignty as they cut across water lines. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has made it abundantly clear he will reject any association agreement between Libya and Turkey, potentially reigniting tensions after their historic 2023 rapprochement. Egypt claims that any oil exploration will infringe on its territorial seas, denouncing them as an infringement of international law. Such tensions would have enormous consequences for the Mediterranean region writ large.

Second, Haftar, could use any growing tension between Egypt and Turkey to extract greater concessions for himself by playing Ankara against Cairo. By publicly signaling deference to Egyptian authority while quietly advancing his ties with Turkey, Haftar stands to emerge stronger, consolidating his family’s hold on power and potentially paving the way for unifying Libyan territory under their control.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Alissa Pavia is a nonresident senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Air defense in the age of saturation: Europe after the post-Cold War peace dividend illusion and Turkey’s Steel Dome

Can Kasapoğlu — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

By the end of the Cold War, European NATO nations considered air and missile defense to be a secondary military priority rather than an essential tool of intrawar deterrence, which refers to controlling escalatory patterns within an ongoing conflict.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine disproved this view, revealing how mass missile and drone salvos can quickly overwhelm limited interceptor supplies and unready command structures. The threat is not about somebody else’s war. When as many as two dozen Russian unmanned aerial vehicles entered Polish airspace on September 10, 2025, NATO allies responded by scrambling one of the most sophisticated tactical defensive contingents in the world. Italian airborne early warning and control aircraft, German Patriot air and missile defense systems, Polish F-16s, fifth-generation Dutch F-35s, and a Belgian A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft were all brought forth to track and engage the drones. The imbalance between the overall price tags of the offensive and defensive packages clashing in the aerial engagement was gargantuan. More importantly, Russia could pursue similar concepts of operations in a NATO showdown—whereas Europe’s air defenses would experience wear and tear quickly in a high-operational-tempo scenario.

While Europe debates between urgent gap filling and long-term industrial autonomy amid the drone wall talks, Turkey has taken a different path. The Steel Dome initiative demonstrates Ankara’s early understanding that air defense requires integrated, scalable, and mass-produced systems on rapid timelines.

Air defense as a strategic imperative after Europe’s post-Cold War illusion

During the Cold War, NATO treated air defense as a foundational mission. This paradigm eroded after 1991 as threat perceptions faded. For more than three decades after the Cold War, Europe operated under the egregiously naive assumption that peer-level air and missile threats had receded into history. That illusion collapsed with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which reintroduced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, combat aviation, and mass drone attacks as central tools of interstate warfare. Moreover, the Twelve-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025 cemented the new air threat picture. The new conflict trends have forced Europe to confront a long-neglected reality: without a coherent, layered air and missile defense, control of the air cannot be assumed and nations cannot stay safe.

Russia fields two missile types that matter most to European defense: the 500-kilometer range, ground-launched 9M723 Iskander and the air-launched, medium-range Kh-47M2 Kinzhal. Ukrainian intelligence assesses combined annual production at roughly 840 to 1,020 missiles, higher than earlier

estimates. The ballistic and aeroballistic missiles are backed by large salvos of cruise missiles and Shahed drones—the latter marks more than five thousand kamikaze assets raining overwhelming damage onto Ukraine in a given month.

Europe’s defense relies mainly on the US Patriot and the Franco-Italian SAMP/T antimissile systems, both dependent on costly interceptors priced at around $2 million to $4 million each—often far more expensive than the missiles they are meant to defeat. Production is the choke point. Patriot interceptor output across the United States, Japan, and Germany might rise from about 850 today to 1,130 by 2027, and possibly to 1,470 by 2029. Even then, global demand means Europe might receive only a fraction of the output, and combat experience shows two or three interceptors are often needed per incoming missile. Output of the alternative, Aster 30 interceptors for SAMP/T, is projected at only 230 to 270 annually for ballistic missile defense, and their performance in Ukraine has lagged that of Patriots, implying higher interceptor consumption. Compounding the problem, Russia and Iran have been producing large numbers of long-range drones that can saturate defenses, increasing the odds that ballistic missiles penetrate targets. Cheaper, mass-produced systems might eventually counter drones, and lasers could one day address ballistic threats—but neither solution will arrive in time to close the imminent missile defense gap.

Europe’s current air defense posture remains uneven. High-end fighter fleets and a mix of European, US, and Israeli missile systems exist, but warfighting prowess lags behind capability. Interceptor stockpiles are insufficient for sustained high-intensity conflict, production timelines are slow, and short-range air defense gaps leave European forces exposed to the kind of kamikaze drone warfare now routine in Ukraine. These weaknesses are as much industrial as military. The response has revealed a strategic divide between two conceptual camps: the “gap fillers” and the “autonomists.” Gap fillers, as defined in this paper, favor rapid procurement of proven, off-the-shelf systems, primarily from the United States and Israel—predominantly the Arrow-3, Patriot, NASAMS, and Barak systems—to close urgent gaps. In contrast, autonomists, led by France, argue for long-term European autonomy through indigenous systems, even at the cost of slower fielding. This tension defines current debates over air defense initiatives and reinforces Europe’s continued reliance on US-made systems at the upper tier. Meanwhile, Turkey, a sui generis European NATO nation with its national defense technological and industrial base, has an alternative path: the Steel Dome.

Europe’s strategic air defense gaps and Turkey’s Steel Dome architecture

Turkey’s Steel Dome represents a critical leap in framing air defense as a national, system-of-systems architecture rather than a collection of stand-alone platforms. The Russian S-400, therefore, will need to be left out in the cold as a stand-alone weapon in Turkish military capabilities.

Designed as an integrated and layered air and missile defense construct, the Steel Dome aims to address threats across short-, medium-, and long-range engagement envelopes and all endoatmospheric altitude segments, while preserving operational sovereignty through indigenous development. The system-of-defensive system has been endorsed at the highest levels of defense decision-making and support for it continues rising as additional components reach operational status. In late August 2025, Turkey crossed a critical threshold in its pursuit of strategic autonomy in air defense with the first operational delivery of the components for the indigenous Steel Dome air defense system. The delivery coincided with the expansion of military electronics company Aselsan’s industrial base, reflecting Ankara’s view of defense production as a pillar of sovereignty. In November 2025, Turkey’s defense industrial base took a significant step forward with the signing of contracts valued at approximately $6.5 billion to procure a broad range of systems for the Steel Dome.

At the force-employment level, the Steel Dome integrates point and area air defense assets with longer-range interceptors into a unified command-and-control framework. Close-in defense is provided by antiaircraft artillery and very short-range systems optimized for counter-UAS (unmanned aircraft system) and low-altitude cruise missile threats. The Hisar family forms the short- and medium-range surface-to-air missile layer, while the Siper system anchors the long-range air and missile defense mission, extending coverage against high-performance aircraft and missile threats. An artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted command-and-control architecture fuses sensors, shooters, and electronic warfare elements into a unified air picture, compressing decision timelines and enabling commanders to operate in a dynamic, contested airspace. In an era defined by unmanned systems and saturation salvos, this coherence is as decisive as kinetic action. The strategic significance of Steel Dome lies less in individual interceptors than in its integration logic. By fusing sensors, effectors, and command elements into a single air picture and prioritizing serial production under national control, Turkey is building an air defense posture designed for sustained competition rather than episodic procurement. In other words, Steel Dome epitomizes the Turkish leadership’s strategic autonomy agenda. The most critical lesson of Ukraine is not merely about the quantities of missiles or radars, but about strategic coherence. Air defense is no longer a procurement problem to be managed in peacetime cycles. Turkey has already grasped the bitter truth and made its choice to act rapidly and decisively through the Steel Dome initiative—a response Turkey’s European allies should study. The Steel Dome initiative also serves industrial and geopolitical purposes. It is intended to reduce dependence on foreign air defense systems while positioning Turkey as a supplier to states facing similar threat environments. The emphasis on modularity and scalability suggests an export-oriented mindset, enabling partners to buy into the architecture incrementally rather than commit to a single, rigid system.

Conclusion

Europe’s current air defense dilemma is defined by scarcity and sequencing. Interceptors are expensive, production is slow, and operational experience shows that quantity alone does not translate into resilience. The deeper vulnerability lies in fragmentation: multiple systems, limited stockpiles, and insufficient integration across sensors, shooters, and command layers. As long as air defense remains divided between national stopgaps and Alliance bottlenecks, Europe will struggle to convert capability into credible deterrence.

Turkey’s Steel Dome offers a contrasting defense industrial policy. By building a layered, integrated architecture under national coordination from the outset, Ankara has prioritized coherence over perfection and sustainability over symbolic capability or overpriced foreign sales. The emphasis on systems integration, domestic production, and serial scalability is key to the Turkish government. In an era in which airspace is increasingly contested by mass and speed, the strategic advantage revolves around a defense that can endure, adapt, and sustain in highly attritional and prolonged wars.

Dr. Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Dr. Kasapoglu holds a Ph.D. from the Turkish War College and an M.Sci. degree from the Turkish Military Academy. Previously he was an Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College in Rome and held a visiting research post at the NATO Cyber Center of Excellence in Tallinn.

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