The Ukrainian leader’s flying visit involved high level stop-offs in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Since the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East almost a month ago, all three Gulf states have sought Ukraine’s help to defend against Iranian drones. Kyiv initially responded by sending a number of drone interception teams to bolster regional air defenses. Zelenskyy’s recent trip aimed to build on these fledgling partnerships.

Initial results are promising. While visiting the region, Zelenskyy signed a series of what he termed as “historic” security agreements with his Gulf counterparts. While no details have been released, it is believed that these agreements envisage Ukraine sharing the country’s anti-drone experience and technological expertise in exchange for benefits including financial support, secure energy supplies, and strategic investments. There is also thought to be considerable mutual interest in developing longer term partnerships across the defense and tech sectors.

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It is easy to understand why the Gulf states gave Zelenskyy such a warm welcome. Over the past month, it has become apparent that existing air defense networks are poorly suited to the novel challenges presented by large numbers of Iranian attack drones. While sophisticated air defense systems such as the US-made Patriot are able to shoot down drones, the high cost and limited availability of interceptor missiles make such systems impractical as a long-term solution.

Nobody understands this better than the Ukrainians. Throughout the past four years, the skies above Ukraine have become a vast laboratory for the development of drone warfare. Russia initially purchased drones from Iran, but has more recently established its own domestic production lines. This has made it possible to dramatically increase the scale of attacks. Russia now routinely launches five hundred drones or more at Ukrainian cities in a single night.

Ukrainian drone producers have responded to this growing threat by developing a range of interceptor drones capable of operating within Ukraine’s existing multi-layered air defense ecosystem. These interceptors are significantly cheaper to manufacture than the drones they are targeting and can be produced in bulk. With a number of wealthy Gulf states now apparently ready to finance Ukrainian drone companies, it is likely that interceptor output will soon skyrocket.

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Signing ten-year defense partnership agreements with three leading Gulf states is a significant outcome for Ukraine. However, the positive optics that surrounded Zelenskyy’s recent regional tour may have been even more important for the country.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than four years ago, Ukraine has been widely seen as a recipient of military aid and a drain on international resources. Zelenskyy’s visit directly challenged this unflattering and outdated view. For the first time, Ukraine was presented as a potentially attractive security partner with much to offer in terms of unique military experience and innovative defense technologies.

For anyone who has been closely following the Russia-Ukraine War, this is hardly news. Over past four years, Ukraine has built Europe’s largest army and has emerged as a world leader in drone warfare. The country’s formerly stagnant defense industry has expanded exponentially and now produces millions of drones every year as well as a growing arsenal of domestically developed cruise missiles.

This has made it possible for the Ukrainian military to blunt Russia’s offensives along the front lines of the war. At sea, Ukraine has used domestically designed marine drones to chase Putin’s Black Sea Fleet away from Crimea. Meanwhile, Kyiv has brought the war back to Russian territory with a long-range bombing campaign that recently knocked out around 40 percent of Russia’s oil export capacity.

Ukraine’s emergence as a major military force is already transforming the balance of power in Europe and will define Kyiv’s relationships with the wider world for decades to come. Zelenskyy’s tour of the Gulf states has helped to highlight this new geopolitical reality.

The Ukrainian leader’s trip was in many ways a masterclass in wartime diplomacy. By moving so nimbly, Zelenskyy secured vital support for the Ukrainian war effort and laid the foundations for potentially game-changing strategic partnerships with the Gulf states. Crucially, he also debunked negative perceptions of his country and enhanced Ukraine’s global standing as a drone warfare superpower.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 5, 2026

Russian army faces comms crisis amid Starlink cut and Kremlin crackdown

By Katherine Spencer, Marc Goedemans

The Russian army in Ukraine is facing a growing communication crisis amid recent disruptions to Telegram and Starlink, leaving troops increasingly in the dark and exposing mounting strains inside Russia, write Katherine Spencer and Marc Goedemans.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Mar 24, 2026

Russia bombs Ukrainian UNESCO site as Putin escalates terror tactics

By Peter Dickinson

Russia bombed a UNESCO World Heritage site in the historic heart of west Ukrainian city Lviv on March 24 as Kremlin efforts to target Ukraine’s civilian population continue to escalate, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2026

Ukraine bombs Russia’s Baltic ports as Zelenskyy targets Putin’s oil exports

By David Kirichenko

Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy says the country’s partners have called on Kyiv to scale down attacks on Russian energy infrastructure after drone strikes reportedly reduced Russia’s oil export capacity by at least 40 percent as global energy prices surge amid the Iran War, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Zelenskyy’s Gulf region tour was a masterclass in wartime diplomacy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Beijing holds these National People’s Congress meetings every spring. Every five years, the gathering signs off on a new five-year development plan. This year’s version is the fifteenth such plan issued since 1953, so Beijing refers to it as the fifteenth five-year plan. These plans signal how Beijing views the world, what their priorities are, and how they want the Chinese people to view their government and where the nation is headed. The meetings are highly scripted, and the plans are finalized well in advance. This year, Beijing crafted the political theatre to send a very clear top-line message: Everything is going according to plan. China is becoming a high-tech power on the world stage, the economy is moving toward higher-value-added growth, and the Chinese Communist Party is taking care of the Chinese people. To the extent that there are bumps in the road, that is due to China’s “external environment,” particularly the United States, which Beijing likes to paint as a global spoiler. 

Those top lines are fairly consistent year-to-year. Beijing always uses these meetings to signal that everything is going according to plan. The details are where things get interesting. This year, five key signals stood out as particularly relevant to the United States and its allies.

1. China is doubling down on rare earths

Beijing has worked for decades to amass control over global critical mineral supply chains. In 2025, China used that control to pressure the Trump administration to back down on tariffs and other policies Beijing objected to. Now Washington—along with many of its allies—is working to undo that leverage. The Trump administration is investing billions to bring new rare earths production facilities online and reduce US dependence on China for the minerals. 

But the new plan suggests China does not plan to stand idly by. Instead, Beijing is gearing up to bolster its dominance over those same supply chains. The new five-year plan states that China’s goal over the next five years is to “continuously strengthen [its] competitive advantages in rare earths, rare metals, and superhard materials.” It orders Chinese firms to move up the value chain. Chinese firms are already buying up the mines that produce these minerals in other nations, and they already send the material those mines produce to China for processing. Now Beijing wants the processed minerals to stay in-country to the extent possible, going into Chinese factories and making the global economy dependent on China not only for processed minerals but for the final products that contain them, as well. China already has that end-to-end dominance in rare earth magnets. Beijing wants to see that vertical control applied in other sectors. 

Last fall, referring to US efforts to diversify these same supply chains to reduce Chinese control, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that the United States is “going to go at warp speed over the next one to two years, and we’re going to get out from under this sword the Chinese have over us.” Beijing is signaling that it will be doing everything in its power to sharpen that sword and keep it exactly where it is. 

2. Biotechnology is ascendant

Until now, leading on biotechnology innovation was a stretch goal for China. For example, the Made in China 2025 plan (the ten-year industrial policy blueprint issued in 2015) lays out concrete targets for Chinese firms to replace their foreign competitors across multiple sectors, but the goals for biotechnology were uniquely vague. That is changing. This new five-year plan lists eight frontier technologies targeted for breakthrough advancements. Of those, three are directly tied to biotechnology innovation: life science and biotechnology, brain science, and pharmaceutical innovation (the other five are artificial intelligence [AI]; quantum computing; nuclear fusion, deep sea, earth and polar exploration; and deep space exploration). The new plan details research and development priorities for each. 

This is the first time a five-year plan has gone into such detail on biotechnology priorities. And for good reason. China is now the world’s primary destination for first-in-human trials, and US firms are paying record amounts for China’s biotechnology outputs. In 2024, US firms paid $52 billion in licensing fees for innovative Chinese drugs; in 2025, that number jumped to $137 billion. 

The new plan indicates that Beijing is now ready to reduce the nation’s reliance on foreign firms. It calls for China to “build out a self-sufficient biotech ecosystem,” which is Beijing’s code for reducing China’s reliance on US and other non-Chinese firms. The plan also calls for tighter biological data regulations and for Chinese firms to maximize AI across this sector. Biotechnology has officially moved up to join the elite echelon of industries receiving Beijing’s priority attention and support. 

3. The pace of exports will continue

During a press conference at the two sessions, Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao offered his view on China’s trade balance: “Exports and imports are like the two wheels on a car. The more balanced they are, the more steadily it runs, and the farther it goes.” Unfortunately for Wang, little about China’s current balance would suggest a smooth ride: The country’s exports are so excessive relative to its imports that this hypothetical car would likely drive in circles. 

Domestic consumption accounts for less than 40 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP), nearly half the US number, which is around 70 percent of US GDP. Since Chinese consumers are not buying what Chinese factories produce, the nation is overly dependent on exports. That is disrupting global markets. In 2025, China’s total trade surplus with the rest of the world was $1.2 trillion, over 6 percent of its GDP. That surplus is due to China’s massive export volumes, which are threatening the economic security of many of its trading partners, putting firms out of business and triggering unemployment in those nations. 

But Beijing is betting that its trading partners will fail to do anything about it. If the nations that absorb Chinese goods put real tariffs and other barriers in place to stem the flood of those imports, Beijing would be forced to reassess its entire economic model. It would be forced to do real rebalancing, boosting Chinese consumers to enable them to buy more of what the nation produces. The new plan gives no indication that this is on the horizon. Instead, Chinese leaders appear to be betting that the current global trade policy paralysis will continue through 2030. 

4. AI-induced job loss remains a major blind spot

Beijing is taking a “move fast and break things” approach to AI deployment. Chinese leaders see AI as a ticket to achieving all of their major political priorities, from surveilling their citizens to achieving global technology leadership and generating new jobs at home. They are pushing to deploy it across the economy as quickly as possible to soak up every benefit AI can provide. Some of the risks from this approach recently played out across the nation when Chinese officials and consumers enthusiastically embraced OpenClaw personal AI assistants. Some local officials—desperate to show Beijing that they are using AI—offered more than one million dollars in grants to anyone developing new businesses based on OpenClaw. Soon the AI assistants were going rogue, running up large bills on consumers’ credits cards and sending their information to identity thieves. The Chinese government is now scrambling to put new guardrails in place.  

With AI-induced layoffs and unemployment, the downside risks are much more serious and will be harder to rectify. Already, China is suffering high unemployment among its urban youth: nearly 20 percent are unemployed according to China’s official statistics. The real number is certainly higher. China’s official youth unemployment statistics were so poor in 2023 that Beijing stopped reporting them and revised its methodology to exclude some elements of the population, such as students. 

Among the young people who do have jobs, a growing portion are gig workers, struggling to find full-time employment. The new five-year plan paints a rosy picture of AI boosting people’s livelihoods. For example, it calls for more AI use in elder care, classrooms, entertainment, and public services. But it does not acknowledge the likely job loss this will trigger for nurses, teachers, artists, and civil servants. It even pushes AI deployment in the very sectors where it is most likely to trigger job loss, such as using AI agents for personal assistants and AI-empowered robots for manufacturing. 

The plan does include a nod to the potential for AI-induced job loss. For example, it calls for Chinese officials to set up “investigation and response mechanisms for the impact of AI on employment” and provide “employment stability guarantees, re-employment training, and employment support” for workers who lose their jobs to AI. But this amounts to just a few sentences of generalities. In contrast, biotechnology is referenced across multiple chapters, with incredibly specific goals. Beijing does not yet seem to view AI deployment as a serious employment challenge. That is a major blind spot. 

5. China aims to become the world’s biggest R&D funder

The new five-year plan calls for the Chinese government to keep research and development (R&D) spending growing at least 7 percent per year over the next five years. That means China’s national labs, universities, and industrial clusters will be flush with cash at a time when the United States is slashing those same budgets. As a result, new analysis in the journal Nature predicts that China’s public spending on research and development could surpass US spending by 2029. China is attempting to utilize this spending gap to leap ahead of the United States in “frontier science” and breakthrough technologies in critical sectors such as AI, quantum computing, and biotechnology. 

In the fourteenth five-year plan (2020-2025), Beijing focused primarily on commercial technology such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, and information and communication technologies. This new plan is aiming higher. It calls for Chinese firms to move the competition up the value chain to innovation in “future industries” or “frontier industries” that are not yet fully commercialized. It calls for Chinese firms to replace foreign competitors as the leading intellectual-property generators, reducing China’s reliance on the United States and boosting the nation’s “self-reliance.” Beijing is betting that US efforts to cut federal R&D spending are China’s big opportunity to surpass the United States as the world’s leading science and technology innovator. Chinese leaders do not plan to stand idly by and let that opportunity go to waste. 

Overall, the new plan indicates that Chinese leaders are much more focused on the nation’s strengths than its weaknesses, and they are feeling incredibly bullish going into 2026. This bodes for even more intense US-China competition over the coming years, particularly in advanced technologies. Washington needs to recognize that the margin of US leadership is narrowing.

The post Five takeaways for US policymakers about China’s new five-year development plan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ankara’s self-image: Peacemaker and stabilizer

For years, the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has consistently described Turkey’s role in the world as providing moral and strategic leadership, seeking peace and stability in its region and beyond. As tensions between the United States and Iran escalated earlier this year, Erdoğan underscored Turkey’s readiness to mediate between the two countries. Indeed, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Istanbul in late February. Since the war began, Fidan has echoed this sentiment throughout his intensive engagement with Gulf leaders, asserting that Turkey’s unique ability to talk to all parties is a strategic asset that can prevent regional contagion and foster long-term stability. 

Fidan’s goal is clear: a “regional ownership” of security that prevents the Middle East from becoming a permanent playground for external military escalations. In the run-up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkish officials pleaded with Washington not to attack without a detailed and workable plan to stabilize the country after its military was defeated. Today, Turkey is eager to prevent another cauldron of chaos from emerging on its southern border, this time in a country that is larger, militarily stronger, and more politically and ethnically complex than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Ankara’s successes so far in its efforts to help stabilize post-Assad Syria have provided Turkish leaders with a new confidence that the country can similarly reduce regional tensions by helping to mediate an end to the war in Iran.

Diplomatic dissonance in the Mediterranean

This vision of Turkey as a regional stabilizer sharply contradicts conventional wisdom across much of Europe. In Athens in particular, memories of the 2020 tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean remain vivid. At that time, Turkish Navy warships accompanied a seismic survey ship of Turkey’s national oil company, TPAO, as it searched for oil and natural gas in waters that both Turkey and Greece claim as part of their exclusive economic zones. Tensions peaked in August 2020, when a Turkish and Greek warship collided near Crete. Recent months have seen a resurgence of pointed rhetoric over the countries’ maritime claims. Senior Greek officials have expressed deep skepticism regarding Ankara’s ambitions, with Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias early last month stating that Turkey’s “revisionist agenda” remains a threat to Aegean stability. Greek leadership has specifically raised alarms over Turkey’s rapidly expanding defense industrial sector and its “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) naval doctrine, which calls for Turkey to defend its interpretation of international law on maritime borders and exclusive economic zones. For Greece, Turkey’s strong military is viewed less as a tool for regional peace and more as a mechanism for coercive diplomacy that continues to challenge Greek and Greek Cypriot sovereignty.

The rhetorical attacks have been even sharper between Turkey and Israel, posing a potentially serious challenge to Ankara’s mediation ambitions. Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have regularly accused each other of crimes against humanity.

Growing support for Turkish mediation elsewhere

Despite the reservations of Greece and Israel, interest in Turkish mediation is growing elsewhere. On March 1, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated in a social media post that she welcomes Turkey’s “readiness to mediate and support a resolution” to the Iran war “through peaceful means.” Pakistan, along with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, have now taken the lead in relaying messages between the warring parties in the hope of containing regional chaos.

Most importantly, US support for Turkish mediation also seems to be growing. A key factor is the personal rapport between the US and Turkish presidents. US President Donald Trump has frequently praised Erdoğan, describing him in October 2019 as a “hell of a leader” and a “tough man who deserves respect.” More recently, when asked whether Erdoğan could play a useful mediation role between Ukraine and Russia in October 2025, Trump replied, “Yeah, Erdoğan can. He’s respected by Russia, Ukraine. I can’t tell you about it, but he is respected by the world. And he’s a friend of mine.” 

Ankara has indeed taken a balanced approach toward Kyiv and Moscow. On the one hand, Turkey has sustained military-technical cooperation with Ukraine throughout Russia’s invasion and steadfastly supported its territorial integrity. Turkey also prevented Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet via the Turkish Straits in accord with the Montreux Convention of 1936. On the other hand, Turkey has refused to join sanctions against Russia and Erdoğan has maintained a robust communication line with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This evenhanded positioning allowed Turkey to broker, together with the United Nations, the July 2022 agreement between Ukraine and Russia on grain exports via the Black Sea.

Turkey’s behind-the-scenes mediation was also crucial to securing the release of hostages from Gaza in late 2023. While the world focused on Qatar’s high-profile mediation, Ankara quietly leveraged its long-standing relations with Hamas’s political bureau, (a relationship that had irritated both Israel and the United States for years), to facilitate the release of more than twenty Thai agricultural workers who were not part of the primary prisoner-exchange deals negotiated by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt. Hamas credited Turkish mediation with securing the deal.

At the time, then US President Joe Biden made no mention of Erdoğan’s role in securing the Thai hostages’ release, instead crediting trilateral efforts by Washington, Doha, and Cairo. Trump has been more willing to publicly credit Turkey’s mediation role in the Israel-Hamas war. While announcing his twenty-point plan to end the Gaza conflict in October 2025, Trump stated, “President Erdoğan was fantastic. He really helped a lot, because he’s very respected.”

US embraces Turkey’s mediation

Trump’s appreciation for Turkey’s mediation seems sufficiently strong to have prompted his administration to drop the criminal case against Halkbank, a major Turkish state-owned bank. The bank was awaiting a multibillion-dollar fine after its 2019 indictment for money laundering over illicit gold shipments to Iran. Had the United States imposed the fine, Halkbank could have collapsed, possibly sparking a crisis across Turkey’s banking system. For years, the Turkish government argued that Halkbank enjoyed sovereign immunity and the case should be dropped, but as recently as October 2025, the Trump administration refused to express support to the US Supreme Court for Halkbank’s appeal that the case be dropped.  

Then on March 6, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) requested that Judge Richard Berman drop the case, citing “extraordinary national security and foreign policy considerations.” The DOJ’s main justification was that Turkey’s assistance was “critical to securing the ceasefire agreement and Hamas’s release of the hostages” that the Trump administration brokered in early 2025.

The timing of the Trump administration’s reversal on the Halkbank case may be telling. Coming a week after the United States and Israel launched their attacks on Iran, Washington’s move may suggest that Trump foresees a role for Turkish mediation in the war. While Netanyahu may balk, Trump may find Ankara’s record of mediation too successful to resist. And indeed, Ankara has already begun playing that mediation role in concert with Pakistan, Saudia Arabia, and Egypt.

Matthew Bryza is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post Could Turkey help mediate an end to the Iran war? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Iranian strikes on Gulf energy infrastructure show that uncertainty—not just supply loss—can trigger sharp global price shocks.
• Energy is reverting from a managed commodity to a geopolitical weapon, revealing where real power lies in times of crisis.
• Gulf states will likely seek to align with US security guarantees, while US dominance is reinforced as the key provider of energy, financial, and security stability.

GENEVA—In geopolitics, there are moments when systems do not evolve gradually but rather reset overnight. The world may be entering such a moment now. The attacks by Iran on energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar matter not only for the damage they inflict, but also for what they reveal: how fragile the global energy system remains, and how quickly the world returns to first principles when that system is under threat.

For years, markets behaved as if energy had been domesticated—diversified, hedged, financialized. That illusion is now fading. Oil is no longer just a commodity. It is increasingly a weapon and a signal. It reveals, with precision, where real power still resides.

A global shock does not require a complete disruption of supply. It requires uncertainty. And uncertainty is priced more aggressively than scarcity. In such conditions, prices do not rise gradually. They jump, often overshooting fundamentals as markets attempt to price geopolitical risk in real time.

The Gulf states

The Gulf states understand this instinctively. For years, some of them pursued a careful balancing act by relying on US security while maintaining pragmatic relations with Iran, even amid accusations that elements within them tolerated or indirectly supported Iranian-linked proxy networks. That strategy collapses the moment infrastructure becomes a target. Ambiguity is a luxury of stability; it rarely survives contact with risk. States whose prosperity depends on uninterrupted energy flows will not tolerate prolonged uncertainty. They will align decisively with the only proven security architecture capable of guaranteeing stability. That architecture is American.

Iran

By contrast, Iran under the current regime risks a historic miscalculation. Its strategy has long relied on asymmetry—pressure without full confrontation, disruption without decisive response. But there is a threshold beyond which such a strategy becomes self-defeating. Targeting the infrastructure that underpins global energy flows is such a threshold. Nations rarely fail because they lack power. More often, they fail because they misjudge the consequences of using power. If Iran is perceived not merely as a regional challenger but as a systemic disruptor of global energy flows, then the response it provokes will not be incremental. It will be structural.

Russia, China, and North Korea

Much has been written about a new alignment among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—an emerging axis opposed to the West. In reality, this has always been more fiction than fact. China depends on stable energy flows from the Gulf. Russia benefits from higher prices but seeks equilibrium, not chaos. North Korea follows but does not lead. When the stakes become real, ideology gives way to interest—and those interests diverge.

Europe

Europe may be another major victim of this situation. At precisely the moment when hard power, energy security, and strategic clarity are required, Europe finds itself largely absent from the field. For decades, it built a model based on external energy, outsourced security, and the belief that economic and normative influence could substitute for geopolitical strength. That model is now showing its weaknesses, and a persistent energy shock could diminish Europe’s geopolitical role further. Without unified military capability or independent energy security, Europe is increasingly reacting to events rather than shaping them. It has shifted, quietly but unmistakably, from actor to arena.

The United States

Beneath all of this lies a deeper truth that has stayed with me for years. During my time at the London Business School, my professor Andrew Scott made a deceptively simple observation: oil and the dollar are the liquidity of the world. He was right. Oil remains the physical liquidity of the global economy. The dollar remains the financial system that prices and stabilizes it. Despite years of discussion about energy transitions, alternative currencies, and new geopolitical alignments, moments like this reveal how little has fundamentally changed. The system still runs on dollar-denominated energy flows. Liquidity, in the end, has no substitute.

There is also a historical parallel worth noting. When US President Ronald Reagan entered office, he defined a small number of strategic priorities. These priorities included restoring economic strength and confronting the Soviet Union. But on everything else, he reacted. That clarity allowed events, many of them unforeseen, to move in his favor. A similar dynamic may be unfolding today. US President Donald Trump did not set out to engineer a global realignment through crisis. But history does not ask whether leaders planned events. It asks whether they were positioned to benefit from them.

If the United States maintains economic strength, energy leverage, and military credibility, then shocks of this kind do not weaken its position. Instead, they reinforce it. Because when the system becomes unstable, the world does not look for consensus. It looks for order. And order requires a guarantor.

This is where one’s legacy is ultimately defined—not in moments of calm but in moments when the system begins to fracture, when uncertainty spreads and decisions become irreversible. Reagan understood this. He did not control events, but he shaped the environment in which they unfolded. History rewarded him for it. Trump may find himself in a similar position. If current dynamics continue, this period may be remembered not as a series of isolated crises, but as the moment when global ambiguity collapsed—and when US power reasserted itself, not by design but by necessity.

In geopolitics, power is measured not by who speaks the loudest, but rather by who cannot be replaced. In a world once again defined by energy, security, and liquidity, the United States remains indispensable.

The post The Iran war has set in motion a global realignment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• To make cross-border payments despite US sanctions, Iran has built a system of workarounds that includes banks, intermediaries, shadow networks, and cryptocurrency.
• China is the top purchaser of Iranian oil, and transactions are increasingly settled in yuan via indirect channels, limiting exposure to US financial oversight.
• Emerging infrastructure such as CIPS and experimental CBDC platforms could support or expand non-dollar settlement, though direct Iran-linked usage remains opaque.

WASHINGTON—There is a lot of attention right now on how Iran is managing access to the Strait of Hormuz—operating a kind of “toll booth” in which it clamps down on commercial flows through the vital waterway while reportedly allowing some vessels to transit for as much as $2 million per voyage or according to particular political and financial conditions.

But an important question has received far less attention: How are Iran and oil purchasers settling their payments under current conditions? What follows is an effort to answer that question, drawing on new GeoEconomics Center research, to shed light on the policy levers Tehran is pulling and the economic-statecraft and technological tools it is employing—as well as the implications for sanctions enforcement.

How Iran settles cross-border payments today

Iran’s cross‑border payments system reflects years of sanctions‑driven adaptation. In 2012, sanctioned Iranian banks were disconnected from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network, which serves as the core infrastructure for global financial messaging. While this did not make all transactions with Iran impossible, it made standard cross-border settlement much more difficult by cutting off access to the main channel for bank-to-bank communication.

In January 2016, following verification steps under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, many Iranian banks were reconnected to SWIFT and some financial sanctions were lifted. But after the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed secondary sanctions, access to formal financial channels narrowed again. This repeated cycle of reintegration and new restrictions made it clear to Tehran that formal dollar-clearing or euro-denominated trade finance was unreliable.

In response, Iran has shifted its cross‑border payments system to a set of overlapping workarounds. Some transactions still move through formal banking channels in jurisdictions willing to absorb sanctions risk. Others are routed through intermediaries that can hold funds, net obligations, or obscure beneficial ownership. Complementing these efforts are state-led initiatives such as the Shetab system. While primarily focused on domestic payments, Iran recently expanded Shetab for cross-border use through a strategic integration with Russia’s Mir payment system. This link connects the national payment switches of both countries, allowing their respective bank cards to be “read” and processed by the other’s banking hardware. There also are several informal networks that settle transactions entirely outside of the banking system. For example, the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has described Iranian “shadow banking” networks that rely on Iran‑based exchange houses and foreign front companies—particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hong Kong, and Singapore—to move billions of dollars tied to oil exports and other activities.

At the base of this structure is hawala, a long-standing, trust-based system that enables value transfer without formal cross-border movement of funds. These networks are anchored in regional hubs such as Dubai, where a large number of Iranian-linked firms operate and provide counterparties for informal settlement. On top of this, Iran uses state-linked intermediaries, including front companies and trading entities, to facilitate transactions tied to oil exports. More recently, Iran also has relied on cryptocurrency to facilitate transactions that can bypass traditional banking rails. For example, the blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis estimated that Iran‑linked crypto activity reached $7.8 billion on‑chain in 2025, with stablecoins increasingly used for settlement and a growing share tied to sanctioned entities. US enforcement actions have increasingly targeted these channels, including sanctions on exchanges and wallet clusters associated with Iranian activity. 

For Tehran, formal, semi‑formal, and informal channels operate in parallel, with transactions routed through different layers depending on risk tolerance, counterparties, and the constraints in place at any given time.

How China’s yuan fits in

China is now Iran’s main oil customer, buying over 80 percent of its seaborne exports. In this partnership, Iran trades discounted oil for Chinese investment and goods, with payments increasingly handled in yuan instead of dollars to reduce exposure to US oversight while also advancing the internationalization of China’s renminbi (RMB). Chinese refiners often buy Iranian oil through intermediaries and non‑dollar banks. The money stays in controlled accounts and is mainly used to pay Chinese contractors or cover imports rather than flowing directly into Iran’s banking system.

China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), a clearing and settlement network launched by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) in 2015 to process cross-border renminbi transactions, could be a potential channel for these yuan-denominated purchases of Iranian oil. 

GeoEconomics Center analysis of CIPS data shows in the chart below that monthly averages for daily transaction volume remained within a $85–105 billion (600–750 billion yuan) range over the past year. In mid-to-late March, however, daily observations rose to over $130 billion (around 940 billion yuan). The increase in volume is notable in the context of the ongoing Iran war, which began on February 28, but it does not by itself show that Iranian oil payments are moving through CIPS. CIPS handles tens of thousands of transactions a day that reflect a wide range of uses, so the data are best read as a sign of broader growth in renminbi settlement capacity, not as direct proof of Iran-linked flows. Beijing also has widened the mandate of CIPS so it can handle some non‑renminbi currencies and provide broader cross‑border services, making it more flexible as a backbone for regional payments. 

The UAE could be emerging as an increasingly important player in this network. First Abu Dhabi Bank joined CIPS as a direct participant in mid‑2025 and was later named an official renminbi clearing bank. Iran has incentives to use RMB in its energy trade with China, while the UAE has long functioned as a hub for Iran’s trade and commercial finance. Given China’s role as the primary destination for Iran’s shipped oil, a Gulf‑based RMB clearing hub could reduce friction in RMB‑denominated trade flows linked to China and support greater regional RMB liquidity. But there is little visibility into how these channels are being used during the current conflict or what is driving the recent uptick in CIPS activity. Any such transactions would likely occur indirectly through Chinese or third-country banks rather than through direct participation on the CIPS network, limiting visibility into how the systems are being used now.

China also could leverage Project mBridge, a cross‑border payments platform designed to enable direct settlement between central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), for purchases of Iranian oil. Originally incubated under the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Innovation Hub, the project brings together the PBOC, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Bank of Thailand, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, and the Central Bank of Saudi Arabia. The project has made more than 4,000 transactions worth $55.49 billion, with China’s digital yuan comprising 95.3 percent of the volume. 

In November 2025, the UAE executed its first government payment using the wholesale digital dirham on mBridge, testing readiness for settling energy and commodity trade—sectors in which China dominates. Data on mBridge usage remains limited, as neither the PBOC nor participant banks are required to disclose those details. There is no public evidence yet of Iran-linked usage of mBridge, and Iran is not a member of the system, which remains experimental. In practice, however, the UAE’s banks, exchange houses, and free‑zone shell companies already serve as conduits for Iranian‑linked trade and finance, raising the possibility that mBridge‑linked institutions could indirectly handle Iranian‑linked transactions even if Iran itself is not a participant in the platform. 

Conversations that the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics team recently had with policymakers in Europe indicate that Group of Seven (G7) finance officials believe participants may be leveraging mBridge during the Iran war. But the linkages and scale are impossible to know without more information. Given the project’s focus on commodity trade with Gulf countries and China, interest in its potential role in Iranian oil payments is high.

What to watch next

As developments around Iran and its oil trade continue to draw attention, policymakers should focus on several key signals.

First, will renminbi‑based payment infrastructure continue to grow? In particular, will CIPS continue to expand its network in the Middle East, where yuan‑denominated trade is easier to facilitate? Project mBridge remains opaque, with limited public data available. Still, as central banks continue to develop and test wholesale CBDCs, indicators such as new country participation in cross-border projects, energy-related pilot transactions, or spikes in activity during periods of financial or geopolitical stress could point to this technology being used more actively.

Iran, too, is advancing its “digital rial” CBDC, initially a reaction to US sanctions, which could eventually give Tehran an additional channel to steer retail and wholesale payments through digital channels. All founding BRICS countries are testing wholesale CBDCs and continue to push for a more multipolar global currency system. Much of this effort focuses on building domestic digital payment networks while piloting cross‑border applications that enable trade settlement in local currencies. Watch for any signals emerging from the next BRICS summit, planned for September 2026 in India, as well as broader developments in these payment systems—particularly given that India is the second‑largest buyer of Iranian oil.

It is important to note that these systems still do not challenge the dollar’s status as the reserve currency and its prevalence in international transactions. CIPS continues to have a much smaller network than the West’s financial architecture, which includes SWIFT and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). However, these alternative systems do undermine a pillar of dollar dominance: the power of financial sanctions. Especially in this case, they provide Iran with channels to maintain oil revenue and trade flows despite pressure.

Iran has levers it can use to facilitate trade in yuan or other non-dollar currencies. Tehran’s payment landscape, however, remains fragmented. The yuan does not provide Iran with a way out of sanctions, but it may offer a cheaper way through them by reducing dependence on dollar-clearing channels and lowering the compliance and intermediary costs associated with sanctioned transactions. 

Perhaps the most important shift to watch, then, is how the routes connecting trade to payment are changing. Are those changes limited to the current crisis? And will they have longer-term implications for cross-border payments outside the dollar?

The post Inside Tehran’s toll booth appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is the tenth chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas, which analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Evolution of freedom

The Dominican Republic’s recent political history is defined less by rupture than by consolidation. By the mid-1990s, the country had already resolved the most consequential question of its institutional life: how political power is contested and transferred. Since the decisive elections of 1996, Dominican politics has been characterized by regular, competitive elections, peaceful alternation in power, and the absence of constitutional ruptures or electoral breakdowns. Governments have come and gone, and parties have risen and declined, but the basic rules of the game have remained intact.

In a regional context marked by institutional volatility—coups, impeachments, constitutional rewrites, and contested elections—this continuity stands out. The Dominican Republic institutionalized electoral competition early and maintained it across political cycles—including long periods of single-party dominance—without sliding into electoral authoritarianism. The result has been more than procedural stability. Over time, this durability has produced cumulative institutional returns: greater predictability for investors, incremental strengthening of legal frameworks, and an environment in which political dissatisfaction is resolved through elections rather than systemic crisis. For three decades, this steadiness has underpinned one of the strongest growth performances in Latin America. The Freedom Index captures this trajectory, showing sustained gains from 1995 onward and further consolidation after 2020.

This pattern is most visible in the political dimension, which provides the clearest entry point into the country’s broader institutional evolution. The Dominican Republic’s democratic transition was prolonged and uneven, beginning with the assassination of dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in 1961 and unfolding through cycles of hope and reversal—including a coup, civil war, US intervention, and decades of semi-competitive elections under Joaquín Balaguer. The decisive consolidation came in 1996, when competitive elections finally became the uncontested mechanism for political power. This continuity is reflected in the consistently high level of the elections component of the political subindex over the entire period.

What is particularly notable is that even prolonged periods of single-party dominance did not translate into electoral authoritarianism. Between 2004 and 2020, when the Dominican Liberation Party governed for sixteen consecutive years, concerns arose about institutional sclerosis, clientelism, and attempts to alter constitutional term limits. The suspension of the February 2020 municipal elections following failures in a new electronic voting system further exposed procedural weaknesses and eroded public trust. Yet constitutional boundaries ultimately held, the electoral framework was restored, and power transferred peacefully to the opposition later that year.

The evolution of political rights over the past two decades reflects a more nuanced reality. From roughly 2010 to 2020, the political rights component shows a gradual decline. This movement does not suggest a drift toward authoritarianism, but rather the accumulated effects of prolonged incumbency. Media outlets became increasingly entangled with government advertising, patronage networks expanded, and civil society grew more skeptical of the political class. These tensions culminated in the large “Marcha Verde” protest movements that began in 2017 and persisted until the 2020 elections, demanding an end to corruption and impunity. Rather than weakening democracy, these mobilizations ultimately reinforced it by channeling discontent through institutional means and contributing to a legitimate transfer of power.

The rebound in political rights after 2020 appears to reflect shifts in political tone and enforcement patterns more than sweeping institutional reform. The arrival of the Luis Abinader administration brought a clearer rhetorical commitment to transparency and accountability, reduced pressure on critical media, and signaled greater tolerance for scrutiny, contributing to improved perceptions of political openness. Civic space widened, even if the formal legal framework governing political rights remained largely unchanged.

Civil liberties, by contrast, have remained relatively stable and high throughout the period. The country did not experience the sharp pandemic-related declines seen in many advanced democracies, particularly with respect to restrictions on movement or assembly. This stability reinforces the broader picture of an open political system that, despite its imperfections, has avoided the authoritarian and electoral backsliding observed elsewhere in the region.

The most puzzling feature of the political subindex is the persistently low score on legislative constraints on the executive, a pattern that in the Dominican case reflects institutional design rather than weak democratic competition. The country operates under a robust presidential system, and the 2010 constitutional reforms aligned legislative and presidential elections on the same electoral calendar. As a result, the party that wins the presidency almost invariably controls Congress as well, reducing incentives for legislative oversight. The limited professionalization of the legislature compounds this structural feature.

However, this does not mean that the executive operates without constraints. In practice, civil society organizations, business associations, trade unions, and protest movements play a decisive role in shaping and blocking legislation. A clear example was President Luis Abinader’s withdrawal of an ambitious fiscal reform proposal in 2021 after strong opposition from business groups and civil society. Similar dynamics have constrained reform efforts in areas such as education, transportation, and labor markets. The low legislative constraint score therefore reflects a misalignment between formal institutional checks and the informal, societal forces that operate in the Dominican political system.

The economic subindex reinforces the broader picture of institutional continuity that characterizes the Dominican Republic’s experience since the mid-1990s. Rather than reflecting abrupt policy shifts or ideological swings, the data point to a gradual and largely uneventful expansion of economic freedom, aligned with a stable political environment. One reason for this continuity lies in the country’s distinctive political economy: Across party lines, there has been broad consensus around openness to trade and foreign investment, while redistributive policies have not been the exclusive domain of the left. In practice, governments of different political orientations have combined pro-market and social welfare objectives in varying proportions, reducing the likelihood of sharp policy reversals. Over the same period, the country completed a structural transition from an agriculture-centered economy to a highly diversified one in which tourism, manufacturing, mining, construction, and services contribute in comparable proportions to GDP, strengthening resilience to external shocks. As a result, changes in economic policy have tended to be incremental, allowing the Dominican Republic to maintain a consistently business-friendly framework while adjusting gradually to social and fiscal pressures.

Trade freedom has been among the most stable components throughout the period. The country adopted an outward-looking growth model early on, anchored in tourism, free trade zones, and export-oriented manufacturing. This openness has proven resilient to changes in government and political cycles. Across party lines, successive administrations have actively pursued and ratified trade agreements with regional blocs and major economies, reinforcing a broad political consensus in favor of international economic integration. As such, trade policy has not been subject to abrupt reversals.

Investment freedom follows a similarly stable, though slightly more uneven, path. The Dominican Republic has long been perceived as relatively business-friendly within the regional context. Periodic fluctuations in this component appear to capture moments of regulatory or fiscal uncertainty rather than shifts toward state intervention or capital controls.

Property rights show gradual improvement but remain an area where institutional limitations are most visible. While large investors tend to operate within a relatively predictable legal environment, smaller firms and households continue to face slower judicial processes and administrative bottlenecks. This uneven protection of property rights contributes to the persistence of informality and limits the diffusion of economic freedom across the broader economy.

Women’s economic freedom registers a clear upward trend over the past three decades, reflecting the steady removal of formal legal barriers to women’s participation in economic life. This formal progress has coincided with increased visibility of women in both political and business leadership, including sustained cross-partisan representation at the vice-presidential level. As in many middle-income countries, improvements in formal equality coexist with persistent gaps in labor market outcomes, suggesting that social norms and institutional rigidities continue to constrain full convergence.

The sharp improvement in legal indicators subindex after 2020 aligns closely with a combination of legal reform and changes in prosecutorial practice. On the legislative side, reforms to the penal code helped modernize the criminal justice framework, clarify legal definitions, and strengthen sanctions for corruption-related offenses, contributing to greater clarity of the law and procedural coherence. At the same time, the appointment of an unusually independent attorney general marked a clear departure from past patterns in the enforcement of those laws. For the first time in decades, high-profile corruption cases were brought not only against figures associated with previous administrations, but also against politicians and officials linked to the governing coalition. Investigations involving senior legislators, mayors, and politically connected actors sent a strong signal that prosecutorial discretion was no longer being exercised along partisan lines, and this shift had an immediate effect on perceptions of judicial independence and effectiveness, as reflected in the legal subindex. However, the conversion of investigations into final convictions has been slower and more uneven, reflecting judicial inertia and inherited procedural constraints. This underscores that prosecutorial autonomy does not necessarily amount to systemic judicial transformation.

At the same time, this episode raises an important institutional question. The recent strengthening of the rule of law appears to rest heavily on the personal credibility and independence of the prosecutor, rather than on a fully consolidated system of judicial autonomy. Whether these gains can be normalized—embedded in procedures, safeguards, and professional norms that outlast individual officeholders—remains to be seen. Taken together, the evolution of freedom in the Dominican Republic shows an institutional trajectory shaped by steadiness rather than spectacle. Political competition has remained credible over time, legal institutions have strengthened without abrupt breaks, and economic rules have evolved through adjustment rather than ideological swings. This pattern stands in contrast to much of the region, where institutional change has often been driven by sharp turns, constitutional resets, and recurrent political crises. In the Dominican case, stability has carried weight. It has allowed investment decisions to be taken without persistent institutional uncertainty and has given economic activity room to expand without the disruptions associated with repeated policy reversals. Social demands, in turn, have tended to find expression through elections, courts, and public debate rather than through systemic crisis. The payoff from this understated but resilient institutional framework becomes clearer when attention shifts from rules to results. The following section examines how this steady expansion of freedom has translated into sustained improvements in income, health, education, and overall standards of living.

From freedom to prosperity

The Dominican Republic’s experience over the past three decades suggests that institutional stability, while rarely dramatic, can be economically productive. The country has recorded the fastest GDP growth in Latin America in the last half-century, averaging approximately 5 percent annually—well above the regional average of 3.2 percent. This performance has translated into the fastest income convergence with the United States of any major Latin American economy: From one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere in the 1960s, the Dominican Republic now has a standard of living roughly one-third that of the United States, compared to one-quarter for the region as a whole. This remarkable performance reflects the cumulative effect of a predictable institutional environment in which economic activity could expand over time rather than being repeatedly disrupted. The Prosperity Index captures this payoff, showing steady improvements in income and basic social indicators since the mid-1990s.

Rather than relying on a single engine of expansion, the Dominican Republic has built a diversified growth model that has evolved gradually over time. Economic activity has been rooted in a combination of tourism, free trade zones, mining, construction, and services, with each sector playing a stabilizing role at different phases of the cycle. Tourism has provided a steady source of foreign exchange, while export-oriented manufacturing in free trade zones has integrated the country into global value chains, especially in medical devices and electronics. Gold mining—anchored by Pueblo Viejo, Latin America’s largest gold mine—has emerged as the country’s leading export and proved especially valuable during the pandemic when mineral revenues helped offset the collapse in tourism. Construction and related services have supported domestic demand, partly reflecting sustained population growth and urbanization. This diversification has reduced exposure to commodity price volatility and limited the risk of abrupt downturns, distinguishing the Dominican Republic from many regional peers whose growth paths have been more narrowly concentrated.

The United States occupies a central place in the Dominican Republic’s external economic relations, but it does so within a relatively diversified trade structure. Geographic proximity, preferential trade arrangements under DR-CAFTA, and long-standing commercial ties have made the United States the country’s most important single trading partner. The relationship cuts in both directions: The Dominican Republic exports free trade zone manufactures and traditional agricultural commodities—tobacco, sugar, cocoa, coffee—while importing energy, machinery, and consumer goods from the United States. This two-way integration has provided a stable demand anchor and supported export-oriented sectors from traditional agriculture to modern manufacturing, with growing nearshoring opportunities. At the same time, the Dominican Republic has avoided excessive concentration on a single market. Trade links with Europe, the Caribbean, and Latin America have expanded over time, and tourism revenues draw on a broad set of source countries. This diversification has reduced vulnerability to shocks originating in any one economy, allowing the country to benefit from deep integration with the United States while maintaining a degree of external balance.

Education presents a more ambivalent picture. The Dominican Republic made a highly visible and politically salient commitment to education funding during the 2010s, following sustained social pressure to comply with constitutional spending mandates. Public investment expanded rapidly, leading to clear improvements in access, school infrastructure, and enrollment. These efforts marked an important shift in public priorities and are reflected in gradual gains in educational attainment indicators captured by the Prosperity Index.

However, improvements in educational quality have lagged far behind the scale of financial effort. Learning outcomes remain weak by international standards, as reflected in the Dominican Republic’s consistently low performance in the Programme for International Student Assessment, where students score well below the OECD and Latin American averages in reading, mathematics, and science. This gap points to institutional constraints rather than a lack of resources. Rigidities in the public education system—particularly regarding teacher evaluation, incentives, and accountability—have proven difficult to overcome. Opposition to reforms aimed at improving performance has often succeeded in preserving existing arrangements that disproportionately benefit a relatively protected group of workers, while limiting gains in system-wide quality and student outcomes. As a result, education has yet to play the role in productivity growth and social mobility that is required for sustained income convergence.

Health outcomes have followed a more linear trajectory. Life expectancy has increased steadily over the period, reflecting income growth, expanded access to basic healthcare, and incremental improvements in coverage. The Dominican Republic did not undertake a radical overhaul of its healthcare system, but rather expanded it gradually, with uneven quality but broad reach. These gains are consistent with the country’s level of development and contribute meaningfully to improvements in overall well-being, even as efficiency and quality challenges persist.

Inequality has improved markedly over the past decade. The Prosperity Index shows a substantial reduction in income inequality since around 2010, with the inequality component increasing by roughly twenty-five points, placing the Dominican Republic among the stronger performers in the region on this dimension. This improvement reflects a combination of sustained economic growth, rising employment, and gradual formalization, which together helped lift incomes at the lower end of the distribution. Unlike in many neighboring countries, these gains were achieved without the boom-and-bust cycles that tend to reverse distributional progress.

At the same time, the decline in measured inequality masks emerging forms of segmentation that could become more consequential over time. High levels of informality continue to limit upward mobility for a large share of workers, constraining access to stable income trajectories and social protection. While overall income dispersion has narrowed, disparities in job quality and long-term opportunity persist. The Dominican Republic’s experience illustrates that inequality can fall meaningfully even as structural dualities remain entrenched—a pattern consistent with a growth model that has been inclusive in aggregate terms but uneven in how opportunities are distributed across the labor force.

These distributional patterns also shape how migration from Haiti features in the prosperity debate. The issue is deeply polarizing, and this polarization has produced policy incoherence rather than resolution. The 2013 Constitutional Court ruling (TC 168-13) held that tens of thousands of Dominican-born individuals of Haitian descent had never been entitled to citizenship—a decision that drew accusations of creating statelessness from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  Subsequent regularization efforts reached only a fraction of the affected population, constrained not only by domestic political backlash but also by Haiti’s limited administrative capacity and inability to provide basic civil documentation for many affected individuals. Meanwhile, mass deportations coexist with the massive use of undocumented labor in construction, agriculture, and services, while Haitian migrants and their descendants represent a substantial share of public spending on schooling and healthcare. The result is neither exclusion nor integration but an intractable ambiguity: pervasive informality, legal precarity, and administrative inconsistency that entrenches inequality even as aggregate indicators improve.

The more consequential challenge lies in the longer-term implications of informal integration. When access to services, education, and employment relies on ad hoc arrangements rather than clear institutional pathways, the risk is not immediate marginalization but gradual stratification. Over time, this can translate into persistent differences in educational trajectories, job quality, and social mobility, even without explicit barriers or discriminatory intent. Haitian migration, therefore, does not currently undermine prosperity outcomes, but it does test the capacity of Dominican institutions to transform informal inclusion into sustainable integration and to prevent new forms of segmentation from emerging alongside otherwise improving inequality indicators.

The path forward

The Dominican Republic approaches the coming years from a comparatively favorable position within Latin America. Democratic norms are consolidated, institutional performance has improved incrementally, and prosperity gains have accumulated without major reversals. The central question ahead is therefore not one of stability, but of trajectory. The challenge is whether the country can move beyond a successful middle-income equilibrium and sustain the kind of productivity gains required to converge toward high-income status.

Externally, the Dominican Republic is unusually well positioned, particularly in its relationship with the United States. Close economic, political, and security ties have long defined the country’s development path, and recent shifts in US trade and industrial policy have, in principle, reinforced this advantage rather than undermined it. Even amid more protectionist rhetoric and policy experimentation in Washington, the Dominican Republic has remained a trusted partner, benefiting from geographic proximity, established supply chains, and a reputation for macroeconomic and political reliability. Yet this favorable positioning has not always translated into concrete gains at the scale one might expect. A telling example is the presence of a US International Development Finance Corporation office in the country, which was initially seen as an opportunity to channel investment and support strategic projects but has so far had very limited activity. This gap highlights a broader risk: Close alignment with the United States creates opportunities, but capturing them requires domestic institutional capacity, project readiness, and strategic coordination. Without these, proximity and trust alone may result in underused potential rather than accelerated convergence.

This places the question of the middle-income trap at the center of the country’s outlook. The Dominican Republic has already captured most of the gains associated with macroeconomic stability, openness, and sectoral diversification. What lies ahead is a more demanding transition toward productivity-driven growth. The risk is not a return to instability or crisis, but a gradual settling into growth rates that are sufficient to sustain middle-income status yet insufficient to achieve convergence with advanced economies. Persistently low educational quality, high informality, limited innovation capacity, and weak spillovers from export sectors continue to constrain productivity. Escaping the middle-income trap will depend on transforming these underlying drivers through improvements in learning outcomes, technical training, and innovation capacity to enable diversification toward higher-value sectors.

Institutionally, recent improvements in the rule of law and anti-corruption enforcement have strengthened public trust and international credibility. However, the durability of these gains remains an open question. Much of the progress since 2020 has relied on leadership choices and informal norms rather than on fully entrenched institutional safeguards. Whether judicial independence, prosecutorial autonomy, and legal clarity can be preserved across political cycles will be a key determinant of future performance. Moreover, prosecution is not the same as prevention, and high-profile cases have demonstrated that corrupt practices persist even under the credible threat of enforcement. A partial rollback would not necessarily trigger immediate instability, but it would weaken the institutional foundations required for higher-quality growth and more complex economic activity, while leaving underlying vulnerabilities in procurement, asset disclosure, and political finance unaddressed.

Regionally, instability represents a more immediate and less controllable risk. The situation in Haiti has deteriorated to an unprecedented degree: Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, gangs—some designated as terrorist organizations—have seized control of an estimated 90 percent of Port-au-Prince, while state institutions have effectively ceased to function. The violence has displaced over one million people and caused tens of thousands of deaths since 2018. This is not cyclical instability but a qualitatively different breakdown. Persistent institutional collapse and humanitarian distress across the border generate security concerns, fiscal pressures, and diplomatic constraints that the Dominican Republic cannot fully manage on its own. While the country has so far absorbed these pressures without major disruption, prolonged instability in Haiti could increasingly test its administrative capacity, border management, and social cohesion, particularly if international engagement remains insufficient.

A related risk stems from the very factors that have underpinned the Dominican Republic’s success. Relative political stability, improving infrastructure, and deep integration into international trade networks also make the country an attractive transit and logistics hub for illicit activities, particularly drug trafficking and associated financial flows. As enforcement pressures shift across the region, there is concern that criminal networks could seek to exploit the Dominican Republic’s ports, transportation systems, and financial channels. This risk does not reflect institutional failure—in fact, the country has achieved record drug interdictions in recent years—but exposure created by openness and connectivity. If not handled carefully, these dynamics could strain security institutions, distort local economies, and erode public trust, undermining some of the institutional gains achieved in recent years.

Finally, the political economy of reform will remain decisive. The Dominican political system continues to combine a strong presidency with a relatively weak legislature and a vibrant civil society capable of constraining government action. As earlier sections have shown, this configuration has been effective at preventing democratic backsliding and forcing accountability, but it has also made structural reform difficult. This tension is particularly evident in the fiscal sphere. A narrow tax base and extensive exemptions limit the state’s capacity to finance higher-quality public services and consistent public policy execution, as well as to strengthen social protection and further reduce structural inequalities. As a result, the government has increasingly turned to debt: Interest payments alone now approach 4 percent of GDP, and debt service consumes 25 to 30 percent of the state budget, crowding out productive public investment. Meanwhile, intractable problems persist—most notably electricity subsidies required to cover distribution losses—that continue to drain fiscal resources. The result is a budget squeezed between debt obligations, unproductive subsidies, and inadequate investment in human capital and infrastructure.

Without fiscal reform, efforts to improve education, infrastructure, and social protection will remain constrained, even as parts of the economy continue to advance. The risk is that inequality, which has declined in aggregate, could begin to rise again in more structural forms, producing a segmented society marked by pockets of high prosperity and opportunity alongside regions and communities that remain disconnected from growth. Whether the political system can move from preserving stability to actively reforming itself—making choices that broaden the tax base and strengthen state capacity—will determine whether the country can convert steady momentum into sustained development. In sum, sudden crises or dramatic reversals are unlikely to define the Dominican Republic’s future. Its prospects hinge instead on whether it can leverage its favorable external position, preserve recent institutional gains, and overcome domestic constraints that limit productivity, human capital formation, and social integration. Stability has served the country well. The challenge now is to turn that stability into sustained convergence—by moving beyond a political culture of indefinite deferral that has allowed structural problems to persist even as the economy expanded. Whether leaders are prepared to make difficult and politically costly decisions—rather than merely avoiding destabilizing ones—will determine whether the next half-century is defined by incremental continuity or genuine transformation.

Marino Auffant is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is a historian and geopolitical strategist whose work examines global macro trends, great-power competition, and economic statecraft. Based in Washington, D.C., he advises public- and private-sector leaders on structural competitiveness, supply-chain strategy, and industrial policy, with a particular focus on strategic dynamics in the Western Hemisphere and US–Dominican Republic relations. His research and advisory work spans energy markets and semiconductor nearshoring strategy. He holds a PhD in history from Harvard University.

The Indexes rank 164 countries around the world. Use our site to explore thirty years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the subindexes and indicators that comprise our Indexes.

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2026 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Against a global backdrop of uncertainty, fragmentation, and shifting priorities, we invited leading economists and scholars to dive deep into the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries around the world. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

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2025 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists, scholars, and diplomats analyze the state of freedom and prosperity in eighteen countries around the world, looking back not only on a consequential year but across twenty-nine years of data on markets, rights, and the rule of law.

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2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

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The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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The post How the Dominican Republic can escape the ‘middle-income trap’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Three decades ago, the West seemed unassailable. The Soviet Union had collapsed and for the third time in the twentieth century, the United States and its allies had emerged victorious in a global struggle against an authoritarian foe—and for the first time in generations, Western liberal democracy did not have an ideological or geopolitical adversary. It was a giddy moment when anything and everything seemed possible.

Today, that heady optimism feels like a distant dream. Thirty years after the Soviet empire ended, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, the largest land war in Europe since World War II. The liberal democratic model of governance that appeared so triumphant and invincible three decades ago is today beleaguered and on the defensive as populism, xenophobia, and authoritarian attitudes sweep Europe and North America. ​​The world today seems as dangerous, if not more so, than during the long twilight struggle of the Cold War.

So what happened? How did we fall from the heady optimism of 1992 to the peril, malaise, and danger of today? What lessons can we learn from the post-Cold War period? Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, the British historian E. H. Carr published his seminal book The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939, which examined the lessons of the interwar period. Carr argued that this era was a crisis of the international system, resulting from the failure of the old liberal order to adapt to and understand new and emergent political, economic, and military realities.

​​This report argues that a similar dynamic played out in the contemporary West in our own thirty-year crisis between the end of the Cold War and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The liberal order failed. But how? And why? The author interviewed dozens of policymakers, analysts, and experts in Europe and North America to distill the lessons of the post-Cold War era.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington.

He is also the founder and author of the Power Vertical Blog and host of the Power Vertical Podcast, both of which focus on Russian affairs. Whitmore was previously a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) from 2018 to 2020 and senior Russia analyst for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) from 2007 to 2017. Prior to joining RFE/RL, Whitmore worked as a foreign correspondent for the Boston Globe in Moscow and Prague.

He also worked as a graduate lecturer with the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina as a visiting lecturer with the History Faculty at Mechnikov National University in Odesa, Ukraine, and the International Relations Faculty at St. Petersburg State University in Russia.

His work has appeared in the Washington Post, the Atlantic, the New Republic, Foreign Policy, World Politics Review, Newsweek, and elsewhere. He has appeared as a guest commentator on CNN, the BBC World Service, NPR, Bloomberg, and various other media.

A native of New Haven, Connecticut, Whitmore earned an MA in political science from Villanova University in 1987 and BA in politics from St. Joseph’s University in Philadelphia in 1986.

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The post How the West lost the post-Cold War era appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With scenarios for the conflict’s next phrase ranging from diplomatic off-ramps to military escalation, we asked Atlantic Council experts to identify their biggest takeaways from the war so far.

What we’ve learned about . . . 

The Iranian regime

US military capabilities 

The Trump doctrine

The Iranian opposition

The Gulf states

Israel

The global economy

Global energy markets

Russia and Iran

China and Iran

The Iranian regime

One month into the Iran war, the Iranian regime is bruised, battered, and (perhaps irrationally) bullish about its future. The regime’s apparatus has withstood the decapitation of its leadership and more than 15,000 strikes on its capabilities and infrastructure. At the same time, the regime has executed a premeditated and effective response that has imposed significant costs on US Gulf allies and energy infrastructure. The de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been its most potent weapon, inflicting significant pain on the global economy that has netted the regime unilateral concessions from the United States to relieve stress on financial markets. 

Internally, the regime appears stable. The Islamic Republic has proven to be much larger than any one individual. There has not been any significant domestic uprising to date. Most notably, there have not been any defections among political and security elites. The most hardline voices within the system have been empowered. All these factors have led many within the regime to believe it is winning the war despite the conditions of the battlefield.   

Yet there are significant challenges ahead for the regime that extend beyond the war. It’s increasingly clear that after rejecting talks with the United States, Iran has no clear plan for what comes next. A reported US offer was nowhere near viable, but the rejection of that offer increases the likelihood of US ground troops invading Iranian territory. A messy situation looks primed to get much worse. 

Assuming the Iranian regime does survive the war, it still faces a long-term existential crisis. The regime cannot provide the economic or political opportunities its population craves. To stay in power, Iran will either need to consistently and systematically repress dissent or make significant changes to the Islamic Republic’s core ideologies. Those changes seem unlikely to happen in the short term. Therefore, surviving this war will only delay the next crisis. 

—Nate Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Beginning in 2015, he served as a senior advisor on Iran policy to successive administrations, including most recently as director for Iran at the US National Security Council. 

US military capabilities

The United States can execute fast, precise, and integrated multi-domain operations at scale, but it can’t sustain this kind of high operational tempo over time. 

Headlines have highlighted new technologies, such as the US military’s use of LUCAS (Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Aircraft Systems), PrSM (Precision Strike Missiles), and an artificial intelligence–driven battle management system. 

The real story, however, is the joint integration of these and other capabilities across at least six combatant commands and thousands of soldiers. The United States is delivering coordinated strikes faster than ever while simultaneously working with allies and partners to effectively defend against Iranian attacks. No other military in the world has demonstrated this level of proficiency. Adversaries can acquire new technologies, but they can’t buy talent and the type of command-and-control culture that empowers US soldiers to act together seamlessly. 

Sustaining these capabilities, however, is a perennial challenge. Demand for munitions exceeds available supply, and as Diana Maurer of the US Government Accountability Office noted in her testimony this month: “DOD has been unable to sustain its weapon systems to meet its goals across all domains and faces challenges providing logistical support to US forces, especially in contested environments.” 

This is why it’s a national security imperative to invest in domestic capacity. The United States must be able to sustain its military in a longer high-end fight—a topic of Forward Defense’s ReForge Commission. 

—Joe Costa is the director of the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans and posture in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

The Trump doctrine

One month into the war with Iran, Trump’s actions have us rethinking his “peace through strength” doctrine. Until this point, it was pretty clear that Trump was okay with short, sharp, decisive actions like we saw with the strike to eliminate Iranian IRGC general Qasem Soleimani in the first Trump administration; Operation Midnight Hammer, which targeted Iranian nuclear sites; and Operation Absolute Resolve, which removed strongman Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela. We also know that Trump is uncomfortable with long, drawn-out military campaigns with no end in sight, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine.  

So while I am not surprised by the airstrikes against Iran, I am surprised by the scale of the campaign and by the fact that it now appears Trump is on the verge of sending in ground forces. Some commentators had previously remarked that we were never going to see Trump send the 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East. But that’s exactly what he did this week.  

It is still my prediction that, consistent with Trump’s “peace through strength” doctrine, the US president will ultimately declare victory and end the conflict soon rather than allow himself to get into an extended military quagmire.   

—Matthew Kroenig  is vice president for geostrategy and fellows and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The Iranian opposition

Amid conflicting messages from the Trump administration about the goal of continued US and Israeli military strikes on Iran (is it for regime change or to only weaken the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and ballistic-missile capacity?) the Iranian opposition has found itself needing to urgently define the path forward.  

This weekend, a group of hundreds of ideologically diverse opposition activists are meeting in London as part of the Iran Freedom Congress to discuss Iran’s future and a pluralistic vision for guiding a transition. Critically, they are not positioning this as a challenge to any other opposition figure, including Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah. Rather, it is intended to “broaden the tent” to ensure that diverse voices are represented in any democratic process moving forward. Pahlavi has also made efforts in recent weeks to expand his reach by holding meetings with a wider set of activists and bringing Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Iranian jurist Shirin Ebadi on to chair a transitional justice committee. Ebadi’s involvement is significant not only for her deep global reach and connections to figures leading transitional justice processes in other countries, but also for the fact that she once supported the 1979 revolution that unseated Pahlavi’s father.  

While this show of unity was celebrated by some, it has also been critiqued by others who have even called for Ebadi to be stripped of her Nobel (which is a technical impossibility). Meanwhile, still others contend that no movement for human rights and democracy can move forward without an immediate cease-fire, that the bombs only weaken the civil society that is seeking an end to this regime, and that a meaner, harsher regime may be left standing once the strikes end.  

In short, much is yet to be determined but will become clear over the next few weeks—including in light of reports from some on Pahlavi’s team that Iranians have organized a ground game that will be activated soon. 

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and a board member of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

The Gulf states

However the Iran war ends, it will not eliminate all of Iran’s attack capabilities. The Iranian regime’s apparent resilience and resolve suggest that the war will not change Iran’s intent to terrorize the region and assert leverage over the Strait of Hormuz either. The United States and Israel may feel comfortable with the dent the war has put in Iran’s long-range missile capabilities and nuclear program, especially as Trump seeks an exit that will quell global markets and relieve political pressure at home. But the threat to Iran’s Gulf neighbors will remain.  

Iran’s attacks on all six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provide an unprecedented opportunity for its member countries to deepen their diplomatic, security, and economic integration in ways that could profoundly strengthen their resilience. GCC solidarity in the immediate aftermath of the attacks demonstrated the potential of such unity, including a historic UN Security Council Resolution.  

One month in, however, longstanding fissures are re-emerging, including around how and when to end the war and what the region should look like after the bombs stop. And it appears there is still a rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that will jeopardize Gulf unity going forward.  

Gulf countries do not have a simple solution for navigating heightened security and economic threats after the war. While there may be frustration with the United States, Russia and China’s responses to the war make it clear that there is no replacing US security support. And while the war’s disruption to oil and gas production reinforces Gulf countries’ efforts to diversify their economies, the disruption to air travel, shipping, and investor confidence underscores that no sector is completely safe.   

The Gulf solution to these threats is likely to be intense diversification: deepening security partnerships with a range of different partners, reducing strategic redundancy through new trade and energy corridors, and embracing a range of industries that are less vulnerable to disruptions to the movement of goods and people, such as advanced technology.  

—Allison Minor is the director of the Project for Middle East Integration with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. She previously served as US deputy special envoy for Yemen and as director for Arabian Peninsula affairs at the National Security Council.

Israel

While US and Israeli forces engage in an unprecedented, combined military campaign in Iran with considerable operational achievements—a high point in bilateral military cooperation—views on the conflict diverge considerably among the American and Israeli publics. 

In contrast with US polls that indicate around 60 percent opposition to the war, support for the war effort began and remained high in Israel, with initial polls indicating well over 80 percent support, and over 90 percent among Jewish Israelis. More recent polling suggests slight slippage, as four weeks of being sent to bomb shelters by missile attacks wears on the population, but an overwhelming majority still support continuing the war. That steady backing is understandable, considering the Iranian regime’s long-held and oft-stated commitment to Israel’s destruction, and its hostility expressed in sponsoring terrorist organizations, attacks on Israel with ballistic missiles, and pursuit of a nuclear program that could enable Iran to possess a nuclear weapon.  

The global interests that animate so much of the American debate around the war—the fear of overstretch in regime-change wars, the global economic shock caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the impact on strategic competition with China and Russia—feature far less prominently in the Israeli discourse. 

While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains a divisive figure in Israeli politics, his political opponents have nearly universally expressed backing for the campaign in Iran. They have echoed his hope that the campaign will weaken the regime to the point that the Iranian people will overthrow it. But that consensus has not translated into a meaningful boost for the prime minister in polls ahead of a crucial election later this year. In a sense, the Israeli consensus, surrounding the need to strike a dangerous foe at its weakest point and take advantage of the opportunity presented by Trump’s willingness to join the fight, exists alongside, and distinct from, Israel’s longstanding polarized politics. 

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017 and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East. 

The global economy

We’ve learned two connected things about the global economy in the month since the Iran war started. The first is that the markets matter for the military. Strikes have consistently ramped up on Friday evenings and over the weekend, while statements about deescalation have often coincided with Sunday evening (when Asian markets open) or Monday morning. This is not a coincidence. There is a direct line of communication between the White House and Wall Street. But Tehran understands this dynamic as well: Many Iranian statements have been crafted precisely to sow confusion in markets at key moments.  

But neither market sentiment nor media rhetoric can overcome the hard reality of oil and gas not being transited through the Strait of Hormuz. Time and again, the reality of the closure has rippled throughout the global economy. In the first week, gas prices dominated concerns. In the second, it was helium, a key component for chip-making throughout the world. In the third week, it was fertilizer and the potential strain on the global food supply. Just like the COVID-19 pandemic, the war has reminded us that for all the discussion about resiliency and artificial intelligence, the global economy is still incredibly reliant on a few strategic chokepoints, and the Strait of Hormuz is one of the most vital. 

—Josh Lipsky is the chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council and the senior director of the GeoEconomics Center. He previously served as an advisor at the International Monetary Fund.

Global energy markets

Geopolitical risks are and will remain an enduring feature of energy markets, but the next energy crisis could dwarf even the Iran war.  

In recent history, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sent world energy and food prices soaring, further amplifying inflation already triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic’s effects on global supply chains and revenge consumption. In 2026, the US–Iran war could become the world’s largest energy crisis in living history, with the head of the International Energy Agency warning that the current supply shock could outstrip the two oil crises of the 1970s combined.  

While energy-related geopolitical risks are inherently unpredictable, they are generally not unforeseeable. The COVID-19 pandemic was sui generis, but Russian President Vladimir Putin credibly threatened a full-scale military action in Ukraine in early 2021, and analysts have been warning about Iran’s ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz for decades.  

Another, greater foreseeable geopolitical risk looms over global energy markets. If the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attempts to coercively absorb Taiwan, probably via quarantine or blockade, Beijing will likely trigger the greatest geopolitical and energy crisis in history. Both the United States and the PRC are nuclear-armed, of course, but both also hold critical leverage over global energy supply chains.  

If the PRC initiates hostilities, Beijing would use its monopoly across critical minerals, including graphite for batteries and possibly petrochemicals, while potentially exploiting cyber vulnerabilities embedded in its energy exports. The United States would seek to constrain the PRC’s imports of crude oil, iron ore, and other commodities, although Beijing is assiduously mitigating its Malacca Dilemma and reducing oil-import exposure via electric vehicles and other measures.  

Just as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz were foreseeable risks, a cross-Strait crisis, while not inevitable, must be prepared for—starting now.   

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report. 

Russia and Iran

Russia has largely been a beneficiary of the war for several reasons. First, US and global attention has shifted from Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine to the war in the Gulf. Second, the United States’ need for weapons in the Middle East may reduce stocks available for Ukraine. Third, the predictable jump in oil prices prompted by the war led Washington to suspend its sanctions on Russian oil, providing a substantial, immediate income boost to Russia’s stumbling economy. 

But not every consequence of the war works in Moscow’s favor. The Gulf countries’ air defense, which is heavy on expensive US weapons, has not been fully up to the task of protecting against Iranian drones and missiles, and has prompted some of these countries to make deals with Ukraine for both drones and help in establishing a layered air defense system. This provides money for Ukraine’s growing drone and defense industries, which means more production not just for the Gulf Arab states but also for Ukraine to use against Russia. This has also improved Ukraine’s standing in the Middle East, where many states had leaned in Moscow’s direction.   

There is one more important issue related to Russian policy in this war: Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to provide Iran with drone components and intelligence that Tehran can use to target US forces, Israel, and the Gulf Arab states. Iran’s drone supply to Russia after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was critical to its campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure and civilians. Russia not only used those drones in its war on Ukraine, but also took the prototype and started improving the drones and producing them in large numbers. Iran has been a beneficiary of these improvements.   

Moscow’s aim is clear: To prevent a US victory in Iran, or at least to slow it down and make it more expensive. It also wants the suspension in oil sanctions to continue as long as possible. The perplexing thing here is the Trump administration’s efforts to ignore or explain away this unpleasant fact. While criticizing US allies for not being more supportive in the Middle East—a fair criticism—it lets Russia off the hook for aiding Iran’s attacks on US servicemembers.

This situation is not likely to hold. Washington’s inaction on this matter may be encouraging Russia to provide additional help. According to Western intelligence, Moscow may now be sending drones to Iran. If a Russian drone or an Iranian drone with Russian components strikes and kills US soldiers, that may prompt the Trump administration to take strong measures to force Putin to knock it off. One such step would be to provide Ukraine the weapons it needs to take out Russia’s massive drone factory in Tatarstan. 

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

China and Iran

One month into the war, Beijing increasingly views this conflict as a strategic opportunity. On the energy front, it is less dependent on imported oil than many of its neighbors and has massive stockpiles that it can use to offset near-term shortages. It is in Iran’s interest to keep the oil payments from China flowing, so Tehran is carefully avoiding firing on China-flagged tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Those ships are among the few passing safely through, with Iran’s blessing.

Thus far, the downsides for China are minimal, and Beijing is focusing on a major upside: This war is forcing the United States to draw down military assets in the Asia-Pacific region. For China, that is a massive strategic win, and well worth any near-term disruptions to global energy markets. China has long complained about the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antiballistic missile system stationed in South Korea. Now, for the first time since its deployment in 2017, the United States is moving some of those interceptors to the Middle East to deal with Iran’s retaliatory strikes.  

Across the board, the US military is already running low on munitions, forcing it to consider pulling assets away from Ukraine as well. That will further embolden Russia, which is yet another win for China given that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said Beijing needs to ensure Russia does not lose that conflict. The Chinese foreign minister told his European counterparts that Beijing benefits when Russia’s actions toward Ukraine keep the United States tied up in that war and unable to focus on China. The Iran conflict is delivering an even bigger distraction from China than the war in Ukraine. 

Chinese analysts do not expect the Iranian regime to fall or the United States to achieve its objectives. Instead, they anticipate that the United States will become mired in a protracted war that further drains US resources. One of China’s leading think tankers recently published a piece framing the war as a “strategic opportunity” for China. China’s censors quickly pulled that article down, most likely to avoid angering Iran or undermining Beijing’s message of outrage over the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But make no mistake: That is the inside view. China sees the United States as dropping a rock on its own foot, becoming (yet again) entangled in the Middle East in ways that will make it exponentially harder for the United States and its allies to counter China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.        

—Melanie Hart is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. She previously served as senior advisor for China in the Office of the Undersecretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment at the US Department of State.

The post Ten lessons from the first month of the Iran war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• A new government has come to power in Bangladesh with a democratic mandate for both economic growth and constitutional reforms passed in a referendum.
• The example of Nepal shows that constitutional reforms alone are not enough if the government can’t tackle corruption and expand economic opportunity. 
• Bangladesh’s new government should prioritize implementing constitutional reforms on anti-corruption and setting up guardrails to prevent future leaders from cracking down on dissent.

WASHINGTON—On February 12, Bangladesh held its first democratic elections since widespread protests ousted the government of Sheikh Hasina, who was prime minister from 1996 to 2001 and again from 2009 to 2024.

During the past year and half, during which an interim government was led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, political parties within the country came together to draft the July Charter. This charter is a redrafting of Bangladesh’s constitution that proposes multiple important changes to the document that has served as the country’s foundational creed since 1972. The changes include explicitly outlining the rights of citizens, adding term limits for the prime minister, creating a bicameral legislature, and establishing more stringent oversight and anti-corruption institutions.

In the February 12 election, voters gave the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) a majority in parliament, making the BNP’s Tarique Rahman the country’s new prime minister. But the voters—through a referendum—also approved the adoption of the July Charter as the country’s new constitution.

The BNP, which ran on a platform of widespread financial assistance and plans to make Bangladesh a trillion-dollar economy by 2034, benefitted from widespread animosity toward Hasina’s banned Awami Leage party. Now, however, it comes to power with the mandate of adopting and implementing the sweeping reforms laid out in the charter.

Whether the new government is willing and able to do so could determine the future of liberal democracy in Bangladesh.

The story of the data: Political decline and executive aggrandizement

Data from the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes paints a grim picture of Bangladesh’s democratic trajectory over the past three decades. No country in South and Central Asia has experienced bigger declines in political freedom since 1995, with a significant erosion of political rights and legislative powers since the late 2000s.

Political rights and constraints on the executive have dropped sharply since late 2000s

From a rule-of-law standpoint, Bangladesh has experienced the seventh largest drop in judicial independence and effectiveness in the world since 1995. As a result, corruption has thrived. 

Judicial independence has drastically declined amid persistent corruption

How might the new government reverse this downward trajectory? The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes broadly show that political freedom and the rule of law are critical for advancing prosperity. Therefore, implementing the judicial, electoral, and rights-related reforms laid out in the July Charter could be important steps toward the BNP realizing its vision for national prosperity.

Lessons from Nepal: The tedious nature of constitutional overhaul

Numerous countries around the world, including Ecuador, Bolivia, and Tunisia, have adopted new constitutions since the turn of the century. But Bangladesh has only to look as far as Nepal to see that effectively implementing constitutional reforms is easier said than done.

While Nepal is different from Bangladesh in that it adopted its current constitution in 2015 in the aftermath of a decades-long civil conflict, there are some broad similarities. Like the Bangladesh’s July Charter proposes, Nepal’s constitution created a bicameral parliamentary system designed to institutionalize democracy in a country that previously experienced high levels of corruption and limited political freedom.

On the surface, Nepal even looked like a democratic success story. The interim constitution that it adopted after the end of the insurgency in 2006, and the permanent constitution it took up in 2015, helped propel the country to the highest levels of political freedom in the South and Central Asia region.

Elevated rights and institutional powers, however, were not enough to prevent the Gen Z-led uprising that overthrew the government in September 2025. These protests were sparked most immediately by government bans on social media, but they reflected deeper frustration with persistent corruption and a lack of economic opportunity for young people. It is these frustrations that Nepal’s new government—set to be led by thirty-five-year old former rapper Balendra Shah—will have to address.

What this shows is that public satisfaction with democratic governance is profoundly rooted in economic opportunity. A lack of economic opportunity paired with perceptions of corruption is a recipe for unrest.

What should Bangladesh’s new government prioritize? 

While the situations of Bangladesh and Nepal are by no means identical, the BNP would be wise to take lessons from its regional neighbor seriously. Combining these lessons with the shortcomings that Hasina’s anti-democratic regimes illuminated in Bangladesh’s previous constitution is the best blueprint for institutionalizing democracy in the world’s eighth most populous country.

All of the reforms outlined in the July Charter should be adopted in accordance with the preferences of voters, but the new government should prioritize implementing two reforms in particular:

1. Elevating the Anti-Corruption Commission from a statutory institution to a constitutional body and embracing the charter’s proposed anti-corruption articles. The new BNP-led government must enact articles 72, 73, and 74, which call for publicizing the owners of companies, trusts, and foundations, for making political party finance information transparent, and for requiring public representatives to disclose their own and their family’s income and assets to the Election Commission, respectively. Prioritizing these measures within the charter will help the new government establish legitimacy and ease public grievances.
2. Changing the process for declaring a state of emergency. The July Charter credits the arbitrary use of emergency declarations as one of the tools that enabled Hasina’s systematic erosion of democracy. Provision 2 of article 6 within the charter calls for cabinet approval and oversight from the opposition leader for any declaration of a state of emergency rather than simply requiring the prime minister’s signature. By broadening the scope of review for state of emergency declarations and mandating the opposition’s involvement, the government can enhance the transparency of such a declaration and mitigate the risk of executive aggrandizement. Implementing this provision can serve as a stepping stone toward institutionalizing democracy in the long term. 

By prioritizing these specific reforms and pairing them with broader measures to advance political freedom and institutional integrity, the BNP can most effectively live up to the mandate it was given by Bangladeshi voters.

Of course, as the example of Nepal (and countless other countries) shows, political freedom and the rule of law must be paired with a focus on creating economic opportunity, especially for the vast swaths of young people that are a feature of many countries in Southeast Asia.

Conversely, however, the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes show that institutionalized democracy and economic liberalization are the most effective catalysts for long-term prosperity.

The BNP has a history of corruption, and the implementation of the July Charter’s provisions is far from certain. But, by marrying a focus on short-term drivers of economic development with the reforms outlined in the charter, Bangladesh’s new government can both prevent future unrest and meet its lofty economic goals.

The post What does Bangladesh’s new government need to do to revitalize democracy? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

When US President Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025 and began efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine via diplomacy, many Ukrainians were not overly optimistic. This skepticism was rooted in their own bitter personal experience of broken Russian promises over the past few decades.

Since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Russia signed a long list of treaties and agreements obliging Moscow to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and refrain from acts of international aggression. These commitments did not prevent Russian President Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine in 2014 or launching a full-scale invasion eight years later. Understandably, few in Kyiv now believe Putin can be trusted to respect future deals.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Over the past year, it has become evident that Russia is using US-led negotiations to stall for time and divide the transatlantic alliance. Putin has refused to join Ukraine in accepting an unconditional ceasefire and continues to insist on maximalist goals that would mean the end of an independent Ukrainian state. Meanwhile, the Kremlin underlines its lack of commitment to peace by sending low-level delegations led by figures such as presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky, who is best known for penning radically anti-Ukrainian history textbooks.

On the battlefield, Russia’s intentions are equally clear. Despite suffering catastrophic losses over the past four years, the Russian army remains on the offensive and continues to recruit tens of thousands of new troops each month to fill the depleted ranks of Putin’s invasion force.

In parallel, Russia is escalating attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population. During the recent winter months, millions of Ukrainians found themselves without access to heating and electricity amid Arctic temperatures due to a strategic bombing campaign targeting critical civilian infrastructure that aimed to freeze the country into submission. According to UN data, 2025 was the deadliest period of the war for Ukrainian civilians since the first months of the invasion, with the number of civilian deaths rising by 31 percent compared to the previous year.

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With the Kremlin ignoring calls for a compromise peace, the only way to advance negotiations is by putting more pressure on Putin. Failure to do so could have disastrous consequences that would be felt far beyond the borders of a subjugated Ukraine.

The current Russian plan is to drag out negotiations indefinitely while grinding down Ukraine’s resistance and sowing division among Kyiv’s international allies. Moscow seeks to entice the United States with promises of lucrative economic cooperation, while supporting populist political forces across the EU in a bid to weaken European support for Ukraine. If this strategy succeeds, Ukraine may at some point become unable to defend itself.

The collapse of Ukrainian resistance would not bring peace to Europe. Instead, a victorious Russia would take control of Ukraine’s formidable military and the country’s rapidly expanding domestic defense industry. Putin would then command the two most powerful armies in Europe, with unrivaled combat experience and knowledge of drone warfare. In such circumstances, it is dangerously delusional to think that Russia would not seek to go further. At the very least, European governments would be forced to increase defense budgets to levels that would dwarf the current cost of supporting Ukraine.

The steps necessary to secure peace through strength are no secret. First and foremost, this means adequately arming Ukraine. Trump suggested in 2025 that if Russia continues to reject peace efforts, he may provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles. This would be a welcome and meaningful step. Other partners including Germany have also spoken of increasing Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Now is the time to do so.

In parallel, sanctions measures targeting Putin’s war economy must be expanded and tightened. This should include steps to increase the costs for international customers who continue to purchase Russian oil and gas exports, thereby funding the Kremlin war machine.

Western leaders have always had the tools at their disposal to counter the Russian threat. Unfortunately, however, they have so far failed to demonstrate the political will necessary to deploy these tools effectively. This excessive caution is counter-productive and only serves to embolden the Kremlin. Moscow believes it is already at war with the West and treats calls for compromise as signs of weakness. If Kyiv’s partners are serious about stopping Russia, they must abandon appeasement and increase the pressure on Putin.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party and a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 5, 2026

Russian army faces comms crisis amid Starlink cut and Kremlin crackdown

By Katherine Spencer, Marc Goedemans

The Russian army in Ukraine is facing a growing communication crisis amid recent disruptions to Telegram and Starlink, leaving troops increasingly in the dark and exposing mounting strains inside Russia, write Katherine Spencer and Marc Goedemans.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Mar 24, 2026

Russia bombs Ukrainian UNESCO site as Putin escalates terror tactics

By Peter Dickinson

Russia bombed a UNESCO World Heritage site in the historic heart of west Ukrainian city Lviv on March 24 as Kremlin efforts to target Ukraine’s civilian population continue to escalate, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Mar 26, 2026

Drone superpower Ukraine is an ideal tech partner for the Gulf states

By Anatoly Motkin

Kyiv’s decision to help defend the Gulf states against Iranian drones by deploying teams of Ukrainian specialists is highlighting the scope for broader tech sector cooperation between Ukraine and the region, writes Anatoly Motkin.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Only additional pressure can push Putin toward peace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The recent public disagreements between an AI company and the US military speaks to a broader breakdown in trust among tech firms, the government, and the public.
• Americans’ skepticism of AI is high, driven by concerns over safety, job losses, environmental impact, and misuse.
• The White House has promoted AI development for economic and national security reasons, but it faces growing political resistance and public pushback over regulation and risks.

WASHINGTON—The recent standoff between Anthropic and the Pentagon over terms of use for the company’s artificial intelligence (AI) models has thrust the role of AI in military and intelligence operations into the national dialogue. As the Pentagon’s contract negotiations with Anthropic broke down and it designated the company a supply chain risk earlier this month, the episode exposed the fraying social contract among leading AI companies, the federal government, and the American public over responsible AI use. 

How Americans view AI

Anthropic’s red lines in the negotiations centered on two issues: the use of its models for the mass surveillance of US citizens and in autonomous weapons. Both topics resonate with an American public that remains deeply skeptical of the technology. A 2025 poll conducted by Gallup and the Special Competitive Studies Project found that 60 percent of Americans distrust AI somewhat or fully. This stands in contrast to much of the rest of the world. According to Stanford’s annual AI Index, large majorities in China, Indonesia, and Thailand (75-80 percent) believe AI-powered products offer more benefits than drawbacks. In the United States, that number is a meager 39 percent. 

Several factors drive this skepticism. Safety concerns, including fears related to AI-driven psychosis and AI-enabled teen suicides, feature prominently in public discourse, as do worries about the technology’s environmental footprint and its impact on jobs. Search “AI and water” on Instagram and you’ll be flooded with posts from influencers calling on followers to boycott AI over the energy and water demands of the data centers powering it. Recent mass layoffs, such as fintech company Block’s decision to cut 40 percent of its workforce due to the integration of AI into the company’s workflows, have amplified fears around broader workforce contractions. Some studies have extrapolated from initial data around AI adoption to suggest that the technology will create more jobs than it eliminates, but much of the public discussion has focused on the prospect of significant job losses on the horizon, raising anxiety among white-collar workers. 

This unease with AI is increasingly visible in politics. More than 1,500 AI-related bills have been introduced in state legislatures in 2026 alone, many focused on protecting consumers and minors from AI-related harms. AI skepticism has come from both sides of the aisle. Data centers have drawn criticism from left-leaning environmental advocates and from deep-red communities alike. A study found that twenty data center projects were blocked in the second quarter of 2025 due to local opposition, representing $98 billion in stalled investment. This year, Democratic and Republican lawmakers have begun backing away from data center investments that they recently championed. At least six Democratic governors used their state of the state addresses to announce plans to roll back incentives or impose new regulations on data centers. And Democratic lawmakers in New York and Maine, as well as Republican lawmakers in Oklahoma, are calling for temporary bans.   

The Trump administration’s approach to AI

The second Trump administration has made AI a national priority from the outset. Just three days after his inauguration, US President Donald Trump issued the first of seven executive orders related to AI released in 2025, which signaled the administration’s intent to “sustain and enhance America’s global AI dominance in order to promote human flourishing, economic competitiveness, and national security.” The order set the tone for the administration’s follow-on actions, including a foundational AI Action Plan that positioned the United States as going all-in on AI against the backdrop of a rising global competition with China. So far, the administration has expanded AI education opportunities, worked to harness AI for science, accelerated permitting for data center construction, and attempted to prevent states from passing laws regulating AI. 

Yet, even before the Anthropic-Pentagon controversy, tension between the administration’s position on AI and its own political base were surfacing. Upon the release of the AI Action Plan in July 2025, former US Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene issued a pointed rebuke. She warned that “competing with China does not mean become like China by threatening state rights, replacing human jobs on a mass scale, creating mass poverty, and resulting in potentially devastating effects on our environment and critical water supply.” The administration’s push to preempt and pause future state laws regulating AI was defeated twice in Congress prior to being advanced by executive order in December 2025. The original congressional campaigns incurred widespread pushback from across the political spectrum, including a request to remove the legislative provision, which was signed by seventeen Republican governors.

Recent announcements suggest the administration is beginning to recognize public resistance. In his State of the Union address, Trump introduced a ratepayer protection pledge that calls on technology companies to commit to covering the cost of increased energy production to support the build-out of data centers. This is intended to prevent those costs from being passed on to local communities. Seven of the largest players in AI have since signed on. A National Policy Framework on AI released at the end of last week reaffirms this push and lays out the administration’s legislative priorities for the technology, including enhanced safeguards for children, increased action to combat AI-enabled scams, and protections for individuals against unauthorized distribution of AI-generated voice or image likenesses.

Despite these moves, the administration’s handling of the Anthropic standoff has intensified debates in public and within the tech sector around the dangers of AI and the necessity of building guardrails for responsible use. The administration’s maximalist position that contracts with AI companies should provide flexibility for the government to employ AI for “all lawful uses” runs counter to US public opinion. Indeed, 80 percent of US adults believe the government should maintain rules for AI safety and data security, even if doing so slows development. 

Public distrust on display 

Following OpenAI CEO Sam Altman’s announcement on February 27 that the company had signed a deal with the Pentagon that it claimed contained the same provisions that Anthropic had been fighting for, public and private reactions were swift, with many skeptical of the company’s claims. Uninstalls of the ChatGPT app jumped 295 percent overnight and a #QuitGPT campaign gained steam on social media. Some OpenAI employees publicly criticized their company’s stance and OpenAI’s hardware lead resigned in protest. 

Anthropic, meanwhile, filed suit, contesting the Pentagon’s designation of the company as a supply chain risk following the inability of the company and the Pentagon to reach an agreement on contractual terms. The case has attracted amicus briefs from a wide range of groups, including tech sector workers, Catholic theologians and ethicists, and the American Civil Liberties Union. A brief signed by a group of almost forty employees from Google and OpenAI, including Google’s chief scientist, affirmed a shared belief in the risks underpinning Anthropic’s contractual red lines. Their brief noted the dangers to US democracy posed by AI-enabled surveillance and warned that today’s AI systems are too immature to be relied on for use in lethal autonomous weapons.

While the immediate controversy may be fading, the episode has already provided a revealing window into US sentiment around AI and the ongoing litigation will keep the issue in public focus. A poll conducted by NBC News this month after the standoff found that 57 percent of registered voters believe the risks of AI outweigh its benefits.

That number should command attention. For the administration’s and the tech sector’s AI ambitions to translate into the economic growth and national security gains that policymakers and CEOs envision, it will take a concerted effort to rebuild the social contract with the public on AI. Treating public skepticism as noise to be managed rather than a signal to be heeded risks causing rapid political polarization on AI. This, in turn, could cause a self-imposed slowdown in the United States’ ability to realize AI opportunities at home and compete effectively abroad, stifling government and industry AI initiatives alike. 

The post The Anthropic standoff reveals a larger crisis of trust over AI appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Although Maduro has been removed from office, his second-in-command Delcy Rodríguez now leads the same regime, prompting a recalibration of how China’s key bilateral relationships in the hemisphere are understood in light of US intervention in Venezuela. This piece examines whether Latin American policymakers and analysts view China’s reaction to Maduro’s ouster as evidence of a shift in Beijing’s regional diplomatic strategy—and whether this episode is influencing how other countries in the region weigh their US–China relationships.

We interviewed thirteen influential sources across diplomatic, military, and academic circles in Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic, spanning a wide range of political perspectives. While this is by no means a representative sample, respondents with different political views were aligned on key aspects of the new playing field in Latin America as it relates to both China and the United States.

After providing a general overview of how US and Chinese actions are interpreted across the region, we turn to Brazil, China’s largest trading partner in the region, and Colombia, the country most directly affected by developments in Venezuela.

Latin America feels a seismic shift

Most of our sources, both left and right leaning, agree the US intervention in Venezuela is a game changer and it will likely modify the power dynamics in the region. They see it as a hard blow to China and a strengthening of US influence in Latin America. For example, Ernesto Samper, former president of Colombia (1994–1998) and former secretary general of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, 2014–2017)—who has been close to the region’s left-wing leaders—doesn’t believe the US intervention in Venezuela was meant to combat drug trafficking or strengthen access to oil revenues. Instead, he sees it as a geopolitical strategy. The intervention represents an attempt to weaken alliances between Latin American governments and external powers, particularly China. The objective is to consolidate what might be termed a Monroe Doctrine 2.0, reasserting US hegemonic control over Latin America. Venezuela is a symbolic target in a wider approach that seeks to assert regional dominance in the face of China’s growing influence. “This catches the Latin American region in its worst moment. We had never been so disconnected,” Samper said. “We’re very divided because part of [Donald] Trump’s diplomacy is not having relations with states, but with governments.”

Yet Samper warns against reading this rapprochement as a definitive realignment. Chinese economic penetration in Latin America, he argues, has already reached a point of near irreversibility—China is now the primary trading partner for most South American countries, and its infrastructure investments are deeply embedded in the region’s development strategies. For most major Latin American economies, China is either the largest or second-largest trading partner. The United States doesn’t have the capacity to replace China economically in the region. “The Chinese have a lot of experience in something Trump simply does not have, which is patience,” Samper said. “And I believe they have been penetrating Latin America to the point where those advances should be considered irreversible.”

Carlos Calderón, researcher and defense expert at the military-run Colombian War College, whose views are more aligned with the center-right than Samper’s, nonetheless has a similar take: “‘Operation Southern Spear’ and Maduro’s capture, ‘Operation Absolute Resolve,’ no doubt send tectonic waves throughout the region, and are meant to signal the United States is back and wants to have a stronger influence than China in the region. Events are too recent to say that Latin American countries are reorienting their relations with China, but I’d say it’s very likely that relations with China will be restructured.”

Behind closed doors, according to Calderón, military leaders in Colombia and neighboring countries that struggle with organized crime networks are welcoming the change in US tactics—not necessarily because they agree that operations such as blowing up drug boats in the Caribbean and Pacific are appropriate, but because they signal what they feel was a needed change in the status quo. They welcome a United States that is more assertive regarding its military presence in the region. “Behind closed doors, military leaders are glad about Operation Southern Spear,” Calderón said. “They wanted a government, either Democrat or Republican, that doesn’t matter to them, that would kick the chess board, so to speak. We’ve been at that [war on drugs] two decades and no pieces have been moved, then we need a reset. Sometimes you have to introduce a little bit of chaos to make a situation more dynamic.”

As the United States assumes this hard-power stance, China’s lack of such power is starker. Maurício Santoro, a political scientist specializing in Brazil–China relations, said the US operation in Venezuela revealed China has limited capabilities when projecting military power in the Western Hemisphere. China is economically vital to Latin America but is not a strong and effective military actor in the region.

A senior Brazilian source familiar with the matter, who asked to remain anonymous, said Chinese officials had privately expressed concern about how the lack of a Chinese military response after Maduro’s removal might be interpreted in Latin America. According to this source, Chinese officials asked whether the region would view China as weak or unable to defend its political partners against unilateral US actions.

Paulo Filho, a retired Brazilian Army colonel who holds a master’s degree in defense and strategy studies from China’s National Defense University, said China’s leadership is still “learning how to be a superpower” in the sense of projecting power beyond its traditional zone of influence. Retired Colonel Rafael Almeida, who is also a graduate of China’s National Defense University, said that the crisis had produced a “reality check” for the region. He summed this up in a single phrase: “China is economically indispensable, but the United States remains politically central.” Almeida also said the episode stressed the urgency of reassessing security concerns and drove home the idea that aligning with either the United States or China has become dangerous and strategically costly.

Caribbean observers, in the meantime, have their eyes on Cuba and are anxious to determine if there will be a domino effect that will cause the decades-long communist regime to follow a path similar to that of Venezuela. “Dominicans are hopeful that Cuba will have a similar outcome for the best, and that Venezuela’s developments lead to improvements,” said Campos de Moya, former assistant to the vice president of the Dominican Republic and former ambassador assigned to the Foreign Ministry. “There are some voices that don’t agree with this view, but the way the situation has unfolded leads most Dominicans, politicians and business leaders, to support what the US is doing in Venezuela and Cuba.”

De Moya says there were concerns in the region that US action against Venezuela and Cuba could spark a wider military conflict with China and Russia, but recent developments signal that won’t happen. He further suggests it’s a good moment for the United States to pressure the Dominican Republic to flip its diplomatic recognition once again from China to Taiwan. “The business community in the Dominican Republic is very upset with China and everything is in place for the country to step back from that relationship,” de Moya said. “The possibility of flipping back to Taiwan is even stronger now.”

One of our few sources who had a different view and didn’t believe the US removal of Maduro is a game changer for regional diplomatic relations was Ricardo Ferrer, fellow at the Center for Secure Free Society and former national director of criminal intelligence for the right-wing Javier Milei government in Argentina. Ferrer doesn’t think China’s position in Venezuela has meaningfully weakened because Beijing’s influence is structural. Ferrer notes that China’s influence in Venezuela is rooted in telecommunications, digital governance, logistics, data systems, and opaque contracts that persist across leadership changes. As an example, he cited Huawei’s extensive role in telecom infrastructure and ZTE-linked databases tied to citizens’ IDs as forms of durable leverage that shape political control through technology. He thinks China’s muted response follows its long-standing strategy toward the hemisphere: avoid direct security competition with the United States while maintaining embedded commercial and infrastructural influence. “There is absolutely no sign of a decline in Chinese influence, which in Venezuela is not solely determined by the economic situation,” Ferrer said.

Brazil: Adapting to a new context and diversifying

Brazil publicly condemned the bombings of alleged drug boats and Maduro’s removal through an official statement that characterized the US action as a “grave affront to Venezuela’s sovereignty,” a highly dangerous precedent, and a violation of international law that threatens Latin America’s long-standing aspiration to remain a “zone of peace.” President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva echoed this position on social media, calling the events unacceptable and urging a robust response through the United Nations. Collectively, these messages reaffirm Brazil’s emphasis on multilateralism and the principle of non-intervention.

Some recent Lula administration initiatives suggest defense issues are garnering greater attention—at least behind the scenes—following the Venezuelan crisis. This has prompted discussions on budget strengthening, deterrence stances, and expanding the institutional role of the armed forces in Brazil’s national strategy. According to high-level sources, the crisis and the volatile regional environment have emphasized the need to strengthen defense capacities.

Rather than a departure from the country’s diplomacy-first tradition, Brazilian decision-makers are framing this readjustment as an adaptation to a new era of major-power competition in which non-intervention norms are weakened. The US operation has renewed fears that it will apply intervention and unilateral coercion whenever its interests are at stake.

The context of the US intervention also caught Brazil in a sensitive position. Brazil had just resolved its own dispute with the Trump administration, which began on April 2, 2025, when Trump imposed a 50-percent tariff on Brazilian imports in retaliation for the prosecution of his political ally, former President Jair Bolsonaro, over an attempted coup d’etat. The tariffs were suspended on November 14, 2025, after several rounds of diplomatic negotiations.

Against this backdrop, Brazil and the European Union (EU) formally signed the EU–Mercosur agreement on January 17, 2026, concluding more than two decades of negotiations. The agreement, which will need ratification by the European Parliament and national legislatures before entering into force, is described as creating one of the world’s largest bilateral free trade areas, covering roughly 700 million consumers and giving Brasília an additional avenue to diversify trade and investment partners amid heightened uncertainty. The timing suggests an effort to increase economic resilience and reduce strategic vulnerability by deepening ties with other players besides the United States and China.

Colombia: Getting closer to the United States

Colombia’s Ministry of Foreign Relations rejected US military intervention in Venezuela and issued a statement that echoed Brazil’s stance, describing the intervention as “actions that have placed at risk the territorial integrity and political autonomy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.” It called for the issue to be taken to the UN Security Council and treated multilaterally. The day of the attack, the Colombian government also sent thirty thousand troops to patrol the border at several crossings, from northern Guajira to Arauca.

In the days following the capture of Maduro, President Gustavo Petro—whose left-wing politics are aligned with Lula’s—received threats from Trump, who hinted at conducting a similar operation in Colombia. As part of a deescalation approach, Petro sought an urgent one-on-one meeting with Trump in the White House to discuss the US intervention, oversight of Venezuela, and the role Colombia could play, signaling Colombia was willing to work with the United States.

No press was allowed in the room but statements from each side offer a glimpse into the conversation. Petro said they discussed counternarcotics operations targeting transnational kingpins (and that he gave Trump a list of names), skepticism toward the effectiveness of sanctions against Venezuela, ways to reactivate the Venezuelan economy (including energy projects), having the United States mediate tensions between Colombia and Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa, declassifying US intelligence related to violence in Colombia, and diplomatic optics such as inviting Trump to Cartagena and reframing Trump’s slogan as “Make the Americas Great Again.” Trump and the White House said the meeting went well, emphasized counternarcotics cooperation as the main focus, and characterized Trump’s approach as preferring diplomacy.

The rapprochement follows a deeply confrontational 2025 between Trump and Petro. In September, the Colombian president’s US visa was revoked, and in October, he and several members of his family were placed under Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions, despite the absence of any US indictments against them. According to Calderón, one objective of the visit was to persuade Trump to lift those sanctions before Petro leaves office in August. Securing their removal would not only ease personal and political constraints on Petro’s final months in power but also signal a partial normalization of bilateral relations after a year marked by open hostility.

Although the immediate outcome of the US intervention in Venezuela has been a reset in US–Colombia relations, Calderón also noted that, in recent years, the Colombian military has felt a need to diversify its partnerships, including in security cooperation and arms procurement. “We can’t help but see that countries such as Brazil and Peru cooperate tightly with the US, but that doesn’t stop them from also talking and establishing security relations with China or Russia . . . They buy Chinese aircraft and Russian helicopters,” Calderón said.

The end of strategic ambiguity

The removal of Maduro should not be read primarily as a Venezuelan event, nor as a narrow bilateral episode between Washington and Caracas. It was a stress test that clarified the real distribution of power in the hemisphere.

On one hand, the episode exposed the asymmetry that has long structured great-power competition in Latin America. The United States retains escalation dominance and the capacity to shape outcomes through force, while China’s influence remains concentrated in finance, infrastructure, trade, and institutional penetration rather than in deterrence. On the other hand, Maduro’s ouster does not signal the collapse of Chinese influence in the region. It reveals the limits of China’s ability to translate rhetorical commitments about sovereignty into material responses when confronted with hard-power realities. What unfolded was not the unraveling of China’s regional presence, but a clarification of its priorities, its risk tolerance, and the boundaries of its foreign policy reach in the Western Hemisphere.

The operation also clarifies that China’s preferred tools of influence are largely irrelevant in moments of kinetic disruption in the region. Years of loans, political backing, diplomatic cover, and rhetorical alignment did not translate into leverage when the core issue became one of coercive force. This matters because much of the current debate on foreign influence assumes a continuity between influence and power. Venezuela shows that this continuity breaks down under pressure.

Latin America’s apparent conditional tolerance of US intervention does not stem from ideological realignment with Washington, but from exhaustion. The United States had not carried out an overt military intervention in South America in modern times, and the last comparable interventions in the hemisphere occurred more than three decades ago in much smaller Central American and Caribbean states. Given the region’s long historical memory of US interference, one would have expected sharp and unified backlash. Instead, the reaction has been restrained and, in some cases, openly appreciative. That alone signals how disruptive Venezuela had become.

Maduro was no longer simply an authoritarian outlier. Venezuela had turned into a sustained source of regional instability, driving mass migration, facilitating organized crime networks, and deepening cross-border insecurity. Even governments publicly critical of US power were privately aware that the status quo had become untenable. The controlled response to Washington’s action reflects a hierarchy of priorities that has become harder to ignore.

Economic development remains central, and this is where China’s role is most visible. But dealing with migration pressures, drug trafficking, transnational criminal networks, and border security have become immediate political imperatives. In those domains, cooperation with the United States remains indispensable. The convergence of security interests that emerged around Maduro’s removal is therefore significant, but it is also narrow and contingent. It reveals less about renewed faith in US leadership than about the degree to which Venezuela had become a destabilizing force that governments felt unable to manage on their own.

If Washington interprets this moment as a blank check and settles for stability without democratic transition, it risks reinforcing long-standing suspicions that intervention is primarily driven by hegemonic control. Removing a destabilizing authoritarian is not the same as resolving the conditions that produced him. The strategic window created by January 3 is real, but it is not self-sustaining.

Lastly, China is unlikely to retreat from the region. It will adapt, recalibrate risk, and continue expanding where economic statecraft remains effective. The competition is now clearer. The United States demonstrated that it retains coercive primacy in the hemisphere. China demonstrated the limits of its willingness to contest it. Latin America is left navigating a landscape in which the space for ambiguity has narrowed and the costs of miscalculation have grown.

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Santiago Villa

Nonresident Fellow

Global China Hub

Africa China

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Thayz Guimarães

Nonresident Fellow

Global China Hub

Americas Brazil

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Parsifal D’Sola

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global China Hub

China Chinese

The Global China Hub tracks Beijing’s actions and their global impacts, assessing China’s rise from multiple angles and identifying emerging China policy challenges. The Hub leverages its network of China experts around the world to generate actionable recommendations for policymakers in Washington and beyond.

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The post After Maduro: Latin America’s policy community reassesses the US-China balance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• China, Russia, and Iran have developed an “Axis of Evasion” that includes integrated supply chains to circumvent Western sanctions.
• Through these supply chains of dual-use technology, Iran is able to develop drones, navigation systems, and other military capabilities. 
• The US should press China on its support of these supply chains, and it should take additional steps to disrupt transshipment hubs and other intermediaries.

WASHINGTON—As the US-Israeli war with Iran continues, some commentators have speculated about why China and Russia appear to be keeping their distance from the conflict. Neither appears eager to intervene militarily to support Iran. Moreover, China is reportedly hesitant to send arms to Iran, while Russia is benefiting from the global oil supply shock caused by the conflict. Some rhetorical support aside, many commentators predict that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping will not get meaningfully involved in Iran.

But such conjecture misunderstands the economic relationships and motivations behind the “Axis of Evasion,” the network of US adversaries that coalesce to circumvent Western economic restrictions. Specifically, it misunderstands how Beijing and Moscow enable Tehran to continue its violence across the Middle East through supply chains. 

The war with Iran is not solely a challenge posed by Iran. To bring about an end to the war and prevent Iran from rebuilding its military capacity, US President Donald Trump will need to confront Xi and Putin about their support for the Iranian regime and their schemes to evade sanctions and export controls.

How the Axis of Evasion works

China enables Russia and Iran by importing their sanctioned oil and selling them sophisticated dual-use technology. Over the past few years, we in the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center have proposed the term “Axis of Evasion” to describe the complex networks these countries use to evade and bypass Western sanctions. Our research has focused, for example, on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, as well as on alternative payment systems, money laundering schemes, and the barter trade. The current war with Iran has brought attention to yet another system or tactic of this Axis: integrated supply chains.

Trade and technology transfer between China, Russia, and Iran—and the associated supply chains—are the result of geography as well as significant Western economic pressure. Due to restrictive export controls and sanctions, these states cannot easily access Western technology and components directly from the United States and other Western countries. Because trade among the Axis of Evasion occurs outside of the Western financial system and, therefore, the reach of Western economic restrictions, these integrated supply chains are more resistant to sanctions and export controls enforcement.

Iran has been subject to extensive and comprehensive US sanctions and Western restrictive economic measures for decades. In October 2021, the United States announced the first export controls specifically targeting unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production. Since then, the Department of Commerce, Department of State, and the Treasury have also restricted third-party countries from exporting US-origin technologies to Iran. Despite the intensity of these restrictions, Western components continue to feature in Iranian drone designs. Often, these components come from China. 

China has supplied Iran with drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and the components thereof, to aid in its aerial and maritime defense capabilities. In other instances, China directly supplies Iran with Western or Chinese technology components that are found in Iranian drones used against US military installations and economic interests in the Gulf, as well as on Russia’s battlefield in Ukraine. Treasury and Commerce actions targeting Iranian sanctions evasion schemes frequently identify and designate Chinese individuals, entities, and addresses that are used as shell or front companies and transshipment hubs. This cooperation extends beyond trading goods, but helps partners to develop and improve their own technological capabilities.

Drones

Iran’s drone program offers the clearest example of how the Axis of Evasion uses localized supply chains to circumvent restrictive economic measures and enhance military production. Iranian UAVs, such as the Shahed series, rely on an ecosystem of imported electronics, engines, navigation components, batteries, and semiconductors. While many of these parts originate in the United States, Europe, and Japan, procurement networks frequently route them through Chinese distributors or trading companies before they reach Iranian manufacturers. Chinese dual-use exports to Iran spiked in January 2024 when the two states formalized a strategic partnership emphasizing defense and security cooperation. Likewise, Chinese exports rose after Trump signed a memorandum restoring maximum pressure on Iran and again in June 2025 after the US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Russia further reinforces this system through wartime cooperation with Iran. Since 2022, Moscow and Tehran have exchanged drone technology and production know-how, allowing both countries to expand manufacturing capacity. In February 2023, Russia established a drone production facility supported by Iranian technology and expertise at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia. As part of a deal, Iran transferred 600 disassembled Shahed-16 drones, components for 1,300 drones, training, and technical expertise to Russia to assist in its war in Ukraine. By 2025, Moscow had moved roughly 90 percent of Shahed assembly to Russia. Meanwhile, Russia developed the Garpiya-3, a modified and improved version of the Shahed, with the help of Chinese specialists and a reported Russian drone factory in China. 

This partnership now appears to be coming full circle. Recent comments by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reveal that Russia is now supplying Iran with Russian-made Shahed drones to use in attacks against the United States and Israel. What began as a sanctions-driven workaround has evolved into a self-reinforcing production network, fueled by Western components, Chinese procurement channels, and Russian manufacturing capacity.

Navigation systems

In another example of these integrated supply chain networks, China facilitates the transfer of both Chinese- and Western-made navigation technology to Iran. Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly sharing satellite imagery and modified Shahed drone technology to improve navigation and targeting based on Russia’s experience of using drones in Ukraine.

Chinese electronics markets and distributors play a critical role in this process. Components originally manufactured for civilian applications—such as inertial sensors or satellite navigation modules—can be purchased through Chinese intermediaries and integrated into Iranian weapons systems. Russia’s experience adapting commercial electronics also feeds into this innovation ecosystem.

Some experts believe that Iranian drones and missiles incorporate Chinese satellite navigation systems to target US and Israeli military assets. In February 2025, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese front companies that were supplying gyro navigation devices to enhance Iranian-made UAVs. In November 2025, a separate network connected to Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company was accused of using shell firms to acquire Chinese sensors and navigation equipment.

In 2021, China gave Iran access to BeiDou, the global positioning satellite system owned and operated by the China National Space Administration. Since the start of the war with the United States and Israel, Iran has used BeiDou to produce decoy signals to confuse threat analysis and conceal actual Iranian military movements.

Chemical precursors

Iran’s ability to sustain missile and explosives production depends on access to chemical precursors and industrial materials. Although these substances are subject to Western export controls, and the US Treasury has sanctioned individuals and entities in Iran and China for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients, enforcement is more difficult when production is distributed across multiple jurisdictions. Chinese chemical companies—many of which operate in sprawling industrial clusters—have repeatedly been linked to shipments of dual-use materials to Iran as well as Russia. Another recent report suggests that Iranian shadow fleet vessels sailing from China contain precursors for rocket fuel.

For Iran, these imports provide critical inputs for solid rocket fuels, propellants, and explosives used in missile systems and other weapons systems. By purchasing precursor materials through intermediaries or reexport hubs, Iranian procurement networks obscure the destination of shipments and exploit gaps in global export-control and sanctions enforcement. The scale and diversity of China’s chemical industry make it particularly difficult for regulators to monitor the end use of every exported compound. 

What to do now

China, Russia, and Iran continue to work together to circumvent and evade Western sanctions and export controls. Meanwhile, the United States has been inconsistent in implementing economic restrictions. After the last Trump-Xi summit in October 2025, Washington suspended the Bureau of Industry and Security Affiliate Rule in exchange for China’s lifting of export controls on critical minerals, effectively revealing how much leverage Beijing retains through its dominance in rare-earth supply chains. Additionally, Washington is easing oil sanctions on Moscow and Tehran in response to rising energy prices and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, exposing the precise issues on which the US is willing to compromise.

As the White House diverts its attention toward the Middle East, the Trump-Xi summit, originally scheduled for next week, was postponed until May. However, a productive push on China could also advance the US position in the Iran conflict. In his meeting with Xi—if not sooner—Trump should confront China’s role in enabling these supply chains, tightening scrutiny of Chinese exports and intermediaries that facilitate sanctions evasion. The White House must make stronger export control enforcement, expanded entity listings, and greater transparency requirements for Chinese distributors involved in dual-use trade central to the agenda. 

But pressure on China alone is not enough. Iran’s procurement networks depend on a web of transshipment hubs and trading companies that move controlled technologies across jurisdictions before they reach their destination in Iran. These networks often rely on distributors and logistics firms in third countries to obscure the origin and destination of sensitive components.

The United States should therefore expand its focus beyond direct exporters and identify the intermediaries and transshipment hubs that repeatedly appear in Iranian procurement chains. With targeted sanctions, enhanced export control enforcement cooperation, and intelligence sharing with partner governments, the United States can help disrupt the flow of dual-use goods before they reach Iran’s defense sector.

This increased enforcement should be paired with incentives. Many countries that serve as transshipment hubs are not politically aligned with Iran but lack the regulatory capacity or economic incentives to fully enforce export controls. Such third countries have also been hit hard by US tariffs, pushing them toward US adversaries purely due to economic incentives. In deploying incentives to encourage stronger compliance, the United States can cooperate with countries willing to strengthen export-control enforcement. In addition to incentives, capacity building programs, including customs modernization, export-control training, and industrial diversification could also enable firms in these jurisdictions to comply with Western restrictive economic measures.

Despite the severity and consistency of US sanctions and export controls targeting Iran’s drone acquisition, Iran maintains the technical knowledge, mature production lines, and continued access to dual-use components necessary to rebuild its drone stockpiles. Cooperation with adversarial states—predominantly China and Russia—further reinforces these capabilities by distributing supply chains and insulating production from Western pressure.

A failure to confront this Axis of Evasion across its networks allows it to continue enabling the flow of dual-use technologies among its members, which will allow Iran to rebuild and expand its drone and missile arsenals both during and potentially after the current war. 

The post From drones to rocket fuel, China and Russia are helping Iran through supply chains appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Trump administration has taken adversarial and unconventional approaches with European allies on subjects ranging from trade to content moderation, but in another important area the United States is proceeding more traditionally. The subject is politically controversial: biometric information sharing for purposes of border security. In late January, European Union officials flew to Washington to start low-key formal talks with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) aimed at an international agreement. Despite the sensitive nature of the endeavor, EU member states and the European Data Protection Supervisor have endorsed it. 

Why is the United States taking a consensual approach with Europe on border security information sharing, and why is the European Union so far willing to accommodate? Why is this agreement on a fast track in Washington and Brussels when law enforcement initiatives such as the projected EU-US CLOUD Agreement have been paused by the Trump administration? Is the border security information-sharing effort a one-off or could it be a harbinger of a return to traditional transatlantic legal diplomacy?

DHS seeks enhanced border security partnerships

DHS operates an international biometric information-sharing program to assist in “assessing the eligibility or public security risk of individuals seeking an immigration benefit or encountered in the context of a border encounter or law enforcement investigation related to immigration or border security issues,” according to the department’s privacy impact assessment (PIA). The program entails “automatic comparison of the fingerprints collected by DHS or a foreign partner on international travelers, suspected criminals, asylum seekers, irregular migrants, refugees, [and] applicants for visa and/or immigration benefits,” the PIA states. Biometric identifiers potentially include facial and iris scans and DNA, as well as traditional fingerprints.

In 2022, DHS decided that all forty-three countries that benefit from visa-free entry to the United States through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) must conclude agreements, dubbed enhanced border security partnerships (EBSP), enabling DHS to screen their biometric records for immigration or border security purposes. When DHS queries a name against a foreign state’s identity records and it yields a match, DHS automatically receives the responsive biometric data. Other identity information also could be conveyed by the foreign state. In the absence of a match in the foreign database, no fingerprints or other biometric information would be supplied to DHS.

Shared competence: EU and member-state roles

Twenty-four of the EU’s twenty-seven member states (all but Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Romania) participate in the VWP; they comprise more than half of all VWP members globally. Each EU state maintains its own national biometric information records for border purposes. Thus, DHS could take an important step toward fulfilling the overall EBSP goal by reaching biometric information-sharing agreements with these EU countries.

The EU, for its part, also has two relevant responsibilities: setting rules protecting personal data transferred outside its territory, per Article 16(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); and setting common policy on visas and external border checks, per Article 77(2) TFEU.

As popular sentiment for stricter border controls has swelled across Europe in recent years, the EU’s policymaking role in this area has become more prominent. In the past year, it has finalized a Pact on Migration and Asylum, a new set of rules on managing migration and asylum applications. In addition, new systems for tracking the entry and exit of foreign travelers and collecting the personal data of those entering EU territory on a visa-free basis are being put in place. These new systems show the EU moving in a similar direction as the United States in collecting information on foreign visitors.

DHS’s demand for biometric information-sharing agreements with EU member states thus touches on an area of “mixed” competence, i.e., one shared between the EU and its member states. In such a situation, the EU and its member states had to decide who would be responsible for negotiating with the United States.

The question took time to resolve. Only in 2024 did the Council of the European Union—which comprises the member states’ national ministers—invite the European Commission to develop a mandate for an international agreement at the EU level. Member states reportedly were eager to bring the collective negotiating strength of the EU to the table with the United States, rather than facing Washington individually.

A year passed before the Commission presented its draft negotiating mandate. It did so based on the understanding that the agreement sought by the United States related to the VWP and thus fell within the EU’s visa policy competence. Negotiations between the Council and Commission on the final contours of the mandate ensued during the second half of 2025.

Finally, in December 2025, the Council adopted a decision authoring the negotiation of an EU-level “framework” agreement with the United States. The framework would provide an overall legal structure for EU member states to conduct bilateral information exchange with DHS, setting the general conditions under which EU member states could provide biometric information to the US border agency. Each eligible member state subsequently would conclude an implementing agreement or arrangement with DHS identifying its relevant databases and operationalizing the data transfers.

Other relevant EU-US agreements

Over the past two decades, the EU has entered into a series of law enforcement and security information-sharing agreements with the United States—ranging from airline passenger name records (PNR) data to financial messaging data (via SWIFT) to mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. DHS is the principal beneficiary of PNR data sharing; the US Department of the Treasury receives SWIFT data used in tracking terrorist finance; and the Department of Justice manages information exchanged for criminal investigations and prosecutions. The United States and the EU also have concluded an agreement elaborating the data protection safeguards that must accompany transfers for law enforcement purposes, the so-called Umbrella Agreement.

In addition, DHS already enjoys access to foreign biometric and biographic data for purposes of preventing and combating serious crime (referred to as PCSC agreements), under a separate negotiating program that commenced in 2009. This earlier generation of agreements assists DHS in border encounters with persons suspected of terrorism and other serious offenses, but they do not apply to all foreign persons seeking to enter the United States.

The EU at that time had also sought to negotiate a PCSC agreement collectively on behalf of its member states, but DHS rebuffed Brussels and instead chose to negotiate individually with each EU member, believing the agency would have better leverage that way. The first two PCSC accords were concluded with Greece and Italy, and eventually all the European participants in the VWP program reached agreements as well.

An EU-level agreement on broad-scale border security information-sharing cooperation with the United States would represent a novel departure for Brussels. “It would be the first agreement concluded by the EU implying large-scale sharing of personal data, including biometric data, for the purpose of border and immigration control by a third country,” the European Data Protection supervisor has observed. 

This time, DHS appears to have appreciated the relative speed and efficiency that comes from negotiating one uniform set of access conditions that will apply to all EU VWP participants. The EU and its member states, meanwhile, seem to have reached a sensible division of labor that respects member states’ prerogatives for controlling their own biometric information databases and for managing technical interactions with DHS.

EU negotiating goals

One major EU ambition in setting the rules and procedures governing DHS queries is to preclude generalized processing of all travelers’ data. A Commission press spokesman emphasized the “non-systematic nature of the information exchange and that the exchange is limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve the objectives of this cooperation.”

The EU mandate further stresses that the EU seeks an agreement that would be reciprocal in nature, enabling member states’ border authorities to query corresponding DHS databases. A leaked Council presidency working paper suggested that a monitoring mechanism should ensure reciprocity in implementation: “Information on member states’ citizens should be exchanged under the framework only if the U.S. exchanges information on American citizens.”

It is not clear that the United States and the EU are entering into these negotiations with entirely congruent views on the scope of the framework agreement. DHS envisages checking the biometric databases of travelers from VWP countries on a routine basis. However, the European Commission, as noted above, views the information exchange as “non-systematic.”

In addition, the US international biometric information-sharing program envisages access to foreign databases “in the context of a border encounter or law enforcement investigation related to immigration or border security issues,” according to the DHS Privacy Impact Assessment (italics added). The EU mandate, by contrast, concentrates on security screening and identity verification at the border, with subsequent law enforcement data access to be exclusively governed by other bilateral agreements. 

The EU’s data protection rules are its main tool in ensuring that information conveyed to DHS pursuant to the EBSP agreement remains targeted. For example, the negotiating directive insists that processing of personal data be limited to what is “necessary and proportionate in individual cases.” Necessity and proportionality is a key concept in EU data protection law, including in the Schrems jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, albeit one that is hard to define a priori.

The EU also seeks to include other traditional data protection safeguards in the EBSP agreement with the United States, according to press reports. One reported provision would require human involvement in decisions having significant adverse effects on individuals, rather than permitting entirely automated decision-making. Another would allow for the transfer of “special categories” of personal data—such as sensitive data regarding political opinions, religion, and sexual orientation—only when necessary and proportionate to prevent criminal or terrorist offenses, and with additional protections that limit the universe of individuals who may access it and the duration of retention. Onward transfers of foreign-supplied biometric data to third countries would require the explicit consent of the country from which the data originated.

According to the European Commission version of the negotiating mandate, the EU also seeks to limit DHS retention of transferred personal data to cases of “travelers in respect of whom there is objective evidence from which it may be inferred that there is a continuing risk to public security or public order.” In other words, DHS would not be permitted to store fingerprint data supplied by EU VWP countries on a generalized basis; it could do so only if it has reason to believe that the person would continue to be a threat—a difficult prediction for a security agency to make at the time of the initial border encounter.

The European Data Protection supervisor stated in his opinion that he “largely supports” the proposed approach with the United States. At the same time, he pointed to certain information-sharing constraints the EU would face. Two important EU data repositories prohibit sharing of information with third countries: Eurodac, which contains biometric information on persons who have applied for refugee status in an EU member state or otherwise have migrated irregularly, and ECRIS, which links together member-state records of third country nationals with criminal convictions within the EU. However, the member states themselves regard the exclusive focus of negotiations with the United States on national databases as “without prejudice to any further reflections on the possibility for information exchange with selected third countries from EU databases,” the leaked Council presidency document suggested.

Finally, the EU mandate also seeks the right to an “effective remedy” for persons whose information has been transferred to DHS. This principle, enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, consistently has proven very difficult to resolve in past EU information-sharing agreements with the United States.

Major issues and possible solutions

The existing web of EU-US information-sharing agreements offer valuable precedents for the latest negotiation on access to biometric data for border security purposes. The PCSC agreements, for example, can provide a template for structuring technical interaction between DHS and EU member-state databases. Equally, the types of data protection provisions contained in the law enforcement Umbrella Agreement could be mirrored in the EBSP agreement, even if the former cannot directly be applied to the border security context.

Remedies for misuse of information likely will prove more difficult to resolve. The Data Privacy Framework (DPF), which offers safeguards against illegal US intelligence agency access to personal data transferred from Europe in the commercial context, provides redress in the form of a special tribunal established within the US Department of Justice. Europeans may not petition an ordinary US court if they believe a US intelligence agency has improperly used their data, however. The Court of Justice of the European Union has yet to decide if this specialized form of recourse meets EU fundamental rights standards.

By contrast, the EU did secure US judicial redress for EU citizens whose information is exchanged for law enforcement purposes, under the terms of the EU-US Umbrella Agreement. It took a US statutory change, through the adoption of the Judicial Redress Act, to extend such a right to foreign persons. (The US Privacy Act otherwise limits the right of judicial redress only to US individuals.) Extending this right to Europeans’ whose biometric data is transferred to DHS for the purposes of border security—as opposed to law enforcement—likely would require a further US statutory amendment. Persuading Congress of the necessity of such a change would be challenging.

The necessity and proportionality concept in EU fundamental rights law serves as a legal technique for balancing data protection rights with legitimate public order and public security interests. In the DPF, the United States accepted explicit reference to the EU’s necessity and proportionality standard—in a sensitive context dealing with potential intelligence agency access to personal data. Incorporating this concept in the border biometric information-sharing setting could similarly assure the EU and its member states that DHS is not engaged in mass data collection.

Legal and political dynamics

DHS faces a complex legal situation in pursuing negotiations involving both the EU and its member states. It is consistently difficult for a US government negotiator to be certain where a particular responsibility lies within the EU’s confederal system. In this case, the task is complicated by the cumbersome division of competences for visa and border policy.

In addition, since DHS seeks information for not just border security but also related law enforcement purposes, it must engage with two separate and varying sources of EU data protection law. Data protection rules for immigration control and visa policy are governed by the General Data Protection Regulation, while the rules for protecting law enforcement data fall under a separate directive.

Political factors in Europe also could slow completion of the agreements with the United States. Some members of the European Parliament who belong to the liberal Renew parliamentary group wrote to the European Commission in January, stating: “Looking at the current geopolitical context, we consider it undesirable for the European Commission to start or continue such negotiations.” Although the European Parliament does not have the power to stop the negotiations, it must approve any international agreement that the EU reaches with the United States.

The Trump administration’s removal of Democratic members serving on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PLCOB) and on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have undermined confidence in European privacy circles in US institutions charged with privacy protection. Moreover, DHS’s proposed rule requiring visitors to the United States to supply five years of details on their social media activity has generated widespread outrage abroad. Although this initiative is formally separate from the VWP program, the European public might well conflate the social media and biometric information demands of the United States.

DHS’s goal of wrapping up both the EU framework agreement and, subsequently, the twenty-four implementing agreements with EU member states by the end of 2026, as has been reported, will likely prove overly ambitious. A more achievable ambition would be to complete the EU framework by that date, with the necessary member states implementing agreements afterward. (The leaked Council presidency document sternly states that it considers “Member States’ commitment to refrain from bilateral negotiations with the US while material discussions on the framework are ongoing to be of critical strategic importance.”)

Nevertheless, there is reason for optimism that the US-EU engagement on border security biometric information sharing will yield success. Both sides appear to have entered talks pragmatically, the EU and its member states by agreeing on a sensible division of labor between themselves, and the United States by accepting the practical benefits of negotiating with both Brussels and member-state capitals. Each is impelled by a desire to have greater control of its borders and sees reciprocal information sharing as a promising approach. However, flexibility on both sides will be indispensable to overcoming divergent positions on issues such as remedies.

Further, by winning support in principle for the framework agreement from the EU’s data protection supervisor, the EU already has shown its commitment to achieving a broadly acceptable agreement. Europe’s collective approach to these negotiations also reflects a sober appreciation of power realities. EU citizens value the ease of visa-free travel to the United States, so member states ultimately will do what is necessary to retain VWP status, within the confines of fundamental rights.

Finally, the EU’s decision to take a leading role in the EBSP negotiations reflects its increased institutional maturity and importance in the field of border security. DHS’s willingness to pursue a framework agreement with the EU may show a corresponding recognition of Brussels’ growing role in this area. As popular sentiment has converged in Europe and America on more tightly controlling borders, there is now an opportunity to achieve a balanced transatlantic agreement on sharing information to that end.

Kenneth Propp is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, an adjunct professor of European Union law at the Georgetown University Law Center, and a senior fellow with the Cross-Border Data Forum. His prior experience includes serving as legal counselor at the US Mission to the European Union in Brussels and in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the US Department of State. 

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Bottom lines up front

• The next phase of the Iran war is highly uncertain, with Gulf states at the center of possible escalation as both likely targets and important US partners.
• Gulf countries previously helped manage tensions with Iran through mediation, diplomacy, and economic ties, but these dynamics are now shifting.
• Factors to watch include expanded Iranian attacks, possible Houthi involvement, fractures within the GCC, and rising domestic effects in Gulf states.

WASHINGTON—The next phase of the Iran war will be defined by uncertainty. At the moment, there is uncertainty over whether the United States, Israel, or Iran will escalate the conflict further. This phase could end abruptly if the conflict does escalate, or it might persist for some time, since even a lull in attacks or a deal might not sustainably address the fundamental issues that led to the outbreak of conflict. What is known, however, is that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states sit at the center of this uncertainty. It is those states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—that Iran would likely target with even more drones, missiles, and potentially further asymmetric attacks if the war intensified. And, more importantly, it will be those states that will share their neighborhood with the Iran that emerges from this conflict. 

Prior to the current conflict, many in Washington viewed GCC countries as holding the keys to resolving widespread concerns about Iran in ways short of war. I saw firsthand over the years the ways in which the Gulf’s diverse relationships helped advance US interests. Oman, for example, has long served as a quiet mediator between the United States and Iran, including when I served as acting US special envoy for Iran from 2023 to 2025. Oman has continued this role right up to the current crisis. Qatar too maintained channels with Iranian leadership that facilitated negotiations for the release of US hostages in Iran and deconfliction efforts between Washington and Tehran in the region and beyond. Saudi Arabia, while maintaining deep suspicions about the regime in Tehran, had taken tentative steps to rehabilitate its relationship with Iran through a series of high-level meetings following years of effort by the United States, other regional countries, and ultimately China to broker a reconciliation that stabilized the region. And the UAE maintained economic ties with Iran that stretched back decades and served both to tighten sanctions pressure on Tehran and hold out hope of potential economic incentives if the Iranian regime changed its worst behaviors. 

But as the war continues, these dynamics that had served the interests of the Gulf states and, in many cases, the United States are shifting, and US policymakers need to be attuned to these changes. This begins with asking the right questions. What the war will ultimately mean for Gulf countries and for the US relationships with them turns on answers to a handful of still-open questions. Five of the most pressing of these questions are explored below. The answers could determine how successful the United States is in securing its interests in the region going forward, both in finding an off-ramp for the conflict and in its broader regional objectives. Iran, too, is likely asking many of the same questions as it seeks to exploit opportunities to shape the Gulf to its own ends.

Will the “new normal” stick?

Since it began its retaliation, Iran has targeted GCC oil and gas infrastructure and commercial interests. Its goal has been to pressure Gulf states to lean on the United States and Israel to cease their strikes. In its more recent and consequential strikes on Qatar’s Ras Laffan Gas Facility, Tehran has shown that it could potentially expand the scope of its attacks, increasing the economic pain on Gulf states and the global economy. Iran can potentially wield this threat to its advantage, but the approach also carries risks. It is dangerous, for example, to assume that Iran can continue to calibrate its strikes to avoid unintended escalation. Iranian forces might strike Gulf economic interests that, whether intentionally or not, would dramatically widen the war. And even without a dramatic incident, experts and advisers have suggested that global companies and even the Gulf countries themselves are considering what the “new normal” in the region looks like, given the lingering impacts and uncertainty from the current conflict and the fact that even a weakened Iran could threaten its neighbors.

Will the Houthis join the fight?

There is an immediate concern that the Houthis in Yemen, either for their own interests or at Iran’s behest, will enter the conflict. If the group does get involved, then it would likely be by restarting attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb Strait—threatening the flow of an additional 12 percent of international seaborne oil transits and 8 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade. For shipping companies, these attacks would add to the already rising costs from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the higher shipping prices as a result of rerouting still occurring from Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in late 2023. These dangers and the costs associated with them would also affect global markets and, even more immediately and profoundly, Saudi Arabia and other GCC member states, given their proximity and the security implications of a re-escalation of the conflict in Yemen. 

Aware of the threats the Houthis pose to global shipping and regional security, the US military could continue to carry out new strikes to weaken the group. But regardless of how Houthi actions play out in the coming weeks, Yemen’s instability and entrenched domestic conflict will undoubtedly endure, as it has for over a decade, threatening to amplify instability in the Gulf region in unpredictable ways. As Yemen director at the National Security Council during the outbreak of fighting with the Houthis more than a decade ago, I witnessed firsthand how the conflict in Yemen reordered Gulf security and economic priorities—and over time even led to fissures between GCC member states. Against the backdrop of a worsening conflict with Iran, a second front of fighting in the region might threaten Gulf and US interests in unpredictable ways.

Will GCC unity fracture?

As the conflict drags on, Iran may increasingly try to fracture GCC unity. It could, for example, seek to exploit the differences in interests and perspectives between Gulf countries, each of which has different relationships with Iran, the United States, Israel, and each other. While the GCC does not traditionally have the same rigorous organizing principles as, for example, the European Union, Gulf member states have benefited when they act in unison. To date, there has been a noticeable “rally around the flag” dynamic in the face of Iranian attacks that has papered over differences among Gulf countries. While Iran has engaged with the GCC as a group in prior instances, it has had more success pursuing and maintaining its individual relationships with member states. Iranian leaders likely believe there is value for them in fracturing the group, in the same way that Iran has sought to exploit differences in interests and values between the United States and its other traditional partners and allies. 

Memories are both short and long in the region, and GCC member states have not forgotten the Gulf rift that occurred during US President Donald Trump’s first term. Then, years of simmering criticism and concern ignited an escalation of mutual accusations leading Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain to sever relations, close airspace, and enforce a blockade on Qatar, for what they said was Doha’s funding of terrorism, fomenting regional unrest, and ties to Iran. I saw the direct implications for US interests as the head of the political section at the US embassy in Riyadh at that time. 

GCC unity will also likely be a factor in how this conflict ends. At times in recent weeks, some Gulf nations have reportedly urged the United States to find an off-ramp. At other times, some have advised escalating strikes to destroy the Iranian regime. These conflicting preferences among Gulf countries augur a worrying trend. The ability of the GCC to maintain a unified voice, which Iran will actively work to divide, will affect the group’s ability to support an end to the conflict that advances the stability of the region as a whole rather than their own parochial interests—as well as its ability to work collectively to advance economic, political, and security goals beyond the Iran war. 

Will domestic instability increase in the Gulf?

Since the war began, there has been little news about domestic instability in the Gulf countries, which aim to continue projecting confidence and stability to the wider world. However, the longer the conflict drags on, the more that it could affect each nation in various ways. This in turn could lead the Gulf states to respond in ways that might be antithetical to US interests and values.

Three points are worth considering here. First, citizens and residents’ economic opportunities and physical security have been, and will continue to be, affected by this conflict. If the fighting gets worse, it could reach a tipping point where there is greater public outcry to end the conflict. Second, economic duress will affect nations’ residents and migrant labor populations more acutely than their citizens, given many Gulf states’ economic systems. If this pressure becomes too much, it could lead to wide-ranging and long-lasting human rights and economic issues. Third, in the past few decades some Gulf countries have at times viewed minority populations with suspicion, accusing certain individuals, especially Shia and other minorities, of receiving support, training, and backing from Iran. As Iran’s grip on its proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen weakens, Tehran might seek to take advantage of any preexisting relationships with these Gulf minority populations. At the same time, Gulf states might use such rumors and fears to quell domestic unrest with potentially devastating consequences. 

Will Gulf states turn toward China and Russia?

In the current phase of the war, Gulf countries will undoubtedly try to reinforce their security through closer partnerships with the United States. But depending on the outcome of this conflict, some Gulf countries may develop concerns about US reliability as an economic and security partner. Gulf leaders might, for example, fault Washington for an inability to control the conflict or for failing to find an off-ramp at an appropriate time. If this happens, some GCC countries might then choose to reinforce their partnership options beyond the United States by strengthening ties with Russia and China—perhaps economically at first, but potentially also strategically. This in turn could make it more difficult for the United States to pursue its interests in the region, not only in terms of its security goals and Iran policy, but also longer-term strategic partnerships on issues as varied as advanced technology, artificial intelligence, and nuclear energy.

Gulf countries have long proven that they maintain their own relationships with Iran and other groups to advance their own interests, much in the same way that many European countries do. These channels have proven useful to convey messages over the years, but the Trump administration should not underestimate Gulf countries’ ability to use the same channels to take steps with Iran that might undercut US interests and long-term goals if Washington is unable to find a suitable off-ramp that serves GCC interests. Similarly, Iran might try to take advantage of its relationships with China, Russia, and the GCC in ways that run counter to US interests, even if the current conflict has created suspicion in Iran’s relationship with its neighbors. 

Mitigating these potential end states will be a long-term project that will require the focused attention of the Trump administration even after a resolution to the immediate conflict.

The Trump administration and GCC countries share an interest in finding a resolution to the current conflict that leaves the region more stable than it was before the launch of Operation Epic Fury. But despite the tactical victories of the US and Israeli campaign against Iran, the war appears to have opened the door to a new wave of uncertainty in the Gulf, which might threaten the very regional stability and economic prosperity it is meant to ensure. 

The post How the Iran war could change the US relationship with Gulf states appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“Today’s release of 250 individuals is a significant humanitarian milestone and a testament to the President’s commitment to direct, hard-nosed diplomacy,” Coale commented. In a further indication of the Trump administration’s interest in warmer bilateral relations, Coale stated that Lukashenka may soon visit Washington.

The removal of US sanctions on three major Belarusian fertilizer industry companies comes at a time when the Iran war is driving up fertilizer prices and posing threats to the global agriculture industry. Officials also discussed the possible reopening of the US Embassy in Minsk.

Lukashenka’s decision to release 250 detainees was widely welcomed. Many of those freed had been in prison since the crackdown that gripped Belarus following the country’s 2020 presidential election, which sparked unprecedented nationwide protests amid allegations of massive voter fraud. The released prisoners included Valiantsin Stefanovich and Marfa Rabkova of Belarusian human rights group Viasna, along with journalist Katsyaryna Andreyeva.

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Under President Trump, the United States has sought a thaw with Minsk. These efforts have so far led to the release of hundreds of political prisoners and an easing of US sanctions against Belarus.

Increased engagement between the US and Belarus represents a significant change in strategy following years of growing tensions between Minsk and Western capitals. Western governments have expressed alarm over Lukashenka’s repressive domestic policies, along with his involvement in Putin’s hybrid war against Europe and his complicity in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Trump administration initiative to reengage with Lukashenka has brought clear humanitarian benefits and has had a life-changing impact on released prisoners along with their families. Nevertheless, concerns remain that the current US approach risks creating incentives for the Belarusian authorities to imprison more domestic opponents.

Despite a number of large-scale releases over the past year, human rights groups claim there are still almost one thousand political prisoners in Belarus, with new names regularly being added to the list as arrests continue. Activists have likened this process to a “revolving door” of repression, with new political prisoners regularly detained as others are pardoned and released.

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Beyond the humanitarian dimension, the US diplomatic outreach to Minsk is seen as an attempt to counter Lukashenka’s near complete dependence on Moscow. Since the 2020 protest movement that almost ousted the Belarus dictator, he has been heavily reliant on Russia for his political survival. In exchange for its support, the Kremlin has sought to expand its grip on neighboring Belarus. This has led to what some have labeled as a “creeping annexation.”

Trump has sought to restart dialogue with Minsk against a backdrop of faltering US-led peace efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine War. So far, however, there is little indication that Lukashenka may be prepared to downgrade his backing for Putin’s invasion or offer any assistance to advance negotiations.

The Belarusian ruler has been a key Russian ally throughout the invasion. This support has included allowing Putin to use Belarus as a gateway for Russia’s initial attempt to seize Kyiv in 2022. More recently, Lukashenka has agreed to host Russian nuclear weapons. He is also accused of aiding Moscow’s drone attacks on Ukraine and partnering with China to produce ammunition for the Russian army.

Lukashenka may now be on track to join Putin among the criminal suspects wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. On March 12, the ICC officially opened an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed by Lukashenka and his security apparatus against political opponents. In March 2023, the ICC issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest in connection with his alleged involvement in the large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children.

The latest Belarusian prisoner releases are an indication of improving relations between Washington and Minsk. However, it remains to be seen whether the benefits of this diplomatic outreach will extend beyond humanitarian goals and lead to broader gains in the security sphere. Lukshenka is no doubt ready to offer more pardons in exchange for economic incentives, but he has yet to demonstrate a willingness to decrease domestic repression or distance himself from the Kremlin.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post US secures new Belarus prisoner release in exchange for sanctions relief appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Estonia’s Internal Security Service, which has earned considerable respect in recent years for a string of high-profile counterintelligence successes, has dismissed the “Narva People’s Republic” initiative as an information operation. Meanwhile, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service doubts any direct Russian government involvement.

A journalist from the Estonian newspaper Postimees recently managed to infiltrate a Telegram chat group and expose the “Narva People’s Republic” as a tiny operation being run by someone likely outside Estonia with apparent ties to St. Petersburg. Given the small scale of the campaign, there is a lively debate in Estonia and across social media over whether highlighting it is a sensible precautionary measure or counterproductive.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Many have inevitably drawn comparisons with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the role played by fake separatist movements created by the Kremlin to justify Moscow’s expansionist agenda in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. When separatist propaganda about “People’s Republics” first began appearing in Ukraine in the years prior to the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, it was not initially taken seriously.

Recent references to a “Narva People’s Republic” appear to refer to the entire Ida-Viru County in northeastern Estonia rather than the city of Narva alone. Like Ukraine’s Donbas, Ida-Viru County was subject to an extended period of russification. During the Soviet occupation following World War II, large numbers of Russian-speakers from various parts of the Soviet Union were settled in Narva and in newly built Soviet industrial cities in the region.

With a current population that remains dominated by Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians, this would seem to make Ida-Viru County ripe for the Kremlin’s influence operations and grievance politics. However, the Estonian government has invested significantly in the region’s economic development and cultural integration.

Also, the fact that many residents of Estonia’s northeast have family links to Russia means they are well aware that they currently enjoy a far better standard of living than most people across the Narva River in the Russian Federation. With Estonia, like Ukraine, one must avoid the fallacy of conflating language with loyalty.

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The fact that a grassroots separatist movement is unlikely to develop in Ida-Viru County will not necessarily prevent Russia from using the separatist narrative to advance its agenda. When efforts to cultivate a local separatist movement in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine proved insufficient in 2014, the Kremlin sent in Russian citizens and military personnel without insignia. Soon after, they were followed by an undeclared invasion force.

Russia’s goal in Estonia might not be military conquest. It is often suggested that Moscow could aim to test NATO’s collective security commitments and discredit the alliance by launching a relatively minor incursion and claiming a small chunk of Estonian territory on the pretext of protecting compatriots. This would be much easier said than done, however, given Estonia’s heavily monitored border, where even the smallest infraction is noticed quickly. In such a case, Estonia would not wait for NATO to respond.

Estonian officials can be prickly about any portrayal of their country as particularly vulnerable or overly reliant on others for security. Since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, there have been endless articles asking “is Narva next?” This framing has been met with strong push back from Estonian security experts.

Similarly, war games exercises resulting in a quick Russian takeover of the Baltic region have been criticized by Estonian officials as lacking understanding of the Baltic states’ own security posture to the point of being insulting. In common with nearby Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania, Estonia employs a whole of society “total defense” concept that should not be underestimated.

Due to the enormous losses it is sustaining in Ukraine, Russia’s military is currently thought to be in no position to launch an invasion of Estonia. In its annual report for 2026, Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, while clear-eyed about the Kremlin’s expansionist ambitions, assessed that Russia has no intention of militarily attacking Estonia or any other NATO member state in the present year, or likely the next.

It is no wonder that Estonia’s foreign and defense policy has been focused on marshaling support for Ukraine as it confronts Russian aggression. It is also easy to understand why elements in Russia would like to create the impression of a looming threat to Estonia. So far, Estonia’s reaction to social media chatter about a supposed separatist movement has been typically phlegmatic. As this narrative has drawn media attention, we can expect to see it pushed further and recycled. Estonia’s NATO allies should follow Tallinn’s lead and react by remaining alert but calm.

James Rice is a doctoral student at the Institute of World Politics and former legislative director for US Senator Chuck Grassley.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 12, 2026

Vladimir Putin is trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end

By Peter Dickinson

As the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale Ukraine invasion approaches, Vladimir Putin finds himself trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end for fear of entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Mar 12, 2026

Iran war highlights Ukraine’s rapid rise to drone superpower status

By David Kirichenko

The Iran war has sparked a sudden surge in international demand for Kyiv’s unique anti-drone expertise and highlighted Ukraine’s rapid emergence as one of the world’s leading drone warfare superpowers, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Mar 5, 2026

Russian army faces comms crisis amid Starlink cut and Kremlin crackdown

By Katherine Spencer, Marc Goedemans

The Russian army in Ukraine is facing a growing communication crisis amid recent disruptions to Telegram and Starlink, leaving troops increasingly in the dark and exposing mounting strains inside Russia, write Katherine Spencer and Marc Goedemans.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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The post Could Russia use fake separatists to destabilize Estonia and discredit NATO? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The argument over Maliki is loud and politically charged. The intra-Kurdish rift has been quieter—but is a far more structural issue.

The deadlock over the premiership is, at its core, a matter of internal balance within the Coordination Framework, the governing coalition of Shia parties that nominated Maliki, and Maliki’s personal ambitions. But in the end, the chosen prime minister must serve the interests of the Coordination Framework. The Iran war, and the existential threat it posed to the Islamic Republic, made Tehran’s allied militias in Iraq more insistent on having a prime minister they approve of. That can be anyone among many candidates in the Coordination Framework’s political ranks. Whether Maliki, caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, or another Coordination Framework figure becomes prime minister matters—particularly for Iraq’s relations with Washington and the tone of its governance. But it is not a fundamental question about the architecture of power in Baghdad.

The dispute between the KDP and the PUK, by contrast, strikes at the heart of a decades-old power-sharing arrangement that has underpinned Kurdish politics since the 1990s. That makes it a far bigger obstacle that must be overcome before Iraq can form a new government.

A deal that kept the peace

After the Kurdish civil war of the mid-to-late 1990s, the two rival factions in the conflict—the KDP and the PUK—emerged as uneasy equals. The peace that followed was not built on trust alone; it was built on a relative balance between the two sides’ territorial control, local support, and military strength.

That balance evolved into a strategic agreement signed in 2006 that lasted more than a decade and kept the peace in the Kurdistan region following the fall of Saddam Hussein. The understanding—essentially between Jalal Talabani of the PUK and Masoud Barzani of the KDP—was clear. The KDP would dominate the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil, taking its presidency, but the PUK would nominate the region’s vice president. The PUK, in turn, would take the lead in Baghdad, with Talabani serving as president of the Federal Republic of Iraq. At the same time, the two parties would split the premiership and parliamentary leadership on a rotating basis and split the rest of the ministries and senior positions evenly.

This arrangement reflected the political reality at the time. The two parties were roughly equal in weight. Each controlled its own territory and security forces. Each commanded loyalty from a distinct constituency. The fifty-fifty split was not simply symbolic; it was an equilibrium that prevented renewed conflict. And for years, it worked.

New competition and electoral drift

That equilibrium began to erode in the aftermath of the 2009 Kurdistan regional elections and the 2010 Iraqi general elections. These elections marked the last time that the KDP and PUK formed a joint electoral alliance.

The rise of the Gorran (Change) Movement in 2009 marked a dramatic shift in the electoral landscape as it carved for itself a large chunk of votes and seats in both the Kurdistan regional and Iraqi parliaments. The PUK suffered splits and the emergence of new competition within its territory, since Gorran was a PUK offshoot, diluting its electoral weight. Meanwhile, the KDP retained cohesion and continued to perform strongly in regional and national elections, resulting in a steady divergence in electoral strength between the two parties. The KDP now consistently outperforms the PUK in both regional and national contests.

In regional elections, the KDP/PUK balance shifted from a parity of 30/29 in 2009 to 38/18 in 2013. The gap grew wider, to 45/21 in 2018 before settling at 39/23 in the latest election in 2024.

The national level showed a similar pattern. The balance changed from 25/21 in favor of the KDP in 2014, to 25/18 four years later in 2018. The KDP improved its standing again in 2021 as the balance reached 31/17. In the November 2025 election, the KDP outperformed the PUK 27/18.

From the KDP’s perspective, the logic is straightforward: Why maintain a fifty-fifty split when the numbers no longer justify it? The PUK sees things differently.

Two competing logics of power

For the KDP, elections are the metric that matters. Seat counts determine legitimacy. Deadlocks over the presidency should be resolved through votes—whether in the Kurdistan parliament or among Kurdish representatives in Baghdad—because the KDP knows it has the numerical advantage.

For the PUK, elections are only one dimension of power. Territorial control, military capability, and alliances matter just as much, if not more. Even if it were to lose every seat, PUK officials have suggested, it would retain security forces, territorial influence, and strategic partnerships. That, in their view, justifies preserving its share of power.

Within the Kurdistan region, this divergence spawned repeated troubles over the past decade. The regional premiership rotation system envisaged in the 2006 agreement collapsed after just one rotation in which the PUK’s Barham Salih was prime minister from 2009 to 2012. The KDP has refused to share the premiership ever since.

In 2015, this dynamic led to a regional government crisis when Barzani refused to step down from the presidency after his term expired. The electoral divergence also contributed to infighting over the Iraqi presidency in 2018. And it created today’s standoff over the formation of the national government.

This clash of logics is at the heart of today’s crisis. The KDP wants a recalibration based on ballots. The PUK wants continuity grounded in balance—based either on its historical strength or by reinvigorating itself through new alliances—and hard power. Neither side is inclined to concede.

Why this matters for Baghdad

Electing a president is a prerequisite for designating a prime minister. Kurdish parties are supposed to coalesce around a joint candidate for the Iraqi presidency. That was relatively easy when Talabani was alive and the PUK and KDP adhered to their strategic agreement but has since become significantly more difficult. If the KDP and the PUK cannot agree on a candidate, the process stalls before it even reaches the premiership.

And the standoff in Kurdistan had already persisted for a full year before the current deadlock emerged in Baghdad. The Kurdistan region held parliamentary elections in October 2024 yet it still has not formed a new government. Almost eighteen months later, the region continues to operate under a caretaker cabinet, and its parliament has struggled to convene. The paralysis in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah feeds directly into the paralysis in Baghdad.

Indeed, the KDP’s surprising decision not to object to Maliki’s nomination despite their long history of hostility—helping set the stage for the current standoff—may well have been based on the expectation that Maliki would return the favor by backing the KDP’s presidential candidate, Fuad Hussein.

This is not a temporary disagreement over personalities. It is a renegotiation of the fundamental terms of Kurdish power-sharing. Such renegotiations are slow, fraught, and potentially destabilizing.

Maliki: Loud but manageable

Contrast this structural political conflict with the controversy over Maliki. His nomination drew criticism domestically and abroad, raised concerns in Washington, and stirred anxieties about Iraq’s political direction. But procedurally, it is easier to resolve than the Kurdish dispute. US President Donald Trump’s public repudiation of Maliki created an awkward situation. Maliki and the Coordination Framework risk losing face if they acquiesce to Trump’s demand to replace Maliki. There is, however, a fairly easy offramp—let parliament end Maliki’s third term before it begins.

The prime minister-designate must form a cabinet and win parliamentary approval. If negotiations fail, the nominee can fall in parliament, as happened in 2020 with Mohammed Allawi and Adnan al-Zurfi. In such a case, the system can simply absorb the failure and move on to another candidate without losing face. In any case, the controversy over Maliki does not threaten to fundamentally alter the distribution of power between Iraq’s main political factions. The Kurdish dispute does.

If the KDP and the PUK cannot agree on the basic rules of coexistence—on how to divide authority in the region and how to represent Kurdish interests in Baghdad—then every subsequent step in the federal process becomes more complicated.

The risk of prolonged stalemate

The longer this standoff continues, the greater the temptation for some actors to seek pathways to bypass consensus arrangements that have defined, and at times paralyzed, Iraq’s post-2003 politics. For better or worse, that could destabilize this system.

Resolving the Kurdish impasse will require flexibility from both sides. The KDP may need to temper its maximalist reading of electoral gains. The PUK may need to acknowledge new political realities. Influential external actors, including Iran, which favors the PUK and distrusts the KDP, will also need to avoid obstructing compromise. None of that will be easy.

The argument over who becomes prime minister may dominate headlines. But the deeper story—the one that will determine how quickly Iraq forms a government—has been unfolding within Kurdish politics for nearly eighteen months. Until the KDP and the PUK settle their dispute over the terms of power-sharing, Baghdad will likely remain stuck in limbo.

Omar Al-Nidawi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and the director of programs at the Enabling Peace in Iraq Center.

The post The real roadblock to government formation in Iraq isn’t Maliki—it’s Kurdish power politics appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• As the Trump administration turns up the pressure on the Cuban government, the United States should also turn its attention to Nicaragua’s authoritarian regime. 
• Nicaragua’s authoritarian consolidation and transnational repression threaten its Central American neighbors and prevent the subregion from becoming more economically integrated.
• The United States should ramp up economic pressure on the Nicaraguan regime and work with regional partners to support the country’s democratic opposition.

WASHINGTON—After nearly seven decades of communist rule, Cuba may be entering its most consequential period in generations. The Trump administration has increased pressure on the Cuban government, implementing a blockade on the island last month. Already struggling before the blockade, Cuba continues to endure food shortages, prolonged blackouts, and, for the past three months, a deepening energy crisis. On March 13, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel stated that Havana has been in talks with Washington to “resolve bilateral differences.” According to reports, the Trump administration aims to force Díaz-Canel to step down in favor of someone more amenable to US interests.

If real change in Cuba does happen, then it will rank among the most important geopolitical developments in the Americas in a very long time, especially coming just months after Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro was captured by the United States.

These developments suggest that a broader network of authoritarian regimes that long helped sustain one another politically, economically, and diplomatically is crumbling. To be sure, this does not mean that democratic openings will emerge on their own, as the case of Venezuela illustrates. Still, it is worth asking: With Maduro’s capture and the potential for a leadership change in Cuba, how should Washington and its partners in Latin America think about what comes next?

Not just a problem for Nicaraguans

While the unfolding situation in Cuba deserves the attention it is receiving, the United States should also turn its focus to another repressive Latin American regime: Nicaragua. The Central American country weighs more heavily on the long-term future of the region than many policymakers admit. For years, Nicaragua’s solidifying authoritarianism has been treated as a contained crisis, with its government considered to be repressive and diplomatically difficult but threatening few far-reaching consequences.

That view no longer holds. Today, the Ortega-Murillo regime is not only dismantling Nicaragua’s institutions, it is also shaping the region around it. United Nations (UN) experts have described the country as an authoritarian state with no remaining independent institutions. And Nicaragua’s persecution of its political opponents extends beyond its borders. The Ortega-Murillo regime is alleged to have denied passports, confiscated property, and even murdered dissidents in neighboring Costa Rica to silence the opposition. According to a report by the UN Group of Human Rights Experts published on March 10, the regime has a “transnational surveillance and intelligence network” that is embedded in diplomatic missions abroad. The malign influence also spills into geopolitics, as Nicaragua publicly backs Russia’s territorial ambitions in Ukraine. In September 2025, the regime signed trade agreements with three Ukrainian regions under Russian occupation, including Donetsk.

The Nicaraguan regime’s transnational repression creates problems across Central America. The Ortega-Murillo regime’s consolidation reinforces the notion that democratic erosion can become permanent. This complicates regional efforts to build a more predictable climate for investment, governance, and international cooperation. The subregion is already strained by migration pressures, weak institutions, and uneven democratic commitment. Any efforts to make Central America’s economies more cohesive will always be limited while one of its states continues to operate as an authoritarian holdout.

Thus, any serious ambition for a more governable, stable, and economically dynamic Central America runs through Nicaragua. The country is too central, large, and significant to work around. Too often, officials from the region have discussed Central American integration in siloed commercial or bureaucratic terms, as though it were mainly a matter of customs modernization, infrastructure, or trade facilitation. All these issues are, of course, important. But fostering a more integrated isthmus also requires political conditions such as legal predictability, credible institutions, and stronger cross-border trust. For any future vision of a more interconnected Central America, there needs to be a regional understanding that authoritarian breakdown in one country weakens the whole.

A new way forward

The subregion’s political conditions do not lend themselves to optimism. Its governments are preoccupied with domestic pressures. Its regional bodies are weak. There may be little appetite now for a broader conversation about reintegration, reconstruction, or long-term strategy for democratization. But that should not prevent US and Central American policymakers from thinking boldly about the future of the region.

A more serious approach to Nicaragua would begin with the United States increasing its economic pressure on the regime. The Trump administration’s decision in December 2025 to levy phased Section 301 tariffs against certain Nicaraguan goods is a welcome start. These efforts should be coupled with regional support for the opposition in Nicaragua and a blanket refusal to normalize the Ortega-Murillo regime’s repression.

A viable future for Nicaragua requires the country’s dictators, Daniel Ortega and his wife Rosario Murillo, to relinquish power and guarantee free and fair elections as soon as possible. US President Donald Trump should press the regime on this point while threatening greater economic pressure, especially where it would hurt the most: gold. Gold is the regime’s top export commodity, and additional US sanctions on the industry would certainly be felt by the leadership. In addition, the US Congress is currently considering other punitive measure on Nicaragua’s gold trade.

In the end, the White House may decide not to go as far in confronting Nicaragua as it did with Venezuela and Iran, or even as far as it is going with Cuba, where the endgame is still unclear. But the combined effect of these recent US actions elsewhere, together with increased economic pressure on Nicaragua, could motivate the current leadership to seek a peaceful exit.

But Nicaragua also needs more. It requires an amnesty for all arbitrarily detained political prisoners, a restoration of basic civil and political rights for all, and the creation of a more credible legal and regulatory environment. What Nicaragua needs is a government that makes room for the private sector and smaller entrepreneurs, as well as conditions that could eventually support domestic and foreign investment with greater confidence.

In Central America, Nicaragua’s authoritarianism remains an issue that cannot be postponed indefinitely. The region’s democratic credibility, institutional future, and economic potential are all tied to how that question is tackled. Central America will struggle to become more resilient, more coherent, and more ambitious until it is.

The post Will Trump focus on Nicaragua next after Venezuela and Cuba? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Charai for The Jerusalem Post: Courage, not recklessness: Why Netanyahu and Trump were right on Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The transatlantic relationship is being reset and Europe is scrambling to keep up. The agenda is no longer set in Brussels. It is set in the White House, shaped by the Trump administration and driven by events from Ukraine to the Middle East. Who controls the agenda now? And what does this mean for the Western Balkans? In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Europe Center, sits down with Dimitris Tsarouhas, Professor at Georgetown University and Washington DC Representative of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), for a frank and far-reaching conversation on one of the most consequential shifts in global politics.

Professor Tsarouhas argues that Europe has failed to do its geopolitical homework. The dream of strategic autonomy has collided with reality. A new global security architecture is taking shape, one in which the role of the United States will be smaller, old assumptions about Russia are being questioned, and Europe must urgently boost its own defense capabilities or risk becoming a spectator in a world it once helped shape.

And at the heart of Europe, literally, there is a gap. The Western Balkans remain outside the EU family, trapped in a waiting room with no clear exit. Young people are leaving. Trust is eroding. Professor Tsarouhas is unambiguous: the process must be transparent and meritocratic, and if countries in the region are doing the work, Europe has no excuse to keep them waiting. The goal must be full EU membership, nothing less.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post The Western Balkans in today’s transatlantic landscape | A Debrief with Dimitris Tsarouhas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ahead of the election, experts from the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center answer the most pressing questions about what the results could mean for the country’s domestic and international priorities during a time of strained transatlantic relations.

How did we get here?

Why did Frederiksen call elections now?

In the months following historic losses for Social Democrats during local elections in November, Frederiksen strategically navigated heightened tensions with the Trump administration over Greenland’s sovereignty. In the aftermath of this confrontation, polls indicated that Frederiksen had boosted support for the Social Democrats across the country. With national polling indicating that the party could secure around 21 percent of the vote—a 3 percent increase from December—Frederiksen called the elections for March 24 to capitalize on this renewed political support and strengthen the Social Democrats’ coalition prospects.

—Jeremy Schaefer is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

What challenges will the next Danish government face in managing strategic relations with the United States?

Denmark countered Trump’s latest effort to seize Greenland through a combination of steadfastness, determination, and calm that, remarkably, underscored its continued commitment to transatlanticism. Critical to that success was Copenhagen’s effectiveness in forging and sustaining a robust coalition of NATO allies that firmly and publicly stood by its side.

Going forward, however, Denmark should not assume that this issue has been settled. As my colleague Dan Fried has said, it is, at best, in a state of remission. To keep it that way, Denmark must continue delivering on its tradition as a committed NATO ally, rapidly fulfill its commitment to increase defense spending to meet the Alliance’s agreed standard of 5 percent of each country’s gross domestic product, and direct a robust portion of that defense spending to reinforcing the military capabilities necessary for Arctic operations. And it should continue advocating and facilitating increased NATO operational presence in the High North—including Greenland. Its presence is justified by the growing geopolitical importance of the High North and the challenges to that region posed by both Russia and China.

—Ian Brzezinksi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO Policy.

How will the crisis over Greenland impact voters’ attitude toward the government?

Frederiksen’s unwavering defense of the Denmark and Greenland’s territorial integrity generated a “rally ’round the flag” effect, boosting public support for the governing coalition and redirecting the political conversation away from other domestic concerns, including the rising cost of housing. Danish voters were reminded of the importance of steady leadership, especially when Denmark must simultaneously manage relations with a major ally and protect its national interests. Looking ahead, it appears that Frederiksen’s recent spotlight on the international stage may win her party additional seats in the Folketing. However, if voters’ support has weakened as the crisis has cooled in recent weeks, the Danes may find themselves in a similar position to the one they are in now: led by a centrist government with leaders from across the ideological spectrum.

—Jeremy Schaefer is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

How has public sentiment in Denmark toward the United States evolved, and how is this impacting Danish policy toward Washington?

Danes generally were appalled and angered by the Trump administration’s threats to seize Greenland through intimidation or force. Rather than submit, as tensions reached a peak in January, the Danish government sent troops to Greenland and prepared to fight against a US invasion. Danish officials I spoke with explained in private that they did not expect they could withstand a determined US assault but would nevertheless fight rather than submit. That determination, political backing from Europe, and opposition within the United States to the prospect of US aggression against a long-standing ally seemed to have convinced Trump to back down.

The damage to US-Danish relations was severe. Sixty percent of Danes consider the United States to be an adversary while only 17 percent consider it to be an ally, an unfortunate but understandable reaction.

Nevertheless, the Danish government has kept its head. On March 17, as the United States was putting pressure on allies to contribute to efforts to open the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has closed in response to US and Israeli attacks, Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen urged Europe to consider such efforts. He made his case in terms of European interests rather than rejecting US demands out of hand. This response serves as a model of cool-headed thinking rather than playing to understandable emotions, and sets a good example that many leaders, including those in the United States, could learn from.  

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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Further reading

Dispatches Mar 13, 2026

What Rob Jetten’s new minority government means for Dutch and European defense

By Elmar Hellendoorn

The new Dutch prime minister and his minority coalition face the most significant geopolitical realignment in Europe in decades.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

Dispatches Mar 2, 2026

Willkommen to Germany’s ‘super election year.’ Here’s what to expect.

By Phyllis Berry

A series of state elections between March and September could see gains by the far-right Alternative for Germany, further challenging Germany’s centrist parties.

Elections Germany

Dispatches Jan 22, 2026

Trump may move on from Greenland. Europe won’t.

By Jörn Fleck, James Batchik

Trump’s willingness to engage in brinkmanship with Europe over Greenland will have a lasting impact on how the continent’s leaders approach relations with Washington.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

The post Your primer on Denmark’s snap parliamentary elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz—a critical oil and gas artery—have triggered price spikes and shortages in Sri Lanka.
• The economic and social impacts are immediate—rising inflation, power outages, business closures, and agricultural disruption.
• Across South and Southeast Asia, countries face fuel shortages, rationing, and reduced industrial activity, while governments scramble to secure supply and curb demand.

GALLE—For the past two years, I have been based largely out of Sri Lanka, closer to Asian clients, while still working regularly from Washington and London. The experience has been an education in emerging market resilience. This is a society in recovery from conflict and natural disaster that remains exposed to external shocks, challenged by entrenched interests, and subject to the influence of larger neighbors. Forged in this crucible, Sri Lanka’s tightly knit communities are highly adept at managing uncertainty. But over the past two weeks, that resilience has been tested in ways that are both familiar and deeply alarming.

Since the US and Israeli strikes on Iran, Sri Lanka has been an unlikely subject of headlines. It provided emergency rescue to Iranian sailors after the US torpedoed their ship off the coast near the city of Galle, where I live. It also gave refuge to a second crew and impounded their vessel in a remote port to keep it away from sensitive commercial traffic around Colombo. A relatively new popular government is desperate to remain neutral and focus on the reforms it was elected for. Yet painstaking economic recovery is now colliding with a massive energy crisis and its immediate effects.

The disruption to flows through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one fifth of global oil and shipped gas transits, has triggered a rapid and systemic shock to energy markets. Prices have surged and availability has tightened severely. A crippling shortage of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) means there is little fuel for cooking. Restaurants and small businesses are shuttering. The lack of fertilizer shipments is thwarting the critical March planting season in this heavily agricultural country. Petrol stations faced strain initially from panicked hoarding behavior (memories of the 2022 crisis are still fresh), and, more recently, from restricted distribution. 

Sri Lanka is just a small example of the energy havoc spreading around the world. Within days of the conflict’s outbreak and the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, much of South and Southeast Asia have moved from price pressure to physical constraint. Asia is particularly reliant on oil and gas from the Gulf, with around 60 percent of its crude oil imports and nearly a third of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) moving through the strait. Almost all countries in the region import most of their fuel and gas, and some only have enough supplies to last a few more weeks. Several Southeast Asia–based refineries, including facilities in Singapore and Malaysia, have cut back ‌output due to constrained crude availability. Panic fuel-buying has spread to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Household reliance on imported LPG is on another scale altogether in India, where hundreds of millions of customers wait for days to replace canisters. 

This is what a real energy shock looks like on the ground.

Governments are now scrambling to secure supply, drawing on limited reserves, issuing emergency tenders, and in many cases trying to reduce demand. 

In recent days, the Sri Lankan government has taken extraordinary steps. It introduced a four-day workweek, and it began moving schools to remote learning on Wednesdays. Transport and public services are being curtailed. On March 15, the government reintroduced a mandatory petrol rationing program that saw millions of subscribers crash the registration website. These are emergency responses to address a fuel-import dependent system under stress.

Lines form to purchase gas near Galle, Sri Lanka, on March 17, 2026. (Phillip Cornell)

Sri Lanka is not alone. Across Asia, governments are implementing emergency measures. Countries are prioritizing household LPG over commercial use. Industrial activity in sectors such as petrochemicals is being curtailed. The Philippines has shortened the workweek. Pakistan has closed schools. Myanmar introduced mobility restrictions.

Air travel is highly sensitive to fuel prices, and airlines are now cutting routes as jet fuel prices rise sharply. This is compounding the air travel chaos caused by closed airspace over the major Gulf “superconnector” airline hubs, with direct impacts on Asian tourist destinations. Across southern Sri Lanka, hotel bookings have dried up. 

The latest pressures have been on the power system in Sri Lanka. The Ceylon Electricity Board is a traditional integrated utility; less than 10 percent of its generation is from liquid fuel. But fuel still provides key flexibility, and local diesel generators are common. After a dry season that reduced hydroelectric capacity, and labor disputes in the face of critical power sector reforms, the fuel shortage is adding to existing system stress. Rolling curtailments and power outages began in earnest this week, forcing hotels and critical services like hospitals to draw further on diesel stocks to feed emergency generation. 

The economic effects of these various price and supply shocks are quick to materialize. Higher fuel costs are feeding through into transport and food systems, contributing to inflation and growth pressures. Prices for daily goods at our local markets have already gone up as shopkeepers anticipate supply chain disruptions. Economies like Sri Lanka are particularly exposed due to weaker currencies, limited fiscal space, and dependence on imports. The International Monetary Fund has warned that sustained increases in energy prices could raise inflation and reduce growth globally, with emerging markets especially exposed. 

Perhaps the most important development is that demand destruction is already underway. The Financial Times, citing JPMorgan analysis, shows that refined fuel shipments in Asia have fallen by 30 to 35 percent, while global oil demand could drop by around one million barrels per day as a result of both price increases and policy measures. The speed of adjustment makes the current crisis unique. During the 2022 energy shock following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, the effects unfolded over months as supply chains reoriented. In this case, disruption to a central maritime artery has compressed the timeline. Physical shortages, policy responses, and economic contraction are occurring in rapid succession. 

Rationing and demand suppression can provide temporary relief, but perceptions and expectations of duration are already causing changes in behavior. Business owners are contemplating risk-mitigation investments such as solar panels and batteries. A neighbor has become the local agent for Sri Lankan–built electric three-wheelers to replace the classic tuk-tuk. There is a real sense of preparing for a structural change.

Motorists line up to purchase gas near Galle, Sri Lanka, on March 17, 2026. (Phillip Cornell)

Resilience is a word often used to describe technical systems, but it is ultimately about people. Sri Lanka has endured considerable hardship in recent decades, but a very real sense of community and shared responsibility provide informal social safety nets that kick into action during tough times. Even as only a guest of the country, I have felt embraced by the community. Invitations to communal iftar dinners, shared use of barbecues or microgrids, and conviviality during hour-long waits for petrol are just small examples of a community solidarity that feels different.

In developed economies, economic disruption is often framed in terms of price increases and inflation. In markets where the impact on daily activities such as cooking, transport, and work is immediate and tangible, disruption becomes a test of crisis behavior.

Sri Lanka is not an outlier but an early warning, and a reminder that the global energy system remains deeply vulnerable to disruption, especially for those who depend on it most.

The post Demand destruction has begun: What Sri Lanka reveals about the global energy crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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This historical comparison does not flatter Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has turned veneration of the fight against Hitler into an unofficial state religion. While Red Army troops played a key role in the Nazi defeat and managed to advance thousands of kilometers from Stalingrad to Berlin, today’s Russian army is in many cases still stuck within walking distance of their positions when the invasion first began in February 2022.

Despite this lack of progress on the battlefield, Putin has so far demonstrated zero interest a compromise peace. Instead, he continues to insist on maximalist demands during negotiations that would destroy Ukraine as an independent state and as a separate nation.

This uncompromising stance makes perfect sense when viewed from Putin’s perspective. After all, the invasion he unleashed in 2022 has cost countless Russian lives and plunged the country into a new Cold War. Putin knows that only total victory can justify these sacrifices.

If Putin accepted the peace terms currently on offer, this would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine free and beyond Kremlin control. Most Russians would regard that as a disastrous defeat. Putin’s dreams of entering Russian history alongside Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Stalin would be shattered. Instead, he would be condemned as the man who lost Ukraine.

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In a very real sense, Putin is caught in a trap of his own making and has no real choice but to fight on. At the same time, however, it would be wrong to suggest that the Kremlin dictator is merely seeking to postpone the inevitable. On the contrary, he remains convinced that the goals of the invasion are still achievable and is now counting on Western disunity to hand him victory in Ukraine.

Putin’s low opinion of the democratic world is based on personal experience. Time and again throughout his reign, Russia’s aggressive actions have sparked vocal condemnation from Western capitals followed with indecent haste by calls for a return to dialogue and “business as usual.”

Western leaders loudly condemned Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, but were soon queuing up to reset relations with the Kremlin. The same lack of resolve was on display following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, with minimal costs imposed on Moscow and multiple European countries actually increasing their dependence on Russian energy exports.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Putin treats the proclamations of his Western counterparts with thinly veiled contempt. While he has been unpleasantly surprised since 2022 by the scale of support for Ukraine, the Russian leader’s own dealings with his Western counterparts have encouraged him to conclude that this unity will prove temporary. As the war grinds into a fifth year with no end in sight, Putin believes he can ultimately outlast the West.

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Shifts within the Western alliance over the past year are fueling confidence in Moscow that current levels of support for Ukraine will not last forever. Since returning to the White House in January 2025, US President Donald Trump has cut military aid to Ukraine and sought to reposition the United States as an intermediary in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

This has placed the burden of supporting the Ukrainian war effort firmly on Europe. According to recent Kiel Institute data, Ukraine’s European partners have done a good job of filling this gap. However, the majority of aid is now coming from a relatively small group of nations including Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain. This places Ukraine’s war effort on fragile foundations.

Meanwhile, a ninety billion euro financing package agreed by EU leaders remains blocked by Hungary. This is part of long-term pattern that has seen Hungary’s pro-Kremlin Prime Minister Viktor Orban repeatedly obstruct or delay efforts by the European Union to strengthen Ukraine or increase pressure on Putin.

With far-right populist parties currently riding high in the polls throughout Europe, Putin also has good cause for optimism over the possible imminent appearance of more Orban-style allies. This could help the Kremlin in its efforts to divide and weaken Europe from within.

Broader geopolitical developments are also placing new strains on Western unity and threatening to undermine backing for Ukraine. The US-Israeli joint operation against Iran is currently causing unprecedented tension among NATO allies, with European countries reluctant to participate in efforts to safeguard the Strait of Hormuz. This has highlighted a growing transatlantic divide that could seriously weaken Ukraine’s position.

Putin cannot risk a compromise peace in Ukraine, but he remains confident that time is on his side. While the Russian army has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, Putin is prepared to wait until Western disunity leaves the Ukrainians stripped of support and at his mercy. While this would not mean an immediate end to the carnage, Putin believes a dramatic decline in Western support would finally allow Russia to pummel an exposed and abandoned Ukraine into submission.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

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Bottom lines up front

• Despite frustration with the US president’s approach and rhetoric, European allies should consider supporting security efforts in the Gulf based on their own interests.
• European militaries and know-how should contribute to unblocking the Strait of Hormuz and defending Gulf partners from Iranian attacks.
• Europe has strong incentives to get involved: rising energy prices threaten its economy and boost Russia’s revenues, which aid Moscow’s war effort against Ukraine.

WASHINGTON—The Iran war wasn’t their idea, and they may not like the way President Donald Trump is conducting it. But despite bullying rhetoric from Trump, the United States’ European allies might consider what they can reasonably do to support security around the Gulf rather than reject White House demands for it out of hand.

Building a coalition and preparing the battlespace for military action takes time and effort, especially when the conflict is in the Middle East. The United States sought and received significant military help from its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite sharp political differences; help that grew over time. Failure in Afghanistan, mixed success in Iraq, and popular frustration over both wars have not made it easier for the United States to get help this time with Iran. The Trump administration’s approach has hurt too: Trump has swung from initially keeping allies in the dark about the operation to demanding allied military support, to then spurning such help as unneeded. The United States started out from behind after Trump’s public attacks on those allies who did fight alongside US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, Trump has denigrated Ukraine’s actual offers of drones and drone specialists to Gulf countries—a field in which the embattled country is arguably the world leader. 

Trump’s March 17 social media post was another sharp rejection of European help: “[W]e no longer ‘need’, or desire, the NATO Countries’ assistance – WE NEVER DID!” That post also included another attack on NATO as a “one way street – We will protect them, but they will do nothing for us.” Given all this, it would be understandable for Europeans to slam Trump for starting a war without consulting with them, only to demand their military support when things start to look complicated. 

Nevertheless, European allies would be better advised to consider what they can do to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz and defend Gulf states under attack by Iran. They should do so not to assuage Trump or to help him out of a self-induced jam, but because Europe’s own critical interests are at stake in this conflict. 

Why Europe should act

The spiking price of oil hurts the entire free world and has sent European governments scrambling for short-term fixes at the gas pump. Parallel surges in oil and gasoline prices have worsened an already bleak outlook for European industry, its competitiveness, and economic growth. At home, rising costs could cause political instability and benefit pro-Russian challengers on the right and left. Abroad, the price spikes in oil could create an estimated three to five billion dollars in additional revenue by the end of March for Russia, Europe’s most aggressive adversary, whose war against Ukraine remains the defining threat to the continent’s own freedom and security.

That windfall from energy-price shocks risks giving Russia a boost, just as Moscow’s position on the battlefield and the prospects for its war economy were deteriorating. Until the present moment, Russia’s position was weakening , thanks primarily to Ukraine’s bravery, grit, and sacrifice, but also because Europe stepped up to provide the financing needed to keep US weapons flowing to Kyiv over the past fourteen months.

European weapons stocks and production are a well-documented problem, but Europe’s stronger engagement in the Gulf could also present important openings in the defense space. The continent’s defense companies have been among the most effective and nimble partners for Ukraine’s battle-tested drone start-ups, and together they could bring new and more cost-effective means for Gulf allies to defend themselves against future attacks from Iran or other actors. That could achieve multiple European-Ukrainian objectives at once: It would preserve much-needed high-end interceptors that Ukraine needs—and Europe would buy from the United States—to defend against Russian ballistic missiles. It would expand cooperation and build new trust in Europe-Gulf relations. And it might shift the position of Gulf countries that have long sat on the fence when it comes to Russia’s war in Ukraine. It would accomplish all of this while avoiding further deterioration in transatlantic relations.

European leaders, therefore, have plenty of reasons to engage constructively with the United States and partners in the Gulf. Speed matters here. How quickly European countries move in pursuit of their own interests sends an important signal to Washington and adversaries in Moscow and Beijing alike. It matters almost as much as the movement itself.

What Europe can do

Some Europeans had already figured this out. On March 1, a day after the start of the military action, a joint statement by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom declared:

“We will take steps to defend our interests and those of our allies in the region, potentially through enabling necessary and proportionate defensive action to destroy Iran’s capability to fire missiles and drones at their source. We have agreed to work together with the US and allies in the region on this matter.”

That statement suggested a willingness to attack Iranian drone and missile sites. An experienced former senior Pentagon official pointed out to the authors that the United Kingdom and French navies could support the United States in protecting Gulf terminals and cities from Iranian attacks and, possibly, help with escorting ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Ukrainian know-how combined with European resourcing and production, from air defense to drone-based mine-hunting, could make important differences as well. If Trump’s language has made it politically complicated for European leaders to help, then these leaders could arrange to respond to requests from Gulf states or other countries affected by the war. 

Trump’s social media posts are unlikely to last; responding to them as they are written risks locking in their bluster and threats. The US military is apt to be a steady partner in figuring out practical details of how European forces can fit into defensive operations intended to limit the war’s damage to the world economy and regional countries. Even if European capabilities are limited, they could free up some US assets elsewhere. 

NATO is probably not the institution to organize such operations and, at this point, gaining Alliance-wide consensus might prove too complex. But individual NATO countries working together could offer military support for Gulf states and safe(r) passage through the strait, structured in a way to be most politically acceptable to domestic audiences. European leaders could even make that offer on the understanding that the United States would continue, and even increase, its support for Ukraine, as Finnish President Alexander Stubb has suggested.

It is neither pleasant nor glorious to respond constructively to Trump’s bullying rhetoric. But finding a way forward that meets European interests and avoids damage to transatlantic ties may be the best of a bad deal.

Trump himself could help, as a start by thanking Ukraine for pitching in and calling on Europeans to follow that example and do what they can. Some, for their own reasons, might take him up on it.

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Beneath this public-facing layer, however, lies a more consequential trend. Turkey and Spain have been consolidating a pragmatic form of political alignment that is increasingly underpinned by security cooperation. It is shaped less by ideology than by a shared view that their strategic and security environments are becoming more fragmented.

That logic became especially visible after two ballistic missiles launched from Iran entered Turkish airspace and were intercepted by NATO air defenses stationed in the Mediterranean. In Ankara, the episode reinforced the perception that allied reassurance can still be tangible at a time when the credibility of security commitments is being tested. For Spain, whose forces have contributed to NATO’s air and missile defense posture in Turkey for more than a decade—and whose Patriot battery detected the Iranian missile that NATO air defenses shot down on March 9—the incident highlighted how sustained operational cooperation can translate into political capital and strategic trust.

Turkey and Spain are operating under a dual-track approach in which Madrid continues to endorse democratic standards and the rule of law as the normative horizon of Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) while deepening defense and security ties with Ankara.

The optics matter here. Spanish President Pedro Sánchez’s outspoken opposition to the US-Israeli war on Iran, widely framed in Turkey as being on the right side of history, has reinforced Madrid’s image as a principled yet pragmatic European interlocutor. In other words, although several political and structural constraints limit further progress within the traditional EU accession process framework, Spain’s approach suggests that pragmatic defense cooperation with Turkey can advance even in the absence of political integration. And this cooperation could help normalize Turkey as a security actor within the Euro-Atlantic perimeter.

A relationship shaped by trust and the absence of vetoes

Often overlooked in debates on Turkey–Europe relations, Spain has nonetheless emerged as one of Ankara’s most pragmatic security partners. And this deepening cooperation comes at a moment when Russia’s war in Ukraine, Middle East volatility, uncertainty over US commitments, and Europe’s rearmament are reshaping the strategic landscape. Turkey has already penetrated Europe’s defense market through bilateral deals and is increasingly discussed as a potential contributor to EU-adjacent instruments such as Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and the European Defense Fund. Yet political constraints remain decisive: Vetoes from some EU member states, low alignment on common foreign and security policy, and the absence of a formal EU–Turkey security framework continue to block meaningful institutionalization. Spain’s approach, therefore, illustrates both an opportunity and its limits. Bilateral defense cooperation can deepen and help normalize Turkey as a security actor. But on its own, this cooperation is unlikely to lead to significant enhancements in EU-Turkey defense cooperation at the broader EU absent changes to the current accession process.

Much of the bilateral relationship hinges on a seeming paradox: The geographical distance between Spain and Turkey has often translated into greater strategic room for convergence on security and defense. Unlike Greece and Cyprus, Spain has no territorial disputes with Turkey. Unlike France, it has not positioned itself as a geopolitical competitor in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Middle East. Unlike Germany or Austria, Spain’s domestic politics are not shaped by large Turkish diaspora communities. Finally, both countries have faced separatist challenges in different forms, a shared experience that can bring their security outlooks closer in some respects. Thus, the relationship is largely depoliticized and insulated from domestic pressures, making it easier for any Spanish government to adopt a relatively favorable posture toward Ankara.

This absence of friction has translated into a high degree of institutional trust. From Ankara’s perspective, Spain is not associated with a priori vetoes against Turkey in European forums. From Madrid’s perspective, Turkey is not a rival—either geopolitically or in the military-industrial domain—but a capable partner whose strategic relevance has increased in a more fragmented security environment. This mutual perception has allowed cooperation to deepen without becoming hostage to broader political tensions.

Spain’s diplomatic posture has reinforced this trust. During periods of heightened tension between Turkey and the EU, Madrid has favored mediation and de-escalation over sanctions and confrontation, as in the case of Eastern Mediterranean energy disputes. Successive Spanish governments, regardless of political orientation, have also maintained a broadly pro-enlargement stance toward Turkey, even as expectations surrounding accession have diminished. Like Italy, Spain has never challenged the EU consensus on Turkey directly but has consistently worked to keep engagement viable and to frame Ankara as a partner rather than an outlier.

Ultimately, despite significant domestic differences, Turkey and Spain have found themselves politically aligned on a critical set of issues, representing among the most critical voices against the war in Gaza and the US-Israeli war against Iran. While this certainly does not suggest ideological alignment between the two governments, it underscores a similar perception of changing global dynamics, paving the way for more direct, constructive engagement.

Strategic convergence under NATO’s umbrella

All this helps explain why defense and strategic cooperation could expand relatively smoothly once geopolitical conditions made such cooperation more necessary. Such convergence can be traced to certain concrete actions within NATO since 2015. As regional instability intensified after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Spain assumed a sustained role in Turkey’s air defense by deploying Patriot air and missile defense systems on Turkish territory under NATO command. Since then, this presence has been continuous, involving multiple rotations and thousands of Spanish military personnel at Incirlik air base.

Over time, this interaction came to assume significance beyond its immediate operational function. It created dense networks of cooperation between their armed forces, strengthened interoperability, and generated political capital in Ankara by demonstrating Spain’s willingness to assume tangible responsibility for Turkey’s security.

This NATO-based convergence also reflects a deeper alignment on strategic priorities. Spain has long resisted a narrow focus on NATO’s eastern flank, warning against the risk of neglecting the Alliance’s southern neighborhood. Madrid has consistently emphasized the security relevance of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa—regions in which Turkey plays a central role as a frontline NATO ally on the southern flank. The appointment of Javier Colomina as the NATO secretary general’s special representative for the southern neighborhood demonstrates Spain’s insistence on “operating equally” on both flanks and is therefore naturally aligned with Turkey’s security priorities.

From strategic alignment to material cooperation

As operational trust consolidated within NATO, Spain–Turkey relations shifted from political coordination to material cooperation, especially in the defense industry. The logic was straightforward: Spain wanted to modernize and internationalize its defense base, but budget constraints and limited political appetite for reaching NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product benchmark for military spending pushed Madrid toward partnerships that can deliver faster and more flexibly than some European-led consortia. The Franco-German dispute surrounding Future Combat Air System fighter jets is a reminder of how slow, costly, and politically rigid intra-European industrial cooperation can become. As one military observer we spoke with put it, Spain needs external partners to accelerate programs, expand exports, and avoid overdependence on larger European defense players.

Turkey’s defense industrial rise has positioned it to meet this demand. Over the past decade, Ankara has moved from supplier-dependence to producing NATO-relevant platforms at scale, with defense exports topping $10 billion in 2025. For Spain, Turkey is less a competitor than a complementary industrial actor—one that brings speed, production capacity, and increasingly interoperable systems.

The bilateral track has also favored coproduction over one-off sales. Navantia’s cooperation with Turkish shipyards on TCG Anadolu established an early template of technology transfer and joint work, now feeding into debates on naval innovation, including drone-enabled concepts. More recently, the relationship has evolved into greater interdependence: In December, Spain finalized a deal to acquire Hürjet to replace its aging F-5s, which will deepen integration in the training and aviation ecosystems. Turkey’s acquisition of Eurofighter Typhoon jets—partly assembled in Spain—links industrial interests, jobs, and production lines. Early talks between Indra and Otokar on land systems point in the same direction. The question is whether this bilateral momentum can be translated into a broader European framework or if it will remain confined to ad hoc cooperation.

Pragmatism under EU constraints

This deepening bilateral cooperation is unfolding against the backdrop of a congested and largely stagnant EU–Turkey relationship. Spain has consistently supported a values-based and institutionalized EU–Turkey horizon, and, more recently, aligned with Josep Borrel, a former EU High Representative from Spain, in advocating a “positive agenda” on common issues. At the margins of the 2024 Madrid bilateral summit, Sánchez emphasized the “exceptional state of bilateral relations,” referring to “Turkey and Spain [as] friends, partners and allies with important cultural, social and economic exchanges.” The numbers seem to confirm this, as the two countries’ bilateral trade reached $20.6 billion in 2025.

This has not prevented Spain from taking public positions on domestic developments in Turkey. Sánchez, especially compared to other European leaders, has been notably vocal on the case against Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, signaling that Spain’s push for a constructive relationship does not imply silence on democracy and the rule of law. Rather, it reflects a compartmentalized approach in which normative conditionality and security engagement proceed on separate tracks.

This dual-track logic comes to the fore on EU defense initiatives. On paper, instruments such as the European Defense Fund and the SAFE program offer frameworks for cooperation with third countries. SAFE allows for limited non-EU procurement projects, suggesting that Turkish industrial participation is not excluded by design. Spain has also expressed openness to Turkey’s possible inclusion in mechanisms such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a framework aimed at deepening defense cooperation between EU members, but which has also included the United Kingdom since 2022. Yet, Madrid has not been able to leverage its position to convince other EU members to grant Turkey access to the project. Under these conditions, bilateral defense cooperation becomes a means of preserving strategic interdependence when institutional integration remains blocked.

Strategic convergence in an era of uncertainty

The broader geopolitical environment has reinforced incentives for this form of pragmatic engagement. The Trump administration’s foreign policy has heightened concerns over the unpredictable and transactional nature of US security commitments, accelerating a shift toward selective partnerships among middle powers. In this context, states with significant regional exposure are increasingly seeking to reduce risk through flexible coalitions and defense‑industrial linkages that are not fully dependent on Washington.

Finally, the Spain–Turkey partnership raises the question of whether such bilateral pragmatism can resonate in Brussels. Spain can help normalize Turkey as a security actor within the Euro-Atlantic perimeter and keep a “positive agenda” politically viable. Uncertainty over the international order and the fragmented nature of the European security backdrop can help Spain–Turkey relations stand as an example for how strategic convergence can shape and be shaped by political alignment.

Riccardo Gasco is the foreign policy program coordinator at IstanPol Institute and a doctoral researcher at Bologna University.

Samuele C. Abrami is a research fellow at the Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB) and a former Mercator-Istanbul Policy Center fellow.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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This is the ninth chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas, which analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Evolution of freedom

If one focuses exclusively on aggregate indicators of institutional quality, Italy’s political and economic evolution since the mid-1990s scores high. Indexes such as those produced by Freedom House consistently classify the country as a consolidated democracy with strong political rights and civil liberties, while measures of market orientation point to broadly open and competitive economic institutions. In line with this broader assessment, the Freedom Index also places Italy among countries with strong democratic and market-oriented institutional frameworks. Yet these reassuring classifications coexist with chronic political instability and a persistent sense that institutions do not work as intended. The central question, therefore, is not whether Italy’s institutions are formally free, but why they have increasingly struggled to generate predictability and effective governance in practice.

To understand this tension, some country-specific context is essential. Since the early 1990s, Italy has undergone a profound political transformation following the collapse of its postwar party system. What is often described as the transition to the “Second Republic” was accompanied by repeated electoral reforms, the emergence and disappearance of new political parties, and a persistent pattern of short-lived governments. Since 1994, Italy has had many prime ministers and governments, and even the average time in office for senators and house representatives has shortened significantly. This instability has not weakened democratic rules as such: Alternation in power has remained regular, elections have remained competitive, and constitutional guarantees have held. But it has profoundly shaped the incentives under which political and administrative institutions operate.

The high score Italy receives on the legislative constraints on the executive component of the Political subindex should be interpreted carefully. The score is due to the perfect bicameralism and to the fact that governments are typically formed by coalitions, which require ongoing negotiation among parties with heterogeneous preferences. However, these legislative constraints are often bypassed by the executive governments of the second republic with more and more frequent government decrees and confidence votes, which reduce the quality of laws. In an environment characterized by frequent government turnover and weak retrospective accountability, unfettered executive power would increase the risk of large and difficult-to-reverse policy mistakes. Under such conditions, strong checks and balances operate as a form of institutional insurance, limiting the potential damage associated with political instability rather than generating it. In other words, given Italy’s political volatility and informational constraints, the institutional frictions that limit executive power play a stabilizing role, and the real worries relate to the frequent government decrees aiming to bypass such checks and balances.

Political instability has far-reaching consequences for how governing takes place. Short political horizons systematically alter legislative incentives. When governments expect a brief tenure, the political drive for visible action exceeds careful implementation. In Italy, this logic has translated into a sustained increase in legislative output since the mid-1990s (see, for example, Gratton et al., 2021). In the early 1980s, the Italian Parliament typically approved on the order of 250–300 laws per year. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, annual legislative output regularly exceeded 500 acts, a large share of which consisted of emergency decree-laws later ratified and expanded by Parliament. When political survival depends more on signaling activity than on long-term outcomes, frequent lawmaking becomes individually rational even if it increases systemic complexity (Aghion et al., 2006; Gratton et al., 2021).

Repeated attempts to reform public procurement in Italy provide a concrete illustration. Successive revisions of the public procurement code (Codice dei contratti pubblici) were introduced (notably in 2016, with major amendments in 2020 and 2023) with the stated objective of simplification and acceleration. Yet each reform layered new rules onto an already dense regulatory framework, generating long transition phases and widespread uncertainty for administrations and firms. Rather than resolving bottlenecks, reform activity itself became a source of legal opacity. This outcome is not accidental: It reflects a political environment in which legislating serves as a signal of decisiveness under instability, while the costs of complexity materialize only after governments have moved on.

Given this sustained accumulation of legislation, the burden of adjustment shifts to the administrative and judicial system. Bureaucracies are required to implement rules that are frequently amended, internally inconsistent, and embedded in dense webs of cross-references. As a result, administrative effort is increasingly diverted from implementation to interpretation. Discretion narrows not because rules are clear, but because ambiguity raises the risk of error and ex post sanction. Faced with unstable legal frameworks, public officials adopt more cautious and formalistic behavior, slowing decision-making and amplifying delays. In my view, the sustained deterioration observed until the mid-2010s in the control of corruption and bureaucratic quality components of the Freedom Index is driven primarily by the latter: It reflects a gradual weakening of bureaucratic effectiveness rather than a sharp increase in corrupt behavior. After 2014, the apparent change in trend seems to be largely explained by improvements in perceptions of corruption control, while underlying bureaucratic quality may not have experienced a comparable structural improvement.

Courts face a similar challenge. When legislation is complex and rapidly changing, judges are required to interpret overlapping provisions with limited guidance. This increases divergence across jurisdictions and over time, even in cases involving similar facts. Legal outcomes become less predictable, not because enforcement is weak, but because interpretation itself becomes uncertain. Firms and citizens, in turn, face a moving legal target: Compliance depends not only on what the law formally prescribes, but on how it will eventually be read and enforced. Legal uncertainty thus emerges as an endogenous consequence of legislative overproduction.

Taken together, these dynamics mark a profound change in how public authority operates in practice. The Italian state still relies on formal rules, written procedures, and legal guarantees, but the proliferation and instability of those rules increasingly undermine their coordinating role. Where a rules-based system is designed to reduce discretion and uncertainty, legal complexity has had the opposite effect. For citizens and firms, interacting with the administration often feels less like following clear rules and more like navigating a maze of overlapping requirements, exceptions, and interpretations. Outcomes depend not only on compliance, but on timing, jurisdiction, and the specific office involved. In this sense, legality itself ceases to be a source of predictability and instead becomes an additional layer of risk. The problem is not the absence of rules, but their excess: When the legal framework becomes too dense and unstable to be reliably understood, the promise of rules-based governance is hollowed out.

Legal uncertainty has significant economic consequences. If Italian laws were written with a level of clarity comparable to that of Italy’s constitution, the country’s GDP today would be almost 5 percent higher. In current terms, this corresponds to roughly €110 billion per year in foregone output. This cost reflects the cumulative effect of legal ambiguity on investment, innovation, and firm growth: When rights and obligations are difficult to interpret, economic actors delay decisions, scale back projects, or avoid activities that are most subject to regulatory scrutiny. These aggregate losses do not arise uniformly across the economy, but are mediated by systematic changes in firm behavior and by who is better able to cope with legal complexity.

These costs are not borne uniformly across firms. Legal uncertainty disproportionately penalizes firms that operate transparently, invest in scale, and rely on predictable enforcement of contracts and regulations. By contrast, firms that operate at a smaller scale or in more informal ways are better able to adapt to unstable rules, absorb ambiguity, or avoid exposure altogether. In environments characterized by complex regulation and uneven interpretation, informality and opacity can become competitive advantages rather than constraints. A large body of evidence shows that regulatory complexity and legal uncertainty systematically shift activity away from more productive, formal firms toward smaller, less transparent ones, with adverse consequences for aggregate productivity. In Italy, this selection mechanism reinforces a bias toward small firm size and low growth strategies, amplifying the long-term economic costs of institutional fragility.

Another important phenomenon that cannot be captured by the freedom scores relates to political participation and trust: Citizens’ engagement with politics is a dimension that most institutional indexes only partially capture. Italy continues to meet high standards in terms of electoral competition and political rights, yet participation has declined markedly over time. Voter turnout in national parliamentary elections fell from around 90 percent in the 1970s to about 64 percent in the most recent election in 2022, one of the lowest levels in postwar Italian history. Participation in European and local elections has declined even more sharply, with turnout in European Parliament elections falling below 50 percent in recent cycles (ISTAT; International IDEA). These trends suggest that disengagement results not from the erosion of formal rights but from a weakening belief that political participation meaningfully affects outcomes in an institutional environment perceived as opaque and ineffective.

The gap between formal institutional quality and lived experience has repeatedly shaped Italy’s political trajectory over the past two decades. Since the early 2000s, Italian politics has oscillated between technocratic solutions—invoked in moments of crisis to restore credibility and stability (as under Mario Monti and later Mario Draghi)—and populist reactions that promise to bypass institutional complexity and reassert political control (seen most clearly in the rise of the Five Star Movement and the League under Matteo Salvini). Neither approach has proved fully successful. Technocratic governments have often stabilized short-term outcomes without addressing deeper institutional fragilities, while populist experiments have struggled to translate political mandates into effective and predictable governance. This pendular movement has contributed to political volatility and reinforced public frustration with both expertise and representation. As shown in a forthcoming book by Guiso et al., the 2008 financial crisis served as the watershed of populism in Europe, but in Italy, distrust in politics and government institutions is also due to the country’s political dynamics. In this context, the relative stability of the current government led by Giorgia Meloni marks a potential turning point: For the first time, a populist-led administration is joining political durability with a rhetoric—particularly on immigration and national identity—that raises concerns about the implications for political and civil rights. Whether Italy’s institutional safeguards will continue to prevent slippage along these lines is a question without an obvious answer and will be addressed more fully in the final section.

Overall, Italy’s experience shows a widening gap between formal institutional strength and institutional effectiveness. Democratic procedures and legal guarantees remain largely intact, and this is reflected in Italy’s relatively strong performance on many aggregate institutional indicators. Yet the capacity of these institutions to generate predictability, sustain investment, and foster broad-based economic opportunity has weakened. This disconnect helps explain why dissatisfaction and disengagement can coexist with formally strong institutions. It also provides the starting point for understanding Italy’s prosperity record since the mid-1990s, and why improvements in formal institutional characteristics have not translated into comparable gains in economic performance.

From freedom to prosperity

Measured along many conventional dimensions, Italy remains a prosperous country. Income per capita is high by international standards, life expectancy is among the longest in the world, and access to education, health care, and basic infrastructure is widespread. Material deprivation is limited for most of the population, and inequality, while not low, is broadly comparable to that of other large European economies. At the same time, these relatively favorable aggregates mask important compositional shifts beneath the surface, which pose a significant risk for the country’s long-term growth and social cohesion.

Although Italy remains a high-income country, its growth performance since the mid-1990s has been consistently weak. Over the past three decades, economic stagnation has become a defining feature of the Italian economy rather than a temporary deviation. Real GDP per capita has grown by less than 10 percent since the mid-1990s, compared with roughly 30 percent in France and more than 40 percent in Germany. Labor productivity growth, which averaged close to 2 percent per year during the postwar decades, has been close to zero since the late 1990s. These patterns point not to a sudden deterioration in living standards, but to a prolonged slowdown in economic dynamism that has reshaped expectations and long-term prospects.

A central feature of Italy’s stagnation is the persistent structure of its productive sector. Employment remains heavily concentrated in small firms, with businesses employing fewer than ten workers accounting for roughly half of total employment—far more than in France or Germany. While this structure once supported growth, it has become increasingly ill-suited to an economy characterized by scale economies, global value chains, and the mounting importance of intangible capital. Productivity dispersion across firms is high, yet reallocation toward more productive firms has been weak, limiting aggregate productivity growth. A substantial empirical literature documents how Italy’s skewed firm-size distribution constrains investment, innovation, and organizational upgrading, contributing to persistently low productivity.

Italy’s firm structure is closely reflected in investment behavior. Business investment as a share of GDP has trended downward since the late 1990s and remains below the euro area average, with particularly weak investment in productivity-enhancing and intangible assets such as software, organizational capital, and research and development. The institutional environment described in the previous section helps explain this pattern. Legal uncertainty and regulatory instability raise the fixed costs associated with expansion and long-horizon projects, increasing firms’ exposure to administrative procedures and judicial risk as they grow.

Italy’s weak growth performance has been accompanied by a gradual but persistent deterioration in distributional outcomes. While overall income inequality, as measured by standard Gini coefficients, remains close to the European average, the aggregate masks important shifts in how income is generated and distributed. Real wage growth has been largely stagnant since the late 1990s, particularly for large segments of the workforce, while income streams less directly exposed to economic volatility have proven more resilient.

Alongside weak growth and limited firm dynamism, Italy’s education system has struggled to function as a channel of social mobility. While average educational attainment has increased, learning environments have become increasingly segmented by family background, neighborhood, and territory. Students from lower-income households are disproportionately concentrated in schools with fewer resources, higher teacher turnover, and more challenging classroom climates. Evidence suggests that perceptions of discrimination, disengagement, and exposure to conflict are significantly more prevalent in schools serving Italy’s disadvantaged populations, and that the differences are strongly correlated with parental income and socioeconomic status. Rather than acting as a powerful equalizer, the education system increasingly mirrors existing inequalities, reinforcing differences in cognitive and non-cognitive skill formation from an early age. These patterns risk entrenching social stratification and limiting intergenerational mobility over the long run, even as aggregate indicators of educational access continue to improve.

Prolonged stagnation and repeated economic shocks disproportionately affect middle- and lower-middle-income groups whose welfare depends on stable employment and the returns to long-term investment in skills. Rather than primarily increasing demand for redistribution, this form of insecurity tends to undermine trust in mainstream political actors and institutions, fueling support for alternatives that promise protection through exclusionary policies. In this sense, social tension is less about inequality per se than about the loss of expected mobility for groups that previously experienced steady, if moderate, progress.

Expectations play a central role in this dynamic. Economic growth depends not only on material inputs or formal rules, but on whether individuals believe that effort will be rewarded over time. As Isaiah Berlin emphasized, a meaningful distinction exists between negative freedom, understood as protection from coercion, and positive freedom, understood as the effective ability to act on one’s choices (Berlin 1969). In Italy, formal guarantees and rights remain largely intact, yet the practical capacity to turn effort, education, and investment into progress has weakened. When income prospects are uncertain and educational opportunities are uneven, formal freedoms coexist with constrained agency. This gap helps explain why improvements in institutional indicators have not translated into stronger productivity growth or renewed economic dynamism.

These constraints are felt most acutely by younger generations. Entering the labor market after two decades of weak growth, today’s young Italians face lower expected returns to education, fragmented career paths, and delayed economic independence. For many, higher educational attainment no longer guarantees stable employment or upward mobility, while access to quality learning environments and early career opportunities remain strongly shaped by family background and territory. As a result, uncertainty is experienced not as a temporary phase but as a persistent condition, influencing decisions about work, mobility, and family formation.

This erosion of confidence in institutions also shapes outcomes in areas where prosperity depends on collective action over long horizons, most notably environmental policy. Italy has made measurable progress in reducing emissions and expanding renewable energy, yet its performance has lagged behind that of several peer countries. Resistance to environmental transformation often reflects concerns about local costs, distributional effects, and the credibility of promised compensation rather than outright opposition to climate goals. In an environment where trust in institutions is fragile, commitments to future benefits carry limited weight. Policies that require short-term adjustment in exchange for long-term gains become harder to sustain, even when they are economically sound and socially desirable. Environmental outcomes therefore reflect not only policy design, but the broader institutional capacity to generate belief in credible, shared returns over time.

Taken together, these patterns point to a central tension in Italy’s recent trajectory. Formal institutions have remained broadly stable, and material living standards remain high, yet the capacity of those institutions to sustain investment, mobility, and credible long-term expectations has weakened. Economic outcomes reflect not a single failure, but the cumulative effects of legal uncertainty, constrained firm growth, segmented education, and eroded confidence in future returns. Prosperity has become more uneven, more fragile, and more dependent on background and position than headline indicators suggest. Whether the equilibrium that has characterized Italy over the past two decades is sustainable in the medium term is the core question addressed in the next section.

The path forward

Italy’s medium-term prospects are shaped by a small number of risks that revolve around institutional credibility, economic sustainability, and demographic pressure, and that together will determine whether the current equilibrium can endure.

The most immediate concern is politico-legal. A proposed constitutional reform of the judicial system, scheduled for a general referendum vote on March 22nd, could result in a significant shift in the balance of powers. Public debate has focused on a narrow and largely symbolic issue—the possibility for prosecutors to become judges—which in practice affects a very small share of magistrates. The more consequential element of the reform is the creation of a new body, appointed in part by the political majority, with the authority to oversee and evaluate the actions of the judiciary. This introduces a clear risk to judicial independence. Even in the absence of direct interference, the mere possibility of executive oversight may discourage the pursuit of sensitive cases involving politically connected actors or the government itself. The institutional risk is amplified by the political process through which the reform is advancing. Because it failed to obtain a two-thirds majority in parliament, the reform will be decided by referendum. In a context of low political participation and widespread disengagement, there is a non-negligible possibility that a far-reaching constitutional change could be approved by a relatively small share of the electorate. Such an outcome would further weaken the perceived legitimacy (or lack thereof) of institutional checks and balances.

A second risk concerns civil and political rights. Italy has long exhibited a gap between strong formal guarantees and uneven lived experience. Recent developments suggest that this gap may narrow—in an unfavorable direction. Since 2022, a stronger emphasis on security and anti-immigration rhetoric has yielded policy initiatives and administrative practices that have already begun to affect indicators of political and civil rights. While the changes observed so far remain limited, the concern is one of persistence rather than rupture. If these trends continue, Italy risks moving from a situation in which dissatisfaction coexists with formally strong protections to one in which the erosion of rights is tangible. This would represent a qualitative shift relative to the past three decades.

The third challenge is economic and structural. Italy’s traditional development model, centered on small, family-owned firms operating in established sectors, has become increasingly inadequate in an economy driven by innovation, scale, and intangible capital. A transition toward more dynamic and technologically intensive activities is necessary. Yet the incentive structure produced by the current institutional environment remains unfavorable. Legal uncertainty, administrative complexity, and limited predictability discourage the long-term investments required to develop new sectors and expand firm size. Without changes to these underlying conditions, the prospects for a meaningful shift in the growth model remain weak, despite the urgency of the challenge.

Demographic and fiscal pressures reinforce these concerns. Stagnant incomes, persistently low fertility, and high levels of public and private debt interact in ways that constrain policy choices. Italy’s population is aging rapidly, and the working-age population is shrinking—placing an increasing strain on the pension system and welfare programs. At the same time, high public debt limits fiscal space, reducing the government’s ability to respond to shocks or to support growth through expansionary policies. In the absence of stronger growth, the sustainability of existing social arrangements will become increasingly difficult to maintain.

Finally, there is the risk associated with the conclusion of the Next Generation EU program. In recent years, these funds have supported public investment and contributed to stabilizing economic activity. There is a concern, however, that they may also have masked underlying weaknesses. Whether these resources have been systematically directed toward projects capable of raising long-term productivity remains unclear. Moreover, they will have to be repaid. When combined with already high debt levels, this raises the possibility that the apparent stabilization of recent years could give way to renewed strain once extraordinary support fades. Temporary fiscal expansions can relax political and financial constraints in the short run while delaying necessary adjustments and amplifying vulnerabilities when support is withdrawn. If growth does not materialize, the adjustment required could be abrupt.

Taken together, these risks point to a fragile equilibrium. Italy has so far avoided abrupt institutional breakdowns and severe economic crises, relying instead on gradual adjustment and external anchors. Whether this equilibrium can be sustained in the medium term will depend on the ability of institutions to preserve independence, restore credibility, and support a development path capable of generating durable growth under tighter economic and demographic constraints.

Massimo Morelli is professor of political science and economics at Bocconi University and senior research scientist at the Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER). A political economist, he earned his PhD in economics from Harvard University in 1996. He spent twenty-two years teaching and conducting research at leading American institutions, including the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton and Columbia University, where he held a full professorship in economics and political science. Since returning to Italy in 2014, he has continued his work at the intersection of economics and political science, publishing in leading journals across both fields.

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Over the past two weeks, I have spoken with a number of Gulf officials to better understand how leaders in the region view this ongoing war. The conversations have been strikingly consistent. For many of them, this conflict was not a matter of if, but when. One senior Gulf official told me that his country has long known its greatest danger lies in Iran and not in Israel—a reality made obvious in recent days.

The war’s inevitability was not due to any one factor, the officials told me. Rather, it was a cumulative consequence of a revolutionary regime that for nearly half a century built its power through murderous proxies, deadly missiles, nuclear aspirations, and relentless intimidation. Another senior Gulf official told me that his country had long argued to US negotiators from Democratic administrations that they were wrong to think that containing Iran’s nuclear capabilities was sufficient, as that failed to address the missiles and proxies that posed threats to its neighbors.

In the telling of Gulf officials, the region has been living in a form of shadow war for years. Proxy conflicts, cyberattacks, and military strikes on energy infrastructure were part of a sustained campaign designed by Iran to test and erode the Gulf’s security architecture. Look at Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and increasingly Riyadh. They reflect a degree of religious tolerance, political moderation, and economic modernization that contrasts sharply with Iran’s theocracy.

A regime down but not out

Some officials in these countries argued privately against Trump’s decision to go to war alongside Israel. Others argued in favor. But none of those I spoke with now want the United States to cut and run before the job is done. Even those Gulf officials wary of escalation (and that includes most of those I spoke to) see this war as the culmination of a long trajectory that required a response at some point—before the balance of power tilted irretrievably in Iran’s direction.

That doesn’t mean Gulf officials favor regime change in Iran, as no one can accurately calibrate how to pull that off. That needs to be a job for the Iranian people. However, it does mean, in their view, that the United States, Israel, and other willing partners should continue eroding the Iranian regime’s destructive capabilities—particularly as it now will be left in a vengeful state. 

Their bottom line: If Iran comes out of this neutered and defanged, it’s better for everyone, even if the regime can’t be fundamentally changed from one that’s run through some combination of theocratic and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders. Put more diplomatically, a senior Gulf official told me: “If Iran is incapable of inflicting harm and exporting instability to its neighbors, that will be a good thing.” 

As for Iran’s leaders, they likely are betting that US domestic politics will save the regime from total collapse. For decades, the Iranian regime has believed that its 1979 revolution, including the taking of American hostages, embarrassed US President Jimmy Carter, weakening his political support and costing him the next election. Iranian leaders probably think that they can impose similar political pain on Trump through a drawn-out conflict and elevated gas prices. If that costs Trump’s party control of Congress in the country’s upcoming midterm elections, it would be Tehran’s “own form of regime change,” as the Atlantic Council’s Alex Plitsas put it to me.

The pivotal weeks ahead

My conversations with Gulf and US officials in recent days have reinforced many of my own views regarding the significance of this moment. There are plenty of pessimistic assessments of the war right now, but they obscure a historic opportunity. The conflict with Iran may prove a true inflection point. It could neutralize the Middle East’s greatest destabilizer over the past four decades, creating new openings for regional security and prosperity. And it could splinter the emerging Axis of Aggressors comprised of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. The White House estimates that Iran, through its direct actions and proxy networks, has been responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Americans—including US service members, diplomats, and civilians—since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 

So how can the United States get from here to there? Through military resolve, strategic patience, and diplomatic cunning. Above all, the United States should not end its military campaign early. That could inadvertently strengthen the position of a weakened Iranian regime. And the regime is weak; its attacks on its neighbors are more the desperate flailing of a failed regime than the resurgence of the revolution. Even now, it will be years before Iran can rebuild its navy and missile capabilities, or again aspire to a nuclear-weapons arsenal. But the next two to three weeks will be critical, as the United States continues to target Iranian capabilities.

“The good news is that the US military is on course over the next few weeks to achieve the stated objectives to destroy or severely degrade Iran’s missiles, drones, the associated industrial base, navy, and nuclear program,” Plitsas, a former Pentagon official, told me. What’s most likely to result in “failure to complete the military operation in Iran is ending it early due to economic pressure from the risk-based closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which is Iran’s objective.”

That is why the United States and its partners must get control of the strait, enable freedom of movement, and prevent economic damage that could give Iran greater leverage.

US officials have told their Gulf partners that they have made progress in bringing together a coalition of countries to escort ships through the strait, despite several countries publicly refusing to contribute to that effort. More US military assets are arriving in the region to provide protection for shipping while continuing to strike at Iran’s ability to disrupt that traffic.

Even as US forces pursue these objectives, Americans should not lose sight of the larger opportunity. This past week, one Trump administration official spoke to me about a longer-term vision harbored by some in the White House of a Middle East where not only moderate Arab and Israeli leaders normalize their relations—as they have done through the Abraham Accords—but a new Iranian government and Arab leaders eventually do so as well, ultimately leading to Israeli-Iranian normalization.   

At this time of war without an obvious end, that vision sounds fantastical. But it is seemingly impossible developments like this one that could become reality, serving both US interests and those of its regional partners, if the Trump administration sees through the mission in Iran that it has set out for itself.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

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The post Now that the Iran war is here, the US must complete its mission appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The Iran conflict has effectively halted tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting oil and LNG flows and triggering global energy market turmoil.
• Europe is vulnerable because it must refill depleted gas storage after high winter demand and increased exports to Ukraine.
• As LNG markets tighten, Europe will have to compete with China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan for purchases—risking either severe price shocks or potential energy shortages.

WASHINGTON—With the conflict in the Gulf well into its third week, a difficult reality is setting in across Europe: Even if a cease-fire were agreed today, the continent is likely already heading toward an energy crisis.

The ongoing US-Israeli strikes on Iran, along with Tehran’s retaliation across the Gulf, have produced one of the most severe disruptions to global energy markets in decades. At the center of the crisis is the Strait of Hormuz, the most critical chokepoint in the global energy trade. Before the current conflict, roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil supply transited the strait each day. The looming threat of Iranian sea mines and missile attacks has brought commercial tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to a near standstill, as some operators opt to anchor outside the waterway rather than risk passage.

While the effective closure of the strait has sent shockwaves through global oil markets, Europe’s immediate vulnerability lies elsewhere: liquefied natural gas (LNG). Approximately 20 percent of global LNG trade passed through the strait before the current conflict, much of it originating in Qatar, the world’s second-largest LNG exporter. There is no viable alternative export route for this LNG.

For Europe, the timing could scarcely be worse.

Preparation for winter starts now

Europe is entering the critical period when underground gas storage must be replenished ahead of winter. Yet European countries are beginning this process in one of the weakest positions in years. Refilling these reserves now depends heavily on LNG imports, following Europe’s rapid shift away from Russian pipeline gas following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. According to the Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory database, European storage levels are currently below 30 percent, a five-year low. A colder-than-average winter, combined with increased gas burn in the power sector, pushed European gas demand up nearly 7 percent since the start of the year. At the same time, pipeline year-over-year exports from the European Union (EU) to Ukraine surged more than tenfold, further accelerating withdrawals. 

Under EU regulations, storage levels must reach at least 90 percent capacity by December. Given current conditions, Europe will need to inject nearly 60 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas during the upcoming refill season just to meet this target. For context, that translates to about 586 terawatt-hours (TWh) of energy—enough to power around 57 million US homes annually, based on average household consumption data from the US Energy Information Administration. Crucially, not all gas imports can be directed into storage; much of it must first satisfy ongoing daily consumption. Even before the escalation in the Gulf, Europe’s depleted storage position was forcing it to plan record LNG imports in 2026.

Further squeezing the LNG market is the March 2 Iranian drone strike on QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan facilities, which forced an immediate shutdown of production. Two days later, the company declared force majeure, meaning that QatarEnergies is temporarily suspended from its contractual commitments of LNG shipments to customers. This declaration has added significant uncertainty to the timeline for restoring Qatari output. Even if the conflict were to end today and the strait were to reopen, full restoration of production could take weeks or even months. Markets know this: QatarEnergy’s announcement triggered an abrupt spike in European gas benchmarks, with prices jumping by more than 50 percent on March 2. It was the largest single‑day increase since the 2022 energy crisis following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing disruption of Russian pipeline flows. These market pressures affect far more than just Europe; they risk reigniting competition between European and Asian importers for scarce LNG cargoes.

Between Asia and Europe

In the past, Asian importers dominated global LNG markets through long-term contracts with exporters, while Europe relied heavily on pipeline gas from Russia. When those flows collapsed after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, European buyers drove LNG prices sharply higher, drawing cargoes originally contracted for Asian markets toward European terminals. This dynamic characterized the 2022 energy crisis, when Europe repeatedly outbid Asian buyers for flexible supply. The current crisis, however, may reverse that pattern. As the loss of Qatari supply tightens global LNG markets, Asian buyers may be willing to outbid Europe for available cargoes—particularly the four major East Asian economies of China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Together, these four accounted for approximately three-quarters of all LNG imported across Asia in 2025, according to data sourced from Kpler. China alone relied on Qatar for 29 percent of its LNG imports in 2025, making it the world’s top LNG importer that year.

Early signs of this dynamic may already be emerging, with reports in recent days that a US LNG tanker originally bound for Belgium changed course toward China—a potential signal that this competition for cargoes is one Europe will likely lose on cost. US LNG exports have become one of Europe’s most important diversification tools since 2022, but even if US producers increase output, it is unlikely to fully offset the loss of Qatari supply in the near term. US liquefaction facilities are already operating near capacity, and the JKM–TTF spread, the price differential between Asian and European LNG markets, has fluctuated sharply in recent months. The spread could significantly widen as Asian buyers compete for alternative supply.

The scale and cost of this supply gap are further amplified by Europe’s decision to phase out Russian pipeline gas and LNG imports by the end of 2027. The EU is set to ban short-term Russian pipeline contracts beginning in June of this year, with all remaining long-term flows required to cease by the end of September 2027. While Russian LNG accounts for a relatively small share of Europe’s supply, it remains a meaningful component: In 2025, the EU imported roughly 17 bcm of Russian LNG, representing approximately 13 percent of total gas imports. European policymakers had anticipated replacing this volume primarily with US LNG, but given the ongoing Middle East conflict, Europe’s plans to fill this gap are increasingly fragile, placing immense strain on both supply security and cost. 

Back where it was in 2022

Brussels has yet to offer a meaningful solution for the energy shock. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has indicated that the EU is exploring measures such as the expanded use of power purchase agreements, temporary state aid mechanisms, and potential gas price caps. During the 2022 crisis, proposals for a gas price cap faced strong opposition from Germany and the Netherlands, which argued that artificially limiting prices could undermine Europe’s ability to attract scarce LNG cargoes and allow Asian buyers to outbid European importers. Today, too, similar measures are likely to face contention and stoke further divisions among the EU member states. 

The current crisis has reignited a debate that emerged in 2022 regarding Europe’s energy strategy and dependence on external suppliers. From 2022 to 2024, Europe undertook an ambitious push to diversify its energy mix and accelerate the deployment of nuclear and renewable capacity. However, these efforts were partially overshadowed by reliance on US LNG and related trade negotiations, in effect trading one dependency for another. Analysts have long cautioned against this pattern of dependence, yet after years of shutting down continental energy projects, most notably the near-complete collapse of German nuclear energy, Europe now finds itself back where it was in 2022: heavily reliant on US LNG, exposed to global price competition, and bringing a policy knife to a global production gun fight. To break this cycle, Europe would need to invest more in its own production capacity. But further deployment of clean energy infrastructure or nuclear development is a multi-year process, and thus it is not a solution to the current crisis.

The Russia question

The energy shock has also reopened the question of Russian sanctions. Notably, the United States appears to be signaling a change in tone. Last week, the White House temporarily loosened restrictions to allow India to import Russian crude oil stranded at sea—a shift from what was agreed to during US-India trade negotiations in February. On March 12, the administration went further, issuing a broader temporary exemption in permitting the sale of Russian seaborne oil currently in transit. The administration’s rationale was that this will help ease pressure on global energy prices. Though framed as a short-term measure, the move underscores how quickly sanctions policy can shift under acute energy market pressure. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent further justified the measure by arguing that Russia taxes production rather than sales, so licensing completed shipments therefore does not provide significant financial benefit to the Kremlin. This argument is difficult to sustain: Since February 2022, Moscow has repeatedly restructured its oil and gas tax regime to maximize state revenues, and there is little reason to believe it would not do so again. 

The Group of Seven (G7) price cap could tell a similar story. The mechanism works by using Western control over global shipping insurance and finance as leverage: tanker operators and insurers who want access to Western financial services must certify that the oil was sold below a set price ceiling, forcing buyers to demand a discount from Moscow. When the cap was set at sixty dollars in 2022, it was just below the market price for Russian oil. But Russian crude has since fallen well below that level, meaning the cap no longer constrains prices. In response, the EU and the United Kingdom lowered their ceiling to around forty-seven dollars to restore its bite, but the United States declined to follow, creating a gap that operators can exploit, and particularly undermining the EU’s move. The Trump administration has never been enthusiastic about the mechanism, and a decision to stop enforcing it entirely cannot be ruled out. If that happens, then one of the few remaining tools limiting Russian energy revenues effectively collapses. 

So far, European leaders have mostly remained firm in their commitments to diversify away from Russian energy. On March 11, von der Leyen warned that returning to Russian energy would be a “strategic blunder” that increases Europe’s vulnerability. At a recent meeting, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni joined other Group of Seven (G7) leaders in rejecting calls to ease sanctions despite the turmoil in global oil markets. Merz has also publicly criticized the US decision to temporarily lift sanctions, calling it “wrong.” However, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever broke openly with the EU’s agreed position this past weekend, arguing that Europe “must normalize relations with Russia and regain access to cheap energy.” He added that European leaders privately agree with him but are unwilling to say so publicly. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán remains another strong European voice publicly urging a reconsideration, though his position carries little weight among his peers because of his long-standing alignment with Moscow. 

Could the EU extend the window of continuing Russian supply past the current deadlines? Perhaps, but doing so would require reopening a complex political and legislative process between the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council. Even under accelerated or emergency procedures, such a move would be politically fraught. In practice, this would mean revisiting the sanctions architecture that has been painstakingly constructed since 2022. Beyond the legal and institutional challenges, such a move would undermine the EU’s geopolitical strategy and effectively finance Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine. For Brussels, this option remains politically untenable. But pressure from individual member states may continue to intensify if prices rise sharply. 

The European dilemma

What this conflict has made clear is that while higher oil prices will raise energy costs globally, Europe’s more immediate challenge is securing sufficient LNG cargoes to refill its depleted gas storage. Toward this end, the calendar is working against European importers. With the refill season running from April to November, losing even two months to a Qatari production halt means forfeiting roughly 25 percent of the injection window before a single additional cargo arrives. European countries could attempt to suppress demand for gas through conservation measures and reduced industrial energy consumption, though the scale required would be politically and economically difficult to sustain. 

More realistically, European buyers will be forced to wait until Asian demand is satisfied, and then pay whatever price remains. Unlike emerging market economies, which may be priced out entirely, Europe has the financial depth to outbid most competitors. But that calculation carries its own cost: securing supply at any price means passing that cost onto households and industry, with all the economic and political consequences that follow.

Ultimately, the crisis reduces to a binary—scarce cargoes mean physical shortages; available but expensive supply means an extraordinary price shock. An obvious release valve—importing Russian pipeline gas once again—remains politically toxic. Reopening that faucet would undercut two years of painful European energy diversification, hand Moscow a significant revenue stream at a moment when the war in Ukraine remains unresolved, and reintroduce precisely the strategic dependency that left Europe exposed in the first place. Either way, this episode has exposed structural weaknesses in Europe’s energy supply chain. Finding a way out of this dilemma will dominate the continent’s political and economic agenda for months to come.

The post How the Iran war could trigger a European energy crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Russian economy has been showing signs of severe strain in recent months as the combined toll of international sanctions, Ukrainian airstrikes, and ballooning defense spending negatively impact the Kremlin coffers. The Iran war now threatens to transform this picture in Moscow’s favor.

With energy prices already spiking and the Strait of Hormuz blocked, the world is entering a fuel crisis that could reinvigorate Putin’s war economy. The United States has already relaxed sanctions on the Kremlin in a bid to ease energy pressures elsewhere. If the current conflict becomes a prolonged campaign, Moscow may be able to repair much of the economic damage done over the past four years.

The Iran war could also provide a more direct boost for Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. With the Trump administration now firmly focused on the Middle East, the Kremlin will face significantly less diplomatic pressure to engage in US-led peace talks with Ukraine, while Kyiv will struggle to keep Russia’s invasion high on the international agenda.

Crucially, the US is expected to prioritize the supply of air defense interceptor missiles to the Middle East over Ukraine. With limited numbers of missiles produced annually, this means Ukrainian air defense crews might soon find themselves short of the ammunition required to defend their cities and infrastructure against Russian ballistic missiles. The consequences for the civilian population could be disastrous.

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Despite these potential advantages, there is little sign of celebration in the Kremlin. While Russia appears well-positioned to benefit economically and militarily, the US-led war with Iran has also served to highlight Russia’s declining international influence and has underlined Moscow’s limitations as an ally.

Since the onset of hostilities at the end of February, the Kremlin has restricted itself to a limited number of statements and has largely refrained from any strong condemnation of the United States. While reports indicate that Moscow is providing Iran with military assistance including targeting data and drone warfare expertise, the Russian response has been strikingly muted and has fallen far short of America’s very public support for Ukraine following Putin’s 2022 invasion.

Putin’s cautious reaction is particularly noteworthy in light of the support Iran has provided to Russia over the past four years. Since 2022, Tehran has supplied Moscow with large quantities of drones, missiles, and ammunition. This backing proved especially important during the early stages of the war, before Russia was able to expand domestic production and diversify its lines of supply.

Despite much speculation over an emerging “Axis of Autocrats” including both Russia and Iran, Putin has so far proved unwilling or unable to repay Tehran for its earlier backing. While Russian and Iranian officials hailed the signing of a “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement” in January 2025, this has not translated into significant Russian aid since the current conflict erupted.

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Russia’s failure to robustly support its Iranian allies is the latest in a series of similar geopolitical setbacks since the beginning of the full-scale Ukraine invasion more than four years ago. In late 2022, Kremlin credibility was dented by Moscow’s inability to prevent a renewal of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, leading to the collapse of Russia’s traditional security role in the South Caucasus. US President Donald Trump has since stepped into the void to lead peace efforts in the region.

The fall of Kremlin-backed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was to prove an even more humiliating blow for Putin. For almost a decade, Moscow had invested significant military and diplomatic resources to keep Assad in power. This engagement was touted by Moscow as proof of Russia’s return to great power status. However, when the Assad regime began to rapidly unravel in late 2024, Russia was unable to intervene. Instead, the Kremlin limited itself to offering the ousted Syrian leader asylum.

Likewise, Russia proved powerless to assist Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro when he was captured by the United States in early 2026. Moscow was seen as a key strategic partner of Maduro and had provided Caracas with a wide range of financial and security backing. Days before the American operation, Russia was still voicing its “full support” for Venezuela. However, the Kremlin ultimately took no action when US forces swooped.

From Armenia and Syria to Venezuela and Iran, Moscow’s obvious inability to aid its allies in times of crisis has seriously damaged Russia’s reputation as a global power. While the Kremlin is still capable of supplying weapons and spreading propaganda, these limited tools are no substitute for the kind of substantial security support that potential partners seek.

For Putin, this matters. Throughout his reign, he has carefully cultivated a strongman image and sought to reassert Russia’s claims to superpower status. However, the world’s leading powers do not maintain their influence through rhetoric alone.

Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s repeated failure to defend its international allies has revealed the underwhelming reality behind Putin’s posturing. This loss of prestige has very practical implications for Moscow’s ability to attract partners and project strength on the world stage. Putin hoped that by conquering Ukraine, he could return Russia to the dominant role it occupied during the Cold War. Instead, he has become bogged down in an invasion that has ruthlessly exposed modern Russia’s geopolitical limitations.

William Dixon is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute specializing in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 10, 2026

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post The Iran war is good for the Russian economy but bad for Putin’s prestige appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Amid a war in Iran, a slowdown in shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and tariff uncertainty, host Christoph Hodel brings you a conversation with John Jovanovic, chairman and president of the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM). In conversation with the Atlantic Council’s vice president for energy and infrastructure, Landon Derentz, Jovanovic stresses the importance of supply chains that are “free, fair, and functioning,” the need for US companies to be competitive, and the role EXIM plays in strengthening those supply chains. He also offers a behind-the-scenes look at Project Vault, a new initiative to create a strategic critical mineral reserve.

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The AC Front Page Podcast, hosted by Juliette Matos, brings you exclusive conversations with heads of state and government, senior US officials, CEOs, and global decision maker—recorded live at the Atlantic Council’s headquarters in Washington, DC, and on stages around the world. From geopolitics and national security to technology and the global economy, this podcast will keep you updated and informed on the policy debates driving today’s headlines.

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The post Inside Trump’s economic strategy, with EXIM Bank’s John Jovanovic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is the eighth chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas, which analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Evolution of freedom

The trajectory of freedom in Benin since the mid-1990s is inseparable from the political rupture of February 1990, when the National Conference laid the foundations of a constitutional democracy that would soon be regarded as a reference point in West Africa and beyond. The period covered by the Freedom Index begins a few years later, when it already captures the effects of that foundational moment: competitive elections, peaceful alternation of power, and the gradual construction of institutions meant to restrain executive authority and embed the rule of law. For roughly two decades, Benin stood out in a region marked by recurrent political instability, authoritarian reversals, and military interventions. While the country faced persistent economic and social challenges, its institutional framework was widely seen as relatively robust.

This overall picture is reflected in the early evolution of the Freedom Index. From the mid-1990s through the first half of the 2010s, Benin maintained a comparatively high level of aggregate freedom, well above the sub-Saharan African average. Political freedom was the main driver of this performance. Elections were generally considered free and competitive, civil and political rights were largely respected, and legislative constraints on the executive, though imperfect, functioned in practice. The legal subindex, while weaker, also benefited from a degree of institutional continuity and predictability uncommon in the region. Economic freedom evolved more unevenly, reflecting structural constraints and the limits of reform, but it did not fundamentally undermine the broader institutional equilibrium.

This trajectory changed markedly after 2016, with the election of Patrice Talon to the presidency—followed by his reelection in 2021. The decline in Benin’s aggregate Freedom Index over the past decade is driven overwhelmingly by a sharp deterioration in the political subindex, and to a lesser extent by changes in the legal framework that weakened checks and balances. The data captures not a sudden collapse, but a deliberate and cumulative transformation of the political system—a shift rooted in a particular diagnosis of Benin’s post-1990 democratic experience as one in need of major restructuring.

Talon came to power on the basis of a critique that resonated with part of the population. In his view, the democratic system that emerged from the National Conference had succeeded in guaranteeing political freedoms but had failed to deliver economic development and effective public policy. He frequently pointed to what he described as a “corrupt democracy,” in which elections were held regularly but governance was undermined by clientelism, fragmented political parties, and pervasive rent-seeking. He often used the example of the National Assembly, where even members of the parliamentary majority were allegedly susceptible to financial inducements in exchange for supporting government legislation. According to this narrative, democracy had become an obstacle to decisive action rather than a framework for collective progress.

This diagnosis was not entirely unfounded. Benin’s political system prior to 2016 was indeed characterized by weakly institutionalized parties, fluid parliamentary alliances, and a high degree of personalization of power. Corruption was widely perceived as endemic, and successive governments struggled to implement ambitious reforms. Talon’s response to these shortcomings, however, involved a profound rebalancing of power in favor of the executive, with lasting consequences for political freedom.

The most visible changes occurred in the realm of elections and political competition. Reforms of the electoral code progressively narrowed the political field by introducing new requirements for party registration and participation. Their effects became fully apparent in the 2019 legislative elections, when opposition parties were excluded from the ballot, resulting in a parliament composed exclusively of parties supporting the president—an unprecedented outcome in post-1990 Benin. These elections triggered widespread protests, followed by a severe crackdown by security forces, leaving four people dead according to Amnesty International. Subsequent electoral reforms reinforced this dynamic by increasing national thresholds for representation that effectively prevented opposition forces from securing parliamentary seats. Although elections continued to be held on schedule, these changes significantly reduced the level of political competition and weakened the role of elections as mechanisms of accountability.

Civil liberties and political rights have evolved along clearly divergent paths. The civil liberties component remains relatively stable, reflecting the absence of generalized repression or a collapse of basic freedoms such as freedom of movement or physical integrity. By contrast, political rights have declined sharply, driven by the progressive restriction of the space for political organization, competition, and expression. This contraction has also affected freedom of the press and media, not through overt censorship or systematic bans, but through legal and judicial mechanisms. New laws regulating online activity and digital expression have introduced strict provisions on defamation and related offenses, which have been actively enforced, including against journalists and civil society activists, often by special courts initially designed to deal with economic crimes and terrorism. The result has been a more constrained and cautious media environment, marked by self-censorship rather than blanket repression, consistent with a pattern in which political freedoms are curtailed primarily through changes in the law and their application rather than through widespread violations of civil liberties.

The legal subindex reflects a more complex and increasingly fragile trajectory. Historically, Benin’s legal framework benefited from the constitutional architecture established in the early 1990s, in which the Constitutional Court played a central role as a guarantor of the rule of law and a key counterweight to executive power. For many years, the court acted as one of the strongest institutional legacies of the National Conference, arbitrating political disputes and enforcing constitutional limits in a way that helped stabilize the democratic system.

Over the past decade, however, this equilibrium has been progressively undermined. Legal uncertainty has increased as successive reforms reshaped the institutional landscape without broad consultation or consensus. The Constitutional Court has gradually lost its capacity to act as an independent check on executive authority, evolving instead into an institution perceived by many citizens as aligned with the governing majority. This shift has weakened confidence in the judiciary more broadly and contributed to a sense that fundamental legal guarantees are increasingly contingent on political considerations rather than constitutional principles.

At the same time, the security component of legal freedom has deteriorated significantly. Benin now faces threats that were largely absent from its territory until recently, particularly in the northern regions bordering Burkina Faso and Niger, where armed groups linked to the Sahelian insurgencies have carried out deadly attacks. These incursions have placed sustained pressure on the state’s security apparatus and introduced new legal and institutional tensions, as the government has sought to respond to an evolving threat environment while operating within a framework already strained by political and judicial centralization. Rising insecurity has combined with declining legal certainty to produce a marked weakening of the rule of law as captured by the legal subindex.

Overall, the evolution of freedom in Benin since 1995 can be divided into two distinct phases. The first, spanning roughly two decades, corresponds to the consolidation of a pluralistic constitutional democracy that, despite its flaws, preserved a relatively high level of political freedom. The second, beginning in 2016, is characterized by a deliberate reconfiguration of the political system that reduced democratic constraints in the name of efficiency and development. The Freedom Index captures this inflection point clearly, highlighting the central role of political institutions in shaping the country’s institutional trajectory.

From freedom to prosperity

The evolution of prosperity in Benin over the past three decades reflects both the achievements and the limits of its development model. Unlike the sharp movements observed in the Freedom Index, changes in the Prosperity Index have been more gradual, shaped by long-term structural factors rather than abrupt political shifts. While Benin has made measurable progress in several dimensions of human development, it continues to rank among the least prosperous countries globally, underscoring the persistence of deep socioeconomic constraints.

Income levels remain low, despite steady growth over extended periods. Real GDP per capita increased gradually from the mid-1990s onward, supported by macroeconomic stability, regional trade, and modest diversification. However, growth rates were insufficient to generate a decisive break with poverty. The country’s economic structure, heavily reliant on agriculture, informal services, and transit trade linked to neighboring economies, limited productivity gains, while income improvements translated only slowly into broader prosperity. This pattern of modest but unspectacular economic progress fed a growing frustration with the democratic system established after 1990 and became a central element in the critique advanced by Talon and his supporters.

Education and health outcomes improved over time, but at a noticeably slower pace than in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Mean and expected years of schooling increased gradually, and life expectancy at birth rose, reflecting expanded access to basic education and healthcare services. However, these gains consistently lagged behind regional averages, pointing to persistent weaknesses in the effectiveness of public provision rather than to a lack of formal progress. Schools and health facilities expanded, but quality, coverage, and outcomes improved unevenly, limiting their impact on human capital formation and overall well-being. The result was a pattern of incremental but comparatively underwhelming advances in education and health, which informed a broader sense that social progress was not keeping pace with expectations or with trajectories observed elsewhere in the region.

Inequality presents a more nuanced picture. Income inequality in Benin has historically been moderate by regional standards, partly reflecting the overall low level of income and the predominance of informal livelihoods. The inequality component of the Prosperity Index does not show dramatic deterioration, but this relative stability should not be interpreted as social equity. Widespread poverty and limited opportunities mean that low inequality often coexists with generalized deprivation rather than shared prosperity.

The minorities component, which assesses equal access to public services and opportunities, remained relatively stable. Benin has not experienced the kind of entrenched ethnic or sectarian exclusion seen in some neighboring countries. However, regional disparities, particularly between the coastal south and the northern regions, have widened in recent years. These disparities are increasingly relevant in the context of rising insecurity in the north, placing additional strain on already fragile social and economic structures.

The relationship between freedom and prosperity in Benin cannot be reduced to a simple causal chain in either direction. The democratic system established after 1990 undeniably expanded political freedoms and opened civic space, but it also generated high expectations regarding the state’s capacity to deliver economic transformation and effective public services. Over time, the gap between these expectations and the modest pace of socioeconomic progress became increasingly visible. It was this discrepancy, more than poverty itself, that began to shape perceptions of failure and fed skepticism toward democratic governance as it had been practiced.

The central issue is not democracy as such, but the weakness of the state that accompanied democratization. Political liberalization advanced without a parallel effort to build strong public institutions, professional administrations, and accountable political parties. Democratic competition therefore often revolved around access to state resources rather than policy performance, while the provision of education, health, and infrastructure remained inefficient and uneven. In this context, economic and social outcomes improved only gradually, reinforcing the perception that political pluralism had not translated into effective public policies or shared prosperity.

This diagnosis helps explain why the promise of a more centralized and decisive model of governance gained traction. The argument advanced under Talon was that political freedom had come to impede state capacity, coherence, and results, and that tighter control was therefore necessary to move the country forward. Yet the prosperity data does not bear out this argument. At least not yet. It shows no clear acceleration of income growth or human development since the curtailment of political freedoms, and certainly no break with the long-standing structural constraints facing the country.

Undeniable progress has been made in the area of infrastructure and in promoting new economic sectors such as tourism, textiles, and the industrial processing of agricultural products, including soybeans, pineapples, cashews, and shea nuts, through a new special industrial zone in the south of the country. However, the concentration of economic power in the hands of a very limited number of entrepreneurs close to the political establishment raises doubts about the sustainability of the public-private partnerships established under Talon and the lasting transformative effect of these initiatives.

The concentration of power and the weakening of democratic checks have introduced new risks—political, institutional, and social—without delivering the promised economic transformation. On November 15, 2025, Beninese citizens woke up to discover that the National Assembly had revised the constitution overnight, introducing major changes to the country’s political and institutional architecture. The terms for the president, members of Parliament, mayors, and municipal councilors were extended from five to seven years. The Senate, a new institution with very significant powers, was created, composed primarily of figures who had held high political office, including former presidents and former speakers of the Parliament but no elected representatives. The Senate will play both a legislative role alongside the National Assembly and a regulatory role to discipline political actors—including possible sanctions such as the deprivation of political rights in the event certain constitutional provisions are violated. Until then, the role of regulator of institutions had been played exclusively by the Constitutional Court in Benin.

The amended constitution also introduced a clause calling for a six-year “grace period” during which the opposition party cannot take initiatives likely to impede the actions of the government in power. Criticism of the ruling government would only be permitted one year before general elections. These constitutional reforms were justified as necessary for the country to avoid being in a permanent election campaign and to allow the government to govern. Details for how the measures, which are unprecedented in Benin and quite disturbing in a democratic country, will be enforced remain vague, which can only raise serious concerns about the implications for the rule of law and the preservation of civil liberties and civic space in Benin after Talon’s departure.

The extremely restrictive provisions of the electoral law for political parties to obtain even a single seat in Parliament produced the predictable result of the legislative elections in January 2026: a return to a National Assembly composed exclusively of MPs from the two parties that support Talon and back Minister of Economy and Finance Romuald Wadagni, Talon’s candidate for the presidential election scheduled in April 2026. The election will include only two candidates, and Wadagni is widely expected to win, extending the power of the ruling bloc.

The path forward

Benin narrowly escaped a sudden descent into institutional chaos on December 7, when soldiers led by a lieutenant colonel commanding the special forces attached to the National Guard launched an attack on Talon’s private residence and announced on public television that they had taken power. The coup attempt failed, but the sequence of events was unprecedented in the country’s recent history and deeply shocking for a society long accustomed to political stability and the strict subordination of the military to civilian authority. The attempted takeover triggered a decisive regional response, with the intervention of the Nigerian Air Force in support of Beninese loyalist units, the rapid mobilization of Nigerian troops on the ground, and the activation of the ECOWAS Standby Force. France, a long-standing security partner of Benin, also provided operational support and intelligence assistance. That such a scenario could unfold in what had widely been perceived as one of the most stable political systems in West Africa revealed vulnerabilities that had long been underestimated or deliberately ignored.

Beyond the immediate shock of the coup attempt, the episode points to a far more uncertain security horizon for Benin. The country is now entering a phase in which insecurity can no longer be viewed as a peripheral or temporary phenomenon confined to its northern borders. Armed groups operating in the central Sahel are likely to continue probing the resilience of state authority, exploiting geographic, social, and institutional vulnerabilities over time rather than through large-scale confrontations alone. The central challenge ahead will be one of endurance: whether the state can sustain effective security responses without exhausting its forces, undermining civil–military cohesion, or eroding public trust as the threat becomes more diffuse and persistent.

Benin’s rapidly evolving security environment coincides with a deteriorating political and regional context. Relations with several neighboring countries have become increasingly strained, against a backdrop of diverging political trajectories and growing mistrust within West Africa. The risk is not only that regional cooperation will weaken but that Benin will find itself more isolated at a moment when cross-border coordination is essential. Domestically, prolonged insecurity is likely to interact with political exclusion and institutional centralization, further testing social cohesion and the legitimacy of state authority. In such a scenario, security challenges cannot be dissociated from political choices, as each has the potential to amplify the other over time.

The assessment of Talon’s two terms in office is highly divisive in Benin and will likely continue to be so for a long time to come. The country’s political and security developments over the next few years will be a determining factor in assessing a decade of political, institutional, economic, administrative, and judicial reforms, which have been implemented with determination, consistency, efficiency, and coldness by an atypical president who came directly from the private sector. On the one hand, there are those who believe that the end justifies the means and it took a strong-willed, self-assured man like Talon to lay the foundations for economic, social and human development that will eventually come to fruition.

On the other hand, there are those who believe that nothing justifies undermining the principles of democracy; protection of rights and freedoms; and political, economic, and social inclusion, which form the basis of a nation’s cohesion, security, stability, and sustainable and shared prosperity. If we consider that development and prosperity include the continuous extension of people’s freedoms to choose their own paths in life, as argued by Indian economist and Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen, we then must question the appropriateness of both the end goal and the means employed over the last decade in Benin.

Looking ahead, the country faces a choice that is often framed in misleading terms. The years prior to Talon’s arrival fostered the perception that political freedom and effective development are inherently at odds, as if pluralism necessarily implies inefficiency and institutional paralysis. Yet this conclusion rests less on an “excess” of freedom than on the failure to consolidate capable public institutions, accountable political parties, and a professional state able to translate democratic competition into policy performance. Political openness and efficient development are not incompatible; they tend to reinforce one another when institutions function properly. The real danger for Benin is not that democracy might fail to deliver prosperity, but that the erosion of political freedoms, justified by Talon in the name of stability and efficiency, may ultimately weaken both development outcomes and the legitimacy of the state, leaving the country more fragile rather than more resilient.

Gilles Olakounlé Yabi is the founder and CEO of WATHI, a participative and multidisciplinary citizen-focused think tank on West African issues. He worked as senior political analyst and later as West Africa project director of the International Crisis Group and as a journalist for the weekly magazine Jeune Afrique in Paris. He holds a PhD in development economics from the University of Clermont-Ferrand in France.

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2026 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Against a global backdrop of uncertainty, fragmentation, and shifting priorities, we invited leading economists and scholars to dive deep into the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries around the world. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

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2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

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The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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The post Weakening democratic checks and regional insecurity put Benin’s future at risk appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 13, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in The Atlantic about Trump’s foreign policy.

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Matthew Kroenig

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The post Kroenig quoted in The Atlantic on Trump’s foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The report provides fresh insights into Russia’s comprehensive wartime program of child deportations. Moscow is accused of abducting tens of thousands of Ukrainian children since 2022 and forcibly transferring them to Russia as part of a “carefully organized plan” coordinated at the highest levels of the Russian Federation state apparatus. Many victims are reportedly subjected to ideological indoctrination designed to strip them of their Ukrainian identity and impose Russian nationality. This process often includes name changes and adoption into Russian families.

Despite extensive campaigning and humanitarian efforts by Ukraine and the international community, only a relatively small number of abducted children have so far been rescued. The plight of Ukraine’s deported kids has made global headlines and has attracted the attention of US First Lady Melania Trump, who has reportedly sought to help facilitate the return of victims by engaging directly with the Kremlin.

The new UN report noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s direct involvement in the mass deportations has been “visible from the outset.” This tallies with existing criminal charges against Putin brought by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. In spring 2023, ICC officials issued an arrest warrant for Putin for his personal role in Russia’s child abduction program. This warrant has since prevented the Kremlin dictator from attending a number of international summits due to fears that he may face arrest for war crimes.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

This is not the first time United Nations investigators have accused Russia of committing crimes against humanity during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A spring 2025 UN probe concluded that the large-scale detention of Ukrainians in occupied regions of the country represented a “systematic attack against the civilian population” that qualified as a crime against humanity. In areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, Moscow is accused of conducting a Stalin-style terror campaign of mass arrests targeting thousands of civilians including elected officials, journalists, civil society activists, religious leaders, cultural figures, and military veterans.

Similarly, a more recent UN investigation into targeted Russian drone strikes against the civilian population in three front line regions of southern Ukraine determined that these aerial attacks amount to a crime against humanity. The killings are clearly intentional, United Nations investigators concluded, with Russian troops reportedly using video-guided drones to hunt down individual victims. Terrified locals refer to Russia’s drone strikes on civilians as a “human safari.”

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The Kremlin’s ongoing program of child deportations and accompanying anti-Ukrainian indoctrination are viewed in Kyiv as elements of a broader Russian plan to erase Ukrainian national identity entirely. Throughout occupied regions of Ukraine, the Russian authorities are ruthlessly eradicating all traces of Ukrainian statehood, history, language, and cultural heritage. Meanwhile, local residents are being forced to accept Russian citizenship. Anyone who refuses to cooperate risks being denied access to basic public services or deported.

Moscow’s efforts to forcibly Russify thousands of abducted Ukrainian children have been widely cited as evidence of the genocidal intent underpinning Russia’s invasion. This is hardly surprising. The 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention specifically identifies “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as one of five internationally recognized acts of genocide.

Russia rejects United Nations claims that it is committing crimes against humanity in Ukraine and has consistently denied allegations of mass child abductions. Instead, Kremlin officials maintain that the large-scale transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia is a routine wartime safety measure. However, nobody in Moscow has been able to explain why it is necessary to indoctrinate children against their native Ukraine and force them to adopt a Russian national identity in order ensure their safety.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 12, 2026

Iran war highlights Ukraine’s rapid rise to drone superpower status

By David Kirichenko

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UkraineAlert Feb 12, 2026

Vladimir Putin is trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end

By Peter Dickinson

As the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale Ukraine invasion approaches, Vladimir Putin finds himself trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end for fear of entering Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

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UkraineAlert Feb 26, 2026

Putin’s plan: Make Ukraine unlivable by destroying essential infrastructure

By William Dixon, Maksym Beznosiuk

With the Russian army currently unable to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs on the battlefield, Putin’s plan for 2026 looks set to focus on escalating bombardment of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure in a bid to make the country unlivable, write William Dixon and Maksym Beznosiuk.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The post UN: Putin’s deportation of Ukrainian children is a crime against humanity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The Ukrainian and Romanian presidents’ recent meeting highlighted the development of the Kyiv-Bucharest partnership and Romania’s growing role in regional security.
• The leaders agreed to long-term cooperation across defense, energy, economic ties, education, and minority rights, including a major joint drone-production project in Romania.
• Expanded energy and infrastructure cooperation—from electricity interconnections to the Vertical Corridor gas route—help position Romania as a regional hub and a critical gateway for Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction.

BUCHAREST and WASHINGTON—“We must not hide that historically there was distrust between our countries,” Romanian President Nicușor Dan said to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on March 12 in Bucharest. However, Dan continued, “This distrust evaporated at the beginning of the war in 2022, and today is a moment when the two countries assume mutual trust in what they can do together, assume common responsibility for this part of Europe, for its citizens and for the entire region.”

Zelenskyy’s visit to Bucharest marks a politically and strategically significant moment for Romania’s regional role. It is the Ukrainian president’s second visit to Romania since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, but the first under Dan, who took office in May 2025. In this sense, the visit also signals that the initial adjustment period of the new Romanian presidency has effectively ended. Romania is now moving from a phase of positioning and signaling toward one of policy implementation, particularly in areas related to regional security and defense cooperation.

The timing of the visit is particularly relevant. Just one day earlier, Romania’s Parliament approved the deployment of additional US military capabilities on Romanian territory, including aerial refueling aircraft and satellite communication systems with a defensive role. Taken together, the two developments highlight how Romania is consolidating its position on NATO’s eastern flank: strengthening its security relationship with the United States, including support for US operations in the Middle East (Romania also offered its support in Gaza) while simultaneously deepening strategic cooperation with Ukraine.

The Strategic Partnership Declaration that Dan and Zelenskyy signed in Bucharest formalizes a relationship that has been intensifying since the start of the war. The framework covers defense cooperation, energy interconnection, economic collaboration, education, and minority rights. These areas suggest that both governments are seeking to anchor their partnership in long-term strategic interests rather than temporary wartime coordination. The progress made on sensitive issues such as minority rights also suggests that both capitals increasingly view their bilateral relationship through the lens of regional security.

The most strategically consequential outcome of the visit is the agreement on joint drone production in Romania, financed through the SAFE program with an estimated allocation of around €200 million. The logic of the project reflects a new model of cooperation: Ukraine contributes battlefield-tested technological know-how developed during the war, while Romania provides NATO territory, industrial capacity, and access to European defense funding. In practice, this represents a shift from traditional military assistance toward co-production of defense technologies, integrating Ukraine’s wartime innovation into the European defense industrial ecosystem.

Energy cooperation represents another structural dimension of the agreements announced on March 12. 

Since late 2022, when Russia began to systematically target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure as part of its military strategy, Romania has been one of Ukraine’s most important European energy partners. It has, for example, advocated within the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, known as ENTSO-E, for greater power exports to Ukraine. It has also scrounged Romania’s system for spare parts that could be used for grid and generation repair, and it has leveraged Romania’s long history with civilian nuclear power to support the heroic efforts of Ukraine’s nuclear operator, Energoatom, to maintain safe operations under the most severe stress imaginable.

In parallel, Ukrainian companies are increasing their footprint in Romania, illustrating how the country’s private sector is adopting an increasingly European focus. For instance, DTEK*, Ukraine’s largest private energy company, is growing its renewables portfolio through new build and acquisitions in Romania’s wind and solar sectors, aiming for a one-gigawatt portfolio by 2030. Projects in this effort include the 60-megawatt Ruginoasa wind farm, the 53-megawatt Glodeni I solar park, and the 126-megawatt Vacaresti solar farm commissioned this past December. Metinvest, DTEK’s sister company, has acquired ArcelorMittal’s Tubular Products plant in Iași, near the Romanian border with Moldova. This cluster of energy and metals investment will now be complemented by defense industry—and in any post-conflict scenario the role of Romanian ports and rail in supporting Ukrainian logistics will grow exponentially. 

Meanwhile, Romania’s longstanding support to Moldova—whose grid is umbilically tied to Ukraine—has played an indispensable role in helping both countries to weather four winters of Putin’s energy war and the end of Russian gas deliveries to Transnistria. Plans to accelerate electricity interconnections—such as the Suceava-Chernivtsi line—and to expand cooperation on gas routes and storage capacity point toward a deeper integration of Ukraine into the regional energy network. 

Romania is also playing a leading role in advancing the commercial understandings necessary for the Vertical Corridor, a planned gas route from Greece to Ukraine. This effort is opening opportunities for increased US liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the region, and it helps position southeastern Europe for the European Union’s 2027 phase-out of all Russian gas. Meanwhile, Romania’s status as the European Union’s largest gas producer—anchored in the offshore Neptun Deep project—points to the future role of Black Sea resources in helping to replace gas formerly sold by Russia. Strategically, this would strengthen Ukraine’s resilience while reinforcing Romania’s ambition to position itself as a regional energy hub linking Ukraine and Moldova with European Union member states.

But Zelenskyy’s visit also showed how the Vertical Corridor is about much more than energy molecules. The discussions in Bucharest point to a broader role for Romania beyond wartime support, with Bucharest increasingly preparing to assume a key role in the reconstruction of Ukraine, particularly in ports, infrastructure, logistics, and cross-border economic integration. With its geographic proximity, access to European Union funding mechanisms, and growing strategic partnership with Kyiv, Romania is likely to become one of the main operational gateways for reconstruction projects and postwar economic cooperation.

Bucharest is steadily moving from a supportive neighbor to a strategic enabler in shaping the security architecture of the Black Sea region and NATO’s eastern flank.

Note: DTEK’s parent company, System Capital Management, is an Atlantic Council donor.

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Bottom lines up front

• Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten leads a minority government that may test whether fragmented parliaments can still deliver effective governance during major geopolitical shifts.
• The government’s agenda prioritizes building a stronger European pillar within NATO and balancing closer European cooperation with continued ties to the United States.
• Its success will depend on managing fiscal pressures, parliamentary fragmentation, and broader debates about Europe’s strategic autonomy and political future.

UTRECHT—When you narrowly beat your primary election foe but can’t form a majority coalition to govern, what do you do? Can you still steer your country through some of the most significant geopolitical realignments since 1945 with a minority government? How Rob Jetten, the Netherlands’ youngest-ever prime minister, and his new government coalition answer these questions may serve as an acid test of minority governance in a highly fragmented political environment.

To form the new government, which was sworn in on February 23, three coalition parties negotiated for nearly four months. The result was a document, titled “Getting started,” which outlines the coalition’s agenda. Maintaining this coalition is one challenge; another is advancing the government’s agenda because the coalition lacks a majority in either chamber of parliament. The minority government’s success in implementing its agenda, including its plans for European security and defense, is likely to have implications well beyond the Low Countries. 

Putting the coalition together

The new coalition consists of Jetten’s progressive liberal Democrats 66 (D66) party, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), and the centrist-liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Out of 150 seats in parliament, this coalition holds only sixty-six seats, ten short of a majority. Its shortfall is even more pronounced in the Senate, where the coalition holds just twenty-two of the seventy-five seats. To enact any new laws or ratify any new international agreements, therefore, Jetten’s minority coalition will need to find compromises with opposition parties.

The Dutch parliament contains no less than seventeen parties, and the new government will need to be creative in finding ways to assemble assorted groups to pass legislation. The main opposition party is the progressive eco-socialist PvdA-Groenlinks (Labour-Green-Left) with twenty seats. Geert Wilders’ anti-immigrant Freedom Party (PVV) disintegrated after losing the elections and a subsequent internal row; its position has been halved from thirty-seven seats before the election to just nineteen now. On the right flank, Right Answer 21 (JA21) has nine seats, and Forum for Democracy and Group Markuzower (a PVV splinter group) each have seven seats.

European pattern and prospects

As the European Union’s (EU’s) fifth-largest economy and one of NATO’s most capable middle powers, the Netherlands often signals broader trends within Northern Europe. If successful in moving legislation forward in parliament, the new government’s foreign and European policy agenda could contribute to larger shifts in overall Euro-Atlantic diplomatic and security relations. At the top of the new government’s security agenda is the ambition of moving toward a European pillar within NATO. At the same time, the government will need to remain fiscally prudent and avoid proposing radical legislative changes to ensure support. 

The relative weakness of the new Dutch government coalition, its minority rule, and the fragmented parliament fit squarely within a wider pattern in European politics. While the constructively pro-European orientation of The Hague may in the short run help support other European centrists, in the longer run, Europe’s structural political problems persist. Together with European partners, the new Jetten government should therefore publicly address the more profound issues facing European liberal democracies, moving beyond the usual technocratic policy analysis. Doing so includes fostering a continental debate about Europe’s future as a civilization underpinning Western values. 

In terms of foreign and security policy, the Netherlands under Jetten and his Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen, a former Christian Democrat member of the European Parliament, seek to strengthen European defenses and strategic autonomy while remaining close to the United States. The coalition document spells out this balancing act, explaining that “the Netherlands must pursue a realistic foreign policy in which Dutch and European interests take precedence. NATO constitutes the cornerstone of our collective security. The United States is the global power with which we share the greatest number of interests. At the same time, our future and prosperity are inextricably linked to a strong Europe.”

What this means in practice is the Netherlands taking steps to strengthen the European pillar within NATO. This requires some notable changes, as demonstrated recently when the Dutch government announced that it would join French-led discussions on European nuclear deterrence. Such nuclear diplomacy is a key indicator of The Hague’s strategic realignment. Historically, the Netherlands was highly skeptical about any European nuclear deterrence initiatives, preferring to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. Also notable is the new coalition’s ambition to create a European equivalent to the Five Eyes intelligence partnership.

Defense acquisition is another major aspect. There will also be an effort to set up a “European Defence Mechanism” for the joint European acquisition of military equipment and common military standard setting. The Hague aims to acquire 40 percent of its defense purchases jointly with European partners. And 50 percent should be procured from Dutch and/or European industry.

Notwithstanding these Europeanization efforts in defense policy, the Netherlands remains committed to its ties with the United States, not in the least through the bilateral nuclear sharing agreements and its F-35 air fleet. Toward this end, the coalition government has proposed a law to enshrine a commitment to spending 3.5 percent of gross domestic product on defense, ensuring a long-term, sustained defense effort. The Netherlands also continues to be a major financial contributor to Ukraine’s war efforts, spending 1 percent of Dutch gross domestic product in support of Ukraine. 

Geopolitical and financial challenges

In financial and economic policy, it is notable that Finance Minister Eelco Heinen of the VVD party remains in place. Heinen faces a “geofinancial challenge”: to strike the right balance between financial policy and geopolitical exigencies, including the search for greater European strategic autonomy. Under his stewardship, fiscal prudence will remain a key theme. In light of the 3.5 percent defense spending pledge, this prudence is already leading to sharp discussions about social welfare reforms.

In the European context, the Netherlands remains opposed to financing other member states’ national debt, or “eurobonds,” reflecting a longstanding Dutch preference for fiscal discipline in the eurozone. Nonetheless, The Hague looks favorably at common European debt-financed instruments like the Defence Fund, SAFE, and the European Investment Bank. This stance befits a broader trend in the Dutch outlook on European debt mutualization. Furthermore, the new government views implementation of the recommendations of both Enrico Letta’s 2024 report on the future of the European single market and Mario Draghi’s 2025 report on EU competitiveness as crucial. And the Netherlands is a frontrunner in the deepening of Europe’s savings and investment union, previously known as the capital markets union. 

The Dutch debate reflects a broader, structural European question: Can a more strategically autonomous Europe emerge not merely from institutional and bureaucratic coordination, which is constrained by a fragmented democratic base, but from a deeper recognition of a shared political destiny? Whether the Jetten government can realize its ambitious European agenda depends on its ability to assemble parliamentary majorities in one of Europe’s most fragmented political systems. The deeper challenge Jetten faces, like other European leaders, is therefore whether he can convincingly give a more profound meaning to his European agenda. His persuasive power may thus ultimately rest on how he approaches Europe: as a civilization underpinning Western values or as an institution for technocratic governance.

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Bottom lines up front

• The new Shield of the Americas initiative aims to strengthen regional cooperation against cartels through intelligence sharing, joint operations, and military coordination.
• While security cooperation is necessary, cartel power largely stems from weak institutions, corruption, and fragile rule of law, which allow criminal networks to infiltrate states.
• The United States should work to strengthen regional governance, including anti-corruption institutions, judicial independence, and transparent regulatory systems.

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration’s new Shield of the Americas initiative reflects Washington’s renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere and the growing recognition that cartel violence poses a hemispheric security challenge. The initiative aims to deepen cooperation among regional governments through intelligence sharing, joint operations, and expanded military coordination to dismantle criminal networks responsible for drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and rising violence across the region.

To launch the initiative, the administration convened thirteen leaders from across Latin America and the Caribbean at a summit in Doral, Florida. From Honduran President Nasry Asfura to Chilean President-elect José Antonio Kast, the group largely consisted of center-right to hard-right leaders broadly aligned with the Trump administration.

The instinct behind the initiative is correct. A coordinated regional response is necessary to disrupt criminal networks. But if the Shield of the Americas is to achieve its stated goals, it must address a deeper reality: The region’s security challenges are rooted in institutional weakness. A coalition of politically aligned governments is not enough. An effective and durable Shield of the Americas must be built on strong institutions.

The vulnerability of weak institutions

Democratic progress in countries across Latin America has stalled or reversed in recent years. Weak rule of law, systemic corruption, and fragile public institutions have created fertile ground for criminal networks to thrive. Cartels succeed not primarily because of military capability, but because governance gaps allow transnational organized crime groups to infiltrate police forces, judicial systems, and political parties.

The consequences are visible throughout the region. Latin America accounts for roughly one-third of the world’s homicides despite representing less than a tenth of the global population. Criminal organizations have evolved into sophisticated multinational networks that traffic drugs, weapons, and people across borders while corrupting state institutions along the way. The result is not only violence, but also weakened states that struggle to respond effectively.

This institutional fragility affects the United States. Weak governance fuels migration, destabilizes regional economies, and deters the kind of transparent, rules-based investment environment that US businesses require.

At the same time, initiatives centered primarily on military coordination risk addressing symptoms rather than underlying causes. Security cooperation is necessary, but it cannot succeed in environments where institutions remain vulnerable to corruption and capture.

Building an institutional shield

To be effective, the Shield of the Americas should therefore expand beyond security coordination to include a serious investment in strengthening governance and the rule of law across the region. Evidence from the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Index underscores why. Across three decades of global data, the rule of law consistently emerges as the most influential driver of prosperity. Countries that strengthen judicial independence, combat corruption, and enforce predictable legal frameworks create the stable environment necessary to attract investment and resist criminal capture.

Washington should therefore pursue three complementary priorities.

First, the United States should support anti-corruption and rule-of-law institutions that directly undermine the operating environment of criminal networks. This includes funding independent prosecutors, strengthening financial oversight bodies, and supporting judicial reforms that improve transparency and accountability. When institutions can investigate corruption and enforce the law impartially, criminal networks lose the protection they rely on.

While the Trump administration has sought to rein in what it views as excessive foreign aid spending globally, the proximity and strategic importance of the Western Hemisphere should encourage a more targeted approach. Strengthening rule-of-law institutions in Latin America is a strategic investment that advances both US and regional interests.

Second, security cooperation and economic engagement should be linked to governance reforms that make countries more stable and investable. Transparent procurement systems, predictable regulatory frameworks, and professional law-enforcement institutions create the conditions necessary for long-term economic growth and foreign investment. These reforms also make it harder for malign actors to secure opaque deals that undermine security and stability.

Third, Washington should expand the toolkit used to strengthen democratic resilience in the region. Alongside traditional security assistance, the United States can leverage investment financing, public–private partnerships, and democracy assistance programs to reinforce rule-of-law reforms, strengthen oversight institutions, and support democratic institutions. Doing this can help ensure that security gains outlast any single government or political coalition.

Expanding the coalition

One limitation of the Shield of the Americas lies in its composition. Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil—all led by left-leaning governments—were absent from the summit despite being among the hemisphere’s largest and most influential countries. So too were leaders such as Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo and Uruguayan President Yamandú Orsi, who have largely aligned with Washington on security and economic priorities over the past year.

In a region known for its constant ideological tides, a security strategy built primarily around ideological convergence will struggle to endure. Cartels and criminal networks operate across borders regardless of ideology, and an effective response will require engagement with democracies across the political spectrum.

A strategy that endures

The Shield of the Americas could represent an opportunity for regional coordination against cartels. But if implemented narrowly as a security alliance, it risks becoming another short-lived effort that fades with political cycles. If it evolves into a broader strategy that strengthens the institutions underpinning democracy and the rule of law, however, it could help build a safer and more prosperous hemisphere for decades to come.

The United States is right to seek a stronger shield against cartels and malign influence in Latin America. But the strongest defense is not a coalition of friendly governments. It is a hemisphere where institutions are resilient enough to resist and dismantle criminal networks.

2026 Atlas: Freedom and prosperity around the world

Against a global backdrop of uncertainty, fragmentation, and shifting priorities, we invited leading economists and scholars to dive deep into the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries around the world. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

The post To succeed, Trump’s Shield of the Americas should focus on institutions as well as cartels appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 12, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on The Beacon of Liberty Podcast about the Truman doctrine.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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Below, Atlantic Council experts pierce the fog of war with clarifying answers to twenty of the most pressing questions about these fast-moving events.

1. Is the US accomplishing its goals in the war?

2. Is Israel achieving its aims in this conflict? 

3. Will the US put boots on the ground in Iran?

4. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the Iranian regime?

5. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the US?

6. What do we know about Iran’s new supreme leader?

7. What happens if the Iranian regime collapses?

8. How is the Iranian opposition responding to the conflict?

9. Is Iran’s nuclear stockpile a danger?

10. What threat does Iran pose to the US homeland?

11. What impact is this war having on US weapons stockpiles?

12. What’s the economic impact on Americans?

13. How is this conflict changing global energy markets?

14. What happens if Kurdish groups launch an armed resistance in Iran?

15. What impact will this conflict have on China?

16. What impact will this conflict have on Russia?

17. Will the Houthis in Yemen get involved?

18. How will this conflict impact Gaza?

19. How will the war impact US-Gulf relations?

20. What other countries could get involved if this war expands?

1. Is the US accomplishing its goals in the war?

Washington’s stated goals have included degrading Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, navy, drones, and control of its terror proxies. The United States is well on its way to achieving these objectives. All of these capabilities are badly degraded with, for example, more than fifty Iranian naval vessels resting on the sea floor. Going after remaining missile and drone manufacturing capabilities will likely take a couple of more weeks, at which point US President Donald Trump will be able to declare victory. 

A better government in Iran that is more cooperative internationally and that respects the human rights of its people is also desirable, but that outcome is largely in the hands of the Iranian people. 

Regardless of who governs next, Iran will be much weaker for years to come and less able to threaten the United States. 

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president for geostrategy and fellows and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

2. Is Israel achieving its aims in this conflict?

Israel almost certainly has set as a strategic objective the collapse of the Iranian regime. That is an expansion of initial goals following the June 2025 twelve-day war. In that conflict, Israeli and US strikes significantly set back the Iranian nuclear program. But some Iranian ballistic missile attacks also managed to penetrate Israeli and US missile defenses. Given the limited stockpile of interceptors, and Iranian ambitions to ramp up production of ballistic missiles that could reach Israel from roughly two thousand to ten thousand—meaning that they could overwhelm Israeli defenses and pose a strategic threat—Israel was prepared to strike at this threat later in 2026.  

But that changed following the popular protests against the regime in January, when it appeared that the Islamic Republic’s internal weakness matched the damage to its nuclear program and deterioration of its regional position and proxy network over the past two years. So in addition to degrading the missile threat by striking launchers, storage sites, and production facilities, Israeli targeting since the beginning of the war has included regime leadership (starting with the supreme leader and others in the conflict’s opening minutes), state security organs that participated in the crushing of the protests (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Basij militia, and police), and oil storage tanks in Tehran described as essential to the regime’s war machine. 

It is understandable that Israelis would seek the demise of the regime. For decades, they have lived with a major regional player openly and ideologically committed to Israel’s destruction, seeking strategic weapons to advance that aim, and arming and funding proxy terror groups that have spilled no small amount of Israeli blood. Tens of thousands of rockets and missiles have been launched against Israeli civilian targets over the past twenty years by Iran and its proxies. Seeing an opportunity to change this reality, which much of the world has taken for granted, has broad appeal in Israel. So far, with a few deadly Iranian missile attacks but Israel’s defenses otherwise holding, the campaign seems to most Israelis to be both necessary and being conducted at a tolerable price. 

What is less clear is how well the Israeli goal of regime change matches the United States’ objectives, or if it does, how long that will remain the case. Trump and his administration have offered inconsistent explanations of the war’s strategic objectives, but at least some of those calls—for “unconditional surrender” and creating the conditions that allow the Iranian people to take over their institutions—are consistent with Israeli goals. But as oil prices spike, markets dip, shipping and supply chains are disrupted, and Iran continues to find gaps in its Arab neighbors’ air defense and cause economic and infrastructure damage, it is possible to imagine Trump seeking an earlier off-ramp with a claim of having significantly defanged the regime. Further, the prospects of regime collapse followed by chaos, civil war, instability spilling over into neighboring countries, and refugee flows is of potentially far greater concern to the United States and its Arab partners than to Israel. If such a gap between Israeli and US goals opens up, expect Trump to be the determiner of when the war ends and to impose that endpoint on Israel, even if it is short of regime change. 

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017 and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East. 

3. Will the US put boots on the ground in Iran?

The United States is not mobilizing conventional ground forces either in the region or in the United States. Iran is a massive country with very difficult topography and would require hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy. Any use of ground forces would likely be limited to special operations forces for specific missions. Trump has espoused military objectives that are achievable through air and sea power without the need for a ground invasion. The military can seed the conditions for regime change by accomplishing its objectives, but a transition to an organic protest movement that the military doesn’t control or a negotiated settlement with the current regime is a political objective.  

Looking back to the Iraq war, Trump has cited the deployment of conventional ground forces and the disbanding of the Iraqi army and government as the reasons the United States became ensnared in a costly insurgency. He is seeking to avoid that by not deploying ground forces and preferring to work with a member of the existing government—if the regime is willing to change its approach. If those conditions come together, Trump can achieve his military objectives and leave at a time of his choosing without a transition to a new government. 

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and leads the initiative’s Counterterrorism Project. He previously served as chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

4. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the Iranian regime?

There is an assumption among some in Washington that Iran will stop fighting when Trump and Israel want to end this war. This is the same reasoning that led the Trump administration to assume Iran would capitulate in nuclear talks and not respond forcefully to the war that Trump and Israel initiated on February 28. This is a very different conflict than the twelve-day war in 2025 or other conflicts in which Iran rapidly de-escalated.  

The Iranian regime perceives that it is in an existential conflict, and it does not appear to be interested in an immediate off-ramp. From Iran’s perspective, a cessation of hostilities would merely be a temporary respite, before the United States or Israel restart the conflict once they have replenished their military supplies.  

Therefore, a slow, protracted, war of attrition is probably Iran’s intended outcome. Iranian leaders are calculating that their country is more willing to take casualties and absorb pain than either the United States or Gulf countries. Therefore, if Iran retains the military capability (including asymmetric threats) to inflict pain on the United States and the Gulf, as well as keep energy prices high, then Iran is more likely to determine the end of the conflict than the United States is. In fact, Iran may only accept an off-ramp if it ensures there is not another near-term war. This would likely entail compelling Trump to enforce a cease-fire that Israel adheres to. This type of belligerent approach is a risky gamble for Iran, as it increases the chances that the United States doubles down on the war and that it draws in the Gulf, but it is also probably a risk the remnants of the regime are willing to take.

—Nate Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Beginning in 2015, he served as a senior advisor on Iran policy to successive administrations, including most recently as director for Iran at the National Security Council.

5. What would be an acceptable end to this war for the US?

The United States is going to come out ahead in this war in almost every conceivable outcome. The president has smashed Iran’s missile capabilities, supported the destruction of some additional nuclear facilities, and killed scores of Iran’s top leaders. Tehran was unwilling to trade its uranium enrichment capability and has never countenanced negotiations on its missiles or proxies. Now it has less of all three. 

Iran, of course, also has a vote on ending the war, but once the threat to the regime is gone—and it looks like it’s receding—Iran will eventually return to business as usual. It could keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, but that would require continuing to expose itself to attack and pressure, and it does need oil revenue, too. Israel could conceivably continue the war alone but would likely scale down—think Gaza—once the United States indicated its desire to stop. 

Perhaps the only unacceptable outcome for the war is if a sustained opposition movement emerges and either suffers more brutality on the streets of Tehran or manages to liberate some territory and then is violently suppressed by the regime. The conditions required for a US win also change if there is a mass casualty terrorist attack at home or overseas directly related to the war, which the United States would need to justify with a more acute strategic objective. If the regime thus wanted to inflict harm on the United States, it might well strike at the homeland, goad Washington into making a sustained effort to replace it, and then try to make the United States suffer further as a result. 

—Andrew L. Peek is the director of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He was previously the senior director for European and Russian affairs at the National Security Council and the deputy assistant secretary for Iran and Iraq at the US Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

6. What do we know about Iran’s new supreme leader?

Iran’s new supreme leader, fifty-six-year-old Mojtaba Khamenei, is the son of the recently deceased Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Many analysts believe that Mojtaba will be a continuation—and potentially more extreme version—of his father. However, less is known about the younger Khamenei, as he rarely speaks or appears in public.  

What we do know is that the new supreme leader was trained by a string of hard-line, anti-Western clerics, played a prominent role in past repression of protesters, and was recently embroiled in a corruption scandal. As a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and an active participant in Iran’s intelligence and defense, he was reportedly the IRGC’s favored candidate. However, his selection is controversial even within the remnants of the Islamic Republic. According to reports, his appointment contravened his father’s written wishes and was opposed by senior political figures in Iran. In this sense, Mojtaba Khamenei’s selection is about more than just succession. It is about stabilizing a system at a moment when uncertainty poses a strategic risk to the regime.

In the short term, Mojtaba Khamenei will likely be focused on Iranian defense, ensuring relative domestic stability, and power projection. Israel and the United States have already expressed opposition to his ascension, leaving open the possibility—perhaps even likelihood—that he will be targeted in future US or Israeli military actions.

—Nate Swanson

7. What happens if the Iranian regime collapses?

The end of the regime is less likely to foster democracy as it is to birth what some are calling “IRGCistan”—a military-dominated state in which the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamanei, is a partner but not the final or ultimate authority, as his father was, and with power firmly vested in the hands of the IRGC. Such a result would provide three pathways forward.  

An IRGC-run Iran could initially be a bigger regional and domestic threat, staking out even harder-line stances in seeking to consolidate power and focused on ensuring no other insider can outflank it. Second, it could seek to quickly gain the support of the Iranian people by showing greater flexibility for a deal with the United States in exchange for an economic boost in the form of sanctions relief. Third, it could lead to a period of confusion and jockeying for power in which Western states will have to decide how much to try to jump into the fray and influence the outcome. 

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Dispatches

Feb 28, 2026

Experts react: The US and Israel just unleashed a major attack on Iran. What’s next?

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts assess the unfolding Operation Epic Fury and where it goes from here.

Conflict Iran

8. How is the Iranian opposition responding to the conflict?

Many in the Iranian opposition both inside and outside of Iran had welcomed targeted military strikes on regime officials and targets in the lead-up to the war. The thinking was that there was no other way to dislodge a violent regime that over forty-seven years had resisted international pressure, sanctions, and multiple internal nationwide anti-regime protests. The war’s opening salvo in killing then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and top regime officials was celebrated widely in Iran and seen as an optimistic start to what many believed would be certain regime change. But with Israel’s strikes on oil depots in Tehran that sent a black smoke cloud over the sky in the second week of the war, along with the destruction of cultural heritage sites, moods have started to shift. Some question how much they are willing to sacrifice for a free Iran and whether the regime—which so far has proved resilient—will actually fall, or whether all the war did was replace one Khamenei with another Khamenei who is thirty years younger. 

But bright spots remain. Many Iranians say there is no turning back now and that the regime has to go or else it will emerge more brutal than ever before. There are reports of people organizing to take to the streets once the bombing stops. Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah, continues to offer to act as a transitional leader for Iran to guide the country to free and fair elections and has attracted new key constituencies to broaden his tent. Inside Iran, seventy opposition activists have joined to form a new group called the Strategic Council of Republicans Inside Iran. Their names have not been declared publicly, but they have made their leadership known to Western governments. And outside Iran, opposition figures are meeting to discuss core transitional issues and encourage pluralistic politics. 

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and a board member of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

9. Is Iran’s nuclear stockpile a danger?

Since Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow in June 2025, it has been difficult for experts to assess how much of Iran’s nuclear stockpile remains accessible and potentially dangerous. Prior to those attacks, Iran’s stockpile had been estimated at about 440.9 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium. 

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the existing stockpile is “mainly” at Isfahan, while other parts of the stockpile may have been destroyed last year. Some experts believe that the stockpile is largely inaccessible and buried underground. After receiving a briefing from the Trump administration, US Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL) raised concern that the administration “never had a plan for that nuclear stockpile of enriched uranium—to destroy [it], to seize it, or to put it under international inspection.”

If the nuclear stockpile is still accessible, then its future may parallel the political future of Iran; a regime that is compliant with US requirements may wish to take measures to safeguard the stockpile and could even allow inspections to resume. However, if the regime feels that it remains under threat, then it could be more motivated to rebuild military and nuclear weapons capabilities. Additionally, if Iran devolves into political chaos and civil war, then the stockpile could fall into the hands of rogue elements with nefarious purposes. 

—Jennifer T. Gordon is the director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

10. What threat does Iran pose to the US homeland?

Iran’s long history and experience in asymmetric warfare—including being a state sponsor for terrorism and perpetrator of cyberattacks—suggests that the kinetic portion of this conflict could be just a start. In retaliation for the death of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020, for example, Tehran sought to murder both Trump and then National Security Advisor John Bolton. While no specific threats have been identified, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appear to be on high alert. Press reports indicate that the DHS warned of potential lone wolf attacks, which are notoriously difficult to identify in advance, in response to the conflict.

Iran’s proxies across the Middle East are another arrow in Tehran’s quiver. Tehran has cultivated, armed, trained, and financed a network of non-state armed organizations operating across the region with links to Africa and parts of Latin America. These groups include Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian militant organizations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, and Yemen’s Houthi movement. Together and individually, they enable Iran to project influence, deter adversaries, and retaliate asymmetrically while preserving a degree of paper-thin plausible deniability.

Currently, Iran’s proxy network remains operational, although increasingly constrained. Hezbollah retains significant military capabilities, though persistent Israeli attacks and the potential that Lebanese authorities work to limit the group’s activities could challenge its efforts to mount a campaign. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias wield influence yet risk nationalist backlash and sanctions. The Houthis have demonstrated reach but face sustained military pressure. 

—Ingrid Small is the deputy director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. She previously served as a senior analyst and analytic methodologist in the US intelligence community for over three decades.

11. What impact is this war having on US weapons stockpiles?

The problem of prioritizing near-term requirements over long-term priorities is not new. This is why the recently released National Defense Strategy rightly called for being clear-eyed about available military resources and emphasized a ruthless prioritization on homeland defense and China, along with rebuilding the US defense industrial base.

But now the Iran war is degrading US military readiness for homeland defense and China. 

While the cumulative readiness impacts of this decision are difficult to quantify in the near-term, the war in Iran will likely drain inventories of critical munitions and parts, with knock-on effects across the force from training schedules to unit strength.

Major assets employed for the war in Iran that are also relevant to homeland defense and/or China include air defense systems, long-range standoff weapons, naval vessels, strategic airlift and aerial refueling, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets. Moreover, military planners must consider the resources required to monitor, deter, or fight North Korea, Russia, and China simultaneously in the event they join a Pacific conflict or a worst-case homeland defense scenario.

How quickly the United States can regenerate readiness for homeland defense and great power competition remains an open question and will depend both on the Trump administration’s decisions and factors outside the administration’s control.    

—Joe Costa is the director of the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans and posture in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

12. What’s the economic impact on Americans?

Most Americans are likely to feel the war in two ways—gas prices and groceries. Nearly 20 percent of the global oil supply transits through the Strait of Hormuz and right now movement is at a standstill. It’s true that the United States is far less reliant on energy imports than it was during the previous two Gulf wars, but the nature of the energy market is that a price spike quickly impacts everyone around the world. And that’s exactly what has happened.  

After some wild swings, the price of oil as of Wednesday is sitting at about ninety dollars a barrel—up from sixty dollars in December. Many Americans are driving by gas stations and seeing a first number starting with a “3.” It may not be long before that becomes a “4”—and it could get worse, depending on how long the crisis lasts. This is something that will be particularly painful for Americans who already list cost of living as one of their top concerns in surveys. The administration is taking a series of actions to try and relieve the pressure: It’s coordinating with allies to put more oil on the market. It’s providing shipping insurance to convince tankers to make the passage. And it’s even temporarily relieving some sanctions on Russian oil. But none of those steps will stop prices from surging higher as long as transit remains blocked and oil production in the Gulf continues to be a target of Iranian drones. 

High gas prices would be bad enough, but expect the cost of other items to tick up, too. Everyday grocery items could soon become more expensive as goods transited across the country on trucks face higher diesel fuel costs. 

All of this creates a headache for Trump’s choice to chair the Federal Reserve, Kevin Warsh. Up until the start of the conflict, inflation pressures had been cooling. But if the war continues and Warsh is confirmed, he will face a president who wants lower interest rates but an economy facing price pressures. That means all those looking for relief on mortgage rates and car loans may have to wait a little longer. 

—Josh Lipsky is the chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council and the senior director of the GeoEconomics Center. He previously served as an advisor at the International Monetary Fund.

13. How is this conflict changing global energy markets?

The conflict is forcing energy markets to price in geopolitical risk that, until recently, was largely theoretical. For years, governments have assessed the energy security vulnerability posed by the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint responsible for roughly one fifth of global oil and gas flows. Today, that vulnerability is no longer a contingency exercise. Even in an otherwise well-supplied market, traders are confronting the real consequences of supply chains tied to a region capable of removing millions of barrels per day from the global market. Oil may be relatively fungible, but the world cannot quickly replace a sudden loss of fifteen million barrels per day. As the conflict persists, the economic knock-on effects compound, and Tehran may be gaining a new layer of deterrence if even the threat of short-range drone or missile attacks can trigger geoeconomic disruption by intermittently halting traffic through Hormuz. 

Natural gas markets are even less flexible. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) export infrastructure takes years—often more than a decade—to move from concept to first cargo, leaving Europe and East Asia structurally exposed. Emerging economies may increasingly forgo planned gas buildouts in favor of alternative energy sources. At the same time, upstream capital may pivot toward the Western Hemisphere—particularly the United States, Guyana, and Canada—where geopolitical risk is perceived as lower. That shift could further entrench North America as a global energy powerhouse while simultaneously accelerating political support in vulnerable capitals for technologies less dependent on Hormuz, including solar and battery storage. 

—Landon Derentz is vice president, energy and infrastructure, senior director, and Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. He previously served as director for energy at the White House National Security Council. 

14. What happens if Kurdish groups launch an armed resistance in Iran?

The Kurdish coalition’s entry into the war could hand Tehran a political opening even as it creates a military problem. Kurdish fighters might stretch Iranian forces and expose weak control in the northwest. But Tehran could also use the specter of separatism to rally Persian nationalism, split the opposition, and frame the war as foreign-backed dismemberment rather than domestic revolt, giving itself a justification for mass arrests and violence against Kurds inside Iran. 

If Kurdish forces receive sufficient support, they could serve several strategic purposes. They might pin down Iranian security forces in the west, giving space for unarmed protesters in major cities to demonstrate without being massacred. They could stretch the regime’s resources thin and reduce pressure on the Gulf states and Israel. And if the Kurds were to take and hold territory in northern Iran, they could create a buffer zone beneficial to Israel and the West. 

For all these reasons, any support for the Kurds should go beyond military backing. It must include political support for Kurdish autonomy in a post-regime Iran, so that the Kurds do not end up being used once again as expendable forces. 

 —Yerevan Saeed is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Dispatches

Mar 6, 2026

How would a Kurdish offensive change the war in Iran?

By Atlantic Council experts

Our experts explain the goals of the various Kurdish groups the United States is reportedly backing for an attack against Iran and how their involvement could impact the wider war.

Conflict Defense Policy

15. What impact will this conflict have on China?

Beijing is in wait-and-see mode. China was Iran’s major oil buyer, but that dependence was mainly one-way: China was buying around 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports, but those purchases accounted for less than 15 percent of China’s total imports.   

Chinese leaders have always known that, as a net oil importer, the straits of Hormuz and Malacca (two narrow sea lanes that ships must traverse to deliver oil from the Middle East to China) presented a major energy security risk. Beijing has long feared that Washington would target Chinese oil tankers in a future US-China crisis, and it has been working furiously to reduce those risks. Today, due to that contingency planning, China is less dependent on imported oil than many observers realize. China is working to electrify the nation’s auto fleet and making shocking progress (electric vehicles can run on coal-fired power, which China has in abundance). And Chinese leaders took advantage of the past few years of low oil prices to go on a buying spree, beefing up their domestic reserves to plan for a future supply crisis such as the one they are now facing.   

Overall, China is perhaps more prepared than any other major economy to face the energy crisis that could emerge from the situation in Iran. And Chinese leaders are very good at strategic planning. They will be looking for ways to turn this situation into an opportunity. Already, for example, the United States is reportedly moving some of its most advanced missile defense units from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East—removing systems that, in Beijing’s view, directly threatened China’s security interests in the region. It is impossible to overstate the degree to which those movements are a massive win for Beijing. And if the United States ends up stuck in another Middle Eastern quagmire that cedes the Indo-Pacific to China, the wins will keep coming.  

—Melanie Hart is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. She previously served as senior advisor for China in the Office of the Undersecretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment at the US Department of State.

16. What impact will this conflict have on Russia?

The conflict in the Middle East is already playing into Russia’s hands. 

The war in Iran has created global anxiety around the supply and availability of crude oil coming out of the Gulf. Earlier this week, oil prices surged to the highest they have been since 2022. To quell oil market fears, the Trump administration eased sanctions on Russian oil. Last Thursday, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a general license to allow for the delivery and sale of sanctioned Russian oil to India for thirty days. Meanwhile, reporting indicates that the administration is considering additional sanctions relief for Russia to enable the sale of Russian Urals.

This is a win for Russia. Russia’s economy has been in a steady decline since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Low oil prices combined with significant Western economic pressure including sanctions on oil majors and shadow fleet vessels as well as the oil price cap, reduced Russia’s energy revenue. US sanctions relief helps Putin sell Russian Urals, generating income for Moscow’s war machine.  

It’s important to note that US sanctions relief does not equate to sanctions relief from the United Kingdom, the European Union, or other Western partners. If the United States eases sanctions on Russian oil but its partners do not, then there could be significant confusion in the compliance space. Financial institutions and the private sector will have to navigate a complex sanctions landscape and may risk exposing themselves to British or European sanctions if they facilitate the sale of Russian oil. Hopefully, the US administration is considering these challenges and coordinating its decisions with its coalition of partners that have sanctioned Russia in response to the war in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Qatar’s LNG capacity remains offline. Russian LNG is not sanctioned, and Russia remains a global supplier of LNG. If the Middle East conflict continues and Qatar is not able to restart its LNG infrastructure quickly, then we could expect to see Russia increasing its LNG exports in attempts to fill the gap and generate income. 

—Kimberly Donovan is director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She is a former senior Treasury official and National Security Council director. 

17. Will the Houthis in Yemen get involved?

Coming to Iran’s defense does not provide the Houthis with the same domestic and reputational benefits that their involvement in the Gaza war did. It also carries new risks, particularly related to the detente the Houthis have had with Saudi Arabia since 2022. The Houthis could still decide to get involved in the Iran war, especially if they calculate that it makes sense to break that detente as Saudi Arabia doubles down on its support to the Houthis’ main rival inside of Yemen, the internationally recognized Yemeni government.  

There are three scenarios for Houthi involvement:

1. Limited strikes on Israel to demonstrate solidarity with Iran;  
2. Limited strikes on Red Sea shipping as they seek to test whether this is a new red line for Saudi Arabia or extract new concessions, given that Riyadh is depending on the Red Sea to maintain some oil production with the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed; or  
3. Widespread Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, Saudi Arabia, and/or ground offensives inside of Yemen aimed at finally seizing Yemen’s oil and gas resources. This third scenario risks reigniting the Yemen war after years of calm and opening up a major new front in the region.  

 —Allison Minor is the director of the Project for Middle East Integration with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. She previously served as US deputy special envoy for Yemen and as director for Arabian Peninsula affairs at the National Security Council.

MENASource

Mar 10, 2026

Will the Houthis join the Iran war?

By Allison Minor

Houthi involvement in the Iran war could reignite the Yemen war after four years of relative calm, with significant implications for Yemen and the region.

Conflict Iran

18. How will this conflict impact Gaza?

Hamas would not have been what it is over the past twenty years without direct financial and material support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, which turned the terror group into one of its chief proxies, given its presence at Israel’s doorstep. Despite differences in religious orientation and doctrine between the Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and the primary Shia force in the world, Tehran has effectively used Hamas to ensure that there wouldn’t be peace or long-term stability between Palestinians and Israelis, prolonging the conflict, which is foundational for the theocratic regime.

Iran helped undermine the Oslo process of the 1990s, militarize the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, and turn post-2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza into a “resistance” citadel. Thus, the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and Gaza’s subsequent decimation would not have occurred without cumulative Iranian involvement. Furthermore, the regime is constantly meddling in the West Bank, supporting rogue Palestinian militants and plots to destabilize the Palestinian Authority and encourage heavy-handed Israeli military actions, hoping this could trigger chaos and a “Third Intifada.”  

A severely weakened regime in Tehran that lacks financial means and reach will likely roll back Iran’s involvement in the Palestinian issue and minimize meddling and sabotage by IRGC agents and officers. This would have various political implications, making groups like Hamas much more vulnerable and unable to rely on Iranian support for armed resistance, while weakening the pro-Iran faction within the group’s politburo.

Alternatively, there is a small but not insignificant risk that the battered and angry remnants of the regime may deploy its limited resources in support of extreme terror activities in Israel and Gaza and the West Bank by using Palestinian elements either sympathetic to Tehran’s cause or purely lured in by financial incentives. Nevertheless, Iranian-aligned elements of Hamas and other Palestinian groups will experience significant setbacks that compound the calamity faced by the Palestinian national project in the aftermath of October 7, further strengthening Israel’s position in the conflict and bolstering its desires for how Gaza’s future trajectory and prospects should unfold. 

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib leads Realign For Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse and develops a new policy framework for rejuvenated pro-Palestine advocacy.

19. How will the war impact US-Gulf relations?

The war will have lasting impacts on US-Gulf relations, but those impacts are still evolving in the war’s second week. In the near term, Gulf countries will seek stronger US security support, including munitions and other air defense support to help defend against Iranian attacks. They will also want clearer US security guarantees over the long term. How the United States responds to these requests will shape Gulf countries’ calculus as they grapple with whether the benefits of housing US military bases are worth the growing risks those bases bring.  

Another critical factor will be what the Iranian threat looks like after US operations conclude and the degree to which the United States coordinates with its Gulf partners as it concludes its operations. Early signs suggest the Iranian regime will prove resilient, and Iran has demonstrated that it can terrorize its neighbors with low-cost drones and disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz that are difficult to eliminate with an air campaign alone. Alternatively, regime collapse and a civil war inside Iran could have lasting consequences for Gulf security. If the Iran that emerges from this war poses a long-term threat to Gulf national security and economic growth, and if Gulf countries assess that the United States is not doing enough to help them combat that threat, then it will create a crippling strain on US-Gulf relations.  

—Allison Minor

20. What other countries could get involved if this war expands?

While the United States and Israel are leading operations against Iran, it is Arab Gulf countries that have found themselves on the front lines. The vast majority of Iranian missile and drone attacks have targeted Gulf countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Gulf countries are weighing how best to deal with the Iranian threat both now and in the long term, but it remains unclear if they will choose to confront Iran militarily, pursue targeted actions to restore a degree of deterrence, or seek to negotiate a new detente with Iran. Thus far, the Gulf countries have not responded militarily to Iranian attacks and have refuted claims suggesting otherwise. The UAE is reportedly considering non-kinetic means to restore deterrence with Iran, while Oman is actively pursuing negotiations.  

Lebanon and Iraq are also being pulled into the conflict: Israel launched a major campaign in Lebanon following attacks from Hezbollah that included airstrikes in southern Beirut and an expanded Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government sees the campaign as a threat to its efforts to navigate Lebanon out of an economic and political crisis and is actively pursuing negotiations with Israel and the United States while demonstrating that it is willing to crack down on Hezbollah in new ways. 

The United States is conducting strikes on Iran-backed militias in Iraq in response to attacks on US bases and diplomatic facilities inside the country, and the stoppage of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has forced Iraq to halt oil production. All this comes as Iraq navigates difficult government formation negotiations and threatens to disrupt an era of relative stability in the country.  

—Allison Minor

The post Twenty questions (and expert answers) about the Iran war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• US–Israeli strikes on Iran and the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader have prompted Hezbollah to enter what its fighters now describe as the decisive “last war” with Israel.
• Hezbollah’s entry into the conflict on March 2—through rocket attacks toward Haifa—may have been coordinated directly between Iran’s Quds Force and Hezbollah’s military wing.
• The fighting is escalating, with tens of thousands of Hezbollah fighters ready for deployment and Israel responding with strikes, evacuations, and ground operations.

BEIRUT—Following the inconclusive end of the month-long Hezbollah-Israel conflict in 2006, Hezbollah fighters began referring to the “last war with Israel,” a climactic future confrontation in which there would be no restrictions on the use of force and from which only one winner would emerge. When Hezbollah launched its conflict with Israel on October 8, 2023, there was an initial fear in Lebanon that this was the beginning of the long-awaited “final war.” After nearly a month of border clashes, then Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah made it clear in his first speech that the “support front” for Hamas in Gaza was but one battle “on the road to Jerusalem” and not a final confrontation.

However, the ongoing US-Israeli attacks on Iran and the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have changed the calculus. Hezbollah is now embarking on what fighters and others close to the organization describe as the “last war,” and the group is fully committed to a long and painful confrontation with Israel. “There won’t be another one after this. Either we win or they win,” a veteran Hezbollah source told me.

Hezbollah entered the war in the early hours of March 2 by firing several rockets from an area north of the Litani River, targeting an Israeli military base near Haifa. Curiously, there is a growing conviction that the decision to join battle was not made by Hezbollah’s political leadership. Instead, it may have been coordinated directly between the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Islamic Resistance, Hezbollah’s armed element. This was confirmed to me by several people close to and inside Hezbollah.

According to a diplomatic source, as soon as reports of the initial rocket fire spread, a senior Lebanese official contacted Hezbollah’s political leaders and asked if they were responsible. The response was a hesitant “maybe.” The official urged Hezbollah to issue a statement denying responsibility. Hezbollah agreed, wrote a statement, and sent it to the official for approval. But by the time the official returned the statement, Hezbollah informed him that it was too late and that the Islamic Resistance had released its own statement confirming responsibility for the cross-border attack. The anecdote indicates that Hezbollah’s political leadership may have been unaware in advance of the rocket attack into Israel.

The decision to strike

Although Khamenei’s assassination in the opening hours of the war on Iran was a shock for Hezbollah, there was no indication that it was planning an imminent retaliation. Even Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem’s statement mourning the loss of Khamenei contained no threats of revenge, only pledges to follow the supreme leader’s path.

Emerging differences between the Islamic Resistance and Qassem, who was elected secretary-general in October 2024 following the death of Nasrallah, have been growing more apparent for some time. Before the latest US-Israeli operation in Iran, Qassem seemed to want to steer Hezbollah in a more Lebanon-centric direction. He had, for example, focused attention on restructuring Hezbollah, centralizing the decision-making process, and tightening security. He had also taken steps to reduce the size of the Islamic Resistance, sideline officials who were close to Nasrallah, and promote figures with more of a political than religious, security, or military background. In part, these efforts were an attempt to streamline an organization that has grown too large and unwieldy, and thus vulnerable to penetration by Israeli intelligence. Another reason was to strengthen Hezbollah’s domestic position at a time of unprecedented pressure due to the battering it received in the 2023–24 conflict and the Lebanese government’s decision this past August to have Hezbollah disarmed. 

My Hezbollah source emphasized that Qassem is a pragmatist who seems to adhere more closely to the line of Imam Hassan than his younger brother Imam Hussein, both of whom are historical figures revered by Shias. The description requires a brief history lesson to understand its import. Imam Hassan was the second caliph after the assassination of his father, Ali. He struck an agreement with his enemy Muawiya, the governor of Syria, in which he relinquished the title of caliph to Muawiya in exchange for a treaty intended to preserve the peace. Shia tradition interprets Imam Hassan’s decision as a strategic and moral choice to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. The agreement outlived Imam Hassan and Muawiya but was breached by the latter’s son, Yazid, spurring Imam Hussein to launch his doomed uprising that culminated in his death and that of his companions at the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD. 

Comparing Qassem to Imam Hassan suggested that the Hezbollah leader might have preferred to avoid entanglement in a war with Israel that would prove highly destructive for Lebanon. Hezbollah’s Shia support base in Lebanon would likely bear the brunt of any major conflict, and it could prove existential for the organization as a viable political, let alone military, entity.

Much of this is now moot; Hezbollah has entered the conflict and will have to let the chips fall where they may. The reaction of the Lebanese government to the launching of rockets into Israel came quickly. The cabinet held an emergency meeting within hours and banned all Hezbollah’s military and security activities. Implementing this decision is another matter, and any serious moves in that direction may not occur until the current conflict is over. Nevertheless, the unprecedented step underlined the government’s sense of frustration and anger that Lebanon has been dragged into a fresh conflict not of its choosing.

“An existential battle”

In his first comments on entering the war, Qassem, setting aside any presumed private misgivings, played down the linkage to the war on Iran and the assassination of Khamenei. Instead, he said Hezbollah’s actions were the result of its patience being exhausted after fifteen months of Israeli occupation in parts of south Lebanon, and as Israeli forces continue near-daily air strikes against his organization’s cadres and facilities. Qassem added that war was “an existential battle” and that “surrender is not an option.”

Sources within and close to Hezbollah tell me that the organization has committed as many as thirty thousand fighters to the battle, some of them drawn from the elite Radwan unit currently deployed in south Lebanon. They are well trained, motivated, and eager to fight. Many fighters had grown frustrated at Hezbollah’s policy of “strategic patience” by turning the other cheek to Israel’s repeated attacks. The existential nature of this conflict for the Iranian regime and possibly for Hezbollah has helped galvanize ideological and religious sentiment to drive the fighters onwards. A letter addressed to the fighters this past week from the leadership of the Islamic Resistance was filled with references to “Karbala” and “jihad” to inspire the cadres. The letter urged the fighters to battle “the tyrants of this age—the killers of prophets and saints, the ‘Great Satan’ America and the cancerous tumor ‘Israel,’” and to fight their enemy “like the self-sacrificing fighters of Karbala.”

So far, Hezbollah’s operations are following a similar pattern to the 2023–24 conflict: confronting Israeli troops on the ground in southern Lebanon, and firing rockets, precision-guided missiles, and suicide drones across the border at targets in Israel. In the previous confrontation in 2023–24, Hezbollah fought with one hand tied behind its back because the Iranians refused to allow the organisation to employ its full arsenal of precision-guided missiles in sufficient numbers to have an effect, a source of great bitterness among the cadres at the time. However, in this battle, there are believed to be no restrictions on the weaponry and tactics that can be used. On March 9, Hezbollah said that it had fired a barrage of precision-guided missiles at a satellite communications station belonging to the Israeli army’s Cyber Defense and Communications Division in the Ella Valley, ninety-five miles south of the border. Two of the missiles struck the site and caused significant damage, judging from footage on social media, in what was Hezbollah’s deepest ever attack into Israel.

At this stage, it is unlikely that Hezbollah is considering cross-border raids into Israel, a tactic for which the Radwan Brigade had trained but is today far harder to achieve given the Israeli troop presence inside Lebanese territory.

Hezbollah’s strategy, likely in coordination with Iran, appears to be to inflict as much pain on Israel for as long as possible in the hope that a settlement is reached between the warring parties that essentially leaves the regime in Tehran in place. Where that result would leave Hezbollah remains to be seen.

The response from Israel

This past week, Israel issued large-scale evacuation warnings for dozens of towns and villages in south Lebanon, both north and south of the Litani River, as well as for the southern suburbs of Beirut. The latter evacuation order on March 5 caused panic and massive traffic jams across Beirut as tens of thousands of residents attempted to flee ahead of a series of Israeli air strikes. Initial Israeli ground operations suggest an intention to deepen an existing buffer zone the army maintains adjacent to the Blue Line, the United Nations term for Lebanon’s southern border. 

Whether the Israelis push further into Lebanon, possibly as far as the Litani River, remains to be seen. Such a step would require a significant military effort and risk an increase in casualties. The area is too large for Israel to occupy for any length of time, which suggests that it may prefer to employ airpower and artillery to destroy populated areas rather than deploy ground forces in large numbers. After all, in the previous conflict in the so-called Sixty-Six-Day War in October and November 2024, the Israeli military was modest in its territorial reach. Mainly special forces units ventured no further than five miles into Lebanese territory, moving on foot, with tanks playing fire-support roles. These operations concentrated on dynamiting villages immediately adjacent to the Blue Line. The geography of south Lebanon, with its steep hills and wooded valleys, is not advantageous for armored columns, as the Israelis have learned to their cost in the past. This lesson could now weigh against a more ambitious push into Lebanon.

It is far too soon to predict with any certainty when and how this war will end. Its fate is intertwined with the convolutions of the ongoing conflict with Iran. But even if the Iran war draws to some form of closure, the Hezbollah-Israel front may well continue until Israel is satisfied that Hezbollah can no longer exist as a military force.

One thing is for sure, however: the Hezbollah that emerges from this war will not be the Hezbollah that entered it.

The post Dispatch from Beirut: Is this Hezbollah’s ‘last war’ with Israel? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Europe Center Resident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks with Brussels-based senior correspondent Augustin Palokaj about growing concerns in the EU capital over Kosovo’s prolonged institutional impasse, after President Osmani’s decision to dissolve the Parliament and the Constitutional Court temporarily suspended the decree dissolving the Kosovo Assembly.

Despite the lifting of EU measures and the prospect of up to €1.5 billion in EU and pre-accession funds, Kosovo remains the only Western Balkan country without EU candidate status. The discussion also examines the postponed visit of EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos to Prishtina and the prospects for a new start in EU-Kosovo relations.

Palokaj also reacts to the letter sent by Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić seeking early access to the EU single market and the Schengen area, a proposal that reportedly disappointed supporters of EU enlargement.

The episode also touches on rule-of-law concerns in Albania, Montenegro’s continued progress in closing accession chapters, and the broader outlook for EU enlargement in the Western Balkans.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post Kosovo’s Political Limbo Worries Brussels | A Debrief with Augustin Palokaj appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Violence in 2025 in the coastal region and Suwayda put the world on alert, testing the control of new authorities. Did anyone expect that those who lost influence with Assad’s fall, such as Iran, Russia, and their proxies, would sit idle and do nothing disruptive during the transitional period? External pressures would certainly challenge the establishment of a “normal” Syrian government.

Domestic pathologies abound after many decades of dictatorship: Sectarian mobilization, torture, corruption, and external patron relationships were tools to undercut potential resistance within the society. Under Assad, intelligence agencies and the Ba’ath party were instrumental in decision-making, operating beyond the reach of formal government institutions. After fifty years of authoritarian rule, and a dozen years of civil war, the country was governed by factions within the security services, power brokers tied to the Assad family, and increasingly by Assad’s foreign backers. This ad hoc but long-standing power structure fell apart in 2024 when Assad fled to Russia on December 8, leaving a power vacuum with no easy fix.

Lack of mandate

Put simply, the current Syrian government inherited an exceedingly complex and dire set of challenges from the Assad regime, both within the country’s borders and beyond. The fact that the most unified and potent military force in the country did not have a broad political mandate caused concern amid the general rejoicing that Assad was gone. The new government in Damascus assumed office upon taking control of the capital and appointed individuals from within Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, or HTS) to key positions to manage the transition, driving international concerns over continued extremism and the lack of representation. The announcement of a more diverse transitional government in March 2025 was a good sign, as were President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s negotiations with Kurdish and Druze factions, but the potential for inclusive governance remains far from being realized.

Internationally, Syria has been under painful and wide-ranging sanctions since the 1980s, isolating the banking system, restricting trade, and limiting import-export activities. The December repeal of the Caesar Act—which was a US response to war crimes under the Assad regime—lifts nearly all sanctions on Syria and is an important step in both unlocking the investment needed for the nation’s reconstruction and improving economic conditions. However, the scale of needs is immense, with conservative reconstruction estimates exceeding $200 billion.

President Trump’s “peace through prosperity” policy, implemented under the leadership of Ambassador Thomas J. Barrack Jr., is pushing Syria to be open to the West and its allies, a big shift from sponsorship by the likes of Russia, Iran, and China. European and American engagement has brought focused attention from international firms—especially US and Turkish companies. Google and Apple have resumed service in the country, ending what has been called “a digital siege,” while the US Chamber of Commerce has seen strong interest in its new Syria program. Turkish firms engaged in energy, construction, and other critical stabilization sectors have flocked to their southern neighbor.

Trump’s influence

Trump’s return to the White House played a crucial role in creating an opening for positive change in Syria and its relations within the region for two key reasons. First, his excellent relationship with President Erdogan enabled diplomatic coordination and top-level trust during the final eleven days of the Assad regime and the immediate aftermath of its fall. “Erdogan is somebody I got along with great. . . . He’s built a very strong, powerful army,” Trump said on December 16, 2024. He added: “Right now, Syria has a lot of, you know, there’s a lot of indefinites . . .  I think Turkey is going to hold the key to Syria.”

Second, Trump’s strong pro-Israel stance and unrivaled popularity among Israelis gave him unique standing to press back on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he called for action in Syria to deter Turkey and weaken the grip of al-Sharaa. Trump’s admonition “you have to be reasonable,” regarding Turkey in Syria, lowered the temperature a few degrees at least, buying important breathing space for the new government to try and stabilize a fragile situation.

Following the appointment of former HTS head al-Sharaa (nom de guerre Jolani) as interim president, the United States initiated the removal of sanctions, including those that had been in place since 1979 This action was prompted by Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa in Riyadh on May 14, 2025, brokered by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. This meeting provided hope for the Syrian people and offered an opportunity for their future reconstruction; it also gave the international community a sign of normalizing engagement with the newly created regime in Damascus.

A key focus has been the unity of Syria. The United States, Turkey and the Syrian government have consistently emphasized the need for Syria to stay united with a central government in Damascus. This stance is crucial in countering the narratives and demands of advocates for decentralization, including Kurdish groups in the northeast, which advocate for a federal system, and the Druze aligned with Hikmet al-Hijri in Suwayda, who seek independence. Damascus has refused both while insisting that differences should not be overcome “through blood.”

Internal dynamics with minorities

The Kurds and the Druze received a lot of press over the summer months in 2025, but lingering problems in predominantly Alawite areas pose another challenge to successful stabilization. Following Assad’s ouster, the coastal area, once the primary base for Assad’s loyalists and a major source of volunteers for the Syrian army, transformed into a haven for former army and intelligence officers. Tensions boiled over into a significant cycle of atrocities when Assad loyalists attacked the new government forces, killing hundreds. The Syrian army responded with overwhelming force, leading to clashes that claimed numerous lives—and atrocities against civilian communities described by the United Nations as “widespread and systematic.”

A Syrian investigative committee acknowledged provocations and atrocities by both pro- and anti-government forces, and the Syrian government committed to accountability on all sides. International scrutiny and concern grew, however, when Druze and Bedouin fighters in Suwayda engaged in another round of attacks and atrocities, resulting in hundreds of casualties. By late summer there had been no new major incidents to add to the list of 2025 armed uprisings, reprisals, and atrocities, but the general impression of fragility and low trust persists.

Incidents likes these prompted some Washington-based observers to oppose removal of sanctions. Others argued that isolating or punishing the new authorities in Damascus would not moderate them, though engagement and incentives might. In the end, much of the international community, and most critically Trump and Barrack, chose to support relief and engagement with al-Sharaa.

A year-end  deadline for the March 2025 agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), long backed by the United States, and the SDF’s associated Democratic Union Party (aka PYD), came to naught: The Kurdish side faced a stalemate as they refused to take any trust-building steps and persisted in their demand for “federalism.” The American side, led by Barrack, committed to a political solution and held multiple talks in Damascus, Erbil, and northeast Syria, but these efforts yielded no tangible results.

On January 16, al-Sharaa issued a presidential order granting Syrian citizenship to Syrian Kurds. This decision, which had been denied by the Assad family for decades, included other privileges such as recognizing Nowruz, marking the first day of spring, as a national holiday and allowing the Kurds to use and teach the Kurdish language.

This presidential order came in response to clashes between the Syrian government and Kurdish groups in Aleppo that lasted for two days and resulted in the evacuation of those groups to northeast Syria.

Following further clashes, the Kurdish-led forces withdrew from the Aleppo countryside, which served as the front line for the PYD against the Syrian government. This withdrawal led to a rapid domino collapse, resulting in the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from Raqqa and most of  Hasakeh province. This allowed the Syrian government to seize control of the oil resources and liberate two major cities overnight.

In an attempt to salvage what could be salvaged, Mazloum Abdi, the head of the SDF, flew to Damascus to meet with Barrack on January 18, 2026. Abdi announced that a new agreement had been reached with Damascus, allowing the SDF to be integrated into the Syrian army and interior ministry. Additionally, the Syrian government would receive control of the oil wells and all governmental institutions, including prisons. After Sal-haraa and Abdi signed a revised implementation agreement on January 30^th, fighting subsided and substantive, though preliminary and fragile, reintegration began.

Fragile ideological middle

Al-Sharaa has gone through a massive personal transformation that may presage the political transformation envisaged for Syria. He removed his military attire and addressed the Syrian people in a suit, adopted a conciliatory approach to various communities within Syria, and sent a clear message to the international community that Syria would be governed by a president rather than the military or religious councils of some sort.

This transformation faced—still faces, to a degree—challenges from his own base. Al-Sharaa wasn’t the only leader in HTS and other opposition movements, and some who shared his objective of defeating Assad advocated a more theocratic vision as the endpoint of revolution. This placed al-Sharaa in the fragile ideological middle: He needed to avoid a clear breach with more radical elements to gain their acquiescence to a governance model far different than that applied in Idlib during the war, one rooted in pragmatism and good relations among Syrians and with neighboring countries.

At the same time, the interim government must balance Turkish-Israeli competition, repatriation of refugees, and a massive reconstruction challenge. Will the path al-Sharaa publicly advocates—moderation, integration, balancing—succeed in managing the various pressures and challenges? It is too soon to say, but nearly a year after Assad’s fall, al-Sharaa is clearly on the right path. Continued pressure from Israel, internal challenges from Syrian hard-liners, the difficult path to reintegrating Druze and Kurds amicably, and immense reconstruction challenges mean that al-Sharaa remains at a critical juncture. Failure on any of these files could undermine faith in his leadership at home and abroad to a degree that momentum in stabilizing Syria would stall. Yet for now, al-Sharaa remains the indispensable man: The lack of alternatives may be his surest safeguard for staying on the path and keeping key domestic and international backers on board.

Asaad Sam Hanna is an intelligence analyst specializing in conflict resolution, regional security, policies, and strategic affairs.

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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.

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In this context, compromise should be viewed not as romanticism but as a geopolitical necessity and a cost-reduction mechanism. The interests of Turkey and the United States do not coincide one to one but, when they clash, the costs paid by both sides increase. Therefore, the emerging picture can be summarized as the two countries moving toward greater coordination in areas where they cannot replace each other and managing their disputes by compartmentalizing them. The return of leadership diplomacy, coordination aimed at producing results on the ground in Gaza, the window of opportunity for cooperation in post-Bashar al-Assad Syria and the Middle East, signals of controlled normalization in the defense sector, the institutional leverage created by the July 2026 NATO Summit, and Trump’s visit to Ankara beforehand all lead to the same conclusion: the relationship can progress not only through crisis-producing issues but also through crisis-preventing areas of agreement.

Leadership diplomacy

The first practical result of leadership diplomacy was the reactivation of that crucial channel with President Recep Erdoğan’s visit to Washington in 2025. The critical implication of this is that most of the problems in Turkish-US relations are political, not technical; even those that appear technical carry the burden of domestic politics, bureaucratic resistance, and intra-Alliance bargaining. Leader-level diplomacy does not eliminate this burden, but it does two things. First, it removes a deadlock from being a permanent obstacle; second, it produces the political authorization that makes technical negotiations possible. What is needed to expand areas of compromise in 2026 is to anchor this momentum in institutional channels: regular strategic dialogue, coordination between defense and foreign affairs channels, and rapid contact mechanisms that can be activated in times of crisis. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s functional contribution on Syria and Gaza in 2025 serves as proof for the White House of improved Turkish-US relations.

Gaza: Despite differences in rhetoric, results-oriented cooperation on the ground

The Gaza issue in Turkish-US relations can be positioned as an important example of compromise in 2025. Although Turkey and the United States have different discourses and priorities regarding the region, it was possible to produce results on the ground in areas such as establishing a ceasefire, access to humanitarian aid, practical implementation mechanisms, and diplomatic coordination. This stands out as a model in which compromise means producing the same result rather than establishing the same discourse.

In 2026, the strategic value of the Gaza file is twofold. First, it demonstrates that a joint crisis management capacity can be developed despite the long-standing normative divergence in Turkish-US relations. Second, this capacity is not just a momentary agreement. If it evolves into a process that can be sustained through multilateral formats, it creates a common output area that reduces regional costs for both countries. But the lesson of 2025 is clear: harmony is not absolute; it is sustainable when it is functional and goal oriented. Despite Israel’s objections, the White House’s support for Turkey’s participation in the International Stabilization Force and Ankara’s willingness to participate are among the most promising recent developments on the Ankara-Washington front. More importantly, the Turkish foreign minister’s presence as a signatory—standing alongside Trump at the inaugural meeting of his Board of Peace in Davos—underscores the weight Washington assigns to Turkey in addressing the Gaza crisis and highlights the potentially constructive role Ankara could play on the ground.

Syria and the Middle East after Assad

The Syria issue has long been a source of tension in Turkish-US relations. However, the past year has shown that the post-Assad era offers an opportunity to reframe this issue. The survival of the new order, the country’s territorial integrity, the establishment of central authority, the easing of sanctions, and the start of reconstruction processes create broad common ground between Ankara and Washington.

The key point that makes compromise possible here is this: for Turkey, stability in Syria means not only increasing border security but also preventing the risk of fragmentation and ensuring that terrorist threats are not reproduced. For the United States, a stable Syria is an outcome that limits the risk of regional wars spreading and reduces the need for costly military engagement. Therefore, in 2026, Syria might cease to be an area where the two countries pursue the same goal with different means and instead evolve into a partial convergence of means.

The file on the YPG and the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is not completely closed; however, with the SDF withdrawing from areas it had long controlled in the face of advancing Syrian forces, Ankara-Washington ties appear to be entering a new phase in terms of Syria. In particular, US Ambassador Tom Barrack’s remark that the conditions on the ground—and thus the perceived need for the SDF in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—have changed could be read as a historic turning point in Turkish-US relations. The critical element that will increase reconciliation in 2026 is verifiable progress on the ground in the post-SDF era: an integration timetable, security arrangements, the alignment of local administrations with the central state, and the limitation of moves by external actors that undermine stability. When this happens, the Syria file could transform from an unsolvable crisis to a manageable transition in the relationship. Furthermore, Washington’s goal is both to align with Ankara on the SDF/YPG issue and to play a role in bringing Israel to an understanding with Syria. Washington and Ankara are on the same page regarding Turkey’s political and military role in Syria providing security for Israel. When considered alongside the constructive and reasonable progress on the Gaza file, this could put the United States, Arab states, and Gulf countries on the same page—and, in turn, create an opportunity for Washington to renew its image as a Middle East peacemaker. This is a new historical threshold and allows for a restructuring of the Middle East regional security architecture that produces security for everyone. With its diplomatic capacity and crisis resolution capabilities, Turkey stands out as a key country in such a process. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s evolving defense pact—and the ongoing talks on Turkey’s potential participation—constitute a noteworthy development, signaling that regional security is shifting from ad hoc responses toward a more institutionalized architecture.

The issue of Iran—one of the critical topics in Turkish-US relations in the Middle East—stands out as an area to be managed (rather than to seek full agreement). Before the conflict broke out, Turkey pursued a cautious approach based on regional balance, economic interaction channels, and border security and cautioned against the military option.

Ankara and Washington share many interest vis-à-vis Iran, including preventing instability by Iranian proxy networks, securing maritime trade routes, limiting Iran’s nuclear program, and ensuring the resilience to shocks of regional energy and connectivity projects. However, Turkey’s security concerns related to potential outcomes of regime collapse and a power vacuum take precedence in policymakers decision-making.

Nevertheless, the United States and Turkey need to stay closely coordinated to prevent fallout from the conflict creating shocks to bilateral relations. Turkey is also poised to play a role in an eventual deescalation and resolution, in tandem with other regional countries.

Defense cooperation

Defense cooperation in Turkish-US relations is both the most fragile and the highest strategic lever. Throughout 2025, signals of normalization and controlled progress at the rhetorical level in the defense sector are coming to the fore: the F-35 issue becoming renegotiable, the emergence of more flexible language on US sanctions on weapons and military systems subject to the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, the F-16 procurement and modernization process advancing to a certain stage, and Turkey continuing its air force modernization with different options. Ankara’s Eurofighter initiative is a striking example of this.

It would be wrong to interpret this table as an immediate solution, but to say that there is no solution at all would miss the mark for 2026. In the defense sector, compromise is achieved not through a single major decision but through a series of complementary, small steps: technical working groups, oversight and transparency mechanisms that address compliance and security concerns, supply chain and subsystem cooperation, joint production, and modernization packages. In particular, the emergence of Turkey’s need for critical components such as domestic fighter jets and engines presents an opportunity to shift the relationship from the crisis files of the past to the capacity partnership of the future. Real compromise could grow in 2026 as the parties shift from the language of maximum demand to the language of feasible packages.

NATO and European security

One of the most important topics to emphasize in bilateral relations is Turkey’s hosting of the 2026 NATO Summit. This is not a protocol detail in terms of bilateral relations; it is a strategic framework opportunity. NATO is the historical backbone of Turkish-US relations. When the backbone is strengthened, the management of side issues also becomes easier.

Washington’s approach in 2026, which pushes Europe to take on more responsibility and pressures it to share the defense burden, increases Turkey’s value within the Alliance. For Ankara, this opportunity is not just about rehashing the rhetoric of strategic importance—it is about institutionalizing coordination through concrete agendas: southern flank security, Black Sea balance, defense industrial capacity, readiness levels, and new threat areas. If the summit process is well managed, Turkish-US relations could enter a more predictable trajectory over the next year, fueled by a common Alliance agenda rather than scattered crisis headlines.

Russia-Ukraine and the Black Sea

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine War, Turkey’s mediation and balancing policy is seen by Washington as a complementary diplomatic role. This area offers one of the most realistic forms of compromise: not complete alignment but a division of labor. There are differences between the US approach and Turkey’s concerns about Black Sea balance, but both sides acknowledge the strategic value of keeping diplomatic channels open and striving to manage the war in a controlled manner. Trump’s frequent references to Turkey’s mediation capacity on Ukraine is more than a normative position; it is an indication that Turkey’s military diplomatic capacity is understood.

What will increase consensus in 2026 is the institutionalization of this division of labor: preventing escalation in the Black Sea, managing trade and maritime security risks, and maintaining concrete mechanisms such as prisoner exchanges and humanitarian mechanisms could make Turkey a burden reducer from Washington’s perspective. Success in this area will be measured less by declaring a common position and more by operating a common crisis management capacity.

South Caucasus

The capacity for compromise in Turkish-US relations can be interpreted as a quiet coordination that manifests itself in the Middle East, the NATO axis, and the South Caucasus. Although Washington and Ankara’s perspectives on this region do not always fit within the same conceptual framework, the common ground between the two capitals is clear: strengthening lasting stability in the South Caucasus, ending cycles of conflict, and preventing the region from becoming a fierce proxy arena for external power competition. For this reason, the Caucasus could form a constructive agenda in the Turkey-US relationship, one that does not generate major headlines but makes the relationship more predictable.

The logic of this compromise takes shape on two levels. First, it supports normalization and peace processes (e.g., between Armenia and Azerbaijan). Progress toward regional peace is consistent with Turkey’s goals of security and connectivity in its immediate neighborhood, while also contributing to the erosion of Russia-centered security dependencies. Second, a security approach that enhances the capacity of regional actors but does not encourage conflict requires a more measured form of engagement aimed at deterrence and stability without completely overwhelming the field with military competition.

In these early days of 2026, there is another reason for addressing the Caucasus as a separate point of agreement in Turkish-US relations: this region is a rare area in which the two countries’ interests often produce complementarity rather than competition. Turkey’s proximity to the region, its political influence, and its capacity for connectivity—combined with the United States’ diplomatic weight and its ability to generate international legitimacy—increase the likelihood of producing a solution file rather than a crisis file. Of course, there are vulnerabilities. The slowdown of peace processes, disruptive moves by external actors, and internal political fluctuations could turn this area back into a source of tension. However, precisely because of these risks, the Caucasus will be an important testing ground in 2026 for what compromise means in Turkish-US relations: not complete alignment in rhetoric but coordination that enhances stability on the ground.

Conclusion

In 2026, Ankara and Washington can create strategic breathing room in their relations through well-designed compromises. The common character of these compromises is cost-reducing functionality rather than ideological convergence. This includes results-oriented coordination on the ground in Gaza, common ground for the sustainability of the post-Assad order in Syria and the Middle East, a shift from crisis to process management in the defense sector, a strengthened institutional backbone within the NATO 2026 framework, and a division of labor in the Black Sea. They all point to the same thing: the future of the relationship lies not in denying disagreements but in accumulating enough common ground to prevent disagreements from holding the relationship hostage.

If these areas of compromise are linked to shared timelines, verifiable steps, and regular consultation mechanisms, Turkish-US relations could make a real leap from controlled fragility to institutionalized pragmatism. And this leap would produce what both sides need most in today’s stormy international environment: predictability.

Murat Yeşiltaş serves as director of foreign policy research at the Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, a policy think tank based in Ankara and also known as SETA. In addition, he is a professor of international politics at the Social Science University of Ankara.

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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.

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Mutually antagonistic narratives have served domestic political purposes in both countries and have become something of a staple in the age of populist democracy of the twenty-first century. Yet the two countries rely on each other extensively in matters of trade, diplomacy, and security. State-to-state relationships are sometimes smoothed over in public but fractious in practice; the US-Turkish dyad is the rarer obverse: disagreeable in public for domestic audiences while resting on a high degree of alignment and collaboration.

Where do bilateral relations go when trust is low, mutual perception negative, but operational collaboration frequent? The answer depends less on rhetoric or polemical discourse and more on alignment of practical interests: We therefore must clear away the smoke of domestically motivated rhetoric to instead focus on mutual benefit. If two states pursue compatible goals and interests, room remains to balance internal political benefits with geopolitical cooperation in a form of complex interdependence. Whether that is the case for the United States and Turkey is a matter of substantial interest, given the weight that both have in the international system and the substantial number of crises and international matters that affect them.

Rorschach test

Articulating interests is more of a political than an academic exercise. It also presents something of a Rorschach test: If you ascribe ideological frames as determinative of status for Ankara (e.g., neo-Ottomanism, Muslim Brotherhood Islamism, reckless aggression) it brings you to one implied set of Turkish interests. If you accept declarative policy as the whole story you get another implied set. It is similarly the case for the United States: If you assume hegemonic interests are the primary driver, it takes you down a certain path; however, that road shifts significantly between and sometimes within presidential administrations. American interests as viewed by Trump differ significantly from those of his predecessor. Yet pattern analysis over time—observed behaviors and statements toward particular goals—tell us how specific a US president and his Turkish counterpart actually perceive the degree to which their interests overlap.

As an imperfect but useful generality, we can ascribe the following traits to Turkish foreign policy: multiaxial engagement and balance-seeking, nationalistic, hard power/realpolitik, traditionally but conditionally attached to the status quo. For decades, Ankara has sought to maximize autonomy while pressing for positive coalitions, where possible. For most of the current century, the United States has focused on maintaining a privileged or primary position in the international system, leavened increasingly with a dose of parsimony and pragmatism, but resting on what might be called enduring counter-revisionism (still in the tradition of US naval strategist and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan).

Ankara and Washington have demonstrated a generally cooperative approach across numerous regional and global issues in recent decades because their top-line approaches are compatible: one a retrenching-but-potent leading power, the other a rising middle power, both disinclined to establish imperial arrangements or to allow others to do so. A brief review of these issues illustrates this general (if imperfect) alignment by assigning numeric values reflecting relative alignment of strategic and diplomatic approaches between the two. Any such numbers game comes with attendant risk of overgeneralizing and missing some context, but statecraft and policy analysis at the higher levels of abstraction unavoidably entail some risk in this regard. So the numbers below are presented as suggestive rather than determinative.

In the table below, full interest alignment equals 1, partial interest alignment 0.5, neither alignment nor friction 0, friction -0.5, counteralignment -1. Descriptions of the cases follow the table.

Table 1: Sizing up US-Turkish alignment and friction on sixteen issues

Black Sea/Ukraine: Both sides wish to see the war end with Ukrainian independence intact; neither recognizes Russian claims over Crimea or Donbass, though Washington has signaled willingness to negotiate the status of territories Russia partially or fully occupies at present. Some differences exist regarding Black Sea access: The United States might like to have access for its own ships and more broadly for a NATO presence and routine access, while Turkey has preferred littoral NATO states do the lifting and a strict interpretation of the Montreux Convention; but neither wants a Russian conquest of Ukraine’s coastline. For a Trump administration interested in some compromise deal with Moscow, the Turkish position is complementary.

Caucasus/Russia: While the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) offers wins for the region and the United States, the Armenian position is a wildcard with elections approaching. Should Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan get the boot in parliamentary elections (to be held no later than mid-June 2026), the United States may tack back to a position that pressures Azerbaijan and marginalizes Ankara. Russian and Iranian pushback on a deal that opens the region to trade on US-friendly terms can be expected. Interest alignment here between Ankara and Washington is solid, though the prospects for realized gain uncertain.

Central Asia: The TRIPP shows US interest in opening up more trade to Central Asia and balancing against outright domination of the region by Russia or China. The Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States both have value in this regard—and have generated more interest from the Trump administration than its predecessor. Central Asia has not traditionally been an area of high investment for the US government; however, energy companies are interested, so having an ally be more engaged is an advantage.  

Africa: US investment and engagement in Africa has lagged, but Washington has concerns about Chinese or Russian influence on the continent. Meanwhile, Turkey has dramatically increased its diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Africa over the past two decades. In countries like Somalia and Libya, Turkish presence has lent heft to US diplomatic and counterterror initiatives. Africa demonstrates the complementarity of having compatible goals but varying levels of commitment.

Syria: Trump has made clear his policy that Syria will be stabilized and maintained as a unitary state and that Ahmed al-Sharaa is an acceptable figure to lead. This comports with Turkish policy, despite Israel’s objections. The assignment of Trump confidant Thomas J. Barrack Jr. as special envoy and positive statements from the US-Turkish working group on Syria have shown close convergence on Syria policy, a remarkable turnaround from the previous decade. The January 2026 agreement to reintegrate northeast Syria with the Syrian Transitional Government was a sign that this alignment was proving determinative on the ground. 

Iraq: Washington wants a stable Iraq that is: not dominated by Iran; oriented to Western energy markets more than Iranian or Chinese; and working amicably with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Iraq may not fulfill all those interests, but Ankara shares them, and the Development Road project to foster Eastern trade with Europe provides a vehicle for all three countries to earn profits while tightening Baghdad’s ties to Western economies. The presence of PKK fighters in northern Iraq remains a point of friction, but ongoing negotiations to disarm the PKK – and US support for those talks – has taken helped reduce that friction.

Gaza: Washington and Ankara both pressed Israel and Hamas, respectively, to accept a ceasefire deal, return of hostages, and military withdrawal from Gaza in return for disarmament. While the truce remains shaky as of late 2025 and the end state Trump and Erdoğan have in mind may differ somewhat, the coordination on diplomatic efforts has been unambiguous.

Iran: There is divergence here between the hard line taken in Washington toward the Islamic Republic and the modus vivendi approach in Ankara. While Ankara may not want regime change in Tehran, and wants to protect trade with its neighbor, the Turkish government has no illusions about Tehran’s destabilizing regional behavior and shares an interest in deterring it. Ankara has tightened enforcement of multilateral sanctions on the Iranian nuclear program—partially redressing a long-standing US grievance with Ankara. The launch of Israel-U.S. Operation Epic Fury to destroy Iran’s power projection and nuclear capabilities has driven fears of instability and chaos along the Turkish border, turning this from an area of some overlap into an area of friction.

Energy: Ankara’s energy diplomacy has sought to position the country as a hub for multidirectional energy transit and major new gas, oil, and nuclear deals have been signed with Washington. US pressure to decrease oil purchases from Russia has created some strain, as Ankara cannot shift to alternate suppliers as quickly as it can with gas.

US global leadership: American leadership that cooperates with Ankara on key strategic objectives, praising in public and transacting in private, plays like music to the ears of Turks. This contrasts greatly with the constraining approach Turkish leaders called for regarding perceived American overreach in Iraq, Syria, and other regions over the past two decades, including demands to reform the United Nations to lessen the power of the five permanent members. Still, this middle power and the great power have imperfect but positive alignment at present.

Trade/defense trade: The relatively light 15 percent tariff levied on Turkish goods and the $100 billion shared goal for bilateral trade are clear indicators of positive intentions. But defense trade is thorny, with a congressional role and some competition between rising Turkish defense players and US prime defense contractors.

European Union: Ankara and Washington remain at odds with Brussels ideologically and stylistically, while maintaining strong strategic and trade ties with numerous members states. Yet the tensions stem from different sources: Turkish desire to enter the bloc and the American administration’s desire to end what it perceives as the EU’s exploitative trade and security practices.

Eastern Mediterranean: The continuing friction between Greece and Turkey redounds against US-Turkish bilateral relations—a problem that continues to play out in the region and in Congress.

Sanctions: The divergences are clear regarding imposition: Ankara supports multilateral but generally not unilateral sanctions and enforcement, whereas the Turkish track record looks spotty from Washington’s perspective.

Israel: Ankara and Jerusalem pursued a rapprochement in the months before October 7, 2023; since then, rancor, acrimony, and mutual suspicion have become the norm. While regional competition over Syria, the Palestinians, and other issues can be managed, related tensions spill over into US-Turkish bilateral relations in a major way—and that seems likely to persist.

Venezuela: Erdoğan’s quixotic friendship with President Maduro had its roots in terms of oil sales and multipolarity theory, but was a clear point of policy divergence as Trump upped the pressure level on Caracas. With the early 2026 arrest of Maduro and muted response from Ankara, this seems likely to be a decreasing source of tension in U.S.-Turkish relations.

A clear trend and policy takeaway

In conclusion, this assessment sketch of sixteen complicated cases of regional and global policy matters yields eleven that demonstrate substantial bilateral alignment, four with significant unalignment, and one somewhere in between. The aggregate score by the simple rubric of “words and deeds reflect alignment” was positive (+4.5 – with the caveat that these numbers are illustrative but rooted more in subjective alignment rather than formal quantitative criteria). An honest critic might quibble with individual ratings and the framing of the cases or argue for the salience of other matters. Yet sixteen is a reasonable sample size, the thought exercise is revealing, and the trend clear: more alignment than friction overall.  

The policy takeaway is equally clear: maintaining a working relationship is vital for both countries. Those arguing for punitive approaches (by the United States) or hedging (by Turkey) disregard potential mutual benefits as well as both opportunity costs and implementation costs. Managing differences and satisfying domestic sentiment require an adaptive response from policy elites in both countries, but the record of cooperation in 2025 indicates that the pragmatism of both presidents fits the moment—and the alignment.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.

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This interview was conducted on January 26, 2026 and has been lightly edited for style.

DJ: We’ve heard that you have agreed to join the Caucus on US-Turkish Relations and Turkish Americans—great news for the bilateral relationship and those interested in it. Can you tell us a little bit about the role of congressional caucuses in general and why we need a Turkey Caucus?

Walkinshaw: I served as chief of staff to the late Rep. Gerry Connolly for nearly a decade. During that time, Rep. Connolly was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and served as a co-chair of the bipartisan Caucus on US-Turkish Relations and Turkish Americans. In my capacity as chief of staff, I supported his leadership on the caucus and, in response to constituent engagement and the strategic importance of the US–Turkish relationship, chose to join the caucus myself.

Congressional country caucuses can play a constructive role in strengthening bilateral relationships, while also providing a bipartisan forum to raise concerns and address areas of disagreement. Rep. Connolly understood the importance of maintaining a strong diplomatic relationship with Turkey, but he was also clear-eyed and outspoken about President Erdoğan’s persistent efforts to consolidate power and suppress political dissent. He used his position as co-chair to consistently sound the alarm about the erosion of democratic norms in Turkey.

I spent years supporting Rep. Connolly’s work in this space, and I intend to use my role on the caucus to continue advocating for a stable, prosperous, and democratic Turkey, and a strong US-Turkish relationship.

DJ: Turkey plays an important role in several major foreign policy priorities for Washington: ending the war in Ukraine, stabilizing Syria, finding a better way out for Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza, and forging a lasting peace in the South Caucasus. And despite the prevailing polarization in US politics, there have been encouraging signs of bipartisan approach in these areas—illustrated by the trip of Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, a Democrat, and Rep. Joe Wilson, a Republican, to Syria and the region last August. How hard is it to work across the aisle on foreign policy matters in the current environment?

Walkinshaw: US foreign policy is framed through bilateral ties, diplomatic and security agreements, treaties, and international organizations with guiding principles to promote democracy, ensure stability, and to invest and work with partners while deterring escalation or military action by adversaries.

It requires balancing the three D’s: defense, diplomacy, and development. Congress may not always agree on how the three D’s should be best implemented, but it’s important to acknowledge that one should not exist without the other and that’s the balance we are always trying to strike when working on foreign policy matters in Congress. Nevertheless, my approach is to identify a path to “yes.” Effective governance requires bipartisan engagement and a willingness to work constructively with colleagues across the aisle. Even in such a polarized environment, I am pleased that Congress worked on consequential issues such as reunifying families separated after the Korean War by passing the Korean American Divided Families National Registry Act, repealing the 1991 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force, and reestablishing the program at the US State Department to support the Ukrainian government in tracking Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. While significant work remains, these efforts underscore that there are serious foreign policy challenges where Congress can, and must, continue to act in a bipartisan manner.

DJ: How do you see the role of Congress—both houses—in shaping US foreign policy and interacting with the executive branch? What is the right balance between oversight/checks and balances on the one hand and “divisions stop at the water’s edge” on the other?

Walkinshaw: Congress is the preeminent branch of government, with broad powers outlined in Article I of the Constitution. What we have seen over the last twenty years, when the White House and Congress are controlled by different parties, Congress finds its Article 1 powers, and when the White House and Congress are controlled by the same party, Congress loses sight of its Article 1 powers. Article 1 of the US Constitution states clearly that Congress has the power to declare war, to lay and collect taxes and duties, and regulate commerce with foreign nations. President Trump is running roughshod and Congress has the responsibility to assert its authorities under the Constitution. President Trump illegally invaded Venezuela with no congressional authorization, putting US service members’ lives at risk, has implemented tariffs unilaterally and illegally, and recently foolishly threatened to purchase or invade Greenland.

Congress must reassert its powers under Article 1 in a bipartisan manner. I’ve supported War Powers resolutions to withdraw troops from hostilities that haven’t been authorized by Congress and voted to terminate the president’s misuse of International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorities to implement tariffs on long-standing US allies. This is a consequential moment in modern American history. President Trump has repeatedly undermined the postwar, rules-based international order and pressured long-standing US allies. Congress possesses clear constitutional authorities to act as a check on this behavior. The challenge is not a lack of power, but a lack of political will among some members to exercise it in the face of partisan pressure and potential political retaliation.

DJ: Your district is one of a handful in the Congress that have massive intrinsic interest in foreign policy and foreign affairs—because of a significant foreign-born population, businesses with foreign interests, and constituents involved with foreign policy and defense. Do you get a lot of input from constituents in your district about foreign policy?

Walkinshaw: I’m proud to represent such a diverse district: 31 percent of the residents in my district are foreign-born. VA-11 is home to a vibrant Korean American community, Uyghur community, South Asian community, and many other immigrant communities that enrich our civic life. VA-11 is also home to more than 50,000 federal employees, many of whom bring national security, foreign policy, and public service experience shaped by our proximity to Washington, DC, and the Pentagon. As a result, my constituents are deeply engaged, highly informed, and passionate about international affairs and US foreign policy.

I value that engagement and actively seek input from constituents, welcome substantive dialogue on their priorities and concerns, and work to ensure their perspectives inform the actions I take in Congress. Representing this district carries both a responsibility and an opportunity; to listen, to lead, and to translate constituent expertise into effective policymaking.

DJ: The US-Turkish relationship has traditionally been focused on defense and security and followed the ups and downs of regional crises. Is it possible to broaden that scope a bit through people-to-people ties, parliamentary exchanges, and greater business cooperation? Is there a role for Congress to play in catalyzing that sort of growth?

Walkinshaw: It is possible to broaden and deepen the US-Turkish relationship, and Congress can play a constructive role in catalyzing that progress. Increased people-to-people ties, parliamentary exchange, and greater business cooperation can and should play an important role in advancing the dialogue around the benefits of civil society and democracy.

DJ: Your predecessor, Congressman Connolly, was a co-chair of the Turkey Caucus, and you were a major support to him during your previous work. Is there unfinished work for the caucus, and what do you see as the best priorities for it after several years of being relatively quiet?

Walkinshaw: The late Rep. Connolly was a steadfast advocate for democratic governance and the rule of law in Turkey. He forcefully condemned the 2016 coup attempt and was equally clear-eyed about President Erdoğan’s subsequent consolidation of power and erosion of democratic institutions. I share those concerns.

At the same time, it is important to recognize Turkey’s significant diplomatic role in a volatile region. Owing to its geostrategic position at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus, Turkey has at times served as a key intermediary, including through its role in brokering the Black Sea Grain Initiative and supporting US efforts to secure a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.

Moving forward, my approach is to uphold democratic principles while engaging with strategic realities.

DJ: What are your greatest concerns regarding US-Turkish relations currently, and what (if any) advice would you have for leaders in both countries to address those?

Walkinshaw: My primary concerns regarding US-Turkish relations center on President Erdoğan’s consolidation of power and his continued engagement with US adversaries. His suppression of political dissent and pursuit of closer alignment with blocs such as BRICS raise serious questions, particularly given Turkey’s status as a NATO ally.

A stronger and more durable US-Turkish relationship ultimately depends on shared democratic commitments. Reaffirming respect for free and fair elections, the rule of law, and the expressed priorities of the Turkish people would not only strengthen Turkey’s democratic institutions but also improve trust and cooperation with the United States and our allies. With respect to President Trump, his record reflects a disregard for democratic norms and the postwar rules-based international order. While his tenure is limited, Congress retains an enduring responsibility to assert its constitutional authorities. I remain confident that Congress will be positioned to more effectively reassert its role, restore oversight, and serve as a meaningful check on executive overreach in the near future.

Congressman James Walkinshaw is a first-term representative of Virginia’s eleventh congressional district. Congressman Walkinshaw serves on the influential House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, on the Military and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, and on the Committee on Homeland Security. He is the Founder and Co-Chair of the Federal Workforce Caucus, launched alongside Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) and Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.)

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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.

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The post Q&A with Rep. James Walkinshaw (VA-11) appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As we enter the second year of the Trump Administration, US-Turkish relations and developments in regions critical to both have been dramatic and fast-paced. Events in Syria and Libya are trending towards state consolidation and strategic opportunity for both Washington and Ankara, while the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine at NATO’s doorstep, the volatile situation in Gaza, and the unfolding war in Iran present challenges both sides seek to navigate in complementary ways.

Technological and geopolitical developments have increased the need for close consultation between the NATO allies, and bilateral coordination has been evident across a range of issues. Yet strategic cooperation remains constrained by a variety of factors. This issue of the Defense Journal takes up several of the regional, military-technical, and policy issues of interest to readers in both countries and to those tracking US-Turkish relations. In an era of positive relations between the two countries’ presidents, parliamentary relations and policy influence also carry great weight—and in this issue we are pleased to have interviews with US Congressman James Walkinshaw and the chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Turkish Parliament Fuat Oktay to add the legislative perspective to bilateral strategic ties.

Rich Outzen and Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council Turkey Program co-managing editors

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council Turkey Program‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International and Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council; former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Assistant Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Permanent Representative to NATO

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Under Secretary of Defense

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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.

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The post Navigating change: US-Turkish defense relations in 2026 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The interview was conducted on February 18, 2026 and has been lightly edited for style.

DJ: Recent developments in Syria appear to have removed a long-standing elephant in the room in US–Turkish relations. Washington and Ankara now seem aligned on preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and on the primacy of a centralized government in Damascus under President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s leadership. How do you assess this convergence, and what does it signal for the future of US–Turkish security cooperation?

Oktay: It is true that Türkiye and the United States have converged in recent years on a number of foreign policy issues. This convergence is visible not only in Syria, but also in efforts to end the war in Ukraine, support a durable framework in Gaza, and encouraging progress in the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process, among other areas. This convergence is for the establishment of sustainable peace and stability in our region. Our region is tired of conflicts and war. The issues in our region should be solved through dialogue and not through armed clashes and war.

In Syria, Türkiye has been supporting the unity and territorial integrity of this country since the very beginning. Now both Türkiye and the United States support Syria’s territorial integrity and unity and recognize the importance of a centralized and effective government in Damascus. A united, stable, inclusive, and prosperous Syria is, first and foremost, in the interest of the Syrian people. It is also in the interest of the broader region.

This convergence reflects a realistic reading of regional dynamics and a mutual understanding that sustainable solutions require regional actors and inclusive diplomacy.

It is the right time to reinforce the positive momentum in Türkiye–US relations to a resilient, future-oriented, principled relationship, grounded in mutual respect and strategic responsibility.

DJ: Do you see this more constructive atmosphere on Syria translating into movement on bilateral defense ties? In your view, what should both sides do to enhance the defense portfolio? And to follow up, what are the odds of Türkiye’s eventual return to the F-35 program in the near to medium term?

Oktay: Defense cooperation should be viewed in the wider context of the overall relationship. One of the main drivers of a more constructive atmosphere has been the direct and cordial dialogue between President [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan and President [Donald] Trump. Strong engagement at the leadership level has generated momentum across multiple areas of cooperation.

Economically, our bilateral trade volume is approaching $40 billion, and we share the objective of reaching $100 billion. Major items—such as Turkish airline companies’ aircraft purchases, long-term LNG [liquefied natural gas] arrangements, and potential future cooperation in civil nuclear energy—can further deepen our economic ties.

In this spirit, defense cooperation should mirror the positive trajectory in our bilateral relations, as well as the growing convergence on regional policy issues. For this reason, it is important to overcome the existing restrictions affecting Türkiye in the defense industry domain. Restrictions between allies are, by definition, inconsistent with the spirit of alliance and partnership.

At present, there are efforts at the governmental level in both countries to identify a workable path forward, including on the question of Türkiye’s access to the F-35 program. In February, as the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, we visited Washington, DC, and held constructive discussions with our counterparts in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. We conveyed our view that it is neither coherent nor sustainable to maintain such restrictions among partners and allies. We hope to see tangible progress at the congressional level to strengthen defense industry cooperation.

DJ: Türkiye’s defense industry has undergone a remarkable transformation over the past decade. Where do you see Turkish defense industrial capabilities today, and what do they represent for both Türkiye and the NATO Alliance? Looking ahead, what should be Ankara’s strategic priorities in this domain?

Oktay: Türkiye’s defense industry has achieved significant and sustained progress over the past two decades. During this period, we have transitioned from an import-procurement model toward a high-volume domestic design and production model, with a growing export dimension.

The share of local and national production in the defense industry has increased from around 20 percent to more than 80 percent, and we expect this rate to reach 85 percent in the near future.

Today, Türkiye is producing manned and unmanned fighter aircraft, such as the Kaan and Kızılelma jets, warships, armored vehicles, missiles, and rockets, as well as advanced sensors and related systems. At the same time, Türkiye is increasingly localizing critical electronic subsystems, including avionics, data links, communications, and mission computers, as well as smart munitions. Defense exports have now surpassed $10 billion annually. Turkish defense industry exports and cooperation cover 185 countries covering all continents, including such NATO members as the US, UK, Spain, and Italy.

In summary, Türkiye has become an important global producer of advanced defense technologies. These capabilities—both in production scale and technological innovation—represent a valuable contribution to NATO’s collective security, and particularly to European security. In this context, the inclusion of Türkiye in European defense industry initiatives is essential in order for both NATO and Europe to fully benefit from Türkiye’s achievements in this field.

DJ: The KAAN fighter program is widely viewed as a cornerstone of Türkiye’s future force structure. What vision do you associate with KAAN, both in terms of operational capabilities and Türkiye’s broader ambitions for defense cooperation and access to new defense markets?

Oktay: KAAN is among the most advanced fifth-generation fighter projects currently under development. It reflects core fifth-generation design requirements such as low observability, sensor fusion, and network-enabled operational concepts.

KAAN will represent a significant capability enhancement for the Turkish Air Force and will strengthen NATO’s southeastern flank. In addition, the program is a major driver of innovation for Türkiye’s broader aerospace ecosystem, with spillover effects across engineering, production, and advanced systems integration.

A number of countries have expressed interest in acquiring or co-producing KAAN. Last year, an agreement for forty-eight KAANaircraft was signed with Indonesia, and several other countries remain in close contact with Türkiye regarding potential cooperation.

DJ: The next NATO summit will be hosted in Ankara. What does this mean symbolically and strategically for the Alliance and for Türkiye? How do you assess Türkiye’s role within NATO today—and NATO’s importance for Türkiye?

Oktay: We look forward to hosting NATO’s next summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026. The summit will be an important opportunity to review progress in implementing the Hague commitments and to take decisions that further strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defense posture.

As the war in Ukraine has heightened Europe’s security concerns and uncertainty is affecting transatlantic relations, the Ankara Summit will be a critical meeting. Key issues will be discussed, and major decisions will be taken on the future direction of the Alliance.

Türkiye has always played, and continues to play, a vital role in the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. Türkiye holds NATO’s second-largest army and remains among the top contributors to NATO operations and missions, supporting both the Alliance’s southeastern and eastern flanks. We have already exceeded the 2-percent benchmark in defense spending, and we remain committed to further strengthening our contributions.

As we are committed to the security of our allies, we likewise expect them to be fully committed to Türkiye’s security and defense.

DJ: Türkiye’s influence across the Turkic world has grown, particularly through the Organization of Turkic States. How would you characterize Ankara’s strategic vision in this space, and what does the geopolitical horizon suggest about Türkiye’s long-term role across this geography?

Oktay: Türkiye has deep historical and cultural ties across the Turkic world. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is today the principal political framework for multilateral cooperation in this space. It reflects a shared vision to deepen integration and promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity. The OTS also functions as a catalyst for stronger regional ownership, and with the establishment of multiple sub-institutions, it is evolving rapidly into a more structured and specialized organization.

In parallel, the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TÜRKPA) serves as the main platform for strengthening parliamentary cooperation among Turkic states and supporting broader integration efforts. At the parliamentary level, we have also developed a mechanism for bringing together the Foreign Relations Committees of the Parliaments of Turkic States. The first such meeting took place in Azerbaijan, and the second meeting was held in Istanbul last year. 

Through these institutions—along with strong bilateral relations—Türkiye is expanding cultural, political, and economic cooperation and coordination among Turkic states, with the objective of promoting peace and prosperity across Central Asia and the Caucasus.Bottom of Form

Fuat Oktay is the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Türkiye. He served as the last Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry between 2016 and 2018. In the first cabinet of the Presidential Government System, he served as Türkiye’s first Vice President between 2018 and 2023.

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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.

Learn more

The post Q&A with Turkish Member of Parliament Fuat Oktay appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For years, Turkey has backed the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, which is recognized by the United Nations as Libya’s legitimate authority. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, have long supported the eastern faction, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by warlord and former CIA asset Khalifa Haftar. Interestingly, Turkey and the Tobruk-based LNA have entered a chapter of significant engagement after being sworn enemies for much of the last decade.

Turkey, for its part, seeks to expand influence over the entirety of Libya for economic and geopolitical gains, wanting to gain access to Libya’s vast oils fields in the eastern zone and aiming to impose its stance in an ongoing maritime dispute with Greece and Egypt over the Eastern Mediterranean, where both countries claim maritime territory. Meanwhile, Haftar and his sons seek recognition from regional powers such as Turkey to legitimize the family’s rule and become the de facto leadership of Libya.

Why this matters

These developments represent a significant shift in domestic and regional dynamics. Domestically, it strengthens Haftar’s LNA as it vies for that prime governing role. The LNA is contending for greater international recognition than the GNU, and a buy-in from a powerful actor like Turkey would surely tip the scales, granting the LNA a level of international legitimacy that could surpass that of the GNU.

The international community (as expressed through the UN) sees the GNU as the legitimate force, but will have to come to terms with Dbeibah’s weakened political hand. Dbeibah himself is well aware of the stakes involved, and while publicly he has endorsed what he sees as Turkey’s “backing of Libya’s stability,” it would be naïve to think he welcomes such efforts. Additionally, it will embolden the Haftar family to continue pursuing an aggressive push for regional integration under its command, potentially leading to de facto unification, albeit under leadership with an abysmal human rights record and dubious allegiance to the West.

Why the LNA welcomes Turkey’s support

In 2019, when Haftar launched his military offensive to gain control over Tripoli, the capital city, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent military support to the GNU, including troops, ships, drones and advisers, for its defense, signaling Turkey’s strong commitment to the Western-backed government. Today, however, Turkey’s goal of repositioning itself regionally spurred a strategic cost-benefit calculus. Isolated after attempting to become a regional hegemon, Turkey has sought to reestablish itself in the region through strategic reengagement with countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

For its part, the LNA stands to benefit considerably from Ankara’s strategic repositioning. First, a potential defense partnership between the LNA and Turkey is quickly taking shape, and it stands to deliver substantial benefits to the Haftar family. In April 2025, Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa and deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan Ground Forces, met Turkey’s general chief of staff, Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu, to discuss a mutually beneficial defense agreement which would include joint military training, capacity building, information sharing, and the procurement of weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Earlier that month, Saddam Haftar paid an official visit to Ankara, marking a new chapter in relations between the nation and the Libyan faction. A subsequent visit by a military delegation from Libya’s eastern forces to Turkey confirmed that this shift is underway, and soldiers from Haftar’s LNA have recently begun training at bases in Turkey, as forces associated with the government in Tripoli have done beginning of  2020.

Secondly, Ankara is looking to deepen its energy ties by investing in gas exploration over disputed water with Libya’s eastern faction. In 2019, Ankara signed an exploratory agreement with Libya’s western faction in Tripoli, but the agreement failed to take off due to eastern opposition. Today, Libya’s eastern powerbrokers look poised to sign it—if, that is, they are granted oversight control over the outputs, after complaining for multiple years of being excluded from key revenue streams and leadership opportunities. If signed, the explorations could provide significant financial benefits to Libya’s eastern area, which suffers from recurring fuel shortages due to its lack of refining capacity. It would also help boost Haftar’s legitimacy by aiding him with key supplies for the local population under his control, strengthening his position both domestically and internationally. 

Third, a rapprochement with Ankara would give the Haftars valuable leverage with Russia and Turkey, enabling them to extract greater concessions from both nations. The Haftars have long been supported by the Russians, especially since their Tripoli offensive in 2019; in turn, they’ve allowed Russian Africa Corps troops to run wild in parts of the country, furthering Russia’s footprint on the continent. While Russia once held greater leverage over the Haftars, this dynamic shifted after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in January 2025, which prompted Moscow to withdraw its military equipment there and seek new military footholds in Libya. Now, with the Haftar family having the upper hand, the family can try to leverage this renewed position of strength to expand its alliances without fearing repercussions from Russia, Turkey’s long-standing rival in the region. It also can hope to exact concessions from both parties, extracting both economic and military benefits which would help consolidate domestic authority.

Implications for the Eastern Mediterranean

The engagement between Libya’s eastern faction and Turkey will likely have ripple effects across the region. First, it could sour the relationship between Egypt and Turkey over the disputed maritime zone agreements. Currently, Egypt rejects the maritime zone set between Ankara and Tripoli, considering them an infringement of Egyptian maritime sovereignty as they cut across water lines. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has made it abundantly clear he will reject any association agreement between Libya and Turkey, potentially reigniting tensions after their historic 2023 rapprochement. Egypt claims that any oil exploration will infringe on its territorial seas, denouncing them as an infringement of international law. Such tensions would have enormous consequences for the Mediterranean region writ large.

Second, Haftar, could use any growing tension between Egypt and Turkey to extract greater concessions for himself by playing Ankara against Cairo. By publicly signaling deference to Egyptian authority while quietly advancing his ties with Turkey, Haftar stands to emerge stronger, consolidating his family’s hold on power and potentially paving the way for unifying Libyan territory under their control.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Alissa Pavia is a nonresident senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Within the Atlantic Council’s longstanding commitment to strengthening the transatlantic relationship, the Atlantic Council Turkey Program conducts research, provides thought leadership, and offers a platform for strategic dialogue between the US, Turkey, and NATO allies to address the region’s toughest challenges and explore opportunities, including in the fields of energy, business & trade, technology, defense, and security.

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The post As Ankara rethinks its Libyan policy, the Haftar family stands to gain appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Many in the West are still in denial over the scale of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia and continue to believe a negotiated settlement is the only realistic option to end the war. This is dangerously delusional. In reality, attempting to make deals with Putin today is as shortsighted as seeking to bargain with Adolf Hitler at the height of World War II. In the 1940s, the allies rejected that idea because they recognized Hitler would never stop and had to be defeated. There is a desperate need for such clarity today.

For the past year, Putin has sabotaged US-led peace talks with endless stalling tactics and diplomatic distractions. It should now be obvious that the Russian ruler is only engaging in negotiations for cynical reasons. First, he seeks to avoid further pressure from the United States. Second, he wishes to buy time to continue destroying Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure. Third, he intends to divide the West and deter further support for Kyiv.

Putin signals his lack of interest in peace by making absurd demands that no Ukrainian government could possibly accept. He calls for Ukraine to surrender the country’s most heavily fortified region without a fight, despite the fact that the Russian army has been unable to capture this territory for more than a decade. He demands a Russian veto over security guarantees for postwar Ukraine, while insisting on the right to interfere in Ukrainian domestic affairs. He questions the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and calls for wartime elections, despite having systematically dismantled Russia’s own fledgling democracy during his twenty-six year reign.  

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Putin’s uncompromising position makes perfect sense when viewed through the prism of Russian imperialism. The peace terms being offered by Trump, which would allow Moscow to retain the approximately 20 percent of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation, may seem generous, but the Kremlin dictator knows he cannot accept anything less than Kyiv’s complete capitulation. For Putin, the survival of a sovereign, democratic Ukraine would be a political death sentence. Russian audiences would view such a deal as a defeat of historic proportions. Rather than securing his legacy as one of Russia’s greatest rulers, Putin would be condemned as the man who lost Ukraine.   

In practical terms, Putin has also come to depend on the war. Over the past four years, it has become the main source of his legitimacy and power. The Russian economy now relies heavily on war-related spending. Russian society as a whole has undergone a radicalization, making it possible to impose new levels of censorship, repression, and propaganda. Without the war, this entire edifice could collapse.

Then there is the issue of Russia’s military veterans. Almost a million men are currently serving in Ukraine. Most have been brutalized by a daily ration of war crimes amid staggering casualties. The vast majority are also now accustomed to receiving salaries far in excess of anything they could hope to earn in Russia. Putin is no doubt painfully aware that if he demobilizes these damaged and dangerous men, he would be unleashing a destabilizing force that could cause chaos across Russia. The only way to prevent this is by extending the invasion indefinitely. 

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None of this means that peace is impossible. In order to secure a sustainable settlement, however, current efforts to appease Putin must end. It is a grave mistake to treat the aggressor and the victim as equals, and an even bigger blunder to pressure the victim into further concessions. Bringing Putin out of international isolation only emboldens him. In Putin’s zero-sum world, goodwill gestures are signs of weakness. It is no coincidence that as calls for a compromise deal have grown louder over the past year, Russia’s bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian population has intensified.   

Western leaders must instead send an unambiguous message to Moscow that they are not prepared to reward Russian aggression. The objective should be to raise the costs of the invasion for the Kremlin until continuing the war poses risks to Putin’s grip on power inside Russia. This goal is realistic. With Putin’s army struggling to achieve any major breakthroughs in Ukraine despite suffering catastrophic casualties, rumblings of discontent are growing. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the Russian economy is beginning to show signs of serious strain. Now is the time to increase the pressure on Putin. 

Tightening economic sanctions is critical. This means tougher measures against Russia’s energy exports along with Putin’s shadow fleet of tankers. It also means implementing secondary sanctions against those who fund the war by purchasing Russian oil and gas. Recent decisions to relax sanctions temporarily in response to the US war in Iran and spiraling global energy prices are a step in the wrong direction that threatens to rescue the Russian economy and fuel international instability. Putin will not stop the invasion until he runs out of money.    

Kyiv’s partners must also provide Ukraine with the military backing to defeat and deter Russia. This should include credible long-term commitments that dash any Russian hopes of outlasting the West in Ukraine. Western countries must overcome their crippling fear of escalation and provide Ukraine with the long-range weapons that will make it possible to strike deep inside Russia. This will allow Ukraine to target Putin’s war machine and create the kind of deterrence that could prevent future repeats of the current invasion.

If Putin is unable to advance in Ukraine while facing mounting economic costs and escalating destruction on the home front, he may finally have to accept that continuing the war poses very real dangers for the stability of his regime. At that point, genuine peace talks could prove possible.

Subsequent negotiations must focus on protecting Ukraine against further Russian aggression. It is vital that any security guarantees transcend political cycles in Western capitals and leave Putin in no doubt that a renewed attack on Ukraine could spark the collapse of the Russian Federation.

The best security guarantees of all remain NATO membership or nuclear status. If these options are currently not feasible, Ukraine needs to receive clear commitments from its major partners that spell out the responses Russia can expect.

Above all, Ukraine’s own armed forces must receive the necessary support to serve as the country’s ultimate security guarantee. European countries have an obvious self-interest in maintaining Ukraine’s military strength. After all, a strong Ukraine is now indispensable for Europe’s broader defense strategy as the continent confronts resurgent Russian imperialism.

Current Western efforts to broker a compromise peace with Putin are based on false assumptions and wishful thinking. This misguided approach only encourages Russia and other authoritarian regimes including Iran, China, and North Korea to pursue aggressive foreign policies. If the West wants a sustainable peace in Europe, it must work to ensure Putin’s defeat in Ukraine.

Oleksandr Merezhko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament for the Servant of the People Party and Chair of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 5, 2026

Iran war could save Vladimir Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion

By Peter Dickinson

While Russia’s inability to assist Iran is undoubtedly embarrassing for the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin could still emerge as a key beneficiary of the escalating conflict in the Middle East, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Russian army faces comms crisis amid Starlink cut and Kremlin crackdown

By Katherine Spencer, Marc Goedemans

The Russian army in Ukraine is facing a growing communication crisis amid recent disruptions to Telegram and Starlink, leaving troops increasingly in the dark and exposing mounting strains inside Russia, write Katherine Spencer and Marc Goedemans.

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Ukraine’s defense sector has already demonstrated enormous battlefield credibility. The next phase is commercial and institutional credibility, writes Michael Druckman.

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The post Western leaders must abandon false hopes of negotiated peace with Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• In Kyiv and Odesa, Ukrainian officials and soldiers express determination and cautious optimism, citing battlefield gains and the importance of continued US and European support.
• US President Donald Trump has significant leverage to pressure Russia to end the war through increased military support for Ukraine and economic pressure targeting Russia’s oil revenues.
• European countries, too, play an important role, as they are developing a multinational security force for Ukraine and expanding financial aid to Kyiv.

KYIV—Stopping Russia’s war on Ukraine has been the Trump administration’s highest priority foreign-policy challenge for over a year. Shortly after his inauguration, President Donald Trump began this effort in a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Since then, US officials have held a series of meetings with their Ukrainian and Russian counterparts. Yes, there have been targets of opportunity that focused US attention and resources for short periods of time, such as Venezuela and now Iran. But over the past year, the administration’s top officials have almost certainly devoted more hours to Ukraine than to any other foreign-policy issue. Trump and Putin spoke again by phone on Monday, with aides saying both Iran and Ukraine were topics of discussion. When the current Iran operation is finished, the administration should return to devoting its primary attention to ending the largest land war in Europe since World War II and finish the job.

When the US and Israeli attacks on Iran began on February 28, I was on a train leaving Kyiv as part of an Atlantic Council delegation. It was for me the latest of more than a dozen visits to Ukraine since February 2022. After a week of conversations with Ukrainian friends, soldiers, officials, and former officials in Odesa and Kyiv, I left impressed with their guarded optimism and unguarded determination to prevail in this war.

At the same time, it was clear immediately after the US strikes began that the Iranian operation would absorb resources and top-level attention for the duration of the operation. But when it ends, there will be a great opportunity for US President Donald Trump to help end the fighting in Ukraine. 

Freedom’s name

After enduring the coldest winter in memory and the most intense Russian attacks of the entire war, Ukrainians had welcomed the end of winter and a perceptible shift in momentum on the battlefield. According to Ukrainian generals I spoke with, successful counterattacks on the southern end of the thousand-kilometer conflict zone had regained hundreds of square kilometers of territory, in part because Elon Musk had denied Starlink communications to Russian military forces. A homegrown, long-range Ukrainian cruise missile had severely damaged a Russian military production center in Votkinsk, a thousand kilometers deep into Russia, causing panic among Russians. Unmanned interceptors have blunted Russian attack drones and are now being deployed in the Middle East to defend against Iranian attacks—attacks that are being aided by Russian intelligence, which is helping Iran target US military facilities.

Some Ukrainians I spoke with held out hope that the ongoing negotiations among Ukraine, Russia, and the United States could lead to a cease-fire. Most, however, were skeptical that the Russians were serious. 

Ukrainian soldiers expressed grim determination to hold off and even push back Russian attacks. They appreciated the US and European support that had sustained them for the past four years. One captain described a moment of panic when, alone in a trench on the contact line, he was unable to contact his supporting command and felt momentarily abandoned. In that moment, he questioned whether all their sacrifices had been worth it. It was an intensely personal account, but he was also making a larger point that US support—military, financial, political, and moral—was supremely important to Ukrainians’ ability to continue defending their country. Left unsaid was the understanding that US support enables Ukrainians to defend the rest of Europe and vital US national interests against an aggressive Russia.

While the Trump administration might pay less attention to a principled rationale for supporting Ukraine—they have other strong reasons—one young woman nonetheless put it clearly and forcefully; she said, “Freedom’s name is Ukraine.”

Trump’s opportunity

The US president is uniquely capable of ending the war in Ukraine, the most difficult conflict he has addressed. And while progress over the past year has at times been slow, Putin knows that Trump has the leverage to force him to stop the killing. Putin fears long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles coming into Ukrainian hands. Trump seriously considered sending these weapons to the Ukrainians last fall and could still do so—or, even better, he could allow the Ukrainians to manufacture these weapons themselves.

There are other steps Trump could take, too. Despite a temporary reprieve for Russia’s oil revenues due to the oil price spike caused by the Iran war, Putin is terrified by the prospect of resumed pressure on the oil exports that fund his war on Ukraine. The Trump administration has already levied tariffs against India for buying Russian oil, sanctioned the two largest Russian oil companies, and seized Russian-flagged oil tankers used to evade sanctions on Russian oil exports (as have the French, Belgians, and British). Trump could use this military and financial leverage to force Putin to stop the war.

Europe’s moment

With or without Russian agreement on a cease-fire, the Ukrainians will need the ability to deter and defeat, if necessary, another Russian invasion. After all, Putin has blatantly disregarded previous promises not to invade Ukraine. The first line of defense will be the Ukrainian army—which is trained, equipped, supported, and funded with Western help. The French and British, the two nuclear-armed European powers, are leading the planning for a military force to be deployed on Ukrainian territory, which has the support of more than thirty other nations. Moreover, Trump has agreed to back up this European-led reassurance force with air power based in Eastern European NATO nations. The current thinking is that this “coalition of the willing” would deploy in western Ukraine after a cease-fire. But since the Russians refuse to negotiate seriously and a formal cease-fire might not be possible, the coalition should deploy this force now. 

Because they understand the threat from an imperialistic Russian autocrat more immediately than the United States, the Europeans have augmented their military planning with impressive financial support to Ukraine. Stymied so far by a couple of European Union (EU) member states in the effort to use hundreds of billions of dollars in Russian frozen assets to support Ukraine, a majority of EU nations plan to borrow ninety billion euros to keep Ukraine solvent and able to purchase weapons, including from US defense manufacturers, for another two years. That $200-plus billion in blocked Russian assets also remain available if the bloc were to agree to use it. 

The Europeans are also offering Ukraine another security guarantee—membership in the EU on an accelerated basis, perhaps as early as next year. 

The Ukrainians continue to defend themselves and the rest of Europe from a hostile Russia. The Europeans are stepping up both militarily and financially. Trump has the unique ability to force Putin to stop the killing. When the Iran operation ends, he could reestablish himself as a man of peace by using that leverage to end the war in Ukraine. 

The post When the Iran operation is finished, Trump should prioritize ending the war in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• EU policymakers have proposed adopting a two-tier membership system: New members would gain some benefits of membership but lack veto power in key votes.
• The two-tier EU proposals risk undermining the credibility of the accession process and stalling the momentum for reforms in candidate countries.
• The two-tier system could also be exploited by embattled Western Balkans leaders seeking to avoid having to make the rule-of-law reforms required for full membership. 

TIRANA—On Monday, European Union (EU) foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said that enlargement of the twenty-seven-member bloc should speed up. “Enlargement is the antidote to Russian imperialism and a sign that the most ambitious multilateral project in history—the European Union—is here to stay,” she told EU ambassadors.

It is an antidote that some EU member states seem hesitant to take, however. No country has joined the EU since 2013, when Croatia was admitted. In the dozen-plus years since then, the bloc has struggled with a fundamental dilemma on further enlargement: Would admitting new members strengthen the EU? Or would the addition of poorer countries with weaker democratic institutions—including some close partners of Russia—further undermine its cohesion due to the bloc’s unanimity-based decision-making?

There have been many reasons why the EU has resisted enlargement for the past dozen-plus years. But concern over the cost to EU member state taxpayers is rarely one of the strongest concerns. The EU could without difficulty absorb the financial costs of admitting the countries of the Western Balkans (Ukraine, on the other hand, is a different matter). For many skeptics of enlargement, a bigger concern than cost is the potential for new members to take EU decision-making hostage and backslide on the rule of law once they are in. Hungary provides perhaps the biggest cautionary tale for this concern. Budapest has exploited the need for unanimous votes by vetoing accession negotiations with Ukraine on geopolitical grounds.

More generally across the EU, however, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 softened resistance to enlargement, with EU leaders reframing the addition of new members as a security imperative. That year, the candidate pool expanded rapidly beyond the six Western Balkans countries and Turkey to also include Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. This year, Trump’s claim on Greenland has drawn renewed EU membership interest in other parts of Europe, such as Iceland, which will hold a referendum on pursuing membership in the coming months.

Riding this momentum, the EU’s executive wing is pushing ahead with talks with Albania and Montenegro, the two candidates facing the least resistance to accession, as they are both NATO allies without major bilateral disputes with any current member states. Montenegro may now be on the cusp of drafting an accession treaty. Last year, Montenegrin Prime Minister Milojko Spajić announced that it was his goal for Montenegro to join the EU by 2028, while Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has set the goal of his country joining by 2030.

Sandwiched between the geopolitical imperative of enlargement and domestic pressures from Euroskeptic parties, the European Commission is now considering solutions that would allow enlargement to move forward without weakening the EU’s decision-making capacity. The solutions reportedly being discussed in Brussels would effectively offer new member states a kind of second-class status in the bloc, effectively creating a two-tier EU.

The proposal for a two-tier EU: Pragmatic or indecisive?

In the proposals reportedly under discussion, new member states would waive their veto rights for an indefinite transition period. During this period, each new member state would have full access to EU funds, institutions, and membership in the single market, but it would not be allowed to block decisions requiring unanimity. This idea does have some precedent, as transition periods on the rights of new members have been used in previous enlargement waves. In 2004, for example, new members had limits on the free movement of workers for up to seven years. But these earlier conditions were policy-specific and clearly time-bound; they did not relate to the new members’ institutional rights.    

At the same time, Brussels has emphasized the need to strengthen post-accession safeguards on the rule of law. These safeguards would embed into the accession treaties provisions that would allow the EU to retain oversight and correction mechanisms over the new members’ performance, thereby preserving some of the leverage that the EU has during the accession process. Last month, European Commission officials touted Montenegro’s upcoming accession treaty as the first of a “new generation” of treaties that give the bloc enforcement tools it can use if new members backtrack on the rule of law.

While these ideas have some benefits, they are also incurring immediate costs to the credibility of the accession process. In effect, the EU is publicly hollowing out the meaning of membership and moving the goalposts midway through accession, all while failing to make a clear political commitment on the timeline of enlargement. Thus, the EU is once again signaling indecisiveness at a critical moment, undermining accession candidates’ momentum for reforms.

The EU’s policy of conditioning accession on reforms can help candidate countries’ political transformations if there is a clear and credible offer for membership. This drives political accountability and empowers candidate countries’ civil societies to push for reforms. Ukraine, for example, has been taking steps to fight corruption, and there have been large anti-corruption protests there even as Kyiv fights a war for survival. This is largely because Ukrainians understand that the fight against corruption is tied to Ukraine’s case for EU membership.

Western Balkan leaders are exploiting the decision-making vacuum

The prolonged indecision by EU member states on the timing, scope, and structure of its enlargement policy risks further derailing the process. It is also providing leaders in the Western Balkans with opportunities to come up with distractions under the guise of strategic leadership and pragmatic solutions.

On February 28, Rama and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić published a joint op-ed in which they called for the Western Balkans to be granted quick access to the EU single market and the Schengen area while forfeiting representation in EU institutions. This would mean even fewer institutional rights than the second-class membership proposal the EU is discussing. It would effectively make the countries of the Western Balkans members of the European Economic Area, like Norway and Iceland, without giving them the institutional rights of EU member states.

It is not a new idea. It has been circulating for almost a decade, promoted primarily by think tanks such as the Berlin-based European Stability Initiative. The argument goes that absent a clear political commitment to enlargement, the EU should offer the accession states something credible and politically feasible in the interim that would anchor them in the EU’s economic orbit and generate tangible benefits until it is ready to bring in countries as full members.

Yet there are reasons to believe that the enthusiastic endorsement of such ideas by Rama and Vučić—at a moment when both Montenegro and Albania appear to have an open path to membership—may be motivated by reasons other than pragmatism.

For one, Brussels is reportedly discussing the suspension of some or all of the EU’s conditional funding for Serbia due to its backsliding on the rule of law, at a time when the country has been roiled by an ongoing wave of anti-corruption protests that began in November 2024. Rama, for his part, has been intensifying his attacks against an empowered judiciary that is going after his party’s top brass. Rama is also facing pushback from the EU for his attack on the judiciary, a troubling sign for Albania’s accession process, since rule-of-law reform is seen as a litmus test of its membership bid.

Regional leaders who are used to governing in conditions of widespread corruption might be hoping that by voluntarily agreeing to second-rate membership, the EU might in turn tolerate second-rate governance and anti-corruption standards. The prospect of receiving EU funds without the accountability and responsibilities required of full member states—including alignment on foreign policy—may sound appealing to those who would like to be EU members while doing business as usual. But in doing so, Western Balkan leaders may in fact be strengthening the arguments of those who believe that the EU should not import new problematic members.

The post Has the EU found a ‘magic bullet’ to its enlargement conundrum or a new distraction? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• While it’s unclear who will lead Iran after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the succession process will likely remain in Iranian hands; the US has only limited levers to influence it.
• Whoever it is, the next leader will need to decide between pragmatic engagement with the world and continued ideological confrontation.
• To coax Iran’s leadership toward the former, the US and its allies should highlight Iran’s needs for post-conflict economic recovery and political and security reforms that are tolerable to regional powers.

WASHINGTON—On Thursday, US President Donald Trump said that he must be “involved in” selecting Iran’s next supreme leader. This pronouncement came as signs in Iran pointed to Mojtaba Khamenei, the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s son, as the leading candidate to replace his father.

However, it’s highly unlikely that Trump or any non-Iranian will direct the succession process, absent either an unlikely capitulation by the remnants of the Iranian regime or a massive escalation of the conflict from the United States that includes a sustained troop presence.

At this point, no one either inside or outside of Iran can say for certain who the next leader will be—or whether there will be multiple leaders before the Iran war ends. Nor should anyone assume that Iran will emerge from the conflict with another supreme leader. It is entirely possible that the country departs from Velayat-e Faqih (the philosophy underpinning the role of the supreme leader as head of state) and moves toward a military takeover or constitutional referendum instead.

But whoever emerges in charge will face an important decision. In a post-conflict scenario, a future Iranian leader must choose between prioritizing stability and the well-being of the Iranian people—by engaging rationally with the international community—and continuing to be driven by the revolutionary and ideological ambitions that defined Khamenei’s reign. In 2006, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger summed up this choice as deciding between “a nation and a cause.” Choosing the former could help quell decades of hostility between the West and Iran, while choosing the latter could perpetuate the confrontation well into the future. 

In the weeks leading up to the conflict, and prior to the death of Khamenei, we consulted with a group of Iran experts to explore ways the United States and allied nations could coordinate efforts and coax change that might result in a more Western-leaning Tehran. The levers available to Washington are limited, but there are three areas where the United States and its allies can exert influence.

1. Iran’s economy and international integration 

In a post-conflict Iran, one of the most important factors shaping a post-Khamenei government will be how it views Iran’s economy. Key economic indicators to watch include inflation, unemployment, the payment of public sector salaries, and the regime’s ability to make necessary subsidy reforms and diversify its revenue beyond oil sales. 

To rebuild and transform its economy, Iran will need international investment; for that, Iran will need sanctions relief; and for that, it will need a complete overhaul of its foreign policy. Since the United States put in place many of the toughest sanctions on Iran, there are steps Washington can take to encourage the new Iranian leadership to recognize this reality.  

However, this likely requires that regime elites face new eruptions of popular unrest over the failing economy and feel economic pressure in their own lives. One of the downsides of US sanctions is that they have created a robust black market that has allowed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other elites to bypass and benefit from the current sanctions regime. There are numerous examples of the entrenched elites benefiting from the current system. If this trend continues during a transition, it makes a pivot toward a more Western-leaning state more difficult. 

Western pressure on regime elites would need to be paired with clear carrots to encourage change. One of the failures of former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s rapprochement with the West was that he could not show how Iran’s nuclear concessions—and his more pragmatic approach—led to a better economic outcome for everyday Iranians. A future Iranian leader will need to be convinced that a pro-Western posture will be economically profitable for both the country and the leader’s interests. 

Since the Carter White House, successive US administrations have enacted policies that punish countries that trade with the current regime. In a break with this approach, the United States and its allies could establish benchmarks that, if met, would create a path for a new Iranian administration to move away from trade with US adversaries and competitors. Recent commitments to investing in post–Bashar al-Assad Syria suggest a way forward, such as Riyadh’s pledge to commit $6.4 billion in investments this past July. Seeking ways for a new Iranian leadership to continue and grow emerging diplomatic ties, like the renewal of Iran-Saudi relations—notably brokered by China three years ago—could present initial building blocks for such an approach. 

2. Iran’s government

Over the course of his tenure, Khamenei did a masterful job maintaining regime unity and avoiding high-profile defections. Any internal dissent has been sidelined without meaningful repercussions on his reign. Even during the recent massacre of Iranian protesters and the subsequent war, there were no significant defections among regime elites.

This elite cohesion presents a predicament for a potential transition to a Western-oriented state. Anti-regime opposition and human rights advocates understandably seek to hold the regime accountable for its crimes but use rhetoric that paints all members of the Iranian establishment with the same broad brush. This eliminates an outlet for those within the existing regime who may secretly want to free themselves but see no way out. 

The 2003 US decision to bar Iraqis from the top tiers of the Baathist party from serving in government and disband the Iraqi military contributed to the challenges in governing Iraq’s multi-ethnic and religious population in the immediate aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s fall. To mitigate the risk of similar fallout, providing a process that isolates apparatchiks from ideologically ambivalent technocrats could spur fence-sitters in the regime to consider life beyond the current political and security construct. In short, to increase the odds of a pro-Western state emerging, there at least needs to be room for a figure like either Reza Pahlavi—the son of the deposed shah—or the Irish Republican leader Gerry Adams to emerge in Iran. 

There is room for the United States and its allies to help lay the groundwork for a process that addresses the needs of the Iranian people for accountability and justice. In considering a rebuilding of the state administration, identifying ways to incorporate an Iran-specific truth and reconciliation mechanism could accomplish this. But critically, it would also need to be designed to signal that regime technocrats will not face retribution for their contribution to the running of the state. In this vein, the mechanisms applied in post-apartheid South Africa and Northern Ireland differed based on the nature of the conflicts and crimes committed. Each wrestled, for example, with the concept of amnesty in exchange for confession. Drawing from lessons of recent investigations, such as the United Nations’ Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, could inform the process and direction of such an effort.

3. Iran’s security structure

In the run-up to the war, the Iranian security doctrine was a three-legged stool—a latent nuclear weapons capability, a robust and capable missile program, and Iran’s network of nonstate regional proxies known as the “Axis of Resistance.” The Islamic Republic’s commitment to this paradigm in the face of crippling sanctions, military threats, and domestic unrest reflect the paramount role that threat perception plays in driving Iranian policymaking. 

This will be difficult to change with a new Iranian leadership keen to avoid the same fate of other leaders. In 2003, for example, Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi voluntarily dismantled his country’s nuclear program; in 2011, he was driven from power and killed. Hardliners in Iran have warned against limiting military capabilities, blaming Libya’s civil war and Qaddafi’s ultimate demise on forfeiting his weapons program. Khamenei himself criticized Qaddafi for abandoning his nuclear ambitions and chided the former leader of Libya for trusting the United States. Other Iranians point to Ukraine as another cautionary tale, in which Kyiv gave up its nuclear weapons following its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 only to be invaded by Russia later. 

However, the key driver shaping Iran’s transition and its future is establishing a security infrastructure acceptable to Iran and tolerated by Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. On its face, this may not seem possible. But the current Iran-Israel hostility has not always existed. They share no borders, and Persians and Jews share more than a millennium of relatively peaceful co-existence. 

For a Western-leaning state to emerge in Iran, it will almost certainly be incumbent upon new Iranian leadership to change Israeli perceptions about Iran’s intentions. The United States and its allies should make clear that the key indicator might very well be Iran’s continued support (and specifically lethal assistance) to Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. The irony is that these groups’ degradation since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks makes them more of a liability to Iran than an asset. But even still, an end to Iranian backing for these proxies would be a massive ideological shift for a regime that built a large part of its internal legitimacy on opposition to Israel.

In many ways, Iran’s hostility to Israel, the United States, and the Gulf is more important than the exact specifications of Iran’s missile and nuclear program. If that hostility is reduced, diminished Israeli and US perceptions of threat could pave the way for limiting both programs in ways that are potentially acceptable to all parties. 

Ultimately, the choice is in the hands of Iran’s next leader. But the United States and its allies and partners can and should help clarify what is at stake—and these three areas are strong places to start.

The post Washington’s limited levers to shape a post-Khamenei Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The Trump administration negotiated a record number of trade deals over the past year, including eight agreements on reciprocal trade and ten related framework deals.
• The Supreme Court’s recent ruling that the president cannot impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act removes what was powerful leverage to make these deals.
• The administration is now shifting to investigations under Section 301 to maintain pressure, but if it does so unpredictably, then countries could abandon agreements, reimpose barriers, or retaliate.

WASHINGTON—On February 20, the US Supreme Court ruled that the US president cannot apply tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In effect, this ruling also poured cold water on the Trump administration’s approach of using country-specific tariffs as leverage to make quick trade deals. 

Up until the Supreme Court’s decision, US President Donald Trump and his US trade representative (USTR), Ambassador Jamieson Greer, were able to put together a remarkable number of trade deals with a wide range of partners in record time. This effort ran from the first announcement of a deal with the United Kingdom in May 2025 to the latest ones with India and Bangladesh in early February of this year. According to the president’s 2026 Trade Policy Agenda, issued by the USTR on March 2, the administration concluded eight agreements on reciprocal trade (ARTs) and ten framework deals that will lead to ARTs or equivalent agreements.

Clearly, the IEEPA tariffs were effective leverage as the USTR pushed others to negotiate and conclude groundbreaking trade deals. Many previous administrations had sought trade agreements to address specific trade barriers, particularly high tariffs and persistent nontariff barriers (NTBs), which can restrict trade to a trickle in key sectors. For example, the USTR worked for over a decade in the World Trade Organization (WTO) beginning in the early 2000s to bring major developing countries to the table to negotiate reductions in their high tariffs, but to no avail. This failure was a central reason why the WTO has lost so much relevance and its rules on most-favored (non-discriminatory) treatment have come under attack in recent years. In previous years, the USTR released its National Trade Estimate report cataloguing foreign trade barriers, and each year it generally cut and pasted descriptions of longstanding trade restrictions and updates to add new ones.

What was lacking in these efforts to address foreign trade barriers was effective leverage. And what made the Trump administration’s record of recent achievements in such a short time possible was a new source of leverage—sudden, unpredictable, massive US tariffs under IEEPA with no regard for WTO rules on tariff bindings and MFN treatment. Now, however, that leverage seems to have disappeared in a puff of smoke only days after the Supreme Court ruling. It has been replaced by the thin gruel of a temporary tariff at a maximum level of 15 percent under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act for balance of payments crises. But even this tariff will expire after 150 days without congressional approval, and it, too, may rest on tenuous legal ground.

So, does this mean that Trump’s leverage disappeared with the removal of the IEEPA tariffs? Does it mean that trading partners will walk away from the trade deals already negotiated or drag their feet on concluding the ones that are still pending? 

Some countries might indeed reassess the current situation and conduct senior-level discussions on how they should position themselves going forward. After all, their trade negotiations with the United States on the ARTs and framework deals occurred under duress, in the face of tariff increases that had not been seen since the 1930s. With the creation of the multilateral trading system after World War II and then decades of progressive reductions in tariffs in the United States and other major developed countries, they had a high degree of certainty that tariffs would not go up again across the board, especially in the United States. That all changed dramatically with the Trump administration and the announcement of a new system of reciprocal tariffs on April 2, 2025. And now that the Trump administration has been substantially disarmed, some may wonder if tariffs have peaked and could start to drift down.

Since the lifting of the IEEPA tariffs on February 24, Trump and Greer have expressed confidence that the ART program will continue and that trading partners will stick with the deals already negotiated. In fact, there have been few signs of cold feet in this regard. While India cancelled a visit of its chief negotiator scheduled for the week after the Supreme Court decision to finalize legal text for an “interim agreement,” this was understandable. Of course, negotiators would need to double-check their mandate following such a sudden development. The European Parliament on February 23 decided to postpone its consideration of the US-European Union (EU) framework deal, reportedly out of concerns that the Trump administration may raise the Section 122 tariffs to the maximum allowable 15 percent, which could be inconsistent with US commitments under the deal. Otherwise, trading partners do not appear to be running for the exit.

There are plenty of reasons for US trading partners to be cautious in moving forward. It is clear, for instance, that the Trump administration and the USTR are proceeding with plan B, namely the initiation of trade barrier investigations under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. In the first days of the Trump administration, plan B could have been plan A if the president had not been so focused on imposing tariffs immediately and without the constraints of statutory requirements that might slow the execution of his grand vision of tariffs as a solution to many problems. A more predictable, defensible, and legally credible approach could have been to initiate multiple Section 301 investigations on a country-by-country and sector-by-sector basis. It is a tried-and-true tool that has been around even before the WTO was established, and it has proven durable over the decades since. It has the advantage of providing impressive USTR authority to impose tariffs and other trade restrictions to address a full range of foreign trade barriers. The rub is that Section 301 investigations require a well-established process of consultations, opportunity for comment, hearings, timetables, and published findings that the president likely felt he could dispense with by using IEEPA authority, which, in fact, did not actually exist.

And while Section 301 investigations generally require a year or more to complete, there is a provision for expedited action. This now seems to be the USTR’s plan over the next few months before the expiration of the Section 122 tariffs. What the United States has now, then, is a new kind of leverage that can be deployed to maintain the ARTs negotiated to date, conclude the pending ones, and continue negotiations on new frameworks and eventual ARTs for virtually every other trading partner. It seems quite likely that early results in these Section 301 cases will match the reciprocal tariffs already agreed with multiple countries. These cases also provide discretion to threaten increased reciprocal tariffs as enforcement leverage if a trading partner hesitates to deliver on its end of the bargain.

However, it will be critical for the Trump administration to use this tool wisely. Even with the increased predictability offered by Section 301 procedural guarantees, random threats of additional tariffs or even total bans on trade will undermine the credibility of this plan B. For example, there remain many cases still pending under Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Act relating to national security, including semiconductors and derivative products, medical devices, robotics, and polysilicon. This authority rests with the Department of Commerce, and there have been hints that more cases may be in the works in additional sectors. 

If US trading partners find that their good-faith efforts to settle on terms for ARTs are rewarded with additional tariffs, then they may start to withdraw from these agreements, walk away from further negotiations, and reimpose higher tariffs and NTBs that the USTR has so diligently sought to negotiate away. Some may even choose to retaliate with even higher tariffs of their own. This is a true turning point for the Trump administration’s trade policy and an opportunity to set it on a more stable and productive course. While it retains leverage, it can just as easily lose this leverage, and the next time, it may not be so easy to recover.

The post How the White House’s plan B on tariffs can give it all the trade leverage it needs appeared first on Atlantic Council.

When Putin first announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he vowed to “demilitarize” and “denazify” Ukraine. He has also sought to justify the war as a campaign against NATO expansion and crusade to revive Russia’s great power status. By almost any measure, Putin has failed to achieve these goals.

The Russian leader’s inability to demilitarize Ukraine has been perhaps his most glaring failure. Indeed, few countries have ever looked less demilitarized than today’s Ukraine. As the war with Russia enters a fifth year, Ukraine possesses Europe’s largest army and is a world leader in drone warfare. From NATO members to Gulf petrostates, countries are now queuing up to access Ukraine’s unrivalled expertise. Meanwhile, a consensus is emerging in European capitals that Ukraine has an indispensable role to play in the future security of the continent.

Likewise, Putin’s bid to “denazify” Ukraine has proved spectacularly counterproductive. The entire concept of “denazification” is Kremlin code for the eradication of Ukrainian national identity, but Putin’s invasion has sparked an unprecedented surge in patriotism among the Ukrainian population along with a deep distrust of all things Russian. As a result, it is now virtually impossible to imagine the emergence of a pro-Russian government in Kyiv, unless permanently propped up by Kremlin bayonets.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Putin has gone to great lengths to blame the war on NATO’s post-1991 eastward expansion beyond the old Iron Curtain. Far from arresting or reversing this process, Russia’s actions have sparked a new and highly significant wave of enlargement. In response to the invasion of Ukraine, both Finland and Sweden opted to abandon decades of neutrality and join NATO. This has more than doubled Russia’s shared border with the alliance, while also transforming the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake.   

On the global stage, the invasion of Ukraine has left Russia unable to project strength or justify its claims to great power status. With the vast majority of his military forces deployed in Ukraine, Putin has proved unable to aid a series of international allies during moments of crisis. Syria, Venezuela, and Iran have all learned the hard way that Putin’s promises of partnership are empty.

Russian prestige has taken a further pounding on the battlefields of Ukraine. Like many others in Moscow and elsewhere, Putin fully expected to secure a quick and complete victory in Ukraine. Instead, his armies have been unable to achieve any decisive breakthroughs despite suffering catastrophic losses. More than four years on, they remain bogged down in brutal attritional warfare.

Putin has tried to distract from this underwhelming military performance by projecting confidence in eventual success, but his boasts of relentless Russian advances now ring increasingly hollow. In February 2026, Ukraine actually liberated more territory than the Russian army was able to seize, making a mockery of Kremlin efforts to portray Russian victory as inevitable. 

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With Russia’s prospects in Ukraine looking increasingly grim, the joint US-Israeli operation against Iran could hardly have come at a better time for Putin. While Russia’s inability to assist a key ally is undoubtedly embarrassing, the Kremlin could potentially emerge as a major beneficiary of the escalating conflict in the Middle East.

The scope for economic gains is obvious. With the Strait of Hormuz under threat and key energy export routes out of the Middle East facing major disruption, Russia stands to benefit more than most from rising oil and gas prices. This could reinvigorate Putin’s war economy at a time when it was beginning to show signs of serious strain.

The US focus on Iran may also distract the Trump administration from diplomatic efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. While these US-led peace talks had not resulted in any tangible progress toward a sustainable settlement, they represent a diplomatic challenge to the Kremlin. Putin will now likely be able to breathe a little easier, at least while the United States remains preoccupied with Iran.

Crucially, escalating hostilities in the Middle East may force Washington to limit the supply of weapons to Ukraine. The US, Israel, and the Gulf states are all reportedly struggling to cope with Iranian drones and are already in danger of running low on air defense ammunition.

In particular, the first days of the conflict have reportedly seen unprecedented use of Patriot air defense missiles, which are in limited supply and desperately needed by the Ukrainians to intercept Russian ballistic missiles. If Kyiv finds itself without these missiles in the coming months, Russia will be able to strike critical infrastructure targets across Ukraine with impunity. This could leave large parts of Ukraine unlivable and have a major impact on the country’s ability to maintain the war effort.

None of this is inevitable. If US-Israeli forces succeed in curtailing Iran’s ability to strike back and can conclude their campaign within a matter of weeks, Putin will have little to cheer. However, if the current air offensive escalates into a protracted military conflict, this will likely strengthen Russia economically while weakening Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and prolonging Europe’s largest invasion since World War II.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Iran war could save Vladimir Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The ongoing Middle East conflict is likely to affect East Asia: Three-quarters of Middle Eastern crude exports to China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan pass through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has effectively closed.
• Oil disruptions could hurt China, the world’s largest oil importer; at the same time, it has greater domestic crude oil production than Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and has been stockpiling.
• China also relies less on LNG imports than many competitors, and prolonged Gulf LNG disruptions could disproportionately damage those economies while leaving China comparatively insulated.

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration’s decision to launch air strikes against the Iranian regime could prove enormously consequential for global oil and gas markets. Even as the strikes and Iranian retaliation continue, it’s worth examining the potential impact of the war on China and East Asia more broadly. A crisis that hits oil supplies clearly harms Beijing’s strategic interests, but one that affects liquefied natural gas (LNG) could end up advancing them.

China, the world’s largest oil importer, would suffer significant economic costs from a long-term, large-scale oil outage in the Middle East. Still, it would fare better than other regional economies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Not only does the People’s Republic of China (PRC) enjoy greater domestic oil production than any of those Asian democracies, but its economy is about as oil-intensive as Japan’s or Taiwan’s, and much less so than South Korea’s. Accordingly, while an oil crisis would bring real pain to the PRC, it might empower Beijing relative to its regional rivals. 

While China would suffer from oil outages, a Middle East crisis with disproportionate LNG outages might benefit the PRC. Natural gas accounts for a relatively small share of China’s primary energy consumption, the country enjoys substantial domestic production, and it can tap pipeline imports from Russia, Central Asia, and Myanmar. Significantly, many of the PRC’s competitors or rivals—the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—are substantially or even wholly reliant on LNG imports for their natural gas consumption. Dutch TTF natural gas prices are up more than 50 percent against last Friday’s close, fueling concerns of an energy-induced inflationary spike. In addition, LNG outages in Qatar, the world’s second-largest producer, would benefit the US LNG complex—and fuel accusations that Washington was reaping windfall benefits from a war it started. Beijing may therefore judge that another LNG-tinged crisis would impose little economic cost on it while potentially further antagonizing Washington’s already-fraught ties with its allies. 

Ominously, Russian President Vladimir Putin said this week that he would deprioritize natural gas exports to Europe as “other markets are opening up.” But the Russian leader is once again lying—he has no major pipeline export alternative to Europe, not even China. Instead, he appears to be establishing Russia’s baseline negotiating position ahead of a likely crisis in LNG markets.

While Tehran has so far not targeted significant regional oil infrastructure in its retaliatory strikes, it still might. With the United States and Israel showing no signs that they will stop targeting Iran’s political leadership, the remnants of the Khamenei regime are becoming increasingly desperate and are taking more risks. Even a trigger-happy regional commander could act independently from the regime. If Iranian forces do start targeting regional oil exports en masse, it could quickly raise Beijing’s ire. On the other hand, large-scale LNG outages might be more palatable for Beijing while harming Tehran’s adversaries—and Iran has not refrained from targeting LNG infrastructure so far. US and allied policymakers should closely follow Beijing’s actions and rhetoric, especially if a Middle East energy crisis disproportionately affects LNG. And from the present crisis, Indo-Pacific capitals should draw important lessons, not the least of which is the importance of strengthening energy security ahead of a potential Taiwan crisis. 

The Strait of Hormuz’s vulnerabilities

Iran’s ability to threaten the world economy centers around the Strait of Hormuz. Traffic along this maritime bottleneck has already ground to a halt amid the threat of attacks, which could send the prices of oil and other commodities higher and potentially trigger a global economic crisis. East Asian economies would be particularly impacted by a closed strait. In 2025, around 78 percent of all Middle Eastern crude oil exports to China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan flowed through this important chokepoint. While Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pipeline capacity of about 2.6 million barrels per day to reach Red Sea ports, this is only a fraction of even their own domestic production, and most Gulf states would not be able to find alternative shipping routes.

East Asian economies are particularly vulnerable to a Middle Eastern oil crisis, and Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are among the most exposed.

Conversely, the PRC imports less via the Strait of Hormuz and has insulated itself, to a degree, from a potential long-term oil outage through rapid vehicle electrification and robust domestic oil production. It has also diversified energy sources—mostly coal, but also renewables. Indeed, China is far less exposed to energy imports than its regional rivals.

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have virtually no domestic crude production and rely almost exclusively on imports. The PRC, meanwhile, meets over a quarter of its oil demand through domestic production. Moreover, the economies of Taiwan and South Korea are much more oil-intensive than that of the PRC, meaning that mainland China generally requires fewer barrels of oil than its rivals to produce one thousand dollars of gross domestic product.

The PRC is therefore better positioned to withstand a major Middle East oil supply disruption relative to regional rivals. Of course, oil is but one of many macroeconomic variables, so the PRC’s economy could still underperform relative to other regional players—especially Taiwan and South Korea—if, for example, the artificial intelligence boom continues along its current trend. However, in addition to its oil production, the PRC’s current stockpiles of crude oil leave it relatively well-prepared for a crisis. 

PRC and East Asia crude oil inventories

Japan has robust import coverage. At present, Japanese onshore crude inventory is holding at 350 million barrels, according to Kpler data. Assuming 2025’s average refinery runs of 2.4 million barrels per day persist in 2026, Japan has nearly 150 days of oil supply in its reserves. This figure is even higher, at 182 days, when accounting only for domestic transportation fuel demand (gas oil/diesel, gasoline, jet). In other words, Japan’s refineries could supply its domestic fuel needs, at current activity levels, for 182 days if it seeks to only satisfy domestic needs and eschews exports. 

While Taiwan and South Korea appear more exposed to a prolonged oil supply disruption at first glance, they are more secure if one distinguishes between only domestic consumption and total demand, which includes crude oil ultimately destined for export as a petroleum product. Based on our measures of Taiwanese and South Korean inventory levels and refinery runs, Taiwan can cover thirty-nine days, while South Korea has just thirty-three days of cover. But both could sustain domestic consumption for much longer. Taiwan, for example, is mandated to hold at least ninety days of cover for current core transportation fuel demand; South Korea has 107 days, with the potential to increase this further with additional policy adjustments to lower domestic retail consumption.

For instance, in April 2024, Taiwan held that its domestic inventories equated to about 167 days of supply for all petroleum products. Taiwan no longer appears to report inventories data, although its Energy Administration at the Ministry of Economic Affairs reports that domestic inventories are compliant with statutory mandates requiring commercial and governmental inventories to hold at least ninety days of consumption. 

The governments of Japan and South Korea report that they have at least 254 days and 210 days, respectively, of supply, while Taiwan has enough for about 120 days, according to The New York Times. 

The PRC has the largest onshore crude stockpiles in the world, with inventory levels estimated at 1.2 billion barrels as of January 2026 with builds amounting to 100 million barrels over the previous year, per Kpler data. With average refinery runs of 15.5 million barrels per day in 2026, less domestic crude production of 4.3 million barrels per day, this implies around 108 days of import cover. On the other hand, if the PRC decided to also maximize domestic consumption and eschew exports of petroleum products, its supply would extend to 130 days.

China may also be able to obtain another 38 million barrels of floating Iranian crude on tankers, many of which are located offshore of Malaysia or China. While the status of these Iranian barrels is currently unclear, the PRC’s existing inventories leave it relatively well positioned to weather an oil crisis, at least compared to its regional rivals. 

LNG’s role in energy, by economy

But a crisis may not only exist solely or even largely in the oil domain: LNG outages could also damage East Asian economies. If Tehran disproportionately targets LNG infrastructure in the Gulf, then its relationship with Beijing may be a significant or even primary factor, as the PRC is much less reliant on LNG imports than other energy importers. Unlike many of its democratic rivals across Europe and the Indo-Pacific, natural gas is a small share of China’s primary energy consumption, and the PRC produces much of its needs domestically. East Asian economies should be alert to the possibility that Tehran will disproportionately target regional LNG infrastructure—not necessarily because it was directed by Beijing, but because the Iranian leadership will likely seek to maximize Western pain while minimizing Chinese anger.  

If Iran does target regional LNG infrastructure, Qatar, the world’s second-largest LNG exporter, could be hit hard. Significantly, Iran drone strikes have already hit Qatar’s Ras Laffan facility, and the complex accounts for about 20 percent of global LNG exports. LNG outages in Qatar would hold significant geopolitical ramifications, as the fuel is only semi-fungible, meaning transportation of the fuel faces infrastructure constraints and bottlenecks. As seen below, the PRC is less exposed to Qatari LNG than Taiwan, South Korea, or Japan. Moreover, as much of its LNG imports satisfy southern Chinese power demand, China can also replace its LNG imports, to a degree, by shifting to other forms of electricity, such as coal or renewables.

Furthermore, if Middle Eastern LNG outages persist, prices may spike even further. There is virtually no global spare capacity right now. Any unplanned incremental expansions would take well over a year, and European natural gas storage levels are low. 

If prices continue to spike, this would boost LNG exports for the United States—already the world’s largest LNG exporter—at the expense of consumers across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. While this development would produce short-term commercial benefits for the United States, it would also potentially widen diplomatic fissures between Washington and its allies across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Washington would be in the awkward position of receiving commercial benefits, at the expense of its allies, from a war it initiated. This dynamic could be a diplomatic boon for Beijing, especially since its media outlets falsely blamed the United States for the 2022 LNG price spike arising from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Energy security risks and lessons

As the world’s largest energy importer, China has a lot to lose from a conflict in the Middle East. Nevertheless, in certain scenarios, Beijing could reap geopolitical benefits that offset some or perhaps even all of the economic costs. Accordingly, policymakers should watch for signs that Tehran is disproportionately targeting LNG infrastructure, pursue short-term mitigation steps, and consider the long-term consequences of the conflict.

Short-term risk mitigation steps are straightforward. To guard against any short-term price spikes, the United States may need to tap its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in coordination with its allies and partners. In addition, Washington may need to incentivize domestic crude oil and natural gas production. In some cases, export projects could be accelerated, perhaps via financing from the Office of Energy Dominance Financing or the Export-Import Bank. Furthermore, agreeing to fill the SPR at a price floor could provide certainty for long-term production, likely sending domestic crude oil production higher. If the crisis metastasizes, however, other measures may be warranted.

The long-term consequences of this crisis are potentially alarming. It could provide a template for Beijing if it attempts to conquer Taiwan via coercion. The PRC’s energy security is transforming in important ways as it becomes increasingly self-reliant. While Beijing is, for now, highly exposed in an oil crisis, its vulnerability will be substantially reduced in a few short years. Vehicle electrification and improving fuel economy have ended Chinese total transport fuel demand growth. Domestic gasoline consumption has already peaked. If—when—China commercializes more advanced batteries, such as semi-solid state or solid-state batteries, its overall demand for oil will likely decrease further. In 2025, China marginally increased domestic crude oil production, and it could likely expand further if energy security becomes an overriding priority; Beijing could also quickly increase overland crude oil pipeline connectivity with Russia by expanding the mainland Chinese leg of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline. In sum, while Beijing remains vulnerable to an oil crisis, it is narrowing its oil exposure to seaborne volumes. If vehicle electrification and battery advances accelerate, Beijing’s interests could shift, including in the Middle East. 

The East Asian democracies and the United States should quickly learn and apply these lessons. The present crisis poses serious dangers but may also foreshadow even graver dangers ahead related to a potential Taiwan crisis. A future confrontation over Taiwan may be determined not only by military might but by logistics and energy security. Accordingly, while East Asian democracies should expand their military capabilities, they would also be wise to bolster energy security by reducing domestic demand, bolstering domestic supply, and stockpiling and hardening dispersed storage. 

The post What a Middle East oil and LNG crisis means for China and East Asia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For decades, discussions of regime change in Iran have conjured warnings of chaos. Policymakers frequently invoke the specter of Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan, expressing a preference for the devil they know over the uncertainty of transition. This posture has allowed the Islamic Republic to consolidate power—financially, militarily, and technologically—while continuing to suppress dissent at home.

Simultaneously, critics argue that the Iranian opposition is too fragmented to present a viable alternative. Yes, the opposition spans ideological, generational, and ethnic lines. Monarchists, federalists, republicans, reformists, labor organizers, and others often share grievances but lack Western standards of coordination.

Assessing Pahlavi

That raises the question of whether Pahlavi could be a unifying figure. One common criticism is that Pahlavi would replace one form of authoritarianism with another—the turban with a crown. This ignores Pahlavi’s repeated and consistent public position as a transitional figure—a bridge, not a destination. Pahlavi has asserted that he seeks to bring Iran to a free and fair referendum where the people select their political system.