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Signing ten-year defense partnership agreements with three leading Gulf states is a significant outcome for Ukraine. However, the positive optics that surrounded Zelenskyy’s recent regional tour may have been even more important for the country.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than four years ago, Ukraine has been widely seen as a recipient of military aid and a drain on international resources. Zelenskyy’s visit directly challenged this unflattering and outdated view. For the first time, Ukraine was presented as a potentially attractive security partner with much to offer in terms of unique military experience and innovative defense technologies.

For anyone who has been closely following the Russia-Ukraine War, this is hardly news. Over past four years, Ukraine has built Europe’s largest army and has emerged as a world leader in drone warfare. The country’s formerly stagnant defense industry has expanded exponentially and now produces millions of drones every year as well as a growing arsenal of domestically developed cruise missiles.

This has made it possible for the Ukrainian military to blunt Russia’s offensives along the front lines of the war. At sea, Ukraine has used domestically designed marine drones to chase Putin’s Black Sea Fleet away from Crimea. Meanwhile, Kyiv has brought the war back to Russian territory with a long-range bombing campaign that recently knocked out around 40 percent of Russia’s oil export capacity.

Ukraine’s emergence as a major military force is already transforming the balance of power in Europe and will define Kyiv’s relationships with the wider world for decades to come. Zelenskyy’s tour of the Gulf states has helped to highlight this new geopolitical reality.

The Ukrainian leader’s trip was in many ways a masterclass in wartime diplomacy. By moving so nimbly, Zelenskyy secured vital support for the Ukrainian war effort and laid the foundations for potentially game-changing strategic partnerships with the Gulf states. Crucially, he also debunked negative perceptions of his country and enhanced Ukraine’s global standing as a drone warfare superpower.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Diplomatic dissonance in the Mediterranean

This vision of Turkey as a regional stabilizer sharply contradicts conventional wisdom across much of Europe. In Athens in particular, memories of the 2020 tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean remain vivid. At that time, Turkish Navy warships accompanied a seismic survey ship of Turkey’s national oil company, TPAO, as it searched for oil and natural gas in waters that both Turkey and Greece claim as part of their exclusive economic zones. Tensions peaked in August 2020, when a Turkish and Greek warship collided near Crete. Recent months have seen a resurgence of pointed rhetoric over the countries’ maritime claims. Senior Greek officials have expressed deep skepticism regarding Ankara’s ambitions, with Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias early last month stating that Turkey’s “revisionist agenda” remains a threat to Aegean stability. Greek leadership has specifically raised alarms over Turkey’s rapidly expanding defense industrial sector and its “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) naval doctrine, which calls for Turkey to defend its interpretation of international law on maritime borders and exclusive economic zones. For Greece, Turkey’s strong military is viewed less as a tool for regional peace and more as a mechanism for coercive diplomacy that continues to challenge Greek and Greek Cypriot sovereignty.

The rhetorical attacks have been even sharper between Turkey and Israel, posing a potentially serious challenge to Ankara’s mediation ambitions. Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have regularly accused each other of crimes against humanity.

Growing support for Turkish mediation elsewhere

Despite the reservations of Greece and Israel, interest in Turkish mediation is growing elsewhere. On March 1, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated in a social media post that she welcomes Turkey’s “readiness to mediate and support a resolution” to the Iran war “through peaceful means.” Pakistan, along with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, have now taken the lead in relaying messages between the warring parties in the hope of containing regional chaos.

Most importantly, US support for Turkish mediation also seems to be growing. A key factor is the personal rapport between the US and Turkish presidents. US President Donald Trump has frequently praised Erdoğan, describing him in October 2019 as a “hell of a leader” and a “tough man who deserves respect.” More recently, when asked whether Erdoğan could play a useful mediation role between Ukraine and Russia in October 2025, Trump replied, “Yeah, Erdoğan can. He’s respected by Russia, Ukraine. I can’t tell you about it, but he is respected by the world. And he’s a friend of mine.”

Ankara has indeed taken a balanced approach toward Kyiv and Moscow. On the one hand, Turkey has sustained military-technical cooperation with Ukraine throughout Russia’s invasion and steadfastly supported its territorial integrity. Turkey also prevented Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet via the Turkish Straits in accord with the Montreux Convention of 1936. On the other hand, Turkey has refused to join sanctions against Russia and Erdoğan has maintained a robust communication line with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This evenhanded positioning allowed Turkey to broker, together with the United Nations, the July 2022 agreement between Ukraine and Russia on grain exports via the Black Sea.

Turkey’s behind-the-scenes mediation was also crucial to securing the release of hostages from Gaza in late 2023. While the world focused on Qatar’s high-profile mediation, Ankara quietly leveraged its long-standing relations with Hamas’s political bureau, (a relationship that had irritated both Israel and the United States for years), to facilitate the release of more than twenty Thai agricultural workers who were not part of the primary prisoner-exchange deals negotiated by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt. Hamas credited Turkish mediation with securing the deal.

At the time, then US President Joe Biden made no mention of Erdoğan’s role in securing the Thai hostages’ release, instead crediting trilateral efforts by Washington, Doha, and Cairo. Trump has been more willing to publicly credit Turkey’s mediation role in the Israel-Hamas war. While announcing his twenty-point plan to end the Gaza conflict in October 2025, Trump stated, “President Erdoğan was fantastic. He really helped a lot, because he’s very respected.”

US embraces Turkey’s mediation

Trump’s appreciation for Turkey’s mediation seems sufficiently strong to have prompted his administration to drop the criminal case against Halkbank, a major Turkish state-owned bank. The bank was awaiting a multibillion-dollar fine after its 2019 indictment for money laundering over illicit gold shipments to Iran. Had the United States imposed the fine, Halkbank could have collapsed, possibly sparking a crisis across Turkey’s banking system. For years, the Turkish government argued that Halkbank enjoyed sovereign immunity and the case should be dropped, but as recently as October 2025, the Trump administration refused to express support to the US Supreme Court for Halkbank’s appeal that the case be dropped.

Then on March 6, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) requested that Judge Richard Berman drop the case, citing “extraordinary national security and foreign policy considerations.” The DOJ’s main justification was that Turkey’s assistance was “critical to securing the ceasefire agreement and Hamas’s release of the hostages” that the Trump administration brokered in early 2025.

The timing of the Trump administration’s reversal on the Halkbank case may be telling. Coming a week after the United States and Israel launched their attacks on Iran, Washington’s move may suggest that Trump foresees a role for Turkish mediation in the war. While Netanyahu may balk, Trump may find Ankara’s record of mediation too successful to resist. And indeed, Ankara has already begun playing that mediation role in concert with Pakistan, Saudia Arabia, and Egypt.

Matthew Bryza is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Can France and Algeria get their relationship back on track?

Karim Mezran — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 16:29:03 +0000

This article was originally published with the Institute for Global Studies and has been adapted and republished with permission.

There are signs of a thaw between Algeria and France, nearly two years after the onset of the serious diplomatic crisis between the North African nation and former colonial power. Ambassador Stéphane Romatet may soon return to lead France’s diplomatic mission in Algiers, as both countries have taken concrete steps on the diplomatic front. However, there appears to be no real political strategy in Algeria for redefining its relationship with France, with the risk that progress in the current favorable moment could lose momentum and end with the two countries stuck in a new limbo.

Over recent months, Algeria has softened its positions on issues related to the colonial past. In particular, on March 9, the Algerian parliament approved an amended law condemning French colonial rule, removing provisions that had called for France to issue official apologies and broad compensation. The Algerian Senate had called for the removal of these provisions, saying that they did not reflect President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s official approach. The amended law helped to at least partially ease the long-standing dispute with France.

Additionally, during these months, Algeria and France resumed high-level communication. For example, in February, French Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez traveled to Algiers for a two-day visit, restoring contact with the Algerian government within the framework of security cooperation. And on March 15, Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf and his French counterpart Jean-Noël Barrot talked cordially on the phone after nearly a year of no contact.

These are positive signs, suggesting an abatement in the crisis, which began when France expressed support for the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Algeria reframed that move within the context of claims related to French colonial rule—an issue that remains sensitive and never fully resolved. During the crisis, France recalled its ambassador, so the announcement that the French ambassador would return to Algiers is a positive signal, opening the door to a more balanced and constructive bilateral dialogue, especially in light of the importance France holds for the Algerian economy.

At the same time, however, Tebboune’s openings risk being little more than symbolic, without the initiation of a more decisive and profound revision of the bilateral relationship, which remains burdened by the often-inconsistent posture of Algerian institutions toward the former colonial power. Algeria has not matched its recent diplomatic progress with a coherent political strategy, leaving the relationship with France vulnerable to renewed stagnation and uncertainty. It is also unclear whether the thorny issue of the Western Sahara will continue to be a central point in dialogue with France as well as, more broadly, France-Morocco relations, which have grown in scope and intensity over the past two years and are now certainly not negotiable in the context of a renewal of relations with Algiers.

Further complicating Algeria-France relations is the unstable nature of regional alliances, strongly influenced by the Trump administration and increasingly assertive Israeli policies regarding Gaza and Iran. Algeria is closely observing the growing friction between French President Emmanuel Macron, US President Donald Trump, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, believing that French foreign policy contains elements of alignment with Algerian positions. No less important is the emerging energy crisis, which opens up opportunities for further cooperation with European countries and with France, in that Algiers could play a leading role in helping major European countries diversify their suppliers of oil and gas.

Algeria is also actively engaged in developing the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline linking Nigeria to the Mediterranean through Niger, which could significantly help meet European energy demand—if the project can finance its high development costs and bolster against insecurity in the Sahel. Algeria could seize on the opportunity of the pipeline and use it to consolidate economic relations with France—although deeper layers of the Algerian “pouvoir” could condition such a partnership on a revision of French positions on Western Sahara, running the risk of bringing relations between the two countries to another abrupt halt.

Additionally, Algeria’s ongoing efforts to restore its regional influence in the Sahel may prove a critical factor in the relaunch of Algeria-France relations, particularly as Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali currently maintain very poor relations with Paris. Algeria is looking toward the Sahel in an effort to rebuild a network of Sahel partners capable of isolating Morocco. It is also looking to re-establish Algiers’ primacy, in looking to strengthen ties with countries that have rocky relations with or outright oppose France, the United States, and Israel.

Such an orientation is likely, in the short term, to bring the issue of Western Sahara back to the center of Algerian discourse, potentially placing France in a position in which it must weigh its renewed relationship with Morocco against the uncertain opportunities offered by Algeria.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and a resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council.

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By alienating its intelligence partners, the US risks losing more than trust

Tressa Guenov — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 15:20:49 +0000

WASHINGTON—In their testimony earlier this month at the annual unclassified Worldwide Threats hearings in the House and Senate, leaders of the US intelligence community barely mentioned allies and partners. The intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, released alongside the hearings, similarly sheds little light on how the United States works with allies to achieve shared intelligence objectives. Yet from protecting US troops to preventing terrorist attacks, the United States has almost certainly relied on—or directly benefited from—the intelligence these networks provide.

The US intelligence community’s scant acknowledgement of these critical connections reflects the current US administration’s often dismissive—and at times aggressive—approach toward foreign partners. In the past two weeks, for example, US President Donald Trump criticized NATO members, as well as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, for not supporting the US-Israeli attacks on Iran and for declining to help secure the Strait of Hormuz.

Treating allies this way, however, is not just corrosive to diplomatic relations. It will almost certainly come at a strategic cost. If the United States continues to alienate key partners, it may soon struggle to sustain and resource mutually beneficial intelligence programs, keep pace with rapid technological change, and defend against determined adversaries such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Even with its skilled intelligence community and vast collection capabilities, the United States simply cannot form a comprehensive global intelligence picture on its own.

Intelligence cooperation often continues quietly and in the shadows, even as diplomatic or trade spats dominate headlines. Intelligence professionals pride themselves on this pragmatic approach to their work. Yet evidence suggests that US allies are beginning to reassess the depth of their intelligence cooperation with the United States. Reporting indicates that the United Kingdom, Colombia, and Canada may have stopped or adjusted intelligence-sharing on suspected drug trafficking vessels in the Caribbean over concerns about the legality of US military strikes. In October 2025, the Dutch military intelligence chief publicly expressed concerns that the United States might use shared intelligence to violate human rights. These signals are not yet a sea change, but they point to an erosion of the most valuable currency in intelligence-sharing: trust.

Even with its skilled intelligence community and vast collection capabilities, the United States simply cannot form a comprehensive global intelligence picture on its own.

In March 2025, the United States briefly suspended vital intelligence support to Ukraine, sparking an international outcry and shocking NATO allies. More recently, in launching Operation Epic Fury against Iran, Trump apparently caught NATO, Gulf, and Asian allies off guard, reportedly providing no advance warning that operations were imminent. This suggests that US-Israeli plans were executed without real-time coordination with allies. Such apparent willingness to bypass allied information-sharing mechanisms introduces unnecessary risk for both the United States and its partners, especially in complex and untested operational environments. By disrupting expectations of reciprocity with allies and potentially placing intelligence professionals and warfighters in more difficult positions to share information, the US administration may therefore undermine its own long-term interests.

It is important to underscore that US intelligence partnerships with allies are not a single program or activity. The eighteen-member US intelligence community has complex relationships with dozens of countries and partner agencies around the world. For example, the Anglophone “Five Eyes” partnership—comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—conducts intelligence cooperation across a range of collection disciplines. The “Nine Eyes” and “Fourteen Eyes” alliances have further broadened the network to include additional partners. On the military side, the US combatant commands often operate joint interagency task forces that benefit from allied and partner joint exercises, intelligence-sharing, and law enforcement support. But intelligence alliances and networks are only as strong as the commitment of their members—and the unpredictability of US actions risks eroding that commitment.

The consequences could be severe. Allies could limit US access to information by prioritizing regional, linguistic, or other organizing principles for their intelligence alliances. Bilateral intelligence relationships could face restrictions on information-sharing that, in the worst case, would degrade the common operating picture during a crisis. Moreover, countries could seek alternatives to US data platforms or methodologies, especially if they fear their intelligence could be used in unlawful or inappropriate ways by the United States. Specialized bilateral relationships between US and allied intelligence professionals could also weaken through reduced exposure and connectivity, especially as the US intelligence community is reportedly losing key expertise to early retirements and staff cuts. All this comes at a time when perennial intelligence cooperation challenges—bureaucratic hurdles, overclassification, system interoperability, and the rapid pace of artificial intelligence and quantum computing development—demand stronger collaboration between the United States and its allies.

Even under optimal conditions, international cooperation is challenging, but today’s security climate forces countries to work through slights and disputes to keep intelligence flowing. Still, allies may come to view this moment as a welcome chance to reform their intelligence communities, increase their independence, and enhance their capabilities. Such an approach would be different from reducing cooperation due to unhealthy breaks in trust. For example, the United Kingdom’s former head of MI6 argued in a March 23 interview that it is time for a refresh in terms of how it approaches cooperation with US intelligence and its reliance on security guarantees from Washington. The most recent US National Defense Strategy urges allies to provide more funding for intelligence, but it is unclear what those changes might entail or who will compel them.

In the meantime, members of Congress and their staff on intelligence, defense, and appropriations committees will need to help safeguard intelligence activities that deliver value to the United States and its allies, as they may be among the few Americans with sufficient clearance and oversight to detect potential problems. More congressional and parliamentary collaboration is needed on intelligence reform, and NATO can offer some collective accountability mechanisms, as well.

For its allies around the world, the United States remains an unmatched intelligence partner—and cooperation with the US intelligence community is key to joint special operations, human intelligence collection, cyber defense, drug interdiction, nuclear deterrence, and more. Yet allies and partners also bring critical capabilities that the United States lacks, including on-the-ground diplomatic experience with Iran, relationships with the Houthis, or the ability to operate credibly in certain cultural contexts. Without their support, the US intelligence picture—much like a Polaroid photo in reverse—will inevitably fade, leaving both Washington and its allies exposed to greater risk.

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Ukraine bombs Russia’s Baltic ports as Zelenskyy targets Putin’s oil exports

David Kirichenko — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 10:15:43 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says some of the country’s partners have called on Kyiv to scale down strikes on Russia’s oil sector as global energy prices surge amid the ongoing Iran War. These international appeals underline the impact of Ukraine’s most recent long-range attacks, which have reportedly reduced Russia’s oil export capacity by at least 40 percent.

Zelenskyy did not specify which of Ukraine’s allies had requested a pause in the country’s current air offensive. In recent weeks, the United States has temporarily relaxed some sanctions on Russian oil exports in a bid to ease mounting pressure on international energy markets due to the closure of the logistically crucial Strait of Hormuz.

Speaking on Monday in Kyiv, the Ukrainian leader indicated that he would only stop targeting Russian oil exports if Moscow also agrees to end its attacks on Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. “We are open to discussing any type of ceasefire; a full ceasefire, an energy ceasefire, a food security ceasefire. We have already proposed all of this and we are still open. If the Russians are ready, let them suggest any time frame,” he stated.

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Zelenskyy’s comments come following some of the most significant Ukrainian airstrikes of the entire war. In recent days, Ukrainian long-range drones have repeatedly struck Russia’s main oil export terminals on the Baltic Sea, causing extensive damage and disrupting one of the Kremlin’s most important economic lifelines.

These Baltic drone raids came just as rising global oil prices linked to the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East threatened to produce a major economic windfall for the Kremlin. By hitting the most critical elements of Russia’s oil export infrastructure, Ukraine is seeking to limit Putin’s ability to translate higher oil prices into increased wartime revenue.

This tactic appears to be working. Speaking to the Current Time media outlet, independent oil and gas industry analyst Boris Aronshtein described the recent series of Ukrainian strikes as “the most serious threat to exports of Russian oil” since the onset of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in 2022. “The thoughtfulness, the scale and direction of the attacks, as well as the timing of their execution; all this together produced an effect that I personally cannot recall in the four-plus years of the war,” he commented.

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Ukraine’s recent attacks on Baltic Sea oil terminals are part of a strategic bombing campaign to weaken Putin’s war machine by targeting the ports, refineries, and associated infrastructure that drive Russia’s economically crucial energy industry. This has been made possible thanks to Kyiv’s decision during the initial phase of Russia’s invasion to prioritize the development of domestically produced long-range strike drones and cruise missiles. As more drones and missiles become available, the scale of Ukraine’s strikes is steadily increasing.

Zelenskyy has repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine’s expanding long-range strike capability is critical for the current war effort and equally important as a deterrent against future Russian aggression. While long-range weapons provided by Kyiv’s partners often come with limitations on how they can be deployed, there are no such restrictions on the use of domestically produced drones and missiles.

Kremlin officials have certainly noticed Kyiv’s growing reach. In recent weeks, former Russian defense minister and current Security Council secretary Sergei Shoigu warned that Ukraine’s domestic drone program had now advanced to the point where no Russian region is safe from attack.

Ukraine’s ability to conduct large-scale airstrikes deep inside Russian territory has sparked vocal criticism from within Russia’s influential war blogger community, while also generating widespread concerns over the effectiveness of the country’s anti-drone defenses. Many have questioned how slow-moving drones could pass through multiple Russian regions to hit targets often located more than one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

In fact, the stage for Ukraine’s recent successes was set by efforts to methodically eliminate Russian air defenses and create corridors for long-range strikes. This approach looks set to continue. With much of the Kremlin’s existing air defense capacity already deployed along the front lines in Ukraine or being used to protect major Russian cities along with the palaces of Putin and his cronies, there is now thought to be little left in reserve to counter the growing Ukrainian drone threat.

The scale and frequency of Ukrainian strikes on oil and gas infrastructure will likely continue to increase in the coming months as Kyiv seeks ways to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. The Ukrainian authorities are hoping these attacks can help bring the end of the war closer by depriving the Kremlin of vital funding and threatening the foundations of Russia’s economic stability.

So far, Putin has rejected calls for a compromise peace. However, he may finally be forced to rethink his invasion if confronted with the prospect of dangerous destabilization on the home front. The Kremlin dictator remains determined to achieve his goal of erasing Ukrainian statehood, but he is also haunted by fears of a new Russian collapse to mirror the catastrophes of 1917 and 1991.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The Gulf states

The Gulf states understand this instinctively. For years, some of them pursued a careful balancing act by relying on US security while maintaining pragmatic relations with Iran, even amid accusations that elements within them tolerated or indirectly supported Iranian-linked proxy networks. That strategy collapses the moment infrastructure becomes a target. Ambiguity is a luxury of stability; it rarely survives contact with risk. States whose prosperity depends on uninterrupted energy flows will not tolerate prolonged uncertainty. They will align decisively with the only proven security architecture capable of guaranteeing stability. That architecture is American.

Iran

By contrast, Iran under the current regime risks a historic miscalculation. Its strategy has long relied on asymmetry—pressure without full confrontation, disruption without decisive response. But there is a threshold beyond which such a strategy becomes self-defeating. Targeting the infrastructure that underpins global energy flows is such a threshold. Nations rarely fail because they lack power. More often, they fail because they misjudge the consequences of using power. If Iran is perceived not merely as a regional challenger but as a systemic disruptor of global energy flows, then the response it provokes will not be incremental. It will be structural.

Russia, China, and North Korea

Much has been written about a new alignment among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—an emerging axis opposed to the West. In reality, this has always been more fiction than fact. China depends on stable energy flows from the Gulf. Russia benefits from higher prices but seeks equilibrium, not chaos. North Korea follows but does not lead. When the stakes become real, ideology gives way to interest—and those interests diverge.

Europe

Europe may be another major victim of this situation. At precisely the moment when hard power, energy security, and strategic clarity are required, Europe finds itself largely absent from the field. For decades, it built a model based on external energy, outsourced security, and the belief that economic and normative influence could substitute for geopolitical strength. That model is now showing its weaknesses, and a persistent energy shock could diminish Europe’s geopolitical role further. Without unified military capability or independent energy security, Europe is increasingly reacting to events rather than shaping them. It has shifted, quietly but unmistakably, from actor to arena.

The United States

Beneath all of this lies a deeper truth that has stayed with me for years. During my time at the London Business School, my professor Andrew Scott made a deceptively simple observation: oil and the dollar are the liquidity of the world. He was right. Oil remains the physical liquidity of the global economy. The dollar remains the financial system that prices and stabilizes it. Despite years of discussion about energy transitions, alternative currencies, and new geopolitical alignments, moments like this reveal how little has fundamentally changed. The system still runs on dollar-denominated energy flows. Liquidity, in the end, has no substitute.

There is also a historical parallel worth noting. When US President Ronald Reagan entered office, he defined a small number of strategic priorities. These priorities included restoring economic strength and confronting the Soviet Union. But on everything else, he reacted. That clarity allowed events, many of them unforeseen, to move in his favor. A similar dynamic may be unfolding today. US President Donald Trump did not set out to engineer a global realignment through crisis. But history does not ask whether leaders planned events. It asks whether they were positioned to benefit from them.

If the United States maintains economic strength, energy leverage, and military credibility, then shocks of this kind do not weaken its position. Instead, they reinforce it. Because when the system becomes unstable, the world does not look for consensus. It looks for order. And order requires a guarantor.

This is where one’s legacy is ultimately defined—not in moments of calm but in moments when the system begins to fracture, when uncertainty spreads and decisions become irreversible. Reagan understood this. He did not control events, but he shaped the environment in which they unfolded. History rewarded him for it. Trump may find himself in a similar position. If current dynamics continue, this period may be remembered not as a series of isolated crises, but as the moment when global ambiguity collapsed—and when US power reasserted itself, not by design but by necessity.

In geopolitics, power is measured not by who speaks the loudest, but rather by who cannot be replaced. In a world once again defined by energy, security, and liquidity, the United States remains indispensable.

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Europe needs a 21st-century containment strategy toward Russia

Vytautas Leškevičius, Julia Salabert — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 19:48:58 +0000

VILNIUS and WASHINGTON—February 22, 2026, marked eighty years since US diplomat George Kennan sent the Long Telegram from Moscow, laying the intellectual foundations for a containment strategy against Russia. As Kennan described in a follow-up Foreign Affairs essay that presented his ideas to the public, “the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Two days after this anniversary marked four years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, starkly illustrating the consequences of abandoning Kennan’s core strategic insight in favor of illusions about convergence, dialogue, or historical inevitability.

Europe today faces a familiar temptation: to substitute process for power, engagement for strategy, and institutional continuity for genuine security. The question is no longer whether Russia can be accommodated into a cooperative European order—that experiment has already failed. The question now is whether Europe and its allies are prepared to organize their security around the reality that Russia cannot be accommodated and must be contained.

Europe’s strategic indecision: Why calls for engagement are back

So far this year, several European countries—France, Germany, and Italy among them—have revived calls for renewed engagement with Moscow. Just this month, the Belgian prime minister said that Europe must negotiate with Russia, adding: “In private, European leaders agree with me, but no one dares to say it out loud.” Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, Poland, and some Baltic leaders remain skeptical.

At the surface level, renewed engagement seems to be driven by fears of European marginalization in emerging diplomatic formats, particularly as the United States has engaged in limited talks about Russia’s war in Ukraine, which have now been paused due to the war in Iran. Europeans do not want to wait for a seat at the table in these talks—especially regarding peace in Ukraine and any future security architecture for the continent.

At a deeper structural level, engagement returns precisely when high-end deterrence and defense posture becomes politically costly, and institutional enforcement weakens. Dialogue appears less disruptive than sustained military modernization, sanctions, and forward deployments. But it is also less pertinent.

Limited but persistent European calls to re-engage with Moscow do not amount to a coherent plan to restore stability. They are reactions to the breakdown of the rules-based order—and to Europe’s inherent uncertainty about how to respond. The core fallacy here lies in conflating the existence of the rules-based order with the institutions that once embodied it. When those rules are violated, the question is not how to preserve institutions as they are, but whether they must be reformed, redesigned, or, in some cases, abandoned altogether.

The failure of stand-alone multilateralism

For decades, Euro-Atlantic security rested on the implicit assumption that institutions themselves generate stability by establishing expectations and enforcing adherence to norms. Multilateral diplomacy presumes rational actors and assumes that repeated interaction will gradually encourage restraint. Authoritarian regimes, nevertheless, have repeatedly exploited this logic by using engagement to gain time, acquire undeserved legitimacy, and garner asymmetric advantage. When enforcement erodes, institutions tend to maintain themselves through inertia rather than effectiveness. Processes replace outcomes, and participation becomes an end rather than a means for something more valuable.

Simply being at the table does not produce peace. When detached from military instruments of power, engagement consumes time while aggressors build strength. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) provides a cautionary example. Rather than confronting Russia’s systematic violations, the organization has increasingly prioritized procedural continuity over substance. Russia and Belarus remain formally engaged while openly dismantling every foundational principle of the OSCE. The result is a structure without content—an institution unable to defend itself, trapped in outdated working methods, and unwilling to adapt to strategic reality.

Multilateralism that cannot enforce its own norms ceases to be a safeguard and becomes a liability. But if a full-scale war in Europe has not forced an institutional transformation, what will?

Why neither engagement nor Cold War nostalgia works

Engagement is often framed as the alternative to escalation. History suggests otherwise. The United States did not pacify Europe during the Cold War through talks. Rather, Washington’s containment strategy deterred the Kremlin from aggression against the United States’ European allies. Kennan’s concept rested on sustained counterpressure—political, economic, and military—designed to shape adversary behavior over time.

At the same time, a nostalgic return to Cold War models is neither possible nor desirable. The Cold War–era strategies of “forward defense” and “flexible response” entailed a permanent, large-scale US military engagement in Europe. The era of such US engagement in Europe is ending. Washington has been explicit about this for years: Europe must develop its own capabilities, capacity, and strategic will. NATO’s ongoing command reforms reflect this shift toward greater European responsibility. The Alliance has begun moving toward a new agenda centered on credible deterrence and defense, resilience, scaling up industrial production, and burden-sharing.

Uncoordinated European initiatives to restart dialogue with Moscow risk undercutting this trajectory by weakening NATO deterrence and defense posture before it is fully restored. The real danger lies in drifting into an incoherent middle ground—where deterrence is insufficient to constrain Russia and engagement without the strength to back it up is insufficient to stabilize Europe’s relations with Moscow.

Updated containment: A functional Euro-Atlantic approach

Containment does not lead to escalation. Rather, it is a stabilizing approach that ensures any dialogue takes place within the framework of credible defense. Similarly, escalation and escalation dominance are different concepts. NATO does not seek to escalate conflicts, but it must retain the capacity to respond from a position of strength if escalation occurs. Securing such escalation dominance requires clear red lines, credible capabilities, political will, and courage.

An updated containment strategy for European countries should rest on five pillars:

First, deterrence before dialogue. Credible military posture is not optional—it is the precondition for engagement. Without the ability to deny cost-free aggression, dialogue risks becoming a channel for delay, leverage, and asymmetry rather than a tool for stability.

Second, institutions are judged by function, not sentiment. Structures that cannot enforce norms must be reformed, bypassed, or replaced. Preserving institutional continuity in the absence of enforcement does not uphold order—it obscures its erosion and delays necessary adaptation.

Third, favor regional and functional formats. Where consensus-bound forums fail, coalitions, primarily regional ones, need to come to the fore. Smaller, purpose-driven groupings can act where unanimity-based institutions are blocked, restoring effectiveness without waiting for unreachable consensus.

Fourth, European ownership. Defense industrial mobilization, infrastructure hardening, and sustained support for Ukraine must become permanent features of European security.

Fifth, strategic coherence. NATO must seize escalation management—through large-scale multidomain exercises, robust responses to hybrid attacks, and the explicit recognition that legacy arrangements with Russia no longer apply. Maintaining escalation dominance will also require breaking a long-standing taboo and integrating conventional and nuclear planning.

An updated containment strategy will require closing sanctions loopholes, integrating civil-military logistics, and expanding defense production through state-backed investment. The Kremlin’s allies and enablers will need to be constrained across multiple regions—from the Indo-Pacific to the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Europe’s renewed debate over engagement with Russia reflects a deeper reluctance to accept that the previous security order has already collapsed. Peace is preserved through strategic clarity, credible deterrence, and robust defense capabilities—not through nostalgia for processes that no longer deliver stability. Only a comprehensive policy grounded in strength, combined with a refusal to compromise on core principles, can alter Moscow’s calculus.

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Can Europe—finally—turn an energy shock into a path toward energy security?

Charles Hendry — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 19:00:00 +0000

When President Trump returned the bust of Sir Winston Churchill to the Oval Office, I hope he might also have spent some time reading up on some of his most memorable quotes.

Two seem particularly relevant at this time. Speaking of the consequences of starting a war, Churchill wrote: “once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.” And more than a century ago, regarding fuel for the navy, he said that energy security comes from “variety and variety alone.” Both remain very relevant today.

One of the principal roles of energy policy is to protect a country and its citizens from massive, external, and unpredictable shocks. Without security, energy won’t be affordable and it certainly won’t be clean either. And while there is a cost to energy security, it is nothing like the cost of insecurity.

The lessons of inaction

Europeans are learning, for the second time in five years, that we have allowed ourselves to be too dependent on vulnerable supply routes. Europe paid a very high price for its overreliance on Russian gas. The argument had been that Russian gas was cheaper, which helped drive European economies, especially in Germany. That held good—until it went catastrophically wrong.

Now the world is seeing the economic threat from the overreliance on oil, gas, and their associated products through the Strait of Hormuz. It wasn’t as though there were no warnings about the risk. Over the past two decades, Iran has repeatedly threatened to blockade the Strait. When it didn’t happen, policymakers breathed a sigh of relief and did nothing more to address the long-term vulnerability it posed.

In the past couple of decades, the world has faced many massive energy shocks. The Fukushima disaster, which forced the world to consider whether it could safely keep its nuclear power plants open. The Macondo disaster, which led to doubts about the future of deep-sea drilling for oil and gas. Those past threats by Iran to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as an earlier Russian dispute, which stopped Russian gas transiting Ukraine to Europe. And, for the United Kingdom, the closures of the Lanegeled pipeline, which is our most important source of gas imports from Norway.

All of those crises were largely unpredictable and unexpected. The difference this time is that the consequences of war with Iran should have been better anticipated and the challenges the world has been facing from the closure of the Strait were far from unpredictable.

The energy crisis across regions

The degree of impact of the oil and gas blockage varies across regions. European and UK reliance on Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) has reduced in recent years, in part replaced by US LNG coming into the European market (which has increased four-fold since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine). However, the global impact is greater than ever, and after just a few weeks, Asia is seeing significant LNG supply shortages, and is taking steps to introduce rationing, reduce demand, or increase the use of coal. Fuel is being rationed in a growing number of countries in Africa, and may be required in Australia to prevent panic buying. Pakistan is cuttingsupplies to industrial customers, and Bangladesh is imposing temporary blackouts. With nearly 20 percent of the world’s LNG coming through the Strait of Hormuz, Europe will certainly also be impacted, as US LNG is pulled toward Asia.

To put it in a stark comparison, world demand for oil dropped by 8 million barrels a day during the first year of Covid. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has led to a loss of 11 million barrels a day, so the impact is potentially significantly worse.

All this means, regardless of how long this crisis lasts, global policymakers need to start planning now for how we reduce this dependency in the future—not just for oil and gas but also for associated products like fertilizer. Around one-third of global fertilizer supply is currently blocked, and a similar proportion of the world’s helium, a product of natural gas processing.

Europe’s path toward variety

Security of supply is multidimensional. It relates to the sources of supply, the diversity of the supply routes, and also the physical security of those routes. Countries that depend on imports need to look at how they reduce that dependency, and make routes to market more secure.

Europe needs to act collectively to hasten the opening up of other sources of crude oil, gas, and refined products, for example in Syria, which can start producing again after years in force majeure.

For the UK, it should also mean maximizing output from the North Sea—regardless of how much gas we will need, it must make sense that as much as possible should come from its own resources (which will also contribute taxes to the government and sustain jobs, even if not affecting prices).

Europe must look at creating new routes to market. New pipelines can be built to reduce pressure points, for example, from Saudi Arabia through Jordan and Syria, or to enable more gas from the Caspian to flow to Europe.

Moreover, Europe needs a strategy to revitalize its declining refinery capacity, rather than too often seeing it as a nice-to-have optional extra. Government strategy will be central to delivering this, but it can only happen if European countries become competitive once again as places to operate energy-intensive industries.

This is a global challenge where Europe must work with partners in the Gulf. Reducing over-dependency is as much in their interests as producers as it is in ours as consumers, and, ultimately, their security is inextricably linked to ours. The Gulf countries fully understand that they need to be reliable partners, where supplies cannot be interrupted at catastrophic cost, and have a vested interest in working with Europe to deliver a more secure and sustainable model.

Let this crisis be a wake-up call

European governments want to reduce exposure to volatile global gas prices by shifting the economy further away from hydrocarbons. While this crisis brings home the risks of being dependent on imports, especially where there are geopolitical risks and natural pain points, we need to be honest in recognizing that, even with a transition away from hydrocarbons, we will be using oil and gas for many years to come.

Regardless of how long this crisis lasts, Europeans need to see it as a wake-up call and, when it is over, we cannot just go back to business as usual. Our energy security, our critical national infrastructure, and our vital energy industries are just too important to be left to the market.

Charles Hendry is a distinguished fellow of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and a former UK minister of state for energy.

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Inside Tehran’s toll booth

Alisha Chhangani — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 18:37:23 +0000

WASHINGTON—There is a lot of attention right now on how Iran is managing access to the Strait of Hormuz—operating a kind of “toll booth” in which it clamps down on commercial flows through the vital waterway while reportedly allowing some vessels to transit for as much as $2 million per voyage or according to particular political and financial conditions.

But an important question has received far less attention: How are Iran and oil purchasers settling their payments under current conditions? What follows is an effort to answer that question, drawing on new GeoEconomics Center research, to shed light on the policy levers Tehran is pulling and the economic-statecraft and technological tools it is employing—as well as the implications for sanctions enforcement.

How Iran settles cross-border payments today

Iran’s cross‑border payments system reflects years of sanctions‑driven adaptation. In 2012, sanctioned Iranian banks were disconnected from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network, which serves as the core infrastructure for global financial messaging. While this did not make all transactions with Iran impossible, it made standard cross-border settlement much more difficult by cutting off access to the main channel for bank-to-bank communication.

In January 2016, following verification steps under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, many Iranian banks were reconnected to SWIFT and some financial sanctions were lifted. But after the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed secondary sanctions, access to formal financial channels narrowed again. This repeated cycle of reintegration and new restrictions made it clear to Tehran that formal dollar-clearing or euro-denominated trade finance was unreliable.

In response, Iran has shifted its cross‑border payments system to a set of overlapping workarounds. Some transactions still move through formal banking channels in jurisdictions willing to absorb sanctions risk. Others are routed through intermediaries that can hold funds, net obligations, or obscure beneficial ownership. Complementing these efforts are state-led initiatives such as the Shetab system. While primarily focused on domestic payments, Iran recently expanded Shetab for cross-border use through a strategic integration with Russia’s Mir payment system. This link connects the national payment switches of both countries, allowing their respective bank cards to be “read” and processed by the other’s banking hardware. There also are several informal networks that settle transactions entirely outside of the banking system. For example, the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has described Iranian “shadow banking” networks that rely on Iran‑based exchange houses and foreign front companies—particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hong Kong, and Singapore—to move billions of dollars tied to oil exports and other activities.

At the base of this structure is hawala, a long-standing, trust-based system that enables value transfer without formal cross-border movement of funds. These networks are anchored in regional hubs such as Dubai, where a large number of Iranian-linked firms operate and provide counterparties for informal settlement. On top of this, Iran uses state-linked intermediaries, including front companies and trading entities, to facilitate transactions tied to oil exports. More recently, Iran also has relied on cryptocurrency to facilitate transactions that can bypass traditional banking rails. For example, the blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis estimated that Iran‑linked crypto activity reached $7.8 billion on‑chain in 2025, with stablecoins increasingly used for settlement and a growing share tied to sanctioned entities. US enforcement actions have increasingly targeted these channels, including sanctions on exchanges and wallet clusters associated with Iranian activity.

For Tehran, formal, semi‑formal, and informal channels operate in parallel, with transactions routed through different layers depending on risk tolerance, counterparties, and the constraints in place at any given time.

How China’s yuan fits in

China is now Iran’s main oil customer, buying over 80 percent of its seaborne exports. In this partnership, Iran trades discounted oil for Chinese investment and goods, with payments increasingly handled in yuan instead of dollars to reduce exposure to US oversight while also advancing the internationalization of China’s renminbi (RMB). Chinese refiners often buy Iranian oil through intermediaries and non‑dollar banks. The money stays in controlled accounts and is mainly used to pay Chinese contractors or cover imports rather than flowing directly into Iran’s banking system.

China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), a clearing and settlement network launched by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) in 2015 to process cross-border renminbi transactions, could be a potential channel for these yuan-denominated purchases of Iranian oil.

GeoEconomics Center analysis of CIPS data shows in the chart below that monthly averages for daily transaction volume remained within a $85–105 billion (600–750 billion yuan) range over the past year. In mid-to-late March, however, daily observations rose to over $130 billion (around 940 billion yuan). The increase in volume is notable in the context of the ongoing Iran war, which began on February 28, but it does not by itself show that Iranian oil payments are moving through CIPS. CIPS handles tens of thousands of transactions a day that reflect a wide range of uses, so the data are best read as a sign of broader growth in renminbi settlement capacity, not as direct proof of Iran-linked flows. Beijing also has widened the mandate of CIPS so it can handle some non‑renminbi currencies and provide broader cross‑border services, making it more flexible as a backbone for regional payments.

The UAE could be emerging as an increasingly important player in this network. First Abu Dhabi Bank joined CIPS as a direct participant in mid‑2025 and was later named an official renminbi clearing bank. Iran has incentives to use RMB in its energy trade with China, while the UAE has long functioned as a hub for Iran’s trade and commercial finance. Given China’s role as the primary destination for Iran’s shipped oil, a Gulf‑based RMB clearing hub could reduce friction in RMB‑denominated trade flows linked to China and support greater regional RMB liquidity. But there is little visibility into how these channels are being used during the current conflict or what is driving the recent uptick in CIPS activity. Any such transactions would likely occur indirectly through Chinese or third-country banks rather than through direct participation on the CIPS network, limiting visibility into how the systems are being used now.

China also could leverage Project mBridge, a cross‑border payments platform designed to enable direct settlement between central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), for purchases of Iranian oil. Originally incubated under the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Innovation Hub, the project brings together the PBOC, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Bank of Thailand, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, and the Central Bank of Saudi Arabia. The project has made more than 4,000 transactions worth $55.49 billion, with China’s digital yuan comprising 95.3 percent of the volume.

In November 2025, the UAE executed its first government payment using the wholesale digital dirham on mBridge, testing readiness for settling energy and commodity trade—sectors in which China dominates. Data on mBridge usage remains limited, as neither the PBOC nor participant banks are required to disclose those details. There is no public evidence yet of Iran-linked usage of mBridge, and Iran is not a member of the system, which remains experimental. In practice, however, the UAE’s banks, exchange houses, and free‑zone shell companies already serve as conduits for Iranian‑linked trade and finance, raising the possibility that mBridge‑linked institutions could indirectly handle Iranian‑linked transactions even if Iran itself is not a participant in the platform.

Conversations that the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics team recently had with policymakers in Europe indicate that Group of Seven (G7) finance officials believe participants may be leveraging mBridge during the Iran war. But the linkages and scale are impossible to know without more information. Given the project’s focus on commodity trade with Gulf countries and China, interest in its potential role in Iranian oil payments is high.

What to watch next

As developments around Iran and its oil trade continue to draw attention, policymakers should focus on several key signals.

First, will renminbi‑based payment infrastructure continue to grow? In particular, will CIPS continue to expand its network in the Middle East, where yuan‑denominated trade is easier to facilitate? Project mBridge remains opaque, with limited public data available. Still, as central banks continue to develop and test wholesale CBDCs, indicators such as new country participation in cross-border projects, energy-related pilot transactions, or spikes in activity during periods of financial or geopolitical stress could point to this technology being used more actively.

Iran, too, is advancing its “digital rial” CBDC, initially a reaction to US sanctions, which could eventually give Tehran an additional channel to steer retail and wholesale payments through digital channels. All founding BRICS countries are testing wholesale CBDCs and continue to push for a more multipolar global currency system. Much of this effort focuses on building domestic digital payment networks while piloting cross‑border applications that enable trade settlement in local currencies. Watch for any signals emerging from the next BRICS summit, planned for September 2026 in India, as well as broader developments in these payment systems—particularly given that India is the second‑largest buyer of Iranian oil.

It is important to note that these systems still do not challenge the dollar’s status as the reserve currency and its prevalence in international transactions. CIPS continues to have a much smaller network than the West’s financial architecture, which includes SWIFT and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). However, these alternative systems do undermine a pillar of dollar dominance: the power of financial sanctions. Especially in this case, they provide Iran with channels to maintain oil revenue and trade flows despite pressure.

Iran has levers it can use to facilitate trade in yuan or other non-dollar currencies. Tehran’s payment landscape, however, remains fragmented. The yuan does not provide Iran with a way out of sanctions, but it may offer a cheaper way through them by reducing dependence on dollar-clearing channels and lowering the compliance and intermediary costs associated with sanctioned transactions.

Perhaps the most important shift to watch, then, is how the routes connecting trade to payment are changing. Are those changes limited to the current crisis? And will they have longer-term implications for cross-border payments outside the dollar?

The post Inside Tehran’s toll booth appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The future of energy geopolitics is written in patents

Andrei Covatariu — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 14:45:33 +0000

For decades, energy security has been shorthand for access to fuel—and the Strait of Hormuz crisis is a staggering demonstration of this. This limited definition, however, is incomplete.

Crucially, energy security is dynamic and multidimensional. Any assessment represents only a snapshot. Today’s tenuous position can erode further if innovation slows, supply chains shift, or competitors gain technological ground. In that sense, research and development (R&D) is no longer peripheral to energy security; it is central to its future trajectory.

Technological capability shapes geopolitical relevance. Countries that lead in the development of energy technologies—whether in batteries, grid systems, advanced materials, or efficiency solutions—do not simply export products. They shape standards, capture value chains, influence alliances, and reinforce strategic autonomy.

One revealing, if imperfect, indicator of this future positioning is patenting.

What the patent landscape reveals

The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) State of Energy Innovation 2026 offers a stark picture. Energy-related patents now represent roughly 10 percent of all global patents (ahead of other important economic sectors, such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, or transport)—a figure that underscores how central energy technologies have become to industrial strategy and national security.

The technological center of gravity has shifted decisively toward low-emissions technologies, and particularly toward energy storage. In 2023 alone, batteries accounted for about 40 percent of global energy patenting.

Geographically, the trend is equally striking. China now accounts for close to two-fifths of global energy patenting and has dramatically increased its share of low-emissions technology patents over the past decade. The United States remains a major innovator, though its patenting intensity has fluctuated across sectors.

Europe, however, recorded its third consecutive year of declining energy patenting through 2023, the last year for which consolidated data are available. While the region remains an important source of innovation, its relative trajectory lags behind both China and the United States.

In a world where intellectual property increasingly shapes industrial power, this is not a minor statistical fluctuation. It is a structural signal.

The limits—and importance—of patent data

Patent counts are not destiny. More patents do not automatically translate into technological superiority or commercial success. The value of a patent depends on its strategic relevance and eventual integration into marketable systems. Many patents remain dormant; some represent incremental improvements; a few reshape entire industries.

Moreover, categorizing patents is complex. Technologies often overlap across digital systems, materials science, energy hardware, and software controls. International classification systems attempt to impose order, and legal provisions aim to prevent “double patenting,” but quantitative measures inevitably simplify a more intricate reality.

And yet, even with these caveats, patenting remains one of the clearest early indicators of innovation intensity. International patent families—used in the IEA analysis—capture inventions that applicants consider valuable enough to protect across multiple jurisdictions. They are not a perfect measure of quality, but they do signal intent, ambition, and strategic positioning.

Viewed through this lens, Europe’s relative slowdown suggests something deeper than temporary volatility. It points to a widening gap in the upstream race to define the energy system of the future.

Innovation does not depend on scale. It precedes it.

Europe’s competitiveness debate frequently centers on familiar structural challenges: high energy prices, regulatory complexity, permitting delays, limited economies of scale, and fragmented capital markets. These constraints undeniably affect manufacturing competitiveness and large-scale industrial deployment.

But R&D and patent generation do not require perfect scale conditions. They depend on sustained investment, institutional coherence, strong research ecosystems, and strategic clarity. Innovation is the first stage of the value chain. Manufacturing scale comes later.

Europe’s difficulties in scaling certain industries cannot serve as an excuse for weakening its upstream research output. If anything, in a fragmented geopolitical environment, protecting and expanding intellectual property generation becomes even more critical.

It is also worth dispelling a common misconception: innovation is not confined to clean technologies. Fossil fuel sectors continue to evolve technologically. The shale revolution in the United States fundamentally altered global oil and gas geopolitics through innovation in drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Today’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) expansion, methane mitigation technologies, digital optimization, and efficiency improvements are all R&D driven. Even as fossil fuel patenting has declined relative to low-emissions technologies, it remains a competitive arena shaped by technological progress.

Energy geopolitics, in other words, is a race across multiple technological fronts.

And this is where Europe’s recent patent trajectory raises a deeper concern. Beyond the numbers themselves, the decline suggests something more structural: not simply a funding issue, but a mindset gap. Despite strong rhetoric in Brussels about strategic autonomy, technological sovereignty, and industrial leadership, the measurable outputs of innovation tell a more cautious story. If Europe’s patent intensity is weakening relative to its peers, it may indicate that the broader ecosystem is not yet calibrated to nurture the next generation of disruptive innovators—those capable of producing breakthrough technologies rather than incremental improvements.

Europe’s policy response—and its contradictions

This diagnosis echoes beyond energy circles. In his 2024 European Competitiveness Report, Mario Draghi warned that Europe’s innovation gap with the United States and China reflects deeper weaknesses in public and private R&D investment, coordination, and commercialization—calling for a reorientation of EU competitiveness strategy toward sustained and coherent research and innovation support. Draghi underscored that closing this gap is essential for Europe to maintain industrial strength and strategic autonomy in advanced technologies.

It is important to acknowledge that the patent data featured by the IEA currently extend only through 2023. Since then, the European Union has intensified its focus on strategic technologies. Horizon Europe, EU’s key research and innovation funding program, continues to channel significant funding into climate, energy, and mobility research. Other initiatives including the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform, the Net-Zero Industry Act, and the Critical Raw Materials Act all reflect recognition that technological sovereignty is now a geopolitical imperative.

Discussions around the next Multiannual Financial Framework (2028–2034) suggest expanded allocations for research and innovation, reinforcing the EU’s ambition to strengthen its industrial and technological base.

However, policy coherence remains fragile.

Recent calls by Italy to suspend the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), citing competitiveness concerns for energy-intensive industries, illustrate the tension between short-term industrial pressure and long-term innovation strategy. While the political logic behind such arguments is understandable, the strategic implications are more troubling. In its March 19 summit conclusions, the European Council did not endorse a pause; instead, it requested targeted temporary measures for the current price spike induced by the Iran war and invited the Commission to present an ETS review by July 2026 to reduce carbon-price volatility and limit impacts on electricity prices—while explicitly safeguarding the ETS’s role as a market-based signal that drives investment and innovation.

A significant portion of ETS revenues finances innovation mechanisms such as the Innovation Fund—one of the world’s largest programs supporting innovative low-carbon technologies. Weakening the ETS would not only alter carbon price signals; it would directly constrain one of Europe’s primary financial channels for scaling breakthrough technologies.

In an era where patents increasingly reflect geopolitical positioning, reducing innovation funding would compound—not resolve—Europe’s competitive challenges.

A strategic choice

Reversing Europe’s patent trajectory is not a matter of a single policy tweak and will require more than higher budgets. It will demand sharper prioritization, faster translation of research into protected intellectual property, and greater coherence between industrial policy and innovation strategy.

In a system where technological capability increasingly shapes geopolitical leverage, patent intensity is not a peripheral metric. It is an early indicator of who is preparing to shape the energy system of the next decades—and who is preparing to adapt to it.

Andrei Covatariu is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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How the West lost the post-Cold War era

Brian Whitmore — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

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Three decades ago, the West seemed unassailable. The Soviet Union had collapsed and for the third time in the twentieth century, the United States and its allies had emerged victorious in a global struggle against an authoritarian foe—and for the first time in generations, Western liberal democracy did not have an ideological or geopolitical adversary. It was a giddy moment when anything and everything seemed possible.

Today, that heady optimism feels like a distant dream. Thirty years after the Soviet empire ended, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, the largest land war in Europe since World War II. The liberal democratic model of governance that appeared so triumphant and invincible three decades ago is today beleaguered and on the defensive as populism, xenophobia, and authoritarian attitudes sweep Europe and North America. The world today seems as dangerous, if not more so, than during the long twilight struggle of the Cold War.

So what happened? How did we fall from the heady optimism of 1992 to the peril, malaise, and danger of today? What lessons can we learn from the post-Cold War period? Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, the British historian E. H. Carr published his seminal book The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939, which examined the lessons of the interwar period. Carr argued that this era was a crisis of the international system, resulting from the failure of the old liberal order to adapt to and understand new and emergent political, economic, and military realities.

This report argues that a similar dynamic played out in the contemporary West in our own thirty-year crisis between the end of the Cold War and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The liberal order failed. But how? And why? The author interviewed dozens of policymakers, analysts, and experts in Europe and North America to distill the lessons of the post-Cold War era.

Read the full report

About the author

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington.

He is also the founder and author of the Power Vertical Blog and host of the Power Vertical Podcast, both of which focus on Russian affairs. Whitmore was previously a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) from 2018 to 2020 and senior Russia analyst for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) from 2007 to 2017. Prior to joining RFE/RL, Whitmore worked as a foreign correspondent for the Boston Globe in Moscow and Prague.

He also worked as a graduate lecturer with the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina as a visiting lecturer with the History Faculty at Mechnikov National University in Odesa, Ukraine, and the International Relations Faculty at St. Petersburg State University in Russia.

His work has appeared in the Washington Post, the Atlantic, the New Republic, Foreign Policy, World Politics Review, Newsweek, and elsewhere. He has appeared as a guest commentator on CNN, the BBC World Service, NPR, Bloomberg, and various other media.

A native of New Haven, Connecticut, Whitmore earned an MA in political science from Villanova University in 1987 and BA in politics from St. Joseph’s University in Philadelphia in 1986.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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How NATO can integrate AI to prevail in future algorithmic warfare

Dominika Kunertova — Mon, 30 Mar 2026 09:00:00 +0000

Bottom lines up front

NATO’s competitive edge in the era of emerging and disruptive technologies will come from purposeful integration of AI technologies across the Alliance’s digital backbone.
Military AI does not generate new vulnerabilities in kind, but it creates more room for human error and miscalculation.
Victory in algorithmic warfare requires electromagnetic spectrum dominance.

Executive summary
Introduction
Part one: Military AI tech trends
Part two: The specter of algorithmic warfare
Part three: Future scenarios
Part four: Policy recommendations
Conclusion

Executive summary

Military artificial intelligence (AI) is moving from the margins of experimentation into the core of how NATO will fight, make critical decisions, and deter competitors over the next decade. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept identifies the technological edge to be critical for the Alliance to fulfil its core tasks. Both contemporary warfare and renewed strategic competition suggest that data-driven AI decision-support systems and autonomous battlefield capabilities augmented with AI will define the character of future conflicts. There is a justified focus on evaluating strategic risks associated with such systems.

This report argues that integrating AI into military systems does not generate vulnerabilities that are fundamentally new in kind compared to existing cyber risks. But the difference lies in consequences. Once AI-enabled decision-support systems and autonomous platforms become critical to Alliance operations, interference with data, models, and computing infrastructure may have implications for NATO’s ability to see, decide, and act under pressure. Similarly, the offensive use of AI-enabled capabilities does not, on its own, raise or lower the nuclear threshold. Escalation thresholds in algorithmic warfare will continue to be driven by effects on the ground rather than by whether a system is AI-enabled. Yet the characteristics of AI—the speed, system opacity, and physical infrastructure—create more room for human error, misperception, and miscalculation.

To explore such possibilities, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, in partnership with the NATO Office of the Chief Scientist, conducted a foresight study to clarify how adversaries might counter AI-enabled capabilities and to examine what this means for NATO doctrine, strategy, and deterrence. The research combined horizon scanning and expert interviews, an off-the-record workshop held in Washington, under Chatham House rules, and scenario modeling. The project mapped AI technology trends across decision-support systems and autonomous platforms, identified likely AI vulnerabilities and vectors of attack, and explored escalation dynamics through structured discussion and scenario-based exercises.

This project brought a new perspective into the debate on the impacts of transformative military AI on future warfare for two reasons. First, it is innovative in its comprehensive scope that encompasses both physical and cyber dimensions of algorithmic warfare. Indeed, it foregrounds the AI triad of data, algorithms, and computing power and shows how each can be attacked through cyber, kinetic, and electromagnetic (EM) means. And second, it examines the intersection of AI and nuclear weapons from a different angle: Tailored nuclear weapons are treated as a potential countermeasure against military AI for their electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects.

There are two key findings.

While military AI does not generate “shock and awe” in and of itself, AI can exacerbate existing risk conditions for accidents and inadvertent escalations.

The report finds that the employment of military AI does not make the use of tailored nuclear weapons more likely. Instead, the choice of target, physical damage, and casualties are what matter. Workshop participants ranked responses to a notional AI-enabled drone saturation attack in the Baltic region by their perceived escalatory potential. Diplomatic action and electronic warfare were the most preferred responses, followed by kinetic strikes, cyber operations, and directed-energy weapons (DEW). Tailored nuclear EMP attacks were viewed as highly escalatory and politically unacceptable for NATO to use to repel an attack over NATO territory, even when framed as a tool of “information warfare.”

At the same time, military AI is expected to make the difference in terms of increasing speed, autonomy, scale, and uncertainty. This research, however, revealed that in comparison with all three components of the AI triad, the human remains the most vulnerable element of AI. Humans are routinely exposed to phishing, social engineering, cognitive bias, and already run the risk of deskilling as more tasks are delegated to machines.

Integrating AI into military operations therefore creates dangers along two pathways. First, speed and data are working against their user. Such compressed timelines can create cognitive problems in decision-making. Without safety and quality protocols in place, flooding decision-support systems with noisy or nonpatternable data can further thicken the fog of war for commanders. Second, AI-enabled military systems become increasingly complex and can lead to normal accidents, making foreign interference detection and exposure difficult to distinguish from system failures.

Algorithmic warfare highlights the importance of electromagnetic spectrum dominance.

Digital modernization of defense—the data-centric approach and software-defined capabilities—will make electromagnetic threats more salient. Russia’s war in Ukraine already highlights how GPS jamming, communications blackouts, and electronic warfare shape combat operations. This trend will intensify as NATO begins to lean on AI-enabled and multidomain command and control.

Advances in military applications of AI further strengthen the convergence between the cyber domain of operations (digital code) and the electromagnetic environment (electrons). In a crowded and contested spectrum, where software-defined radios, commercial satellites, and cloud-linked data centers underpin military networks, the distinction between “cyber” and “conventional” attack begins to blur. Further fielding of directed-energy weapons also indicates shifting the center of gravity to energy supplies.

Attacks on AI systems can use several vectors. The adversary can target model weights through espionage and hacking; poison training datasets; blind or spoof sensors on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; disable data relays; or physically damage hardware in data centers, cables, satellites, or uncrewed systems. Cyber operators, electronic warfare units, special forces, and conventional reconnaissance-strike systems may all participate in degrading AI-enabled capabilities. In contrast, the ongoing trend of lowering the cost of warfare will make any requirements for new protection measures, such as shielding or hardening, difficult to implement due to the trade-offs in terms of cost, weight, and endurance.

The report develops three future scenarios, including a fourth baseline case, to identify likely implications of future algorithmic warfare for NATO’s doctrine and strategy: guarded opportunism, brave new world, and minority report.

Guarded opportunism outlines a future in which military AI, despite its transformative impacts, does not require the military to dramatically alter the rules of engagement. Instead of introducing qualitatively new risks or vulnerabilities, the challenges related to military AI remain manageable with disciplined cyber hygiene and resilient power supply. On the risk side, this scenario points to heightened dangers of AI-fueled hybrid warfare below the threshold of armed conflict.
Brave new world is a less likely but more dangerous scenario detailing the conditions for escalation spirals. Transformative effects of AI lead to conventionalizing nuclear weapons. Fielding of AI-enabled military capabilities provokes the adversary to use new nuclear-powered EM weapons. Nuclear EMP attacks are viewed as a legitimate use of nuclear weapons that belong to the specter of algorithmic warfare.
Minority report presents a different take on the possible algorithmic future in which AI technology hype drives strategy. This scenario focuses on cognitive challenges for political and military decision-makers, who tend to overestimate near‑term benefits and discount the long-term risks and compound challenges of AI integration. Instead of improving AI operational implementation processes, countries race to achieve phantom AI advantages that destabilize the international security environment.

For NATO to leverage and maintain the advantage from transformative AI technologies, this report makes seven recommendations for NATO leaders that can contribute to NATO’s future strategy and doctrine adaptation.

Master AI literacy. NATO needs to develop standards for continuous AI skill development for commanders, operators, and policymakers. AI literacy is not just a strategic competency but also an instrument of restraint.
Engineer redundancy. Instead of creating a digital copy of all existing procedures, NATO should prioritize maintaining the ability to transmit information on rehearsed secondary systems.
Coordinate approach to AI tech industry. NATO should develop a code of conduct for AI tech company engagements that addresses the formation of an exclusive suppliers’ group, the knowledge gap in the private sector, and the rules for civilian software engineers in war zones.
Maintain information dominance. NATO should develop a functional framework for operationalizing AI in support of algorithmic warfare that prioritizes military objectives over abstract benchmarks and diversify its early warning systems.
Clarify escalation thresholds. NATO should develop a shared understanding of escalation thresholds for algorithmic warfare, decide on response triggers, and predelegate command authority in time-compressed scenarios to avoid escalation risks and decision paralysis.
Assess the electromagnetic layer with accuracy. Future algorithmic warfare will require NATO to treat electromagnetic spectrum operations as a distinct layer of multidomain operations to protect its strategic initiative and command-and-control superiority. NATO should also update its standards to reflect the changing scope of critical infrastructure as AI becomes a strategic asset to avoid underestimating the EM layer.
Deter by ambiguity. NATO should project resilience while cloaking its sensitive AI assets in a black box unexplainable by adversaries. However, such deterrence by ambiguity should not erode internal accountability of NATO-run AI systems.

Introduction

The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept emphasizes the importance of the Alliance maintaining its technological edge to achieve mission success.¹ But NATO’s ability to ensure military effectiveness and uphold a credible deterrence and defense posture faces challenges in the era of emerging and disruptive technologies. In the context of rapidly evolving warfare tactics and renewed strategic competition, AI-powered decision-support systems (DSS) and autonomous battlefield capabilities are expected to shape future conflicts. NATO’s 2022 Digital Transformation Vision therefore intended to accelerate the adoption of data and AI analytics to unlock new advantages for the Alliance.²

Accordingly, NATO’s AI Strategy encourages strategic foresight activities to help allies achieve a reasonable level of AI readiness.³ It also focuses on anticipating new challenges and risks related to algorithmic warfare from adversarial use of AI. While the military potential of AI is versatile and uncertain, it has nonetheless become difficult to overlook its importance to strategic competition. Countries are racing to develop and deploy AI across their civilian economies and militaries. Russia, the most significant and direct threat to NATO allies, and the People’s Republic of China, a strategic competitor seeking to control key technologies, have widely communicated their intentions to field AI for military purposes.⁴

Research objective

The Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, in partnership with the NATO Office of the Chief Scientist, has conducted a foresight study addressing this crucial topic. This effort seeks to gain more clarity on AI’s transformative military effects over the next decade. This report assesses the vulnerabilities entailed in AI integration into NATO military capabilities in the context of the digital transformation of defense and the growing importance of electromagnetic spectrum operations. Importantly, it identifies ways in which adversaries might counter future AI-enabled capabilities on and off the battlefield. The objective is thus to understand how these developments may affect NATO’s doctrine and strategy moving forward.

This report’s focus on the transformative effects of military AI is highly relevant given NATO’s ambition to conduct multidomain operations.⁵ As outlined in the Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy, NATO political and military leaders intend to use advanced analytics in combination with multimodal data from sensor networks for a consolidated multidomain situational awareness in real time.⁶ While the “digital backbone” is intended to enable command and control across all domains, a broader digital interoperability framework with a secured data-sharing ecosystem will enhance political consultation and decision-making processes.

This report therefore seeks to address the complex question of the likely implications of future military AI countermeasures on NATO’s doctrine and strategy. This means identifying the risks from integrating transformative AI into military systems, examining the vulnerabilities the adoption of AI will create, assessing the severity and probability of corresponding adversarial attacks, and formulating recommendations. Importantly, to limit the dangers of technological determinism, this project examined how political and military leaders and policy planners (at the state level of decision-making) perceive new technologies appearing on the battlefield and craft their responses to escalate or not.⁷

Methodology

In terms of methodology, this report used several data collection and analysis tools. The first phase of the project consisted of horizon scanning and road mapping. Through a structured evidence-gathering process based on desk research of relevant open-source documents and background expert interviews, this report identified the most important drivers of change, as well as the likely future developments at the intersection of AI and the defense sector that are at the margins of current thinking and planning.

In the second phase, the Atlantic Council hosted an off-the-record closed workshop held on an unclassified level in Washington. Through two prescripted discussions, conducted under Chatham House rules, policy and scholarly experts were asked to stress test the assumptions from the first phase. This informed the project on the likelihood of AI countermeasures and conditions for escalation in future algorithmic warfare, as well as to validate recommendations.

The third and last phase of the project centered on future scenario development. This is a useful policy analysis tool that visualizes a set of possible future conditions to help NATO decision-makers to anticipate challenges as they define capability requirements for NATO’s success in future algorithmic warfare.

Structure

This report proceeds as follows. Part One maps AI technology trends and their military applications over the next decade, from the battleﬁeld to the war room. Part Two then proceeds to anticipate the vulnerabilities of AI-enabled systems and to assess the possible vectors of attack to explore escalation pathways in algorithmic warfare; it covers both digital and physical dimensions across the so-called “AI triad” of algorithms, data, and computing power—and adds a human factor.

Part Three outlines three algorithmic futures—guarded opportunism, brave new world, and minority report—based on the likely transformative effects of military AI and their impact on international security. This line of scientific inquiry is highly relevant given ongoing research concerned with the impact of roboticized autonomous systems operating with minimal human supervision on future conflicts.⁸

Part Four discusses recommendations for NATO leaders. Based on the project’s findings, this report raises seven main action points that are categorized into three areas: AI readiness and resilience; military AI doctrine; and deterrence.

Part one: Military AI tech trends

AI is becoming a general-purpose military technology that will sit inside almost every digital system that NATO uses.⁹ Its transformative effects will likely concentrate in two areas. First, decision-support systems will expand the scale of information analytics military commanders can process to make better decisions fast. Second, autonomous and semiautonomous platforms will shift how militaries sense, move, and strike on the battlefield. Together, these developments are driving an AI era of algorithmic warfare.¹⁰

AI can, in principle, be implemented in everything that uses a computer. As defense establishments digitize, AI has never been a single-purpose capability in itself. Rather, AI architecture underpins modern command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, and weapons systems. NATO’s own definitions reflect this evolution. In 1995, NATO described AI as the capability of a functional unit to perform tasks generally associated with human intelligence, such as reasoning and learning. By 2005, it was also seen as “the branch of computer science” focused on building systems that reason, learn, and improve themselves.¹¹ These definitions now apply across a much broader digital ecosystem. Software has become a defining component of many weapon systems and AI is increasingly embedded in sensors, networks, and command-and-control tools.

The overall expectations about AI’s impact on future warfare can be captured in three concepts: speed, scale, and autonomy. Speed refers to faster sensing, processing, and engagement cycles. Scale refers to the ability to handle vast volumes of data and to coordinate large numbers of distributed assets, including swarms of UASs. Autonomy refers to the degree to which AI systems can operate with minimal human supervision. NATO’s challenge will be to harness these three dimensions without sacrificing control, accountability, or interoperability.

From general-purpose enabler to algorithmic warfare

The military applications of AI span relatively low-stakes use cases such as administrative automation and training, operational functions like logistics and cybersecurity, and high-stakes roles in targeting, electronic warfare, and human-machine teaming in combat.¹² From a functional standpoint, experts in defense and military affairs expect AI to matter depending on the AI model type, broadly divided in four categories: generative AI, classification, prediction, and autonomy.¹³ This includes tasks in which large volumes of data must be processed quickly, where patterns are too complex for human perception, where actions need to follow real-time operational intelligence fast, and where simulated environments can meet high training requirements.

Generative AI: Content, coaching, and cognitive effects

Generative AI models create novel content that mimics the statistical properties of the data on which they are trained in response to human prompts. In the military context, these systems are likely to be used as “agents” or virtual advisers that support commanders and staff in alleviating their daily administrative burdens and automating less critical processes, such as drafting routine reports, summarizing long documents, and translating technical information.¹⁴ In training and simulation, generative AI models can serve as simulation tools in war games and exercises. They populate synthetic environments with plausible adversarial actors and behaviors. This role improves scenario realism and generates alternative courses of action.

At the same time, these features can also be weaponized for offensive information operations. Adversaries can use generative AI to run large-scale, low-cost disinformation campaigns. This may involve producing tailored propaganda or impersonating Alliance leaders, journalists, and civil society voices. Generative AI will therefore be a powerful tool in the hands of adversaries seeking to manipulate perceptions and erode NATO’s cohesion.¹⁵

Classification: Noise and signal in a sensor-saturated battlespace

Classification models excel at recognizing patterns in labeled data and assigning new inputs to categories they have learned. Militaries already use such models for computer vision, facial and object recognition, and behavior detection. Computer vision models can identify vehicles, aircraft, ships, and infrastructure in imagery from satellites, aircraft, and UASs against their regularly updated data libraries. Classification tools can become crucial for early warning systems, from detecting stealthy cyber intrusions to flagging irregular troop movements. In sum, over the next decade, these systems are well-suited to sit at the core of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting architectures.

Much is expected from AI-enabled electronic warfare too. In a battlespace saturated with sensors, classification tools can automate filtering of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as distinguishing signal from noise and highlighting anomalous signals that warrant human attention. Furthermore, signal processing algorithms can suggest waveforms to counter hostile signals and thus help overcome adversarial jamming in real time.¹⁶ As the electromagnetic spectrum becomes more contested, the ability to recognize and respond to subtle patterns faster than an adversary will be a critical advantage.

Prediction and data fusion: Scaling decision support

Prediction models analyze historical and real-time data to identify trends and forecast likely future events. In military settings, they underpin decision-support systems (DSS) designed to help commanders cope with complexity and information overload. The transition to multidomain operations underscores the importance of such multimodal data fusion and analytics.¹⁷

This type of AI model is therefore suitable to support battle management, as they fuse information from multiple sources and data streams from land, air, maritime, cyber, and space assets, and integrate them into a single operating picture that is updatable in real time.¹⁸ However, this also means that such data-centric decision-making processes can narrow commanders’ perceptions and constrain their choices.¹⁹

They can also highlight early warning indicators, propose likely adversary courses of action, and flag emerging risks in logistics and supply chains. In logistics, in particular, AI can support predictive maintenance of critical stockpiles; forecast demand for ammunition, fuel, and spare parts; and anticipate bottlenecks in transportation networks.²⁰ Predictive systems can also assist with medical support by estimating casualties and optimizing the positioning of medical resources.²¹

Autonomy: From perception to action

Autonomy involves AI systems that perceive their environment, process real-time data from sensors, and make decisions in pursuit of a mission objective without constant human intervention. In this case, AI models can cause kinetic effects, as they can direct hardware and/or software to react within the physical realm based on the input from the immediate environment.

Onboard AI enables uncrewed aircraft, ground vehicles, and maritime platforms to filter and fuse sensor inputs, navigate in contested environments, and pass the most relevant information back to human controllers. Advances in machine vision, for example, allow drones to compare real-time imagery from downward-facing cameras with stored satellite images and inertial data to determine their position without reliance on global navigation satellite systems. This is particularly important in GPS-denied or heavily jammed environments.²²

Autonomy is also extending to terminal guidance and target recognition. Today, many drones operate on autopilot for parts of their mission, with humans in- or on-the-loop for final engagement decisions. Over time, fully autonomous solutions that combine visual navigation, target recognition, and terminal guidance are likely to proliferate. Seamless data flows, however, are crucial. The Ukrainian forces use a practice that resembles “Uber targeting,” where one unit identifies a target, shares the observation on an encrypted network, and the targeting assignment goes to whichever unit is available, even facilitating joint-strike capability from multiple vectors.²³ AI-enabled systems that can collect, process, and act on information in real time will make such dynamic targeting more common, especially when communications with higher headquarters are degraded.

From incremental adoption to algorithmic warfare

Together, developments in these functional areas point toward the algorithmic future of warfare. Broadly speaking, algorithmic warfare refers to integrating automated, autonomous, and AI technologies into the conduct of war, while decreasing the role of human elements.²⁴ In algorithmic warfare, the military conducts operations through AI-enabled capabilities that collect, analyze, and act on data at speeds and scales beyond human capacity. Artificially intelligent means operate when human warfighters cannot and reduce their exposure to danger. Such AI-enabled autonomous capabilities will especially be assigned tasks at the edge of the battlespace to handle time-critical sensing and response functions without human supervision and with minimum guidance.²⁵

Yet the most transformative effects of military AI are likely to appear in two use cases. First, AI in DSS will expand the scale and speed of information processing, giving commanders a richer but more mediated view of the operating environment. Decision-support tools will not only help humans make better-informed choices but also shape the decision space by highlighting some options and obscuring others. Second, AI embedded in weapons platforms will use speed and autonomy to compress the kill chain, shrinking the time between detection, identification, decision, and engagement.²⁶ This has implications for escalation control, the rules of engagement (ROE), and the role of commanders in supervising rapid, machine-driven engagements.

Drivers of change

Several structural drivers are signaling greater reliance on AI and algorithmic approaches to warfare. These drivers are particularly important for NATO as it implements its Digital Transformation Vision and prepares for multidomain operations.

Digital modernization of defense

First, the broader digital modernization of defense is creating the conditions in which AI can thrive. Modern militaries are upgrading their IT infrastructure and moving to software-defined capabilities that deliver new functionality to existing platforms.²⁷ This also means adopting data-centric approaches to capability development through collaborative digital spaces.

As militaries continue implementing digital modernization of their forces, their dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum is crucial for their new dependencies on sensors, satellites, and networked systems. Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of EM warfare, including GPS jamming and communications blackouts.²⁸ These developments push militaries to design more resilient, autonomous, and decentralized command-and-control structures with better cybersecurity measures. At the same time, electromagnetic warfare in the West has not gotten the attention it needs and is still seen as largely subservient to or stovepiped from cyber.²⁹

Interconnected domains

Second, the move toward multidomain operations (MDO) requires integrating effects across land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace, as well as in the virtual and cognitive dimensions. MDO aims to “[orchestrate] military activities, synchronize non-military instruments of power, and deliver converging effects at the speed of relevance.”³⁰ To make this possible, allies are building a digital backbone that can enable command and control across all domains. However, the effectiveness of this backbone depends on interoperable data sharing, secure and reliable communications, and advanced analytics capable of fusing data into a real-time consolidated multidomain picture. Turning well-integrated AI models into C4ISR systems that enhance situational awareness and support decision-making becomes part of the key conditions for conducting multidomain operations.

Autonomy pursuits

Third, recent and ongoing conflicts are accelerating experimentation with AI-enabled autonomous and decision-support systems. In Ukraine, AI-driven platforms already analyze extensive sensor and signal data to generate real-time targeting suggestions and logistical predictions.³¹ In Gaza, reports indicate that machine-learning systems such as “Gospel” and “Lavender” have been used to support dynamic targeting and terminal navigation by combining multi-source imagery with other intelligence inputs.³² These cases illustrate a shift from isolated, weapon-centric AI applications toward more comprehensive systems that inform planning, targeting, and force deployment at all command levels.

Drones are no longer only agents of remote warfare but are fast becoming agents of algorithmic warfare as well. Demand has surged for battlefield drone footage. Thousands of drone-camera videos depicting successful strikes are used to train computer-vision models, while engineers race to design uncrewed systems that can navigate and coordinate in GPS- and communications-denied environments using on-board processing and limited power.

Two motivations stand out: building “mass for precision” and supplementing shrinking human force structures. Swarm tactics and swarm command seek to saturate defenses and compress reaction times through the coordinated use of large numbers of low-cost platforms. At the same time, demographic trends and recruitment challenges will incentivize greater robotic integration and human-machine teaming. Forward-deployed, uninhabited platforms on standby will increasingly redefine how militaries think about force projection and readiness.³³ For instance, large drone formations can provide the aggressor with an edge in the invasion of foreign territory, highlighting the challenge to the capacity of air defenses.³⁴ Across these trends, AI is fast becoming more than just a technological tool; it is a vital strategic competency,³⁵ and will likely determine which militaries can exploit AI—at scale and under stress. For NATO, understanding where AI is most likely to transform operations, and how adversaries might target the vulnerabilities of AI-enabled systems, is a prerequisite for credible deterrence and effective defense in the emerging era of algorithmic warfare.

Part two: The specter of algorithmic warfare

Militaries have not yet realized the full potential of AI technologies, but it is not difficult to see how AI will shape the strategic environment and wartime paradigms. As the AI race intensifies, potent AI-enabled capabilities will be deployed as part of NATO’s digital transformation and decision-support ambitions.³⁶ This section translates interview insights and workshop discussions into a structured analysis of AI’s core components and their vulnerabilities and the likely vectors of adversarial attack. Two case studies used in the workshop—AI applications in autonomous weapons platforms and in a decision-support system—further informed the analysis of the limits of main AI countermeasures and the conditions under which escalation in algorithmic warfare may occur. This is because the likelihood of an adversary attacking NATO for using AI models for predictive maintenance is comparatively low.

AI triad

Military AI rests on three interlocking components often described as the AI triad: data, algorithms, and computing power.³⁷ Each component has a specific implication for offense-defense parameters. For instance, algorithms imply attacks on model architecture, computing power involves disrupting semiconductors and supply chains, while data concern cyberattacks to poison datasets.

Data refers to information about the focus area of the machine-learning system, collected from sensors and other sources, organized, stored, and made accessible. Algorithms are the series of instructions used to process information; machine-learning algorithms derive insights from datasets and the learnable parameters that encode the core capabilities of an AI model in model weights. Computing power provides the speed and capacity to execute algorithms at scale, train models to determine weights, and run inference offline on deployed systems.³⁸ In practice, computing power includes processors and graphics cards, advanced semiconductors, content delivery networks, power supplies, and cooling. Defense applications often need to run offline on edge devices under strict size, weight, and power constraints, or on government cloud resources with limited GPU availability. Data, sometimes dubbed the new “munition” due to their importance for modern warfare, encompasses issues such as volume, quality, salience, and labeling. The amount of training data strongly influences effectiveness, though collecting the right operational data and labeling it correctly are important for accuracy and alignment. Algorithms feed data into model weights through training, and their resulting internal architecture determines future data analysis in real-time operations.

AI vulnerabilities and vectors of attack

Integrating AI introduces several challenges along the entire triad. Core datasets are massive, models can be opaque, and natural-language prompting expands input surfaces. These characteristics create multiple entry points for adversaries and raise the importance of disciplined processes and safeguards. Adversaries will attempt to degrade NATO’s AI-enabled capabilities by targeting the triad across cyber, electromagnetic, and conventional kinetic dimensions. This section outlines how such attacks would prevent the Alliance from enjoying advantages from AI.

Computing power

Vulnerabilities associated with computing power reflect the physicality of AI infrastructure. This is because advanced semiconductors and specialized chips must be sourced, supplied, and integrated into systems that also require stable energy and cooling. The performance of inference-heavy applications may depend on AI-optimized hardware. These dependencies create risks during material shortages, expose weak points in data centers, and constrain performance at the tactical edge.

Adversaries can exploit material attributes of semiconductors. They can disrupt the supply of specialized AI chips, seed vendor-supplied Trojan backdoors, or manipulate cloud architectures built with commercial technology. They can target the electricity supply of data centers and sabotage their water-cooling systems to cause outages, or damage undersea cables and content-delivery networks to disrupt data flows.

Data

Data is vulnerable across the lifecycle of AI models. Adversaries can poison training datasets through cyber operations that mislabel data or introduce hidden triggers that cause the model to misbehave. Poorly labeled or biased datasets degrade performance, making certain classes of objects invisible to the system or misclassifying them at critical ranges. If the wrong data is collected, or if the right data is corrupted, the entire decision-support chain can lead a model to malfunction and reduce its reliability in the long term.

Adversaries can also interfere with real-life data collection. Because drones and other autonomous systems rely on environmental input, adversaries can tamper with surroundings to impact sensory input and cause abnormal behavior. For instance, blinding sensors on ISR platforms with optical illusions, or adjusting the sensors themselves, and generating spoofing signals can mislead the model into inappropriate responses.³⁹ In addition to onboard perception and planning modules, adversaries can target control interfaces, power management, data relays, and user interfaces used to coordinate connected autonomous systems. Alternatively, disabling low-orbit satellites can also stop real-time input and data sharing.

Algorithms

Incorporating AI into the digital architecture makes the existing systems susceptible to attacks that target the AI model itself. Because model parameters encode internal configuration variables crucial for its operation, compromising weights and biases gives an attacker significant leverage. Adversaries can also try to steal model weights through espionage or proxy hackers, gaining access to the core capabilities of the model for manipulation.⁴⁰
Adversaries can thicken the fog of war for algorithms by flooding AI-enabled DSS with inputs that are inaccurate, uncategorizable, or nonpatternable. They can exploit the rare and unpredictable features of the battlefield, since AI models are mostly trained on either synthetic data or on datasets from previous conflicts that may not quite fit the type and circumstances of the current war zone.

Interviewed experts and workshop participants indicated that the most likely adversarial action against military AI architecture would include:

Blinding sensors on ISR platforms to stop the real-time input of new data.
Spreading misinformation to confuse the algorithms with nonpatternable data.
Physically damaging undersea cables to disrupt data sharing.
Conducting espionage in the suppliers’ private lab facilities.

Surprisingly, however, the most vulnerable component of AI seems to be the human; data and algorithms follow, with the computing power being the least vulnerable of AI components. Such human-related vulnerabilities include personalized phishing, social engineering, cognitive bias, and deskilling.

Countering military AI

Having discussed the vectors of adversarial attacks on AI-enabled military systems and capabilities, this section now briefly comments on the means of such attacks. These AI countermeasures include cyber operations, conventional kinetic attack, electronic warfare, directed energy weapons (DEW), and tailored nuclear weapons with enhanced electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Each has distinct advantages and limitations.

Cyber operations

Cyber operations can interfere with how AI models learn and operate by manipulating ones and zeros. Cyberattacks can degrade the model’s performance or integrity, limit its availability by delaying responses or rendering command-and-control systems inoperative at crucial moments.⁴¹ Integrating AI into military systems increases their vulnerability simply by creating more targets for computer hacking.⁴² These AI vulnerabilities include compromising software libraries, poisoning training data, hijacking AI infrastructure, or stealing sensitive AI properties. Such cyberattacks, however, require prior intelligence to target the right datasets and processing centers. Their effects can be difficult to assess and attribute in real time, which increases the potential for miscalculation.

Conventional kinetic action

Conventional kinetic attacks can target ISR assets including space-based systems, airborne warning and control system aircraft, and other hardware components integral in critical AI infrastructure. Traditional air defenses can target offensive AI onboard small autonomous vehicles with low-cost interceptors, nets, and guns. Kinetic action is tangible but can be escalatory depending on target and context, and it may be expensive or resource-intensive if used at scale against saturation attacks.

Electronic warfare

Electronic warfare uses electromagnetic energy to degrade hostile systems by jamming or spoofing. EW can produce reversible, nonlethal effects, but it is constrained by range, power, antennas, and by the need for detailed knowledge of enemy waveforms and code. Focused jamming and signal spoofing in case of multisensor platforms can confuse AI into analytical errors and lead to wrong reactions. Jamming, however, is possible only in the case of collaborative autonomous platforms that communicate among themselves the adaptive course of their action.

Directed-energy weapons

High-power microwaves and high-energy lasers widen the range of electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO). They can disable or destroy electronics on autonomous platforms using concentrated electromagnetic energy.⁴³ While microwaves are suitable for area defenses and perimeter denial against swarms of drones, lasers with their energy beams perform point defense similar to short-range air defense and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar missions. They have low logistics tails and low cost per shot, but they are power hungry and range-limited. Atmospheric conditions, such as rain and fog, can reduce beam quality and effectiveness, as well as increase fratricide risks. Their applications for space missions look promising given their reusability and the potential to degrade or destroy a satellite.⁴⁴

Tailored nuclear weapons with enhanced electromagnetic pulse

Nuclear explosions of all types—from underground to high altitudes—are accompanied by an electromagnetic pulse. The strength and area coverage of this intense time varying electromagnetic radiation depends on the warhead type and yield, and the altitude of the detonation.⁴⁵ This means that while high-altitude airbursts can have a continent-wide deposition region, for explosions in the atmosphere at altitudes below 30 kilometers, the radius ranges from 5 to 16 kilometers.⁴⁶

Since the 1960s, EMPs, either man-made or natural, have been known to have a potential to disrupt, damage, or destroy a wide array of electrical and electronic systems.⁴⁷ Degradation of electrical and electronic system performance as a result of exposure to the EMP may cause either permanent functional damage or a temporary operational impairment, lasting from seconds to hours.⁴⁸ Computers used in data processing systems, communications systems, and semiconductors belong to the category of devices most susceptible to failure.⁴⁹

While airbursts have little or no fallout and no residual radiation, it is difficult to predict their effects and impact on today’s sensitive electronics, as well as avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties. Together with the difficulty to signal limited nuclear use, since the adversary cannot distinguish low-yield from high-yield weapons, such employment of nuclear EMP weapons remains highly problematic and inherently escalatory.⁵⁰ Experimental exercises over the past decades have identified no assurance that a nuclear strike would remain limited.⁵¹

Escalation and algorithmic warfare

The workshop assessed the salience of AI-enabled lethal operations along an escalatory pathway from minor cyber operations to DEW and nuclear EMP. The following paragraphs summarize the expert participants’ discussion on the conditions under which the use of military AI could increase the risk of escalation.

Escalation is defined as “an increase in the intensity or scope of conflict that crosses threshold(s) considered significant by one or more of the participants.”⁵² Escalation thresholds then depend on retaliation in response to some form of attack. The workshop discussion highlighted the distinction between effects-based and means-based escalation logics. While effects-based logic identifies thresholds depending on the impact that is irrespective of the weapons type, means-based logic emphasizes the qualitative difference between nuclear, conventional, and cyber domains. Some means are regarded as less escalatory than others. For instance, cyberattacks have proven capable of restraining the escalation dynamic and even de-escalating geopolitical crises.⁵³ Similarly, attacks on large drones are less likely to lead to escalation than attacks on inhabited aircraft.⁵⁴

Most researchers studying the AI-nuclear intersection focus on AI amplifying existing risks in nuclear command, control, and communications that can spark accidental nuclear confrontation,⁵⁵ undermining deterrence with AI-enabled conventional systems,⁵⁶ incentivizing first strike,⁵⁷ or exacerbating the proliferation/verification dilemma.⁵⁸ This workshop addressed the concern of a possible deliberate use of nuclear weapons as a warfighting tool designed to produce electromagnetic pulse effects to counter military AI. Previous experimental war-gaming showed that although low-yield nuclear weapons do indeed destabilize international security since they are seen as a substitute for high-yield nuclear use, they do not seem to increase the likelihood of crossing the nuclear threshold.⁵⁹

The workshop scenario described an AI-enabled fast and lethal drone saturation attack into the Baltic region. The scenario listed a number of possible responses:

Diplomatic action.
Economic sanctions.
Cyberattack.
Conventional kinetic response.
Electronic warfare measures.
Directed energy weapons.
Tailored nuclear weapons with enhanced electromagnetic pulse.

The workshop participants ranked responses by their perceived escalatory potential. Diplomatic action and electronic warfare tended to come first and often in parallel. Kinetic action, cyber operations, and DEW followed as second-ring responses. Economic sanctions were seen as medium-term tools, not immediate response levers. Tailored nuclear EMP was considered least probable but most escalatory, with a consensus that its use over NATO territory would be unacceptable. Among the most prevalent concerns against the nuclear EMP use, the participants noted: lowering the threshold for strategic nuclear weapon use; observing the nuclear “taboo,” the response’s proportionality, proliferation of nuclear weapons following nuclear use, and setting a negative precedent.

The follow-on discussion highlighted that adversaries may exploit AI structural risks. Complex AI systems can make attribution and intent assessment harder as AI and autonomy create conditions for plausible deniability. In addition, increased speed and data volumes can work against the user, since time-pressured scenarios increase the risk that decision-makers may rely more heavily on potentially compromised AI outputs, without even understanding the source of unanticipated inputs or system failures.⁶⁰

The workshop confirmed that military AI is not escalatory because offensive AI-enabled capabilities do not meaningfully increase the nature or intensity of a conflict. What matters is the choice of target, the physical damage, and the presence of casualties. At the same time, the properties of AI—speed, autonomy, and opacity—can increase the risk of inadvertent escalation. Despite the fight for EM spectrum dominance, the AI status of an attack does not lower nuclear thresholds—effects on the ground determine response. Ultimately, the vicinity of the adversary’s troops continues to be perceived as more escalatory than an AI-powered swarm attack.

Part three: Future scenarios

Juxtaposing the possible transformative effects of military AI against the threat perception (table A), this foresight study outlines three military AI future scenarios: Guarded opportunism, brave new world, and minority report. The goal is to anticipate long‑haul innovation in countering adversarial attacks on NATO’s AI systems and to inform military research and development decisions.⁶¹

The scenarios are modeled after two variables with a graduated level of likelihood. The first variable concerns the transformative impact of AI: whether countries achieve any strategic advantage from integrating AI into their militaries. And the second variable addresses an adversary’s threat perception: whether integrating AI provokes the development of new countermeasures and/or changes on the escalation ladder.

The fourth quadrant—AI fatigue—represents the most unlikely scenario with no decisive AI advantage and no heightened threat perception. It is less policy‑salient but remains useful as a control for future policy planning.

Scenario I. Guarded opportunism

This is the most plausible future scenario. AI meaningfully transforms military affairs and confers comparative advantage on states that integrate it well, yet it does not worsen adversary threat perceptions. Business continues largely as usual. AI‑enabled decision support and autonomy systems transform the character of warfare through expanded scale and increased operational speed yet without changing the nature of war.

NATO’s digital transformation and integrated AI-enabled military capabilities do not introduce qualitatively new risks or vulnerabilities. These remain familiar to cyberspace and can be managed with disciplined cyber hygiene and resilient power-supply architectures. However, AI may heighten some of the existing threat pathways and security risks. As AI becomes integral to the ability to operate and respond, degraded situational awareness and power outages, for instance, could become more consequential—and a new center of gravity—in digitalized, software-defined defense. Decision‑support systems help commanders filter the noise and frame choices faster, but they do not demand new categories of resilience beyond what Part Two already identified for the AI triad.

Hybrid pressure intensifies below the threshold of armed conflict. Cable cuts, data center intrusions, and information operations become routine. Russia continues sabotaging critical AI infrastructure to disrupt supply chains and cyber and drone intimidation campaigns across Europe.⁶² Yet technology knowledge and investments into resilient computer systems limit these escalation attempts. Better engineering and AI literacy shorten detection and attribution loops and make recovery faster.

Two challenges stand out. The first is the intergovernmental character of the Alliance. NATO relies on its member countries for certain types of cyber operations. This dependence on capitals to act creates latency in time‑sensitive crises and may result in inefficient responses that may not prevent further escalation of hybrid warfare. The second is information warfare targeting the Alliance’s reputation. NATO publics in left‑leaning governments are targeted with disinformation campaigns that frame AI‑enabled capabilities as unethical “killer robots,” arguing that NATO violates its own principles of responsible use of AI. Adversaries are further fueling domestic opposition to reduce tech-sector cooperation.

Still, guarded opportunism is defined by low escalation risks. Algorithmic warfare remains bounded by existing ROE and proportional responses. The only time AI and nuclear fields cross their paths with real-world consequences is in the widespread adoption of small nuclear reactors across the military to power demanding computations of AI models.

Scenario II. Brave new world

In the second scenario, AI is transformative and threat perception worsens. The AI triad delivers a real strategic and operational edge. However, AI-related risks grow with it over time due to insufficient literacy, lack of regular training, lagging skill development, and sloppy implementation of zero‑trust policy across armed forces. Furthermore, rapid and widespread integration of AI models creates new vulnerabilities, stemming from limited human agency, which complicate the cognitive aspects of decision-making.⁶³ The result is an increased probability of flash wars among autonomous robotic systems, in which algorithms interact at such a fast pace that humans would not be involved.⁶⁴

Such a degraded security environment sees multiple escalation spirals. Compressed decision-making times and fully autonomous systems contribute to perceptions of asymmetric disadvantage between Russia and NATO. Russia’s doctrine and force structure amplify the problem. Russia’s revision of its nuclear doctrine in 2024—with its greater emphasis on “aerospace attacks,” explicitly including drones, as one of the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be used—seems to lower the threshold for nuclear use.⁶⁵ This demonstrates that Russia became more reliant on its nonstrategic nuclear weapons after its conventional forces degraded in the war on Ukraine.⁶⁶ This seems to strengthen the Russian leadership’s belief that nonstrategic nuclear weapons are Russia’s “competitive advantage” over NATO.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Russia’s vision of new generation warfare builds upon weapons based on new physical principles, including radio frequency, laser, infrasonic, and electromagnetic. Russia has indeed been developing a precision-strike system built on integration of EW, uncrewed strike and reconnaissance systems, hypersonic weapons, and low-yield nuclear warheads.

In contrast, as NATO’s deterrent power derives from advanced conventional capabilities, this scenario portrays a deeper blurring of conventional and nuclear domains.⁶⁸ Yet NATO struggles to attain superiority in strategic command and control, while avoiding dependencies on commercial clouds and satellites. Large‑scale outages and cascading failures are more frequent. Allies hold regular war-gaming exercises to make sure that the Alliance’s responses remain proportionate even when attacks are AI‑generated. Yet Russia’s asymmetric countermeasures to the multidomain concept keep causing electronic damage to NATO command posts and communications centers.⁶⁹

In high tension, states embrace capabilities that manipulate the spectrum—microwaves, lasers, tailored EMP—seeking to blunt swarms and blind sensors. While EW once seemed unbeatable, jamming lost its teeth against uncrewed vehicles that do not use communication and navigation links. And if autonomy was an antidote to EW, then degrading the electromagnetic environment has become the antidote to AI-enabled military capabilities.

Some governments resume nuclear explosive testing of airburst effects, which contributes to further entangling AI with the nuclear domain. The line between conventional and nuclear war will get more fragile with the proliferation of new classes of EMP weapons. Nuclear proliferation gets out of control as more countries strive to develop their own low-yield nuclear EMP deterrent to counter AI-enabled adversaries. Worse, numerous experts inside and outside Russia believe that a nuclear EMP attack does not need to be governed by the same set of considerations as strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrine.⁷⁰ Nuclear EMP weapons are understood within the category of electronic warfare or information warfare, not nuclear warfare. In this increasingly popular interpretation, an EMP attack is regarded as a legitimate use of nuclear weapons within the specter of algorithmic warfare. Even if nuclear EMP is conceptualized as a form of information warfare in some circles, its use would be profoundly escalatory.

Scenario III. Minority report

In the third scenario, technology hype drives strategy. AI does not deliver decisive comparative advantage for the military, yet threat perceptions grow worse. Exaggerated expectations about the game-changing, transformative, and inevitable impact of AI fuel anxiety about falling behind. The fear of missing out, rather than tangible advantages from AI models, pushes countries deep into the AI race. Such alarmism about phantom AI advantages has a destabilizing effect on strategic balance.

Information asymmetries deepen the problem. NATO militaries and Russian officials tout milestones and “breakthroughs,” while major AI firms speak of revolutionary models. The strategic conversation fixates on what might be developed tomorrow rather than what is fielded today. Decision‑makers overestimate near‑term effects and discount the risks and challenges of AI integration work highlighted in Parts One and Two. As a result, nuclear-armed great powers interpret routine military exercises as cover for preemptive strikes at machine‑speeds and tend to see AI-enabled ISR improvements as a direct threat to their second-strike capabilities.

Escalation pathways in this scenario are cognitive. On the one hand, leaders race to push fully autonomous prototypes forward before safety case evaluations are completed. Miscalculation risk rises not because AI-enabled autonomous weapons systems are unstoppable, but because the decision-makers believe they are. On the other, the adversaries deploy cognitive warfare tactics of “algorithmic amplification” to influence how decision-makers reason, degrade critical decision-making processes, and undermine their sense of security.⁷¹

The Alliance faces the challenge of lowering expectations while preserving its technological edge. However, while allies agreed to coordinate their political objectives of developing AI-enabled armed forces, the lack of national resources and ineffectiveness of their national AI strategies to achieve them weakened NATO’s cohesion.⁷² Leading AI countries are reluctant to institutionalize transparent metrics for AI readiness that separate laboratory promise from operational proof.

This scenario points to the need to move beyond the polarizing hopes-vs-fears dichotomy of AI in order to translate technological potential into military advantage through a sound implementation strategy.⁷³ This scenario reminds policymakers and defense planners to budget for the cognitive dimension of technological competition. Publics and markets react to hyped narratives faster than to scientific results. Adversaries will try to exploit this gap with rhetoric about their AI leapfrogging, announcing the winner of the AI race.

Across all three futures, NATO faces distinct challenges posed by future algorithmic warfare. NATO’s advantage from AI models rests on speed, scale, and autonomy delivered by a resilient AI triad under close human oversight. Guarded opportunism is the most likely scenario and highlights AI vulnerabilities in the light of hybrid and information warfare. Brave new world is less likely but the more dangerous of the three futures. In this algorithmic future, NATO is constantly on the cusp of spirals of escalation and de-escalation and points to the dangers from rapid and widespread integration of AI models without correspondingly fast doctrinal adaptation. Minority report, meanwhile, outlines the destabilizing effects of AI hype in the context of lacking safety and transparency standards.

Part four: Policy recommendations

NATO’s advantage in algorithmic warfare will depend on converting AI’s speed, scale, and autonomy into reliable military capabilities while avoiding inadvertent escalation. This report suggests that the Alliance should focus on three lines of effort. First, it must build AI readiness and resilience across the Alliance. Second, it must refine military AI doctrine to preserve information dominance and to clarify response triggers under compressed timelines. Third, it must develop a deterrence strategy for its strategic AI-enabled DSS. These policy recommendations address the AI vulnerabilities and attack vectors identified in the report’s earlier sections, providing practical steps for NATO leaders implementing the Digital Transformation Vision and preparing for multidomain operations. Each recommendation is intended for near‑term adoption to set conditions for long‑term advantages from AI.

I. AI readiness and resilience

NATO should anchor its AI strategy in two core principles—literacy and redundancy—and reinforce those principles through a coordinated approach to the AI tech industry. Such an approach will help NATO avoid the risks of stale knowledge and deskilling.

Recommendation 1: Master AI literacy

AI literacy should be treated as a strategic competency for commanders, operators, and policymakers rather than as a niche topic confined to chief information officers. NATO should integrate AI education into professional military education, operational exercises, and staff development programs so that leaders understand both the promise and the limits of current AI models. AI-literate armed forces are less likely to succumb to tech-centric thinking and automation bias in future strategy and doctrine development.

NATO should also educate wider publics and political elites so that strategy debates do not become hostage to hype. Clear explanations of how models are evaluated, how data shape military performance, and how human judgment remains central are key for preparing policymakers at all levels to make informed AI-related decisions.⁷⁴

Recommendation 2: Engineer redundancy

Maintaining the ability to transmit information is essential for coordinated actions. NATO should assume that outages and system failures will occur. The Alliance needs to exercise capabilities in communications‑degraded electromagnetic environments and design robust and rehearsed secondary systems. This involves mapping cyber and physical dependencies to avoid single points of failure.

The Alliance should pursue controlled geographic decentralization of data centers to improve resilience of its AI architecture. This will require lawmakers to align national legislative requirements on strict data standards and protocols for insider-outsider threat detection. Vetting the data that goes into AI-enabled DSS, together with delineating clear boundaries between training periods and operational deployment of AI models, will improve the ability to isolate “poisoned” data and contain their spread. Training a team of experts to ensure human oversight of AI workings can limit the consequences of system malfunctions, while limiting the number of people with authorized access to base model parameters, can reduce the risk of sabotage and espionage.

Investment priorities should include research programs that work on future novel materials for shielding and protection of high-speed digital computers against EM interference. Given that the adversaries are likely to invest heavily in spoofing and dazzling hardware capabilities, the Allies should consider hardened interfaces against exfiltration. Lastly, NATO should invest in resources for continuous active defenses that constantly look for evidence of deception and run malfunction diagnostics.

Recommendation 3: Coordinate approach to AI tech industry

NATO should develop a code of conduct for private-sector engagements. The code would require AI companies developing products for decision-support systems and autonomous platforms to adhere to safety and ethical standards. The Alliance should create a trusted group of commercial suppliers and establish clear rules for civilian software engineers and technicians deployed in war zones. To prevent adversaries from achieving tech superiority, the Allies should examine their technology dependencies, “friend-shore” supply chains, and tighten export controls of critical components.

The Alliance should try to address the knowledge gap that exists in the private sector on how EMPs affect computer-based systems. NATO should partner with space tech organizations that have experience with the most advanced research into electromagnetic disturbances. As part of coordinating government–industry unclassified information sharing, NATO could also facilitate partnerships between traditional military hardware providers with software developers so that commercial capabilities can be deployed on military‑grade platforms. Lastly, NATO should encourage forward thinking. Routine, joint red‑teaming and data‑poisoning drills with industry will expose weaknesses. Regular brainstorming on risks from new EMP weapons and postquantum cryptography should feed into the life-cycle design of current systems.

II. Military AI doctrine

Doctrine must convert technical possibility into operational advantage while reducing the pathways to inadvertent escalation. Three recommendations on doctrinal adaptation can contribute to preserving NATO’s advantage from AI.

Recommendation 4: Maintain information dominance

NATO should develop a functional framework for operationalizing AI in support of algorithmic warfare that prioritizes military objectives over abstract benchmarks. Commanders should measure success in terms of effects—such as optimized asset‑to‑target allocation on defense—rather than in terms of statistical thresholds.

Investments should focus on early warning systems, electromagnetic warfare capabilities, and a layered counter‑UAS architecture that combines continuous passive radars, electronic warfare, DEW, and point defenses.

Maintaining information dominance also requires the ability to distinguish routine probing in the form of hybrid air denial operations from preparations for larger operations using drone saturation attacks. Exercises should therefore include ambiguous data, degraded sensors, and adversarial attempts to manipulate inputs so that the troops learn to question AI outputs without losing their operational tempo.

Recommendation 5: Clarify escalation thresholds

Compressed timelines will produce decision paralysis unless allies agree on response triggers and predelegate command authority to avoid escalation risks. NATO allies should develop a shared understanding of escalation thresholds for algorithmic warfare, including thresholds defining the strategic effects of adversarial AI-enabled attacks, as well as of attacks on NATO’s own AI architecture.

NATO also should have clear protocols in place for attribution and proportionality regarding the Alliance’s responses. For instance, would poisoning an adversary’s data count as an offensive cyber operation? NATO allies also need to make sure there are clear rules of engagement for autonomous and semiautonomous response systems. In anticipating the adversary’s deniability claims in the event of AI-enabled attacks, such as “accident” or “loss of control,” NATO should not be adjusting its red lines between subthreshold manipulation and armed attack.

Recommendation 6: Assess the electromagnetic layer with accuracy

The electromagnetic spectrum should not be an afterthought. NATO defense planners need to take the electromagnetic spectrum into consideration at the beginning of warfare planning and develop a spectrum plan with assigned frequencies. Future algorithmic warfare may require NATO to update its standards for survivability (STANAG 4145) to reflect the reality that modern critical infrastructure includes data centers and commercial satellites in addition to traditional command facilities.
In planning for EM-contested environments, NATO allies should preposition shielded assets—power, fuel, generators, and communications equipment—in forward locations to avoid logistical shortages during compressed timelines. They could also invest in software‑defined or reconfigurable radios and optical/laser communications. They should also explore the use of UAS or balloon‑based repeaters to restore the ability to transmit information when ground infrastructure is compromised. Treating the spectrum as a distinct layer of multidomain operations will protect the strategic initiative and the superiority in command and control that NATO seeks to maintain.

III. Deterrence

As AI‑enabled systems underpin strategic command‑and‑control functions, NATO must develop a deterrence strategy based on black box ambiguity without locking itself into a rigid declaratory policy.

Recommendation 7: Deter by ambiguity

NATO should project resilience while keeping the internal architecture of sensitive AI systems opaque to adversaries. Black box AI would also deprive adversaries of the ability to assess the real costs of potential attack. At the same time, the Alliance must maintain the diagnostic capacity to distinguish foreign interference from technical failure in case of system malfunctions, so that ambiguity does not erode internal accountability.

Building and demonstrating resilience—technical, organizational, and informational—will enable NATO to signal confidence and control. Its strategic communication should make clear that deliberate interference with decision‑support systems could carry serious consequences, even if precise thresholds and responses remain undisclosed. Taken together, these seven recommendations translate the analytical sections into concrete actionable items. Literacy keeps humans in charge under compressed timelines. Redundancy and industry coordination make the AI triad more trustworthy. Doctrine secures the informational high ground and clarifies action in crisis. Finally, deterrence by ambiguity protects the Alliance’s AI advantage without inspiring its adversaries into building new countermeasures. Implemented in parallel, these steps position NATO to enjoy its AI advantage in algorithmic warfare on terms that contribute to a stable security environment.

Conclusion

NATO’s competitive edge in the era of emerging and disruptive technologies will come from treating AI as a general-purpose enabler embedded across the Alliance’s digital backbone, rather than as a stand-alone “wonder weapon.” AI-enabled decision support and autonomy do not create vulnerabilities that are different in kind from cyber risks, but they raise the stakes by tying mission-critical effects—speed, scale, and autonomy—to software-defined systems that adversaries will target. Escalation will continue to be governed by effects and targets, not labels, while cognitive factors complicate judgment under time pressure. The practical implication for NATO is clear: invest in literacy, engineer redundancy, clarify doctrine, and project resilience with measured ambiguity.

This report addresses NATO’s ambition to protect its AI technological edge while digitalizing defense. Part One showed how AI will matter most in two intertwined areas: decision-support systems that compress time and expand the scale of information processing, and autonomous or semiautonomous platforms that accelerate sensing, movement, and strike. These advantages rely on the secured AI triad of algorithms, data, and computing power. Part Two mapped where adversaries will try to turn those strengths into liabilities—poisoning data, spoofing sensors, stealing model weights, interrupting cloud access and cable backhaul, and attacking the AI physical infrastructure. The analysis emphasized that while attempts to degrade AI-enabled military capabilities will resemble cyberspace operations, the consequences of failure are amplified when AI is made responsible for situational awareness at the core of command-and-control decision-making.

Parts Three and Four translated those findings into future forecasting and recommendations. The foresight scenario exercise underscored that the most likely near-term pathway is one of guarded opportunism—AI improves productivity and tempo without changing the nature of war—while the most dangerous pathway blends real AI advantage with worsening threat perception, making EMSO and directed-energy tools more salient in crisis. The most deceptive pathway is driven by hype: Threat perceptions rise even when fielded capabilities do not correspond to exaggerated predictions. Across all futures, effects, targets, and collateral risk determine algorithmic warfare dynamics.

Crucially, military AI systems do not introduce vulnerabilities that are categorically new, yet the consequences of foreign interference can be greater. If AI-enabled systems are integral to a unit’s ability to operate and respond, then successful attacks on those systems may warrant responses that are more escalatory than tit-for-tat cyber exchanges. Timing matters as well. Loss of real-time situational awareness in a crisis reduces clarity about what happened and who is responsible, raising the probability of misperception and inadvertent escalation. In practice, this report calls for disciplined deployment of decision-support systems that can only rely on rehearsed secondary systems.

The study also clarified the relationship between EMSO and nuclear restraint in the context of tailored, nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Means-based analysis sheds light on how emerging technologies shape modern escalation dynamics. Rather than making technology-centric estimates, this report highlights systemic risks related to AI: How leaders perceive risk under pressure remains decisive.

Literacy is therefore more than a training agenda; it is an instrument of restraint. Educated policymakers, commanders, and publics are less likely to treat AI as “cyber pixie dust” or to confuse reversible electronic effects with strategic attack. They will be better able to choose the right mission for the AI-enabled capability. In parallel, designating data centers, cables, AI labs, and commercial satellites as critical infrastructure and strategic assets will help align strategy and doctrine with the realities of a software-defined force.

This study contributes to AI literacy by stripping away hype and clarifying where algorithmic warfare introduces new challenges. For NATO leaders implementing the Digital Transformation Vision, the immediate tasks are practical: align skill development programs, harden the AI triad, codify response triggers, and show resilience without over-specifying red lines. Doing so reduces the risk that exaggerated expectations about new technology will drive strategy.

The report’s findings point to a future research agenda that looks into how tactical actions can engage strategic effects. AI-enabled autonomy and speed can magnify the psychological impact of hybrid campaigns, especially where the cost of interceptors is high and the pace of exchange is machine-driven. Routine “gray zone” activities are already redefining the baseline of normalcy across Europe.⁷⁵ Such threshold uncertainty permits plausible deniability, keeping the adversarial action away from Article 5 territory.

Open questions remain. How robust is the “firebreak” in escalation theory when algorithmic systems increasingly shape perception and timing? Can allies maintain recognizable qualitative distinctions between domains when effects propagate across them in multidomain operations? And where, precisely, do we draw escalation thresholds when nonkinetic actions in the electromagnetic spectrum generate strategic consequences? Answering these questions will require continued red teaming, transparent metrics for AI readiness, and joint experimentation that links tactical vignettes to strategic decision-making fora.

The Alliance has long excelled at military hardware. In a data-centric, software-defined approach to defense, advantage will come from systems engineering and smart innovation adoption choices. If NATO invests in AI literacy and redundancy, elevates the EM spectrum within the multidomain operations concept, and projects resilience with measured ambiguity, it can protect its AI edge and defend against adversarial attacks. That is the path to credible deterrence and effective defense in the emerging AI era of algorithmic warfare.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the interviewed experts and workshop participants for their generosity in sharing their time and knowledge, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative staff for making a home for this project, and the NATO Office of the Chief Scientist for choosing to fund this project as part of its 2025 grants program.

About the author

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Dominika Kunertova

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Artificial Intelligence Central Europe

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative aims to reinforce the strong and resilient transatlantic relationship that is prepared to deter and defend, succeed in strategic competition, and harness emerging capabilities to address future threats and opportunities.

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43 Kelley M. Sayler et al., 2024, “Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, July 11, https://crsreports.congress.gov R46925.

44 Zhanna L. Malekos Smith, 2024, “The Specter of EMP Weapons in Space,” Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, March 27, https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/article/the-specter-of-emp-weapons-in-space.

45 US Department of Energy, 2017, US Department of Energy Electromagnetic Pulse Resilience Action Plan, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/DOE%20EMP%20Resilience%20Action%20Plan%20January%202017.pdf#:~:text=Although%20an%20EMP%20is%20also%20generated%20by,EMP%20events%20produced%20by%20high%20altitude%20detonations.

46 Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, 1977, “The Electromagnetic Pulse and Its Effects,” in The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Glasstone and Dolan, eds., US Department of Defense and the Energy Research and Development Administration, 514–531, Digitized and published by Chris Griffith and Eric A. Meyer, 2022, https://atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/effects/glasstone-dolan/chapter11.html.

47 Roger Allen Meade, 2022, “Operation Fishbowl,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, National Nuclear Security Administration, US Department of Energy, October 25, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1896391.

48 Glasstone and Dolan, “The Electromagnetic Pulse and Its Effects.”

49 Washington State Department of Health, 2003, “Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP),” Fact Sheet 320-090, Division of Environmental Health, Office of Radiation Protection, https://doh.wa.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/Documents/Pubs/320-090_elecpuls_fs.pdf.

50 Richard Wolfson and Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, 2021, Nuclear Choices for the Twenty-First Century: A Citizen’s Guide, MIT Press.

51 Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey H. Michaels, 2019, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 4th ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

52 Forrest E. Morgan et al., 2008, Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation), 8.

53 Sarah Kreps and Jacquelyn Schneider, 2019, “Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains: Moving beyond Effects-based Logics,” Journal of Cybersecurity 5, no. 1: 1–11, tyz007, https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyz007.

54 Erik Lin-Greenberg, 2022, “Wargame of Drones: Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Crisis Escalation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 66, no. 10: 1737–1765, https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221106960.

55 James Johnson, 2021, “‘Catalytic Nuclear War’ in the Age of Artificial Intelligence & Autonomy: Emerging Military Technology and Escalation Risk between Nuclear-Armed States,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 1–41, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1867541.

56 Steve Fetter and Jaganath Sankaran, 2024, “Emerging Technologies and Challenges to Nuclear Stability,” Journal of Strategic Studies 48, no. 2: 252–96, doi:10.1080/01402390.2024.2433766; Vladislav Chernavskikh and Jules Palayer, 2025, “Impact of Military Artificial Intelligence on Nuclear Escalation Risk,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), June, https://doi.org/10.55163/FZIW8544; and Jacob Stokes, 2025, Averting AI Armageddon: US–China–Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence, Center for a New American Security, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/averting-ai-armageddon.

57 Michael C. Horowitz, 2019, “When Speed Kills: Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence and Stability,” Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 6, 764–788. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1621174.

58 David M. Allison and Stephen Herzog, 2025, “Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: The Technological Arms Race for (In)visibility,” Risk Analysis 45, no. 11: 3839–3859, https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.70105.

59 Andrew W. Reddie and Bethany Goldblum, 2022, “Evidence of the Unthinkable: Experimental Wargaming at the Nuclear Threshold,” Journal of Peace Research 60, no. 5: 760–776, https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221094734.

60 Matthijs M. Maas, 2019, “How Viable Is International Arms Control for Military Artificial Intelligence? Three Lessons from Nuclear Weapons,” Contemporary Security Policy 40, no. 3: 285–311.

61 Alexander Kott, and Philip Perconti, 2025, “How Accurate Is Forecasting of Military Technologies?,” NATO Defense College, Hindsight Series Paper no. 6, https://www.ndc.nato.int/how-accurate-is-forecasting-of-military-technologies/.

62 Charlie Edwards and Nate Seidenstein, 2025, “The Scale of Russian Sabotage Operations against Europe’s Critical Infrastructure,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, August 19, https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2025/08/the-scale-of-russian–sabotage-operations–against-europes-critical–infrastructure/.

63 Avi Goldfarb and Jon R. Lindsay, 2022, “Prediction and Judgment: Why Artificial Intelligence Increases the Importance of Humans in War,” International Security 46, no. 3: 7–50, doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00425.

64 Paul Scharre, 2018, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, 1^st ed. (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company).

65 Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024, “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” per Russian Presidential Order no. 991, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/.

66 Liviu Horovitz and Lydia Wachs, 2024, “Russian Nuclear Weapons in Belarus? Motivations and Consequences,” Washington Quarterly 47, no. 3, 103–29, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2024.2398952.

67 Jacek Durkalec, 2025, “Counterforce at the Regional Level of War: A European Perspective,” in Counterforce in Contemporary U.S. Nuclear Strategy, ed. Brad Roberts, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 152–167.

68 Wilfred Wan and Gitte du Plessis, 2025, “Blurring Conventional–Nuclear Boundaries: Nordic Developments, Global Implications,” SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2025/blurring-conventional-nuclear-boundaries-nordic-developments-global-implications.

69 Katarzyna Zysk, 2023, “Struggling, Not Crumbling: Russian Defence: AI in a Time of War,” RUSI, Commentary, November 20, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/struggling-not-crumbling-russian-defence-ai-time-war.

70 Peter Vincent Pry, 2017, “Foreign Views of Electromagnetic Pulse Attack,” Report to the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, http://www.firstempcommission.org/uploads/1/1/9/5/119571849/foreign_views_of_emp_attack_by_peter_pry_july_2017.pdf.

71 Frank Hoffman, 2025, “Assessing ‘Cognitive Warfare,’ ” Small Wars Journal, November 14, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/14/assessing-cognitive-warfare/#_ednref3.

72 Dominika Kunertova and Olivier Schmitt, 2024, “Assessing NATO’s Cohesion: Methods and Implications,” International Politics 62: 1097–1110, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-024-00641-1.

73 Andreas Graae, 2023, Servers before Tanks? Defence AI in Denmark, Defense AI Observatory, DAIO Study 23|18, https://defenseai.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/daio_study2318_servers_before_tanks_andreas_graae.pdf.

74 Sophia Hatz et al., 2025, “Local US Officials’ Views on the Impacts and Governance of AI: Evidence from 2022 and 2023 Survey Waves,” PLOS ONE 20, no. 10, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0332919.

75 The Atlantic Council has defined the gray zone as “the space in which defensive and offensive activity occurs above the level of cooperation and below the threshold of armed conflict.” See “Adding Color to the Gray Zone: Establishing a Strategic Framework for Hybrid Conflict,” a Forward Defense project, Atlantic Council, December 23, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/scowcroft-center-for-strategy-and-security/forward-defense/adding-color-to-the-gray-zone-establishing-a-strategic-framework-for-hybrid-conflict/.

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Deterrence in a two-peer world requires prudence

Kingston Reif — Fri, 27 Mar 2026 16:50:37 +0000

Bottom lines up front

US nuclear strategy must now account for a rapidly expanding Chinese nuclear force alongside a modernizing Russia.
Whether the current US nuclear force is sufficient depends on unresolved questions about China’s nuclear plans, US objectives, and Russian and Chinese doctrines.
Arms control should be pursued now rather than waiting for a buildup that offers the US no near-term bargaining leverage.

Washington’s plans to rebuild its nuclear arsenal conceived in the early 2010s assumed a world in which Russia was not an acute threat, China maintained a modest nuclear deterrent, and arms control constrained US and Russian nuclear forces. None of those conditions remain.

Today, China’s extensive nuclear buildup and increasingly assertive foreign policy, Russia’s continued modernization and nuclear saber-rattling, and the erosion of arms control define a new era. These trends are prompting a reexamination of US nuclear strategy not seen since the Cold War’s end. What conflict scenarios must be anticipated? How large and diverse should the arsenal be to deter both Russia and China simultaneously? And can arms control contribute to US security amid deepening tensions?

Washington faces the challenge of preserving credible deterrence and reassuring allies against two potential nuclear peers—possibly acting together—without fueling dangerous instability or draining resources from other defense priorities. This will require a balanced approach: continuing modernization and hedging against uncertainty, while avoiding counterproductive arsenal growth and pursuing arms control to reduce risks.

The new nuclear threat environment

Nuclear weapons are increasingly salient in international politics. China’s quest to become a world class nuclear power amid rising tensions with the United States is the most striking development. The United States projects China will field about one thousand operational warheads by 2030 and potentially fifteen hundred by 2035—up from roughly two hundred in 2020. Beijing’s construction of hundreds of new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, focus on increasing launch readiness, and pursuit of more flexible response options reflect a posture aimed at enhancing survivability, countering US advantages, and improving its ability to control the escalation of a nuclear conflict.

Russia continues to modernize its forces, broaden the role of nuclear weapons in its doctrine, and use nuclear bullying to deter Western support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, the arms control framework that once bounded the US-Russia nuclear relationship has effectively collapsed. The last pillar of this framework, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expired in February with nothing to replace it.

Longstanding US nuclear strategy has been that credible deterrence of nuclear attack against the US homeland and extended deterrence to US allies and partners requires several elements. These include:

Maintaining sufficient survivable forces in the event of a large-scale strike on un-alerted US forces;
Retaining nuclear counterforce capabilities “to reduce potential adversaries’ ability to employ nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies” (aka damage limitation) to the extent practicable if deterrence fails and;
Ensuring the availability of graduated response options against potential adversary attempts to escalate out of failed conventional aggression.

The United States previously had to deter only one nuclear peer and could treat China as a lesser threat. Now Washington must prepare to face Russia and a far more formidable nuclear China. Russian and China could even coordinate, or one could act opportunistically while the United States is engaged with the other.

Some former government officials and experts warn this shift presents fundamentally new challenges. Ignoring the challenges would leave Washington and its allies vulnerable and would signal waning resolve. The bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission concluded in its October 2023 report that the current US nuclear modernization program is inadequate. It recommended urgent preparations to upload reserve warheads after New START’s expiration, develop additional limited‑use options, and plan for a larger force in the longer term.

The Biden administration acknowledged that deterring multiple nuclear adversaries might soon require a bigger and more diverse deployed arsenal, but deferred any decision to the Trump administration. Whether the Trump administration will revise US force requirements to address China’s nuclear transformation remains to be seen. The administration’s National Defense Strategy, released in January, stated: “We will modernize and adapt our nuclear forces accordingly with focused attention on deterrence and escalation management amidst the changing global nuclear landscape.”

Nuclear force sizing considerations

Strategic forces

China is the primary driver of the concern that the current US arsenal—1,550 deployed warheads and seven hundred deployed delivery systems—is insufficient, particularly Beijing’s recent construction of more than 300 new silo-based ICBMs. Advocates of increasing the deployed arsenal to hold these targets at risk argue that doing so is necessary to fulfill US nuclear employment objectives, including the damage limitation objective, against both Russia and China simultaneously.

These advocates are correct that there is nothing magical or sacrosanct about 1,550 warheads and that New START was negotiated in a world that has changed markedly over the past fifteen years. Yet other considerations are relevant to the question of whether an increase is needed.

First, analysis conducted during President Barack Obama’s second term concluded that core US targeting objectives could still be satisfied with roughly one‑third fewer deployed weapons than New START allowed. If the US arsenal is more than enough for deterrence against Russia, that suggests some available headroom to address growth in China’s force, at least in the near term.

Second, if a US decision to grow the deployed force triggers offsetting responses from Russia and China, that could erase any relative advantage Washington might have gained from an increase.

A third consideration is why an increase is necessary on a day-to-day peacetime basis, as the deployed force can be generated and uploaded to higher levels in a crisis or escalating war. (A counter to this argument would be that there might not be enough lead time to upload in these scenarios.) Moreover, excessive uploading of warheads could reduce the operational flexibility of the arsenal.

Even if growth isn’t required in the near term, a point might come when it could be necessary if China builds up its warheads and launchers to the high end of current projections—or beyond them. But if Beijing levels off at one thousand warheads, the case for holding steady would be stronger.

Geopolitical risk is not the only challenge facing the US nuclear enterprise. Practical constraints loom large. The ongoing modernization program will yield fewer delivery systems on submarines than today’s arsenal, as the new Columbia‑class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will carry eight fewer missile tubes than their Ohio-class predecessors. The program also faces mounting cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance issues, which could force difficult trade‑offs with conventional modernization priorities.

Near‑term options to expand US strategic forces are limited to reactivating four missile tubes per Ohio‑class SSBN deactivated under New START and uploading additional warheads to deployed delivery systems from the reserve stockpile. New delivery systems beyond existing modernization plans cannot begin to be fielded until the mid- to late-2030s, and their acquisition would further increase costs, depending on the scale of expansion. (Modification of some existing systems to make them more capable could potentially be achieved sooner.)

The confluence of the above geopolitical and modernization transition risks means any uploading to address one of the risks would reduce the ability to address the other—as well as any unforeseen technical problems affecting the functioning of a type of delivery system or warhead, or any operational risk caused by advances in adversary capabilities.

Nonstrategic forces

There is also a debate about whether US nonstrategic nuclear capabilities are sufficient in a two‑peer environment. One argument is that Russia and China believe their theater nuclear forces provide coercive leverage and escalation management options that Washington’s lower-yield air‑ and sea‑based weapons cannot match. (The United States fields a small number of B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe but has not housed dedicated theater nuclear forces in the Indo-Pacific since the end of the Cold War.) Some allies also worry this asymmetry could undermine US resolve and capacity to defend them.

Russia’s excessive reliance on nonstrategic nuclear weapons (it is believed to possess one to two thousand such weapons) seems to be driven by its perception of a conventional imbalance vis-à-vis the United States and NATO more broadly. According to the 2025 US intelligence community’s annual threat assessment, “Russia’s vast arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons helps it to offset Western conventional superiority and provide formidable escalation management options in theater war scenarios.” The Defense Intelligence Agency added that “Russia almost certainly seeks to avoid direct conflict with NATO because it assesses it cannot win a conventional military confrontation with the alliance.”

New US theater capabilities with different military characteristics—such as a new sea-launched nuclear-armed cruise missile—would give the president additional options to respond to limited Russian nuclear use. But if Russia’s theater weapons are intended to counter NATO conventional superiority, it’s not clear that additional US theater capabilities would have a significant impact on Russia’s threshold for nuclear use beyond existing US and Alliance options. According to Michael Kofman and Anya Loukianov Fink, two experts on Russian nuclear strategy: “One of the misperceptions about Russian nuclear strategy is that it takes advantage of lower-yield nuclear weapons that the United States does not have. This appears nowhere in Russian military writings or deliberations.” Meanwhile, the best way to deter Russian limited nuclear use is to perpetuate Russia’s perception that a conventional war with NATO would be unwinnable for Moscow so that it doesn’t start such a war in the first place.

The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses, “China probably seeks lower-yield nuclear warhead capabilities to provide proportional response options that its high-yield warheads cannot deliver” for its theater-range delivery systems such as the DF-26 missile. A dedicated regional nuclear capability in the Pacific would give Washington a response option it doesn’t currently have. Yet whether China is pursuing low-yield options to gain a coercive edge over the United States in a conventional conflict or to offset perceived US advantages in nonstrategic arms remains uncertain. The answer matters for determining the degree to which a dedicated US option would strengthen deterrence.

Any potential benefits of extra US nonstrategic weapons should be weighed against the potential risks. These hazards include the unintended escalation risks of adding nuclear options to existing or planned conventional ground- and sea-launched missiles (adversaries could assume any dual-capable missile launch as nuclear) and reduced availability of launchers to fire conventional weapons.

An additional consideration is that Washington might face conventional inferiority in one theater in a multi‑peer conflict, forcing it to consider increased reliance on nonstrategic nuclear options for war fighting. But US first use would carry high escalation risks and could require scores—if not hundreds—of additional warheads, a number likely beyond the near‑term capacity of the US nuclear production base.

Key questions

Where one falls on the sufficiency question depends greatly on what conflict scenarios the United States and its allies need to be prepared to deter and respond to, as well as the associated nuclear employment objectives, posture, and force structure one believes is required for deterrence in these scenarios. Reasonable people can disagree on these determinations and how much risk is prudent to accept given competing priorities.

As the Trump administration grapples with the “how much is enough” question, additional analysis would be beneficial for identifying the available option space in the new strategic landscape. Key questions include the following.

Does the United States need to achieve a similar level of damage limitation against multiple adversaries simultaneously? Or would the ability to limit damage from one adversary while inflicting a lesser, though still intolerable, level of damage on the second adversary be sufficient?
Do Russia and China perceive gaps in US nuclear capabilities at both the strategic and regional or theater levels?
How would augmented strategic nuclear capabilities—alongside improved long-range conventional strike and missile defenses—be expected to enhance deterrence, and what potential adversary responses and stability implications should be considered?
What are the potential benefits and risks of additional dedicated US theater nuclear capabilities for shaping adversary decision-making during crisis and conflict, and how might they affect escalation dynamics, intra-war deterrence, and conflict termination?
What are the current and future geopolitical, transition, and operational risks the nuclear enterprise needs to hedge against? What are the options to mitigate them?
Are there nonnuclear alternatives that could meet deterrence objectives, especially considering rapid advances in technology?

Arms control considerations

After returning to office, President Donald Trump wasted little time in calling for negotiations with Russia and China to “denuclearize . . . in a very big way.”

A year later, the president decided not to accept or counter Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer to continue observing the New START limits for one year beyond the treaty’s expiration. Instead, senior administration officials have doubled down on the need to pursue multilateral arms control that includes additional types of nuclear weapons and both Russia and China.

Russia has indicated it will continue to observe the treaty’s central limits on warheads and delivery systems so long as the United States does. Given there is no immediate need for the United States to expand the deployed arsenal—and even if there were, uploading would take time—the Trump administration should not give Russia a reason to build up. At the same time, the administration should push for the resumption of a dialogue on strategic stability, risk reduction, and a successor agreement to New START. The discussions should address strategic and nonstrategic weapons not captured by New START.

Such steps would preserve at least informal limits on Russia’s strategic forces while Washington reviews requirements to address China, restore communication on nuclear issues, and increase diplomatic pressure on Beijing. In addition, this approach would be consistent with the National Security Strategy’s call to “reestablish strategic stability with Russa.”

As the administration pursues its goals for arms control in the new security landscape, it is important to remember that arms control is a tool and not an end in and of itself. It is a means to manage competition and enhance US competitive advantages. And it is a tool that retains considerable value.

There is value in verifiable weapon ceilings, transparency about weapon holdings, counteracting the potential peril of emerging technology, and addressing particularly destabilizing types of weapons such as the placement of strategic weapons in space. There is value given the limitations on the US ability to keep up in a nuclear competition, due to the constraints on its ability to build new weapons. And there is value in demonstrating US leadership and exercising the skills of a waning US arms control enterprise.

Some analysts assert a nuclear buildup would create leverage for future negotiations. But US-Russian arms control history suggests a more complicated story. Building new strategic systems beyond current plans isn’t possible for another decade and thus offers no near‑term bargaining value. Whether uploading reserve warheads would influence Moscow or Beijing depends on how they factor these warheads into their threat assessment. Decades of US nuclear superiority did not persuade Beijing to negotiate, and Russia conditions discussions of its exotic strategic delivery systems (e.g. Skyfall and Poseidon) and nonstrategic weapons on limits to US missile defenses and advanced conventional strike capabilities.

It remains to be seen if meaningful progress on arms control is possible so long as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and China’s unwillingness to get off the arms control sidelines continues. But if a process does get underway, several issues will likely arise.

If the Trump administration is open to another bilateral accord on US and Russian strategic forces, what the administration proposes to Moscow is likely to be influenced by an assessment of what is needed to deter China. That assessment could yield a proposal to Moscow with higher limits on deployed strategic weapons than New START, as well as a shorter duration, to hedge against uncertainty over China’s buildup. This would reverse the trend of progressively lower limits in previous agreements. But that does not mean there wouldn’t be value in such an arrangement in terms of stability, predictability, and transparency, especially compared to an alternative with no agreement. (Such an agreement also wouldn’t require the United States to operate at the height of those limits on a day-to-day basis.)

Missile defense will inevitably feature in any negotiation, especially one seeking limits below or beyond New START. Trump’s interest in enhancing US homeland defenses via Golden Dome has prompted unsurprising criticism in Moscow and Beijing, but pursuing arms control need not be in conflict with missile defense. Workable compromises exist if both sides are willing to bargain. Washington can both augment its missile defenses and use them as a lever for securing significant Russian and Chinese concessions.

Non‑strategic nuclear weapons are often viewed as essential to any New START successor. But as Michael Albertson of the Center for Global Security Research notes, the Trump administration should weigh potential benefits against complexity and cost. Given US concerns about Russia’s potential limited use of nuclear weapons if it is losing a conventional war, even cutting Russia’s nonstrategic arsenal in half would not resolve the issue. Greater value could come from data exchanges, notifications, on‑site inspections, and consolidating storage sites.

It remains unrealistic to expect China to immediately join a trilateral agreement with the United States and Russia that limits nuclear weapons. A more achievable near-term approach is to begin a bilateral conversation on risk reduction topics such as crisis management and guardrails at the intersection of emerging technology and nuclear risk, which could later be broadened to a multilateral conversation. If momentum can be generated, seeking a better understanding of China’s arsenal composition and plans should be a high priority. If the United States knew, for example, that China had an end point in mind for its buildup, that would provide much-needed confidence and predictability and help to avoid worst-case planning.

Conclusion

The US response to the new strategic environment must be based on more than just a reconsideration of numbers and types of nuclear weapons. By aligning prudent military planning with purposeful diplomacy, the United States can preserve deterrence, prevent dangerous competition, and strengthen the foundations of global security in an era of unprecedented nuclear complexity.

This issue brief is part of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Great nuclear debate series, a curated anthology of perspectives on arms control, force sizing, and missile defense from leading experts.

About the author

Kingston Reif is a senior international and defense researcher at RAND. From 2021 to 2024, he served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for threat reduction and arms control.

explore the program

Forward Defense leads the Atlantic Council’s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.

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Why US strategic nuclear forces must expand after New START

Paul Amato — Fri, 27 Mar 2026 16:49:34 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The United States needs a nuclear force larger than today’s and flexible enough to influence adversary decision-making at all stages of crisis and conflict.
A US strategic deterrent capable of delivering roughly 2,400 operationally deployed warheads in the near term should be sufficient to meet US strategy requirements.
Force attributes and flexibility matter as much as numbers, though.

Now that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty has expired, the debate begins over what the United States should do next regarding its nuclear posture. The recently released National Defense Strategy (NDS) sheds little light on the Trump administration’s plans; it does not even mention New START. Instead, the NDS largely eschews details on US nuclear policy and capabilities, noting only that the United States “will modernize and adapt our nuclear forces accordingly with focused attention on deterrence and escalation management.”¹ What this means for US force size and posture will play out over the coming months and years, likely beginning with submission of the president’s annual budget request later this spring.

In anticipation of this debate, many commentators urge caution, suggesting that any expansion in US force size (even in response to actions by China and Russia) could prompt an uncontrolled arms race.² Others argue that the United States has time to prepare for the emerging threats it faces so there is no need to panic, suggesting that adjustments can wait until the country gets closer to the end of the existing modernization program of record.³ Still others contend that the United States already has enough nuclear weapons and that force growth would be expensive and counterproductive.⁴One specific argument points to a 2013 Obama administration assessment that the US nuclear force could be reduced by up to one-third, claiming this extra one-third today provides sufficient headroom to manage China’s emergence as a nuclear peer.⁵

While much of this debate focuses on numbers alone, policymakers and military officials must also account for the attributes of the deployed force necessary for effective and credible deterrence. The question of “how much is enough” is not solely a matter of numbers, but of force size and the overall capabilities of the warheads and delivery systems the United States deploys. US force posture must be capable of deterring a diverse array of nuclear-armed adversaries and, if deterrence fails, must enable the achievement of national objectives against one or more of them. In general terms, national objectives include: restoring deterrence and managing escalation; limiting damage to the United States and its allies and partners; and imposing unacceptable damage on an adversary.⁶ The capabilities needed to achieve these objectives vary from adversary to adversary. They require not just an appropriately sized force, but one with the attributes needed for the array of objectives that US nuclear forces might need to achieve against each.

Given the evolving security environment and growing demands on US strategic deterrence, a force larger and more diverse from that fielded today is needed as a matter of priority—one that provides capabilities responsive to the deterrence challenges now confronting the United States.

New START’s expiration is good news for US security

Despite the New START treaty (NST) now being in the rearview mirror, it is worth revisiting why its expiration enhances US security. First, today’s security environment is significantly more dangerous than when NST was ratified—or even when it was extended in 2021—a conclusion repeatedly documented by the US government over the past decade. In 2010, Russia was viewed as a potential strategic partner of the United States and NATO, and great-power conflict was widely seen as unlikely.⁷ Since then, both Russia and China have demonstrated a willingness to use force to advance geopolitical aims—Russia in Ukraine and China by expanding its territorial sway in and around the South China Sea. And Russia continues to brandish its nuclear capabilities to coerce Ukraine and the West.⁸ Great-power conflict is no longer a remote possibility.

Second, in 2010 China’s nuclear posture was not central to US deterrence planning. China’s nuclear force was often treated as a “lesser included” component of the Russian threat, meaning a force sufficient to deter Russia would also suffice for China. This assumption no longer holds. As two senior Biden administration officials responsible for nuclear strategy observed in 2025, “After decades of maintaining only a minimal nuclear capability, China is on pace to nearly quintuple its 2019 stockpile of some 300 nuclear warheads by 2035, in a quest to attain an arsenal equivalent in strength to Russia’s and the United States.’”⁹ China’s growth places greater demands on the US nuclear force, due not only to the anticipated size of its future arsenal but also to the quandaries it presents for US military planners who must account for crisis or potential conflict with more than one nuclear adversary.

Third, in 2010 the Obama administration still harbored hopes of negotiating a denuclearization pathway with North Korea regarding its then nascent nuclear program. By the mid-2000s, however, North Korea was already pursuing a breakout capability intended to “directly hold the United States at risk.”¹⁰ Today, North Korea possesses a more robust nuclear arsenal capable of striking the United States and its regional allies.¹¹ In fact, to date, the second Trump administration has not restated the 2018 policy (later adopted by the Biden administration) that any North Korean nuclear use would lead to the end of the Kim Jong-Un regime. This omission might reflect a reassessment of that policy’s feasibility in light of North Korea’s expanding capabilities.¹²

Fourth, in 2010 there was little apparent evidence of cooperation among rogue or revisionist actors. Today, such cooperation, if not outright coordination, is evident.“¹³ Few in 2010 would have envisioned North Korean soldiers fighting in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf.¹⁴ It would be dangerously naïve to assume conflict with one adversary would not elicit support from one or more of the others, whether direct or indirect. Simply put, Russia, China, and North Korea all being armed with nuclear weapons means that any crisis or conflict with one risks a nuclear crisis or conflict with one or both of the others. Credibly deterring all three—even if engaged in conflict with only one—requires a force larger than NST permitted and that is tailored to the distinct deterrence and targeting requirements for each.

Fifth, while NST only addressed strategic systems, the urgent need for the United States to develop and field theater-focused capabilities (so-called non-strategic or theater nuclear weapons) was a reason to allow NST to expire. Russia possesses a far larger theater-focused arsenal than the United States, a disparity NST did nothing to mitigate.¹⁵ Other adversaries similarly see value in developing and fielding such capabilities.¹⁶ While the United States is beginning to address this gap by developing a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, that system remains a decade away and is likely insufficient by itself. Moving beyond NST allows the United States to field additional strategic capabilities to help offset this imbalance, even if imperfectly.

In short, NST was “the wrong treaty for the current time.” Getting out from under its constraints will enable the United States to prepare in earnest for contemporary deterrence challenges—focusing not only on numbers, but on the force attributes required for credible and effective deterrence against a diverse group of nuclear-armed adversaries.¹⁷

The current US strategic nuclear force is inadequate

The ability to deter an adversary from taking extreme actions is not simply a matter of having a nuclear weapon that can be delivered to a target. As a senior US Strategic Command deterrence thinker has observed, deterrence is “an intentional act or set of actions aimed to influence adversaries’ decision-making, so that [they] choose restraint over aggression.”¹⁸ Because deterrence is directed at a decision-maker’s perceptions, deterrence planners “must assess our capabilities relative to the doctrine, exercises, statements, threats and behavior of potential adversaries.”¹⁹ In other words, the United States must be able to influence different adversaries differently. This approach requires maintaining tailored and flexible strategies, plans, and capabilities that can be leveraged effectively across a spectrum of adversaries and contexts. Simply retaining a force structured and sized consistent with NST would limit this flexibility in important ways.

First, US nuclear forces must be able to support multiple objectives depending on circumstances presented. While there are different ways to articulate these requirements, they generally include:

deterring an adversary from initiating a nuclear attack;
deterring further use if nuclear weapons have already been employed;
and rendering an adversary incapable of continuing large-scale nuclear strikes.²⁰

A force capable of achieving all this requires flexibility and options. This is not a new concept. As the secretary of defense’s fiscal year 1975 annual report noted, to be “credible and hence effective over the range of possible contingencies deterrence must rest on many options and on a spectrum of capabilities . . . to support these options.”²¹ This requires the ability to apply the right force at the right time against the right target or set of targets, consistent with policy guidance and the law of armed conflict.

Numerous factors go into determining how best to service a particular target with a nuclear weapon, factors that multiply with a large adversary target base.²² In a simpler two-party context, planners must carefully examine the resources at their disposal and the characteristics of the specific targets identified to develop specific approaches to meet national objectives.²³ But all US nuclear weapons are not interchangeable. Among other factors, planners must consider the types of weapons available, the phase of conflict for which they are needed, their flight characteristics, their yield, their range, their time to target, the desired effect on a particular target, and long-standing policy guidance to achieve objectives at the lowest level of damage possible and to minimize unintended effects. Today and in the coming years, moreover, they need to make such plans recognizing that other nuclear-armed adversaries might be poised to exploit US distraction to pursue their own geopolitical objectives.

A nuclear force constrained in size and composition by a 2010-era treaty does not provide sufficient flexibility to effectively manage these factors across all potential adversaries. As an example, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are viewed as the most prompt US capability. But the need for prompt options applies to each US nuclear-armed adversary, and the United States might need to retain such prompt options for other targeting priorities that might arise as a contingency unfolds. In this context, targets that require prompt options could exceed the number of ICBMs available. Similarly, efforts to avoid overflight of one nuclear-armed state while striking another can further restrict ICBM options, increasing escalation risk or undermining mission success.

Other examples include yield and range. Policy directs achieving objectives at the lowest level of damage possible. But if only higher-yield weapons are available to the president at a given stage of conflict, presidential options narrow and escalation risks rise. Simply uploading additional warheads onto existing or future delivery systems like Minuteman III or Sentinel, moreover, is not a panacea, as increased payloads can impose range restrictions that reduce flexibility and further constrain planners.²⁴

Given considerations such as these, force adequacy cannot be measured by aggregate numbers alone. Even if the total number of delivery systems and warheads is numerically sufficient on paper to service the required targets, a force constrained by the legacy NST structure would leave little ability to offer the president meaningful options for a force that must be postured to manage a multiple adversary environment. In practice, when facing such an expanded target base, there might be only one or two approaches to a given target set, especially when facing simultaneous or sequential crises or conflicts, sharply constraining presidential decision space.

Second, the US nuclear force must account for operational limitations. For example, analyses that cite bomber payload capacity often ignore attrition that is inevitable in a high-intensity conventional conflict.²⁵ Whether B-52s, B-2s, or B-21s, some will be destroyed while flying conventional missions, bringing into question how many will be available if and when strategic bomber strikes are needed.²⁶ Losses to bombers or critical enablers such as aerial refueling tankers could significantly reduce available nuclear options. Similarly, ballistic missile submarines must periodically return to port for replenishment, and strategic bombers cannot remain on alert indefinitely.²⁷ Moreover, emerging threats spanning from quantum sensing to unmanned systems could further affect availability of strategic platforms in unknown ways.²⁸ Advocates of a size-constrained force often overlook these risks.

Third, simultaneous or sequential crises dramatically increase complexity. Planners might be required to generate deterrence options across multiple theaters at distinct stages of conflict in support of different political and military objectives, and against adversaries that might be coordinating their actions.

Complexity grows as the number of strategic adversaries increases, their level of coordination deepens, and the range of their escalation options expands. In crisis or conflict, this complexity manifests as a high level of uncertainty regarding potential escalation pathways that the United States must consider and seek to influence.²⁹

Further, this complexity can evolve over multiple pathways. Deterrence requirements will differ markedly depending on whether a crisis or conflict originates with Russia, China, or North Korea. Where and against whom a crisis begins will impact the mix of capabilities upon which the United States will lean most heavily because US plans necessarily rely on different mixes of capabilities in each case to deter or to achieve objectives.

What should US strategic force posture look like?

The United States does not need a force equal to the combined arsenals of Russia and China. And China’s nuclear growth alone should not dictate US posture. Rather, a decision on the precise nuclear force mix “will depend largely on the choices adversaries make and on how much risk a president is willing to accept in both the most plausible and worst-case nuclear scenarios.”³⁰

So far, the Trump Administration has not directly addressed nuclear force size. The NDS signals an intent to “adapt [US] nuclear forces,”³¹ and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has similarly pledged to develop “additional options” to support deterrence and escalation management.³² While these statements suggest an openness to nuclear force expansion, it is impossible to divine the Trump administration’s intent at this time.

In the absence of more detail, the administration could be guided in future posture decisions by recommendations from the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission and other commentators, pursuing options in the short-term that include: uploading additional warheads on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); reopening SLBM tubes that were capped as part of NST; and restoring nuclear capability to the full B-52 fleet.³³ Retaining a number of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines as long as technically and operationally feasible could also help, as could potentially re-operationalizing and loading the 50 ICBM silos that were taken offline as part of NST. In the medium and longer-term, accelerating the nuclear modernization program of record where possible and, eventually, increasing the number of new systems fielded as part of the modernization program would also provide opportunities to increase flexibility.

Of these options, the precise mix will ultimately be determined by Trump administration and military officials based upon classified analysis.³⁴Still, the foregoing considerations indicate the need for a force exceeding that previously permitted by NST—an operationally relevant force that is large and flexible enough to influence adversary decision-making at all stages of crisis and conflict, and that is capable of achieving national objectives against more than one nuclear adversary if it becomes necessary.

Specific posture decisions regarding each triad leg bring with them multiple variables that make direct comparisons difficult.³⁵ Still, given the current trajectory of adversary nuclear force developments, a US strategic deterrent capable of delivering of roughly 2,400 operationally deployed warheads in the near term should be large and flexible enough to meet US strategy requirements.³⁶ These increases should be spread across all three triad legs, further diversifying the weapons and delivery platforms available to planners – and to the president – when confronting potential crisis or conflict in today’s multiple adversary environment.³⁷

This posture would ensure the United States retains a capability, if needed, to target either Russian or Chinese nuclear forces and have a credible capacity available to deter or if necessary achieve national objectives against the other; provide the president more options to deal with multiple adversaries in simultaneous or sequential contingencies, thereby expanding decision space and increasing his ability to manage escalation; account for potential attrition to US nuclear forces in conflict; and provide the capability to deal with North Korea should that threat manifest, either before or during a crisis or conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary.

This uptick would represent a reasonable increase over NST levels and would set the stage for a more comprehensive assessment of US nuclear capabilities in the longer-term—whether less capability is needed as Russia and China show interest in meaningful arms control engagement, or more is needed if the security environment fails to improve. But today, arbitrarily adhering to limits designed for a different time and a different security environment is not in the US national interest and would stand in the way of fielding the force necessary to maintain credible and effective deterrence.

It’s not 2010 anymore

US strategic nuclear force levels that made sense in 2010 no longer suffice in 2026. The challenges facing planners today are more diverse and complex—and will only grow more so. To maintain credible deterrence, the United States must be able to deter and must be more capable of achieving national objectives against each nuclear-armed adversary individually or in combination, in both simultaneous and sequential scenarios. A force constrained by legacy NST decisions risks undermining that capacity and inviting the very conflicts US nuclear forces are intended to deter. A larger, more diverse force than the United States fields today is needed to afford the nation the flexibility it needs to maintain credible and effective deterrence in the coming years.

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1 U.S. Department of Defense, 2026 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 23, 2026), https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF.

2 Mark Trevelyan, “Explainer: What Is the New START Nuclear Treaty and Why Does Its Expiry Matter?” Reuters, January 30, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-new-start-nuclear-treaty-why-does-its-expiry-matter-2026-01-30/.

3 Rose Gottemoeller, “Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on an ‘Arms Race 2.0,’”US Senate, December 10, 2025, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/f44409cc-cc99-f286-066b-1283777d682b/121025_Gottemoeller_Testimony.pdf.

4 “Expiration of US-Russia Agreement Could Trigger Rapid, Dangerous Nuclear Arms Race, New Report Warns,”Union of Concerned Scientists, January 12, 2026, https://www.ucs.org/about/news/nuclear-agreement-expiration-could-trigger-rapid-arms-race.

5 Kingston Reif, “Earlier this month Sam Charap and I published an op-ed on where the United States and Russia should try to go on arms control in the near-term. Among our recs: the sides should agree on a…” LinkedIn, June 15, 2025, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kingston-reif-982a2053_earlier-this-month-sam-charap-and-i-published-activity-7340111754321944576-UrkW?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAFRSmgBZ9X59om6OMkni6whIn4mpEHSAHQ.

6 Each president has historically provided classified guidance to the Department of Defense on his nuclear employment objectives, referred to herein as national objectives. As one commentator points out, historically unclassified or previously declassified literature suggests four such objectives. Pat McKenna, “Counterforce Strategy versus Counterforce Targeting” in Brad Roberts, ed., “Counterforce in Contemporary US Strategy,” Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 2025, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2025-05/2025-0529-CGSR-Occasional-Paper-Counterforce-In-Contemporary-US-Nuclear-Strategy.pdf. Three of those objectives are the focus of this article. The fourth, according to McKenna, is “managing risks that are inherent to a highly dynamic geopolitical environment.”

7 Reid J. Epstein, “Kerry: Russia Behaving Like It’s the 19th Century,” Politico, March 2, 2014, https://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-now/2014/03/kerry-russia-behaving-like-its-the-19th-century-184280.

8 Alexander Smith, “Trump Calls Russia’s Missile Test ‘Inappropriate’—But Is Putin’s Nuclear-Powered Weapon Actually a Threat?” NBC News, October 27, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/world/russia/russia-burevestnik-missile-trump-putin-test-inappropriate-ukraine-rcna239984.

9 Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi, “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age: National Security in a World of Proliferating Risks and Eroding Constraints,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-new-nuclear-age-narang-vaddi.

10 “North Korea Military Power: A Growing Regional and Global Threat,” Defense Intelligence Agency, October 15, 2021, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/NKMP.pdf.

11 Daniel M. Gettinger and Mary Beth Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs,” Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10472.

12 Paul Amato, “Unsettling Allies, Emboldening Pyongyang,” RealClearDefense, January 29, 2026, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/01/29/unsettling_allies_emboldening_pyongyang_1161599.html

13 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment: Report to the United States House of Representatives Arms Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,” Defense Intelligence Agency, March 25, 2025, https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2025_dia_statement_for_the_record.pdf?utm_source; Amy Hawkins, Andrew Roth, and Helen Davidson, “Xi, Putin, Kim and the Optics of a New World Order,” Guardian, September 6, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/news/ng-interactive/2025/sep/06/xi-jinping-vladimir-putin-kim-jong-un-optics-new-world-order.

14 Jared Martin, “The Second North Korean Wave in Ukraine: What Next as Pyongyang’s Troops Arrive on Russia’s Front Lines?” Modern War Institute, August 8, 2025, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-second-north-korean-wave-in-ukraine-what-next-as-pyongyangs-troops-arrive-on-russias-front-lines.

15 2024—Report to the Senate on the Status of Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons Negotiations Pursuant to Subparagraph (a)(12)(B) of the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty,” US Department of State, February 25, 2025, https://www.state.gov/2024-report-to-the-senate-on-the-status-of-tactical-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons-negotiations-pursuant-to-subparagraph-a12b-of-the-senate-resolution-of-advice-and-consent-to-ratification-of/.

16 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025,” US Department of Defense, December 23, 2025, https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF. (“The PLA is probably pursuing nuclear weapons with yields below 10 kilotons. Such weapons address long-held PLA desires to be able to conduct limited nuclear counterstrikes against military targets and control nuclear escalation.”)

17 Eric S. Edelman and Franklin C. Miller, “No New START: Renewing the U.S.-Russian Deal Won’t Solve Today’s Nuclear Dilemmas, Foreign Affairs, June 3, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/no-new-start.

18 Kayse Jansen, “New Strategic Deterrence Frameworks for Modern-Day Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 112, January 2024, https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=joint-force-quarterlyhttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=joint-force-quarterly.

19 Terri Moon Cronk, “Policy Official: Posture Review Emphasizes Capabilities, Deters Use of Nukes,” US Department of Defense, February 16, 2018, https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1444722/policy-official-posture-review-emphasizes-capabilities-deters-use-of-nukes/.

20 See, for example: McKenna, “Counterforce Strategy versus Counterforce Targeting.” Greg Weaver, “Alternative Deterrence Strategies for a Two-Peer Environment,” in Roberts, “Counterforce in Contemporary US Strategy,” describes different US historical objectives for deterrence, assurance, and achieving objectives if deterrence fails. See: Jansen, “New Strategic Deterrence Frameworks for Modern-Day Challenges.”

21 “Annual Defense Department Report: FY 1975,” US Department of Defense, March 4, 1974, 38, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1975_DoD_AR.pdf.

22 Michael Elliot, “Turning Presidential Guidance into Nuclear Operational Plans“ in Charles Glaser, Austin Long, and Brian Radzinsky, eds.,“Managing US Nuclear Operations in the 21st Century,” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/books/managing-u-s-nuclear-operations-in-the-21st-century/.

23 Ibid.

24 That is, ballistic missiles that are deployed with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

25 Col Mark A. Gunzinger, USAF (Ret.), “The B-21 Bomber: A Cost-effective Deterrent for a Multi-polar World,” Mitchell Institute, September 2024, https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/app/uploads/2024/09/The-B-21-Bomber-A-Cost-effective-Deterrent-FINAL.pdf.

26 Northrop Grumman corporation, the maker of the B-2 and B-21 bombers, is a sponsor of the Atlantic Council’s work on strategic forces issues.

27 “Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines—SSBN,” US Navy, last updated February 27, 2025, https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169580/fleet-ballistic-missile-submarines-ssbn/; Oriana Pawlyk, “Putting Nuclear Bombers Back on 24-Hour Alert Would Exhaust the Force, General Says,” Military.com, April 22, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/22/putting-nuclear-bombers-back-24-hour-alert-would-exhaust-force-general-says.html.

28 Paul Amato, “In Defense of the US Maintaining a Balanced Nuclear Triad,” Atlantic Council, September 29, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/in-defense-of-the-us-maintaining-a-balanced-nuclear-triad/.

29 Jansen, “New Strategic Deterrence Frameworks for Modern-Day Challenges.”

30 Narang and Vaddi, “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age;” Edelman and Miller, “No New START.”

31 U.S. Department of Defense, 2026 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.

32 “Remarks by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at the Reagan National Defense Forum (As Delivered),” US Department of Defense, December 6, 2025, https://www.war.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4354431/remarks-by-secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-at-the-reagan-national-defense-forum-a/.

33 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, DC, October 2023), https://ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/A/Am/Americas%20Strategic%20Posture/Strategic-Posture-Commission-Report.pdf; Narang and Vaddi, “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age”; Edelman and Miller, “No New START

34 Admiral Charles Richard, USN (Ret.), Hon. Franklin C. Miller, and Robert Peters, “Nuclear Deterrence vs Nuclear Warfighting: Is There a Difference and Does it Matter?” National Institute for Public Policy, April 15, 2025, https://nipp.org/information_series/admiral-charles-richard-usn-ret-hon-franklin-c-miller-and-robert-peters-nuclear-deterrence-vs-nuclear-warfighting-is-there-a-difference-and-does-it-matter-no-623-april-15-2025.

35 For example, the number of warheads that are available to be delivered by US SSBNs is a function of how many boats are operational; how many are at sea at a given time, how many operational launch tubes are available, and MIRV configuration.

36 This estimate draws from public sources. See Hans M. Kristensen, MattKorda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, “United States nuclear weapons, 2025.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 13, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2024.2441624. This estimate uses NST bomber counting rules (~60 airframes); a rough doubling of deployed ICBM warheads (~900 total); and a one-third increase in SLBM warheads (~1440 total), the latter two of these deployed on either the existing or an expanded number of delivery platforms.

37 To this end, the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM in conjunction with policy makers will need to assess the optimal mix of platforms and warheads to maximize the necessary flexibility and operational relevance.

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The Eastern Mediterranean won’t replace Russian or Gulf gas—but it can be Europe’s energy shock absorber

Hany Ghanem and Chrissy Bishai — Fri, 27 Mar 2026 16:39:31 +0000

WASHINGTON—Europe’s energy system has experienced a massive structural shift in recent years. Since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine four years ago, the continent has significantly reduced its dependence on Russian gas, cutting imports by 90 percent between 2021 and 2025, with plans to fully phase it out by November 2027. But this transition has not eliminated risk; it has reconfigured it and even created new vulnerabilities.

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is now central to European energy security. While diversification has reduced reliance on a single supplier, it has increased exposure to global chokepoints. LNG depends on maritime routes vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. In a post–October 7, 2023, Middle East, disruptions in the Red Sea and current tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have underscored the fragility of these flows. The war in Iran and Tehran’s effective closure of the strait—through which roughly 20 percent of global oil and LNG transits—has driven price spikes and cargo disruptions. Europe must now compete with Asian buyers to secure LNG, raising the risk of shortages before winter.

In this context, a developing gas industry in the Eastern Mediterranean is emerging not as a replacement for Gulf or Russian gas, but as a flexible regional energy corridor that can reinforce Europe’s resilience while advancing regional integration.

A basin of opportunity—within limits

Natural gas discoveries across Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus have transformed the Eastern Mediterranean into a meaningful energy basin. The Levant Basin alone holds an estimated 120 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas.

At the same time, Europe’s gas demand is structurally declining due to efficiency gains, fuel substitution, and decarbonization policies. European regulatory constraints—particularly methane emissions standards—are also reshaping import dynamics.

The implication is clear: The Eastern Mediterranean’s role will be material but limited. It cannot replace Russian gas at scale, but it does not need to. Its value lies in flexibility, diversification, and responsiveness during market stress.

Egypt: The system’s anchor—and constraint

Egypt sits at the center of this emerging system. It is the only country in the region with operational LNG export infrastructure, with terminals at Idku and Damietta. These facilities allow gas from neighboring producers to be liquefied and exported via the global spot market, providing critical flexibility unconstrained by rigid long-term contracts.

This infrastructure has enabled a functional regional model: Israeli gas flows via pipeline to Egypt, where it is liquefied and exported. Future Cypriot production is expected to follow the same pathway, as building new LNG terminals remains expensive.

Organizationally, Egypt hosts the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which has become the primary platform for coordinating regional gas development. By aligning producers, transit states, and consumers—and involving companies in the conversation via the Gas Industry Advisory Committee—the EMGF has helped foster cooperation in a historically fragmented region.

Yet Egypt is also the system’s primary constraint. Domestic gas demand has risen steadily, while production from key fields such as Zohr has declined from peak levels. As a result, Egypt’s export capacity has tightened, and it has increasingly relied on Israeli imports to meet domestic needs. A recent $35 billion deal to supply an additional 130 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Israeli gas underscores this dependence.

This dual role—as both hub and constraint—characterizes the region’s energy equation. Europe’s access to Eastern Mediterranean gas ultimately hinges on Egypt’s ability to balance domestic demand with export capacity.

Israel: The basin’s supply engine

If Egypt is the system’s anchor, Israel is its primary source of incremental supply. Offshore discoveries such as Tamar and Leviathan have transformed Israel into a regional gas exporter. Leviathan alone holds approximately 600 bcm of recoverable gas, with expansion expected to boost output further.

Israel exports gas primarily to Egypt and Jordan through established pipelines. These flows feed directly into Egypt’s LNG infrastructure, linking Israeli production to European markets.

This arrangement has created a functional regional energy system despite limited political integration. Israeli upstream supply underpins Egyptian exports, while Egypt provides access to global markets.

Cyprus: The next phase

Cyprus represents the next wave of potential supply. Discoveries such as Aphrodite and Cronos indicate that Cyprus could be a substantial resource base. Development strategies increasingly center on integration with Egyptian infrastructure, particularly via subsea pipelines connecting Cypriot fields to Egypt’s LNG terminals. However, without operational LNG infrastructure, timelines remain uncertain due to regulatory, investment, and geopolitical constraints. Cyprus should be viewed as a medium-term option rather than an immediate supply source.

From supply source to shock absorber

Taken together, the Eastern Mediterranean is unlikely to be transformative in scale but is highly valuable as a modular layer of energy resilience for Europe in the coming decade.

Estimates suggest the region could support approximately 30–40 bcm of annual exports to Europe under favorable conditions. While insufficient to replace Russian or Gulf gas, this volume is significant enough to stabilize markets during inevitable disruptions.

Its strategic value lies in optionality—the ability to provide incremental supply, diversify routes, and respond flexibly to shocks.

Connecting to IMEC

The Eastern Mediterranean’s importance for energy becomes even clearer when viewed through the lens of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

IMEC envisions an integrated network linking India, the Gulf, and Europe through transport, digital, and energy infrastructure. Within this framework, the Eastern Mediterranean can serve as the energy anchor of the corridor’s western segment, linking regional gas resources to European markets.

This alignment supports broader US and European strategic objectives by strengthening economic ties among aligned partners and reinforcing regional stability.

Securing the Eastern Mediterranean’s role in Europe’s energy future

To accelerate and stabilize Eastern Mediterranean energy development:

Israel and Cyprus should resolve their dispute over the Ishai reservoir to unlock joint development.
Cyprus and investors should finalize regulatory and commercial frameworks for exports to Egypt, including agreements with the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS).
Egypt should expand renewable energy capacity to reduce domestic gas consumption and preserve export volumes.
Regional governments should leverage the EMGF to coordinate development, align stakeholder incentives, and support investment.
Governments must ensure geopolitical tensions do not disrupt existing cooperation, particularly Egypt–Israel–Jordan gas flows.

Eastern Mediterranean gas will not eliminate Europe’s exposure to global volatility. Rather, its strategic value lies in reinforcing resilience at the margins—providing additional supply during disruptions, diversifying routes, and anchoring a regional energy system that aligns infrastructure with geopolitics.

In an era defined less by abundance than adaptability, Eastern Mediterranean gas may prove more valuable for its flexibility than its scale.

The post The Eastern Mediterranean won’t replace Russian or Gulf gas—but it can be Europe’s energy shock absorber appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Only additional pressure can push Putin toward peace

Kira Rudik — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 21:19:03 +0000

After more than a year of US-led talks to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is little sign of progress toward peace. Instead, Moscow is now reportedly aiding Tehran as Iranian drones target United States bases and American allies across the Gulf region. New approaches are clearly needed in order to prevent a further descent into international insecurity.

When US President Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025 and began efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine via diplomacy, many Ukrainians were not overly optimistic. This skepticism was rooted in their own bitter personal experience of broken Russian promises over the past few decades.

Since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, Russia signed a long list of treaties and agreements obliging Moscow to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and refrain from acts of international aggression. These commitments did not prevent Russian President Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine in 2014 or launching a full-scale invasion eight years later. Understandably, few in Kyiv now believe Putin can be trusted to respect future deals.

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Over the past year, it has become evident that Russia is using US-led negotiations to stall for time and divide the transatlantic alliance. Putin has refused to join Ukraine in accepting an unconditional ceasefire and continues to insist on maximalist goals that would mean the end of an independent Ukrainian state. Meanwhile, the Kremlin underlines its lack of commitment to peace by sending low-level delegations led by figures such as presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky, who is best known for penning radically anti-Ukrainian history textbooks.

On the battlefield, Russia’s intentions are equally clear. Despite suffering catastrophic losses over the past four years, the Russian army remains on the offensive and continues to recruit tens of thousands of new troops each month to fill the depleted ranks of Putin’s invasion force.

In parallel, Russia is escalating attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population. During the recent winter months, millions of Ukrainians found themselves without access to heating and electricity amid Arctic temperatures due to a strategic bombing campaign targeting critical civilian infrastructure that aimed to freeze the country into submission. According to UN data, 2025 was the deadliest period of the war for Ukrainian civilians since the first months of the invasion, with the number of civilian deaths rising by 31 percent compared to the previous year.

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With the Kremlin ignoring calls for a compromise peace, the only way to advance negotiations is by putting more pressure on Putin. Failure to do so could have disastrous consequences that would be felt far beyond the borders of a subjugated Ukraine.

The current Russian plan is to drag out negotiations indefinitely while grinding down Ukraine’s resistance and sowing division among Kyiv’s international allies. Moscow seeks to entice the United States with promises of lucrative economic cooperation, while supporting populist political forces across the EU in a bid to weaken European support for Ukraine. If this strategy succeeds, Ukraine may at some point become unable to defend itself.

The collapse of Ukrainian resistance would not bring peace to Europe. Instead, a victorious Russia would take control of Ukraine’s formidable military and the country’s rapidly expanding domestic defense industry. Putin would then command the two most powerful armies in Europe, with unrivaled combat experience and knowledge of drone warfare. In such circumstances, it is dangerously delusional to think that Russia would not seek to go further. At the very least, European governments would be forced to increase defense budgets to levels that would dwarf the current cost of supporting Ukraine.

The steps necessary to secure peace through strength are no secret. First and foremost, this means adequately arming Ukraine. Trump suggested in 2025 that if Russia continues to reject peace efforts, he may provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles. This would be a welcome and meaningful step. Other partners including Germany have also spoken of increasing Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Now is the time to do so.

In parallel, sanctions measures targeting Putin’s war economy must be expanded and tightened. This should include steps to increase the costs for international customers who continue to purchase Russian oil and gas exports, thereby funding the Kremlin war machine.

Western leaders have always had the tools at their disposal to counter the Russian threat. Unfortunately, however, they have so far failed to demonstrate the political will necessary to deploy these tools effectively. This excessive caution is counter-productive and only serves to embolden the Kremlin. Moscow believes it is already at war with the West and treats calls for compromise as signs of weakness. If Kyiv’s partners are serious about stopping Russia, they must abandon appeasement and increase the pressure on Putin.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party and a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Drone superpower Ukraine is an ideal tech partner for the Gulf states

Anatoly Motkin — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 20:43:08 +0000

In recent weeks, the Iran war has shone a spotlight on Ukraine’s emergence as a drone superpower. Kyiv’s decision to help defend the Gulf states against Iranian attack drones by deploying teams of Ukrainian specialists is now highlighting the scope for broader tech sector cooperation between Ukraine and the region. This potential for partnership was underlined by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Saudi Arabia on March 26.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, few analysts predicted that the outgunned Ukrainians would soon fundamentally alter the global understanding of unmanned systems warfare. Yet that is precisely what has happened. From improvised FPV drones strapped with grenades to the long-range naval strike drones that have forced Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to retreat, Ukraine has demonstrated that asymmetric drone warfare can neutralize conventional military advantages in ways that expensive Western defense systems never quite anticipated.

What distinguishes Ukraine’s drone program is not simply its scale, but also the speed and adaptability of its development cycles. Ukrainian engineers, often operating in basements and converted workshops, upgrade drone designs in a matter of days rather than the year-long processes typical of conventional defense procurement. Software updates are pushed out overnight. Lessons from the morning’s combat inform the afternoon’s engineering innovations. The Ukrainian battlefield has become the most demanding product testing environment in the world.

This lean, decentralized, and ruthlessly practical model has not gone unnoticed in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and their Gulf region neighbors. All have been studying the Ukrainian experience carefully. For countries that have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in conventional military hardware only to find themselves operating in a world where a commercially available drone can threaten a warship, the Ukrainian approach represents both a warning and an opportunity.

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The Gulf states are not passive observers of technological change. The UAE’s Vision 2071, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, and Qatar’s National Vision 2030 all share a common ambition to transform their economies from hydrocarbon dependency into diversified, knowledge-based societies where technology plays a central role.

Defense and security technology, long imported wholesale from the United States, United Kingdom, and France, is increasingly identified as a sector where these nations want enhanced domestic capacity. This is not merely a matter of patriotic pride; it is increasingly recognized as a strategic necessity.

For now, ambition and execution remain some distance apart. The Gulf states have capital in abundance and a genuine appetite for technology transfer. What they have found harder to cultivate organically is the specific combination of engineering talent, risk tolerance, regulatory flexibility, and competitive urgency that drives genuine innovation. This is precisely where Ukraine’s wartime technology ecosystem presents an intriguing counterpart.

The case for deeper Ukraine-Gulf technology cooperation rests on synergies that are easy to overlook amid the noise of geopolitics. Ukraine possesses what the Gulf states most covet: Battle-proven engineering expertise; a deep talent pool in software, electronics, and materials science; and a development culture forged under conditions of extreme pressure.

Meanwhile, the Gulf states can offer what Ukraine most urgently needs: Capital, global commercial networks, and the ability to provide a stable platform for technology commercialization at a time when much of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and economic base remain under threat.

Drone technology sits at the most visible intersection of these complementary strengths, but it is far from the only area for potential cooperation. The ecosystem that has made Ukraine’s drone program so formidable is built on broad technical foundations including robust software engineering, AI-assisted target recognition, electronic warfare countermeasures, and sophisticated logistics platforms. Each of these capabilities has substantial civilian and commercial applications in areas that match the priorities of the Gulf states.

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Any deepening of Ukraine-Gulf technology ties must navigate a complex geopolitical landscape. The Gulf states have, with varying degrees of success, sought to maintain working relationships with both Russia and Ukraine throughout the current war.

This studied neutrality is a potentially valuable asset in fostering Ukraine-related technology cooperation. Some Ukrainian companies might prefer partners who can operate without the political complications of deeper NATO engagement, while Gulf-based joint ventures offer a flexibility that Western partners often cannot.

At the same time, the Gulf states maintain active ties with both Russia and China, creating potential risks for Ukraine’s battle-tested tech to travel further than intended. EU and US sanctions packages have repeatedly flagged UAE-based entities for supplying military and dual-use goods to Russia, including microelectronics and UAV components. The threat of Ukrainian defense IP migrating toward Beijing or Moscow through a Gulf intermediary is not theoretical. It is a structural problem that any co-production framework would need to resolve before NATO partners could endorse it.

Western governments are watching these dynamics carefully. There is a legitimate concern in Washington and Brussels about the dual-use nature of drone and AI technologies amid alarm that capabilities developed by Ukraine could, if commercialized through Gulf intermediaries, find their way into the hands of hostile actors.

These concerns will require careful management. But they should not obscure the more fundamental point that technology partnerships between Ukraine and the Gulf, conducted transparently and within a clear governance framework, could potentially serve the strategic interests of both parties and of the broader rules-based international order.

Ukraine’s drone program is the most dramatic expression of a broader technological transformation that the country has undergone since the Euromaidan Revolution of 2014 and, with accelerating urgency, since 2022. The war with Russia has in many ways turbo-charged Ukraine’s tech sector, driving engineers toward defense applications with the same creative energy previously directed at consumer software.

For the Gulf states, engaging with this ecosystem means potentially accessing not just drone know-how but a broader pipeline of technology talent and startup energy. A deliberate focus on Ukrainian technology companies, whether through direct investment, co-investment structures with Ukrainian state entities, or technology accelerator partnerships, would represent a logical extension of existing Gulf region investment strategies.

Transforming this potential into reality requires deliberate institutional architecture. At the governmental level, the frameworks for technology and investment cooperation between Ukraine and the Gulf states remain underdeveloped compared to those with EU member states or the United States. Bilateral investment treaties, technology transfer agreements, and joint venture frameworks need to be negotiated, or existing agreements updated, to reflect the current reality of Ukraine’s technological capabilities and the investment priorities of individual Gulf states.

At the industry level, dedicated platforms for technology matchmaking are needed. Existing tech sector events are useful, but a more targeted mechanism such as an annual Ukraine-Gulf technology forum could provide the sustained attention that one-off exhibitions cannot. Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation and the country’s tech industry associations have the institutional capacity to anchor such an initiative from the Ukrainian side.

At the financial level, the structure of Gulf investment in Ukrainian technology will need to be carefully designed to account for the realities of war, reconstruction, and regulatory complexity. Special purpose vehicles, escrow arrangements, and the use of third-country holding structures may be necessary to provide Gulf investors with the governance certainty they require.

The interest that Gulf region governments and investors are showing in Ukraine’s drone capabilities is, at one level, simply pragmatic. But this interest, if properly cultivated, could serve as the entry point for a much broader and more consequential relationship.

Ukraine needs to rebuild its economy, attract sustainable foreign investment, and establish itself as a technology hub that can thrive in the postwar era. The Gulf states need to accelerate their technology transitions, diversify their strategic partnerships, and develop genuine domestic innovation capacity rather than simply buying capabilities off the shelf from Western defense contractors. These are not competing objectives. They are, in important respects, the same objective approached from different directions.

The drones are the headline. But behind the headline lies the possibility of a durable, mutually beneficial technology partnership between two of the world’s most dynamic and consequential technology stories of the current decade. Whether that possibility is realized will depend on the vision and initiative of policymakers, investors, and entrepreneurs on both sides. The ingredients for something significant are present. The question is whether those involved will have the strategic clarity to combine them.

Anatoly Motkin is president of the StrategEast Center for a New Economy, a non-profit organisation with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, developing the knowledge driven economy in the Eurasian region.

What Iran’s attacks on Turkey reveal about NATO’s future

Ali Mammadov — Thu, 26 Mar 2026 17:12:23 +0000

The US-Israeli war against Iran has not bypassed Turkey. Since the beginning of the conflict, NATO air defenses intercepted three ballistic missiles fired from Iran toward Turkish airspace, according to Turkish officials. This included an incident that produced an explosion near Incirlik Air Base. Turkey has asked Tehran for clarification, while Iran has denied deliberately targeting Turkish territory. The result is a strategically sensitive reality: A NATO ally has found itself exposed to direct spillover from a regional war it is trying hard not to enter.

The implications extend well beyond Turkey. These incidents are testing NATO’s credibility under modern conditions, where threats often fall into the gray zone between peacetime nuisance and full-scale armed attack. In such cases, the Alliance faces a genuine strategic dilemma. It must reassure an exposed ally and preserve deterrence while also avoiding an impulsive response that could widen a regional war and create a far more dangerous confrontation. Turkey’s current predicament shows that the future of NATO will be shaped not only by whether its members can fight together in a worst-case scenario, but by whether it can respond credibly to dangerous cases that fall short of one.

At first glance, the obvious question is whether this is an Article 5 moment. But Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was never designed to operate as a mechanical trigger. The treaty states that an armed attack against one ally shall be considered an attack against all, while also leaving each ally to take “such action as it deems necessary.” NATO’s own explanation of collective defense and Article 5 makes the same point: Solidarity is firm, but the form of assistance remains up to member states’ political and strategic calculations rather than being automatically triggered. That is why Alliance leaders were able to keep Article 5 off the table after the first incident without suggesting indifference to Turkey’s security.

That should not be read as passivity. Turkish officials said explicitly that NATO air defenses shot down the missiles, with the interceptions carried out by Alliance assets in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara also announced on March 10 that the Alliance reinforced Turkey’s air defenses by deploying a US Patriot system near the Kürecik radar site in Malatya, a key NATO facility for missile tracking and early warning. These steps show that the Alliance is already doing what modern deterrence increasingly requires: Reinforcing defenses, reducing vulnerability, and containing escalation before it gets out of hand.

Still, restraint by itself does not fully answer the credibility question. Alliance credibility today cannot rest only on treaty language or quiet military measures. It also depends on whether exposed allies and potential adversaries can see that attacks affecting NATO territory produce visible political seriousness. If repeated incidents on allied territory are met in a way that feels too muted, too improvised, or too private, uncertainty begins to grow around what solidarity actually looks like in practice. NATO does not need to escalate militarily every time a missile or drone crosses into allied airspace. It does, however, need to show more clearly that pressure on member territory is noticed, discussed, and answered with coordinated resolve.

Turkey is an especially important test case because it sits on NATO’s southern flank, where Alliance challenges have often looked different from those on the eastern flank. Much of NATO’s recent debate has focused, understandably, on Russia’s war against Ukraine and the defense of eastern Europe. But NATO has long insisted that its commitment extends to threats “from all directions” under a 360-degree approach. If that language is to carry strategic weight, the Alliance has to show that the security of a southern ally under regional pressure is treated as part of the same collective credibility problem, even when the source of danger is different.

Turkey’s own behavior also deserves careful attention. Ankara has not sought Article 4 consultations, and Turkish officials have signaled that they do not want to be pulled more deeply into the Iran war. That caution is understandable. A government can view an incident as serious while still deciding that a formal Alliance process is not the wisest next step. This is precisely what makes the Turkey case so revealing. Modern Alliance management depends not only on what NATO is willing to do, but also on what an exposed ally wants NATO to do, and when. At times, an ally may prefer reinforcement and quiet coordination to a dramatic collective declaration. However, even if Turkey demurs from direct requests or consultations, NATO offering these things still benefits the Alliance’s reputation in Ankara and among the general public in Turkey.

At the same time, caution should not obscure a larger institutional lesson. Turkey has turned to NATO consultation mechanisms before during regional crises, especially in 2012, when violence spilling over from Syria led Turkey to seek Article 4 consultations and later prompted NATO’s deployment of Patriot batteries to help protect Turkish territory. The current moment therefore fits into a broader pattern: Turkey periodically reminds NATO that the southern flank can become a front line with little warning, and NATO periodically rediscovers that credibility is not only an eastern-flank question. The difference today is that the surrounding international environment is even more polarized, making calibrated responses more difficult and more important.

This is also part of a wider pattern of pressure on Alliance boundaries. In recent years, Russian drones and missiles have repeatedly entered or threatened NATO airspace, prompting calls for a more coordinated response. Alliance commanders have argued that firm responses to Russian incursions have helped deter further violations. The pattern is becoming clear: NATO is increasingly being tested not only by invasion scenarios, but by limited, ambiguous, and politically complicated actions that probe its thresholds without crossing them in the clearest possible way. Turkey’s experience with Iranian missiles now belongs in that same category of Alliance stress test.

For NATO, the challenge is to prevent these gray-zone incidents from producing a credibility gap. If every incident below the level of a major attack is treated as too minor for a serious political response, adversaries may conclude that there is broad space to pressure Alliance members without triggering meaningful consequences. If, on the other hand, every such incident is treated as a trigger for dramatic escalation, deterrence risks becoming recklessness. The future of the Alliance depends on avoiding both errors. What is needed is a stronger middle ground, one in which NATO pairs strategic restraint with visible solidarity, rapid consultation, and practical defensive action.

That is why the Alliance now needs a clearer framework for military incursions that fall short of open war. Drones, missile overflights, limited strikes, airspace violations, and similar coercive acts no longer belong to the margins of Alliance security. They are becoming part of its daily strategic environment. NATO should therefore develop more explicit procedures for what happens when members’ territory is exposed to repeated sub-threshold attacks. Such a framework would not replace Article 5, nor would it commit the Alliance to automatic escalation. It would instead clarify the menu of responses available below that threshold: immediate consultations, public statements of solidarity, temporary defensive deployments, intelligence coordination, air and missile defense reinforcement, and clear diplomatic signaling toward the source of the incident. In today’s security environment, credibility requires that allies and adversaries alike understand that NATO has a plan not only for full-scale war, but also for the increasingly common forms of aggression that fall below it.

That means several steps should now be considered. NATO should become more comfortable using consultation mechanisms quickly and flexibly when allied territory is repeatedly exposed to missile, drone, or airspace incidents, even when Article 5 is not under discussion. The Alliance should make defensive reinforcement more visible, especially on the southern flank, where reassurance has often been quieter than on the eastern one. It should also improve public signaling. Even where NATO chooses restraint, it should communicate that limited attacks on allied territory are neither being normalized nor ignored. These steps would not make the Alliance more escalatory. They would make it more credible.

Turkey’s recent missile incidents therefore reveal something important about NATO’s future. The Alliance’s credibility in this challenging period will not be judged only by whether it can invoke Article 5 in the most dramatic scenario. It will also be judged by whether it can handle repeated, dangerous, sub-threshold challenges without appearing passive, divided, or uncertain. In that sense, the attacks affecting Turkey are not just a regional security story. They are a warning that NATO’s next great test may come not from a single unmistakable attack, but from the accumulation of smaller crises that force the Alliance to prove that prudence and credibility can still go together.

Ali Mammadov is a PhD researcher at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government focusing on global stability, alliance formation, and rising powers. You can find him on X.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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From drones to rocket fuel, China and Russia are helping Iran through supply chains

Kimberly Donovan and Emily Ezratty — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 20:59:35 +0000

WASHINGTON—As the US-Israeli war with Iran continues, some commentators have speculated about why China and Russia appear to be keeping their distance from the conflict. Neither appears eager to intervene militarily to support Iran. Moreover, China is reportedly hesitant to send arms to Iran, while Russia is benefiting from the global oil supply shock caused by the conflict. Some rhetorical support aside, many commentators predict that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping will not get meaningfully involved in Iran.

But such conjecture misunderstands the economic relationships and motivations behind the “Axis of Evasion,” the network of US adversaries that coalesce to circumvent Western economic restrictions. Specifically, it misunderstands how Beijing and Moscow enable Tehran to continue its violence across the Middle East through supply chains.

The war with Iran is not solely a challenge posed by Iran. To bring about an end to the war and prevent Iran from rebuilding its military capacity, US President Donald Trump will need to confront Xi and Putin about their support for the Iranian regime and their schemes to evade sanctions and export controls.

How the Axis of Evasion works

China enables Russia and Iran by importing their sanctioned oil and selling them sophisticated dual-use technology. Over the past few years, we in the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center have proposed the term “Axis of Evasion” to describe the complex networks these countries use to evade and bypass Western sanctions. Our research has focused, for example, on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, as well as on alternative payment systems, money laundering schemes, and the barter trade. The current war with Iran has brought attention to yet another system or tactic of this Axis: integrated supply chains.

Trade and technology transfer between China, Russia, and Iran—and the associated supply chains—are the result of geography as well as significant Western economic pressure. Due to restrictive export controls and sanctions, these states cannot easily access Western technology and components directly from the United States and other Western countries. Because trade among the Axis of Evasion occurs outside of the Western financial system and, therefore, the reach of Western economic restrictions, these integrated supply chains are more resistant to sanctions and export controls enforcement.

Iran has been subject to extensive and comprehensive US sanctions and Western restrictive economic measures for decades. In October 2021, the United States announced the first export controls specifically targeting unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production. Since then, the Department of Commerce, Department of State, and the Treasury have also restricted third-party countries from exporting US-origin technologies to Iran. Despite the intensity of these restrictions, Western components continue to feature in Iranian drone designs. Often, these components come from China.

China has supplied Iran with drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and the components thereof, to aid in its aerial and maritime defense capabilities. In other instances, China directly supplies Iran with Western or Chinese technology components that are found in Iranian drones used against US military installations and economic interests in the Gulf, as well as on Russia’s battlefield in Ukraine. Treasury and Commerce actions targeting Iranian sanctions evasion schemes frequently identify and designate Chinese individuals, entities, and addresses that are used as shell or front companies and transshipment hubs. This cooperation extends beyond trading goods, but helps partners to develop and improve their own technological capabilities.

Drones

Iran’s drone program offers the clearest example of how the Axis of Evasion uses localized supply chains to circumvent restrictive economic measures and enhance military production. Iranian UAVs, such as the Shahed series, rely on an ecosystem of imported electronics, engines, navigation components, batteries, and semiconductors. While many of these parts originate in the United States, Europe, and Japan, procurement networks frequently route them through Chinese distributors or trading companies before they reach Iranian manufacturers. Chinese dual-use exports to Iran spiked in January 2024 when the two states formalized a strategic partnership emphasizing defense and security cooperation. Likewise, Chinese exports rose after Trump signed a memorandum restoring maximum pressure on Iran and again in June 2025 after the US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Russia further reinforces this system through wartime cooperation with Iran. Since 2022, Moscow and Tehran have exchanged drone technology and production know-how, allowing both countries to expand manufacturing capacity. In February 2023, Russia established a drone production facility supported by Iranian technology and expertise at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia. As part of a deal, Iran transferred 600 disassembled Shahed-16 drones, components for 1,300 drones, training, and technical expertise to Russia to assist in its war in Ukraine. By 2025, Moscow had moved roughly 90 percent of Shahed assembly to Russia. Meanwhile, Russia developed the Garpiya-3, a modified and improved version of the Shahed, with the help of Chinese specialists and a reported Russian drone factory in China.

This partnership now appears to be coming full circle. Recent comments by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reveal that Russia is now supplying Iran with Russian-made Shahed drones to use in attacks against the United States and Israel. What began as a sanctions-driven workaround has evolved into a self-reinforcing production network, fueled by Western components, Chinese procurement channels, and Russian manufacturing capacity.

Navigation systems

In another example of these integrated supply chain networks, China facilitates the transfer of both Chinese- and Western-made navigation technology to Iran. Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly sharing satellite imagery and modified Shahed drone technology to improve navigation and targeting based on Russia’s experience of using drones in Ukraine.

Chinese electronics markets and distributors play a critical role in this process. Components originally manufactured for civilian applications—such as inertial sensors or satellite navigation modules—can be purchased through Chinese intermediaries and integrated into Iranian weapons systems. Russia’s experience adapting commercial electronics also feeds into this innovation ecosystem.

Some experts believe that Iranian drones and missiles incorporate Chinese satellite navigation systems to target US and Israeli military assets. In February 2025, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese front companies that were supplying gyro navigation devices to enhance Iranian-made UAVs. In November 2025, a separate network connected to Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company was accused of using shell firms to acquire Chinese sensors and navigation equipment.

In 2021, China gave Iran access to BeiDou, the global positioning satellite system owned and operated by the China National Space Administration. Since the start of the war with the United States and Israel, Iran has used BeiDou to produce decoy signals to confuse threat analysis and conceal actual Iranian military movements.

Chemical precursors

Iran’s ability to sustain missile and explosives production depends on access to chemical precursors and industrial materials. Although these substances are subject to Western export controls, and the US Treasury has sanctioned individuals and entities in Iran and China for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients, enforcement is more difficult when production is distributed across multiple jurisdictions. Chinese chemical companies—many of which operate in sprawling industrial clusters—have repeatedly been linked to shipments of dual-use materials to Iran as well as Russia. Another recent report suggests that Iranian shadow fleet vessels sailing from China contain precursors for rocket fuel.

For Iran, these imports provide critical inputs for solid rocket fuels, propellants, and explosives used in missile systems and other weapons systems. By purchasing precursor materials through intermediaries or reexport hubs, Iranian procurement networks obscure the destination of shipments and exploit gaps in global export-control and sanctions enforcement. The scale and diversity of China’s chemical industry make it particularly difficult for regulators to monitor the end use of every exported compound.

What to do now

China, Russia, and Iran continue to work together to circumvent and evade Western sanctions and export controls. Meanwhile, the United States has been inconsistent in implementing economic restrictions. After the last Trump-Xi summit in October 2025, Washington suspended the Bureau of Industry and Security Affiliate Rule in exchange for China’s lifting of export controls on critical minerals, effectively revealing how much leverage Beijing retains through its dominance in rare-earth supply chains. Additionally, Washington is easing oil sanctions on Moscow and Tehran in response to rising energy prices and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, exposing the precise issues on which the US is willing to compromise.

As the White House diverts its attention toward the Middle East, the Trump-Xi summit, originally scheduled for next week, was postponed until May. However, a productive push on China could also advance the US position in the Iran conflict. In his meeting with Xi—if not sooner—Trump should confront China’s role in enabling these supply chains, tightening scrutiny of Chinese exports and intermediaries that facilitate sanctions evasion. The White House must make stronger export control enforcement, expanded entity listings, and greater transparency requirements for Chinese distributors involved in dual-use trade central to the agenda.

But pressure on China alone is not enough. Iran’s procurement networks depend on a web of transshipment hubs and trading companies that move controlled technologies across jurisdictions before they reach their destination in Iran. These networks often rely on distributors and logistics firms in third countries to obscure the origin and destination of sensitive components.

The United States should therefore expand its focus beyond direct exporters and identify the intermediaries and transshipment hubs that repeatedly appear in Iranian procurement chains. With targeted sanctions, enhanced export control enforcement cooperation, and intelligence sharing with partner governments, the United States can help disrupt the flow of dual-use goods before they reach Iran’s defense sector.

This increased enforcement should be paired with incentives. Many countries that serve as transshipment hubs are not politically aligned with Iran but lack the regulatory capacity or economic incentives to fully enforce export controls. Such third countries have also been hit hard by US tariffs, pushing them toward US adversaries purely due to economic incentives. In deploying incentives to encourage stronger compliance, the United States can cooperate with countries willing to strengthen export-control enforcement. In addition to incentives, capacity building programs, including customs modernization, export-control training, and industrial diversification could also enable firms in these jurisdictions to comply with Western restrictive economic measures.

Despite the severity and consistency of US sanctions and export controls targeting Iran’s drone acquisition, Iran maintains the technical knowledge, mature production lines, and continued access to dual-use components necessary to rebuild its drone stockpiles. Cooperation with adversarial states—predominantly China and Russia—further reinforces these capabilities by distributing supply chains and insulating production from Western pressure.

A failure to confront this Axis of Evasion across its networks allows it to continue enabling the flow of dual-use technologies among its members, which will allow Iran to rebuild and expand its drone and missile arsenals both during and potentially after the current war.

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Kroenig quoted in The New York Times on NATO, Trump, and Iran

cbertrand — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 18:50:08 +0000

Original Source

On March 25, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in The New York Times on NATO Secretary General Rutte’s praise of the war in Iran, arguing that Rutte openly criticizing President Trump would undermine the alliance.

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Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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Negotiating an EU-US biometric information-sharing agreement

Kenneth Propp — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 18:00:00 +0000

Bottom lines up front

The US and EU are negotiating a biometric data-sharing agreement to allow DHS access to EU member states’ fingerprint and other biometric databases.
The EU has never before agreed to provide a non-EU country large-scale access to Europeans’ personal data for purposes of the foreign country’s border security.
The EU aims to secure limits on bulk data collection, human oversight of automated decisions, and reciprocal access to US databases.

The Trump administration has taken adversarial and unconventional approaches with European allies on subjects ranging from trade to content moderation, but in another important area the United States is proceeding more traditionally. The subject is politically controversial: biometric information sharing for purposes of border security. In late January, European Union officials flew to Washington to start low-key formal talks with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) aimed at an international agreement. Despite the sensitive nature of the endeavor, EU member states and the European Data Protection Supervisor have endorsed it.

Why is the United States taking a consensual approach with Europe on border security information sharing, and why is the European Union so far willing to accommodate? Why is this agreement on a fast track in Washington and Brussels when law enforcement initiatives such as the projected EU-US CLOUD Agreement have been paused by the Trump administration? Is the border security information-sharing effort a one-off or could it be a harbinger of a return to traditional transatlantic legal diplomacy?

DHS seeks enhanced border security partnerships

DHS operates an international biometric information-sharing program to assist in “assessing the eligibility or public security risk of individuals seeking an immigration benefit or encountered in the context of a border encounter or law enforcement investigation related to immigration or border security issues,” according to the department’s privacy impact assessment (PIA). The program entails “automatic comparison of the fingerprints collected by DHS or a foreign partner on international travelers, suspected criminals, asylum seekers, irregular migrants, refugees, [and] applicants for visa and/or immigration benefits,” the PIA states. Biometric identifiers potentially include facial and iris scans and DNA, as well as traditional fingerprints.

In 2022, DHS decided that all forty-three countries that benefit from visa-free entry to the United States through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) must conclude agreements, dubbed enhanced border security partnerships (EBSP), enabling DHS to screen their biometric records for immigration or border security purposes. When DHS queries a name against a foreign state’s identity records and it yields a match, DHS automatically receives the responsive biometric data. Other identity information also could be conveyed by the foreign state. In the absence of a match in the foreign database, no fingerprints or other biometric information would be supplied to DHS.

Shared competence: EU and member-state roles

Twenty-four of the EU’s twenty-seven member states (all but Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Romania) participate in the VWP; they comprise more than half of all VWP members globally. Each EU state maintains its own national biometric information records for border purposes. Thus, DHS could take an important step toward fulfilling the overall EBSP goal by reaching biometric information-sharing agreements with these EU countries.

The EU, for its part, also has two relevant responsibilities: setting rules protecting personal data transferred outside its territory, per Article 16(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); and setting common policy on visas and external border checks, per Article 77(2) TFEU.

As popular sentiment for stricter border controls has swelled across Europe in recent years, the EU’s policymaking role in this area has become more prominent. In the past year, it has finalized a Pact on Migration and Asylum, a new set of rules on managing migration and asylum applications. In addition, new systems for tracking the entry and exit of foreign travelers and collecting the personal data of those entering EU territory on a visa-free basis are being put in place. These new systems show the EU moving in a similar direction as the United States in collecting information on foreign visitors.

DHS’s demand for biometric information-sharing agreements with EU member states thus touches on an area of “mixed” competence, i.e., one shared between the EU and its member states. In such a situation, the EU and its member states had to decide who would be responsible for negotiating with the United States.

The question took time to resolve. Only in 2024 did the Council of the European Union—which comprises the member states’ national ministers—invite the European Commission to develop a mandate for an international agreement at the EU level. Member states reportedly were eager to bring the collective negotiating strength of the EU to the table with the United States, rather than facing Washington individually.

A year passed before the Commission presented its draft negotiating mandate. It did so based on the understanding that the agreement sought by the United States related to the VWP and thus fell within the EU’s visa policy competence. Negotiations between the Council and Commission on the final contours of the mandate ensued during the second half of 2025.

Finally, in December 2025, the Council adopted a decision authoring the negotiation of an EU-level “framework” agreement with the United States. The framework would provide an overall legal structure for EU member states to conduct bilateral information exchange with DHS, setting the general conditions under which EU member states could provide biometric information to the US border agency. Each eligible member state subsequently would conclude an implementing agreement or arrangement with DHS identifying its relevant databases and operationalizing the data transfers.

Other relevant EU-US agreements

Over the past two decades, the EU has entered into a series of law enforcement and security information-sharing agreements with the United States—ranging from airline passenger name records (PNR) data to financial messaging data (via SWIFT) to mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. DHS is the principal beneficiary of PNR data sharing; the US Department of the Treasury receives SWIFT data used in tracking terrorist finance; and the Department of Justice manages information exchanged for criminal investigations and prosecutions. The United States and the EU also have concluded an agreement elaborating the data protection safeguards that must accompany transfers for law enforcement purposes, the so-called Umbrella Agreement.

In addition, DHS already enjoys access to foreign biometric and biographic data for purposes of preventing and combating serious crime (referred to as PCSC agreements), under a separate negotiating program that commenced in 2009. This earlier generation of agreements assists DHS in border encounters with persons suspected of terrorism and other serious offenses, but they do not apply to all foreign persons seeking to enter the United States.

The EU at that time had also sought to negotiate a PCSC agreement collectively on behalf of its member states, but DHS rebuffed Brussels and instead chose to negotiate individually with each EU member, believing the agency would have better leverage that way. The first two PCSC accords were concluded with Greece and Italy, and eventually all the European participants in the VWP program reached agreements as well.

An EU-level agreement on broad-scale border security information-sharing cooperation with the United States would represent a novel departure for Brussels. “It would be the first agreement concluded by the EU implying large-scale sharing of personal data, including biometric data, for the purpose of border and immigration control by a third country,” the European Data Protection supervisor has observed.

This time, DHS appears to have appreciated the relative speed and efficiency that comes from negotiating one uniform set of access conditions that will apply to all EU VWP participants. The EU and its member states, meanwhile, seem to have reached a sensible division of labor that respects member states’ prerogatives for controlling their own biometric information databases and for managing technical interactions with DHS.

EU negotiating goals

One major EU ambition in setting the rules and procedures governing DHS queries is to preclude generalized processing of all travelers’ data. A Commission press spokesman emphasized the “non-systematic nature of the information exchange and that the exchange is limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve the objectives of this cooperation.”

The EU mandate further stresses that the EU seeks an agreement that would be reciprocal in nature, enabling member states’ border authorities to query corresponding DHS databases. A leaked Council presidency working paper suggested that a monitoring mechanism should ensure reciprocity in implementation: “Information on member states’ citizens should be exchanged under the framework only if the U.S. exchanges information on American citizens.”

It is not clear that the United States and the EU are entering into these negotiations with entirely congruent views on the scope of the framework agreement. DHS envisages checking the biometric databases of travelers from VWP countries on a routine basis. However, the European Commission, as noted above, views the information exchange as “non-systematic.”

In addition, the US international biometric information-sharing program envisages access to foreign databases “in the context of a border encounter or law enforcement investigation related to immigration or border security issues,” according to the DHS Privacy Impact Assessment (italics added). The EU mandate, by contrast, concentrates on security screening and identity verification at the border, with subsequent law enforcement data access to be exclusively governed by other bilateral agreements.

The EU’s data protection rules are its main tool in ensuring that information conveyed to DHS pursuant to the EBSP agreement remains targeted. For example, the negotiating directive insists that processing of personal data be limited to what is “necessary and proportionate in individual cases.” Necessity and proportionality is a key concept in EU data protection law, including in the Schrems jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, albeit one that is hard to define a priori.

The EU also seeks to include other traditional data protection safeguards in the EBSP agreement with the United States, according to press reports. One reported provision would require human involvement in decisions having significant adverse effects on individuals, rather than permitting entirely automated decision-making. Another would allow for the transfer of “special categories” of personal data—such as sensitive data regarding political opinions, religion, and sexual orientation—only when necessary and proportionate to prevent criminal or terrorist offenses, and with additional protections that limit the universe of individuals who may access it and the duration of retention. Onward transfers of foreign-supplied biometric data to third countries would require the explicit consent of the country from which the data originated.

According to the European Commission version of the negotiating mandate, the EU also seeks to limit DHS retention of transferred personal data to cases of “travelers in respect of whom there is objective evidence from which it may be inferred that there is a continuing risk to public security or public order.” In other words, DHS would not be permitted to store fingerprint data supplied by EU VWP countries on a generalized basis; it could do so only if it has reason to believe that the person would continue to be a threat—a difficult prediction for a security agency to make at the time of the initial border encounter.

The European Data Protection supervisor stated in his opinion that he “largely supports” the proposed approach with the United States. At the same time, he pointed to certain information-sharing constraints the EU would face. Two important EU data repositories prohibit sharing of information with third countries: Eurodac, which contains biometric information on persons who have applied for refugee status in an EU member state or otherwise have migrated irregularly, and ECRIS, which links together member-state records of third country nationals with criminal convictions within the EU. However, the member states themselves regard the exclusive focus of negotiations with the United States on national databases as “without prejudice to any further reflections on the possibility for information exchange with selected third countries from EU databases,” the leaked Council presidency document suggested.

Finally, the EU mandate also seeks the right to an “effective remedy” for persons whose information has been transferred to DHS. This principle, enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, consistently has proven very difficult to resolve in past EU information-sharing agreements with the United States.

Major issues and possible solutions

The existing web of EU-US information-sharing agreements offer valuable precedents for the latest negotiation on access to biometric data for border security purposes. The PCSC agreements, for example, can provide a template for structuring technical interaction between DHS and EU member-state databases. Equally, the types of data protection provisions contained in the law enforcement Umbrella Agreement could be mirrored in the EBSP agreement, even if the former cannot directly be applied to the border security context.

Remedies for misuse of information likely will prove more difficult to resolve. The Data Privacy Framework (DPF), which offers safeguards against illegal US intelligence agency access to personal data transferred from Europe in the commercial context, provides redress in the form of a special tribunal established within the US Department of Justice. Europeans may not petition an ordinary US court if they believe a US intelligence agency has improperly used their data, however. The Court of Justice of the European Union has yet to decide if this specialized form of recourse meets EU fundamental rights standards.

By contrast, the EU did secure US judicial redress for EU citizens whose information is exchanged for law enforcement purposes, under the terms of the EU-US Umbrella Agreement. It took a US statutory change, through the adoption of the Judicial Redress Act, to extend such a right to foreign persons. (The US Privacy Act otherwise limits the right of judicial redress only to US individuals.) Extending this right to Europeans’ whose biometric data is transferred to DHS for the purposes of border security—as opposed to law enforcement—likely would require a further US statutory amendment. Persuading Congress of the necessity of such a change would be challenging.

The necessity and proportionality concept in EU fundamental rights law serves as a legal technique for balancing data protection rights with legitimate public order and public security interests. In the DPF, the United States accepted explicit reference to the EU’s necessity and proportionality standard—in a sensitive context dealing with potential intelligence agency access to personal data. Incorporating this concept in the border biometric information-sharing setting could similarly assure the EU and its member states that DHS is not engaged in mass data collection.

Legal and political dynamics

DHS faces a complex legal situation in pursuing negotiations involving both the EU and its member states. It is consistently difficult for a US government negotiator to be certain where a particular responsibility lies within the EU’s confederal system. In this case, the task is complicated by the cumbersome division of competences for visa and border policy.

In addition, since DHS seeks information for not just border security but also related law enforcement purposes, it must engage with two separate and varying sources of EU data protection law. Data protection rules for immigration control and visa policy are governed by the General Data Protection Regulation, while the rules for protecting law enforcement data fall under a separate directive.

Political factors in Europe also could slow completion of the agreements with the United States. Some members of the European Parliament who belong to the liberal Renew parliamentary group wrote to the European Commission in January, stating: “Looking at the current geopolitical context, we consider it undesirable for the European Commission to start or continue such negotiations.” Although the European Parliament does not have the power to stop the negotiations, it must approve any international agreement that the EU reaches with the United States.

The Trump administration’s removal of Democratic members serving on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PLCOB) and on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have undermined confidence in European privacy circles in US institutions charged with privacy protection. Moreover, DHS’s proposed rule requiring visitors to the United States to supply five years of details on their social media activity has generated widespread outrage abroad. Although this initiative is formally separate from the VWP program, the European public might well conflate the social media and biometric information demands of the United States.

DHS’s goal of wrapping up both the EU framework agreement and, subsequently, the twenty-four implementing agreements with EU member states by the end of 2026, as has been reported, will likely prove overly ambitious. A more achievable ambition would be to complete the EU framework by that date, with the necessary member states implementing agreements afterward. (The leaked Council presidency document sternly states that it considers “Member States’ commitment to refrain from bilateral negotiations with the US while material discussions on the framework are ongoing to be of critical strategic importance.”)

Nevertheless, there is reason for optimism that the US-EU engagement on border security biometric information sharing will yield success. Both sides appear to have entered talks pragmatically, the EU and its member states by agreeing on a sensible division of labor between themselves, and the United States by accepting the practical benefits of negotiating with both Brussels and member-state capitals. Each is impelled by a desire to have greater control of its borders and sees reciprocal information sharing as a promising approach. However, flexibility on both sides will be indispensable to overcoming divergent positions on issues such as remedies.

Further, by winning support in principle for the framework agreement from the EU’s data protection supervisor, the EU already has shown its commitment to achieving a broadly acceptable agreement. Europe’s collective approach to these negotiations also reflects a sober appreciation of power realities. EU citizens value the ease of visa-free travel to the United States, so member states ultimately will do what is necessary to retain VWP status, within the confines of fundamental rights.

Finally, the EU’s decision to take a leading role in the EBSP negotiations reflects its increased institutional maturity and importance in the field of border security. DHS’s willingness to pursue a framework agreement with the EU may show a corresponding recognition of Brussels’ growing role in this area. As popular sentiment has converged in Europe and America on more tightly controlling borders, there is now an opportunity to achieve a balanced transatlantic agreement on sharing information to that end.

about the author

Kenneth Propp is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, an adjunct professor of European Union law at the Georgetown University Law Center, and a senior fellow with the Cross-Border Data Forum. His prior experience includes serving as legal counselor at the US Mission to the European Union in Brussels and in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the US Department of State.

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Toplines: Deterring Putin’s aggression against NATO

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 17:34:22 +0000

Top three

If Vladimir Putin can’t win a clear victory in Ukraine, he will seek one elsewhere; a clear victory in Ukraine would embolden Moscow to further aggression.
Europe must prepare to meet these threats with less American support.
The lowest risk option for Moscow—and therefore the threat Europe needs to prepare for most urgently—is Russian forces occupying Norway’s Svalbard archipelago.

worth a thousand words

Five places where Russia might test NATO resolve through aggression against Alliance territory.

The Diagnosis

The strategic context: The rise of autocratic regimes worldwide poses an alarming challenge to the global community of democracies, leading to an international system marked by instability and increasing fragmentation. Debates over how to approach the threat have divided the community, with traditional alliances and coalitions under increasing strain. Further, the current US administration’s response to these challenges is strikingly different from those of past administrations. Over time, the US presence in Europe is likely to decline, and Europe must rapidly increase its defense capabilities in response.

The threat: Despite its losses in Ukraine, Russia is reconstituting its forces and continues to pose a formidable military threat. The Russian economy has rebounded from 2022’s historic sanctions and looks unlikely to collapse in the near term. Further, there are no political checks within Russia on Putin’s desire to re-establish dominance in Eurasia.

The risk: NATO isn’t ready— militarily, intellectually, diplomatically—to confront Moscow’s determined testing of the Alliance’s resolve. Should Moscow actually seek to enact one of these scenarios, the Alliance is at risk of fracturing–nothing short of a robust Article 5 response from the Alliance would be sufficient to credibly reset allied deterrence against any further provocations against NATO territories by Russia and thereby preserve the alliance itself.

The prescription

expand active and reserve forces to divisional strength
establish a combined Baltic corps with NATO enablers
fortify key terrain and infrastructure
pre-position supplies
rehearse rapid multinational reinforcement to deter or defeat a Russian push toward Kaliningrad.

Bottom lines

By themselves, none of the Nordic or Baltic countries can deter or fend off Russian aggression in any of these five scenarios. At this time, NATO is not postured to do so either. To deter these scenarios, here are the first steps:

Place NATO brigades in the Nordic-Baltic region, as promised at the Madrid summit in 2022.
Create a comprehensive exercise schedule building on or similar to BALTOPS, specifically for Svalbard and Åland, to demonstrate capability to rapidly move in and defend the territory.
Mobilize the NATO alliance and Europe writ large to provide the Baltic states with critical financial assistance beyond what already exists, to a level that has not been forthcoming to date.
Accelerate the preparation of the populations of these countries for the reality of the risk of Russian aggression. While this is primarily a responsibility for the national governments, NATO can and should have a role to play.

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Report

Feb 12, 2026

Putin’s next move? Five Russian attack scenarios Europe must prepare for

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Whether emboldened by victory in Ukraine or motivated by a loss to pursue success elsewhere, Russian president Vladimir Putin is likely to continue his campaign of aggression. The Nordic and Baltic region, already subject to a campaign of intimidation, is in the Kremlin’s crosshairs—with these five places at greatest risk.

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Russia bombs Ukrainian UNESCO site as Putin escalates terror tactics

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 24 Mar 2026 21:35:39 +0000

Russia bombed a UNESCO World Heritage site in the historic heart of west Ukrainian city Lviv on March 24 as Kremlin efforts to target Ukraine’s civilian population continue to escalate. The rare daytime drone strike hit a residential building close to the Bernardine monastery complex, causing extensive damage and leaving two people seriously injured. The area has featured on the UNESCO World Heritage Site List since 1998 as part of Lviv’s historic architectural ensemble.

Ukrainian officials condemned Tuesday’s attack on the bustling downtown district of Lviv and called on the international community to react. “Russia brutally struck the center of Lviv, a city of exceptional cultural value and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. I urge the UNESCO Director General to immediately respond to this crime in the strongest terms,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha. “Russia is doing exactly what the Iranian regime is doing in the Middle East, but in the middle of Europe.”

Video footage of the bombing appears to show a Russian drone flying unimpeded into the building in central Lviv, indicating a targeted airstrike. This was the latest in a series of similar Russian attacks on Ukrainian heritage sites that have fueled accusations of a deliberate campaign to erase the symbols of Ukrainian culture and national identity. In response to these repeated Russian attacks, UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee has already added three Ukrainian sites located in Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa to the UN agency’s official List of World Heritage in Danger.

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Many Ukrainians saw Tuesday’s attention-grabbing airstrike on a non-military target in central Lviv as part of Kremlin efforts to terrorize the civilian population and break Ukrainian society’s will to resist the ongoing Russian invasion. “This is how Russia tries to make normal life impossible,” commented Ukrainian member of parliament Inna Sovsun.

Over the past year, Russian attacks of civilian targets have risen sharply. According to United Nations data, 2025 was the deadliest period for Ukrainian civilians since the initial months of the full-scale invasion, with the number of deaths rising by 31 percent compared to the previous year.

Many of these civilian deaths came as a result of an escalating bombing campaign made possible by the dramatic expansion of Russia’s domestic drone production capacity. Whereas aerial attacks in 2023 and 2024 typically involved dozens of drones, it is now common for Russia to launch hundreds of unmanned bomber drones at targets across Ukraine in a single day. For example, Tuesday’s strike in central Lviv was part of a nationwide attack involving almost one thousand drones over a 24-hour period. The sheer scale of these bombing raids means that Ukrainian air defenses are often overwhelmed.

The recent winter season saw Russia’s most extensive bombing campaign against the Ukrainian civilian population of the entire war, with a coordinated air offensive targeting critical heating and power infrastructure amid Arctic temperatures. This apparent attempt to freeze millions of Ukrainians into submission in their own homes ultimately failed, but it did serve to underline Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin’s readiness to employ terror tactics as he seeks to increase the pressure on the Ukrainian authorities and push Kyiv toward capitulation.

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Moscow’s mounting attacks on Ukrainian civilians have come against a backdrop of growing battlefield frustration for the Kremlin. Despite enjoying the military initiative throughout 2025, Russia managed to seize less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory while suffering catastrophic losses.

This underwhelming military performance has continued in recent months. For the first time in more than two years, Ukraine actually liberated more land during February 2026 than Russia was able to occupy. The Russian army’s inability to achieve a decisive breakthrough is now causing rumblings of discontent on the home front, including among Russia’s vocal pro-war blogger community.

Despite his army’s lack of progress on the battlefield, Putin shows no signs of a willingness to compromise on the maximalist goals of his invasion. Instead, he continues to insist on peace terms that would leave postwar Ukraine isolated, defenseless, and completely at his mercy.

The Russian ruler knows he cannot afford to settle for anything less. After all the sacrifices of the past four years, a negotiated peace that left 80 percent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control and firmly anchored in the Western world would be viewed in Moscow as a defeat of historic proportions.

With no obvious route to military victory in Ukraine, Putin finds himself trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end for fear of weakening his grip on power and tarnishing his place in Russian history. So far, he has responded to this dilemma by increasing attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population.

There is very little evidence to suggest this approach is working. On the contrary, recent polls indicate that the bombardment of civilians has hardened Ukraine’s resolve to fight on rather than accept peace terms dictated by the Kremlin. Nevertheless, Russian attacks on civilians are likely to expand further in the coming months as Putin lacks credible alternatives to revive his faltering invasion.

Russia’s decision to bomb a heritage site in the middle of a major Ukrainian city in broad daylight was a signal of intent that points unmistakably toward a coming escalation. Putin is clearly struggling to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, but he remains committed to extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and is prepared to ruthlessly target the civilian population in order to break the current deadlock and force the country’s surrender. Tuesday’s attack on a UNESCO site in the heart of Lviv sent a chilling message that nobody and nowhere in Ukraine is safe.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Lukashenka’s decision to release 250 detainees was widely welcomed. Many of those freed had been in prison since the crackdown that gripped Belarus following the country’s 2020 presidential election, which sparked unprecedented nationwide protests amid allegations of massive voter fraud. The released prisoners included Valiantsin Stefanovich and Marfa Rabkova of Belarusian human rights group Viasna, along with journalist Katsyaryna Andreyeva.

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Under President Trump, the United States has sought a thaw with Minsk. These efforts have so far led to the release of hundreds of political prisoners and an easing of US sanctions against Belarus.

Increased engagement between the US and Belarus represents a significant change in strategy following years of growing tensions between Minsk and Western capitals. Western governments have expressed alarm over Lukashenka’s repressive domestic policies, along with his involvement in Putin’s hybrid war against Europe and his complicity in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Trump administration initiative to reengage with Lukashenka has brought clear humanitarian benefits and has had a life-changing impact on released prisoners along with their families. Nevertheless, concerns remain that the current US approach risks creating incentives for the Belarusian authorities to imprison more domestic opponents.

Despite a number of large-scale releases over the past year, human rights groups claim there are still almost one thousand political prisoners in Belarus, with new names regularly being added to the list as arrests continue. Activists have likened this process to a “revolving door” of repression, with new political prisoners regularly detained as others are pardoned and released.

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Beyond the humanitarian dimension, the US diplomatic outreach to Minsk is seen as an attempt to counter Lukashenka’s near complete dependence on Moscow. Since the 2020 protest movement that almost ousted the Belarus dictator, he has been heavily reliant on Russia for his political survival. In exchange for its support, the Kremlin has sought to expand its grip on neighboring Belarus. This has led to what some have labeled as a “creeping annexation.”

Trump has sought to restart dialogue with Minsk against a backdrop of faltering US-led peace efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine War. So far, however, there is little indication that Lukashenka may be prepared to downgrade his backing for Putin’s invasion or offer any assistance to advance negotiations.

The Belarusian ruler has been a key Russian ally throughout the invasion. This support has included allowing Putin to use Belarus as a gateway for Russia’s initial attempt to seize Kyiv in 2022. More recently, Lukashenka has agreed to host Russian nuclear weapons. He is also accused of aiding Moscow’s drone attacks on Ukraine and partnering with China to produce ammunition for the Russian army.

Lukashenka may now be on track to join Putin among the criminal suspects wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. On March 12, the ICC officially opened an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed by Lukashenka and his security apparatus against political opponents. In March 2023, the ICC issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest in connection with his alleged involvement in the large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children.

The latest Belarusian prisoner releases are an indication of improving relations between Washington and Minsk. However, it remains to be seen whether the benefits of this diplomatic outreach will extend beyond humanitarian goals and lead to broader gains in the security sphere. Lukshenka is no doubt ready to offer more pardons in exchange for economic incentives, but he has yet to demonstrate a willingness to decrease domestic repression or distance himself from the Kremlin.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Could Russia use fake separatists to destabilize Estonia and discredit NATO?

James Rice — Tue, 24 Mar 2026 20:31:17 +0000

In recent weeks, references to a pro-Russian separatist movement in neighboring Estonia have begun appearing with increasing frequency on social media. The so-called “Narva People’s Republic” clearly echoes the “People’s Republics” established by the Kremlin in eastern Ukraine during the early stages of Russia’s invasion in spring 2014. However, not everyone is convinced that this virtual movement is worthy of serious attention.

Estonia’s Internal Security Service, which has earned considerable respect in recent years for a string of high-profile counterintelligence successes, has dismissed the “Narva People’s Republic” initiative as an information operation. Meanwhile, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service doubts any direct Russian government involvement.

A journalist from the Estonian newspaper Postimees recently managed to infiltrate a Telegram chat group and expose the “Narva People’s Republic” as a tiny operation being run by someone likely outside Estonia with apparent ties to St. Petersburg. Given the small scale of the campaign, there is a lively debate in Estonia and across social media over whether highlighting it is a sensible precautionary measure or counterproductive.

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Many have inevitably drawn comparisons with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the role played by fake separatist movements created by the Kremlin to justify Moscow’s expansionist agenda in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. When separatist propaganda about “People’s Republics” first began appearing in Ukraine in the years prior to the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, it was not initially taken seriously.

Recent references to a “Narva People’s Republic” appear to refer to the entire Ida-Viru County in northeastern Estonia rather than the city of Narva alone. Like Ukraine’s Donbas, Ida-Viru County was subject to an extended period of russification. During the Soviet occupation following World War II, large numbers of Russian-speakers from various parts of the Soviet Union were settled in Narva and in newly built Soviet industrial cities in the region.

With a current population that remains dominated by Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians, this would seem to make Ida-Viru County ripe for the Kremlin’s influence operations and grievance politics. However, the Estonian government has invested significantly in the region’s economic development and cultural integration.

Also, the fact that many residents of Estonia’s northeast have family links to Russia means they are well aware that they currently enjoy a far better standard of living than most people across the Narva River in the Russian Federation. With Estonia, like Ukraine, one must avoid the fallacy of conflating language with loyalty.

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The fact that a grassroots separatist movement is unlikely to develop in Ida-Viru County will not necessarily prevent Russia from using the separatist narrative to advance its agenda. When efforts to cultivate a local separatist movement in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine proved insufficient in 2014, the Kremlin sent in Russian citizens and military personnel without insignia. Soon after, they were followed by an undeclared invasion force.

Russia’s goal in Estonia might not be military conquest. It is often suggested that Moscow could aim to test NATO’s collective security commitments and discredit the alliance by launching a relatively minor incursion and claiming a small chunk of Estonian territory on the pretext of protecting compatriots. This would be much easier said than done, however, given Estonia’s heavily monitored border, where even the smallest infraction is noticed quickly. In such a case, Estonia would not wait for NATO to respond.

Estonian officials can be prickly about any portrayal of their country as particularly vulnerable or overly reliant on others for security. Since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, there have been endless articles asking “is Narva next?” This framing has been met with strong push back from Estonian security experts.

Similarly, war games exercises resulting in a quick Russian takeover of the Baltic region have been criticized by Estonian officials as lacking understanding of the Baltic states’ own security posture to the point of being insulting. In common with nearby Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania, Estonia employs a whole of society “total defense” concept that should not be underestimated.

Due to the enormous losses it is sustaining in Ukraine, Russia’s military is currently thought to be in no position to launch an invasion of Estonia. In its annual report for 2026, Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, while clear-eyed about the Kremlin’s expansionist ambitions, assessed that Russia has no intention of militarily attacking Estonia or any other NATO member state in the present year, or likely the next.

It is no wonder that Estonia’s foreign and defense policy has been focused on marshaling support for Ukraine as it confronts Russian aggression. It is also easy to understand why elements in Russia would like to create the impression of a looming threat to Estonia. So far, Estonia’s reaction to social media chatter about a supposed separatist movement has been typically phlegmatic. As this narrative has drawn media attention, we can expect to see it pushed further and recycled. Estonia’s NATO allies should follow Tallinn’s lead and react by remaining alert but calm.

James Rice is a doctoral student at the Institute of World Politics and former legislative director for US Senator Chuck Grassley.

And at the heart of Europe, literally, there is a gap. The Western Balkans remain outside the EU family, trapped in a waiting room with no clear exit. Young people are leaving. Trust is eroding. Professor Tsarouhas is unambiguous: the process must be transparent and meritocratic, and if countries in the region are doing the work, Europe has no excuse to keep them waiting. The goal must be full EU membership, nothing less.

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What Romania’s role in the Iran war reveals about its diplomatic positioning

Alex Șerban, Kirsten Fontenrose — Mon, 23 Mar 2026 18:55:38 +0000

BUCHAREST and WASHINGTON—Recent diplomatic tensions involving Iran and Romania reveal more than a temporary geopolitical episode. They illustrate the increasingly complex strategic environment facing NATO allies on Europe’s eastern flank. Romania’s decision to authorize additional US military capabilities on its territory reflects a long-standing commitment to the transatlantic alliance. But it also highlights the delicate balancing act Bucharest must perform: reinforcing its strategic partnership with Washington while maintaining cohesion with European partners that are navigating a more uncertain transatlantic relationship.

The developments began when the United States requested temporary access to Romanian military infrastructure to support operations in the Middle East. Romania’s Supreme Council of National Defense approved the US request to deploy several capabilities, including aerial refueling aircraft and satellite communication systems serving a defensive role. Romania’s Parliament then endorsed the decision, reaffirming the legal framework that governs US access to Romanian bases under bilateral agreements and NATO commitments.

Soon after the approval, the first visible signs of this deployment appeared. According to Romanian media reports, three US Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft landed at the 90th Air Base near Otopeni. While these aircraft are not combat platforms, they are among the most critical enablers of modern air operations. By allowing fighter jets and surveillance aircraft to refuel midair, tanker aircraft extend operational range and endurance, effectively expanding the geographic reach of allied airpower. Their presence in Romania strengthens the logistical backbone supporting US and NATO operations across multiple theaters.

Iran’s reaction followed quickly. A spokesperson for the Iranian foreign ministry warned that allowing US forces to operate from Romanian territory could be interpreted as participation in military aggression. Bucharest responded to Tehran’s threats with notable restraint. Romanian officials emphasized that the country is not involved in any conflict with Iran and reiterated that the deployment of US assets is defensive and conducted under existing bilateral agreements. The Romanian foreign ministry also stressed that the missile defense infrastructure hosted by Romania serves purely defensive purposes and operates within NATO’s collective security framework.

When Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei warned that hosting US aerial refueling tankers would make Romania a participant in military aggression, he was not making a legal argument so much as a threat intended to deter US partners. Tehran’s objective is to ensure that each US partner—including Romania, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom—concludes that the risk is not worth bearing alone and quietly declines. If enough partners hesitate, then the coalition Washington is trying to consolidate never fully materializes, improving Iran’s strategic position without requiring direct military confrontation.

Iran has pressed Gulf states and European partners separately, issuing warnings calibrated to each country—threatening Gulf states with strikes on energy infrastructure while warning European governments of legal consequences and damage to bilateral ties. The logic is consistent: Make the cost of cooperation feel personal and isolating, in the hope that no partner feels confident enough in collective backing to hold firm. The approach works when partners deliberate alone; it is far less effective when they coordinate openly and signal unity.

Romania has strong grounds to hold firm on its position. The 2005 US-Romania Defense Cooperation Agreement established the framework for US military access to multiple joint-use facilities, including the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base. Together with the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and the 2011 Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century, this creates a comprehensive legal basis for US operations on Romanian soil—one that has been ratified by the Parliament and upheld consistently for two decades. Iran’s invocation of potential damage to bilateral relations underscores the limits of its leverage. Romania-Iran ties are sufficiently limited that their deterioration carries minimal strategic cost for Bucharest.

The energy dimension reinforces this asymmetry. Iran does not export natural gas to Romania and has no infrastructure or contractual mechanism through which it could exert pressure. Meanwhile, Romania’s energy sector is expanding, positioning it to become a major European gas producer. Tehran therefore lacks meaningful economic leverage over Bucharest in the energy domain.

On the military side, Romania has approved the deployment of support assets rather than strike capabilities. After weeks of sustained military pressure on Iranian infrastructure, Tehran’s ability to project force into southeastern Europe is constrained, though not eliminated. More importantly, US forces are present on Romanian territory. Any direct attack on facilities such as the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base would involve US personnel, raising the stakes significantly and triggering a bilateral response that would not depend on full NATO consensus.

However, Iran has a documented history of covert operations across Europe, and Romania’s role as a host for US forces increases its exposure to malign activities. While real, this threat remains limited by Iran’s current operational constraints and the escalation risks associated with targeting a NATO member hosting US troops.

That said, Romania’s position also brings into focus one of NATO’s most sensitive strategic assets: the ballistic missile defense installation at Deveselu. Operational since 2016, the Aegis Ashore system forms part of NATO’s broader missile defense architecture designed to intercept ballistic threats originating outside the Euro-Atlantic area. While the system is purely defensive, its presence places Romania at the center of ongoing geopolitical debates and makes it a frequent target of criticism from both Russia and Iran.

Asked about Iran’s warnings on March 19, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte emphasized Alliance unity, stating that “Romania is safe; we will defend every centimeter of allied territory,” while highlighting Romania’s key role in strengthening security on the eastern flank. This reassurance reflects the broader strategic importance of Romania within NATO’s deterrence posture, particularly in the Black Sea region.

Even more recent developments—including Iran firing missiles toward the Diego Garcia military base and threatening to attack power generation across the Gulf—point to the regime’s willingness and capability to strike beyond its immediate neighborhood. In recent days, several European countries have put their security services on heightened alert. Reports by the Romanian news site HotNews that Iran may be activating operational networks in Europe have increased the relevance of NATO’s missile defense shield. The Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu increasingly represents not only a defensive buffer but a front line in the protection of major European capitals against evolving ballistic threats.

At the same time, the episode highlights a broader debate within the Alliance. While Romania continues to rely heavily on the United States as the cornerstone of its security guarantees, discussions in Europe increasingly emphasize strategic autonomy. Proposals such as expanding France’s nuclear deterrence to cover European allies reflect concerns about the long-term reliability of US security commitments. Romania’s response has been cautious: open to deeper European cooperation but firmly committed to NATO as the central pillar of deterrence.

Meanwhile, the current tensions among NATO allies over the Iran war may ultimately strengthen allied cohesion despite short-term turbulence. As Iulian Chifu, a former advisor to the president of Romania on strategic affairs, put it, the war has “exposed the limits of unilateral action, forcing the United States to rediscover the strategic necessity of allied coordination and reinforcing NATO as the central framework for collective security.”

Navigating this environment requires careful diplomacy. Romania’s challenge is not to choose between Washington and its European partners, but to reinforce both pillars simultaneously. Clear coordination and collective messaging among allies will be essential to counter efforts to fragment the coalition. In an era of intensifying geopolitical competition and evolving transatlantic dynamics, Romania’s ability to maintain that balance may prove to be one of its most important strategic contributions to the Alliance.

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The Strait of Hormuz crisis will ripple across plastics and food supply chains, helping Beijing and Moscow, hurting Americans

Joseph Webster and Kate Burnett — Mon, 23 Mar 2026 15:12:26 +0000

Every day that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed brings the world economy closer to a crisis. While the closure has acutely affected oil and gas supplies and prices, it could soon send convulsions through supply chains for other commodities, such as plastics and fertilizers, that are foundational to the global economy and food supplies. This cascade of effects could strengthen China and Russia’s geopolitical influence over impacted supply chains, while hurting consumers around the world, including in the United States. If the Strait of Hormuz closure persists for even a few more months, it could become the single-largest and most consequential energy and supply chain disruption in modern history, all but ensuring a global period of stagflation.

The geopolitical fallout: China and Russia could gain leverage in petrochemicals and fertilizers

Amid outages in the petrochemical complex across ex-China Asia and the Middle East, the crisis could enable Beijing to establish new chokepoints over the near-term or more enduringly. Similarly, Beijing’s close partners in Moscow and Minsk will become more powerful across food supply chains.

Petrochemicals, the feedstock for plastics and other products

The direct and second-order consequences of a Strait of Hormuz closure could reverberate through petrochemical markets with major economic and geopolitical implications. In the upstream segment, the Middle East normally supplies about 30 percent of global seaborne exports of liquefied petroleum gas, which can be used for petrochemicals feedstock. Drewry analyst Anshika Prajapati estimates that prolonged closure of the Strait would reduce 24 percent of global seaborne naphtha, another key petrochemical input. These exports are now largely cut off from global markets.

In addition to the upstream outage, downstream facilities in East Asia could face closure due to insufficient electricity, while Middle East petrochemical export facilities are facing massive disruptions. South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan hold significant petrochemical export capacity. But petrochemical plants are highly electricity-intensive, and powering the electricity grids of these East Asian democracies relies heavily on a now severely constricted liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. Accordingly, if Middle East LNG production outages force these countries to ration electricity, they could choose to curtail certain petrochemical products in favor of higher priority use cases for LNG, such as air conditioning or the manufacturing of semiconductors or high bandwidth memory for artificial intelligence (AI) supply chains.

Conversely, while the oil and gas shortage could harm already-suffering South Korean, Taiwanese, and Japanese petrochemicals industries, it could help Chinese companies consolidate parts of the supply chain. While the profitability of Chinese petrochemical firms could take a short-term hit, they have access to abundant electricity—and China’s partner, Russia, is a major supplier of its petrochemicals feedstock, including naphtha, an ingredient that Asian petrochemical companies are scrambling to obtain. In the wake of the crisis, South Korean petrochemical producers are cutting run rates by up to 50 percent; impacts in Japan are also severe, as about 42 percent of its naphtha supply comes from the Middle East. Thus, the Middle East crisis and its ripple effects could ultimately see the petrochemical sector concentrate in China, giving Beijing yet another leverage point over global supply chains. For example, China, which shifted from a net importer of global polyvinyl chloride (PVC) to a net exporter, now accounts for 78 percent of global incremental PVC capacity additions. Chinese PVC producers largely use a coal-based process that requires no imported oil or naphtha, while top producers in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea are already cutting output over fears of losing feedstock and electricity. Therefore, while Chinese petrochemical producers will be hit by the crisis, they could yet emerge on top.

The United States, whose shale-based petrochemical producers are insulated from the Hormuz disruption, will likely gain market share if prices spike. Nevertheless, certain nodes of the global petrochemical supply chain could be concentrated in China if the crisis persists, and as the allied industrial base is degraded.

If global petrochemical constraints persist due to upstream supply issues and petrochemical closures, consumer prices will rise, or even soar. US consumers will be disproportionately impacted, as the average US resident used 255 kilograms of new plastics in 2019, versus a world average of 60.1 kilograms.

Fertilizers and food prices

Not only has the Strait of Hormuz closure interrupted global energy trade, but it has also suspended the movement of fertilizer representing roughly 30 percent of globally traded ammonia-based nitrogen fertilizer that is vital before planting season. While the United States is one of the largest fertilizer producers, it relies on ammonia imports to lower costs and meet demand; it has previously relied on imports for roughly half of domestic urea use. Although US ammonia imports do not primarily route through the Strait of Hormuz, the closure constricts global supply, driving up prices that US markets cannot escape. Fertilizer supplies are already significantly lower than normal, and prices are surging. The cost of urea at the import hub in New Orleans rose 32 percent in just one week, from $516 to $683 per metric ton.

The United States will feel the economic impact of rising input costs on multiple fronts. When the cost of producing crops increases, farmers and food processors will pass those expenses through the supply chain, directly increasing the final price consumers pay for goods. Farmers may also be less incentivized to grow nitrogen-intensive crops, such as corn. This could also have cost implications for livestock feed, and thus meat and dairy products for consumers.

Disrupted fertilizer supply chains hold important geopolitical consequences. China, the second largest fertilizer exporter, is shielding its farmers and consumers from price shocks by constricting sales abroad, for now. As China withholds fertilizer exports, countries that previously sourced from Chinese and Middle Eastern suppliers will scramble for alternatives, further tightening global markets.

In the near term, Russia and Belarus are well-positioned to fill any gap left behind. Russia remains the world’s largest exporter of fertilizer, and Belarus is a major agricultural player in potash, a nutrient used for fertilizer. If Russia and Belarus face no export constraints, they are well-placed to exercise greater influence across global fertilizer markets.

China largely uses domestically-sourced coal as feedstock for ammonia and fertilizer production, so its output will not be directly constrained by a Strait of Hormuz closure. Over the medium term, Beijing may selectively step back into export markets if the geopolitical and commercial benefits outweigh domestic food security risks.

If global supply chain outages persist, Beijing, Moscow, and Minsk may cooperate more closely on global fertilizer distribution.

The economic fallout: A long-duration Strait of Hormuz closure will bring waves of economic pain

This analysis is not comprehensive: as during COVID, many acute supply chain vulnerabilities will only reveal themselves with time. However, this analysis on key commodities does reveal that outages in the Strait of Hormuz will quickly translate into waves of economic pain.

The first two waves will crest in the form of higher refined product prices. This is already happening: jet fuel has low storage inventories and is therefore sensitive to supply outages. Accordingly, jet fuel and air ticket prices are soaring, especially in Asia. The rest of the world will quickly follow. Other refined products, such as diesel and gasoline, will be in the next wave.

The third wave of price increases will ripple throughout the US and global economy in the form of higher agricultural prices. As ammonia, fertilizer, and diesel input prices rise, farmers will plant less and crop yields will fall, sending consumer food prices higher. If Beijing, in partnership with Moscow and Minsk, selectively restricts agricultural-related exports, then US and global inflation will run higher.

The next inflation wave may be less visible, but more insidious. Food packaging, medical supplies, clothing, and virtually every manufactured good rely on petrochemicals in some way. Accordingly, petrochemical outages in the Asian democracies would trigger broad-based price increases in the United States. If China imposes export controls on certain petrochemical products (just as it does for critical minerals), US inflation will likely run higher.

Finally, the combination of these waves, along with other latent vulnerabilities, may trigger broad-based, sustained price increases. In turn, the commodity price spike may shape longer-term inflation expectations for consumers. If the Federal Reserve loses its hard-won credibility on containing prices, consumer inflation expectations will rise. All else being equal, this would lift inflation and real interest rates.

Every day the Strait is closed brings higher prices and new risks for the United States and its allies. As allied industrial capacity tightens, especially in petrochemicals and fertilizers, China and Russia will increasingly be able to secure new geopolitical leverage across global supply chains. Every day the war continues gives them more cards to play.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report.

Kate Burnett is a young global professional at the Global Energy Center.

This analysis reflects their own personal opinions.

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Your primer on Denmark’s snap parliamentary elections

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 18:54:08 +0000

Danes will head to the polls on March 24 for snap parliamentary elections to choose 179 members of the Folketing, Denmark’s unicameral national parliament. After underperforming in local elections last November, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s Social Democrats party seeks to regain national support over its handling of the dispute with the United States surrounding Greenland’s sovereignty.

Ahead of the election, experts from the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center answer the most pressing questions about what the results could mean for the country’s domestic and international priorities during a time of strained transatlantic relations.

How did we get here?

Why did Frederiksen call elections now?

In the months following historic losses for Social Democrats during local elections in November, Frederiksen strategically navigated heightened tensions with the Trump administration over Greenland’s sovereignty. In the aftermath of this confrontation, polls indicated that Frederiksen had boosted support for the Social Democrats across the country. With national polling indicating that the party could secure around 21 percent of the vote—a 3 percent increase from December—Frederiksen called the elections for March 24 to capitalize on this renewed political support and strengthen the Social Democrats’ coalition prospects.

—Jeremy Schaefer is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

What challenges will the next Danish government face in managing strategic relations with the United States?

Denmark countered Trump’s latest effort to seize Greenland through a combination of steadfastness, determination, and calm that, remarkably, underscored its continued commitment to transatlanticism. Critical to that success was Copenhagen’s effectiveness in forging and sustaining a robust coalition of NATO allies that firmly and publicly stood by its side.

Going forward, however, Denmark should not assume that this issue has been settled. As my colleague Dan Fried has said, it is, at best, in a state of remission. To keep it that way, Denmark must continue delivering on its tradition as a committed NATO ally, rapidly fulfill its commitment to increase defense spending to meet the Alliance’s agreed standard of 5 percent of each country’s gross domestic product, and direct a robust portion of that defense spending to reinforcing the military capabilities necessary for Arctic operations. And it should continue advocating and facilitating increased NATO operational presence in the High North—including Greenland. Its presence is justified by the growing geopolitical importance of the High North and the challenges to that region posed by both Russia and China.

—Ian Brzezinksi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO Policy.

How will the crisis over Greenland impact voters’ attitude toward the government?

Frederiksen’s unwavering defense of the Denmark and Greenland’s territorial integrity generated a “rally ’round the flag” effect, boosting public support for the governing coalition and redirecting the political conversation away from other domestic concerns, including the rising cost of housing. Danish voters were reminded of the importance of steady leadership, especially when Denmark must simultaneously manage relations with a major ally and protect its national interests. Looking ahead, it appears that Frederiksen’s recent spotlight on the international stage may win her party additional seats in the Folketing. However, if voters’ support has weakened as the crisis has cooled in recent weeks, the Danes may find themselves in a similar position to the one they are in now: led by a centrist government with leaders from across the ideological spectrum.

—Jeremy Schaefer is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

How has public sentiment in Denmark toward the United States evolved, and how is this impacting Danish policy toward Washington?

Danes generally were appalled and angered by the Trump administration’s threats to seize Greenland through intimidation or force. Rather than submit, as tensions reached a peak in January, the Danish government sent troops to Greenland and prepared to fight against a US invasion. Danish officials I spoke with explained in private that they did not expect they could withstand a determined US assault but would nevertheless fight rather than submit. That determination, political backing from Europe, and opposition within the United States to the prospect of US aggression against a long-standing ally seemed to have convinced Trump to back down.

The damage to US-Danish relations was severe. Sixty percent of Danes consider the United States to be an adversary while only 17 percent consider it to be an ally, an unfortunate but understandable reaction.

Nevertheless, the Danish government has kept its head. On March 17, as the United States was putting pressure on allies to contribute to efforts to open the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has closed in response to US and Israeli attacks, Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen urged Europe to consider such efforts. He made his case in terms of European interests rather than rejecting US demands out of hand. This response serves as a model of cool-headed thinking rather than playing to understandable emotions, and sets a good example that many leaders, including those in the United States, could learn from.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

What Rob Jetten’s new minority government means for Dutch and European defense

By Elmar Hellendoorn

The new Dutch prime minister and his minority coalition face the most significant geopolitical realignment in Europe in decades.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

Dispatches Mar 2, 2026

Willkommen to Germany’s ‘super election year.’ Here’s what to expect.

By Phyllis Berry

A series of state elections between March and September could see gains by the far-right Alternative for Germany, further challenging Germany’s centrist parties.

Elections Germany

Dispatches Jan 22, 2026

Trump may move on from Greenland. Europe won’t.

By Jörn Fleck, James Batchik

Trump’s willingness to engage in brinkmanship with Europe over Greenland will have a lasting impact on how the continent’s leaders approach relations with Washington.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

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Oil waivers risk sustaining Russia’s war effort amid the Iran war

Linas Kojala, Vytautas Leškevičius — Fri, 20 Mar 2026 18:21:39 +0000

VILNIUS—On March 12, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that the Trump administration would ease some US sanctions on Russian crude oil. The Treasury Department issued a general license allowing the purchase and delivery of otherwise sanctioned Russian oil already loaded on vessels as of March 12, and it will apply until April 11. In doing so, the Trump administration has made it easier for Moscow to keep barrels moving at a moment when the war in the Middle East has pushed oil markets into turmoil. Bessent described the move as “narrowly tailored” and “short-term.” But it is still sanctions relief for Russian oil.

This announcement did not come out of nowhere. On March 5, the White House first gave India a thirty-day waiver allowing it to buy Russian oil already at sea. It has now widened that relief to other cargoes loaded before the new cut-off. The aim is to get more supply onto the market fast and limit the shock from the Iran war on global energy markets.

That matters because in oil markets, signaling is often nearly as important as regulation. Once the United States shows flexibility, traders, insurers, and refiners start recalculating risk. Indian refiners have responded quickly, buying at least twenty million barrels of Russian oil since being granted the first waiver.

Make no mistake, the United States loosening its sanctions helps Russia, which is looking for additional funds to finance its war on Ukraine. Before the recent decision, economic pressure on Moscow was biting. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies calculated that Russia’s 2025 oil and gas federal budget revenues fell to 8.5 trillion roubles, or about $101.4 billion, accounting for only 23 percent of total federal revenues, the lowest share in roughly two decades. Most of the revenue was oil-related.

Make no mistake, the United States loosening its sanctions helps Russia, which is looking for additional funds to finance its war on Ukraine.

In fact, Russia’s overall budget picture was worse than Moscow admitted. Officially, Russia said its 2025 federal deficit was 2.6 percent of gross domestic product. Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service, the BND, put the real figure closer to 3.6 percent. And this year looked worse still for Russia’s economy. Its oil and gas revenues halved year-on-year in January to 393.3 billion roubles. In February, according to the International Energy Agency, Russia’s oil and fuel export revenues fell to the lowest level since the start of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions were constraining Russia’s current cash flow, which is essential for its war effort.

The Iran war has changed the equation. Brent crude was trading above $100 a barrel on March 13 and headed for roughly a 9 percent weekly gain despite the US waiver. Russia is benefiting both from the higher oil prices and from the US sanctions waiver, which lowers the commercial risk of Moscow’s energy exports. Russia does not need a full rollback of sanctions to feel relief. It only needs a short-term mix of firmer prices, more willing buyers, and less fear among intermediaries.

Temporary emergency measures to stop an oil panic are understandable. But they must remain exactly that—temporary, narrow, and clearly tied to cargoes already afloat. Turning them into a broader easing of sanctions would reward Russia just as financial pressure was beginning to constrain its room for maneuver in its war against Ukraine. The International Monetary Fund forecasts Russia’s 2026 economic growth at just 0.8 percent, with the fiscal deficit staying elevated because of weaker export revenues. That pressure should be maintained, not diluted.

The danger is not confined to Washington. Once the United States starts loosening the screws, some Europeans will argue that Brussels should do the same. That pressure is already visible. The European Union (EU) is looking into emergency options to contain energy prices, even as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has warned that returning to Russian energy would be a “strategic blunder.” Hungary and Slovakia are already testing how far they can push on sanctions, demanding, inter alia, Ukraine renew the flow of oil through the damaged Druzhba pipeline. Because EU sanctions require unanimity among member states, even a limited US waiver might shift the political calculus in Europe. That is why any relief for Russian oil must remain short-term and exceptional. Otherwise, it will make it easier for Europe’s weakest links to argue for a broader review of sanctions on Russia.

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 20:14:13 +0000

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine recently entered a fifth year and has now been underway for longer than the entire cataclysmic conflict between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during World War II.

This historical comparison does not flatter Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has turned veneration of the fight against Hitler into an unofficial state religion. While Red Army troops played a key role in the Nazi defeat and managed to advance thousands of kilometers from Stalingrad to Berlin, today’s Russian army is in many cases still stuck within walking distance of their positions when the invasion first began in February 2022.

Despite this lack of progress on the battlefield, Putin has so far demonstrated zero interest a compromise peace. Instead, he continues to insist on maximalist demands during negotiations that would destroy Ukraine as an independent state and as a separate nation.

This uncompromising stance makes perfect sense when viewed from Putin’s perspective. After all, the invasion he unleashed in 2022 has cost countless Russian lives and plunged the country into a new Cold War. Putin knows that only total victory can justify these sacrifices.

If Putin accepted the peace terms currently on offer, this would leave around 80 percent of Ukraine free and beyond Kremlin control. Most Russians would regard that as a disastrous defeat. Putin’s dreams of entering Russian history alongside Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Stalin would be shattered. Instead, he would be condemned as the man who lost Ukraine.

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In a very real sense, Putin is caught in a trap of his own making and has no real choice but to fight on. At the same time, however, it would be wrong to suggest that the Kremlin dictator is merely seeking to postpone the inevitable. On the contrary, he remains convinced that the goals of the invasion are still achievable and is now counting on Western disunity to hand him victory in Ukraine.

Putin’s low opinion of the democratic world is based on personal experience. Time and again throughout his reign, Russia’s aggressive actions have sparked vocal condemnation from Western capitals followed with indecent haste by calls for a return to dialogue and “business as usual.”

Western leaders loudly condemned Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, but were soon queuing up to reset relations with the Kremlin. The same lack of resolve was on display following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, with minimal costs imposed on Moscow and multiple European countries actually increasing their dependence on Russian energy exports.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Putin treats the proclamations of his Western counterparts with thinly veiled contempt. While he has been unpleasantly surprised since 2022 by the scale of support for Ukraine, the Russian leader’s own dealings with his Western counterparts have encouraged him to conclude that this unity will prove temporary. As the war grinds into a fifth year with no end in sight, Putin believes he can ultimately outlast the West.

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Shifts within the Western alliance over the past year are fueling confidence in Moscow that current levels of support for Ukraine will not last forever. Since returning to the White House in January 2025, US President Donald Trump has cut military aid to Ukraine and sought to reposition the United States as an intermediary in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

This has placed the burden of supporting the Ukrainian war effort firmly on Europe. According to recent Kiel Institute data, Ukraine’s European partners have done a good job of filling this gap. However, the majority of aid is now coming from a relatively small group of nations including Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain. This places Ukraine’s war effort on fragile foundations.

Meanwhile, a ninety billion euro financing package agreed by EU leaders remains blocked by Hungary. This is part of long-term pattern that has seen Hungary’s pro-Kremlin Prime Minister Viktor Orban repeatedly obstruct or delay efforts by the European Union to strengthen Ukraine or increase pressure on Putin.

With far-right populist parties currently riding high in the polls throughout Europe, Putin also has good cause for optimism over the possible imminent appearance of more Orban-style allies. This could help the Kremlin in its efforts to divide and weaken Europe from within.

Broader geopolitical developments are also placing new strains on Western unity and threatening to undermine backing for Ukraine. The US-Israeli joint operation against Iran is currently causing unprecedented tension among NATO allies, with European countries reluctant to participate in efforts to safeguard the Strait of Hormuz. This has highlighted a growing transatlantic divide that could seriously weaken Ukraine’s position.

Putin cannot risk a compromise peace in Ukraine, but he remains confident that time is on his side. While the Russian army has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, Putin is prepared to wait until Western disunity leaves the Ukrainians stripped of support and at his mercy. While this would not mean an immediate end to the carnage, Putin believes a dramatic decline in Western support would finally allow Russia to pummel an exposed and abandoned Ukraine into submission.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Kaluderovic in Foreign Policy: The drone attrition tap

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 20:12:51 +0000

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Kaluderovic in Fox News: Trump’s strike on Iran deals a major blow to Putin’s war machine in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 20:09:30 +0000

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Gongadze in Ukrainska Pravda: “Europe at war.” Friends of Europe’s warning shot

Atlantic Council — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 19:17:13 +0000

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Wartime Ukraine offers global lessons on the future of cyber resilience

Oleksandr Bakalynskyi, Maggie McDonough — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 17:58:46 +0000

The twelve years of cyber warfare that have accompanied Russia’s escalating invasion of Ukraine have transformed the country’s digital environment into a proving ground for modern conflict. Persistent cyber attacks against government systems, critical infrastructure, energy networks, media outlets, and the financial sector have become a defining feature of Ukraine’s wartime reality. Amid this sustained pressure, Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to defend itself and has developed a degree of cyber resilience that is now embedded in the digital state.

Russian aggression in the cyber sphere has forced Ukraine into rapid and often improvised defense. Coordination mechanisms have emerged across government agencies, volunteer networks, and private sector IT firms, with operational responses conducted under constant pressure. Permanent mobilization, however, is not sustainable. Instead, the goal is to codify the next phase of reform in Ukraine’s evolving cyber security strategy.

For Ukraine, the strategic objective is no longer limited to repelling cyber attacks. It is to ensure continuity of state functions even when attacks succeed. This requires a national cyber resilience framework that encompasses government, business, and civil society. It demands continuous professional training along with strengthened legislative and risk management frameworks. It also implies a culture of cyber hygiene at the citizen level. Together, these measures represent a shift from episodic defense to durable digital statehood.

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Ukraine’s experience over the past twelve years underscores a central truth of cyber defense: People play a decisive role in cyber security. Since 2014, thousands of professionals from the private sector, volunteer networks, and academia have mobilized to defend Ukraine’s digital front. Sustaining this momentum requires institutional support and a long-term talent strategy.

Priority areas include integrating cyber education across schools, universities, and military institutions. Partnerships between industry and academia should undergo expansion through education and internships. Workforce development is not merely a labor market issue; it is a pillar of cyber sovereignty and continuity of government. It is also crucial to establish a national cyber reserve supported by access to cyber ranges and allied training platforms.

Wartime conditions have already accelerated innovation in Ukraine. Cloud-based backups, relocation of critical data to secure environments abroad, and decentralized platforms for citizen services are now routine. These practices must be institutionalized to endure beyond the war. Priorities include embedding innovations into permanent government processes and establishing applied cyber research centers at universities.

The convergence of academia, defense institutions, and the technology sector in wartime Ukraine is enabling a distinct national cyber security model to emerge rooted in operational experience and continuous adaptation. It is a model that complements existing frameworks while reflecting Ukraine’s realities. As a result, Ukraine has become an integral actor within the Euro-Atlantic cyber ecosystem.

At the international level, cooperation with the EU, NATO, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan has evolved from ad hoc assistance to structured partnerships. Core focuses include joint threat intelligence-sharing mechanisms; harmonization with EU and NATO standards; participation in multinational exercises; and the development of a shared resilience space in which national resilience contributes to collective defense. Ukraine’s expertise positions it not only as a recipient of assistance, but increasingly as an exporter of operational resilience models to partners confronting hybrid threats.

Ukraine’s progress demonstrates the importance of embedding cyber resilience in institutional architecture rather than treating it as a reactive function. A resilience-by-design model entails distributed system architecture to reduce single points of failure. It requires adoption of open standards and transparent protocols, along with continuous training and simulations embedded in institutional life cycles.

Psychological resilience training for cyber professionals operating under sustained pressure and information warfare conditions is also crucial. This should position cyber security as a governance principle, framing Ukraine not only as a state under attack but as a testing ground for next generation digital resilience.

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Since the onset of Russia’s invasion in 2014, Ukraine has become the world’s most consequential real-time laboratory for cyber resilience. The country’s experience demonstrates that effective cyber security is an integrated system encompassing governance, education, law, diplomacy, and economic resilience. Institutionalizing these lessons into a durable national cyber resilience ecosystem will underpin postwar recovery and long-term digital sovereignty.

For partners, Ukraine’s experience offers much more than a narrative of resistance. It represents a practical plan for collective security for the coming decades of international military conflicts, each of which will have a mandatory digital component.

As Ukraine develops its forthcoming National Cybersecurity Strategy 2.0, several priorities should guide the next phase of institutional reform. First, Ukraine should expand the doctrine of active cyber protection, enabling defensive operations that proactively detect, disrupt, and neutralize threats before they impact critical systems.

Second, the continued Euro-integration of Ukraine’s cyber regulatory framework will be essential. This should include alignment with EU directives such as NIS2, the Critical Infrastructure Resilience framework, and the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), ensuring interoperability with European cyber governance standards.

Third, Ukraine should actively participate in the development of a European cyber shield. The goal should be a collective resilience architecture built on shared threat intelligence, joint incident response mechanisms, and coordinated defensive capabilities across the continent.

Fourth, long-term resilience requires sustained investment in cyber workforce development aligned with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0. This should include standardized training pathways, public-private talent pipelines, and the expansion of national cyber reserve capacities.

Fifth, strengthening cyber security capacity at the regional administration level across Ukraine will be vital. This can help ensure that local governments and regional critical infrastructure operators possess the operational capabilities and resources necessary to implement national cyber resilience policies effectively.

Finally, Ukraine’s next cyber strategy should also define a clear wartime framework that establishes legal authorities, operational coordination mechanisms, and public–private responsibilities for defending national digital and operational infrastructure during periods of armed conflict or hybrid attack.

With each subsequent international conflict, the digital component will grow in importance and become an increasingly critical part of the battlefield. This is already becoming clear in the current context of revolutionary progress in robotics, the development of AI, big data, parallel computing, and ever-accelerating data transmission technologies.

In this evolving environment, success will no longer depend on greater human or conventional military resources, but on an innovative, flexible, and progressive approach toward the development and use of the latest technologies. In these conditions, cyber resilience is not only a security strategy but also the foundation of freedom.

Dr. Oleksandr Bakalinskyi is a Senior Researcher at the G. E. Pukhov Institute for Modeling in Energy Engineering at the National Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. Maggie McDonough is the Senior Vice President and Chief Innovation Officer at the Baltimore Development Corporation. She was previously affiliated with the Purdue Applied Research Institute (PARI) and Purdue’s Center for Education & Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS), where she served as a technical advisor on global cyber security resilience programming.

Europe should help in the Gulf to serve its own interests, regardless of Trump’s demands

Daniel Fried, Jörn Fleck — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 19:27:26 +0000

WASHINGTON—The Iran war wasn’t their idea, and they may not like the way President Donald Trump is conducting it. But despite bullying rhetoric from Trump, the United States’ European allies might consider what they can reasonably do to support security around the Gulf rather than reject White House demands for it out of hand.

Building a coalition and preparing the battlespace for military action takes time and effort, especially when the conflict is in the Middle East. The United States sought and received significant military help from its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite sharp political differences; help that grew over time. Failure in Afghanistan, mixed success in Iraq, and popular frustration over both wars have not made it easier for the United States to get help this time with Iran. The Trump administration’s approach has hurt too: Trump has swung from initially keeping allies in the dark about the operation to demanding allied military support, to then spurning such help as unneeded. The United States started out from behind after Trump’s public attacks on those allies who did fight alongside US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, Trump has denigrated Ukraine’s actual offers of drones and drone specialists to Gulf countries—a field in which the embattled country is arguably the world leader.

Trump’s March 17 social media post was another sharp rejection of European help: “[W]e no longer ‘need’, or desire, the NATO Countries’ assistance – WE NEVER DID!” That post also included another attack on NATO as a “one way street – We will protect them, but they will do nothing for us.” Given all this, it would be understandable for Europeans to slam Trump for starting a war without consulting with them, only to demand their military support when things start to look complicated.

Nevertheless, European allies would be better advised to consider what they can do to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz and defend Gulf states under attack by Iran. They should do so not to assuage Trump or to help him out of a self-induced jam, but because Europe’s own critical interests are at stake in this conflict.

Why Europe should act

The spiking price of oil hurts the entire free world and has sent European governments scrambling for short-term fixes at the gas pump. Parallel surges in oil and gasoline prices have worsened an already bleak outlook for European industry, its competitiveness, and economic growth. At home, rising costs could cause political instability and benefit pro-Russian challengers on the right and left. Abroad, the price spikes in oil could create an estimated three to five billion dollars in additional revenue by the end of March for Russia, Europe’s most aggressive adversary, whose war against Ukraine remains the defining threat to the continent’s own freedom and security.

That windfall from energy-price shocks risks giving Russia a boost, just as Moscow’s position on the battlefield and the prospects for its war economy were deteriorating. Until the present moment, Russia’s position was weakening , thanks primarily to Ukraine’s bravery, grit, and sacrifice, but also because Europe stepped up to provide the financing needed to keep US weapons flowing to Kyiv over the past fourteen months.

European weapons stocks and production are a well-documented problem, but Europe’s stronger engagement in the Gulf could also present important openings in the defense space. The continent’s defense companies have been among the most effective and nimble partners for Ukraine’s battle-tested drone start-ups, and together they could bring new and more cost-effective means for Gulf allies to defend themselves against future attacks from Iran or other actors. That could achieve multiple European-Ukrainian objectives at once: It would preserve much-needed high-end interceptors that Ukraine needs—and Europe would buy from the United States—to defend against Russian ballistic missiles. It would expand cooperation and build new trust in Europe-Gulf relations. And it might shift the position of Gulf countries that have long sat on the fence when it comes to Russia’s war in Ukraine. It would accomplish all of this while avoiding further deterioration in transatlantic relations.

European leaders, therefore, have plenty of reasons to engage constructively with the United States and partners in the Gulf. Speed matters here. How quickly European countries move in pursuit of their own interests sends an important signal to Washington and adversaries in Moscow and Beijing alike. It matters almost as much as the movement itself.

What Europe can do

Some Europeans had already figured this out. On March 1, a day after the start of the military action, a joint statement by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom declared:

“We will take steps to defend our interests and those of our allies in the region, potentially through enabling necessary and proportionate defensive action to destroy Iran’s capability to fire missiles and drones at their source. We have agreed to work together with the US and allies in the region on this matter.”

That statement suggested a willingness to attack Iranian drone and missile sites. An experienced former senior Pentagon official pointed out to the authors that the United Kingdom and French navies could support the United States in protecting Gulf terminals and cities from Iranian attacks and, possibly, help with escorting ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Ukrainian know-how combined with European resourcing and production, from air defense to drone-based mine-hunting, could make important differences as well. If Trump’s language has made it politically complicated for European leaders to help, then these leaders could arrange to respond to requests from Gulf states or other countries affected by the war.

Trump’s social media posts are unlikely to last; responding to them as they are written risks locking in their bluster and threats. The US military is apt to be a steady partner in figuring out practical details of how European forces can fit into defensive operations intended to limit the war’s damage to the world economy and regional countries. Even if European capabilities are limited, they could free up some US assets elsewhere.

NATO is probably not the institution to organize such operations and, at this point, gaining Alliance-wide consensus might prove too complex. But individual NATO countries working together could offer military support for Gulf states and safe(r) passage through the strait, structured in a way to be most politically acceptable to domestic audiences. European leaders could even make that offer on the understanding that the United States would continue, and even increase, its support for Ukraine, as Finnish President Alexander Stubb has suggested.

It is neither pleasant nor glorious to respond constructively to Trump’s bullying rhetoric. But finding a way forward that meets European interests and avoids damage to transatlantic ties may be the best of a bad deal.

Trump himself could help, as a start by thanking Ukraine for pitching in and calling on Europeans to follow that example and do what they can. Some, for their own reasons, might take him up on it.

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The unspoken yet growing synergy in Turkey–Spain relations

Riccardo Gasco & Samuele C. Abrami — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 19:21:14 +0000

In recent weeks, amid the turmoil sparked by the US-Israeli war against Iran, Turkey-Spain relations have gained unusual visibility. Turkish and Spanish government accounts have posted about the two countries’ “brotherhood” on social media, Turkish journalists have closed their news programs by thanking the Spanish government, and state TV has aired videos highlighting bilateral ties.

Beneath this public-facing layer, however, lies a more consequential trend. Turkey and Spain have been consolidating a pragmatic form of political alignment that is increasingly underpinned by security cooperation. It is shaped less by ideology than by a shared view that their strategic and security environments are becoming more fragmented.

That logic became especially visible after two ballistic missiles launched from Iran entered Turkish airspace and were intercepted by NATO air defenses stationed in the Mediterranean. In Ankara, the episode reinforced the perception that allied reassurance can still be tangible at a time when the credibility of security commitments is being tested. For Spain, whose forces have contributed to NATO’s air and missile defense posture in Turkey for more than a decade—and whose Patriot battery detected the Iranian missile that NATO air defenses shot down on March 9—the incident highlighted how sustained operational cooperation can translate into political capital and strategic trust.

Turkey and Spain are operating under a dual-track approach in which Madrid continues to endorse democratic standards and the rule of law as the normative horizon of Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) while deepening defense and security ties with Ankara.

The optics matter here. Spanish President Pedro Sánchez’s outspoken opposition to the US-Israeli war on Iran, widely framed in Turkey as being on the right side of history, has reinforced Madrid’s image as a principled yet pragmatic European interlocutor. In other words, although several political and structural constraints limit further progress within the traditional EU accession process framework, Spain’s approach suggests that pragmatic defense cooperation with Turkey can advance even in the absence of political integration. And this cooperation could help normalize Turkey as a security actor within the Euro-Atlantic perimeter.

A relationship shaped by trust and the absence of vetoes

Often overlooked in debates on Turkey–Europe relations, Spain has nonetheless emerged as one of Ankara’s most pragmatic security partners. And this deepening cooperation comes at a moment when Russia’s war in Ukraine, Middle East volatility, uncertainty over US commitments, and Europe’s rearmament are reshaping the strategic landscape. Turkey has already penetrated Europe’s defense market through bilateral deals and is increasingly discussed as a potential contributor to EU-adjacent instruments such as Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and the European Defense Fund. Yet political constraints remain decisive: Vetoes from some EU member states, low alignment on common foreign and security policy, and the absence of a formal EU–Turkey security framework continue to block meaningful institutionalization. Spain’s approach, therefore, illustrates both an opportunity and its limits. Bilateral defense cooperation can deepen and help normalize Turkey as a security actor. But on its own, this cooperation is unlikely to lead to significant enhancements in EU-Turkey defense cooperation at the broader EU absent changes to the current accession process.

Much of the bilateral relationship hinges on a seeming paradox: The geographical distance between Spain and Turkey has often translated into greater strategic room for convergence on security and defense. Unlike Greece and Cyprus, Spain has no territorial disputes with Turkey. Unlike France, it has not positioned itself as a geopolitical competitor in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Middle East. Unlike Germany or Austria, Spain’s domestic politics are not shaped by large Turkish diaspora communities. Finally, both countries have faced separatist challenges in different forms, a shared experience that can bring their security outlooks closer in some respects. Thus, the relationship is largely depoliticized and insulated from domestic pressures, making it easier for any Spanish government to adopt a relatively favorable posture toward Ankara.

This absence of friction has translated into a high degree of institutional trust. From Ankara’s perspective, Spain is not associated with a priori vetoes against Turkey in European forums. From Madrid’s perspective, Turkey is not a rival—either geopolitically or in the military-industrial domain—but a capable partner whose strategic relevance has increased in a more fragmented security environment. This mutual perception has allowed cooperation to deepen without becoming hostage to broader political tensions.

Spain’s diplomatic posture has reinforced this trust. During periods of heightened tension between Turkey and the EU, Madrid has favored mediation and de-escalation over sanctions and confrontation, as in the case of Eastern Mediterranean energy disputes. Successive Spanish governments, regardless of political orientation, have also maintained a broadly pro-enlargement stance toward Turkey, even as expectations surrounding accession have diminished. Like Italy, Spain has never challenged the EU consensus on Turkey directly but has consistently worked to keep engagement viable and to frame Ankara as a partner rather than an outlier.

Ultimately, despite significant domestic differences, Turkey and Spain have found themselves politically aligned on a critical set of issues, representing among the most critical voices against the war in Gaza and the US-Israeli war against Iran. While this certainly does not suggest ideological alignment between the two governments, it underscores a similar perception of changing global dynamics, paving the way for more direct, constructive engagement.

Strategic convergence under NATO’s umbrella

All this helps explain why defense and strategic cooperation could expand relatively smoothly once geopolitical conditions made such cooperation more necessary. Such convergence can be traced to certain concrete actions within NATO since 2015. As regional instability intensified after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Spain assumed a sustained role in Turkey’s air defense by deploying Patriot air and missile defense systems on Turkish territory under NATO command. Since then, this presence has been continuous, involving multiple rotations and thousands of Spanish military personnel at Incirlik air base.

Over time, this interaction came to assume significance beyond its immediate operational function. It created dense networks of cooperation between their armed forces, strengthened interoperability, and generated political capital in Ankara by demonstrating Spain’s willingness to assume tangible responsibility for Turkey’s security.

This NATO-based convergence also reflects a deeper alignment on strategic priorities. Spain has long resisted a narrow focus on NATO’s eastern flank, warning against the risk of neglecting the Alliance’s southern neighborhood. Madrid has consistently emphasized the security relevance of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa—regions in which Turkey plays a central role as a frontline NATO ally on the southern flank. The appointment of Javier Colomina as the NATO secretary general’s special representative for the southern neighborhood demonstrates Spain’s insistence on “operating equally” on both flanks and is therefore naturally aligned with Turkey’s security priorities.

From strategic alignment to material cooperation

As operational trust consolidated within NATO, Spain–Turkey relations shifted from political coordination to material cooperation, especially in the defense industry. The logic was straightforward: Spain wanted to modernize and internationalize its defense base, but budget constraints and limited political appetite for reaching NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product benchmark for military spending pushed Madrid toward partnerships that can deliver faster and more flexibly than some European-led consortia. The Franco-German dispute surrounding Future Combat Air System fighter jets is a reminder of how slow, costly, and politically rigid intra-European industrial cooperation can become. As one military observer we spoke with put it, Spain needs external partners to accelerate programs, expand exports, and avoid overdependence on larger European defense players.

Turkey’s defense industrial rise has positioned it to meet this demand. Over the past decade, Ankara has moved from supplier-dependence to producing NATO-relevant platforms at scale, with defense exports topping $10 billion in 2025. For Spain, Turkey is less a competitor than a complementary industrial actor—one that brings speed, production capacity, and increasingly interoperable systems.

The bilateral track has also favored coproduction over one-off sales. Navantia’s cooperation with Turkish shipyards on TCG Anadolu established an early template of technology transfer and joint work, now feeding into debates on naval innovation, including drone-enabled concepts. More recently, the relationship has evolved into greater interdependence: In December, Spain finalized a deal to acquire Hürjet to replace its aging F-5s, which will deepen integration in the training and aviation ecosystems. Turkey’s acquisition of Eurofighter Typhoon jets—partly assembled in Spain—links industrial interests, jobs, and production lines. Early talks between Indra and Otokar on land systems point in the same direction. The question is whether this bilateral momentum can be translated into a broader European framework or if it will remain confined to ad hoc cooperation.

Pragmatism under EU constraints

This deepening bilateral cooperation is unfolding against the backdrop of a congested and largely stagnant EU–Turkey relationship. Spain has consistently supported a values-based and institutionalized EU–Turkey horizon, and, more recently, aligned with Josep Borrel, a former EU High Representative from Spain, in advocating a “positive agenda” on common issues. At the margins of the 2024 Madrid bilateral summit, Sánchez emphasized the “exceptional state of bilateral relations,” referring to “Turkey and Spain [as] friends, partners and allies with important cultural, social and economic exchanges.” The numbers seem to confirm this, as the two countries’ bilateral trade reached $20.6 billion in 2025.

This has not prevented Spain from taking public positions on domestic developments in Turkey. Sánchez, especially compared to other European leaders, has been notably vocal on the case against Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, signaling that Spain’s push for a constructive relationship does not imply silence on democracy and the rule of law. Rather, it reflects a compartmentalized approach in which normative conditionality and security engagement proceed on separate tracks.

This dual-track logic comes to the fore on EU defense initiatives. On paper, instruments such as the European Defense Fund and the SAFE program offer frameworks for cooperation with third countries. SAFE allows for limited non-EU procurement projects, suggesting that Turkish industrial participation is not excluded by design. Spain has also expressed openness to Turkey’s possible inclusion in mechanisms such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a framework aimed at deepening defense cooperation between EU members, but which has also included the United Kingdom since 2022. Yet, Madrid has not been able to leverage its position to convince other EU members to grant Turkey access to the project. Under these conditions, bilateral defense cooperation becomes a means of preserving strategic interdependence when institutional integration remains blocked.

Strategic convergence in an era of uncertainty

The broader geopolitical environment has reinforced incentives for this form of pragmatic engagement. The Trump administration’s foreign policy has heightened concerns over the unpredictable and transactional nature of US security commitments, accelerating a shift toward selective partnerships among middle powers. In this context, states with significant regional exposure are increasingly seeking to reduce risk through flexible coalitions and defense‑industrial linkages that are not fully dependent on Washington.

Finally, the Spain–Turkey partnership raises the question of whether such bilateral pragmatism can resonate in Brussels. Spain can help normalize Turkey as a security actor within the Euro-Atlantic perimeter and keep a “positive agenda” politically viable. Uncertainty over the international order and the fragmented nature of the European security backdrop can help Spain–Turkey relations stand as an example for how strategic convergence can shape and be shaped by political alignment.

Riccardo Gasco is the foreign policy program coordinator at IstanPol Institute and a doctoral researcher at Bologna University.

Samuele C. Abrami is a research fellow at the Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB) and a former Mercator-Istanbul Policy Center fellow.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Italy faces a dangerous gap between stability on paper and citizens’ lived experience

Massimo Morelli — Wed, 18 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Bottom lines up front

Italian politicians take office expecting a brief tenure, which has led to a pile-up of contradictory legislation bogging down courts and government agencies.
The country’s rapidly aging population and economic backbone of small family-owned firms make the economic growth urgently needed more difficult to achieve.
The central question for Italy is why its free and democratic institutions struggle to generate predictability and effective governance.

This is the ninth chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas, which analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Evolution of freedom

If one focuses exclusively on aggregate indicators of institutional quality, Italy’s political and economic evolution since the mid-1990s scores high. Indexes such as those produced by Freedom House consistently classify the country as a consolidated democracy with strong political rights and civil liberties, while measures of market orientation point to broadly open and competitive economic institutions. In line with this broader assessment, the Freedom Index also places Italy among countries with strong democratic and market-oriented institutional frameworks. Yet these reassuring classifications coexist with chronic political instability and a persistent sense that institutions do not work as intended. The central question, therefore, is not whether Italy’s institutions are formally free, but why they have increasingly struggled to generate predictability and effective governance in practice.

To understand this tension, some country-specific context is essential. Since the early 1990s, Italy has undergone a profound political transformation following the collapse of its postwar party system. What is often described as the transition to the “Second Republic” was accompanied by repeated electoral reforms, the emergence and disappearance of new political parties, and a persistent pattern of short-lived governments. Since 1994, Italy has had many prime ministers and governments, and even the average time in office for senators and house representatives has shortened significantly. This instability has not weakened democratic rules as such: Alternation in power has remained regular, elections have remained competitive, and constitutional guarantees have held. But it has profoundly shaped the incentives under which political and administrative institutions operate.

The high score Italy receives on the legislative constraints on the executive component of the Political subindex should be interpreted carefully. The score is due to the perfect bicameralism and to the fact that governments are typically formed by coalitions, which require ongoing negotiation among parties with heterogeneous preferences. However, these legislative constraints are often bypassed by the executive governments of the second republic with more and more frequent government decrees and confidence votes, which reduce the quality of laws. In an environment characterized by frequent government turnover and weak retrospective accountability, unfettered executive power would increase the risk of large and difficult-to-reverse policy mistakes. Under such conditions, strong checks and balances operate as a form of institutional insurance, limiting the potential damage associated with political instability rather than generating it. In other words, given Italy’s political volatility and informational constraints, the institutional frictions that limit executive power play a stabilizing role, and the real worries relate to the frequent government decrees aiming to bypass such checks and balances.

Political instability has far-reaching consequences for how governing takes place. Short political horizons systematically alter legislative incentives. When governments expect a brief tenure, the political drive for visible action exceeds careful implementation. In Italy, this logic has translated into a sustained increase in legislative output since the mid-1990s (see, for example, Gratton et al., 2021). In the early 1980s, the Italian Parliament typically approved on the order of 250–300 laws per year. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, annual legislative output regularly exceeded 500 acts, a large share of which consisted of emergency decree-laws later ratified and expanded by Parliament. When political survival depends more on signaling activity than on long-term outcomes, frequent lawmaking becomes individually rational even if it increases systemic complexity (Aghion et al., 2006; Gratton et al., 2021).

Repeated attempts to reform public procurement in Italy provide a concrete illustration. Successive revisions of the public procurement code (Codice dei contratti pubblici) were introduced (notably in 2016, with major amendments in 2020 and 2023) with the stated objective of simplification and acceleration. Yet each reform layered new rules onto an already dense regulatory framework, generating long transition phases and widespread uncertainty for administrations and firms. Rather than resolving bottlenecks, reform activity itself became a source of legal opacity. This outcome is not accidental: It reflects a political environment in which legislating serves as a signal of decisiveness under instability, while the costs of complexity materialize only after governments have moved on.

Given this sustained accumulation of legislation, the burden of adjustment shifts to the administrative and judicial system. Bureaucracies are required to implement rules that are frequently amended, internally inconsistent, and embedded in dense webs of cross-references. As a result, administrative effort is increasingly diverted from implementation to interpretation. Discretion narrows not because rules are clear, but because ambiguity raises the risk of error and ex post sanction. Faced with unstable legal frameworks, public officials adopt more cautious and formalistic behavior, slowing decision-making and amplifying delays. In my view, the sustained deterioration observed until the mid-2010s in the control of corruption and bureaucratic quality components of the Freedom Index is driven primarily by the latter: It reflects a gradual weakening of bureaucratic effectiveness rather than a sharp increase in corrupt behavior. After 2014, the apparent change in trend seems to be largely explained by improvements in perceptions of corruption control, while underlying bureaucratic quality may not have experienced a comparable structural improvement.

Courts face a similar challenge. When legislation is complex and rapidly changing, judges are required to interpret overlapping provisions with limited guidance. This increases divergence across jurisdictions and over time, even in cases involving similar facts. Legal outcomes become less predictable, not because enforcement is weak, but because interpretation itself becomes uncertain. Firms and citizens, in turn, face a moving legal target: Compliance depends not only on what the law formally prescribes, but on how it will eventually be read and enforced. Legal uncertainty thus emerges as an endogenous consequence of legislative overproduction.

Taken together, these dynamics mark a profound change in how public authority operates in practice. The Italian state still relies on formal rules, written procedures, and legal guarantees, but the proliferation and instability of those rules increasingly undermine their coordinating role. Where a rules-based system is designed to reduce discretion and uncertainty, legal complexity has had the opposite effect. For citizens and firms, interacting with the administration often feels less like following clear rules and more like navigating a maze of overlapping requirements, exceptions, and interpretations. Outcomes depend not only on compliance, but on timing, jurisdiction, and the specific office involved. In this sense, legality itself ceases to be a source of predictability and instead becomes an additional layer of risk. The problem is not the absence of rules, but their excess: When the legal framework becomes too dense and unstable to be reliably understood, the promise of rules-based governance is hollowed out.

If Italian laws were written with a level of clarity comparable to that of Italy’s constitution, the country’s GDP today would be almost 5 percent higher.

Legal uncertainty has significant economic consequences. If Italian laws were written with a level of clarity comparable to that of Italy’s constitution, the country’s GDP today would be almost 5 percent higher. In current terms, this c orresponds to roughly €110 billion per year in foregone output. This cost reflects the cumulative effect of legal ambiguity on investment, innovation, and firm growth: When rights and obligations are difficult to interpret, economic actors delay decisions, scale back projects, or avoid activities that are most subject to regulatory scrutiny. These aggregate losses do not arise uniformly across the economy, but are mediated by systematic changes in firm behavior and by who is better able to cope with legal complexity.

These costs are not borne uniformly across firms. Legal uncertainty disproportionately penalizes firms that operate transparently, invest in scale, and rely on predictable enforcement of contracts and regulations. By contrast, firms that operate at a smaller scale or in more informal ways are better able to adapt to unstable rules, absorb ambiguity, or avoid exposure altogether. In environments characterized by complex regulation and uneven interpretation, informality and opacity can become competitive advantages rather than constraints. A large body of evidence shows that regulatory complexity and legal uncertainty systematically shift activity away from more productive, formal firms toward smaller, less transparent ones, with adverse consequences for aggregate productivity. In Italy, this selection mechanism reinforces a bias toward small firm size and low growth strategies, amplifying the long-term economic costs of institutional fragility.

Another important phenomenon that cannot be captured by the freedom scores relates to political participation and trust: Citizens’ engagement with politics is a dimension that most institutional indexes only partially capture. Italy continues to meet high standards in terms of electoral competition and political rights, yet participation has declined markedly over time. Voter turnout in national parliamentary elections fell from around 90 percent in the 1970s to about 64 percent in the most recent election in 2022, one of the lowest levels in postwar Italian history. Participation in European and local elections has declined even more sharply, with turnout in European Parliament elections falling below 50 percent in recent cycles (ISTAT; International IDEA). These trends suggest that disengagement results not from the erosion of formal rights but from a weakening belief that political participation meaningfully affects outcomes in an institutional environment perceived as opaque and ineffective.

The gap between formal institutional quality and lived experience has repeatedly shaped Italy’s political trajectory over the past two decades. Since the early 2000s, Italian politics has oscillated between technocratic solutions—invoked in moments of crisis to restore credibility and stability (as under Mario Monti and later Mario Draghi)—and populist reactions that promise to bypass institutional complexity and reassert political control (seen most clearly in the rise of the Five Star Movement and the League under Matteo Salvini). Neither approach has proved fully successful. Technocratic governments have often stabilized short-term outcomes without addressing deeper institutional fragilities, while populist experiments have struggled to translate political mandates into effective and predictable governance. This pendular movement has contributed to political volatility and reinforced public frustration with both expertise and representation. As shown in a forthcoming book by Guiso et al., the 2008 financial crisis served as the watershed of populism in Europe, but in Italy, distrust in politics and government institutions is also due to the country’s political dynamics. In this context, the relative stability of the current government led by Giorgia Meloni marks a potential turning point: For the first time, a populist-led administration is joining political durability with a rhetoric—particularly on immigration and national identity—that raises concerns about the implications for political and civil rights. Whether Italy’s institutional safeguards will continue to prevent slippage along these lines is a question without an obvious answer and will be addressed more fully in the final section.

Overall, Italy’s experience shows a widening gap between formal institutional strength and institutional effectiveness. Democratic procedures and legal guarantees remain largely intact, and this is reflected in Italy’s relatively strong performance on many aggregate institutional indicators. Yet the capacity of these institutions to generate predictability, sustain investment, and foster broad-based economic opportunity has weakened. This disconnect helps explain why dissatisfaction and disengagement can coexist with formally strong institutions. It also provides the starting point for understanding Italy’s prosperity record since the mid-1990s, and why improvements in formal institutional characteristics have not translated into comparable gains in economic performance.

From freedom to prosperity

Measured along many conventional dimensions, Italy remains a prosperous country. Income per capita is high by international standards, life expectancy is among the longest in the world, and access to education, health care, and basic infrastructure is widespread. Material deprivation is limited for most of the population, and inequality, while not low, is broadly comparable to that of other large European economies. At the same time, these relatively favorable aggregates mask important compositional shifts beneath the surface, which pose a significant risk for the country’s long-term growth and social cohesion.

Although Italy remains a high-income country, its growth performance since the mid-1990s has been consistently weak. Over the past three decades, economic stagnation has become a defining feature of the Italian economy rather than a temporary deviation. Real GDP per capita has grown by less than 10 percent since the mid-1990s, compared with roughly 30 percent in France and more than 40 percent in Germany. Labor productivity growth, which averaged close to 2 percent per year during the postwar decades, has been close to zero since the late 1990s. These patterns point not to a sudden deterioration in living standards, but to a prolonged slowdown in economic dynamism that has reshaped expectations and long-term prospects.

A central feature of Italy’s stagnation is the persistent structure of its productive sector. Employment remains heavily concentrated in small firms, with businesses employing fewer than ten workers accounting for roughly half of total employment—far more than in France or Germany. While this structure once supported growth, it has become increasingly ill-suited to an economy characterized by scale economies, global value chains, and the mounting importance of intangible capital. Productivity dispersion across firms is high, yet reallocation toward more productive firms has been weak, limiting aggregate productivity growth. A substantial empirical literature documents how Italy’s skewed firm-size distribution constrains investment, innovation, and organizational upgrading, contributing to persistently low productivity.

Italy’s firm structure is closely reflected in investment behavior. Business investment as a share of GDP has trended downward since the late 1990s and remains below the euro area average, with particularly weak investment in productivity-enhancing and intangible assets such as software, organizational capital, and research and development. The institutional environment described in the previous section helps explain this pattern. Legal uncertainty and regulatory instability raise the fixed costs associated with expansion and long-horizon projects, increasing firms’ exposure to administrative procedures and judicial risk as they grow.

Italy’s weak growth performance has been accompanied by a gradual but persistent deterioration in distributional outcomes. While overall income inequality, as measured by standard Gini coefficients, remains close to the European average, the aggregate masks important shifts in how income is generated and distributed. Real wage growth has been largely stagnant since the late 1990s, particularly for large segments of the workforce, while income streams less directly exposed to economic volatility have proven more resilient.

Alongside weak growth and limited firm dynamism, Italy’s education system has struggled to function as a channel of social mobility. While average educational attainment has increased, learning environments have become increasingly segmented by family background, neighborhood, and territory. Students from lower-income households are disproportionately concentrated in schools with fewer resources, higher teacher turnover, and more challenging classroom climates. Evidence suggests that perceptions of discrimination, disengagement, and exposure to conflict are significantly more prevalent in schools serving Italy’s disadvantaged populations, and that the differences are strongly correlated with parental income and socioeconomic status. Rather than acting as a powerful equalizer, the education system increasingly mirrors existing inequalities, reinforcing differences in cognitive and non-cognitive skill formation from an early age. These patterns risk entrenching social stratification and limiting intergenerational mobility over the long run, even as aggregate indicators of educational access continue to improve.

Prolonged stagnation and repeated economic shocks disproportionately affect middle- and lower-middle-income groups whose welfare depends on stable employment and the returns to long-term investment in skills. Rather than primarily increasing demand for redistribution, this form of insecurity tends to undermine trust in mainstream political actors and institutions, fueling support for alternatives that promise protection through exclusionary policies. In this sense, social tension is less about inequality per se than about the loss of expected mobility for groups that previously experienced steady, if moderate, progress.

In Italy, formal guarantees and rights remain largely intact, yet the practical capacity to turn effort, education, and investment into progress has weakened.

Expectations play a central role in this dynamic. Economic growth depends not only on material inputs or formal rules, but on whether individuals believe that effort will be rewarded over time. As Isaiah Berlin emphasized, a meaningful distinction exists between negative freedom, understood as protection from coercion, and positive freedom, understood as the effective ability to act on one’s choices (Berlin 1969). In Italy, formal guarantees and rights remain largely intact, yet the practical capacity to turn effort, education, and investment into progress has weakened. When income prospects are uncertain and educational opportunities are uneven, formal freedoms coexist with constrained agency. This gap helps explain why improvements in institutional indicators have not translated into stronger productivity growth or renewed economic dynamism.

These constraints are felt most acutely by younger generations. Entering the labor market after two decades of weak growth, today’s young Italians face lower expected returns to education, fragmented career paths, and delayed economic independence. For many, higher educational attainment no longer guarantees stable employment or upward mobility, while access to quality learning environments and early career opportunities remain strongly shaped by family background and territory. As a result, uncertainty is experienced not as a temporary phase but as a persistent condition, influencing decisions about work, mobility, and family formation.

This erosion of confidence in institutions also shapes outcomes in areas where prosperity depends on collective action over long horizons, most notably environmental policy. Italy has made measurable progress in reducing emissions and expanding renewable energy, yet its performance has lagged behind that of several peer countries. Resistance to environmental transformation often reflects concerns about local costs, distributional effects, and the credibility of promised compensation rather than outright opposition to climate goals. In an environment where trust in institutions is fragile, commitments to future benefits carry limited weight. Policies that require short-term adjustment in exchange for long-term gains become harder to sustain, even when they are economically sound and socially desirable. Environmental outcomes therefore reflect not only policy design, but the broader institutional capacity to generate belief in credible, shared returns over time.

Taken together, these patterns point to a central tension in Italy’s recent trajectory. Formal institutions have remained broadly stable, and material living standards remain high, yet the capacity of those institutions to sustain investment, mobility, and credible long-term expectations has weakened. Economic outcomes reflect not a single failure, but the cumulative effects of legal uncertainty, constrained firm growth, segmented education, and eroded confidence in future returns. Prosperity has become more uneven, more fragile, and more dependent on background and position than headline indicators suggest. Whether the equilibrium that has characterized Italy over the past two decades is sustainable in the medium term is the core question addressed in the next section.

The path forward

Italy’s medium-term prospects are shaped by a small number of risks that revolve around institutional credibility, economic sustainability, and demographic pressure, and that together will determine whether the current equilibrium can endure.

The most immediate concern is politico-legal. A proposed constitutional reform of the judicial system, scheduled for a general referendum vote on March 22nd, could result in a significant shift in the balance of powers. Public debate has focused on a narrow and largely symbolic issue—the possibility for prosecutors to become judges—which in practice affects a very small share of magistrates. The more consequential element of the reform is the creation of a new body, appointed in part by the political majority, with the authority to oversee and evaluate the actions of the judiciary. This introduces a clear risk to judicial independence. Even in the absence of direct interference, the mere possibility of executive oversight may discourage the pursuit of sensitive cases involving politically connected actors or the government itself. The institutional risk is amplified by the political process through which the reform is advancing. Because it failed to obtain a two-thirds majority in parliament, the reform will be decided by referendum. In a context of low political participation and widespread disengagement, there is a non-negligible possibility that a far-reaching constitutional change could be approved by a relatively small share of the electorate. Such an outcome would further weaken the perceived legitimacy (or lack thereof) of institutional checks and balances.

Italy risks moving from a situation in which dissatisfaction coexists with formally strong protections to one in which the erosion of rights is tangible.

A second risk concerns civil and political rights. Italy has long exhibited a gap between strong formal guarantees and uneven lived experience. Recent developments suggest that this gap may narrow—in an unfavorable direction. Since 2022, a stronger emphasis on security and anti-immigration rhetoric has yielded policy initiatives and administrative practices that have already begun to affect indicators of political and civil rights. While the changes observed so far remain limited, the concern is one of persistence rather than rupture. If these trends continue, Italy risks moving from a situation in which dissatisfaction coexists with formally strong protections to one in which the erosion of rights is tangible. This would represent a qualitative shift relative to the past three decades.

The third challenge is economic and structural. Italy’s traditional development model, centered on small, family-owned firms operating in established sectors, has become increasingly inadequate in an economy driven by innovation, scale, and intangible capital. A transition toward more dynamic and technologically intensive activities is necessary. Yet the incentive structure produced by the current institutional environment remains unfavorable. Legal uncertainty, administrative complexity, and limited predictability discourage the long-term investments required to develop new sectors and expand firm size. Without changes to these underlying conditions, the prospects for a meaningful shift in the growth model remain weak, despite the urgency of the challenge.

Demographic and fiscal pressures reinforce these concerns. Stagnant incomes, persistently low fertility, and high levels of public and private debt interact in ways that constrain policy choices. Italy’s population is aging rapidly, and the working-age population is shrinking—placing an increasing strain on the pension system and welfare programs. At the same time, high public debt limits fiscal space, reducing the government’s ability to respond to shocks or to support growth through expansionary policies. In the absence of stronger growth, the sustainability of existing social arrangements will become increasingly difficult to maintain.

Temporary fiscal expansions can relax political and financial constraints in the short run while delaying necessary adjustments and amplifying vulnerabilities when support is withdrawn.

Finally, there is the risk associated with the conclusion of the Next Generation EU program. In recent years, these funds have supported public investment and contributed to stabilizing economic activity. There is a concern, however, that they may also have masked underlying weaknesses. Whether these resources have been systematically directed toward projects capable of raising long-term productivity remains unclear. Moreover, they will have to be repaid. When combined with already high debt levels, this raises the possibility that the apparent stabilization of recent years could give way to renewed strain once extraordinary support fades. Temporary fiscal expansions can relax political and financial constraints in the short run while delaying necessary adjustments and amplifying vulnerabilities when support is withdrawn. If growth does not materialize, the adjustment required could be abrupt.

Taken together, these risks point to a fragile equilibrium. Italy has so far avoided abrupt institutional breakdowns and severe economic crises, relying instead on gradual adjustment and external anchors. Whether this equilibrium can be sustained in the medium term will depend on the ability of institutions to preserve independence, restore credibility, and support a development path capable of generating durable growth under tighter economic and demographic constraints.

about the author

Massimo Morelli is professor of political science and economics at Bocconi University and senior research scientist at the Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER). A political economist, he earned his PhD in economics from Harvard University in 1996. He spent twenty-two years teaching and conducting research at leading American institutions, including the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton and Columbia University, where he held a full professorship in economics and political science. Since returning to Italy in 2014, he has continued his work at the intersection of economics and political science, publishing in leading journals across both fields.

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How the Iran war could trigger a European energy crisis

Lisa Basquel — Tue, 17 Mar 2026 16:22:41 +0000

WASHINGTON—With the conflict in the Gulf well into its third week, a difficult reality is setting in across Europe: Even if a cease-fire were agreed today, the continent is likely already heading toward an energy crisis.

The ongoing US-Israeli strikes on Iran, along with Tehran’s retaliation across the Gulf, have produced one of the most severe disruptions to global energy markets in decades. At the center of the crisis is the Strait of Hormuz, the most critical chokepoint in the global energy trade. Before the current conflict, roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil supply transited the strait each day. The looming threat of Iranian sea mines and missile attacks has brought commercial tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to a near standstill, as some operators opt to anchor outside the waterway rather than risk passage.

While the effective closure of the strait has sent shockwaves through global oil markets, Europe’s immediate vulnerability lies elsewhere: liquefied natural gas (LNG). Approximately 20 percent of global LNG trade passed through the strait before the current conflict, much of it originating in Qatar, the world’s second-largest LNG exporter. There is no viable alternative export route for this LNG.

For Europe, the timing could scarcely be worse.

Preparation for winter starts now

Europe is entering the critical period when underground gas storage must be replenished ahead of winter. Yet European countries are beginning this process in one of the weakest positions in years. Refilling these reserves now depends heavily on LNG imports, following Europe’s rapid shift away from Russian pipeline gas following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. According to the Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory database, European storage levels are currently below 30 percent, a five-year low. A colder-than-average winter, combined with increased gas burn in the power sector, pushed European gas demand up nearly 7 percent since the start of the year. At the same time, pipeline year-over-year exports from the European Union (EU) to Ukraine surged more than tenfold, further accelerating withdrawals.

Under EU regulations, storage levels must reach at least 90 percent capacity by December. Given current conditions, Europe will need to inject nearly 60 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas during the upcoming refill season just to meet this target. For context, that translates to about 586 terawatt-hours (TWh) of energy—enough to power around 57 million US homes annually, based on average household consumption data from the US Energy Information Administration. Crucially, not all gas imports can be directed into storage; much of it must first satisfy ongoing daily consumption. Even before the escalation in the Gulf, Europe’s depleted storage position was forcing it to plan record LNG imports in 2026.

Further squeezing the LNG market is the March 2 Iranian drone strike on QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan facilities, which forced an immediate shutdown of production. Two days later, the company declared force majeure, meaning that QatarEnergies is temporarily suspended from its contractual commitments of LNG shipments to customers. This declaration has added significant uncertainty to the timeline for restoring Qatari output. Even if the conflict were to end today and the strait were to reopen, full restoration of production could take weeks or even months. Markets know this: QatarEnergy’s announcement triggered an abrupt spike in European gas benchmarks, with prices jumping by more than 50 percent on March 2. It was the largest single‑day increase since the 2022 energy crisis following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing disruption of Russian pipeline flows. These market pressures affect far more than just Europe; they risk reigniting competition between European and Asian importers for scarce LNG cargoes.

Between Asia and Europe

In the past, Asian importers dominated global LNG markets through long-term contracts with exporters, while Europe relied heavily on pipeline gas from Russia. When those flows collapsed after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, European buyers drove LNG prices sharply higher, drawing cargoes originally contracted for Asian markets toward European terminals. This dynamic characterized the 2022 energy crisis, when Europe repeatedly outbid Asian buyers for flexible supply. The current crisis, however, may reverse that pattern. As the loss of Qatari supply tightens global LNG markets, Asian buyers may be willing to outbid Europe for available cargoes—particularly the four major East Asian economies of China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Together, these four accounted for approximately three-quarters of all LNG imported across Asia in 2025, according to data sourced from Kpler. China alone relied on Qatar for 29 percent of its LNG imports in 2025, making it the world’s top LNG importer that year.

Early signs of this dynamic may already be emerging, with reports in recent days that a US LNG tanker originally bound for Belgium changed course toward China—a potential signal that this competition for cargoes is one Europe will likely lose on cost. US LNG exports have become one of Europe’s most important diversification tools since 2022, but even if US producers increase output, it is unlikely to fully offset the loss of Qatari supply in the near term. US liquefaction facilities are already operating near capacity, and the JKM–TTF spread, the price differential between Asian and European LNG markets, has fluctuated sharply in recent months. The spread could significantly widen as Asian buyers compete for alternative supply.

The scale and cost of this supply gap are further amplified by Europe’s decision to phase out Russian pipeline gas and LNG imports by the end of 2027. The EU is set to ban short-term Russian pipeline contracts beginning in June of this year, with all remaining long-term flows required to cease by the end of September 2027. While Russian LNG accounts for a relatively small share of Europe’s supply, it remains a meaningful component: In 2025, the EU imported roughly 17 bcm of Russian LNG, representing approximately 13 percent of total gas imports. European policymakers had anticipated replacing this volume primarily with US LNG, but given the ongoing Middle East conflict, Europe’s plans to fill this gap are increasingly fragile, placing immense strain on both supply security and cost.

Back where it was in 2022

Brussels has yet to offer a meaningful solution for the energy shock. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has indicated that the EU is exploring measures such as the expanded use of power purchase agreements, temporary state aid mechanisms, and potential gas price caps. During the 2022 crisis, proposals for a gas price cap faced strong opposition from Germany and the Netherlands, which argued that artificially limiting prices could undermine Europe’s ability to attract scarce LNG cargoes and allow Asian buyers to outbid European importers. Today, too, similar measures are likely to face contention and stoke further divisions among the EU member states.

The current crisis has reignited a debate that emerged in 2022 regarding Europe’s energy strategy and dependence on external suppliers. From 2022 to 2024, Europe undertook an ambitious push to diversify its energy mix and accelerate the deployment of nuclear and renewable capacity. However, these efforts were partially overshadowed by reliance on US LNG and related trade negotiations, in effect trading one dependency for another. Analysts have long cautioned against this pattern of dependence, yet after years of shutting down continental energy projects, most notably the near-complete collapse of German nuclear energy, Europe now finds itself back where it was in 2022: heavily reliant on US LNG, exposed to global price competition, and bringing a policy knife to a global production gun fight. To break this cycle, Europe would need to invest more in its own production capacity. But further deployment of clean energy infrastructure or nuclear development is a multi-year process, and thus it is not a solution to the current crisis.

The Russia question

The energy shock has also reopened the question of Russian sanctions. Notably, the United States appears to be signaling a change in tone. Last week, the White House temporarily loosened restrictions to allow India to import Russian crude oil stranded at sea—a shift from what was agreed to during US-India trade negotiations in February. On March 12, the administration went further, issuing a broader temporary exemption in permitting the sale of Russian seaborne oil currently in transit. The administration’s rationale was that this will help ease pressure on global energy prices. Though framed as a short-term measure, the move underscores how quickly sanctions policy can shift under acute energy market pressure. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent further justified the measure by arguing that Russia taxes production rather than sales, so licensing completed shipments therefore does not provide significant financial benefit to the Kremlin. This argument is difficult to sustain: Since February 2022, Moscow has repeatedly restructured its oil and gas tax regime to maximize state revenues, and there is little reason to believe it would not do so again.

The Group of Seven (G7) price cap could tell a similar story. The mechanism works by using Western control over global shipping insurance and finance as leverage: tanker operators and insurers who want access to Western financial services must certify that the oil was sold below a set price ceiling, forcing buyers to demand a discount from Moscow. When the cap was set at sixty dollars in 2022, it was just below the market price for Russian oil. But Russian crude has since fallen well below that level, meaning the cap no longer constrains prices. In response, the EU and the United Kingdom lowered their ceiling to around forty-seven dollars to restore its bite, but the United States declined to follow, creating a gap that operators can exploit, and particularly undermining the EU’s move. The Trump administration has never been enthusiastic about the mechanism, and a decision to stop enforcing it entirely cannot be ruled out. If that happens, then one of the few remaining tools limiting Russian energy revenues effectively collapses.

So far, European leaders have mostly remained firm in their commitments to diversify away from Russian energy. On March 11, von der Leyen warned that returning to Russian energy would be a “strategic blunder” that increases Europe’s vulnerability. At a recent meeting, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni joined other Group of Seven (G7) leaders in rejecting calls to ease sanctions despite the turmoil in global oil markets. Merz has also publicly criticized the US decision to temporarily lift sanctions, calling it “wrong.” However, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever broke openly with the EU’s agreed position this past weekend, arguing that Europe “must normalize relations with Russia and regain access to cheap energy.” He added that European leaders privately agree with him but are unwilling to say so publicly. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán remains another strong European voice publicly urging a reconsideration, though his position carries little weight among his peers because of his long-standing alignment with Moscow.

Could the EU extend the window of continuing Russian supply past the current deadlines? Perhaps, but doing so would require reopening a complex political and legislative process between the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council. Even under accelerated or emergency procedures, such a move would be politically fraught. In practice, this would mean revisiting the sanctions architecture that has been painstakingly constructed since 2022. Beyond the legal and institutional challenges, such a move would undermine the EU’s geopolitical strategy and effectively finance Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine. For Brussels, this option remains politically untenable. But pressure from individual member states may continue to intensify if prices rise sharply.

The European dilemma

What this conflict has made clear is that while higher oil prices will raise energy costs globally, Europe’s more immediate challenge is securing sufficient LNG cargoes to refill its depleted gas storage. Toward this end, the calendar is working against European importers. With the refill season running from April to November, losing even two months to a Qatari production halt means forfeiting roughly 25 percent of the injection window before a single additional cargo arrives. European countries could attempt to suppress demand for gas through conservation measures and reduced industrial energy consumption, though the scale required would be politically and economically difficult to sustain.

More realistically, European buyers will be forced to wait until Asian demand is satisfied, and then pay whatever price remains. Unlike emerging market economies, which may be priced out entirely, Europe has the financial depth to outbid most competitors. But that calculation carries its own cost: securing supply at any price means passing that cost onto households and industry, with all the economic and political consequences that follow.

Ultimately, the crisis reduces to a binary—scarce cargoes mean physical shortages; available but expensive supply means an extraordinary price shock. An obvious release valve—importing Russian pipeline gas once again—remains politically toxic. Reopening that faucet would undercut two years of painful European energy diversification, hand Moscow a significant revenue stream at a moment when the war in Ukraine remains unresolved, and reintroduce precisely the strategic dependency that left Europe exposed in the first place. Either way, this episode has exposed structural weaknesses in Europe’s energy supply chain. Finding a way out of this dilemma will dominate the continent’s political and economic agenda for months to come.

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The Iran war is good for the Russian economy but bad for Putin’s prestige

Maksym Beznosiuk, Will Dixon — Tue, 17 Mar 2026 15:50:23 +0000

Two weeks since the outbreak of the Iran war, commentators around the world are already declaring Vladimir Putin the winner. It is easy to see why so many seem to believe that the Russian President will emerge as the main beneficiary of escalating hostilities in the Middle East. After all, from energy exports to the invasion of Ukraine, Putin clearly has much to gain.

The Russian economy has been showing signs of severe strain in recent months as the combined toll of international sanctions, Ukrainian airstrikes, and ballooning defense spending negatively impact the Kremlin coffers. The Iran war now threatens to transform this picture in Moscow’s favor.

With energy prices already spiking and the Strait of Hormuz blocked, the world is entering a fuel crisis that could reinvigorate Putin’s war economy. The United States has already relaxed sanctions on the Kremlin in a bid to ease energy pressures elsewhere. If the current conflict becomes a prolonged campaign, Moscow may be able to repair much of the economic damage done over the past four years.

The Iran war could also provide a more direct boost for Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. With the Trump administration now firmly focused on the Middle East, the Kremlin will face significantly less diplomatic pressure to engage in US-led peace talks with Ukraine, while Kyiv will struggle to keep Russia’s invasion high on the international agenda.

Crucially, the US is expected to prioritize the supply of air defense interceptor missiles to the Middle East over Ukraine. With limited numbers of missiles produced annually, this means Ukrainian air defense crews might soon find themselves short of the ammunition required to defend their cities and infrastructure against Russian ballistic missiles. The consequences for the civilian population could be disastrous.

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Despite these potential advantages, there is little sign of celebration in the Kremlin. While Russia appears well-positioned to benefit economically and militarily, the US-led war with Iran has also served to highlight Russia’s declining international influence and has underlined Moscow’s limitations as an ally.

Since the onset of hostilities at the end of February, the Kremlin has restricted itself to a limited number of statements and has largely refrained from any strong condemnation of the United States. While reports indicate that Moscow is providing Iran with military assistance including targeting data and drone warfare expertise, the Russian response has been strikingly muted and has fallen far short of America’s very public support for Ukraine following Putin’s 2022 invasion.

Putin’s cautious reaction is particularly noteworthy in light of the support Iran has provided to Russia over the past four years. Since 2022, Tehran has supplied Moscow with large quantities of drones, missiles, and ammunition. This backing proved especially important during the early stages of the war, before Russia was able to expand domestic production and diversify its lines of supply.

Despite much speculation over an emerging “Axis of Autocrats” including both Russia and Iran, Putin has so far proved unwilling or unable to repay Tehran for its earlier backing. While Russian and Iranian officials hailed the signing of a “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement” in January 2025, this has not translated into significant Russian aid since the current conflict erupted.

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Russia’s failure to robustly support its Iranian allies is the latest in a series of similar geopolitical setbacks since the beginning of the full-scale Ukraine invasion more than four years ago. In late 2022, Kremlin credibility was dented by Moscow’s inability to prevent a renewal of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, leading to the collapse of Russia’s traditional security role in the South Caucasus. US President Donald Trump has since stepped into the void to lead peace efforts in the region.

The fall of Kremlin-backed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was to prove an even more humiliating blow for Putin. For almost a decade, Moscow had invested significant military and diplomatic resources to keep Assad in power. This engagement was touted by Moscow as proof of Russia’s return to great power status. However, when the Assad regime began to rapidly unravel in late 2024, Russia was unable to intervene. Instead, the Kremlin limited itself to offering the ousted Syrian leader asylum.

Likewise, Russia proved powerless to assist Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro when he was captured by the United States in early 2026. Moscow was seen as a key strategic partner of Maduro and had provided Caracas with a wide range of financial and security backing. Days before the American operation, Russia was still voicing its “full support” for Venezuela. However, the Kremlin ultimately took no action when US forces swooped.

From Armenia and Syria to Venezuela and Iran, Moscow’s obvious inability to aid its allies in times of crisis has seriously damaged Russia’s reputation as a global power. While the Kremlin is still capable of supplying weapons and spreading propaganda, these limited tools are no substitute for the kind of substantial security support that potential partners seek.

For Putin, this matters. Throughout his reign, he has carefully cultivated a strongman image and sought to reassert Russia’s claims to superpower status. However, the world’s leading powers do not maintain their influence through rhetoric alone.

Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s repeated failure to defend its international allies has revealed the underwhelming reality behind Putin’s posturing. This loss of prestige has very practical implications for Moscow’s ability to attract partners and project strength on the world stage. Putin hoped that by conquering Ukraine, he could return Russia to the dominant role it occupied during the Cold War. Instead, he has become bogged down in an invasion that has ruthlessly exposed modern Russia’s geopolitical limitations.

William Dixon is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute specializing in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.

Cate Hansberry — Mon, 16 Mar 2026 16:00:00 +0000

March 16, 2026

The coming compute war in Ukraine

Why compute infrastructure will decide the next phase of the conflict

By Clara Kaluderovic

It’s May 2026 in the Kharkiv sector of Ukraine. A Ukrainian commander launches eight hundred autonomous drones—a coordinated swarm of air and ground systems programmed to suppress enemy air defenses, identify and strike artillery positions, and exploit gaps in Russian lines. The operation depends on real-time coordination: sensors feeding targeting data to strike platforms, movement algorithms synchronizing advance rates, and machine learning systems adapting to Russian countermeasures.

Eighteen minutes into the mission, Russian electronic warfare assets sever the swarm’s tactical ground uplinks to Western cloud infrastructure.¹ The swarm doesn’t abort—it continues operating on preprogrammed instructions. But it can’t adapt. Russian forces rapidly move their artillery and air defense systems. Ukrainian sensors detect the movement but can’t retask strike drones without cloud connectivity. The algorithms that would normally coordinate sensors with shooters can’t execute. What should have been a precisely synchronized operation devolves into hundreds of individual platforms executing obsolete instructions against targets that have already moved.

This scenario hasn’t transpired yet. But the conditions that could make it inevitable are already in place.

The war in Ukraine is often described in the language of weapons: air defense systems, artillery pieces, drones, and munitions. Yet a less visible element will shape the next phase of the conflict just as decisively as any piece of military hardware: the infrastructure to create and harness computational power, or compute.

From state preservation to warfighting speed

For four years, Ukraine has executed a strategically sophisticated digital strategy: protecting state continuity by migrating critical data and services from vulnerable domestic servers to Western cloud infrastructure.² By mid-2022, just months into the invasion, more than ten petabytes of data—from ministries, universities, private firms, and individuals—had shifted to the cloud.³ This ensured continuity of government operations, supported remote learning, and reduced the risk that a missile strike could erase essential records.

That migration was brilliant crisis management. It preserved the Ukrainian state under fire. But state continuity is not warfighting. As combat evolves toward mass deployment of unmanned systems, algorithmic control of targeting processes, and increasingly autonomous operations, Ukraine’s computational requirements are changing fundamentally. The challenge is shifting from keeping systems online to enabling decisions at machine speed—despite Russian efforts to sever access to the infrastructure that makes machine-speed decisions possible.

The question is no longer whether Western cloud providers have sufficient storage and compute capacity. They do. The question is whether Ukraine can reliably access that capacity fast enough to sustain operations when Russia is actively denying the connection.

What is emerging is a war over compute capability itself: a contest over which side can sustain the fastest operational cycles—sensing, deciding, striking, adapting—while spectrum and infrastructure come under both kinetic and electronic attack.

The bandwidth wall

In peacetime, cloud computing feels abstract, almost invisible. In war, it becomes concrete and existential. Remote data centers accessed via networks become critical infrastructure. Designating cloud systems as critical infrastructure in the Ukrainian context unlocks vital resources, ensuring these facilities receive prioritized air and cyber defenses, guaranteed energy provisioning, and international reconstruction funding.⁴ When those links degrade, the cloud doesn’t just slow down—it vanishes.

Ukraine’s 2022 migration solved one vulnerability (domestic servers vulnerable to Russian missile attacks) while creating another: total dependence on contested network pathways now central to warfighting capability.

In peacetime, cloud computing feels abstract, almost invisible. In war, it becomes concrete and existential.

Drone swarms are often discussed as an artificial intelligence (AI) challenge—computer vision for target identification, autonomy for independent navigation, and coordination algorithms for multiplatform synchronization. In practice, the first constraint is bandwidth. A Carnegie Mellon University study found that a single high-definition (HD) drone video feed at twenty-five frames per second consumes approximately ten megabits per second (Mbps).⁵ While a commander wouldn’t stream video from every platform in a massive swarm, even pulling just a handful of feeds for operator control and target designation—combined with the constant telemetry data, encryption overhead, and packet retransmission required to coordinate the remaining hundreds of drones—creates an operational bottleneck.⁶

Because continuous human-in-the-loop control doesn’t scale gracefully in Ukraine’s contested electromagnetic environment, the operational logic is unforgiving: Forces must either process data locally at the edge—transmitting only highly compressed targeting summaries upstream—or accept that cloud-dependent systems will fail when links are degraded.

Satellite connectivity via Starlink has significantly strengthened Ukraine’s communications resilience. As a proliferated low earth orbit (pLEO) constellation, Starlink is inherently difficult to jam at the orbital level, making it an assured command and control (C2) backup to terrestrial fiber. However, even advanced pLEO architectures introduce constraints at the tactical edge. Uplink bandwidth (10 to 30 Mbps per terminal) and latency (25 to 60 milliseconds) create bottlenecks for high-volume operations. A single HD video feed can consume most of a terminal’s uplink budget, and the ground terminals themselves remain highly vulnerable to localized Russian electronic warfare.⁷

More dangerously, Starlink has become a single point of failure. If these tactical uplinks were effectively denied—whether by Russian terminal jamming, cyberattacks aimed at user networks, or corporate policy shifts—Ukraine would possess no terrestrial or satellite alternative capable of sustaining its current command tempo. If the link goes down, the current architecture of warfighting would collapse within days.⁸

When Russia induces intermittent denial through jamming or cyberattack, cloud-centric architectures don’t just degrade—they fail.

The arithmetic is merciless. Ukraine is producing drones at industrial scale—well over three million annually across aerial, ground, and maritime categories toward a projected seven million in 2026.⁹ As autonomy spreads throughout this ecosystem, bandwidth requirements will outstrip available connectivity by orders of magnitude unless Ukraine fundamentally restructures how and where computation occurs.¹⁰

The infrastructure asymmetry

Ukraine operates approximately fifty-eight data centers compared with Russia’s 251.¹¹ This disparity matters profoundly. More facilities mean greater resilience against kinetic strikes, sovereign control over critical workloads, and capacity to convert domestic energy into computational advantage. Ukraine has compensated through Western cloud access—a genuine strategic asset that Russia cannot easily match. But external dependence creates a ceiling that becomes visible as autonomy scales and adversaries systematically target the links.

The energy dimension compounds this vulnerability. Compute infrastructure requires massive electrical power. Data centers are power-conversion facilities as much as they are computing facilities. Ukraine’s electrical grid has been under sustained Russian attack since October 2022. Strikes have destroyed approximately nine gigawatts of generating capacity—roughly half of prewar levels.¹² Millions of Ukrainians face rolling blackouts lasting up to four days.

This energy crisis has exposed critical fragility. Attacks have decimated thermal power plants, which provide critical load-balancing, while the largest nuclear facility, Zaporizhzhia, remains under occupation and offline. This places extreme strain on the remaining active plants, like the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant, to sustain baseload power.¹³

This strain creates a strategic trap: Russian attacks degrade Ukraine’s domestic power generation, which reduces capacity for domestic compute infrastructure, which in turn increases dependence on external cloud services accessed via networks that Russia can interdict. Ukraine needs compute infrastructure to fight effectively, but the same threats that create that need also are destroying the energy systems required to sustain domestic computing capability. This forces a difficult data localization trade-off: Keeping data within national borders ensures sovereign control and reduces latency, but relying on infrastructure outside of Ukraine’s borders trades that sovereignty for unparalleled physical security against kinetic attacks.

Russia, meanwhile, is pursuing computational sovereignty. Moscow is deepening AI cooperation with China, investing in domestic data-center capacity, and expanding energy infrastructure specifically to support compute-intensive operations. Russia announced a 200 percent increase in military spending for 2025-2026, with significant portions allocated to domestic technology development and infrastructure hardening.¹⁴

This strategy doesn’t mean Russian capabilities are superior; to the contrary, Western cloud infrastructure remains far more advanced, boasting superior hyperscale efficiency, next-generation AI accelerators, and deeper integration of cutting-edge foundational models. But Russia is building resilience through sovereign control and redundancy, accepting lower performance in exchange for systems that can’t be easily severed by adversary action. Ukraine cannot fully mirror this approach given resource constraints and the ongoing attacks on its energy grid. But it must complement cloud reliance with domestic and forward-deployed compute nodes to sustain rapid decision cycles when connectivity degrades or fails.

The interior of one of the apartments in a residential multi-story building is damaged as a result of a Russian strike drone hit in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, on February 26, 2026. (Photo by Dmytro Smolienko/Ukrinform/NurPhoto).

The architecture of warfighting compute

What Ukraine needs—and what any military force will need for autonomous operations at scale in the future—is a layered computational architecture.

The first layer is cloud-scale compute for strategic functions, hosted primarily in allied nations outside of Ukraine. This handles large-scale data aggregation, AI model training, pattern analysis across theater-wide sensor networks, and long-term intelligence processing. This will remain vital and leverage Western technological advantages that Russia cannot match.

The second layer consists of domestic data centers for operational workloads that cannot tolerate cloud latency or link vulnerability. These support theater-level coordination, regional sensor fusion, command and control systems, and logistics planning. These facilities need hardening against kinetic strikes and cyberattacks—such as zero-day exploits or data-wiping malware designed to paralyze command and control. They also require redundant power supplies and geographic distribution to prevent single points of failure.

The third layer involves forward-deployed compute nodes at brigade and battalion levels. These are rugged servers in mobile containers or hardened facilities that can execute tactical coordination, sensor-to-shooter integration, and autonomous system management even when higher-echelon networks are degraded or severed. These nodes need enough processing power to manage hundreds of autonomous platforms simultaneously, updating targeting data, coordinating maneuver, and adapting to enemy actions—all without requiring constant capacity to access and employ cloud infrastructure.

Finally, edge compute on platforms themselves provides the last line of resilience. These are processing capabilities embedded in drones, ground vehicles, and sensor systems that enable basic autonomous functions—obstacle avoidance, target recognition, and formation keeping—without any external connectivity.

This is not hypothetical. New interceptor programs scaling in Ukraine in late 2025 operate on exactly this principle.¹⁵ These systems utilize optical navigation modules that cost less than a smartphone but possess sufficient edge processing to visually lock onto Russian drones. Once locked, they cut their radio link entirely, rendering Russian electronic warfare useless because there is no signal to jam. The drone effectively becomes a flying, disconnected server that solves a single terminal problem: collision.

Each layer serves a different function and operates under different connectivity assumptions. Cloud computing assumes reliable high-bandwidth links and optimizes for processing power and data scale. Edge computing assumes zero connectivity and optimizes for survival of individual platforms. The layers in between—domestic and forward-deployed nodes—are what enable operational effectiveness when conditions fall between those extremes, which in modern combat will be most of the time.

The cost implications are significant but manageable. A forward-deployed compute node with sufficient capacity to manage battalion-level autonomous operations might cost two million dollars, with a total cost of five million dollars when you include hardening, redundant power, and cooling systems. This is expensive relative to individual drones, but modest compared to traditional armored vehicles or artillery systems. More importantly, these nodes are force multipliers: A three-million-dollar compute node that enables effective coordination of five hundred autonomous platforms represents a far better return on investment than three million dollars spent on additional uncoordinated platforms.¹⁶

Current Western aid to Ukraine has focused overwhelmingly on kinetic systems: artillery, air defense, and armored vehicles. Very little has gone toward computational infrastructure. This made sense when the primary challenge was state survival and maintaining basic military capability. As the war evolves toward autonomous operations, however, aid priorities need to evolve accordingly.

What Russia is learning

Russia’s approach to the compute challenge differs fundamentally from Ukraine’s. While Ukraine has leveraged Western cloud superiority, Russia has pursued what might be called “computational autarky”—accepting lower performance in exchange for independence and resilience.

Russian domestic data-center capacity, while less sophisticated than Western equivalents, provides sovereign control over critical military workloads. While Russian military planners face less risk from radio-frequency jamming of satellite uplinks due to their reliance on hardwired domestic fiber-optic lines, they trade one vulnerability for another. To sustain their operations, they must aggressively defend these physical nodes against kinetic strikes—as proven by air domain attacks like Operation Spiderweb—and targeted cyber operations aimed at paralyzing specific computing centers. While completely severing Russia from its compute power is exceedingly difficult, degrading its critical operational nodes is a highly viable threat.¹⁷

More concerning is Russia’s deepening cooperation with China on AI and computing. This isn’t just about purchasing Chinese technology—though that matters. It’s about access to Chinese expertise in autonomous systems, sensor processing, and algorithmic targeting. China already supplies roughly 80 percent of the critical technologies used in Russian drones, and engineers from both nations are collaborating closely on technology development and battlefield adaptation.¹⁸ China leads the world in certain AI applications, particularly computer vision and pattern recognition. Russian access to Chinese AI capabilities could narrow the technological gap with Western systems faster than most Western analysts currently anticipate.

Russia is also learning operationally. Ukrainian drone strikes on targets inside Russia—reported almost daily throughout early 2026—force Russian air defenses to process massive volumes of sensor data, coordinate response across multiple systems, and adapt to Ukrainian tactics in near-real time. These aren’t just kinetic exchanges; they’re competitions in computational speed and algorithmic effectiveness. Russia is building institutional knowledge about autonomous operations under fire at operational tempo, not in peacetime exercises.

The Russian approach has significant weaknesses: lower-quality infrastructure, dependence on Chinese cooperation that may not survive geopolitical shifts, and vulnerability of domestic data centers to long-range Ukrainian strikes. But Russia has thought systematically about computational resilience in ways that Ukraine, focused on survival and leveraging Western support, has not yet fully addressed.

The compute war: Speed vs. resilience

The coming compute war will test whether Ukraine can preserve something that may be even more critical than state continuity: the speed of its learning and decision cycles.

Modern warfare increasingly resembles software development more than industrial production.

Modern warfare increasingly resembles software development more than industrial production. Ukrainian drone units update software and tactics continuously—a technique that works on Monday may be countered by Russian forces by Friday and adapted again by the following Monday. This operational tempo demands computational infrastructure that can support experimentation, rapid prototyping, large-scale testing, and instantaneous deployment across thousands of platforms simultaneously.

Victory will not hinge on who possesses the most servers in aggregate. It will hinge on who can keep computation, coordination, and adaptation functioning under active denial—when spectrum is contested, networks are degraded, and time itself becomes a weapon.

The paradox is that speed and resilience often conflict. Cloud computing optimizes for speed: massive processing power, global data access, and rapid scaling. But it assumes reliable connectivity. Autonomous edge computing optimizes for resilience: operation under denial, degraded communications, and individual platform survival. But it sacrifices coordination, learning, and adaptation that require centralized processing.

The side that solves this paradox—building systems that maintain speed while surviving denial—will have a decisive advantage. And all of this requires not just technology but operational art: understanding what computation must happen when and where, what can be prepositioned before links fail, what decisions can be delegated to autonomous systems, and what must remain under human control even when that means accepting slower execution.

A soldier from the Taifun Special Forces UAV Unit, who participates in combat missions in the Kharkiv region, carries an aerial reconnaissance drone recovered upon landing, Ukraine, February 22, 2026. (Photo by Viacheslav Madiievskyi/Ukrinform via ZUMA Press Wire)

The implications for the United States

There is a second lesson here that extends far beyond Ukraine. For the United States, this conflict is a preview of a fundamental shift in what constitutes strategic infrastructure.

Federal, state, and local governments in the United States still regard data centers primarily as commercial real estate—involving zoning questions, permitting challenges, and local economic development. The Ukraine war suggests a radically different framework: Sustaining compute under attack is a national security imperative, as critical as shipbuilding capacity or semiconductor production.

If the next phase of warfare is shaped by learning cycles and distributed autonomy, then the defense industrial base is no longer only steel and shells. It includes electrical grid capacity, cooling infrastructure, secure facilities, and resilient compute systems that can convert data into operational advantage faster than adversaries can disrupt the process.

Furthermore, because the United States projects power globally, it will face severe distance and latency challenges in any future conflict. A secure data center in Virginia cannot command a drone swarm in the Indo-Pacific at machine speed. This geographic reality dictates that the United States must possess forward-deployed, allied-hosted compute architectures to mitigate the immense latency constraints of expeditionary warfare.

This shift has immediate policy implications. First, grid resilience for computing infrastructure is paramount. Data centers require enormous electrical power: A large facility can consume as much electricity as a small city. In the continental United States, these facilities depend on a grid that was designed for efficiency, not resilience against military attack. Strategic data-center locations need hardened power supplies, backup generation capacity, and rapid restoration capabilities that current commercial facilities lack.

Second, the United States needs mandated geographic distribution of computing capacity. Commercial cloud providers optimize for efficiency, often concentrating computing capacity in specific regions with favorable power costs and network connectivity. From a national security perspective, this approach creates vulnerabilities. Geographic distribution ensures no single region or facility becomes a strategic single point of failure.

Third, the nation should consider a strategic compute reserve. The United States maintains strategic reserves of petroleum, grain, and medical supplies. A similar approach to dormant but maintained data-center capacity would allow activation during crisis, providing surge computing capability when commercial systems are disrupted or need to prioritize military workloads.

Fourth, technology export controls must expand. The United States restricts the export of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to adversaries. It should consider similar controls on data-center technology, cooling systems, and high-performance computing architecture that could help adversaries build resilient computational infrastructure.

Finally, NATO computational resilience must be addressed. While NATO has already acknowledged that severe cyberattacks can trigger the Article 5 collective-defense pledge, the Alliance must go further to explicitly include computational infrastructure in its joint defense planning. Allied nations need assured access to computing capacity during crises even when their domestic infrastructure is under attack. This might require treaty-level agreements on computing resource sharing, protection of undersea cables connecting allied data centers, and prepositioned computational capability in forward-deployed locations.

These aren’t theoretical concerns. Ukraine is living this reality now. Ukrainian commanders are making life-and-death operational decisions based on whether they can access computational resources through contested networks. The United States and its allies would face these same challenges in any high-intensity conflict with a peer adversary capable of targeting networks and infrastructure.

The advantage the United States currently enjoys is time to prepare, though that may be running out. Ukraine is solving these problems under fire, improvising solutions while fighting for its very survival. The United States can—and must—solve them expeditiously, investing in resilience before conflict makes that investment impossible and focusing on enhanced deterrence to make such conflict unlikely.

What must happen now

For Ukraine, the immediate requirement is diversification of computational architecture. This doesn’t mean abandoning Western cloud access, which remains a critical advantage and asset. It means complementing that access with:

Hardened, bunker-grade domestic data centers in western Ukraine, away from front lines but close enough to support operational tempo. These facilities need redundant power from multiple sources, physical hardening against missile strikes, and cyber defenses against Russian intrusion. International assistance should include funding for this infrastructure, which will likely need to be established through robust public-private partnerships.
Forward-deployed compute nodes at the operational and tactical levels. These don’t need to match cloud-scale processing power, but they do need sufficient capacity to manage autonomous operations when higher-echelon networks degrade, with enough redundancy that destruction of individual nodes doesn’t collapse the entire system.
Redundant nonradio communications to ensure reliable connectivity to drones, a core issue. Therefore, investment in redundant physical links is as vital as the computing layers. This capacity includes fiber-optic tethered drones that are physically immune to jamming and free-space optical (laser) links that can transmit high-bandwidth data between “mother” drones and forward nodes without creating a radio signature.
Bandwidth prioritization and compression algorithms that reduce data transmission requirements. If raw video from one thousand drones requires ten Gbps but processed targeting data requires only one hundred Mbps, the system becomes sustainable on available networks.
Energy infrastructure specifically designated for computing, including small modular reactors, solar arrays with battery storage, and protected generator facilities—power sources that can sustain computational infrastructure even when the broader grid is under attack.

For the United States, the requirement is recognition that this isn’t just a Ukrainian problem—it’s a preview of US challenges in future conflict. That recognition should drive Department of Defense investment in distributed computing architecture designed for operation under denial, not just peacetime efficiency.

It also should include mandating “endpoint autonomy” in acquisition. The Department of Defense must shift acquisition requirements to favor systems capable of fully disconnected execution. Rather than treating weapons solely as kinetic effectors dependent on off-board data, future programs must define them as self-contained edge compute nodes. Critical kill chain functions—target identification, discrimination, and terminal guidance—must reside on the platform’s own hardware. This ensures that a loss of a link during the terminal phase does not result in mission failure, treating connectivity as an enhancement for coordination rather than a prerequisite for operation.

A whole-of-government strategy for computational resilience is required, including the Department of Homeland Security for grid protection, the Department of Energy for energy infrastructure, the State Department for international agreements on undersea cables, and the Department of Commerce for export controls. Simultaneously, professional military education must treat computational infrastructure as seriously as logistics, fires, or maneuver. Commanders need to understand bandwidth constraints, latency implications, and trade-offs between centralized and distributed processing, just as they currently understand fuel consumption or ammunition expenditure rates.

Finally, experimentation and exercises must specifically test performance under degraded connectivity. While the US military has increasingly integrated assured C2 into its operational exercises, the depth and scale of these denied-environment simulations must rapidly expand. Exercises need to consistently simulate complete network denial, test autonomous operations under severe communications loss, and identify failure modes before those failures occur in combat.

For NATO and allied nations, the requirement is collective computational resilience as part of collective defense. This includes protected undersea cables connecting allied data centers with the same defensive priority currently given to sea lines of communication. It requires prepositioned computational infrastructure in forward locations, similar to prepositioned stocks of equipment but focused on enabling command, control, and autonomous operations. Information-sharing agreements must specifically address access to computational resources during crisis to ensure smaller allied nations aren’t disadvantaged by lack of domestic infrastructure. Joint investment in energy infrastructure is also critical to sustain allied computing requirements, recognizing that electrical power for computation is as strategically important as fuel for vehicles.

What’s at stake

The technology is already here. Ukraine is producing autonomous drones at industrial scale. Algorithmic targeting is becoming increasingly operational. Machine-learning systems are adapting to Russian countermeasures in real time. What’s missing isn’t technology—it’s the infrastructure to sustain use of that technology under deliberate adversary denial.

If this problem is solved correctly, autonomous tactical units will collapse the coordination overhead that currently limits military effectiveness. New algorithmically piloted systems will enable operational realities built on machine-tempo, combined-arms synchronization. Commanders will delegate bounded execution to formations that self-synchronize sensors, fires, and maneuver, exploiting fleeting windows faster than adversaries can respond, while retaining ultimate responsibility for intent, constraints, and actions taken.

If this problem is solved incorrectly—or not solved at all—autonomous systems will become liabilities rather than assets. Platforms that depend on cloud connectivity will fail when an adversary severs that connectivity. Operations that assume reliable networks will collapse when those networks degrade. The side that builds autonomous capability without building resilience will discover that sophisticated technology without infrastructure becomes inert hardware.

Ukraine’s cloud migration preserved the state under fire. The coming compute war will test whether Ukraine can preserve the speed of its decision cycles—and whether the West understands that speed without resilience is fragility waiting to be exploited.

The United States and its allies have been given an extraordinary gift: the opportunity to learn these lessons while someone else is paying the cost in blood and treasure. Ukraine is the laboratory. The experiments are ongoing. The data is available. The question is whether Western militaries and policymakers will learn quickly enough, and whether they will invest in computational resilience before the next conflict removes that option.

It is imperative to get this right—and get it right first. The autonomous transition will not wait. Neither will the United States’ adversaries.

about the author

Clara Kaluderovic is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, a former Schmidt Fellow at the Special Competitive Studies Project, and a member of the Aspen Strategy Group’s Rising Leaders Class of 2026. Kaluderovic is co-founder and CEO of Mental Health Global, a nonprofit partnered with the Ukrainian Armed Forces to deliver AI-enabled mental health support in conflict zones, and co-founder of ex2, an AI nonprofit developing large language models for underrepresented languages including Kurdish.

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1 Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine,” Royal United Services Institute, May 2023.

2 Emma Schroeder and Sean Dack, “A Parallel Terrain: Public-Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment,” Atlantic Council, February 2023.

3 Amazon Web Services (AWS), “Safeguarding Ukraine’s Data,” AWS Public Sector Blog, June 2022.

4 Tianjiu Zuo et al., “Critical Infrastructure and the Cloud: Policy for Emerging Risk,” Atlantic Council, July 2023.

5 Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science, “Bandwidth-efficient Live Video Analytics for Drones via Edge Computing,” IEEE/ACM Symposium on Edge Computing, 2018.

6 Carnegie Mellon, “Bandwidth-efficient Live Video Analytics.”

7 Ookla Speedtest Intelligence, “Starlink Performance in Europe,” Q3 2024.

8 “Ukraine Says Starlink’s Global Outage Hit Its Military Communications,” Reuters, July 25, 2025; and “Starlink Crackdown Cripples Russians—but American Engineer Warns Ukraine Is Just as Vulnerable,” Euromaidan Press, February 6, 2026.

9 “Ukraine on Track to Produce 3 Million Drones in 2025,” Kyiv Independent, December 2024.

10 See “Data Centers in Ukraine” and “Data Centers in Russia,” Cloudscene Market Directory, Cloudscene, 2024.

11 International Energy Agency, “Ukraine’s Energy Security and the Coming Winter,” 2024; and Financial Times, “Russia Has Taken Out Half of Ukraine’s Power Generation,” June 2024.

12 Energoatom Official Statement; and Al Jazeera Staff, “Mapping Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,” Al Jazeera, September 2022.

13 “Ukraine’s DefTech at the End of 2025: From Drone Mas s to Systems Warfare,” New Geopolitics Research Network, December 2025; and “Ukrainian Company Reveals Its New Drone Interception Control Technology,” Pravda, January 2026.

14 Michael Newton, “How are Drones Changing War? The Future of the Battlefield,” Center for European Policy Analysis(CEPA), November 3, 2025.

15 David Kirichenko, “Ukraine’s AI Drones Are Reshaping Modern Warfare as Precision Strikes Outpace Traditional Artillery,” Milwaukee Independent, October 24, 2025.

16 General James E. Cartwright and Jags Kandasamy, “Operationalizing Artificial Intelligence and the Edge Continuum for Joint All-Domain Dominance,” Atlantic Council, August 2023.

17 “How Fiber Optic Networks Resist Signal Interference,” Fiber Optics Explained, May 2, 2025.

18 David Kirichenko, “The Booming China-Russia Drone Alliance,” CEPA, June 4, 2025.

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UN: Putin’s deportation of Ukrainian children is a crime against humanity

Peter Dickinson — Sat, 14 Mar 2026 12:10:22 +0000

Russia’s mass deportation of Ukrainian children is a crime against humanity, a new United Nations investigation has found. Published this week by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the report concluded that following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Kremlin officials “at the highest level” have overseen large-scale deportations from occupied regions of Ukraine targeting thousands of Ukrainian children.

The report provides fresh insights into Russia’s comprehensive wartime program of child deportations. Moscow is accused of abducting tens of thousands of Ukrainian children since 2022 and forcibly transferring them to Russia as part of a “carefully organized plan” coordinated at the highest levels of the Russian Federation state apparatus. Many victims are reportedly subjected to ideological indoctrination designed to strip them of their Ukrainian identity and impose Russian nationality. This process often includes name changes and adoption into Russian families.

Despite extensive campaigning and humanitarian efforts by Ukraine and the international community, only a relatively small number of abducted children have so far been rescued. The plight of Ukraine’s deported kids has made global headlines and has attracted the attention of US First Lady Melania Trump, who has reportedly sought to help facilitate the return of victims by engaging directly with the Kremlin.

The new UN report noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s direct involvement in the mass deportations has been “visible from the outset.” This tallies with existing criminal charges against Putin brought by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. In spring 2023, ICC officials issued an arrest warrant for Putin for his personal role in Russia’s child abduction program. This warrant has since prevented the Kremlin dictator from attending a number of international summits due to fears that he may face arrest for war crimes.

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This is not the first time United Nations investigators have accused Russia of committing crimes against humanity during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A spring 2025 UN probe concluded that the large-scale detention of Ukrainians in occupied regions of the country represented a “systematic attack against the civilian population” that qualified as a crime against humanity. In areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, Moscow is accused of conducting a Stalin-style terror campaign of mass arrests targeting thousands of civilians including elected officials, journalists, civil society activists, religious leaders, cultural figures, and military veterans.

Similarly, a more recent UN investigation into targeted Russian drone strikes against the civilian population in three front line regions of southern Ukraine determined that these aerial attacks amount to a crime against humanity. The killings are clearly intentional, United Nations investigators concluded, with Russian troops reportedly using video-guided drones to hunt down individual victims. Terrified locals refer to Russia’s drone strikes on civilians as a “human safari.”

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The Kremlin’s ongoing program of child deportations and accompanying anti-Ukrainian indoctrination are viewed in Kyiv as elements of a broader Russian plan to erase Ukrainian national identity entirely. Throughout occupied regions of Ukraine, the Russian authorities are ruthlessly eradicating all traces of Ukrainian statehood, history, language, and cultural heritage. Meanwhile, local residents are being forced to accept Russian citizenship. Anyone who refuses to cooperate risks being denied access to basic public services or deported.

Moscow’s efforts to forcibly Russify thousands of abducted Ukrainian children have been widely cited as evidence of the genocidal intent underpinning Russia’s invasion. This is hardly surprising. The 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention specifically identifies “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as one of five internationally recognized acts of genocide.

Russia rejects United Nations claims that it is committing crimes against humanity in Ukraine and has consistently denied allegations of mass child abductions. Instead, Kremlin officials maintain that the large-scale transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia is a routine wartime safety measure. However, nobody in Moscow has been able to explain why it is necessary to indoctrinate children against their native Ukraine and force them to adopt a Russian national identity in order ensure their safety.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The Strategic Partnership Declaration that Dan and Zelenskyy signed in Bucharest formalizes a relationship that has been intensifying since the start of the war. The framework covers defense cooperation, energy interconnection, economic collaboration, education, and minority rights. These areas suggest that both governments are seeking to anchor their partnership in long-term strategic interests rather than temporary wartime coordination. The progress made on sensitive issues such as minority rights also suggests that both capitals increasingly view their bilateral relationship through the lens of regional security.

The most strategically consequential outcome of the visit is the agreement on joint drone production in Romania, financed through the SAFE program with an estimated allocation of around €200 million. The logic of the project reflects a new model of cooperation: Ukraine contributes battlefield-tested technological know-how developed during the war, while Romania provides NATO territory, industrial capacity, and access to European defense funding. In practice, this represents a shift from traditional military assistance toward co-production of defense technologies, integrating Ukraine’s wartime innovation into the European defense industrial ecosystem.

Energy cooperation represents another structural dimension of the agreements announced on March 12.

Since late 2022, when Russia began to systematically target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure as part of its military strategy, Romania has been one of Ukraine’s most important European energy partners. It has, for example, advocated within the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, known as ENTSO-E, for greater power exports to Ukraine. It has also scrounged Romania’s system for spare parts that could be used for grid and generation repair, and it has leveraged Romania’s long history with civilian nuclear power to support the heroic efforts of Ukraine’s nuclear operator, Energoatom, to maintain safe operations under the most severe stress imaginable.

Romania is likely to become one of the main operational gateways for reconstruction projects and postwar economic cooperation.

In parallel, Ukrainian companies are increasing their footprint in Romania, illustrating how the country’s private sector is adopting an increasingly European focus. For instance, DTEK*, Ukraine’s largest private energy company, is growing its renewables portfolio through new build and acquisitions in Romania’s wind and solar sectors, aiming for a one-gigawatt portfolio by 2030. Projects in this effort include the 60-megawatt Ruginoasa wind farm, the 53-megawatt Glodeni I solar park, and the 126-megawatt Vacaresti solar farm commissioned this past December. Metinvest, DTEK’s sister company, has acquired ArcelorMittal’s Tubular Products plant in Iași, near the Romanian border with Moldova. This cluster of energy and metals investment will now be complemented by defense industry—and in any post-conflict scenario the role of Romanian ports and rail in supporting Ukrainian logistics will grow exponentially.

Meanwhile, Romania’s longstanding support to Moldova—whose grid is umbilically tied to Ukraine—has played an indispensable role in helping both countries to weather four winters of Putin’s energy war and the end of Russian gas deliveries to Transnistria. Plans to accelerate electricity interconnections—such as the Suceava-Chernivtsi line—and to expand cooperation on gas routes and storage capacity point toward a deeper integration of Ukraine into the regional energy network.

Romania is also playing a leading role in advancing the commercial understandings necessary for the Vertical Corridor, a planned gas route from Greece to Ukraine. This effort is opening opportunities for increased US liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the region, and it helps position southeastern Europe for the European Union’s 2027 phase-out of all Russian gas. Meanwhile, Romania’s status as the European Union’s largest gas producer—anchored in the offshore Neptun Deep project—points to the future role of Black Sea resources in helping to replace gas formerly sold by Russia. Strategically, this would strengthen Ukraine’s resilience while reinforcing Romania’s ambition to position itself as a regional energy hub linking Ukraine and Moldova with European Union member states.

But Zelenskyy’s visit also showed how the Vertical Corridor is about much more than energy molecules. The discussions in Bucharest point to a broader role for Romania beyond wartime support, with Bucharest increasingly preparing to assume a key role in the reconstruction of Ukraine, particularly in ports, infrastructure, logistics, and cross-border economic integration. With its geographic proximity, access to European Union funding mechanisms, and growing strategic partnership with Kyiv, Romania is likely to become one of the main operational gateways for reconstruction projects and postwar economic cooperation.

Bucharest is steadily moving from a supportive neighbor to a strategic enabler in shaping the security architecture of the Black Sea region and NATO’s eastern flank.

Note: DTEK’s parent company, System Capital Management, is an Atlantic Council donor.

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What Rob Jetten’s new minority government means for Dutch and European defense

Elmar Hellendoorn — Fri, 13 Mar 2026 12:54:11 +0000

UTRECHT—When you narrowly beat your primary election foe but can’t form a majority coalition to govern, what do you do? Can you still steer your country through some of the most significant geopolitical realignments since 1945 with a minority government? How Rob Jetten, the Netherlands’ youngest-ever prime minister, and his new government coalition answer these questions may serve as an acid test of minority governance in a highly fragmented political environment.

To form the new government, which was sworn in on February 23, three coalition parties negotiated for nearly four months. The result was a document, titled “Getting started,” which outlines the coalition’s agenda. Maintaining this coalition is one challenge; another is advancing the government’s agenda because the coalition lacks a majority in either chamber of parliament. The minority government’s success in implementing its agenda, including its plans for European security and defense, is likely to have implications well beyond the Low Countries.

Putting the coalition together

The new coalition consists of Jetten’s progressive liberal Democrats 66 (D66) party, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), and the centrist-liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Out of 150 seats in parliament, this coalition holds only sixty-six seats, ten short of a majority. Its shortfall is even more pronounced in the Senate, where the coalition holds just twenty-two of the seventy-five seats. To enact any new laws or ratify any new international agreements, therefore, Jetten’s minority coalition will need to find compromises with opposition parties.

The Dutch parliament contains no less than seventeen parties, and the new government will need to be creative in finding ways to assemble assorted groups to pass legislation. The main opposition party is the progressive eco-socialist PvdA-Groenlinks (Labour-Green-Left) with twenty seats. Geert Wilders’ anti-immigrant Freedom Party (PVV) disintegrated after losing the elections and a subsequent internal row; its position has been halved from thirty-seven seats before the election to just nineteen now. On the right flank, Right Answer 21 (JA21) has nine seats, and Forum for Democracy and Group Markuzower (a PVV splinter group) each have seven seats.

European pattern and prospects

As the European Union’s (EU’s) fifth-largest economy and one of NATO’s most capable middle powers, the Netherlands often signals broader trends within Northern Europe. If successful in moving legislation forward in parliament, the new government’s foreign and European policy agenda could contribute to larger shifts in overall Euro-Atlantic diplomatic and security relations. At the top of the new government’s security agenda is the ambition of moving toward a European pillar within NATO. At the same time, the government will need to remain fiscally prudent and avoid proposing radical legislative changes to ensure support.

The relative weakness of the new Dutch government coalition, its minority rule, and the fragmented parliament fit squarely within a wider pattern in European politics. While the constructively pro-European orientation of The Hague may in the short run help support other European centrists, in the longer run, Europe’s structural political problems persist. Together with European partners, the new Jetten government should therefore publicly address the more profound issues facing European liberal democracies, moving beyond the usual technocratic policy analysis. Doing so includes fostering a continental debate about Europe’s future as a civilization underpinning Western values.

In terms of foreign and security policy, the Netherlands under Jetten and his Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen, a former Christian Democrat member of the European Parliament, seek to strengthen European defenses and strategic autonomy while remaining close to the United States. The coalition document spells out this balancing act, explaining that “the Netherlands must pursue a realistic foreign policy in which Dutch and European interests take precedence. NATO constitutes the cornerstone of our collective security. The United States is the global power with which we share the greatest number of interests. At the same time, our future and prosperity are inextricably linked to a strong Europe.”

What this means in practice is the Netherlands taking steps to strengthen the European pillar within NATO. This requires some notable changes, as demonstrated recently when the Dutch government announced that it would join French-led discussions on European nuclear deterrence. Such nuclear diplomacy is a key indicator of The Hague’s strategic realignment. Historically, the Netherlands was highly skeptical about any European nuclear deterrence initiatives, preferring to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. Also notable is the new coalition’s ambition to create a European equivalent to the Five Eyes intelligence partnership.

Defense acquisition is another major aspect. There will also be an effort to set up a “European Defence Mechanism” for the joint European acquisition of military equipment and common military standard setting. The Hague aims to acquire 40 percent of its defense purchases jointly with European partners. And 50 percent should be procured from Dutch and/or European industry.

Notwithstanding these Europeanization efforts in defense policy, the Netherlands remains committed to its ties with the United States, not in the least through the bilateral nuclear sharing agreements and its F-35 air fleet. Toward this end, the coalition government has proposed a law to enshrine a commitment to spending 3.5 percent of gross domestic product on defense, ensuring a long-term, sustained defense effort. The Netherlands also continues to be a major financial contributor to Ukraine’s war efforts, spending 1 percent of Dutch gross domestic product in support of Ukraine.

Geopolitical and financial challenges

In financial and economic policy, it is notable that Finance Minister Eelco Heinen of the VVD party remains in place. Heinen faces a “geofinancial challenge”: to strike the right balance between financial policy and geopolitical exigencies, including the search for greater European strategic autonomy. Under his stewardship, fiscal prudence will remain a key theme. In light of the 3.5 percent defense spending pledge, this prudence is already leading to sharp discussions about social welfare reforms.

In the European context, the Netherlands remains opposed to financing other member states’ national debt, or “eurobonds,” reflecting a longstanding Dutch preference for fiscal discipline in the eurozone. Nonetheless, The Hague looks favorably at common European debt-financed instruments like the Defence Fund, SAFE, and the European Investment Bank. This stance befits a broader trend in the Dutch outlook on European debt mutualization. Furthermore, the new government views implementation of the recommendations of both Enrico Letta’s 2024 report on the future of the European single market and Mario Draghi’s 2025 report on EU competitiveness as crucial. And the Netherlands is a frontrunner in the deepening of Europe’s savings and investment union, previously known as the capital markets union.

The Dutch debate reflects a broader, structural European question: Can a more strategically autonomous Europe emerge not merely from institutional and bureaucratic coordination, which is constrained by a fragmented democratic base, but from a deeper recognition of a shared political destiny? Whether the Jetten government can realize its ambitious European agenda depends on its ability to assemble parliamentary majorities in one of Europe’s most fragmented political systems. The deeper challenge Jetten faces, like other European leaders, is therefore whether he can convincingly give a more profound meaning to his European agenda. His persuasive power may thus ultimately rest on how he approaches Europe: as a civilization underpinning Western values or as an institution for technocratic governance.

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Iran war highlights Ukraine’s rapid rise to drone superpower status

David Kirichenko — Thu, 12 Mar 2026 21:00:19 +0000

Ukrainian drone warfare experts arrived in the Middle East this week to defend the region against Iranian attack drones. Teams of Ukrainian specialists will help coordinate air defense operations in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and will also reportedly work alongside American colleagues to protect US military bases in Jordan.

News of these landmark deployments came also exactly one year after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s infamous Oval Office meeting with US President Donald Trump, which saw the US leader tell his Ukrainian counterpart, “You don’t have the cards.” Twelve months on, it would appear that Zelenskyy does in fact have some trump cards of his own.

The Iran war has sparked a sudden surge in international demand for Ukraine’s unique drone warfare expertise. As hostilities have spread across the Gulf region, more and more states are now looking to Kyiv for support as they seek to counter swarms of Iranian attack drones that are threatening to overwhelm or exhaust conventional missile-based air defenses.

Nobody is better equipped to address this challenge than Ukraine. Since 2022, the Ukrainians have gained unrivaled experience defending their country against massive Russian drone attacks on an almost daily basis. They have learned to do so in a cost-effective and sustainable manner by employing a wide range of tools including cheap interceptor drones, sophisticated monitoring systems, electronic warfare equipment, and helicopter gunships.

Since the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, Ukraine has signaled a readiness to share its drone warfare experience with the United States and its Gulf region allies. Kyiv’s offer has been readily accepted. As a result, the Ukrainian drone defense crews currently deploying to the Middle East are likely to be the first of many. Others are also taking note. Berlin confirmed plans this week to have Ukrainian experts train German troops, while Romania unveiled a major joint venture to co-produce drones together with Ukraine.

This is having a profound impact on Ukraine’s international image. Until recently, Ukraine was widely regarded as a country with little leverage that was heavily dependent on the West for survival. In light of recent developments, a radically different picture is now emerging of Ukraine as a valuable security partner and a major military power in its own right.

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Ukraine’s rise to drone superpower status has been remarkably rapid. The country first began experimenting with the use of drones on the battlefield in the wake of Russia’s initial invasion in 2014. However, major breakthroughs would not take place until the full-scale invasion of 2022.

In the space of just four years, Ukraine has gone from defense tech startup to global leader in the art of drone warfare. This remarkable progress owes much to Ukraine’s vibrant prewar tech sector and the country’s strong entrepreneurial spirit, which have combined to turbo-charge the wartime development of a domestic drone manufacturing sector. The existential nature of the Russian threat has also played a key role, providing local producers and government officials with all the motivation they need to remove potential roadblocks and maximize domestic output.

Ukrainian officials recognized early in the war that they could not rely on Western partners to supply the necessary weapons and ammunition on time and in sufficient quantities. Prioritizing the mass production of comparatively cheap drones was identified as Ukraine’s most realistic strategy as the country sought to counter Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower and conventional firepower. The results speak for themselves. When the full-scale invasion began, Ukraine only had a handful of drone producers. In 2026, domestic output is expected to reach seven million drones.

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Ukraine’s strategic emphasis on drones has transformed the war on land, in the air, and at sea. Around three-quarters of all Russian battlefield casualties are now inflicted by Ukrainian drones. Meanwhile, a drone-dominated kill zone stretching for over ten kilometers either side of the front lines makes any major offensive operations fraught with danger for the attackers. As the Russian invasion enters a fifth year, Ukraine’s “drone wall” is now the key to the country’s defensive strategy.

At sea, Kyiv has used domestically developed naval drones to break the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and neutralize around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet. Following a string of naval humiliations, Putin was forced to withdraw the remainder of his warships from Crimea to the relative safety of Russia itself.

Ukraine’s naval drones are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Some recent models have been armed with anti-aircraft missile capabilities, while others have served as mini aircraft carriers for smaller drones. This creative use of maritime drone technologies has made it possible for Ukraine to gain the upper hand in the Battle of the Black Sea, despite not having a conventional navy to speak of.

Ukraine’s growing drone arsenal also includes long-range drones that have made it possible to strike targets deep inside Russia. In recent years, Kyiv has escalated attacks on military and industrial sites located over one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. This has expanded the geographical scope of the war and brought Putin’s invasion home to Russia in ways that the Kremlin propaganda machine is unable to censor.

Ukraine’s new friends in the Gulf region are primarily interested in Kyiv’s interceptor drone technologies. These weapons have been developed in response to Russia’s own innovative use of attack drones. Since acquiring the blueprints from Iran during the early stages of the war, Russia has significantly upgraded its fleet of Shahed drones to make them bigger, faster, and more maneuverable. Moscow has also dramatically increased production, enabling far larger nightly attacks on targets throughout Ukraine.

The Ukrainian authorities have responded to this escalating Russian bombardment by developing a series of interceptor drones that can be mass produced for a fraction of the cost of traditional air defense missiles. Customers including oil giant Saudi Aramco are reportedly now queuing up to acquire these Ukrainian interceptors.

When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he expected an easy victory and vowed to “demilitarize” the country. With Ukrainian drone specialists now training NATO forces while guarding Gulf petrostates and US military bases, it is safe to say that this attempted demilitarization has backfired in spectacular fashion.

Rather than leaving Kyiv disarmed and defenseless, the war unleashed by Putin four years ago has transformed Ukraine into a drone superpower. This newfound status is already changing outside perceptions of the country and looks set to further strengthen Ukraine’s geopolitical standing as more countries seek to benefit from Kyiv’s drone warfare expertise. Zelenskyy clearly holds plenty of cards and is prepared to play them.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

In other words, they were not designed to be part of a battlefield.

As a result, energy security in the region has often been treated primarily as a corporate security problem managed by national oil companies, rather than as an integrated civil-military planning challenge. That assumption has come increasingly into question since the 2019 strikes on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais facilities. Iran’s attacks this month only underscore the point.

How should Gulf states respond? Two recent conflicts—one involving a major energy exporter and the other a country fighting to keep its power grid running—offer useful lessons. Iraq provides lessons for maintaining export flows—pipelines, terminals, and maritime routes that allow oil to reach global markets despite persistent sabotage. Ukraine illustrates the challenge of domestic resilience: how a national electricity system can continue functioning even while large portions of the grid are repeatedly struck. For Gulf states, which are both export heavyweights and share a regional electricity network through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Interconnection Authority, the challenges that Iraq and Ukraine have faced—and their responses, both successful and not—are worth studying.

Iraq and export resiliency

Iraq provides one of the clearest examples of how an energy exporter adapts when infrastructure becomes a sustained target. Following the US invasion in 2003, insurgent groups quickly discovered the vulnerability of Iraq’s energy system. To this day, the country remains on a road to resiliency, and its path in recent years has been far from smooth. Pipeline sabotage has remained frequent, and the security forces tasked with protecting energy infrastructure—including the pipeline police—have struggled with corruption and uneven training. Yet the country still produced several practical ideas that other energy exporters may find useful. Three lessons in particular stand out:

1. Dedicated pipeline protection forces

Following the 2003 invasion, coalition authorities and Iraqi ministries created specialized units to protect energy infrastructure. These units include an Oil Protection Force comprising roughly 14,000 guards responsible for pipelines, pumping stations, and export facilities. While these units faced challenges related to corruption and the quality of their training, the institutional principle remains important: Protecting energy infrastructure requires dedicated forces organized specifically for that mission rather than general military units temporarily assigned to infrastructure protection.

2. Drone surveillance and thermal monitoring of pipeline corridors

In late 2025, Iraq’s Energy Police Directorate announced the deployment of nearly fifty drones to conduct daily reconnaissance and transmit real-time data to a central command center in Baghdad. Officials also reported the installation of thermal cameras along parts of the pipeline network in cooperation with the Military Industrialization Authority. These systems help detect abnormal heat signatures associated with leaks, fires, or potential sabotage and allow operators to identify suspicious activity along infrastructure corridors that are difficult to patrol continuously.

3. Offshore loading buoys that create alternative export pathways

Iraq has expanded its maritime export capacity through a network of buoys known as single-point moorings (SPMs), which are connected to subsea pipelines. These buoys allow large tankers to load crude oil several miles from shore without docking at fixed terminals. These floating loading points function as distributed export nodes. If major port terminals come under attack or are forced offline, tankers can still load through offshore moorings.

These adaptations did not eliminate attacks on Iraq’s energy sector. Northern export infrastructure—particularly the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline to the Mediterranean—has been repeatedly sabotaged. Iraqi oil exports continued largely because both production and shipments shifted through the country’s southern maritime export system in the Gulf near Basra. Multiple terminals and offshore loading buoys allowed tankers to continue loading crude even when parts of the system were disrupted.

Ukraine’s lessons in keeping the lights on

If Iraq offers lessons in protecting energy exports, Ukraine provides a stark illustration of how governments can keep domestic energy systems running even while infrastructure is under sustained attack.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s power grid has faced sustained missile and drone attacks against generation plants, substations, and transmission infrastructure. Yet despite widespread damage and recurring blackouts, the system has continued operating under extreme strain.

The war has produced several practical ideas about how governments can keep national energy systems operating during sustained strikes. Four lessons in particular stand out:

1. Hardening critical grid infrastructure

Ukrainian operators have reinforced substations and transformers with protective barriers and blast walls. In some locations, particularly vulnerable equipment was relocated or buried underground.

2. Rapid-repair brigades and pre-positioned spare parts

Ukrainian grid operators developed specialized teams capable of quickly restoring electricity after strikes. These brigades travel across the country replacing damaged transformers and reconnecting transmission lines—often restoring service within hours or days.

3. Cross-border grid integration and emergency electricity imports

Ukraine accelerated synchronization with the European ENTSO-E electricity network in March 2022, allowing electricity imports from neighboring countries when domestic generation capacity was damaged.

4. Cross-border gas diplomacy and reverse-flow supply routes

Ukraine has strengthened energy resilience by expanding cross-border gas connections with European partners. For decades, most pipelines in Central and Eastern Europe were designed to carry Russian gas westward through Soviet-era transit networks. After Russia’s gas disputes with Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, European countries began modifying these systems so gas could flow in the opposite direction—allowing supplies from European markets to move east toward Ukraine. Finally, a growing north–south transmission route linking liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals in Greece with pipeline networks through Bulgaria, Romania, and Central Europe—often referred to as the Vertical Gas Corridor—is further expanding the region’s ability to move non-Russian gas to Ukraine during the war.

Ukraine’s experience highlights a harsher reality about infrastructure resilience in modern conflict. Preventing damage entirely is rarely possible. The more realistic objective is to limit disruption and restore service quickly enough for the system to keep operating.

What Gulf governments can learn

Drawing on lessons from both cases, several priorities emerge for Gulf planners, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

1. Conduct vulnerability mapping and pursue “low-tech hardening”

Gulf governments should conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments across oil, gas, and electricity systems to identify the most critical infrastructure nodes and the most likely points of attack. Above-ground pipeline segments, exposed substations, and single export corridors represent predictable vulnerabilities. Gulf states should prioritize simple physical protections that reduce infrastructure vulnerability at relatively low cost. Burying exposed pipeline segments, reinforcing pumping stations, and installing protective structures around substations can significantly reduce damage from drone or missile debris.

2. Institutionalize cross-ministry energy protection procedures and establish emergency operations centers

Energy protection should not rely solely on corporate security departments or temporary military deployments. Gulf governments should establish dedicated structures to coordinate defense ministries, energy agencies, and infrastructure operators. These structures should include 24/7 emergency coordination and monitoring cells focused specifically on energy infrastructure during conflict or crisis, linking civilian energy operators with military authorities, police, fire services, and other government agencies.

3. Expand monitoring of pipeline corridors and remote infrastructure

Energy infrastructure in the Gulf spans thousands of kilometers of terrain that cannot be guarded continuously. Governments should deploy drone surveillance, thermal sensors, and fixed monitoring systems along pipeline routes and critical infrastructure corridors. These systems help detect abnormal heat signatures associated with leaks, fires, or sabotage and allow operators to identify suspicious activity along infrastructure corridors that are difficult to patrol continuously.

4. Pre-position strategic spare parts and repair capacity

Gulf governments should pre-position critical spare parts—including transformers, control systems, and pipeline components—and maintain specialized repair teams capable of restoring operations under emergency conditions.

5. Expand offshore loading infrastructure to create alternative export pathways

Expanding offshore loading infrastructure—particularly SPMs connected to subsea pipelines—can create additional export pathways. Because SPMs are smaller and located offshore, they are harder to target than large terminals and allow tankers to load crude offshore—often up to ten miles away—providing additional distance and warning time from drone or missile attacks. (It is worth noting that this SPM option does not exist for LNG exports, which require specialized liquefaction plants and cryogenic infrastructure to cool gas to roughly –162°C before shipping.)

6. Pursue “grid diplomacy” through deeper regional electricity integration

Cross-border electricity interconnections should be treated as strategic infrastructure. The Gulf already possesses a regional power network through the GCC Interconnection Authority linking Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. Expanding contingency power-sharing agreements within this network could allow Gulf states to support one another during infrastructure disruptions.

With the norm of not attacking civilian energy infrastructure seemingly eroded in modern conflict, governments must take a proactive and whole-of-society approach to energy security.

For Gulf states at the center of global energy markets, resilience will depend on protecting both domestic energy systems and the export infrastructure that connects them to the world. In future conflicts, the ability to keep energy flowing may prove just as decisive as the ability to defend territory.

The post Energy under attack: What the Gulf can learn from Ukraine and Iraq appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkey has weathered regional instability before. But the war in Iran poses greater risks to Ankara than past conflicts.

Grady Wilson — Thu, 12 Mar 2026 15:51:22 +0000

Despite Turkey’s hopes and efforts to mediate prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Ankara is being increasingly drawn into the US and Israeli war against Iran. Turkey aimed to publicly distance itself from the conflict as much as possible in its initial statements, condemning both the strikes on Iran as well as Tehran’s strikes against regional countries. Notably, Turkey was not included in the long list of countries targeted in Iran’s retaliatory strikes early on despite housing US forces at the Incirlik Air Base in the country’s south. Turkish officials were quick to underline that Turkish airspace and assets in the country were not to be used to attack Iran.

However, on Wednesday, March 4, two developments shattered the illusion of Turkey’s ability to steer clear of the conflict. First, NATO shot down an Iranian ballistic missile “directed at Turkish airspace.” Second, there was widespread reporting that the CIA was working to arm Kurdish forces to foment rebellion in Iran.

It was unclear what the Iranian missile was targeting or even whether it was aimed at Turkey or elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as Cyprus. But even if it was aimed in error, Turkey takes violations of its airspace very seriously. Simply ask Russia, whose jet Turkey shot down in October 2015 after straying into Turkish airspace during a Russian bombing campaign in Syria.

Turkey limited its response to the violation from Iran to formal diplomatic channels, summoning the Iranian ambassador in Ankara and holding a private call between the two nations’ foreign ministers. Meanwhile, public pronouncements from Turkish government officials underscored the state’s commitment to protecting its sovereignty. There was no indication that the missile would trigger NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause—Alliance officials quickly poured cold water on the notion and it’s not clear Turkey would even want or seek it in this circumstance.

But on March 9, NATO intercepted a second Iranian missile over Turkey, creating new complications for Ankara. The debris of the second missile fell over the inland province of Gaziantep, in contrast to the first, which hit Hatay, located on the coast. The second missile strike to breach Turkish airspace is therefore less easily explained as an error than the first, and it is likely that one or both of them were aimed at Incirlik.

US intelligence appears to be lining up behind this assessment. On Monday, the US State Department raised its warning for southeast Turkey, the region nearest the Iranian border, to “do not travel,” the highest risk level. And nonessential staff were ordered to leave the US consulate in Adana. The second missile also led to a more direct and targeted rebuke from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who said Tehran continues to take “wrong and provocative” steps and that Turkey has issued the necessary warnings to Iran.

Meanwhile, the news that the CIA was arming Kurdish forces to combat Iran set off alarm bells in Turkey, which has been burnt badly by previous partnerships between the United States and auxiliary Kurdish ground forces. Most notably, there have been Turkish tensions with the United States over US support for the People’s Defense Units (YPG), a Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and Turkey. With US support, the YPG was effective in combatting and curtailing the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) starting in 2014, but the group also precipitated a diplomatic crisis with Turkey that the US-Turkish bilateral relationship is only now beginning to recover from. The prospect of a similar scenario repeating itself in Iran was raised at a recent event the Atlantic Council’s Turkey program hosted on US-Turkey cooperation in Syria.

Moreover, the emboldening of the transnational Kurdish nationalist movement in Syria also played a key role in the breakdown of the peace process between Turkey and the PKK in 2015. Now in 2026, Turkey is once again moving toward resolving the PKK issue, under the “terror-free Turkey” initiative. Regional spoilers or irritants to this very delicate and choreographed process could once again threaten to derail the conclusion of the almost fifty-year conflict between Turkey and the PKK, which has claimed the lives of tens of thousands.

Fortunately, based on US President Donald Trump’s messaging over the weekend and signals that the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq was not keen to put itself more into the crosshairs, it looks as if Turkey’s fears of a Kurdish uprising in Iran aligned with the PKK will be avoided.

But the fact that support for such an insurgency was being considered underscores the lack of clarity on the goals and endgame of the conflict, which is particularly concerning for states like Turkey that neighbor Iran. Given its experiences with the Syrian civil war and the war in Iraq, Turkey is deeply averse to the potential of regional disintegration and power vacuums at its border. The specter of terror organizations with freedom to operate on its border is something Turkey cannot help but be vigilant against, as would any country in its position.

In this context, Turkey is adopting a delicate balancing act, seeking to protect its territory, security, and economic interests. Despite significant concerns over the war in Iran, Turkey has invested heavily in its outreach to the Trump administration, working to turn its bilateral relationship with the United States around from historic lows. Thus far, Turkey has crafted public messaging aiming to avoid criticizing the United States and drawing Trump’s ire.

But much in the same way Turkey approaches Russia, Ankara views Iran as a fact of life to be managed simultaneously through cooperation when possible and competition when it is not. An irony is that Turkey has been one of the largest beneficiaries of the severe degradation to Iran and its regional proxy network wrought mainly by Israel since the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Since then, Turkey’s influence in Syria, the South Caucasus, and Iraq has increased while Iran’s has decreased.

But when it comes to the US and Israeli war against Iran, the risks are greater and the outcomes more uncertain. Any actions Turkey considers taking to respond to Iran’s missiles or to protect its borders are calibrated against the inevitability that it will need to deal with whatever Iran is left standing after the conflict ends—and the regional fallout that results. For now, that means Turkey is, to the extent possible with war raging next door, seeking to avoid escalating in both kinetic and rhetorical terms.

Grady Wilson is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Kosovo’s Political Limbo Worries Brussels | A Debrief with Augustin Palokaj

sjones — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 14:28:46 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Europe Center Resident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks with Brussels-based senior correspondent Augustin Palokaj about growing concerns in the EU capital over Kosovo’s prolonged institutional impasse, after President Osmani’s decision to dissolve the Parliament and the Constitutional Court temporarily suspended the decree dissolving the Kosovo Assembly.

Despite the lifting of EU measures and the prospect of up to €1.5 billion in EU and pre-accession funds, Kosovo remains the only Western Balkan country without EU candidate status. The discussion also examines the postponed visit of EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos to Prishtina and the prospects for a new start in EU-Kosovo relations.

Palokaj also reacts to the letter sent by Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić seeking early access to the EU single market and the Schengen area, a proposal that reportedly disappointed supporters of EU enlargement.

The episode also touches on rule-of-law concerns in Albania, Montenegro’s continued progress in closing accession chapters, and the broader outlook for EU enlargement in the Western Balkans.

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Q&A with Turkish Member of Parliament Fuat Oktay

Atlantic Council Turkey Program — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Fuat Oktay is the chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s (Türkiye’s Parliament) Foreign Affairs Committee. He previously served as a vice president of the Republic of Türkiye. The Defense Journal of the Atlantic Council Turkey Program recently interviewed Oktay, covering US- Türkiye relations, the Turkish defense industry, and NATO.

The interview was conducted on February 18, 2026 and has been lightly edited for style.

DJ: Recent developments in Syria appear to have removed a long-standing elephant in the room in US–Turkish relations. Washington and Ankara now seem aligned on preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and on the primacy of a centralized government in Damascus under President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s leadership. How do you assess this convergence, and what does it signal for the future of US–Turkish security cooperation?

Oktay: It is true that Türkiye and the United States have converged in recent years on a number of foreign policy issues. This convergence is visible not only in Syria, but also in efforts to end the war in Ukraine, support a durable framework in Gaza, and encouraging progress in the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process, among other areas. This convergence is for the establishment of sustainable peace and stability in our region. Our region is tired of conflicts and war. The issues in our region should be solved through dialogue and not through armed clashes and war.

In Syria, Türkiye has been supporting the unity and territorial integrity of this country since the very beginning. Now both Türkiye and the United States support Syria’s territorial integrity and unity and recognize the importance of a centralized and effective government in Damascus. A united, stable, inclusive, and prosperous Syria is, first and foremost, in the interest of the Syrian people. It is also in the interest of the broader region.

This convergence reflects a realistic reading of regional dynamics and a mutual understanding that sustainable solutions require regional actors and inclusive diplomacy.

It is the right time to reinforce the positive momentum in Türkiye–US relations to a resilient, future-oriented, principled relationship, grounded in mutual respect and strategic responsibility.

DJ: Do you see this more constructive atmosphere on Syria translating into movement on bilateral defense ties? In your view, what should both sides do to enhance the defense portfolio? And to follow up, what are the odds of Türkiye’s eventual return to the F-35 program in the near to medium term?

Oktay: Defense cooperation should be viewed in the wider context of the overall relationship. One of the main drivers of a more constructive atmosphere has been the direct and cordial dialogue between President [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan and President [Donald] Trump. Strong engagement at the leadership level has generated momentum across multiple areas of cooperation.

Economically, our bilateral trade volume is approaching $40 billion, and we share the objective of reaching $100 billion. Major items—such as Turkish airline companies’ aircraft purchases, long-term LNG [liquefied natural gas] arrangements, and potential future cooperation in civil nuclear energy—can further deepen our economic ties.

In this spirit, defense cooperation should mirror the positive trajectory in our bilateral relations, as well as the growing convergence on regional policy issues. For this reason, it is important to overcome the existing restrictions affecting Türkiye in the defense industry domain. Restrictions between allies are, by definition, inconsistent with the spirit of alliance and partnership.

At present, there are efforts at the governmental level in both countries to identify a workable path forward, including on the question of Türkiye’s access to the F-35 program. In February, as the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, we visited Washington, DC, and held constructive discussions with our counterparts in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. We conveyed our view that it is neither coherent nor sustainable to maintain such restrictions among partners and allies. We hope to see tangible progress at the congressional level to strengthen defense industry cooperation.

DJ: Türkiye’s defense industry has undergone a remarkable transformation over the past decade. Where do you see Turkish defense industrial capabilities today, and what do they represent for both Türkiye and the NATO Alliance? Looking ahead, what should be Ankara’s strategic priorities in this domain?

Oktay: Türkiye’s defense industry has achieved significant and sustained progress over the past two decades. During this period, we have transitioned from an import-procurement model toward a high-volume domestic design and production model, with a growing export dimension.

The share of local and national production in the defense industry has increased from around 20 percent to more than 80 percent, and we expect this rate to reach 85 percent in the near future.

Today, Türkiye is producing manned and unmanned fighter aircraft, such as the Kaan and Kızılelma jets, warships, armored vehicles, missiles, and rockets, as well as advanced sensors and related systems. At the same time, Türkiye is increasingly localizing critical electronic subsystems, including avionics, data links, communications, and mission computers, as well as smart munitions. Defense exports have now surpassed $10 billion annually. Turkish defense industry exports and cooperation cover 185 countries covering all continents, including such NATO members as the US, UK, Spain, and Italy.

In summary, Türkiye has become an important global producer of advanced defense technologies. These capabilities—both in production scale and technological innovation—represent a valuable contribution to NATO’s collective security, and particularly to European security. In this context, the inclusion of Türkiye in European defense industry initiatives is essential in order for both NATO and Europe to fully benefit from Türkiye’s achievements in this field.

DJ: The KAAN fighter program is widely viewed as a cornerstone of Türkiye’s future force structure. What vision do you associate with KAAN, both in terms of operational capabilities and Türkiye’s broader ambitions for defense cooperation and access to new defense markets?

Oktay: KAAN is among the most advanced fifth-generation fighter projects currently under development. It reflects core fifth-generation design requirements such as low observability, sensor fusion, and network-enabled operational concepts.

KAAN will represent a significant capability enhancement for the Turkish Air Force and will strengthen NATO’s southeastern flank. In addition, the program is a major driver of innovation for Türkiye’s broader aerospace ecosystem, with spillover effects across engineering, production, and advanced systems integration.

A number of countries have expressed interest in acquiring or co-producing KAAN. Last year, an agreement for forty-eight KAANaircraft was signed with Indonesia, and several other countries remain in close contact with Türkiye regarding potential cooperation.

DJ: The next NATO summit will be hosted in Ankara. What does this mean symbolically and strategically for the Alliance and for Türkiye? How do you assess Türkiye’s role within NATO today—and NATO’s importance for Türkiye?

Oktay: We look forward to hosting NATO’s next summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026. The summit will be an important opportunity to review progress in implementing the Hague commitments and to take decisions that further strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defense posture.

As the war in Ukraine has heightened Europe’s security concerns and uncertainty is affecting transatlantic relations, the Ankara Summit will be a critical meeting. Key issues will be discussed, and major decisions will be taken on the future direction of the Alliance.

Türkiye has always played, and continues to play, a vital role in the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. Türkiye holds NATO’s second-largest army and remains among the top contributors to NATO operations and missions, supporting both the Alliance’s southeastern and eastern flanks. We have already exceeded the 2-percent benchmark in defense spending, and we remain committed to further strengthening our contributions.

As we are committed to the security of our allies, we likewise expect them to be fully committed to Türkiye’s security and defense.

DJ: Türkiye’s influence across the Turkic world has grown, particularly through the Organization of Turkic States. How would you characterize Ankara’s strategic vision in this space, and what does the geopolitical horizon suggest about Türkiye’s long-term role across this geography?

Oktay: Türkiye has deep historical and cultural ties across the Turkic world. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is today the principal political framework for multilateral cooperation in this space. It reflects a shared vision to deepen integration and promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity. The OTS also functions as a catalyst for stronger regional ownership, and with the establishment of multiple sub-institutions, it is evolving rapidly into a more structured and specialized organization.

In parallel, the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TÜRKPA) serves as the main platform for strengthening parliamentary cooperation among Turkic states and supporting broader integration efforts. At the parliamentary level, we have also developed a mechanism for bringing together the Foreign Relations Committees of the Parliaments of Turkic States. The first such meeting took place in Azerbaijan, and the second meeting was held in Istanbul last year.

Through these institutions—along with strong bilateral relations—Türkiye is expanding cultural, political, and economic cooperation and coordination among Turkic states, with the objective of promoting peace and prosperity across Central Asia and the Caucasus.Bottom of Form

Fuat Oktay is the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Türkiye. He served as the last Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry between 2016 and 2018. In the first cabinet of the Presidential Government System, he served as Türkiye’s first Vice President between 2018 and 2023.

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Q&A with Rep. James Walkinshaw (VA-11)

Atlantic Council Turkey Program — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Congressman James Walkinshaw is a first-term representative of Virginia’s eleventh congressional district. The Defense Journal of the Atlantic Council Turkey Program recently interviewed Rep. Walkinshaw covering US-Turkey relations, the Caucus on US-Turkish Relations and Turkish Americans, and Congress’ role in foreign policymaking.

This interview was conducted on January 26, 2026 and has been lightly edited for style.

DJ: We’ve heard that you have agreed to join the Caucus on US-Turkish Relations and Turkish Americans—great news for the bilateral relationship and those interested in it. Can you tell us a little bit about the role of congressional caucuses in general and why we need a Turkey Caucus?

Walkinshaw: I served as chief of staff to the late Rep. Gerry Connolly for nearly a decade. During that time, Rep. Connolly was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and served as a co-chair of the bipartisan Caucus on US-Turkish Relations and Turkish Americans. In my capacity as chief of staff, I supported his leadership on the caucus and, in response to constituent engagement and the strategic importance of the US–Turkish relationship, chose to join the caucus myself.

Congressional country caucuses can play a constructive role in strengthening bilateral relationships, while also providing a bipartisan forum to raise concerns and address areas of disagreement. Rep. Connolly understood the importance of maintaining a strong diplomatic relationship with Turkey, but he was also clear-eyed and outspoken about President Erdoğan’s persistent efforts to consolidate power and suppress political dissent. He used his position as co-chair to consistently sound the alarm about the erosion of democratic norms in Turkey.

I spent years supporting Rep. Connolly’s work in this space, and I intend to use my role on the caucus to continue advocating for a stable, prosperous, and democratic Turkey, and a strong US-Turkish relationship.

DJ: Turkey plays an important role in several major foreign policy priorities for Washington: ending the war in Ukraine, stabilizing Syria, finding a better way out for Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza, and forging a lasting peace in the South Caucasus. And despite the prevailing polarization in US politics, there have been encouraging signs of bipartisan approach in these areas—illustrated by the trip of Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, a Democrat, and Rep. Joe Wilson, a Republican, to Syria and the region last August. How hard is it to work across the aisle on foreign policy matters in the current environment?

Walkinshaw: US foreign policy is framed through bilateral ties, diplomatic and security agreements, treaties, and international organizations with guiding principles to promote democracy, ensure stability, and to invest and work with partners while deterring escalation or military action by adversaries.

It requires balancing the three D’s: defense, diplomacy, and development. Congress may not always agree on how the three D’s should be best implemented, but it’s important to acknowledge that one should not exist without the other and that’s the balance we are always trying to strike when working on foreign policy matters in Congress. Nevertheless, my approach is to identify a path to “yes.” Effective governance requires bipartisan engagement and a willingness to work constructively with colleagues across the aisle. Even in such a polarized environment, I am pleased that Congress worked on consequential issues such as reunifying families separated after the Korean War by passing the Korean American Divided Families National Registry Act, repealing the 1991 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force, and reestablishing the program at the US State Department to support the Ukrainian government in tracking Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. While significant work remains, these efforts underscore that there are serious foreign policy challenges where Congress can, and must, continue to act in a bipartisan manner.

DJ: How do you see the role of Congress—both houses—in shaping US foreign policy and interacting with the executive branch? What is the right balance between oversight/checks and balances on the one hand and “divisions stop at the water’s edge” on the other?

Walkinshaw: Congress is the preeminent branch of government, with broad powers outlined in Article I of the Constitution. What we have seen over the last twenty years, when the White House and Congress are controlled by different parties, Congress finds its Article 1 powers, and when the White House and Congress are controlled by the same party, Congress loses sight of its Article 1 powers. Article 1 of the US Constitution states clearly that Congress has the power to declare war, to lay and collect taxes and duties, and regulate commerce with foreign nations. President Trump is running roughshod and Congress has the responsibility to assert its authorities under the Constitution. President Trump illegally invaded Venezuela with no congressional authorization, putting US service members’ lives at risk, has implemented tariffs unilaterally and illegally, and recently foolishly threatened to purchase or invade Greenland.

Congress must reassert its powers under Article 1 in a bipartisan manner. I’ve supported War Powers resolutions to withdraw troops from hostilities that haven’t been authorized by Congress and voted to terminate the president’s misuse of International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorities to implement tariffs on long-standing US allies. This is a consequential moment in modern American history. President Trump has repeatedly undermined the postwar, rules-based international order and pressured long-standing US allies. Congress possesses clear constitutional authorities to act as a check on this behavior. The challenge is not a lack of power, but a lack of political will among some members to exercise it in the face of partisan pressure and potential political retaliation.

DJ: Your district is one of a handful in the Congress that have massive intrinsic interest in foreign policy and foreign affairs—because of a significant foreign-born population, businesses with foreign interests, and constituents involved with foreign policy and defense. Do you get a lot of input from constituents in your district about foreign policy?

Walkinshaw: I’m proud to represent such a diverse district: 31 percent of the residents in my district are foreign-born. VA-11 is home to a vibrant Korean American community, Uyghur community, South Asian community, and many other immigrant communities that enrich our civic life. VA-11 is also home to more than 50,000 federal employees, many of whom bring national security, foreign policy, and public service experience shaped by our proximity to Washington, DC, and the Pentagon. As a result, my constituents are deeply engaged, highly informed, and passionate about international affairs and US foreign policy.

I value that engagement and actively seek input from constituents, welcome substantive dialogue on their priorities and concerns, and work to ensure their perspectives inform the actions I take in Congress. Representing this district carries both a responsibility and an opportunity; to listen, to lead, and to translate constituent expertise into effective policymaking.

DJ: The US-Turkish relationship has traditionally been focused on defense and security and followed the ups and downs of regional crises. Is it possible to broaden that scope a bit through people-to-people ties, parliamentary exchanges, and greater business cooperation? Is there a role for Congress to play in catalyzing that sort of growth?

Walkinshaw: It is possible to broaden and deepen the US-Turkish relationship, and Congress can play a constructive role in catalyzing that progress. Increased people-to-people ties, parliamentary exchange, and greater business cooperation can and should play an important role in advancing the dialogue around the benefits of civil society and democracy.

DJ: Your predecessor, Congressman Connolly, was a co-chair of the Turkey Caucus, and you were a major support to him during your previous work. Is there unfinished work for the caucus, and what do you see as the best priorities for it after several years of being relatively quiet?

Walkinshaw: The late Rep. Connolly was a steadfast advocate for democratic governance and the rule of law in Turkey. He forcefully condemned the 2016 coup attempt and was equally clear-eyed about President Erdoğan’s subsequent consolidation of power and erosion of democratic institutions. I share those concerns.

At the same time, it is important to recognize Turkey’s significant diplomatic role in a volatile region. Owing to its geostrategic position at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus, Turkey has at times served as a key intermediary, including through its role in brokering the Black Sea Grain Initiative and supporting US efforts to secure a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.

Moving forward, my approach is to uphold democratic principles while engaging with strategic realities.

DJ: What are your greatest concerns regarding US-Turkish relations currently, and what (if any) advice would you have for leaders in both countries to address those?

Walkinshaw: My primary concerns regarding US-Turkish relations center on President Erdoğan’s consolidation of power and his continued engagement with US adversaries. His suppression of political dissent and pursuit of closer alignment with blocs such as BRICS raise serious questions, particularly given Turkey’s status as a NATO ally.

A stronger and more durable US-Turkish relationship ultimately depends on shared democratic commitments. Reaffirming respect for free and fair elections, the rule of law, and the expressed priorities of the Turkish people would not only strengthen Turkey’s democratic institutions but also improve trust and cooperation with the United States and our allies. With respect to President Trump, his record reflects a disregard for democratic norms and the postwar rules-based international order. While his tenure is limited, Congress retains an enduring responsibility to assert its constitutional authorities. I remain confident that Congress will be positioned to more effectively reassert its role, restore oversight, and serve as a meaningful check on executive overreach in the near future.

Congressman James Walkinshaw is a first-term representative of Virginia’s eleventh congressional district. Congressman Walkinshaw serves on the influential House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, on the Military and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, and on the Committee on Homeland Security. He is the Founder and Co-Chair of the Federal Workforce Caucus, launched alongside Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) and Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.)

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As Ankara rethinks its Libyan policy, the Haftar family stands to gain

Karim Mezran, Alissa Pavia — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Libya remains mired in a protracted civil conflict that has divided the country between rival factions in the West and East, each attracting foreign military and economic support. Ankara, which had strongly backed one side, recently modified its foreign policy to pursue rapprochement with neighbors in the region, which has significant implications for Libya and its own influence in a shifting landscape there.

For years, Turkey has backed the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, which is recognized by the United Nations as Libya’s legitimate authority. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, have long supported the eastern faction, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by warlord and former CIA asset Khalifa Haftar. Interestingly, Turkey and the Tobruk-based LNA have entered a chapter of significant engagement after being sworn enemies for much of the last decade.

Turkey, for its part, seeks to expand influence over the entirety of Libya for economic and geopolitical gains, wanting to gain access to Libya’s vast oils fields in the eastern zone and aiming to impose its stance in an ongoing maritime dispute with Greece and Egypt over the Eastern Mediterranean, where both countries claim maritime territory. Meanwhile, Haftar and his sons seek recognition from regional powers such as Turkey to legitimize the family’s rule and become the de facto leadership of Libya.

Why this matters

These developments represent a significant shift in domestic and regional dynamics. Domestically, it strengthens Haftar’s LNA as it vies for that prime governing role. The LNA is contending for greater international recognition than the GNU, and a buy-in from a powerful actor like Turkey would surely tip the scales, granting the LNA a level of international legitimacy that could surpass that of the GNU.

The international community (as expressed through the UN) sees the GNU as the legitimate force, but will have to come to terms with Dbeibah’s weakened political hand. Dbeibah himself is well aware of the stakes involved, and while publicly he has endorsed what he sees as Turkey’s “backing of Libya’s stability,” it would be naïve to think he welcomes such efforts. Additionally, it will embolden the Haftar family to continue pursuing an aggressive push for regional integration under its command, potentially leading to de facto unification, albeit under leadership with an abysmal human rights record and dubious allegiance to the West.

Why the LNA welcomes Turkey’s support

In 2019, when Haftar launched his military offensive to gain control over Tripoli, the capital city, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent military support to the GNU, including troops, ships, drones and advisers, for its defense, signaling Turkey’s strong commitment to the Western-backed government. Today, however, Turkey’s goal of repositioning itself regionally spurred a strategic cost-benefit calculus. Isolated after attempting to become a regional hegemon, Turkey has sought to reestablish itself in the region through strategic reengagement with countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

For its part, the LNA stands to benefit considerably from Ankara’s strategic repositioning. First, a potential defense partnership between the LNA and Turkey is quickly taking shape, and it stands to deliver substantial benefits to the Haftar family. In April 2025, Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa and deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan Ground Forces, met Turkey’s general chief of staff, Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu, to discuss a mutually beneficial defense agreement which would include joint military training, capacity building, information sharing, and the procurement of weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Earlier that month, Saddam Haftar paid an official visit to Ankara, marking a new chapter in relations between the nation and the Libyan faction. A subsequent visit by a military delegation from Libya’s eastern forces to Turkey confirmed that this shift is underway, and soldiers from Haftar’s LNA have recently begun training at bases in Turkey, as forces associated with the government in Tripoli have done beginning of 2020.

Secondly, Ankara is looking to deepen its energy ties by investing in gas exploration over disputed water with Libya’s eastern faction. In 2019, Ankara signed an exploratory agreement with Libya’s western faction in Tripoli, but the agreement failed to take off due to eastern opposition. Today, Libya’s eastern powerbrokers look poised to sign it—if, that is, they are granted oversight control over the outputs, after complaining for multiple years of being excluded from key revenue streams and leadership opportunities. If signed, the explorations could provide significant financial benefits to Libya’s eastern area, which suffers from recurring fuel shortages due to its lack of refining capacity. It would also help boost Haftar’s legitimacy by aiding him with key supplies for the local population under his control, strengthening his position both domestically and internationally.

Third, a rapprochement with Ankara would give the Haftars valuable leverage with Russia and Turkey, enabling them to extract greater concessions from both nations. The Haftars have long been supported by the Russians, especially since their Tripoli offensive in 2019; in turn, they’ve allowed Russian Africa Corps troops to run wild in parts of the country, furthering Russia’s footprint on the continent. While Russia once held greater leverage over the Haftars, this dynamic shifted after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in January 2025, which prompted Moscow to withdraw its military equipment there and seek new military footholds in Libya. Now, with the Haftar family having the upper hand, the family can try to leverage this renewed position of strength to expand its alliances without fearing repercussions from Russia, Turkey’s long-standing rival in the region. It also can hope to exact concessions from both parties, extracting both economic and military benefits which would help consolidate domestic authority.

Implications for the Eastern Mediterranean

The engagement between Libya’s eastern faction and Turkey will likely have ripple effects across the region. First, it could sour the relationship between Egypt and Turkey over the disputed maritime zone agreements. Currently, Egypt rejects the maritime zone set between Ankara and Tripoli, considering them an infringement of Egyptian maritime sovereignty as they cut across water lines. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has made it abundantly clear he will reject any association agreement between Libya and Turkey, potentially reigniting tensions after their historic 2023 rapprochement. Egypt claims that any oil exploration will infringe on its territorial seas, denouncing them as an infringement of international law. Such tensions would have enormous consequences for the Mediterranean region writ large.

Second, Haftar, could use any growing tension between Egypt and Turkey to extract greater concessions for himself by playing Ankara against Cairo. By publicly signaling deference to Egyptian authority while quietly advancing his ties with Turkey, Haftar stands to emerge stronger, consolidating his family’s hold on power and potentially paving the way for unifying Libyan territory under their control.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Alissa Pavia is a nonresident senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Ankara and Washington can build on recent groundwork to improve relations and stability

Murat Yeşiltaş — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Turkish-US relations have long been overshadowed and stymied by crisis: S-400 sanctions, the People’s Defense Units (YPG) and YPG influence in Syria, F-35 defense procurement, competitive alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the normative divisions created by regional conflicts. Despite these complex problems, after President Donald Trump returned to the White House, 2025 became a transitional year in which these problems were not solved but did not paralyze bilateral relations; moreover, the relationship was carried forward by increasing areas of compromise. Therefore, as we move further into 2026, the fundamental question is not whether there will be a major break or rapprochement but whether the two countries transform the pragmatic groundwork laid in 2025 into a more permanent working arrangement and make areas of compromise the main axis driving the relationship.

In this context, compromise should be viewed not as romanticism but as a geopolitical necessity and a cost-reduction mechanism. The interests of Turkey and the United States do not coincide one to one but, when they clash, the costs paid by both sides increase. Therefore, the emerging picture can be summarized as the two countries moving toward greater coordination in areas where they cannot replace each other and managing their disputes by compartmentalizing them. The return of leadership diplomacy, coordination aimed at producing results on the ground in Gaza, the window of opportunity for cooperation in post-Bashar al-Assad Syria and the Middle East, signals of controlled normalization in the defense sector, the institutional leverage created by the July 2026 NATO Summit, and Trump’s visit to Ankara beforehand all lead to the same conclusion: the relationship can progress not only through crisis-producing issues but also through crisis-preventing areas of agreement.

Leadership diplomacy

The first practical result of leadership diplomacy was the reactivation of that crucial channel with President Recep Erdoğan’s visit to Washington in 2025. The critical implication of this is that most of the problems in Turkish-US relations are political, not technical; even those that appear technical carry the burden of domestic politics, bureaucratic resistance, and intra-Alliance bargaining. Leader-level diplomacy does not eliminate this burden, but it does two things. First, it removes a deadlock from being a permanent obstacle; second, it produces the political authorization that makes technical negotiations possible. What is needed to expand areas of compromise in 2026 is to anchor this momentum in institutional channels: regular strategic dialogue, coordination between defense and foreign affairs channels, and rapid contact mechanisms that can be activated in times of crisis. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s functional contribution on Syria and Gaza in 2025 serves as proof for the White House of improved Turkish-US relations.

Gaza: Despite differences in rhetoric, results-oriented cooperation on the ground

The Gaza issue in Turkish-US relations can be positioned as an important example of compromise in 2025. Although Turkey and the United States have different discourses and priorities regarding the region, it was possible to produce results on the ground in areas such as establishing a ceasefire, access to humanitarian aid, practical implementation mechanisms, and diplomatic coordination. This stands out as a model in which compromise means producing the same result rather than establishing the same discourse.

In 2026, the strategic value of the Gaza file is twofold. First, it demonstrates that a joint crisis management capacity can be developed despite the long-standing normative divergence in Turkish-US relations. Second, this capacity is not just a momentary agreement. If it evolves into a process that can be sustained through multilateral formats, it creates a common output area that reduces regional costs for both countries. But the lesson of 2025 is clear: harmony is not absolute; it is sustainable when it is functional and goal oriented. Despite Israel’s objections, the White House’s support for Turkey’s participation in the International Stabilization Force and Ankara’s willingness to participate are among the most promising recent developments on the Ankara-Washington front. More importantly, the Turkish foreign minister’s presence as a signatory—standing alongside Trump at the inaugural meeting of his Board of Peace in Davos—underscores the weight Washington assigns to Turkey in addressing the Gaza crisis and highlights the potentially constructive role Ankara could play on the ground.

Syria and the Middle East after Assad

The Syria issue has long been a source of tension in Turkish-US relations. However, the past year has shown that the post-Assad era offers an opportunity to reframe this issue. The survival of the new order, the country’s territorial integrity, the establishment of central authority, the easing of sanctions, and the start of reconstruction processes create broad common ground between Ankara and Washington.

The key point that makes compromise possible here is this: for Turkey, stability in Syria means not only increasing border security but also preventing the risk of fragmentation and ensuring that terrorist threats are not reproduced. For the United States, a stable Syria is an outcome that limits the risk of regional wars spreading and reduces the need for costly military engagement. Therefore, in 2026, Syria might cease to be an area where the two countries pursue the same goal with different means and instead evolve into a partial convergence of means.

The file on the YPG and the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is not completely closed; however, with the SDF withdrawing from areas it had long controlled in the face of advancing Syrian forces, Ankara-Washington ties appear to be entering a new phase in terms of Syria. In particular, US Ambassador Tom Barrack’s remark that the conditions on the ground—and thus the perceived need for the SDF in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—have changed could be read as a historic turning point in Turkish-US relations. The critical element that will increase reconciliation in 2026 is verifiable progress on the ground in the post-SDF era: an integration timetable, security arrangements, the alignment of local administrations with the central state, and the limitation of moves by external actors that undermine stability. When this happens, the Syria file could transform from an unsolvable crisis to a manageable transition in the relationship. Furthermore, Washington’s goal is both to align with Ankara on the SDF/YPG issue and to play a role in bringing Israel to an understanding with Syria. Washington and Ankara are on the same page regarding Turkey’s political and military role in Syria providing security for Israel. When considered alongside the constructive and reasonable progress on the Gaza file, this could put the United States, Arab states, and Gulf countries on the same page—and, in turn, create an opportunity for Washington to renew its image as a Middle East peacemaker. This is a new historical threshold and allows for a restructuring of the Middle East regional security architecture that produces security for everyone. With its diplomatic capacity and crisis resolution capabilities, Turkey stands out as a key country in such a process. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s evolving defense pact—and the ongoing talks on Turkey’s potential participation—constitute a noteworthy development, signaling that regional security is shifting from ad hoc responses toward a more institutionalized architecture.

The issue of Iran—one of the critical topics in Turkish-US relations in the Middle East—stands out as an area to be managed (rather than to seek full agreement). Before the conflict broke out, Turkey pursued a cautious approach based on regional balance, economic interaction channels, and border security and cautioned against the military option.

Ankara and Washington share many interest vis-à-vis Iran, including preventing instability by Iranian proxy networks, securing maritime trade routes, limiting Iran’s nuclear program, and ensuring the resilience to shocks of regional energy and connectivity projects. However, Turkey’s security concerns related to potential outcomes of regime collapse and a power vacuum take precedence in policymakers decision-making.

Nevertheless, the United States and Turkey need to stay closely coordinated to prevent fallout from the conflict creating shocks to bilateral relations. Turkey is also poised to play a role in an eventual deescalation and resolution, in tandem with other regional countries.

Defense cooperation

Defense cooperation in Turkish-US relations is both the most fragile and the highest strategic lever. Throughout 2025, signals of normalization and controlled progress at the rhetorical level in the defense sector are coming to the fore: the F-35 issue becoming renegotiable, the emergence of more flexible language on US sanctions on weapons and military systems subject to the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, the F-16 procurement and modernization process advancing to a certain stage, and Turkey continuing its air force modernization with different options. Ankara’s Eurofighter initiative is a striking example of this.

It would be wrong to interpret this table as an immediate solution, but to say that there is no solution at all would miss the mark for 2026. In the defense sector, compromise is achieved not through a single major decision but through a series of complementary, small steps: technical working groups, oversight and transparency mechanisms that address compliance and security concerns, supply chain and subsystem cooperation, joint production, and modernization packages. In particular, the emergence of Turkey’s need for critical components such as domestic fighter jets and engines presents an opportunity to shift the relationship from the crisis files of the past to the capacity partnership of the future. Real compromise could grow in 2026 as the parties shift from the language of maximum demand to the language of feasible packages.

NATO and European security

One of the most important topics to emphasize in bilateral relations is Turkey’s hosting of the 2026 NATO Summit. This is not a protocol detail in terms of bilateral relations; it is a strategic framework opportunity. NATO is the historical backbone of Turkish-US relations. When the backbone is strengthened, the management of side issues also becomes easier.

Washington’s approach in 2026, which pushes Europe to take on more responsibility and pressures it to share the defense burden, increases Turkey’s value within the Alliance. For Ankara, this opportunity is not just about rehashing the rhetoric of strategic importance—it is about institutionalizing coordination through concrete agendas: southern flank security, Black Sea balance, defense industrial capacity, readiness levels, and new threat areas. If the summit process is well managed, Turkish-US relations could enter a more predictable trajectory over the next year, fueled by a common Alliance agenda rather than scattered crisis headlines.

Russia-Ukraine and the Black Sea

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine War, Turkey’s mediation and balancing policy is seen by Washington as a complementary diplomatic role. This area offers one of the most realistic forms of compromise: not complete alignment but a division of labor. There are differences between the US approach and Turkey’s concerns about Black Sea balance, but both sides acknowledge the strategic value of keeping diplomatic channels open and striving to manage the war in a controlled manner. Trump’s frequent references to Turkey’s mediation capacity on Ukraine is more than a normative position; it is an indication that Turkey’s military diplomatic capacity is understood.

What will increase consensus in 2026 is the institutionalization of this division of labor: preventing escalation in the Black Sea, managing trade and maritime security risks, and maintaining concrete mechanisms such as prisoner exchanges and humanitarian mechanisms could make Turkey a burden reducer from Washington’s perspective. Success in this area will be measured less by declaring a common position and more by operating a common crisis management capacity.

South Caucasus

The capacity for compromise in Turkish-US relations can be interpreted as a quiet coordination that manifests itself in the Middle East, the NATO axis, and the South Caucasus. Although Washington and Ankara’s perspectives on this region do not always fit within the same conceptual framework, the common ground between the two capitals is clear: strengthening lasting stability in the South Caucasus, ending cycles of conflict, and preventing the region from becoming a fierce proxy arena for external power competition. For this reason, the Caucasus could form a constructive agenda in the Turkey-US relationship, one that does not generate major headlines but makes the relationship more predictable.

The logic of this compromise takes shape on two levels. First, it supports normalization and peace processes (e.g., between Armenia and Azerbaijan). Progress toward regional peace is consistent with Turkey’s goals of security and connectivity in its immediate neighborhood, while also contributing to the erosion of Russia-centered security dependencies. Second, a security approach that enhances the capacity of regional actors but does not encourage conflict requires a more measured form of engagement aimed at deterrence and stability without completely overwhelming the field with military competition.

In these early days of 2026, there is another reason for addressing the Caucasus as a separate point of agreement in Turkish-US relations: this region is a rare area in which the two countries’ interests often produce complementarity rather than competition. Turkey’s proximity to the region, its political influence, and its capacity for connectivity—combined with the United States’ diplomatic weight and its ability to generate international legitimacy—increase the likelihood of producing a solution file rather than a crisis file. Of course, there are vulnerabilities. The slowdown of peace processes, disruptive moves by external actors, and internal political fluctuations could turn this area back into a source of tension. However, precisely because of these risks, the Caucasus will be an important testing ground in 2026 for what compromise means in Turkish-US relations: not complete alignment in rhetoric but coordination that enhances stability on the ground.

Conclusion

In 2026, Ankara and Washington can create strategic breathing room in their relations through well-designed compromises. The common character of these compromises is cost-reducing functionality rather than ideological convergence. This includes results-oriented coordination on the ground in Gaza, common ground for the sustainability of the post-Assad order in Syria and the Middle East, a shift from crisis to process management in the defense sector, a strengthened institutional backbone within the NATO 2026 framework, and a division of labor in the Black Sea. They all point to the same thing: the future of the relationship lies not in denying disagreements but in accumulating enough common ground to prevent disagreements from holding the relationship hostage.

If these areas of compromise are linked to shared timelines, verifiable steps, and regular consultation mechanisms, Turkish-US relations could make a real leap from controlled fragility to institutionalized pragmatism. And this leap would produce what both sides need most in today’s stormy international environment: predictability.

Murat Yeşiltaş serves as director of foreign policy research at the Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, a policy think tank based in Ankara and also known as SETA. In addition, he is a professor of international politics at the Social Science University of Ankara.

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Foe or friend? US-Turkey bilateral relations seem set to improve as interests align

Rich Outzen — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Few alliance relationships generate as much public drama as US-Turkish ties. In the roughly seventy-five years since Turkish accession to NATO there have been ups and downs between Washington and Ankara, with the past twenty years marked by particularly sharp differences over regional policy and frequent bouts of public criticism and recriminations. President Trump’s second term has brought a positive turn in tone and optics—but there are still widespread perceptions in both capitals that the “other” ally is at best unreliable and perhaps more foe than friend.

Mutually antagonistic narratives have served domestic political purposes in both countries and have become something of a staple in the age of populist democracy of the twenty-first century. Yet the two countries rely on each other extensively in matters of trade, diplomacy, and security. State-to-state relationships are sometimes smoothed over in public but fractious in practice; the US-Turkish dyad is the rarer obverse: disagreeable in public for domestic audiences while resting on a high degree of alignment and collaboration.

Where do bilateral relations go when trust is low, mutual perception negative, but operational collaboration frequent? The answer depends less on rhetoric or polemical discourse and more on alignment of practical interests: We therefore must clear away the smoke of domestically motivated rhetoric to instead focus on mutual benefit. If two states pursue compatible goals and interests, room remains to balance internal political benefits with geopolitical cooperation in a form of complex interdependence. Whether that is the case for the United States and Turkey is a matter of substantial interest, given the weight that both have in the international system and the substantial number of crises and international matters that affect them.

Rorschach test

Articulating interests is more of a political than an academic exercise. It also presents something of a Rorschach test: If you ascribe ideological frames as determinative of status for Ankara (e.g., neo-Ottomanism, Muslim Brotherhood Islamism, reckless aggression) it brings you to one implied set of Turkish interests. If you accept declarative policy as the whole story you get another implied set. It is similarly the case for the United States: If you assume hegemonic interests are the primary driver, it takes you down a certain path; however, that road shifts significantly between and sometimes within presidential administrations. American interests as viewed by Trump differ significantly from those of his predecessor. Yet pattern analysis over time—observed behaviors and statements toward particular goals—tell us how specific a US president and his Turkish counterpart actually perceive the degree to which their interests overlap.

As an imperfect but useful generality, we can ascribe the following traits to Turkish foreign policy: multiaxial engagement and balance-seeking, nationalistic, hard power/realpolitik, traditionally but conditionally attached to the status quo. For decades, Ankara has sought to maximize autonomy while pressing for positive coalitions, where possible. For most of the current century, the United States has focused on maintaining a privileged or primary position in the international system, leavened increasingly with a dose of parsimony and pragmatism, but resting on what might be called enduring counter-revisionism (still in the tradition of US naval strategist and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan).

Ankara and Washington have demonstrated a generally cooperative approach across numerous regional and global issues in recent decades because their top-line approaches are compatible: one a retrenching-but-potent leading power, the other a rising middle power, both disinclined to establish imperial arrangements or to allow others to do so. A brief review of these issues illustrates this general (if imperfect) alignment by assigning numeric values reflecting relative alignment of strategic and diplomatic approaches between the two. Any such numbers game comes with attendant risk of overgeneralizing and missing some context, but statecraft and policy analysis at the higher levels of abstraction unavoidably entail some risk in this regard. So the numbers below are presented as suggestive rather than determinative.

In the table below, full interest alignment equals 1, partial interest alignment 0.5, neither alignment nor friction 0, friction -0.5, counteralignment -1. Descriptions of the cases follow the table.

Table 1: Sizing up US-Turkish alignment and friction on sixteen issues

Regional matter	Turkish position	US position	Assessment	Score
Ukraine/Black Sea	Ukraine survives	Ukraine survives	Full alignment	+1
Caucasus	Peace/prosperity deals	Iran, Russia lose influence	Full alignment	+1
Central Asia	Middle Corridor/ Organization of Turkic States	Russia, China influence limited	Full alignment	+1
Africa	Greater engagement	Russia, China influence limited	Full alignment	+1
Syria	Stable, unified	Stable, unified	Full alignment	+1
Iraq	Stable, unified, not under Iranian control	Stable, unified, not under Iranian control	Full alignment	+1
Gaza	Peace/Israel out	Peace/Hamas out	Partial alignment	+0.5
Energy	Diversify supply	Diversify supply/ marginalize Iran and Russia	Partial alignment	+0.5
US global leadership	US leadership conditional	US leadership but with counterbalances	Partial alignment	+0.5
Trade/defense trade	Autonomous Turkey, sales both ways	Turkey buys more/ doesn’t compete with US firms	Partial alignment	+0.5
European Union	Key trade partner, accession woes	Key trade partner, perceived as exploitative	Alignment but not cooperation	0
Eastern Mediterranean	Greater role for Turkey	Protect Greece	Friction	-0.5
Iran	Deterred but engaged, stable	Regime replaced or weakened	Friction	-0.5
Sanctions	Only multilateral	Multilateral and Minilateral	Friction	-0.5
Israel	Constrain Israel	Fully support Israel	Friction	-1
Venezuela	Engaged	Deterred/punished	Unalignment	-1

Black Sea/Ukraine: Both sides wish to see the war end with Ukrainian independence intact; neither recognizes Russian claims over Crimea or Donbass, though Washington has signaled willingness to negotiate the status of territories Russia partially or fully occupies at present. Some differences exist regarding Black Sea access: The United States might like to have access for its own ships and more broadly for a NATO presence and routine access, while Turkey has preferred littoral NATO states do the lifting and a strict interpretation of the Montreux Convention; but neither wants a Russian conquest of Ukraine’s coastline. For a Trump administration interested in some compromise deal with Moscow, the Turkish position is complementary.

Caucasus/Russia: While the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) offers wins for the region and the United States, the Armenian position is a wildcard with elections approaching. Should Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan get the boot in parliamentary elections (to be held no later than mid-June 2026), the United States may tack back to a position that pressures Azerbaijan and marginalizes Ankara. Russian and Iranian pushback on a deal that opens the region to trade on US-friendly terms can be expected. Interest alignment here between Ankara and Washington is solid, though the prospects for realized gain uncertain.

Central Asia: The TRIPP shows US interest in opening up more trade to Central Asia and balancing against outright domination of the region by Russia or China. The Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States both have value in this regard—and have generated more interest from the Trump administration than its predecessor. Central Asia has not traditionally been an area of high investment for the US government; however, energy companies are interested, so having an ally be more engaged is an advantage.

Africa: US investment and engagement in Africa has lagged, but Washington has concerns about Chinese or Russian influence on the continent. Meanwhile, Turkey has dramatically increased its diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Africa over the past two decades. In countries like Somalia and Libya, Turkish presence has lent heft to US diplomatic and counterterror initiatives. Africa demonstrates the complementarity of having compatible goals but varying levels of commitment.

Syria: Trump has made clear his policy that Syria will be stabilized and maintained as a unitary state and that Ahmed al-Sharaa is an acceptable figure to lead. This comports with Turkish policy, despite Israel’s objections. The assignment of Trump confidant Thomas J. Barrack Jr. as special envoy and positive statements from the US-Turkish working group on Syria have shown close convergence on Syria policy, a remarkable turnaround from the previous decade. The January 2026 agreement to reintegrate northeast Syria with the Syrian Transitional Government was a sign that this alignment was proving determinative on the ground.

Iraq: Washington wants a stable Iraq that is: not dominated by Iran; oriented to Western energy markets more than Iranian or Chinese; and working amicably with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Iraq may not fulfill all those interests, but Ankara shares them, and the Development Road project to foster Eastern trade with Europe provides a vehicle for all three countries to earn profits while tightening Baghdad’s ties to Western economies. The presence of PKK fighters in northern Iraq remains a point of friction, but ongoing negotiations to disarm the PKK – and US support for those talks – has taken helped reduce that friction.

Gaza: Washington and Ankara both pressed Israel and Hamas, respectively, to accept a ceasefire deal, return of hostages, and military withdrawal from Gaza in return for disarmament. While the truce remains shaky as of late 2025 and the end state Trump and Erdoğan have in mind may differ somewhat, the coordination on diplomatic efforts has been unambiguous.

Iran: There is divergence here between the hard line taken in Washington toward the Islamic Republic and the modus vivendi approach in Ankara. While Ankara may not want regime change in Tehran, and wants to protect trade with its neighbor, the Turkish government has no illusions about Tehran’s destabilizing regional behavior and shares an interest in deterring it. Ankara has tightened enforcement of multilateral sanctions on the Iranian nuclear program—partially redressing a long-standing US grievance with Ankara. The launch of Israel-U.S. Operation Epic Fury to destroy Iran’s power projection and nuclear capabilities has driven fears of instability and chaos along the Turkish border, turning this from an area of some overlap into an area of friction.

Energy: Ankara’s energy diplomacy has sought to position the country as a hub for multidirectional energy transit and major new gas, oil, and nuclear deals have been signed with Washington. US pressure to decrease oil purchases from Russia has created some strain, as Ankara cannot shift to alternate suppliers as quickly as it can with gas.

US global leadership: American leadership that cooperates with Ankara on key strategic objectives, praising in public and transacting in private, plays like music to the ears of Turks. This contrasts greatly with the constraining approach Turkish leaders called for regarding perceived American overreach in Iraq, Syria, and other regions over the past two decades, including demands to reform the United Nations to lessen the power of the five permanent members. Still, this middle power and the great power have imperfect but positive alignment at present.

Trade/defense trade: The relatively light 15 percent tariff levied on Turkish goods and the $100 billion shared goal for bilateral trade are clear indicators of positive intentions. But defense trade is thorny, with a congressional role and some competition between rising Turkish defense players and US prime defense contractors.

European Union: Ankara and Washington remain at odds with Brussels ideologically and stylistically, while maintaining strong strategic and trade ties with numerous members states. Yet the tensions stem from different sources: Turkish desire to enter the bloc and the American administration’s desire to end what it perceives as the EU’s exploitative trade and security practices.

Eastern Mediterranean: The continuing friction between Greece and Turkey redounds against US-Turkish bilateral relations—a problem that continues to play out in the region and in Congress.

Sanctions: The divergences are clear regarding imposition: Ankara supports multilateral but generally not unilateral sanctions and enforcement, whereas the Turkish track record looks spotty from Washington’s perspective.

Israel: Ankara and Jerusalem pursued a rapprochement in the months before October 7, 2023; since then, rancor, acrimony, and mutual suspicion have become the norm. While regional competition over Syria, the Palestinians, and other issues can be managed, related tensions spill over into US-Turkish bilateral relations in a major way—and that seems likely to persist.

Venezuela: Erdoğan’s quixotic friendship with President Maduro had its roots in terms of oil sales and multipolarity theory, but was a clear point of policy divergence as Trump upped the pressure level on Caracas. With the early 2026 arrest of Maduro and muted response from Ankara, this seems likely to be a decreasing source of tension in U.S.-Turkish relations.

A clear trend and policy takeaway

In conclusion, this assessment sketch of sixteen complicated cases of regional and global policy matters yields eleven that demonstrate substantial bilateral alignment, four with significant unalignment, and one somewhere in between. The aggregate score by the simple rubric of “words and deeds reflect alignment” was positive (+4.5 – with the caveat that these numbers are illustrative but rooted more in subjective alignment rather than formal quantitative criteria). An honest critic might quibble with individual ratings and the framing of the cases or argue for the salience of other matters. Yet sixteen is a reasonable sample size, the thought exercise is revealing, and the trend clear: more alignment than friction overall.

The policy takeaway is equally clear: maintaining a working relationship is vital for both countries. Those arguing for punitive approaches (by the United States) or hedging (by Turkey) disregard potential mutual benefits as well as both opportunity costs and implementation costs. Managing differences and satisfying domestic sentiment require an adaptive response from policy elites in both countries, but the record of cooperation in 2025 indicates that the pragmatism of both presidents fits the moment—and the alignment.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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Navigating change: US-Turkish defense relations in 2026

Atlantic Council Turkey Program — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

Foreword

As we enter the second year of the Trump Administration, US-Turkish relations and developments in regions critical to both have been dramatic and fast-paced. Events in Syria and Libya are trending towards state consolidation and strategic opportunity for both Washington and Ankara, while the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine at NATO’s doorstep, the volatile situation in Gaza, and the unfolding war in Iran present challenges both sides seek to navigate in complementary ways.

Technological and geopolitical developments have increased the need for close consultation between the NATO allies, and bilateral coordination has been evident across a range of issues. Yet strategic cooperation remains constrained by a variety of factors. This issue of the Defense Journal takes up several of the regional, military-technical, and policy issues of interest to readers in both countries and to those tracking US-Turkish relations. In an era of positive relations between the two countries’ presidents, parliamentary relations and policy influence also carry great weight—and in this issue we are pleased to have interviews with US Congressman James Walkinshaw and the chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Turkish Parliament Fuat Oktay to add the legislative perspective to bilateral strategic ties.

Rich Outzen and Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council Turkey Program co-managing editors

Articles

Foe or friend? US-Turkey bilateral relations seem set to improve as interests align

By Rich Outzen

Is Syria on the right path?

By Asaad Sam Hanna

Q&A with Rep. James Walkinshaw (VA-11)

By Atlantic Council Turkey Program

Q&A with Turkish Member of Parliament Fuat Oktay

By Atlantic Council Turkey Program

Ankara and Washington can build on recent groundwork to improve relations and stability

By Murat Yeşiltaş

As Ankara rethinks its Libyan policy, the Haftar family stands to gain

By Karim Mezran and Alissa Pavia

Air defense in the age of saturation: Europe after the post-Cold War peace dividend illusion and Turkey’s Steel Dome

By Can Kasapoğlu

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council Turkey Program‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International and Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council; former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Assistant Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Permanent Representative to NATO

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Under Secretary of Defense

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Air defense in the age of saturation: Europe after the post-Cold War peace dividend illusion and Turkey’s Steel Dome

Can Kasapoğlu — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000

By the end of the Cold War, European NATO nations considered air and missile defense to be a secondary military priority rather than an essential tool of intrawar deterrence, which refers to controlling escalatory patterns within an ongoing conflict.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine disproved this view, revealing how mass missile and drone salvos can quickly overwhelm limited interceptor supplies and unready command structures. The threat is not about somebody else’s war. When as many as two dozen Russian unmanned aerial vehicles entered Polish airspace on September 10, 2025, NATO allies responded by scrambling one of the most sophisticated tactical defensive contingents in the world. Italian airborne early warning and control aircraft, German Patriot air and missile defense systems, Polish F-16s, fifth-generation Dutch F-35s, and a Belgian A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft were all brought forth to track and engage the drones. The imbalance between the overall price tags of the offensive and defensive packages clashing in the aerial engagement was gargantuan. More importantly, Russia could pursue similar concepts of operations in a NATO showdown—whereas Europe’s air defenses would experience wear and tear quickly in a high-operational-tempo scenario.

While Europe debates between urgent gap filling and long-term industrial autonomy amid the drone wall talks, Turkey has taken a different path. The Steel Dome initiative demonstrates Ankara’s early understanding that air defense requires integrated, scalable, and mass-produced systems on rapid timelines.

Air defense as a strategic imperative after Europe’s post-Cold War illusion

During the Cold War, NATO treated air defense as a foundational mission. This paradigm eroded after 1991 as threat perceptions faded. For more than three decades after the Cold War, Europe operated under the egregiously naive assumption that peer-level air and missile threats had receded into history. That illusion collapsed with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which reintroduced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, combat aviation, and mass drone attacks as central tools of interstate warfare. Moreover, the Twelve-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025 cemented the new air threat picture. The new conflict trends have forced Europe to confront a long-neglected reality: without a coherent, layered air and missile defense, control of the air cannot be assumed and nations cannot stay safe.

Russia fields two missile types that matter most to European defense: the 500-kilometer range, ground-launched 9M723 Iskander and the air-launched, medium-range Kh-47M2 Kinzhal. Ukrainian intelligence assesses combined annual production at roughly 840 to 1,020 missiles, higher than earlier

estimates. The ballistic and aeroballistic missiles are backed by large salvos of cruise missiles and Shahed drones—the latter marks more than five thousand kamikaze assets raining overwhelming damage onto Ukraine in a given month.

Europe’s defense relies mainly on the US Patriot and the Franco-Italian SAMP/T antimissile systems, both dependent on costly interceptors priced at around $2 million to $4 million each—often far more expensive than the missiles they are meant to defeat. Production is the choke point. Patriot interceptor output across the United States, Japan, and Germany might rise from about 850 today to 1,130 by 2027, and possibly to 1,470 by 2029. Even then, global demand means Europe might receive only a fraction of the output, and combat experience shows two or three interceptors are often needed per incoming missile. Output of the alternative, Aster 30 interceptors for SAMP/T, is projected at only 230 to 270 annually for ballistic missile defense, and their performance in Ukraine has lagged that of Patriots, implying higher interceptor consumption. Compounding the problem, Russia and Iran have been producing large numbers of long-range drones that can saturate defenses, increasing the odds that ballistic missiles penetrate targets. Cheaper, mass-produced systems might eventually counter drones, and lasers could one day address ballistic threats—but neither solution will arrive in time to close the imminent missile defense gap.

Europe’s current air defense posture remains uneven. High-end fighter fleets and a mix of European, US, and Israeli missile systems exist, but warfighting prowess lags behind capability. Interceptor stockpiles are insufficient for sustained high-intensity conflict, production timelines are slow, and short-range air defense gaps leave European forces exposed to the kind of kamikaze drone warfare now routine in Ukraine. These weaknesses are as much industrial as military. The response has revealed a strategic divide between two conceptual camps: the “gap fillers” and the “autonomists.” Gap fillers, as defined in this paper, favor rapid procurement of proven, off-the-shelf systems, primarily from the United States and Israel—predominantly the Arrow-3, Patriot, NASAMS, and Barak systems—to close urgent gaps. In contrast, autonomists, led by France, argue for long-term European autonomy through indigenous systems, even at the cost of slower fielding. This tension defines current debates over air defense initiatives and reinforces Europe’s continued reliance on US-made systems at the upper tier. Meanwhile, Turkey, a sui generis European NATO nation with its national defense technological and industrial base, has an alternative path: the Steel Dome.

Europe’s strategic air defense gaps and Turkey’s Steel Dome architecture

Turkey’s Steel Dome represents a critical leap in framing air defense as a national, system-of-systems architecture rather than a collection of stand-alone platforms. The Russian S-400, therefore, will need to be left out in the cold as a stand-alone weapon in Turkish military capabilities.

Designed as an integrated and layered air and missile defense construct, the Steel Dome aims to address threats across short-, medium-, and long-range engagement envelopes and all endoatmospheric altitude segments, while preserving operational sovereignty through indigenous development. The system-of-defensive system has been endorsed at the highest levels of defense decision-making and support for it continues rising as additional components reach operational status. In late August 2025, Turkey crossed a critical threshold in its pursuit of strategic autonomy in air defense with the first operational delivery of the components for the indigenous Steel Dome air defense system. The delivery coincided with the expansion of military electronics company Aselsan’s industrial base, reflecting Ankara’s view of defense production as a pillar of sovereignty. In November 2025, Turkey’s defense industrial base took a significant step forward with the signing of contracts valued at approximately $6.5 billion to procure a broad range of systems for the Steel Dome.

At the force-employment level, the Steel Dome integrates point and area air defense assets with longer-range interceptors into a unified command-and-control framework. Close-in defense is provided by antiaircraft artillery and very short-range systems optimized for counter-UAS (unmanned aircraft system) and low-altitude cruise missile threats. The Hisar family forms the short- and medium-range surface-to-air missile layer, while the Siper system anchors the long-range air and missile defense mission, extending coverage against high-performance aircraft and missile threats. An artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted command-and-control architecture fuses sensors, shooters, and electronic warfare elements into a unified air picture, compressing decision timelines and enabling commanders to operate in a dynamic, contested airspace. In an era defined by unmanned systems and saturation salvos, this coherence is as decisive as kinetic action. The strategic significance of Steel Dome lies less in individual interceptors than in its integration logic. By fusing sensors, effectors, and command elements into a single air picture and prioritizing serial production under national control, Turkey is building an air defense posture designed for sustained competition rather than episodic procurement. In other words, Steel Dome epitomizes the Turkish leadership’s strategic autonomy agenda. The most critical lesson of Ukraine is not merely about the quantities of missiles or radars, but about strategic coherence. Air defense is no longer a procurement problem to be managed in peacetime cycles. Turkey has already grasped the bitter truth and made its choice to act rapidly and decisively through the Steel Dome initiative—a response Turkey’s European allies should study. The Steel Dome initiative also serves industrial and geopolitical purposes. It is intended to reduce dependence on foreign air defense systems while positioning Turkey as a supplier to states facing similar threat environments. The emphasis on modularity and scalability suggests an export-oriented mindset, enabling partners to buy into the architecture incrementally rather than commit to a single, rigid system.

Conclusion

Europe’s current air defense dilemma is defined by scarcity and sequencing. Interceptors are expensive, production is slow, and operational experience shows that quantity alone does not translate into resilience. The deeper vulnerability lies in fragmentation: multiple systems, limited stockpiles, and insufficient integration across sensors, shooters, and command layers. As long as air defense remains divided between national stopgaps and Alliance bottlenecks, Europe will struggle to convert capability into credible deterrence.

Turkey’s Steel Dome offers a contrasting defense industrial policy. By building a layered, integrated architecture under national coordination from the outset, Ankara has prioritized coherence over perfection and sustainability over symbolic capability or overpriced foreign sales. The emphasis on systems integration, domestic production, and serial scalability is key to the Turkish government. In an era in which airspace is increasingly contested by mass and speed, the strategic advantage revolves around a defense that can endure, adapt, and sustain in highly attritional and prolonged wars.

Dr. Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Dr. Kasapoglu holds a Ph.D. from the Turkish War College and an M.Sci. degree from the Turkish Military Academy. Previously he was an Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College in Rome and held a visiting research post at the NATO Cyber Center of Excellence in Tallinn.

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Western leaders must abandon false hopes of negotiated peace with Putin

Oleksandr Merezhko — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 21:35:07 +0000

For more than twelve years, Ukraine has been defending itself against an escalating Russian invasion that seeks to erase the Ukrainian state from the map of Europe and overturn the existing world order. So far, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield or break the Ukrainian nation’s resistance. Despite this lack of progress, however, he shows no sign of compromising on his maximalist goals.

Many in the West are still in denial over the scale of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia and continue to believe a negotiated settlement is the only realistic option to end the war. This is dangerously delusional. In reality, attempting to make deals with Putin today is as shortsighted as seeking to bargain with Adolf Hitler at the height of World War II. In the 1940s, the allies rejected that idea because they recognized Hitler would never stop and had to be defeated. There is a desperate need for such clarity today.

For the past year, Putin has sabotaged US-led peace talks with endless stalling tactics and diplomatic distractions. It should now be obvious that the Russian ruler is only engaging in negotiations for cynical reasons. First, he seeks to avoid further pressure from the United States. Second, he wishes to buy time to continue destroying Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure. Third, he intends to divide the West and deter further support for Kyiv.

Putin signals his lack of interest in peace by making absurd demands that no Ukrainian government could possibly accept. He calls for Ukraine to surrender the country’s most heavily fortified region without a fight, despite the fact that the Russian army has been unable to capture this territory for more than a decade. He demands a Russian veto over security guarantees for postwar Ukraine, while insisting on the right to interfere in Ukrainian domestic affairs. He questions the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and calls for wartime elections, despite having systematically dismantled Russia’s own fledgling democracy during his twenty-six year reign.

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Putin’s uncompromising position makes perfect sense when viewed through the prism of Russian imperialism. The peace terms being offered by Trump, which would allow Moscow to retain the approximately 20 percent of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation, may seem generous, but the Kremlin dictator knows he cannot accept anything less than Kyiv’s complete capitulation. For Putin, the survival of a sovereign, democratic Ukraine would be a political death sentence. Russian audiences would view such a deal as a defeat of historic proportions. Rather than securing his legacy as one of Russia’s greatest rulers, Putin would be condemned as the man who lost Ukraine.

In practical terms, Putin has also come to depend on the war. Over the past four years, it has become the main source of his legitimacy and power. The Russian economy now relies heavily on war-related spending. Russian society as a whole has undergone a radicalization, making it possible to impose new levels of censorship, repression, and propaganda. Without the war, this entire edifice could collapse.

Then there is the issue of Russia’s military veterans. Almost a million men are currently serving in Ukraine. Most have been brutalized by a daily ration of war crimes amid staggering casualties. The vast majority are also now accustomed to receiving salaries far in excess of anything they could hope to earn in Russia. Putin is no doubt painfully aware that if he demobilizes these damaged and dangerous men, he would be unleashing a destabilizing force that could cause chaos across Russia. The only way to prevent this is by extending the invasion indefinitely.

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None of this means that peace is impossible. In order to secure a sustainable settlement, however, current efforts to appease Putin must end. It is a grave mistake to treat the aggressor and the victim as equals, and an even bigger blunder to pressure the victim into further concessions. Bringing Putin out of international isolation only emboldens him. In Putin’s zero-sum world, goodwill gestures are signs of weakness. It is no coincidence that as calls for a compromise deal have grown louder over the past year, Russia’s bombardment of Ukraine’s civilian population has intensified.

Western leaders must instead send an unambiguous message to Moscow that they are not prepared to reward Russian aggression. The objective should be to raise the costs of the invasion for the Kremlin until continuing the war poses risks to Putin’s grip on power inside Russia. This goal is realistic. With Putin’s army struggling to achieve any major breakthroughs in Ukraine despite suffering catastrophic casualties, rumblings of discontent are growing. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the Russian economy is beginning to show signs of serious strain. Now is the time to increase the pressure on Putin.

Tightening economic sanctions is critical. This means tougher measures against Russia’s energy exports along with Putin’s shadow fleet of tankers. It also means implementing secondary sanctions against those who fund the war by purchasing Russian oil and gas. Recent decisions to relax sanctions temporarily in response to the US war in Iran and spiraling global energy prices are a step in the wrong direction that threatens to rescue the Russian economy and fuel international instability. Putin will not stop the invasion until he runs out of money.

Kyiv’s partners must also provide Ukraine with the military backing to defeat and deter Russia. This should include credible long-term commitments that dash any Russian hopes of outlasting the West in Ukraine. Western countries must overcome their crippling fear of escalation and provide Ukraine with the long-range weapons that will make it possible to strike deep inside Russia. This will allow Ukraine to target Putin’s war machine and create the kind of deterrence that could prevent future repeats of the current invasion.

If Putin is unable to advance in Ukraine while facing mounting economic costs and escalating destruction on the home front, he may finally have to accept that continuing the war poses very real dangers for the stability of his regime. At that point, genuine peace talks could prove possible.

Subsequent negotiations must focus on protecting Ukraine against further Russian aggression. It is vital that any security guarantees transcend political cycles in Western capitals and leave Putin in no doubt that a renewed attack on Ukraine could spark the collapse of the Russian Federation.

The best security guarantees of all remain NATO membership or nuclear status. If these options are currently not feasible, Ukraine needs to receive clear commitments from its major partners that spell out the responses Russia can expect.

Above all, Ukraine’s own armed forces must receive the necessary support to serve as the country’s ultimate security guarantee. European countries have an obvious self-interest in maintaining Ukraine’s military strength. After all, a strong Ukraine is now indispensable for Europe’s broader defense strategy as the continent confronts resurgent Russian imperialism.

Current Western efforts to broker a compromise peace with Putin are based on false assumptions and wishful thinking. This misguided approach only encourages Russia and other authoritarian regimes including Iran, China, and North Korea to pursue aggressive foreign policies. If the West wants a sustainable peace in Europe, it must work to ensure Putin’s defeat in Ukraine.

Oleksandr Merezhko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament for the Servant of the People Party and Chair of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

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When Russia occupied Crimea in 2014 and shortly afterward invaded east Ukraine’s Donbas region, many observers in Washington and European capitals saw it as a shocking but limited land grab. Many accepted the narrative that Crimea and eastern Ukraine were “Russian lands,” populated by Russian speakers who supposedly wanted to be part of Russia. Some even argued that Moscow was merely responding to local preferences, albeit illegally. Even then, it was clear that this reading was dangerously wrong. In reality, Moscow was asserting a unilateral right to intervene wherever it claimed the population as compatriots, regardless of what those communities actually wanted.

The idea of protecting Russian compatriots has long served as the backbone of a broader Kremlin project aimed at redrawing borders and reasserting Russian dominance across the post‑Soviet space. Similar tactics including cultural outreach, imperialistic propaganda, the distribution of Russian passports, and military intervention, have been evident in Moldova’s Transnistria region, Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and Ukraine. This approach also poses an obvious threat to a range of other countries.

Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 confirmed that Crimea was not an exception but a pilot project. Putin’s justification for war leaned heavily on the idea of restoring Russia’s so-called historical unity and protecting Russian speakers in the Donbas region from alleged discrimination.

Alarmingly, even as Russia bombed Ukrainian cities and attempted to seize Kyiv, many Western discussions continued to treat parts of Ukraine as spaces where Russia’s claims might be partially legitimate or at least negotiable. This conceptual carve‑out has endured over the past four years, subtly shaping proposals to freeze the conflict along the current lines of control.

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The idea of a single, unified Russian people stretching across borders is less a sociological reality than a political ambition. The Kremlin has long blurred the lines between ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, non‑Russian ethnic minorities such as Abkhazians and Ossetians, and political “compatriots.” This allows Moscow to manufacture a constituency that justifies military intervention, even where Russian speakers are a minority or have no desire for Moscow’s protection.

This dynamic is visible in Ukraine today. Moscow claims to be acting on behalf of Ukraine’s Russian‑speaking communities, but in practice it has bombed, tortured, deported, and repressed these communities throughout the occupied territories. Meanwhile, millions of Ukrainians who speak Russian at home, including many in cities like Kharkiv and Odesa, have chosen to resist Russian forces, volunteer for the Ukrainian army, or flee westward, contradicting the notion that language determines loyalty.

Putin’s talk of defending compatriots is a not a minority rights policy; it is a carefully crafted propaganda script to justify military aggression. First, Moscow defines a broad, elastic category of compatriots. Then it alleges discrimination against them. The target group next receives Russian passports. Finally, the Kremlin claims a duty to intervene militarily. When international policymakers and commentators accept the vocabulary of “protection” on Moscow’s terms, they are accepting the logic of empire. After all, modern borders depend on international law not historical grievance or dubious ethnic claims.

As the largest European invasion since World War II enters a fifth year, Western policy is still constrained by the remnants of these myths. When officials suggest that a peace settlement might involve Ukraine “recognizing realities on the ground” in Crimea or the occupied east of the country, they echo the idea that these territories are somehow less Ukrainian because of their demographic and linguistic profile.

In practice, this means legitimizing and rewarding the Kremlin’s compatriot policy. Accepting this logic in Ukraine would signal that using Russian speakers and the protection of ethnic Russians as a pretext for occupation and annexation is an acceptable tool of statecraft. That message would not only entrench Russia’s gains in Ukraine; it would also open the door to similar tactics in other states from Kazakhstan to the Baltics, where Moscow could once again weaponise bogus historical narratives to justify future aggression.

To move toward real peace, Western governments need to update not only their military and economic policies, but also their mental maps. That means rejecting Russia’s imperial expansion strategy built on historical myths that foster the quiet assumption that Crimea and eastern Ukraine are “different” in ways that justify special rights for Moscow. Instead, any settlement must reflect international law and the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, rather than Putin’s imperial ambitions.

As long as the West grants tacit legitimacy to Russia’s compatriot doctrine and Putin’s claims to “historically Russian lands” in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and beyond, it will be extremely difficult to end the current war in a manner that will safeguard European security.

Dr. Agnia Grigas is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.

What’s the state of Russia’s economy?

the GeoEconomics Center — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 15:44:36 +0000

It’s been four years since Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine and the G7 responded with an unprecedented level of coordinated economic statecraft measures. Where is Russia’s economy now?

Josh Lipsky and Jessie Yin are joined in this episode by director Kim Donovan and associate director Maia Nikoladze of the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative to tackle the energy dimension of Russia’s wartime economy. From sanctions to shadow fleets, we discuss evasion tactics and how Russia could benefit from an extended conflict in the Middle East that boosts oil prices.

Note: This episode was recorded on March 3, 2026.

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Guide to the Global Economy is your go-to podcast for navigating the increasingly busy intersection of global economics, finance, national security, and geopolitics. Through interviews with leading experts and behind-the-scenes insights from the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, we break down the storylines that matter most for the global economy—from major news everyone’s talking about to developments few have noticed. These days, if you don’t get economics, you don’t get Washington. From tariffs to crypto to sanctions and beyond, our team is here to guide you. Watch and listen wherever you get your podcasts.

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When the Iran operation is finished, Trump should prioritize ending the war in Ukraine

William B. Taylor — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 15:42:58 +0000

KYIV—Stopping Russia’s war on Ukraine has been the Trump administration’s highest priority foreign-policy challenge for over a year. Shortly after his inauguration, President Donald Trump began this effort in a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Since then, US officials have held a series of meetings with their Ukrainian and Russian counterparts. Yes, there have been targets of opportunity that focused US attention and resources for short periods of time, such as Venezuela and now Iran. But over the past year, the administration’s top officials have almost certainly devoted more hours to Ukraine than to any other foreign-policy issue. Trump and Putin spoke again by phone on Monday, with aides saying both Iran and Ukraine were topics of discussion. When the current Iran operation is finished, the administration should return to devoting its primary attention to ending the largest land war in Europe since World War II and finish the job.

When the US and Israeli attacks on Iran began on February 28, I was on a train leaving Kyiv as part of an Atlantic Council delegation. It was for me the latest of more than a dozen visits to Ukraine since February 2022. After a week of conversations with Ukrainian friends, soldiers, officials, and former officials in Odesa and Kyiv, I left impressed with their guarded optimism and unguarded determination to prevail in this war.

At the same time, it was clear immediately after the US strikes began that the Iranian operation would absorb resources and top-level attention for the duration of the operation. But when it ends, there will be a great opportunity for US President Donald Trump to help end the fighting in Ukraine.

Freedom’s name

After enduring the coldest winter in memory and the most intense Russian attacks of the entire war, Ukrainians had welcomed the end of winter and a perceptible shift in momentum on the battlefield. According to Ukrainian generals I spoke with, successful counterattacks on the southern end of the thousand-kilometer conflict zone had regained hundreds of square kilometers of territory, in part because Elon Musk had denied Starlink communications to Russian military forces. A homegrown, long-range Ukrainian cruise missile had severely damaged a Russian military production center in Votkinsk, a thousand kilometers deep into Russia, causing panic among Russians. Unmanned interceptors have blunted Russian attack drones and are now being deployed in the Middle East to defend against Iranian attacks—attacks that are being aided by Russian intelligence, which is helping Iran target US military facilities.

Some Ukrainians I spoke with held out hope that the ongoing negotiations among Ukraine, Russia, and the United States could lead to a cease-fire. Most, however, were skeptical that the Russians were serious.

The author meets with Ukrainian soldiers and staff at a rehabilitation clinic in Kyiv, Ukraine, on February 25, 2026. (Credit: RECOVERY)

Ukrainian soldiers expressed grim determination to hold off and even push back Russian attacks. They appreciated the US and European support that had sustained them for the past four years. One captain described a moment of panic when, alone in a trench on the contact line, he was unable to contact his supporting command and felt momentarily abandoned. In that moment, he questioned whether all their sacrifices had been worth it. It was an intensely personal account, but he was also making a larger point that US support—military, financial, political, and moral—was supremely important to Ukrainians’ ability to continue defending their country. Left unsaid was the understanding that US support enables Ukrainians to defend the rest of Europe and vital US national interests against an aggressive Russia.

While the Trump administration might pay less attention to a principled rationale for supporting Ukraine—they have other strong reasons—one young woman nonetheless put it clearly and forcefully; she said, “Freedom’s name is Ukraine.”

Trump’s opportunity

The US president is uniquely capable of ending the war in Ukraine, the most difficult conflict he has addressed. And while progress over the past year has at times been slow, Putin knows that Trump has the leverage to force him to stop the killing. Putin fears long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles coming into Ukrainian hands. Trump seriously considered sending these weapons to the Ukrainians last fall and could still do so—or, even better, he could allow the Ukrainians to manufacture these weapons themselves.

There are other steps Trump could take, too. Despite a temporary reprieve for Russia’s oil revenues due to the oil price spike caused by the Iran war, Putin is terrified by the prospect of resumed pressure on the oil exports that fund his war on Ukraine. The Trump administration has already levied tariffs against India for buying Russian oil, sanctioned the two largest Russian oil companies, and seized Russian-flagged oil tankers used to evade sanctions on Russian oil exports (as have the French, Belgians, and British). Trump could use this military and financial leverage to force Putin to stop the war.

Europe’s moment

With or without Russian agreement on a cease-fire, the Ukrainians will need the ability to deter and defeat, if necessary, another Russian invasion. After all, Putin has blatantly disregarded previous promises not to invade Ukraine. The first line of defense will be the Ukrainian army—which is trained, equipped, supported, and funded with Western help. The French and British, the two nuclear-armed European powers, are leading the planning for a military force to be deployed on Ukrainian territory, which has the support of more than thirty other nations. Moreover, Trump has agreed to back up this European-led reassurance force with air power based in Eastern European NATO nations. The current thinking is that this “coalition of the willing” would deploy in western Ukraine after a cease-fire. But since the Russians refuse to negotiate seriously and a formal cease-fire might not be possible, the coalition should deploy this force now.

Because they understand the threat from an imperialistic Russian autocrat more immediately than the United States, the Europeans have augmented their military planning with impressive financial support to Ukraine. Stymied so far by a couple of European Union (EU) member states in the effort to use hundreds of billions of dollars in Russian frozen assets to support Ukraine, a majority of EU nations plan to borrow ninety billion euros to keep Ukraine solvent and able to purchase weapons, including from US defense manufacturers, for another two years. That $200-plus billion in blocked Russian assets also remain available if the bloc were to agree to use it.

The Europeans are also offering Ukraine another security guarantee—membership in the EU on an accelerated basis, perhaps as early as next year.

The Ukrainians continue to defend themselves and the rest of Europe from a hostile Russia. The Europeans are stepping up both militarily and financially. Trump has the unique ability to force Putin to stop the killing. When the Iran operation ends, he could reestablish himself as a man of peace by using that leverage to end the war in Ukraine.

The post When the Iran operation is finished, Trump should prioritize ending the war in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Has the EU found a ‘magic bullet’ to its enlargement conundrum or a new distraction?

Agon Maliqi — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 12:46:35 +0000

TIRANA—On Monday, European Union (EU) foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said that enlargement of the twenty-seven-member bloc should speed up. “Enlargement is the antidote to Russian imperialism and a sign that the most ambitious multilateral project in history—the European Union—is here to stay,” she told EU ambassadors.

It is an antidote that some EU member states seem hesitant to take, however. No country has joined the EU since 2013, when Croatia was admitted. In the dozen-plus years since then, the bloc has struggled with a fundamental dilemma on further enlargement: Would admitting new members strengthen the EU? Or would the addition of poorer countries with weaker democratic institutions—including some close partners of Russia—further undermine its cohesion due to the bloc’s unanimity-based decision-making?

There have been many reasons why the EU has resisted enlargement for the past dozen-plus years. But concern over the cost to EU member state taxpayers is rarely one of the strongest concerns. The EU could without difficulty absorb the financial costs of admitting the countries of the Western Balkans (Ukraine, on the other hand, is a different matter). For many skeptics of enlargement, a bigger concern than cost is the potential for new members to take EU decision-making hostage and backslide on the rule of law once they are in. Hungary provides perhaps the biggest cautionary tale for this concern. Budapest has exploited the need for unanimous votes by vetoing accession negotiations with Ukraine on geopolitical grounds.

More generally across the EU, however, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 softened resistance to enlargement, with EU leaders reframing the addition of new members as a security imperative. That year, the candidate pool expanded rapidly beyond the six Western Balkans countries and Turkey to also include Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. This year, Trump’s claim on Greenland has drawn renewed EU membership interest in other parts of Europe, such as Iceland, which will hold a referendum on pursuing membership in the coming months.

Riding this momentum, the EU’s executive wing is pushing ahead with talks with Albania and Montenegro, the two candidates facing the least resistance to accession, as they are both NATO allies without major bilateral disputes with any current member states. Montenegro may now be on the cusp of drafting an accession treaty. Last year, Montenegrin Prime Minister Milojko Spajić announced that it was his goal for Montenegro to join the EU by 2028, while Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has set the goal of his country joining by 2030.

Sandwiched between the geopolitical imperative of enlargement and domestic pressures from Euroskeptic parties, the European Commission is now considering solutions that would allow enlargement to move forward without weakening the EU’s decision-making capacity. The solutions reportedly being discussed in Brussels would effectively offer new member states a kind of second-class status in the bloc, effectively creating a two-tier EU.

The proposal for a two-tier EU: Pragmatic or indecisive?

In the proposals reportedly under discussion, new member states would waive their veto rights for an indefinite transition period. During this period, each new member state would have full access to EU funds, institutions, and membership in the single market, but it would not be allowed to block decisions requiring unanimity. This idea does have some precedent, as transition periods on the rights of new members have been used in previous enlargement waves. In 2004, for example, new members had limits on the free movement of workers for up to seven years. But these earlier conditions were policy-specific and clearly time-bound; they did not relate to the new members’ institutional rights.

At the same time, Brussels has emphasized the need to strengthen post-accession safeguards on the rule of law. These safeguards would embed into the accession treaties provisions that would allow the EU to retain oversight and correction mechanisms over the new members’ performance, thereby preserving some of the leverage that the EU has during the accession process. Last month, European Commission officials touted Montenegro’s upcoming accession treaty as the first of a “new generation” of treaties that give the bloc enforcement tools it can use if new members backtrack on the rule of law.

While these ideas have some benefits, they are also incurring immediate costs to the credibility of the accession process. In effect, the EU is publicly hollowing out the meaning of membership and moving the goalposts midway through accession, all while failing to make a clear political commitment on the timeline of enlargement. Thus, the EU is once again signaling indecisiveness at a critical moment, undermining accession candidates’ momentum for reforms.

The EU’s policy of conditioning accession on reforms can help candidate countries’ political transformations if there is a clear and credible offer for membership. This drives political accountability and empowers candidate countries’ civil societies to push for reforms. Ukraine, for example, has been taking steps to fight corruption, and there have been large anti-corruption protests there even as Kyiv fights a war for survival. This is largely because Ukrainians understand that the fight against corruption is tied to Ukraine’s case for EU membership.

Western Balkan leaders are exploiting the decision-making vacuum

The prolonged indecision by EU member states on the timing, scope, and structure of its enlargement policy risks further derailing the process. It is also providing leaders in the Western Balkans with opportunities to come up with distractions under the guise of strategic leadership and pragmatic solutions.

On February 28, Rama and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić published a joint op-ed in which they called for the Western Balkans to be granted quick access to the EU single market and the Schengen area while forfeiting representation in EU institutions. This would mean even fewer institutional rights than the second-class membership proposal the EU is discussing. It would effectively make the countries of the Western Balkans members of the European Economic Area, like Norway and Iceland, without giving them the institutional rights of EU member states.

It is not a new idea. It has been circulating for almost a decade, promoted primarily by think tanks such as the Berlin-based European Stability Initiative. The argument goes that absent a clear political commitment to enlargement, the EU should offer the accession states something credible and politically feasible in the interim that would anchor them in the EU’s economic orbit and generate tangible benefits until it is ready to bring in countries as full members.

Yet there are reasons to believe that the enthusiastic endorsement of such ideas by Rama and Vučić—at a moment when both Montenegro and Albania appear to have an open path to membership—may be motivated by reasons other than pragmatism.

For one, Brussels is reportedly discussing the suspension of some or all of the EU’s conditional funding for Serbia due to its backsliding on the rule of law, at a time when the country has been roiled by an ongoing wave of anti-corruption protests that began in November 2024. Rama, for his part, has been intensifying his attacks against an empowered judiciary that is going after his party’s top brass. Rama is also facing pushback from the EU for his attack on the judiciary, a troubling sign for Albania’s accession process, since rule-of-law reform is seen as a litmus test of its membership bid.

Regional leaders who are used to governing in conditions of widespread corruption might be hoping that by voluntarily agreeing to second-rate membership, the EU might in turn tolerate second-rate governance and anti-corruption standards. The prospect of receiving EU funds without the accountability and responsibilities required of full member states—including alignment on foreign policy—may sound appealing to those who would like to be EU members while doing business as usual. But in doing so, Western Balkan leaders may in fact be strengthening the arguments of those who believe that the EU should not import new problematic members.

The post Has the EU found a ‘magic bullet’ to its enlargement conundrum or a new distraction? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Fighting mercenaries: A Ukrainian soldier’s perspective

Alia Brahimi — Mon, 09 Mar 2026 19:22:07 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 15 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by Dimko Zhluktenko, a Ukrainian drone pilot and analyst within the Unmanned Systems Forces of the Ukrainian military. They discuss the realities of drone warfare in Ukraine, as well as the ways in which mercenary forces change the nature and tempo of battle. Dimko describes how he and his comrades are combatting Shahed drones, the psychological mechanisms necessary to keep fighting an army which uses waves of expendable manpower, and the need for NATO to start thinking of drones as bullets. Dimko also talks about how procurement and innovation cycles on both sides of the war are now measured in weeks, and how the geeks of war have turned the tide in Ukraine.

“Russian PMCs have less bureaucracy, more autonomous decision-making, and they can divert from their doctrine in favour of what actually works… They are more results-focused than the Russian military.”

Dimko Zhluktenko, Ukrainian drone pilot and analyst

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

About the podcast

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it examines the causes and implications of the increasing use of mercenaries in armed conflicts.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare reveals about the world we currently inhabit, the future of the international system, and what war may look like in the coming decades.

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Host Alia Brahimi chats with modern warfare expert Andreas Krieg about the sudden deployment of three private military companies to the Netzarim corridor in the Gaza Strip.

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“Youth as merchandise”: Iraqi mercenaries in Ukraine

By Alia Brahimi

In Season 2, Episode 13 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by the Iraqi political analyst Mohammed Salih to discuss the legion of Iraqi men turning up on the frontlines of the war in Ukraine.

Iraq Middle East

By Ankit Panda and Henry “Trey” Obering

Coming soon

Stay updated

Explore the program

The post Strategy for a new nuclear age appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iran war could save Vladimir Putin’s failing Ukraine invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 22:34:17 +0000

The mood in Moscow was strikingly subdued in late February as the country marked four years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin officials made little mention of the anniversary, while the heavily censored Russian media offered only minimal coverage. With no end in sight to the increasingly costly war, this lack of fanfare is easy to understand. However, events currently unfolding in the Middle East may yet rescue Vladimir Putin’s faltering invasion.

When Putin first announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he vowed to “demilitarize” and “denazify” Ukraine. He has also sought to justify the war as a campaign against NATO expansion and crusade to revive Russia’s great power status. By almost any measure, Putin has failed to achieve these goals.

The Russian leader’s inability to demilitarize Ukraine has been perhaps his most glaring failure. Indeed, few countries have ever looked less demilitarized than today’s Ukraine. As the war with Russia enters a fifth year, Ukraine possesses Europe’s largest army and is a world leader in drone warfare. From NATO members to Gulf petrostates, countries are now queuing up to access Ukraine’s unrivalled expertise. Meanwhile, a consensus is emerging in European capitals that Ukraine has an indispensable role to play in the future security of the continent.

Likewise, Putin’s bid to “denazify” Ukraine has proved spectacularly counterproductive. The entire concept of “denazification” is Kremlin code for the eradication of Ukrainian national identity, but Putin’s invasion has sparked an unprecedented surge in patriotism among the Ukrainian population along with a deep distrust of all things Russian. As a result, it is now virtually impossible to imagine the emergence of a pro-Russian government in Kyiv, unless permanently propped up by Kremlin bayonets.

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Putin has gone to great lengths to blame the war on NATO’s post-1991 eastward expansion beyond the old Iron Curtain. Far from arresting or reversing this process, Russia’s actions have sparked a new and highly significant wave of enlargement. In response to the invasion of Ukraine, both Finland and Sweden opted to abandon decades of neutrality and join NATO. This has more than doubled Russia’s shared border with the alliance, while also transforming the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake.

On the global stage, the invasion of Ukraine has left Russia unable to project strength or justify its claims to great power status. With the vast majority of his military forces deployed in Ukraine, Putin has proved unable to aid a series of international allies during moments of crisis. Syria, Venezuela, and Iran have all learned the hard way that Putin’s promises of partnership are empty.

Russian prestige has taken a further pounding on the battlefields of Ukraine. Like many others in Moscow and elsewhere, Putin fully expected to secure a quick and complete victory in Ukraine. Instead, his armies have been unable to achieve any decisive breakthroughs despite suffering catastrophic losses. More than four years on, they remain bogged down in brutal attritional warfare.

Putin has tried to distract from this underwhelming military performance by projecting confidence in eventual success, but his boasts of relentless Russian advances now ring increasingly hollow. In February 2026, Ukraine actually liberated more territory than the Russian army was able to seize, making a mockery of Kremlin efforts to portray Russian victory as inevitable.

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With Russia’s prospects in Ukraine looking increasingly grim, the joint US-Israeli operation against Iran could hardly have come at a better time for Putin. While Russia’s inability to assist a key ally is undoubtedly embarrassing, the Kremlin could potentially emerge as a major beneficiary of the escalating conflict in the Middle East.

The scope for economic gains is obvious. With the Strait of Hormuz under threat and key energy export routes out of the Middle East facing major disruption, Russia stands to benefit more than most from rising oil and gas prices. This could reinvigorate Putin’s war economy at a time when it was beginning to show signs of serious strain.

The US focus on Iran may also distract the Trump administration from diplomatic efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. While these US-led peace talks had not resulted in any tangible progress toward a sustainable settlement, they represent a diplomatic challenge to the Kremlin. Putin will now likely be able to breathe a little easier, at least while the United States remains preoccupied with Iran.

Crucially, escalating hostilities in the Middle East may force Washington to limit the supply of weapons to Ukraine. The US, Israel, and the Gulf states are all reportedly struggling to cope with Iranian drones and are already in danger of running low on air defense ammunition.

In particular, the first days of the conflict have reportedly seen unprecedented use of Patriot air defense missiles, which are in limited supply and desperately needed by the Ukrainians to intercept Russian ballistic missiles. If Kyiv finds itself without these missiles in the coming months, Russia will be able to strike critical infrastructure targets across Ukraine with impunity. This could leave large parts of Ukraine unlivable and have a major impact on the country’s ability to maintain the war effort.

None of this is inevitable. If US-Israeli forces succeed in curtailing Iran’s ability to strike back and can conclude their campaign within a matter of weeks, Putin will have little to cheer. However, if the current air offensive escalates into a protracted military conflict, this will likely strengthen Russia economically while weakening Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and prolonging Europe’s largest invasion since World War II.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Enforce sanctions to prevent Russia from benefitting in a prolonged Iran crisis

Kimberly Donovan — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 18:03:00 +0000

WASHINGTON—As all eyes turn to the war in Iran, the United States and its Western allies cannot afford to take their sights off Russia. Ongoing US and Israeli strikes on Iran, combined with Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz and its attacks on energy and military infrastructure across the Middle East, are leading to spikes in oil prices. Some analysts warn that oil prices could rise to one hundred dollars per barrel if there is a prolonged disruption of oil exports from the Gulf. Watching all this is Russia, eager to sell the hundreds of millions of barrels of sanctioned oil it currently has sitting in storage tankers at sea.

Oil’s rise

Oil futures have fluctuated since the war began. On Tuesday, Brent crude traded at nearly $84 per barrel, its highest price since July 2024. While the surge appears to be leveling off, oil prices are up 15 percent this week. Many analysts anticipate that the longer the conflict goes on and risks to the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf energy infrastructure persist, the greater the likelihood of further price increases.

There are global economic implications associated with high oil prices, including higher inflation, negative impacts on markets, and increased prices at the gas pump and for common goods. But there are also more specific implications for the Russian economy: Higher oil prices could help Moscow continue funding its war against Ukraine despite being under heavy sanctions. As policymakers consider next steps with Iran, they should double down on enforcing sanctions against Russia to prevent Moscow from benefiting from the conflict in Iran.

Russia’s opportunity

Russia has been under increasing economic pressure from Western sanctions since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The United States and its allies imposed sanctions, export controls, asset blockings, an oil price cap, and other restrictive economic measures aimed at reducing Moscow’s ability to fund and equip its war. This pressure, for example, includes US and UK sanctions targeting Russia’s four largest oil companies—Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom Neft, and Surgutneftgas—and their subsidiaries, as well as US, UK, and European Union (EU) sanctions targeting the “shadow fleet” of Russian oil tankers and facilitators enabling Russian sanctions evasion. These sanctions took the Group of Seven (G7) advanced economies’ sixty-dollar price cap on Russian oil, enacted in December 2022, a significant step forward by further restricting Moscow’s ability to sell its oil and reducing Russia’s oil revenue.

As these sanctions have taken hold, Russia’s economy has been hit hard. While the Kremlin has sought to reshape Russia’s economy into supporting its war, its revenue from oil exports has fallen. Prior to 2022, fossil fuel exports funded nearly 40 percent of Russia’s federal budget. In 2025, this dropped to 25 percent. This fall in revenue was due to a combination of a global oil surplus, low oil prices, and Western economic pressure.

After European countries started to phase out purchases of Russian Urals due to the price cap and sanctions, China and India became the primary importers of Russia’s oil. In the past year, however, Beijing and New Delhi reduced their imports of Russian oil due to concerns over US secondary sanctions exposure, tariffs, and, in India’s case, difficult trade negotiations with the United States. China continued to buy oil from Iran and Venezuela, evading US sanctions, and it began importing more oil from Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, India started sourcing more oil from the United States and Gulf states to meet its domestic demand.

But now, as oil prices surge and it becomes more difficult to move oil out of the Persian Gulf, big oil consumers such as China and India will need to shore up their supplies. Russia is ready and waiting for fresh demand for its oil: On Wednesday, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said that Russia is getting “signals of renewed interest from India.”

In January, the EU and the United Kingdom reduced the Russian oil price cap to $44.10 per barrel, a move that was intended to further curb Russian oil revenue. But with oil prices over $80 per barrel this week and many analysts expecting those prices to rise, $44.10 per barrel becomes an attractive discount for readily available oil, giving Russia an opportunity to increase oil sales.

The Western response

While the US-Israeli war against Iran is expanding across the Middle East, Russia’s war in Ukraine continues. If Russia is left unchecked and sanctions are not enforced, Russia may have the opportunity to replenish its coffers with oil revenue. This would shore up Russia’s declining economy, provide it with the funds it needs to continue the bloodshed in Ukraine, and weaken US and Western leverage in peace negotiations. The West cannot afford to let this happen.

The United States, the EU, the United Kingdom, and the broader G7 sanctions coalition should step up the enforcement of their existing sanctions against Russia now. This should include levying additional sanctions on Russia’s energy sector, including currently unsanctioned oil companies, refineries, ports, and financial institutions that facilitate oil and gas transactions.

In addition, the United States should align its shadow fleet sanctions with those of the EU and the United Kingdom. Aligning or matching sanctions with allies extends the tool’s reach across jurisdictions and reduces sanctions evasion. In addition to designating the shadow fleet vessels, allies should expand operations to seize them. These seizures reduce Russia’s profits from sanctioned oil and send a clear message that sanctions evasion will not be tolerated. Further, these operations remove dangerous unseaworthy vessels from the water, preventing potential environmental and maritime accidents, as well as potential national security risks, such as undersea cable cutting.

Beyond oil, Western partners should also pursue sanctions on Russia’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector, especially now that Qatar’s LNG capacity is shut down as a result of the war in Iran. Qatar’s LNG exports represent 20 percent of the global supply. Meanwhile, Russia remains the fourth-largest LNG supplier, behind Australia, Qatar, and the United States. With Qatari LNG offline, Russia, if left unchecked, could fill the gap in supply. Further, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU should make clear to China and India that sanctions on Russian energy remain in place and it would be in their best interest to comply with them.

The weaker the Russian economy performs, the greater the West’s leverage in negotiations to end Moscow’s war in Ukraine. To maintain and bolster this leverage over Russia, the United States and its allies should enforce and increase their sanctions efforts to ensure that the Kremlin cannot economically benefit from a boost in energy sales as a result of the Iran war.

Energy Sanctions Dashboard

This dashboard focuses on US sanctions and restrictive measures placed on crude oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela—including the unintended consequences and the lessons learned.

The post Enforce sanctions to prevent Russia from benefitting in a prolonged Iran crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian army faces comms crisis amid Starlink cut and Kremlin crackdown

Katherine Spencer, Marc Goedemans — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 14:05:45 +0000

The Russian army in Ukraine is facing a growing communications crisis amid recent disruptions to Telegram and Starlink, leaving troops increasingly in the dark and exposing mounting strains inside Russia.

The problems began in early February when Elon Musk imposed restrictions on unauthorized Russian access to Starlink satellites operated by Musk’s SpaceX company that provide high-speed internet. The move came following talks between Musk and recently appointed Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

Starlink made headlines in 2022 as a crucial tool for the Ukrainian military during the initial phase of the Russian invasion. More recently, Russia has acquired thousands of Starlink internet terminals and incorporated them as an important element of the invading army’s communications infrastructure.

Efforts to disable unauthorized Russian terminals operating in Ukraine had an immediate impact, with Ukrainian officials reporting a sharp drop in Russian bombardments and drone attacks on front line positions. In one incident on the Zaporizhzhia front, twelve Russian soldiers were reportedly killed by friendly fire after a Starlink terminal failure.

Ukraine appears to have benefited from Russia’s sudden loss of connectivity. In the first five days following the Starlink cutoff, Ukrainian forces reportedly liberated more than two hundred square kilometers of territory, representing an area roughly equivalent to the Russian army’s gains throughout the whole month of December. This trend has continued into early March.

While there is still some debate over the extent to which the areas reclaimed by Ukraine had previously been under Russian control, the advances provided a boost to Ukrainian morale while strengthening the country’s front line position. According to the Institute for the Study of War, this battlefield success owed much to the disruption caused by Russia’s loss of Starlink services.

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With no domestically produced alternative to Starlink technology, Russian units are now scrambling to find alternative ways to communicate. Some have sought to revive access to the Starlink system, with the Ukrainian authorities warning that Russians are now attempting to pressure the families of Ukrainian prisoners to register terminals.

Russia’s own satellite communications system, which is run by Gazprom Space Systems, has been used in a limited capacity during the war. However, it is regarded as far less reliable than Starlink and is not seen as a viable alternative.

The fallout over the loss of Starlink has sparked a scandal in Russia, with many questioning why the army allowed itself to become so dependent on a communications system owned and controlled by an American company. Critics have attacked this development as both a national humiliation and a strategic blunder which left the Russian military dangerously vulnerable.

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Russia’s recent communication woes are not only due to external restrictions. Days after Musk agreed to cut Starlink access, the Kremlin moved to slow down the hugely popular messenger app Telegram, citing the application’s failure to comply with Russian data laws.

This was widely seen as a significant step toward closing one of the few remaining uncensored communications channels in Putin’s Russia. Telegram serves as a leading news platform among Russian audiences with over 93 million users in the country.

The Kremlin decision to restrict Telegram sparked a rare backlash within Russia’s own ranks, with pro-war bloggers particularly vocal in their criticism. The limitations further undermined connectivity between Russian forces fighting in Ukraine, with many soldiers complaining that the loss of Telegram would hamper their ability to share battlefield information and conduct fundraising activities.

Recent measures against Telegram are part of a much larger effort by Putin to exert greater control over all digital communications. The end goal appears to be the establishment of a “sovereign internet” inside Russia sealed off from foreign influence.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has banned Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, and X. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is now actively pushing Russians to use the new state-controlled MAX app, which contains extensive tracking capabilities for surveillance and is now pre-installed on all phones in Russia.

As the war in Ukraine has progressed, Russia has also restricted internet usage through the widespread implementation of mobile internet blackouts. Putin recently signed a law expanding the ability of state bodies to restrict connectivity, essentially handing the security services a kill switch to the internet inside Russia.

Putin’s readiness to target Telegram despite the challenges this creates for the Russian army in Ukraine has led to speculation that he may be prioritizing domestic regime stability over military success. Some have suggested that he could be preparing for a new and politically risky mobilization; others believe the Kremlin fears unrest as the economic situation in Russia worsens.

Whatever the true motives behind recent efforts to throttle Telegram in Russia, the Kremlin’s actions do not project confidence. On the contrary, they hint at a regime seeking to silence critics and prevent any potential grassroots discontent from gaining traction.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Marc Goedemans is a Young Global Professional at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Fellow

Mark Temnycky

Nonresident Fellow

Eurasia Center

Ukraine Geopolitics & Energy Security

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What Macron’s changes to French nuclear policy mean for European security

Jonathan Rosenstein and Emily Cheesman — Wed, 04 Mar 2026 17:34:55 +0000

WASHINGTON—Backed by the French submarine Le Téméraire, French President Emmanuel Macron on Monday laid out changes to the French nuclear posture, announcing a doctrine of “forward deterrence.” With this new doctrine come four important changes: France will increase the number of warheads in its arsenal. It will simultaneously stop disclosing the size of its total stockpile to maintain strategic ambiguity. It will allow for forward-basing of nuclear weapons outside French territory. And it will enhance bilateral collaboration on deterrence with key European partners.

The dimensions of France’s nuclear shift

Macron’s speech marks the most substantial shift in French nuclear posture in decades. First, France will increase the number of nuclear weapons in its force de dissuasion (deterrent force) for the first time since 1992. This change reflects the belief that France’s current arsenal is too small to credibly project deterrence beyond its borders, particularly amid concerns about its ability to penetrate Russian air defenses. In tandem with this numerical increase, France will withhold total stockpile counts, a move aimed at complicating adversary targeting and nuclear planning through strategic ambiguity.

France will also allow the temporary deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft to allied European countries. Crucially, there will be no nuclear sharing or delegated authorities to any other nation, meaning the sole decision-making authority remains with Paris. Nonetheless, stationing nuclear forces outside French territory adds strategic depth and visibly underscores France’s commitment to European partners.

In addition, France will work with other European countries to develop a shared understanding of the threat, coordinate responses, and improve coordination on escalation dynamics in a conventional conflict environment. Beyond collaboration with Germany and the United Kingdom, the first stage will involve Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark, including visits to strategic sites and joint exercises.

Immediately after Macron’s speech, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced the establishment of a Franco-German nuclear steering group and said that Germany would provide conventional support in French nuclear exercises before the end of the year. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk declared that these advancements in nuclear deterrence will ensure “that our enemies will never dare to attack us.”

Macron also made the case for continued strategic support by European partners on conventional arms. He specifically cited the need for collective resources to develop early-warning capabilities, advanced anti-drone and anti-missile defense systems, and deep-precision strike capabilities. This aligns with the French doctrine of épaulement (mutual support), where conventional forces support nuclear operations, but goes further by operationalizing this concept and framing conventional actions as subnuclear steps on the escalation ladder.

What was France’s previous nuclear doctrine—and why is it changing now?

Macron’s speech expands previous declarations to adapt to an unpredictable security environment. In March 2025, the French president launched a “strategic debate” on using France’s deterrent to protect Europe. Monday’s speech reaffirmed that the country’s “vital interests” extend beyond its borders—and reinforced this rhetorical shift with concrete changes to France’s deterrence posture.

What do the changes mean for France’s current arsenal? At present, according to open-source reporting, the French nuclear force comprises roughly three hundred warheads, including air- and sea-based legs—a modest arsenal compared to the US and Russian forces, which have 1,700 and 1,718 deployed warheads, respectively. This force has traditionally been underpinned by a doctrine of sufficiency and sovereignty.

Augmenting the size of the French nuclear arsenal marks a significant departure from the principle of sufficiency. Historically, the French deterrent was designed to impose unacceptable costs in response to adversary attacks on French vital interests—likely meaning a counter-population targeting strategy that could be accomplished with a single retaliatory strike. Macron’s announcement signals a clear intent to expand the operational scope of the French deterrent. France has the technical capacity and reserve materials to add warheads, but large-scale expansion is limited by its 1996 halt to fissile material production. Without clarity on the scale of the planned increase, it is difficult to assess if the stockpile change is intended to allow for a new targeting strategy.

Consistent with the French tradition of nuclear independence, Macron did not, for example, announce any further integration into NATO’s nuclear planning body. By maintaining an independent nuclear force, France adds an alternate decision-making center to NATO’s deterrent posture. This complicates adversary calculations and necessitates new forums for allied coordination beyond NATO’s nuclear planning framework.

Macron’s speech came amid a larger debate about greater European strategic autonomy and meaningful burden-shifting in NATO’s deterrence mission. This policy reorientation reflects deep and growing unease among some US allies in Europe following the release of the 2026 US National Defense Strategy and the 2025 US National Security Strategy, both of which signal a clear US preference for offloading regional security responsibilities onto allies. These documents reignited dormant debates over the viability and desirability of a European-based deterrent.

What’s next?

Macron’s speech is significant, but its ability to reassure allies and deter Russia remains uncertain. Notably absent from Macron’s list of partners are the Baltic states, Norway, and Finland—countries that directly border Russia. Though it is unclear why they are not participating in the new French nuclear security architecture, their absence underscores the enduring limitations of France’s nuclear posture as an extended deterrent.

Macron also reaffirmed France’s rejection of tactical nuclear responses and nuclear warfighting, reflecting both political will and the lack of sub-strategic options in the French arsenal. This continuity, however, limits France in the face of Russia’s advanced sub-strategic capabilities and its emphasis on heightened aggression at the onset of a conflict. Russia’s nuclear arsenal includes roughly 1,500 non-strategic warheads, and perceived imbalances in nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis NATO could embolden the Kremlin to employ low-yield nuclear weapons—for which France lacks credible, flexible response options.

Some European allies may worry that Macron’s decisions could be reversed by a Euroskeptic successor after next year’s presidential election. One prominent 2027 challenger, Jordan Bardella, has been outspoken against the Europeanization of the French deterrent. Indeed, France’s nuclear umbrella, like the US umbrella, offers no iron-clad guarantee. If nonnuclear allies feel insufficiently protected, some—particularly those under significant threat from Russia—could be tempted to pursue indigenous weapons programs.

To hedge against this scenario, Europe should prioritize conventional deterrence and the essential capabilities that Macron highlighted in his speech. This includes early warning capabilities, long-range strike capabilities, and advanced anti-drone and anti-missile defense systems. Meanwhile, the United States should support France’s enhanced contribution to European defense while reaffirming its commitment to NATO and nuclear deterrence on the continent. Without sustained US reassurance and allied coordination, NATO’s deterrence credibility may weaken, potentially enabling continued Russian aggression—a risk to both European and US security.

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Dispatch from Kyiv: After a long, cold winter, momentum is back on Ukraine’s side

John E. Herbst — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 21:57:02 +0000

KYIV—The woods around Ukraine’s capital were still snowy and the skies overcast as our train approached Kyiv–Pasazhyrskyi station in the early morning of February 24. The carriages were filled with former senior Western officials, prominent journalists, and national security experts heading to the Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference, which takes place every February on the anniversary of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In previous years, the forum was the capital’s most high-profile event, with many Ukrainian leaders and elites in attendance. This year it came in a close second to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcoming eleven European leaders and senior officials to the city, as the visitors announced a €920 million aid package for the country’s battered energy system.

A delegation from the Atlantic Council, including the author, meet with Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Olexandr Mischenko on February 26, 2026. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine)

What’s more, over thirty leaders of the Coalition of the Willing, including British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, convened virtually to speak with Zelenskyy alongside those leaders physically in Kyiv. They reaffirmed the role the coalition would play to prevent future Russian aggression—including by deploying troops—if US President Donald Trump’s efforts to broker a peace deal prove successful.

It all added up to a more positive atmosphere than one might think given the typical tone of the discussion about this war in Washington.

The beginning of warmer weather

At 28 degrees Fahrenheit, the morning air was crisp but a good bit warmer than the often subzero lows Kyiv suffered in January. The extreme cold had given Russian President Vladimir Putin one more reason to intensify his air assault on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, a major focus of Moscow’s military campaign every winter since the 2022 invasion. In targeting energy infrastructure, Putin’s goal has been to bludgeon Ukraine’s civilian population into submission, something the Russian military has not been able to manage on the battlefield.

In recent weeks, Russian attacks have inflicted significant damage on an already weakened Ukrainian energy system. These attacks follow other major blows to Ukraine’s ability to generate power, including Russia’s seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in March 2022 and its destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric dam in June 2023. As a result, Ukraine’s electrical generating capacity has fallen from nearly 34 gigawatts before February 2022 to less than 14 gigawatts today.

Even with a significant amount of energy imports, Ukraine experienced major power outages throughout the country this winter, and many homes were without heat and electricity in subzero weather. But this was of little strategic value to Putin. Many of the Ukrainians I spoke with in Kyiv said that they were furious but not disheartened by the bombings. They had no choice but to continue the war because, however unpleasant, living under Russian bombs is much better than living under Russian occupation. Besides, they added, spring would soon be here.

In the middle of the battlefield

At the YES conference and in meetings across Kyiv over the following three days, I had the opportunity to speak with senior Ukrainian officials in the president’s office and in the foreign affairs, security, energy, and economic ministries and agencies. I also spoke with opposition leaders, journalists, and everyday Ukrainians. I found that the warming temperatures—and the presence of supportive European leaders bearing vital aid—were not the only reasons that many Ukrainians were more upbeat than I had anticipated.

Perhaps the most important factor was the modest good news from several quarters on the battlefield. While commentary in the West over the past year has spoken of small but inevitable Russian gains on the ground, recent developments suggest a less gloomy situation.

To begin with, Ukrainian forces took advantage of billionaire Elon Musk’s decision in early February to switch off Starlink service near the battlefield—thus substantially slowing Russian communications and weakening the accuracy of Russian weapons. In addition, Ukraine recently launched and expanded several small offensives in the Donbas, the south, and the north, retaking some 200–400 square kilometers of territory. These gains have undermined Moscow’s claims—repeated often—that Russian forces have taken control of Pokrovsk in Donbas and Kupiansk near Kharkiv. They also help puncture the narrative, regrettably shared by some officials in Washington, of inevitable Kremlin battlefield advances.

In some areas, Russia is making advances, but they come at an exorbitant cost—an average of nearly 35,000 dead or wounded per month in 2025, according to a report by analysts Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe. Last spring, there were reports of casualty ratios of one to five or six favoring Ukraine. Recent reporting suggests the ratio has gone up substantially—to the point that Russian recruitment efforts cannot fully replace combat losses, the first time this has happened in the war. Ukraine’s new defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, has indicated that Russian casualties could increase to 50,000 or more a month. Russia’s tactic of deploying what are effectively kamikaze waves of troops, in an attempt to conquer more territory as fast as possible, will only increase its losses.

The Ukrainians I spoke with were also heartened by the successful deployment of the long-discussed Ukrainian Flamingo cruise missile in late February. It successfully hit a Russian arms production facility in the city of Votkinsk, more than eight hundred miles from the Ukrainian border. This new weapon will force Russian defense production and the basing of Russian military aircraft further from the battlefield. It will also complicate the movement of Russian military supplies to occupied Ukraine. Growing economic woes in Russia resulting from the sanctions imposed by Trump on Rosneft and Lukoil, as well as the seizure of several Russian “shadow fleet” oil tankers, also complicate Putin’s war effort.

An end to the war?

There was much talk in Kyiv about the state of the negotiations to end the war. Some Ukrainians were concerned by reports that the Trump administration was pushing hard for their country to hand over the heavily fortified territory of the western Donbas that Russian forces have been unable to take—on the dubious assumption that Moscow would be willing to agree to a durable peace once it controls all of the Donbas. Few Ukrainians accept that logic, but some find comfort in the fact that the United States and Ukraine are now discussing turning this area into a “free economic zone” that would require both Ukrainian and Russian forces to withdraw an equal distance from their current positions.

Some Ukrainians I spoke with also echoed Zelenskyy’s public statements that the US security guarantees agreed by the two parties are robust. As a reminder of how far things have come, a year ago Washington was not willing to discuss guarantees. Of course, according to news reports, these details are only being discussed between the United States and Ukraine. There is no indication that Moscow would be willing to accept anything less than full control of western Donbas. Nor does Russia appear willing to accept European troops in Ukraine as a deterrence force.

We left Kyiv late on February 27. Before arriving in Warsaw the next day, we heard the news of US-Israeli strikes on Iran. Some reports suggested that Trump made the decision because he concluded that Iran was not negotiating in good faith, which was hardly a secret. This decision underscores the puzzle in the Trump administration’s efforts to establish a durable peace ending Russian aggression in Ukraine. Most of the diplomatic energy thus far appears directed at reaching agreement between the United States and Ukraine, while the Kremlin has said no to a half-dozen US proposals to stop the shooting. From time to time, there have been rumors of flexibility from the Kremlin, but so far there is no hard evidence. There were similar rumors about Iranian flexibility—until Trump got tired of being played.

The latest developments in the Middle East underscore the important role that Ukraine can play as a partner to the United States. For years, Iranian Shahed drones have been used by the Russians against Ukrainians. Ukrainians have gained experience protecting themselves against hundreds of Shahed drones aimed at their nation almost every night. As Zelenskyy rightly pointed out in response to the attacks in the Gulf, the world can see that Ukrainian air defense experience is “irreplaceable.”

Note: The author’s travel to Kyiv was sponsored in part by the Victor Pinchuk Foundation, which hosts the Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference.

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Experts react: How the world is responding to the US-Israeli war with Iran

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 18:11:08 +0000

The US-Israeli war against Iran has now escalated into a regional conflict, and consequences are already extending far beyond the Middle East. After asking our Mideast experts to assess the impacts of the war for nearby countries, we’ve turned to our global network to send us dispatches on how leaders in Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America are reacting to the spreading conflict. Here’s what they reported back to us.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Russia: Not riding to the rescue—again

United Kingdom: Trying to stay out of it

European Union: Caught between defending the rules-based order and aligning with Washington

Ukraine: A sense of schadenfreude—but also new risks

Canada: Calibrated, cautious, and aligned with allies

Argentina: A supportive response colored by a history of terror

Spain: Defiance against the US driven by domestic politics

China: A restrained response borne of a bind

While the war with Iran is not all about China, any analysis that neglects Beijing’s role in the war, or dismisses the great-power competition underlying it, is either incomplete or a deliberate red herring.

China’s own decisions have tied it to Middle Eastern geopolitics. In 2018, it proposed a new regional security architecture. In 2023, it brokered the Iran–Saudi rapprochement and hosted Hamas for mediation talks with its rival Palestinian faction Fatah. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative is presented explicitly as an alternative to the US-led order. Iran has received an economic lifeline from Beijing, secured a berth in the bloc of emerging economies knows as BRICS, and had the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operate within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Today China is the largest trading partner, the largest importer, and one of the largest foreign investors across much of the Middle East and North Africa. There are over 400,000 Chinese nationals in the United Arab Emirates alone. Now that population is subjected to attacks from Iranian drones and missiles that are most likely made with China-sourced precursor chemicals and components.

Yet China’s public response to the war has been characteristically limp: evacuation advisories for citizens near conflict zones and formulaic condemnations of Israel and the United States.

Beneath that restraint lies an impossible bind. Iran is at its weakest, detested by its population at home and an exporter of radicalism abroad, yet it is also Beijing’s most reliable anti-Western bulwark and a source of deeply discounted oil. Meanwhile, China lacks the means to counterbalance US and Israeli military dominance. Oil prices rose by more than 5 percent on Monday and could spike toward one hundred dollars a barrel with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf states, which absorb much of China’s Belt and Road Initiative investment and supply roughly a third of China’s crude, are now coming under attack from Iranian missiles and drones.

The irony is acute. It was US military supremacy in the Iraq war and the shockwaves of the Arab Spring that first pushed Beijing toward a more proactive Middle East policy. Now it has gotten a possible regime change and another war in the region, and it is none the wiser.

The pivot point lies with the Gulf monarchies. If they enter the fight, China would face a situation it cannot finesse. But it would also present an opportunity that neither the United States nor Israel could generate alone: to make China a credible offer to stop propping up Tehran and allow for the development of a more stable and prosperous region in which to do business. Whether China is too blinkered by great-power ideology to recognize that opportunity remains the defining question.

—Tuvia Gering is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a researcher at the Diane & Guilford Glazer Foundation Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

Russia: Not riding to the rescue—again

WASHINGTON, DC—One of the knock-on effects of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran is that they have exposed—yet again—that Russia is an unreliable ally.

Iran’s rulers are now absorbing the same bitter lesson learned by the autocrats of Syria and Venezuela before them. For all its talk of establishing a multipolar world, for all of its bluster about leading an anti-Western bloc of states, Moscow lacks the will and the capacity to come to the aid of its alleged partners.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the third Kremlin-backed autocrat to fall in the past fifteen months. When Syrian rebels ousted Kremlin ally Bashar al-Assad from power in 2024, the Kremlin could only grant the deposed dictator asylum in Russia. Likewise, Moscow was helpless to aid Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro when the United States apprehended him in January.

And as Politico reports, when US and Israeli bombs were pounding Iran on Saturday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov “offered his Iranian counterpart sympathy and promised his—verbal—support.” And after Khamenei was killed, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered Tehran little more than condolences.

Beyond Latin America and the Middle East, the trend of the Kremlin abandoning allies and partners is also evident in the former Soviet space. When Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, launched a military campaign to take Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and 2023, Moscow failed to support its erstwhile ally Armenia.

The cold, hard reality is that the Putin regime is so consumed by its war of aggression against Ukraine that it lacks the bandwidth to defend its geopolitical interests elsewhere.

But while the Kremlin has yet again suffered reputational damage, Moscow still hopes to salvage some benefits from the war in Iran. The resulting higher oil prices will benefit Russia’s depleted war chest. Unrest in the Middle East will distract attention and media oxygen from Ukraine. And should the US-Israeli war against Iran turn into a quagmire, Moscow certainly hopes to be a beneficiary of the chaos. As Chatham House’s Grégoire Roos notes: “Until the situation in Iran is clarified, the keywords for Moscow will be ‘strategic hedging.’”

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

United Kingdom: Trying to stay out of it

LONDON—The overwhelming view here is that military action taken by the United States and Israel on Saturday was not the right thing to do while negotiations were edging forward toward a deal. Comparisons are being made to US President George W. Bush’s catastrophic Iraq invasion and the lasting consequences for the region and interests of the United States and its closest ally, the United Kingdom.

In the United Kingdom, the stock of the Trump and Netanyahu administrations’ foreign policy in the Middle East is not high. The apparently premature abandonment of diplomacy for the military option will not have surprised many and has likely reinforced the view that both leaders are acting more for domestic political reasons and their own narrow interests. Military action does not—at least to British eyes—seem to have followed sufficient careful analysis of the US national interest and the broader interests of US allies.

The British political establishment, media, and public are highly critical and unsympathetic to the Islamic Republic of Iran. There was widespread outrage following the massacre of protesters in January. Nevertheless, what is likely to dominate public discourse in the coming days is the United States’ lack of clear, realizable objectives, a legal basis under international law, or new evidence to justify the rush to war and immediate regional destabilization. Those themes will overwhelm any attempt to justify action as a response to what happened in January and the despotic and brutal Islamic regime.

Some commentators, including former Conservative members of parliament and Reform leader Nigel Farage, have argued that the United Kingdom should prioritize supporting its closest ally, the United States, over debate on the legality of military action or how things reached this point. So far, that argument does not seem to have resonated widely.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer and the Labour government are between a rock and a hard place given their championing of the primacy of international law. The lack of clarity from them on what the United Kingdom should do next adds to the general sense that this is not the United Kingdom’s conflict, and that the country would be wise to stay out of it. Of course, events on the ground (for example, Iran striking UK military assets defending allies in the region) may rapidly overtake this position. How Starmer and his government align over the coming days is likely to be highly significant for UK domestic politics.

—Nicholas Hopton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former British ambassador to Iran.

European Union: Caught between defending the rules-based order and aligning with Washington

BRUSSELS—Europe finds itself in a structurally uncomfortable position, partly because of events and partly because of its own past choices. For years, European Union (EU) policy toward Iran was centered on Tehran’s nuclear program and anchored in diplomacy backed by incremental pressure. The priority was containment through negotiation and de-escalation. That approach has long run its course. A coherent new strategy has yet to emerge.

The current crisis exposes both this strategic vacuum and the EU’s internal divisions. Competing logics are at play throughout the bloc.

Some leaders are prioritizing international law, condemning the US-Israeli strikes as a war of choice. Failing to mention international law risks eroding Europe’s credibility as a defender of the rules-based order, particularly in the Global South where accusations of double standards resonate.

Another logic prioritizes transatlantic cohesion. Openly confronting Washington could carry risks at a moment of geopolitical volatility. Europe was just able to avoid US President Donald Trump’s grab for Greenland. Restraint on the Iran issue therefore seems prudent for some.

A third logic concerns Iran itself. Many quietly hope that the strikes weaken a repressive regime, reduce nuclear-proliferation risks, and curb proxy warfare. At the same time, there is concern that escalation or spillover could produce something worse.

Europe is trying hard to reconcile these three concerns, but finding common ground is difficult. Some, such as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, have attempted to bridge the divide by shifting the debate toward the “day after,” urging coordination with Washington and European partners on what follows. This forward-looking framing may paper over intra-European tensions. But it also risks bypassing the unresolved question of principle at the heart of the debate.

—Roderick Kefferpütz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. The views expressed in this article are his own.

Ukraine: A sense of schadenfreude—but also new risks

KYIV—Iran’s Shahed drones have menaced Ukrainians for more than four years, striking our homes and murdering civilians far from the battlefield. So there was a certain amount of schadenfreude across Ukraine as the United States and Israel hobbled the Iranian regime with airstrikes of their own over the weekend. The display of decisive US force against a key Russian ally may have also applied some psychological pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was once again reminded how devastating US military power can be and may be reflecting on potential scenarios for how that could play out if his own regime came under direct attack. Iran’s response—drone and missile attacks across the Middle East—may also provide an opportunity to showcase Ukrainian anti-drone technology, which may be even more effective than some air defenses currently in the region.

The Iran strikes do pose some risks to Ukraine, too. Russian propagandists will likely have no problem warping the attacks on Iran into a justification for Moscow’s so-called “special military operation” against Ukraine. And retaliatory strikes by Iran place a premium on air-defense interceptors, which are already in short supply and which Ukraine desperately needs for its own defense. Finally, any increase in global oil prices means more revenue for the Kremlin to use to continue its war on Ukraine.

—Major General (ret.) Volodymyr Havrylov is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former Ukrainian deputy minister of defense.

Canada: Calibrated, cautious, and aligned with allies

CALGARY—Ottawa’s response to the US–Israeli strikes on Iran and escalating regional tensions has been cautious, calibrated, and aligned with allies.

Speaking to media from a trade mission to India over the weekend, Prime Minister Mark Carney stated that “Canada supports the United States acting to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to prevent its regime from further threatening international peace and security,” while emphasizing that Canada is not militarily engaged. He coupled that support with a call for civilian protection and renewed diplomacy, signaling continuity in Canada’s position that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are destabilizing.

The Canadian Armed Forces are not participating in combat operations but maintain a regional footprint through liaison and intelligence roles under Operation FOUNDATION in Qatar, Bahrain, and Jordan. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has heightened vigilance amid concerns about potential Iranian cyber or proxy activity, though no specific domestic threat has been identified.

Domestically, the conflict resonates deeply. Canada is home to approximately 280,000 Iranian-Canadians, ranking fifth globally among Iranian diaspora populations after the United States, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany. The community’s response reflects both fear for relatives abroad and apprehension about regional spillover. For Ottawa, the challenge is strategic balance: uphold alliance commitments, safeguard domestic cohesion, and preserve diplomatic space in a volatile Middle East.

—Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, and a former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

Argentina: A supportive response colored by a history of terror

WASHINGTON, DC—It’s no surprise that Argentinian President Javier Milei has been the most vocal supporter in Latin America of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran. Since the attacks began, his foreign ministry has voiced strong support for the actions, calling Iran a “threat” to “long-term international stability and security.” After the killing of Khamenei, Milei put out a presidential statement commending the operation, calling the ruthless Iranian leader “one of the most evil, violent, and cruel individuals that human history has ever seen.”

Much of the rest of the region called for restraint or respect for international law (Brazil and Mexico, for example) or outright condemned the US and Israeli airstrikes (Colombia). Paraguay (whose foreign minister spoke with his Israeli counterpart on Sunday) stands out for joining Argentina in explicitly being supportive of this past weekend’s actions. There has been wider agreement, however, on condemning Iran’s retaliatory attacks on Gulf countries, from Argentina and Brazil to Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama.

Argentina’s firm stance in support of the US and Israeli actions is due not only to Milei’s strong support of Israel but also to the fact that Argentina has experienced the scourge of the Iranian regime firsthand. In the early 1990s, Argentina fell victim to two Iran-linked terror attacks that shook the country. In 1992, Hezbollah detonated a truck packed with explosives at the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing twenty-nine people and wounding more than two hundred others. Two years later, a car bomb detonated at the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association Jewish Community Center building in Buenos Aires. That day marked the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentine history, with eighty-five people killed and over three hundred wounded.

Thirty years later, Argentina’s highest criminal court found Iran responsible for this latter bombing. For Argentina, these heinous attacks will never be forgotten and are a constant reminder of the need to prevent Iran from continuing to pose threats to the world. Many of the people accused by the Argentine justice system of serving as the architects of the attacks have since risen through the ranks of Iran’s security and military services with impunity.

Since taking office, Milei has also made a point of aligning his foreign policy with Israel and the United States, marking them as Argentina’s twin examples to follow. Given Argentina’s increasing economic alignment with the United States, and the sentiments of many in Argentina when it comes to Iran, expect Milei to continue to lead the region in supporting actions to dismantle the Iranian regime.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Spain: Defiance against the US driven by domestic politics

After the US-Israeli strikes on Iran began, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez denied the United States the use of jointly operated Spanish airbases and Trump responded by threatening to cut trade ties with Madrid. Sánchez’s decision to pick another fight with the Trump administration should be seen through the lens of Spain’s domestic politics and the prime minister’s attempt to placate the extreme left of his base. As his popularity wanes, Sánchez knows well that standing up to the United States and Israel will resonate with certain sectors of the electorate, as did his decision last year to make Spain the sole NATO member not to commit to increase defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product. This all plays well with Sánchez’s base as his Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party looks ahead to regional parliamentary elections this year and the 2027 national elections. By citing international law and the legacy of the 2003 Iraq war, Sánchez can prey on lingering passions of the Spanish left to solidify his own weak position.

But Sánchez will also open himself up to political attacks that question the coherence of these actions. Alberto Feijoó, leader of the center-right Popular Party, has already accused Sánchez of sacrificing Spain’s foreign policy credibility to partisan politics. The European Commission released a statement expressing its solidarity with Spain over Trump’s trade threat. But this issue will nevertheless add to a growing suspicion in European capitals about Spain’s reliability as a strategic partner as Europe prepares to act more independently. As calls for a “two-speed” Europe become louder, Sánchez’s decision to self-isolate Spain may give ammunition to those who prefer to leave Madrid in the second tier of any future multi-tier EU architecture.

—Andrew Bernard is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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#AtlanticDebrief – What’s in store for the Three Seas Summit? | A Debrief from Amb. Romana Vlahutin

Francis — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 17:49:58 +0000

What’s on the agenda for the 2026 Three Sees Summit (3SI) in Dubrovnik?

Senior Fellow Ian Brzezinski sits down with Special Envoy for Strategic Connectivity and Three Seas Initiative of Croatia Ambassador Romana Vlahutin to discuss the upcoming 3SI Summit in Croatia and opportunities for international engagement on energy, economy, and more.

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How the broadening Middle East conflict could strengthen Russia’s hand

Andrei Covatariu — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 15:05:52 +0000

Bottom lines up front

European gas prices do not jump 45 percent in a vacuum. They do so when geopolitics collides with structural vulnerability. The latest spike is not just a market reaction to Middle East tensions; it is a stress test for Europe’s energy strategy and political cohesion—and a reminder that Russia still benefits when the system shakes.

The immediate triggers are clear. Broader regional escalation has raised the risk premium across oil and gas markets. QatarEnergy paused liquefied natural gas (LNG) production following attacks on key facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City, a complex that underpins a significant share of global LNG trade. At the same time, disruption in the Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly a fifth of global LNG and oil flows transit—have forced traders and shipowners to reassess exposure.

Add to this the uncertainty around pipeline gas flows between Iran and Turkey. If those volumes are curtailed or interrupted, Ankara may need to source additional cargoes on the spot LNG market. That would introduce yet another price-sensitive buyer competing directly with Europe for flexible supply.

Individually, each of these developments is manageable. Together, they create something more destabilizing: a synchronized tightening of global gas optionality.

Europe’s structural weakness this year

What makes this moment particularly uncomfortable for the European Union is timing.

First, storage levels are low after a relatively harsh winter, now below 30 percent. That does not mean an immediate shortage—but it does mean a steeper refill requirement.

Second, snow coverage in parts of Southern and Central Europe has been below average. Lower snow coverage translates into lower hydro generation in spring and summer. In practical terms, that means more gas-fired power generation precisely when Europe needs to inject gas back into storage.

Third, the storage refill clock is unforgiving. EU rules require storage facilities to approach 90 percent fullness ahead of winter. Even with recent flexibility in deadlines, the market knows injections must accelerate over the summer.

This is why conflict duration matters more than the initial price spike. Even if the Trump administration’s original estimate of four to five weeks proves accurate, that window overlaps with the early injection season. Four weeks of shipping disruptions, elevated insurance costs, and LNG rerouting is more than enough to reshape summer price curves—and political narratives.

The political spillover: A test for the Russian phaseout

Here is where the story shifts from markets to geopolitics.

The EU has committed—politically and legally—to phasing out Russian gas imports. The logic is strategic: reduce structural dependence on Moscow, limit Kremlin’s leverage, and harden Europe’s energy security architecture.

However, price spikes revive old arguments. In this context, governments such as Hungary and Slovakia could raise concerns about the feasibility of maintaining the current phaseout timeline amid elevated market stress. The argument would likely emphasize the perceived affordability, reliability, and geographic proximity of Russian pipeline gas, raising the question of whether additional constraints are prudent during a period of global instability.

In practical terms, an easing of the phaseout could take the form of delayed implementation deadlines, temporary exemptions for certain member states, extended transitional contracts, or a slower reduction of remaining pipeline and LNG imports under the justification of market stability.

This framing ignores the strategic cost of dependency. Yet in times of economic strain, short-term affordability arguments gain traction. High prices do not just test consumers—they test cohesion.

In this sense, Russia benefits without firing a shot in the Gulf. A tighter LNG market strengthens the perceived value of residual Russian flows. Moscow does not need to regain market dominance to gain leverage; it only needs to remain a marginal supplier in a tight system.

The oil dimension: Moscow’s quiet advantage in Asia

The advantage is not limited to gas.

If conventional oil flows from Gulf Cooperation Council exporters to Asia continue to be disrupted, China’s refiners will look for reliability. At the same time, Venezuelan exports to China have already been constrained by US enforcement actions. This context leaves Russia in a stronger negotiating position.

China, in particular, has been importing record volumes of Russian crude at steep discounts. In a context where Gulf supply faces logistical risk, Moscow’s barrels become relatively more valuable. The Kremlin may not eliminate discounts overnight, but it can narrow them—protecting revenue at a moment when higher oil prices already improve its fiscal outlook.

The real question for Europe

Against this backdrop, Russia appears to be the primary short-term beneficiary. Not because it controls the crisis, but because it benefits from fragmentation. Higher gas prices complicate Europe’s phaseout strategy. Political fault lines inside the EU widen as affordability concerns grow. But this advantage is contingent.

If Europe responds by doubling down on diversification, strengthening demand-side flexibility, and maintaining political unity on the Russian phaseout, the shock could ultimately reinforce strategic resilience.

If, instead, the crisis triggers policy backtracking, delayed phaseouts, or reconsidered bilateral gas deals with Moscow, then the Kremlin will have achieved something more durable than short-term revenue gains: restored leverage.

Andrei Covatariu is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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Turkey’s gas diversification strategy and rising share of LNG

Eser Özdil — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 14:00:00 +0000

Executive summary

Since the adoption of the National Energy and Mining Policy in 2017, Turkey has executed a paradigm shift in its natural gas supply architecture, transitioning from a rigid, pipeline-dependent importer to a flexible, diversified regional energy actor. This transformation has been underpinned by a strategic diversification of import infrastructure from exclusive reliance on pipelines to an aggressive expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) regasification capacity.

A central pillar of this strategy has been the deployment of floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs), which have allowed Turkey to rapidly scale its daily entry capacity beyond peak winter demand levels. By 2025, the country’s regasification capacity had increased approximately fivefold to 150 million cubic meters (mcm), compared to pre-2016 levels of 37 mcm. This infrastructure redundancy is not merely a security buffer; it is a calculated commercial instrument designed to foster competition between incumbent pipeline suppliers—primarily Russia and Iran—and the global LNG market.

This enhanced flexibility has fundamentally altered Turkey’s negotiating position. State-owned operator BOTAŞ has successfully created a position to substitute Russian or Iranian molecules with flexible LNG sources based on more market-based pricing mechanisms instead of long-term oil-indexed prices. The historical reliance on oil-indexed pricing is being systematically dismantled in favor of hybrid formulas (blending Dutch TTF, oil indexation, and, more recently, Henry Hub-indexed contracts with US majors).

Furthermore, this diversification strategy and the rationale for it have transcended domestic security of supply, evolving into a commercial offensive aimed at Southeastern Europe. Through the commissioning of the Saros FSRU and the expansion of the Silivri underground storage facility, Turkey has physically integrated its national gas grid with the Balkan markets, enabling gas exports to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova. Combined with the phased development of the Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea, which creates a domestic production field projected to meet significant domestic demand by 2028, Turkey is effectively repositioning itself from a transit corridor to a pivotal gas trading hub at the intersection of European and Asian markets.

This report provides an exhaustive analysis of the execution of this strategy from 2016 to 2025. It examines the granular details of infrastructure investments, the commercial restructuring of the contract portfolio, the technical and economic development of the Sakarya gas field, and the geopolitical implications of Turkey’s emergence as a gas exporter to Europe.

1. Introduction: The strategic imperative for diversification

The structural transformation of the Turkish natural gas market over the last decade is rooted in a response to the geopolitical and commercial vulnerabilities that characterized the country’s energy landscape in the early twenty-first century. Historically, Turkey imported nearly 99 percent of its natural gas, with the vast majority being delivered via long-distance pipelines from Russia (Blue Stream, Trans-Balkan, and, later, TurkStream), Iran (Tabriz-Ankara), and Azerbaijan (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum).

These supplies were governed by rigid long-term “take-or-pay” contracts, typically spanning twenty to twenty-five years. Pricing was predominantly indexed to high-sulfur fuel oil and gas oil prices, with a lag of six to nine months. This structure exposed the Turkish economy to two distinct risks.

Commercial exposure: During periods of elevated oil prices, gas import costs surged irrespective of underlying gas market fundamentals, placing pressure on the current account balance and BOTAŞ’s balance sheet.
Supply security: Reliance on technically volatile flows from Iran, which frequently suffered pressure drops during peak winter demand, and politically sensitive flows from Russia left the Turkish grid susceptible to supply shocks. Disputes between Russia and Ukraine (in 2006 and 2009) and recurring technical failures in the Iranian system almost every winter underscored the fragility of a pipeline-centric model.

Turkey’s strategic inflection point emerged in the 2016–2017 period. Facing expiring legacy contracts and a volatile geopolitical environment, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources initiated a doctrine of “localization and diversification.” The objective was threefold: to maximize the use of domestic resources (renewables and, later, Black Sea gas), diversify import sources to reduce dependence on any single supplier to below 50 percent, and invest in infrastructure that provides optionality (i.e. the physical ability to switch suppliers based on price and availability).

2. Infrastructure Investment: The expansion of regasification capacity (2016–2025)

The cornerstone of Turkey’s diversification strategy has been the rapid development of LNG entry capacity. Unlike pipelines, which take year to construct, are capital intensive and geopolitically complex, LNG terminals—particularly FSRUs—offer speed and flexibility. Between 2016 and 2025, Turkey transformed its coastal infrastructure to ensure that daily gasification capacity exceeds peak winter consumption, theoretically allowing the country to meet its entire annual gas demand via LNG if necessary. However, practically speaking, because peak demand is exceeding 300 mcm/day in the coldest days of the winter, LNG terminals can roughly cover half of the country’s total demand or act as last resort supplier for entire household demand in case of serious flows via pipelines.

2.1 Onshore terminal modernization

Marmara Ereğlisi LNG terminal (BOTAŞ)

Commissioned in 1994, the Marmara Ereğlisi terminal is the backbone of LNG supply for the high-consumption industrial zones of Thrace and Istanbul. Operational for decades, the terminal has seen continuous investment since 2016 to upgrade its send-out capacity and storage.

Operational capacity: in 2024, the terminal’s daily send-out capacity reached approximately 37 mcm.
Storage capacity: 255,000 cubic meters across three tanks.
Strategic role: located on the northern coast of the Sea of Marmara, it provides baseload stability to the region that accounts for the country’s highest industrial electricity and gas consumption.

Aliağa LNG terminal (private)

Located in Izmir, and operated by a private company.

Operational capacity: recent investments have pushed its daily send-out capacity to 40 mcm.
Storage capacity: high-capacity storage tanks totaling 280,000 cubic meters.
Strategic role: supplying the Aegean region’s gas-fired power plants and industrial zones.

2.2 The strategic pivot to FSRUs

The most distinct shift in post-2016 policy was the adoption of FSRUs. These vessels provided a solution to land constraints and permitting delays, allowing Turkey to bring new capacity online in record time.

Etki Liman FSRU (private)

Commissioned in December 2016 in Aliağa, Izmir, Etki Liman was Turkey’s first FSRU project, and which demonstrated the viability of the technology.

Capacity: daily send-out capacity of 28 mcm.
Significance: its rapid deployment immediately following the 2015–2016 geopolitical tensions with Russia was a signal of Turkey’s intent to diversify rapidly.

Ertuğrul Gazi FSRU (BOTAŞ)

In a move toward asset ownership rather than leasing, BOTAŞ commissioned the Ertuğrul Gazi in 2021. Stationed at the Dörtyol terminal in Hatay, near the Syrian border, this vessel is critical for the energy security of southern and southeastern Anatolia.

Investment: constructed by Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea for an estimated cost of $225 million.
Storage capacity: 170,000 cubic meters and a daily regasification capacity of 28 mcm.
Strategic role: by injecting gas into the southern transmission lines, the Ertuğrul Gazi mitigates the risks associated with the erratic flow of the Iran-Turkey pipeline, which historically suffers from pressure drops during winter. It also supplies heavy industry in the Iskenderun Bay area.

Saros FSRU (BOTAŞ)

Operational since early 2023, the Saros FSRU located in the Gulf of Saros (in the northwest Aegean Sea) is the most geostrategically significant addition to the fleet.

Location: its position allows gas to be injected into the Thrace region without the navigational constraints of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits or the need to traverse the entire Turkish grid from east to west.
Capacity: daily send-out capacity of 28 mcm.
Export enabler: Crucially, the Saros terminal is located near the interconnection points with the Greek and Bulgarian grids. This proximity makes it the physical cornerstone of Turkey’s gas export deals to the Balkans. It allows LNG cargoes arriving from the United States or other exporters to be regasified and piped directly into the Trans-Balkan Pipeline (in reverse flow) or the interconnector with Bulgaria.

Future fleet expansion

Looking toward 2035, the Ministry of Energy has articulated plans to expand the FSRU fleet to five active units. This expansion strategy includes a novel operational concept: deploying FSRUs abroad. Negotiations have been reported regarding the deployment of a Turkish FSRU to Egypt or Morocco to manage seasonal demand imbalances, effectively positioning BOTAŞ as a regional infrastructure service provider.

2.3 Underground storage as a balancing mechanism

Complementing the LNG intake is the expansion of underground storage (UGS), which is essential for managing the seasonality of supply and demand balances and storing gas during periods of low spot prices (summer) for use during peak demand (winter).

Silivri UGS: expanded to a capacity of 4.6 billion cubic meters (bcm) with a daily withdrawal capacity of 75 mcm.
Tuz Gölü (Salt Lake) UGS: currently undergoing expansion to reach 5.4 bcm by 2028, with a withdrawal capacity of 40 mcm per day.

Combined impact: by 2028, Turkey aims to have storage capacity equivalent to 20 percent of its annual consumption, aligning with European Union benchmarks for supply security.

3. Domestic production: The Sakarya gas field investment

While LNG provided import flexibility, the discovery of the Sakarya gas field in the western Black Sea in 2020 fundamentally altered Turkey’s long-term energy balance. With reserves initially estimated at 540 bcm and revised upward to 710 bcm following further appraisals (including the Çaycuma-1 discovery), this field represents the largest industrial project in the country’s history.

3.1 Technical development and phases

The development of the Sakarya field is an ultra-deepwater project (at a depth of more than 2,000 meters), requiring cutting-edge engineering and massive capital investment.

Phase 1 (operational)
- Status: the first gas was delivered to the Filyos Natural Gas Processing Facility in April 2023.Investment: phase 1 involved the drilling of ten wells and the construction of subsea production systems and a 170-kilometer (km) pipeline to shore. The initial production plateau was set at 10 mcm per day (approximately 3.5 bcm per year (bcm/y)).
- Current output: as of 2024–2025, daily production has ramped up to approximately 7–9.5 mcm per day.
Phase 2 (under construction)
- Scope: this phase targets the drilling of approximately 26–30 additional wells.Contracting: A consortium including Saipem, SLB (Schlumberger), and Subsea7 was awarded the Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Installment (EPCI) contract for the second phase. Saipem’s share of the contract alone is valued at approximately $1.5 billion, covering the installation of 170 km of pipelines and subsurface systems.
- Target: the objective is to raise production to 40 mcm per day (approximately 15 bcm/y) by 2028.
Floating production unit (FPU)
- To process the increased volumes from the wider basin, Turkey has purchased an FPU from China. This vessel, expected to be operational by 2027–2028, will process raw gas offshore before transmission, functioning similarly to the Osman Gazi platform but on a larger scale.

3.2 Economic and strategic impact

Import substitution: At its plateau production of 15 bcm/y, the Sakarya field will cover approximately 25–30 percent of Turkey’s current domestic consumption. This will directly reduce the annual gas import bill by billions of dollars, improving the chronic current account deficit.
Contractual leverage: The certainty of 15 bcm of domestic gas, which is expected to reach plateau levels in 2028 from the Sakarya field, and with high probability, increase as exploration continues in other parts of the Black Sea, provides BOTAŞ with a “walk-away” option in negotiations. It forces suppliers such as Gazprom and NIOC to offer competitive pricing or risk losing market share permanently.

The development of the Sakarya field is an ultra-deepwater project (at a depth of more than 2,000 meters), requiring cutting-edge engineering and massive capital investment.

Phase 1 (operational)
- Status: the first gas was delivered to the Filyos Natural Gas Processing Facility in April 2023.Investment: phase 1 involved the drilling of ten wells and the construction of subsea production systems and a 170-kilometer (km) pipeline to shore. The initial production plateau was set at 10 mcm per day (approximately 3.5 bcm per year (bcm/y)).
- Current output: as of 2024–2025, daily production has ramped up to approximately 7–9.5 mcm per day.

Phase 2 (under construction)
- Scope: this phase targets the drilling of approximately 26–30 additional wells. Contracting: A consortium including Saipem, SLB (Schlumberger), and Subsea7 was awarded the Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Installation (EPCI) contract for the second phase. Saipem’s share of the contract alone is valued at approximately $1.5 billion, covering the installation of 170 km of pipelines and subsurface systems.
- Target: the objective is to raise production to 40 mcm per day (approximately 15 bcm/y) by 2028.
Floating production unit (FPU)
- To process the increased volumes from the wider basin, Turkey has purchased an FPU from China. This vessel, expected to be operational by 2027–2028, will process raw gas offshore before transmission, functioning similarly to the Osman Gazi platform but on a larger scale.

4. Import dynamics: LNG vs. pipeline gas competition

The interplay between pipeline gas and LNG in the Turkish market is driven by contract expirations, relative price dynamics, and the strategic objective to minimize geopolitical risk.

4.1 Evolution of the import mix

Historically, pipeline gas accounted for 85–90 percent of Turkish imports. Since 2016, however, investments in LNG infrastructure have allowed LNG to capture significant market share. In 2024 and 2025, LNG imports periodically accounted for 25 percent of total demand, with spot LNG playing a crucial balancing role. The share of Russian gas in Turkey’s total supply has declined structurally, dropping from more than 50 percent in 2018 to less than 40 percent in 2025. This reduction is not accidental; it is the result of BOTAŞ declining to renew expiring pipeline contracts at full volumes, choosing instead to fill the gap with spot LNG and medium-term contracts.

4.2 The expiry wall and contract strategy

The period between 2021 and 2026 constitutes a “contract expiry wall” during which the majority of Turkey’s legacy long-term contracts (totaling more than 40 bcm) come up for renewal.

Russia (Gazprom): Contracts for the Blue Stream and the western route (transferred to TurkStream) faced expiration. In late 2024 and early 2025, BOTAŞ extended these contracts—but, crucially, only for one year. This broke the tradition of twenty-year lock-in contract structures, allowing Turkey to reassess market conditions annually.
Iran (NIOC): The long-term contract for 9.6 bcm/y expires in 2026. Negotiations are ongoing, but Turkey’s increased LNG capacity significantly weakens Iran’s bargaining power, which was previously bolstered by the lack of alternative supply routes to eastern Anatolia.

Thanks to LNG infrastructure, BOTAŞ has an upper hand in negotiations vis-à-vis Russia and Iran.

4.3 US LNG and the hedging strategy

The United States has emerged as a critical partner in Turkey’s diversification of gas supplies. In 2025, the United States became Turkey’s fourth-largest gas supplier, providing 5.5 bcm. Upstream investment: To manage the price volatility of US LNG (indexed to the Henry Hub benchmark), Turkey has announced plans to invest directly in US upstream assets. Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) is in talks with ExxonMobil and Chevron to acquire stakes in production fields. This acts as a physical hedge. If Henry Hub prices rise, the cost of LNG imports for BOTAŞ increases, but the revenue from TPAO’s US production assets also rises, neutralizing the fiscal impact on the Turkish state. This vertical integration strategy mimics the portfolio approach of global supermajors.

5. Commercial strategy: The new LNG portfolio and pricing

In 2024 and 2025, BOTAŞ executed an unprecedented wave of contracting, signing agreements totaling nearly 20 bcm/y of LNG supply. This portfolio is designed to be geographically diverse and commercially flexible.

5.1 Key LNG agreements (2024–2025)

The table below summarizes the major agreements signed or operationalized in this period, based on data from industry sources.

Supplier company	Origin/portfolio	Annual quantity (bcm/y)	Duration	Start date	Strategic note
Oman LNG	Oman	1.4	Ten years	2025	Diversification away from the Atlantic basin
Sonatrach	Algeria	4.4	Three years (renewed)	2024	Extension of a decades-long partnership
ExxonMobil	United States/ portfolio	3.8	Ten years	2027	Henry Hub indexed and a foundational US deal
Shell	United States/ portfolio	4.0	Ten years	2027	High volume and destination flexibility
TotalEnergies	Portfolio	1.6	Ten years	2027	Strengthens European commercial ties
SEFE–I	Germany/portfolio	0.6	Three years	2026	Winter-weighted supply profile
SEFE–II	Portfolio	0.6	Ten years	2028	Winter-weighted supply profile
ENI–I	Portfolio	0.5	Ten years	2026	Winter-weighted supply profile
ENI–II	Portfolio	0.5	Ten years	2028	Winter-weighted supply profile
Woodside	Portfolio	0.65	Nine years	2030	US deal, Winter-weighted supply profile
Cheniere	Portfolio	1.2	One year	2026	Winter-weighted supply profile
Petrochina	Portfolio	Cooperation agreement	N/A	N/A	N/A
Hartree	Portfolio	0.3	Two years	2026	Winter-weighted supply profile
BP	Portfolio	1.6	Three years	2026	Winter-weighted supply profile
JERA	Portfolio	0.6	One year	2026	Winter-weighted supply profile
Equinor	Portfolio	0.50	Three years	2026	Winter-weighted supply profile
Mercuria	Portfolio	4 (up to 70 bcm)	Twenty years	2026	US deal, Winter-weighted supply profile

5.2 Evolution of pricing formulas

A critical element of these new contracts is a shift in pricing mechanisms.

Legacy model (oil Indexation): Historically, contracts with Gazprom and Iran were 100-percent indexed to Brent crude and oil products (often with the price movements averaged over the past 3-6-9 months. This meant gas prices remained high even when global gas hub prices crashed, penalizing the Turkish economy.
The hybrid transition: In contract renewals post-2021, particularly with Russia, Turkey successfully negotiated a shift to hybrid formulas. Current pipeline contracts often feature a split, such as 70 percent TTF (Dutch Title Transfer Facility) and 30-percent oil and linked. This links import costs more closely to the European spot market reality.
The Henry Hub advantage: The deal with ExxonMobil and other US suppliers introduces Henry Hub indexation. Historically, Henry Hub prices (US domestic gas) have been significantly lower and less volatile than European (TTF) or Asian (JKM) benchmarks. By securing volumes linked to Henry Hub, BOTAŞ gained exposure to the structurally lower cost of US gas production, creating a potential for price arbitrage relative to European market prices.

6. From importer to regional hub: The export strategy

Turkey’s infrastructure buildout has created a capacity surplus. With more than 50 bcm of LNG entry capacity, 15 bcm of domestic production, and existing pipeline capacity, the total supply potential exceeds domestic demand (approximately 50–55 bcm). BOTAŞ is capitalizing on this surplus by positioning Turkey as a gas trading hub for Eastern Europe.

6.1 The “Turkish blend” concept

Actively seeking to decouple from Russian energy—Turkey has advanced a concept it describes as a “Turkish blend.” Gas entering the national grid from Azerbaijan and the United States, along with other LNG suppliers such as Oman, Qatar, Nigeria, Algeria, Australia, and Egypt etc., is comingled with gas from the Sakarya field. When BOTAŞ exports gas to Bulgaria or Hungary, the molecules are legally and chemically indistinguishable. This allows BOTAŞ to supply certain European markets that do not want to buy Russian molecules either direct or indirectly. This role as an aggregator and blender is central to the hub strategy.

6.2 Key export agreements

Since 2023, BOTAŞ has signed a series of historic export deals, leveraging the Saros FSRU by regasifying LNG volumes coming from multiple sources and the Trans-Balkan Pipeline (now operating in reverse flow, from Turkey to Europe).

Bulgaria (Bulgargaz): A landmark thirteen-year agreement, signed in early 2023, grants Bulgargaz access to Turkish LNG terminals and the transmission grid, with a transfer volume of up to 1.5 bcm/y. This effectively breaks Gazprom’s monopoly on Bulgarian supply.
Hungary (MVM): A groundbreaking deal made Hungary the first non-bordering country for Turkish exports. The initial volume was 275 mcm, with plans for significant expansion.
Romania (OMV Petrom): An agreement to supply up to 4 mcm (approximately 1.5 bcm/y) via the Trans-Balkan Pipeline.
Moldova: A contract to supply 2 mcm per day to help the country reduce its critical dependence on Russian gas supplied via Ukraine.

6.3 Political and commercial motivations

Commercial: BOTAŞ is increasingly transforming from a national utility into a regional trader, capturing margins between its diversified import portfolio and European hub prices.
Political: By becoming one of the energy security enablers for southeastern NATO allies (Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary), Ankara significantly enhances its diplomatic leverage within the Alliance. It creates a mutual dependency that acts as a buffer against political friction in other areas. The United States actively supports this role, viewing Turkish FSRUs as a vector to displace Russian dominance in the Balkans.

7. Conclusion: Commercial and political implications

The period from 2016 to 2025 marks a phase of consolidation and maturation in Turkey’s gas market. The country has successfully mitigated its primary strategic weakness—energy dependence—through a capital-intensive but high-yield strategy of infrastructure expansion and resource diversification.

Commercial benefits

Price arbitrage: access to gas indexed to multiple benchmarks including Henry Hub, TTF, and oil-indexed formulas allows BOTAŞ to manage its weighted average cost of gas (WACOG) more flexibly, shielding the domestic economy from single-market shocks.
Trading revenue: the utilization of surplus capacity for exports creates a new revenue stream in hard currency, which is essential for BOTAŞ’s financial sustainability.

Political benefits

Strategic autonomy: the ability to meet domestic demand without Russian pipelines (in a crisis scenario) removes the “energy weapon” from Russia’s diplomatic arsenal. Therefore LNG infrastructure and domestic gas production create important leverage.
Regional influence: Turkey has embedded itself as an indispensable node in the European energy security architecture. The Turkish hub is no longer an aspiration but a physical reality defined by steel pipes, floating terminals, and binding contracts.

By 2028, with the Sakarya field likely at full production and five FSRUs in operation, Turkey could cease to be merely a bridge for energy and become a center of price formation—a true hub where the dynamics of Asian, European, and Middle Eastern gas markets intersect.

About the author

Eser Özdil is an energy fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program & founder of Glocal Group Consulting, Investment & Trade. You can follow him on X at @eserozdil.

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Ukraine’s experience is indispensable in the fight against Iranian drones

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 01:14:09 +0000

UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer says Britain plans to deploy Ukrainian drone warfare specialists to the Middle East as part of international efforts to counter the growing threat posed by swarms of Iranian drones. Amid Iranian airstrikes across the region, Starmer announced on March 1 that Britain would “bring experts from Ukraine to help Gulf partners shoot down Iranian drones attacking them.”

For Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Starmer’s proposal represents long overdue recognition of his country’s status as a military force to be reckoned with. “Ukraine’s experience in defense is, in many respects, irreplaceable,” Zelenskyy commented following Starmer’s remarks. While the Ukrainian leader has yet to commit to a role in the Gulf, he has offered to dispatch Ukraine’s leading anti-drone specialists if regional leaders can first convince Vladimir Putin to pause his ongoing invasion.

Britain’s decision to call on Ukrainian expertise serves to underline modern Ukraine’s remarkable transformation from military backwater to world leader in drone warfare. When the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, decades of post-Soviet neglect had left the Ukrainian military in a sorry state. At the time, Kyiv could only call on a few thousand combat troops and had to rely on a ragtag collection of volunteer battalions to contain Kremlin forces in the east of the country.

A series of ambitious reforms followed, but it was not until the full-scale invasion of February 2022 that the Ukrainian army truly came of age. Faced with the existential threat of Russia’s invasion, the Ukrainian nation rose up to resist. The ranks of the army swelled to include around one million troops, while the country’s stagnant defense industry was soon taking the first steps toward an unprecedented resurgence that continues to this day.

Over the past four years, much of Ukraine’s defense sector growth has focused on new technologies as Ukrainians have sought ways to counter Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of funding, manpower, and conventional weapons. A thriving domestic ecosystem of defense tech startups has emerged, with a particular emphasis on drone production. Ukrainian developers are able to test new ideas almost immediately in combat conditions, leading to a culture of relentless innovation that has turbo-charged the evolution of drone warfare and reshaped the battlefield.

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Ukraine’s prowess has not gone unnoticed, with numerous European partners seeking to benefit from Ukrainian military know-how. In recent weeks, Germany became the latest NATO country to unveil plans for Ukrainian military instructors to train their troops. Ukrainian trainers are also reportedly sharing their drone warfare insights with multiple other European countries including Poland and Britain.

This represents a striking shift in the relationship between Ukraine and the country’s allies. Throughout the period from 2014 until 2022, Western military trainers routinely traveled to Ukraine to provide instruction, while the defense sector discourse in Kyiv revolved around Ukrainian efforts to adopt and incorporate NATO standards. After four years of defending themselves against the biggest European invasion since World War II, it is now Ukraine that is setting the standards, while NATO commanders try to catch up.

Ukraine’s NATO partners have much to learn, it would seem. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that during a spring 2025 exercise in Estonia involving NATO forces and Ukrainian drone crews, the Ukrainians easily overcame a far larger NATO contingent, sparking considerable alarm and much debate. Meanwhile, many Ukrainian soldiers have noted that the military equipment provided by the country’s Western partners is often now redundant due to the lightning pace of the technological advances taking place on the Ukrainian battlefield.

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Ukraine’s emergence as a major military power is a nightmare scenario for Russia. When Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion four years ago, he identified the “demilitarization” of Ukraine as one of his two key war aims. If demilitarization was the goal, the invasion has failed in spectacular fashion. Far from being demilitarized, today’s Ukraine now boasts the largest and most technologically advanced army in Europe.

Across the continent, there is growing awareness that with the United States seeking to reduce its transatlantic security commitments, Ukraine is destined to play a central role in the future defense of Europe. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any European security strategy that doesn’t include Ukraine as a core contributor. A country that spent years fruitlessly seeking an invitation to join NATO is now acknowledged as a guarantor of Europe’s security at a time when faith in the effectiveness of the alliance has fallen to record lows.

Zelenskyy’s proposal to send specialists to the Middle East in exchange for a Kremlin ceasefire should probably not be taken literally, but it does reflect the confidence of a man who knows his country is more prepared than most for the realities of twenty-first century warfare. Zelenskyy clearly recognizes that Ukraine’s unrivaled experience is a valuable commodity. This is particularly true in the current context, with Iranian drones saturating existing air defenses and demanding the kind of cost-effective solutions that Ukraine has spent the past four years perfecting.

The Ukrainian leader also well aware that his country’s military strength represents a major trump card as he seeks to negotiate a settlement that will safeguard Ukrainian statehood and secure the country’s European future. The war unleashed by Putin in 2022 was meant to strip Ukraine of its army, its identity, and its sovereignty. Instead, it has transformed Ukraine into one of Europe’s leading military powers and positioned the country at the cutting edge of global defense sector innovation. This new reality will help define Ukraine’s place in the wider world for decades to come, while serving as a formidable obstacle to Russia’s imperial ambitions.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Missiles made in Ukraine are bringing Putin’s invasion home to Russia

David Kirichenko — Mon, 02 Mar 2026 23:47:55 +0000

Ukraine conducted a landmark airstrike in late February, using domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles to hit a military production facility deep inside Russia. The strike on the Votkinsk complex, which produces a range of ballistic and cruise missiles for the Russian military, marked the first time Kyiv had successfully targeted a strategically significant Russian defense industry site with long-range missiles manufactured in Ukraine.

Surveillance camera footage and satellite images released following the attack appeared to show evidence of a precision hit that caused extensive damage. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed news of the strike as an indication of Ukraine’s growing capabilities. “We carried out precise strikes with Flamingo missiles at a range of 1,400 kilometers. I believe this is truly a success for our industry,” he commented.

The attack has helped restore the credibility of Ukraine’s Flamingo missile program, which has been subject to much speculation and significant skepticism since first making headlines last summer. The missiles, developed by Ukrainian defense sector startup Fire Point, generated a considerable amount of initial buzz but failed to make any major impact on the battlefield during the second half of 2025. Zelenskyy recently acknowledged that development was delayed by a Russian attack on a production site.

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The emergence of the Flamingo as a credible threat marks a major upgrade in Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. With a reported maximum range of around three thousand kilometers and a payload of over one thousand kilograms, the Flamingo is far more powerful than the drones typically used by Ukraine for strikes inside Russia. While long-range drones have been instrumental in puncturing the myth of Russian invulnerability, their relatively small payloads have meant that damage caused in attacks is often easy to repair. As the recent strike in Votkinsk demonstrated, the Flamingo has the potential to be far more destructive.

Much will now depend on Ukraine’s ability to scale up output and produce enough Flamingos to make a difference. While the February attack on the Votkinsk facility was a success, Ukrainian officials have since confirmed that multiple missiles were required in order for one to hit home. It will therefore be crucial to manufacture entire flocks of Flamingos if the Ukrainians wish to make the most of this new weapon.

The Flamingo initiative is one of a number of Ukrainian missile projects currently under development. Ukraine is pouring millions of dollars into a new domestic “missile market” that aims to replicate the success of its rapidly expanding drone industry. Recently appointed Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov has noted that the government is acting like a venture investor by giving large grants to multiple different local companies active in missile production.

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Ukraine’s emphasis on the development domestic missile capabilities makes strategic sense. The front lines of the war have remained largely static for over three years, with Russia unable to secure any decisive breakthroughs despite holding the battlefield initiative throughout this period. Kyiv’s current plan is to reduce any further Russian advances to a bare minimum while inflicting crippling losses. In parallel, Ukraine aims to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia with an escalating campaign of airstrikes using missiles in combination with drones.

Ukrainian commanders are playing a long game by targeting the Russian oil refineries, energy infrastructure, and military production facilities that support the war effort. This approach is designed to gradually erode Moscow’s ability to generate revenues and fund the invasion. Adding missiles to the mix dramatically increases the challenges facing the Kremlin. As Ukraine’s long-range arsenal expands, Russia’s limited air defenses will be stretched thinner and thinner. The end goal is to transform Russia’s vastness from an asset into a liability.

No single weapon can serve as a silver bullet to stop Russia’s invasion. However, the true significance of Ukraine’s domestic missile program lies in its trajectory. If Kyiv can maintain the current pace of innovation while simultaneously reducing costs and scaling production, this will greatly strengthen the country’s position at the negotiating table.

Putin seems to be well aware of the dangers posed by long-range missiles and has worked hard to prevent Kyiv’s partners from supplying Ukraine with these weapons. When Western leaders mulled lifting restrictions on the use of Western missiles against targets inside Russia in late 2024, Putin warned that this would place NATO “at war” and Russia. More recently, he intervened directly when US President Donald Trump appeared to be on the verge of providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.

There is no denying that Putin has been successful in his efforts to deter Kyiv’s allies, but he cannot stop the Ukrainians from producing their own long-range missiles. If this trend continues, it can help establish a framework for a pragmatic settlement. Many in Ukraine believe a strong arsenal of domestically produced long-range missiles can serve as a meaningful deterrent against future Russian aggression. While Ukrainians have little faith in written security guarantees, they see long-range missile capabilities as something Putin simply cannot ignore.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Europe must not seek Putin’s approval before sending troops to Ukraine

Stephen Blank — Mon, 02 Mar 2026 22:49:46 +0000

European leaders will not send troops to monitor a ceasefire in Ukraine without first securing permission from Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Britain’s Telegraph reports. The news represents a significant political victory for Russia and comes following a coordinated Kremlin campaign of intimidation designed to deter any European military deployment to Ukraine.

This informal Russian veto over European troops in Ukraine places a key element of the current peace process in jeopardy. Ever since the so-called Coalition of the Willing began to take shape in early 2025, participating countries led by Britain and France have been developing plans to send a significant number of troops to Ukraine following a ceasefire in order to monitor adherence and serve as a reassurance force. However, Putin has consistently signaled that he will not agree to a European military presence, with Kremlin officials stating that any European soldiers sent to Ukraine would be “legitimate targets.”

These threats appear to have worked. With the Coalition of the Willing reportedly unwilling to act unless Putin gives them the green light, the entire concept of a reassurance force is now in doubt. This means that a viable and independently monitored ceasefire in Ukraine looks to be unattainable. All Putin need do to block the process is withhold his approval indefinitely.

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Europe’s reluctance to sanction a military mission to Ukraine without Russia’s prior agreement is the latest setback to a faltering peace process. After more than a year of false starts and fruitless talks, many now believe that Russia has no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire and does not genuinely seek peace.

Critics argue that Putin is using the current US-led negotiations to buy time and as an opportunity win over the Trump administration. The Kremlin dictator remains adamant that despite the slow progress of his invasion, Russia will still ultimately achieve its goals in Ukraine. It came as no surprise when reports emerged recently claiming that Russian officials are privately mocking Trump for his naivety about Putin’s true intentions.

With little prospect of progress toward a negotiated peace settlement, Western leaders should be focusing their energies on steps to secure Russia’s defeat in Ukraine. Unfortunately, however, there currently appears to be little chance of this happening. Since 2022, the West has largely wasted Ukraine’s sacrifices while failing to arm Kyiv for victory or impose sufficiently stiff sanctions on Moscow. As the invasion enters a fifth year, there are now some signs of growing European resolve, but much more needs to be done in order to stop Russia.

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Putin’s ability to intimidate European leaders on the issue of troop deployments to Ukraine underlines Europe’s continued lack of credibility in the international security arena. While there has been plenty of talk in European capitals over the past year about the need for greater strategic autonomy, this has yet to translate into concrete action. European governments are still not ready to provide credible deterrence against Russia and suffer from an absence of overall leadership that makes decisive action in the security sphere particularly challenging.

The Trump administration’s efforts to step back from transatlantic security commitments have highlighted the need for increased European defense spending, but Europe remains reliant on the US and has no practical alternative to NATO. It is therefore important to reinvigorate rather than undermine the alliance. Instead, the opposite is happening, with faith in NATO’s collective security commitment presently at all-time lows. This only emboldens Putin. Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump is actually validating European fears by demanding that Ukraine and not Russia make concessions to end the war.

Intelligence agencies and Western government officials increasingly acknowledge that Russia is preparing for a wider European war. This makes it all the more vital to increase backing for Ukraine and integrate the country deeper into Europe’s defense architecture. There are signs this is well understood, with encouraging recent developments including the co-production of weapons in a number of European countries for use in Ukraine.

Putin has long since made clear that he will only negotiate under duress. The Kremlin dictator remains committed to erasing Ukrainian statehood and will not enter into serious talks to end the war until the alternative is defeat. In order to reach that point, Europe must continue to rearm while incorporating the lessons learned on the battlefields of Ukraine and developing the drone capabilities that will define the wars of the future.

Crucially, European leaders must also recover their political nerve and demonstrate to Putin that he cannot hope to intimidate them indefinitely. They can begin by declaring that Russia does not get to decide whether European troops are deployed to a sovereign and independent Ukraine.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

In September, however, Merz’s government will face an even greater challenge in the eastern German states of Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where the AfD has a good chance of winning a plurality of the vote. AfD gains—coupled with increased Left Party support—could force the CDU and SPD into unwanted and unwieldy alliances or minority governments intended to keep the AfD out of power. This, in turn, could make it even harder for the parties to deliver on their platforms, reinforcing skepticism about how effectively German democracy functions.

If the AfD wins a parliamentary majority in one or both of the states—currently unlikely but not impossible—its control of a state government could pose the most serious challenge to German politics since reunification.

Centrist dominance fades, populists are on the rise

This year’s election results will almost certainly deepen the fragmentation and polarization of German party politics. Across the country, support for the established centrist parties of the pre-unification Federal Republic—the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, the SPD, the liberal Free Democrats, and the Greens—continues to decline. At the same time, the extreme-right AfD and, to a lesser extent, the post-communist Left Party are on the rise.

East-west differences also persist. In the west—home to about 80 percent of the national electorate—the established parties still draw on a larger reservoir of party loyalists (mainly older voters), and the FDP and Greens benefit from a sizable educated middle class. Moreover, the increasing personalization of German politics often leads to late-breaking support for incumbents and the reelection of minister-presidents.

Though party fragmentation has led to more frequent coalition reshuffling, the AfD remains frozen out of government. This is mainly due to the concept of the Brandmauer, or “firewall,” against the far right. None of the major German political parties will work with the AfD at either the state or federal level. However, some eastern German Christian Democrats have expressed unhappiness with this approach, arguing that it forces them to make policy compromises with leftist parties that are at odds with CDU preferences and that they view as being out of step with a more conservative public.

The smaller Left Party, which since unification has been in a number of coalitions with the SPD and the Greens, has also been sidelined by the Christian Democrats. Since late 2024, however, the CDU is in a coalition with the left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW)—a Left Party breakaway—in the eastern state of Thuringia. This cooperation has sparked considerable unease within the CDU because of stark policy differences, but it was deemed necessary to block the AfD, which had won a plurality of the vote, from taking power.

The upcoming series of state elections marks the third such electoral cycle since the AfD was founded in 2013, initially as a protest movement against eurozone bailouts. By 2014, the party had seized on dissatisfaction with mass migration as its signature issue. Since then, it has radicalized as its support has grown, now espousing a full spectrum of extreme-right identity politics: anti-migration, anti-Green, anti-LGBTQ, anti-“woke,” pronatalist policies favoring ethnic Germans, as well as nationalist historical revisionism.

The AfD’s rise has not been linear. In 2021, the party’s support declined in all five state elections and in that year’s federal vote. However, amid rising inflation, stagnating economic growth, and renewed migration debates, the party reached new highs in the 2024 state elections and the May 2025 Bundestag election. Several state security agencies, along with the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz), have deemed the AfD or parts of the party as extremist, although the Federal Constitutional Court is reviewing the federal designation.

What the March elections mean for Merz and his party

State elections typically reflect a mix of national and state-level dynamics, though in recent years they have often served as referenda against the federal government. Popular minister-presidents, however, can sometimes buck national trends.

In March, attention will focus on contests between the CDU and the Greens in Baden-Württemberg and between the CDU and the SPD in Rhineland-Palatinate. In both states, the incumbent party trails in polling but is relying on well-known and popular candidates or incumbents. An electoral plurality does not automatically translate into government leadership if a party cannot assemble a parliamentary majority. By convention, however, the largest coalition party leads the government.

Baden-Württemberg is the only state led by a Green minister-president. Incumbent Winfried Kretschmann (in office since 2011) heads a coalition with the CDU but is not seeking reelection. Instead, former Federal Minister of Agriculture Cem Özdemir—a well-known figure in German politics—is leading the Greens’ ticket. Özdemir enjoys greater name recognition and favorability than CDU candidate Manuel Hagel.

Hagel, who lacks executive experience, has framed the Greens as a threat to the state’s export-driven economy and calls for a return to more conservative policies. Even if he leads the CDU to victory, he will likely still need the Greens to secure a parliamentary majority.

SPD support is likely to slip even further from its 2021 record low, as its opposition status and slim prospects of leading the government leave it struggling to gain media attention or voter traction. The Left Party is likely to benefit from the SPD’s weakness and may surpass the five-percent threshold to enter the state parliament for the first time. Meanwhile, the FDP, which has been represented in the state parliament continuously since its founding in 1952, is fighting to remain above that threshold.

In Rhineland-Palatinate, the SPD has governed since 1991 and is currently in a coalition with the Greens and FDP. Although initially trailing the CDU in the polls, Minister-President Alexander Schweitzer remains popular and hopes to replicate the SPD’s 2021 come-from-behind victory. A poll published on February 26 now shows the race in a statistical dead heat.

If the SPD cedes first place, blame would likely fall on the party’s unpopular federal leadership, potentially weakening Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil’s already fragile standing within the party. Even if the SPD finishes first, it will probably need to put together a new coalition, particularly if the FDP fails to clear 5 percent. In that case, the Left Party could emerge as a first-time coalition partner. However, a CDU-SPD coalition—led by whichever party wins the most votes—remains the most likely outcome.

Fall votes could redraw Germany’s political map

Although the western German states are larger and economically stronger, elections this fall in the eastern German states of Saxony-Anhalt (September 6) and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (September 20) carry greater political weight. In eastern Germany, the AfD has scored its strongest electoral results and polls in the mid-30s to 40 percent in the two states. If enough smaller parties fail to clear the 5 percent threshold, the AfD’s vote share could translate into a parliamentary majority—giving it full control of a state government and the chance to implement its far-right agenda.

Even without a clear victory, combined AfD and Left Party strength could force the formation of a minority coalition, as already seen in three other eastern German states.

Still, late campaign shifts are possible, and fear of an AfD victory may spur at least some countermobilization and tactical voting, favoring the CDU in Saxony-Anhalt and the SPD in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.

In Saxony-Anhalt, Minister-President Sven Schulze assumed office only in late January after his CDU predecessor stepped down to improve the party’s electoral prospects for September. Schulze heads a CDU-SPD-FDP coalition, but polls still give the AfD a lead of more than 10 percentage points.

Sven Schulze, the minister-president of Saxony-Anhalt and chairman of the CDU Saxony-Anhalt, speaks during a CDU party conference on February 20, 2026. (IMAGO/Frank Turetzek via Reuters Connect)

The 150-plus-page draft of the AfD’s party program outlines a vision fundamentally at odds with Germany’s current political system and constitutional order. The party’s minister-president candidate, Ulrich Siegmund, is directly implicated in its burgeoning nepotism scandal, and the AfD’s response to the issue may prove decisive in the election. In 2021, fears of an AfD victory triggered a late CDU surge. Given the CDU’s refusal to cooperate with the AfD, the Left Party, and the BSW, a minority government appears most likely unless the AfD secures a parliamentary majority—particularly since the FDP and Greens are likely to win enough votes to remain in the state parliament.

The AfD currently holds an even bigger lead in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where Minister-President Manuela Schwesig, in office since 2017, heads an SPD-Left government but has seen her popularity decline. AfD candidate Leif-Erik Holm is trying to project a more moderate image than some of his colleagues, openly distancing himself from Siegmund and the Saxony-Anhalt AfD. With the Greens and FDP unlikely to reenter parliament, forming an anti-AfD coalition could prove difficult. A minority government is the most plausible outcome.

Berlin, both Germany’s capital and a federal state, will also hold state elections on September 20. Governing Mayor Kai Wegner leads a CDU-SPD coalition but has faced criticism for his handling of a prolonged power outage that left parts of the city without electricity for over a week in December. Recent polling shows support split among five parties—CDU, SPD, Greens, Left Party, and AfD—making it less challenging to form a coalition without the AfD.

The stakes go beyond the states

Support for the once dominant CDU/CSU and SPD peaked nearly fifty years ago at over 90 percent of the combined popular vote. But since German reunification—and especially with the rise of the AfD—the party system has fragmented sharply. The firewall against the far right has kept the AfD out of power but has not halted its growth and radicalization. At the same time, the need to form coalition governments that cross the left-right spectrum has resulted in a lack of coherent policy and clear alternation of power, pushing dissatisfied voters toward more extreme parties. Frustration is also mounting within the CDU, which increasingly views the firewall as narrowing its coalition options and curbing its economic and social reform agenda. Merz remains committed to the firewall because of the AfD’s far-right agenda, and this commitment is unlikely to collapse before the next federal election. With economic growth weak—and further strained by US and Chinese trade policies—it is hard to see how Germany escapes this cycle of fragmentation and polarization.

Note: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

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Ukraine’s women may hold the key to the country’s future security

Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, Sofia Kryshtal — Thu, 26 Feb 2026 22:42:55 +0000

Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s ongoing invasion is often framed as a referendum on Western resolve, but the real test is whether the Ukrainians themselves can sustain a credible defense posture over time. As the war enters a fifth year, Ukraine’s long-term security will depend less on promises from abroad than on decisions made at home.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent diplomatic push reflects this reality. Throughout 2025, he intensified efforts to shape a settlement that would not simply freeze the front, but also create a durable security framework. He did so knowing that any peace will be judged by its ability to prevent a future renewal of Russian aggression.

Crucially, peace through strength must mean the strength of the entire nation, not half of it. Ukraine’s security cannot rest on external guarantees alone. It must also be based on national capacity, including a cultural and institutional shift that integrates women as a pillar of defense planning. This is not a social policy argument. It is a force generation argument.

Even in an optimistic scenario, any agreement between Kyiv and Moscow will demand long-term readiness and self-reliance. Ceasefires can be violated. Commitments can erode. What endures is force posture: Trained units, predictable rotation, and the resilience to absorb pressure.

Deterrence is not a document. It is a condition and it rests on how effectively a state mobilizes and prepares its population. Yet Ukraine’s mobilization still reflects post-Soviet assumptions. Men between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-nine are treated as the default defenders of the state, while women are viewed as supplementary. That division no longer matches battlefield realities or Ukraine’s strategic needs.

Since 2024, Kyiv has tightened mobilization rules, expanded enforcement, and narrowed exemptions. These measures have stabilized force levels, but they have not solved the underlying problem: Ukraine is fighting a prolonged war of attrition against a far larger adversary. Pulling more men into the system without changing how the system functions will not produce sustainable results.

One weakness is preparation and allocation. Many men still only receive limited training before mobilization. At the same time, tens of thousands of women with in-demand support skills in fields such as logistics, communications, medicine, intelligence, engineering, IT, and drones, remain outside the recruitment and training pipelines.

The result is inefficiency on two fronts. Front line units are overstretched and denied predictable rotation, while rear area roles are often filled by personnel whose skills are misaligned with their assignments.

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Ukraine does not need to mirror Russia’s mass mobilization model. It needs smarter force management. Women can be systematically integrated into roles currently performed by men far away from the front, including checkpoints, border duties, logistics hubs, training commands, communications and intelligence units, and other rear-area security functions.

In a war of attrition, regular rotation is essential to combat effectiveness. Reallocating personnel this way would relieve pressure on front line units. Over time, it would create a broader preparedness posture in which more Ukrainians have the skills to resist renewed aggression. It would also broaden the pool of people with military experience, which strengthens deterrence long after any ceasefire.

The case for integration is not hypothetical. Ukrainian women have volunteered in large numbers since 2014. Legislation adopted in 2018 granted women equal rights and responsibilities in the Ukrainian armed forces. By 2025, more than 70,000 women were serving in the Ukrainian military, including in drone units, medical evacuation teams, intelligence cells, and logistics chains. Recruiting data from the past year indicates that roughly one in five new candidates entering the pipeline was female.

Despite the growing prominence of women, the Ukrainian military has not yet fully adapted. Legal equality has not translated into institutional integration. Access to training and promotion is inconsistent. Women are still too often treated as volunteers rather than a core element of force planning. Discrimination and sexual harassment persist, while accountability is uneven.

Many barriers are practical. Units often lack properly fitted equipment and uniforms. Separate barracks, showers, and toilets are not universal. Access to gynecological care is inconsistent. Mechanisms to prevent and address harassment and misconduct are sometimes poorly enforced. These are not symbolic deficiencies; they directly affect retention, readiness, and morale.

A modern defense strategy is not built on weapons alone. It is built on resilience. Russia’s theory of victory assumes Ukrainian society will fracture under prolonged pressure. Zelenskyy’s diplomacy aims to deny Moscow that outcome by securing international backing and buying time. But society must disprove Russia’s assumptions in practice.

A whole-of-society defense that mobilizes women across military and security roles sends a strong signal of endurance. It demonstrates that Ukraine is prepared for years of deterrence and reinforces the message that Ukraine is building a modern European state.

This signal will also matter to allies. Western support is increasingly constrained by domestic politics. Ukraine’s strongest argument is not moral clarity alone, but strategic credibility. A country that can sustain defense over time is easier to support than one perpetually dependent on emergency assistance.

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Other states facing serious long-term threats have updated their security cultures. Israel mandated conscription for both genders in 1949. Norway introduced gender-neutral conscription in 2015; Sweden followed in 2018.

Ukraine has taken steps toward modernization. In 2024, it updated defense education curricula in secondary schools. By 2025, pilot programs expanded civilian preparedness. But beyond high school, structured pathways for women to acquire military training remain limited. Lyceums and military academies are still underused as talent pipelines.

The costs of delay compound. Exhaustion erodes combat effectiveness. Poor rotation accelerates burnout, desertion, and casualties. No peace plan, however carefully negotiated, can compensate for a force structure that excludes half the population from systematic preparation.

Whether Zelenskyy’s peace initiative succeeds or stalls, Ukraine will require endurance. The policy agenda should be clear. First, Kyiv should extend mandatory service to women aged twenty-five to sixty for designated non-front line support roles currently filled by men such as logistics, medical support, communications, and administration.

It will be crucial to clearly codify exemptions based on factors including parental and family commitments, along with professional status and medical limitations. This will make it possible to free more male personnel for front line duty while sustaining continuity of operations.

Second, the Ukrainian authorities need to fix the basics that determine retention and readiness. This includes properly fitted uniforms and equipment, adequate facilities, reliable medical and gynecological care, and strict enforcement against harassment and misconduct.

Third, Ukraine should expand training and education pipelines that actively target women, including military higher education. Recruiting data already shows demand; the state should convert that demand into readiness, while civil society tracks progress.

Fourth, Ukraine’s allies should support women’s integration through training exchanges. Western military commanders have decades of lessons to share on integrating women into units and training pipelines.

Finally, Kyiv will need to invest in long-term societal preparation. Ukraine cannot rely on emergency mobilization alone; youth must be educated early for the responsibility of defense. When service is framed as an expected civic duty rather than an abrupt wartime shock, conscription becomes a sustainable pillar of national security.

Security guarantees will shape Ukraine’s future, but guarantees are not substitutes for national capacity. Zelenskyy is right to pursue diplomacy that does not mortgage sovereignty; he is also correct to insist peace must be durable. Durability, however, will be measured in battalions, rotations, and readiness, not in signatures.

Ukraine’s most reliable long-term defense asset is its people: Men and women alike. Mobilizing and integrating women is not about ideology. It is a strategy for victory and long-term security.

Calin Trenkov-Wermuth is the former principal security governance advisor at the US Institute of Peace and co-author of The Future of the Security Sector in Ukraine, published by USIP. Sofia Kryshtal is the former executive coordinator of the USIP Task Force on the Future of the Security Sector in Ukraine.

This is forcing Putin and his generals to rethink. The Kremlin dictator remains determined to extinguish Ukrainian independence and force Ukraine permanently back into the Russian orbit. However, he knows that there is little prospect of achieving his ambitious objectives via the bloody battles currently taking place over the rust belt towns and villages of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

In order to break this strategic deadlock, Russia aims to systematically dismantle the conditions that allow Ukraine to function as a state. This means the continued bombardment of energy infrastructure throughout the country; it is also likely to involve expanded attacks on other crucial public utilities, such as municipal water services and sewage treatment. In parallel, Russia will increase strikes on civilian transport with an emphasis on Ukraine’s logistically vital rail network.

The end goal is to deprive Ukraine of the industrial capacity to defend itself and destroy the basic amenities to sustain even a minimum standard of living. Kremlin officials hope this will break Ukrainian morale and enable Putin to dictate the terms of peace.

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Russia has made no formal declarations regarding its intentions, but the strategic shift toward the bombardment of infrastructure over the past year has been unmistakable. In 2025, Russia launched around 55,000 kamikaze drones at targets in Ukraine, representing a fivefold increase from the total one year earlier. Attacks have sought to deprive individual cities of power while severing Ukraine’s national energy network along the Dnipro River.

The impact of this bombing campaign extends far beyond civilian suffering. By cutting off major power generation assets and disrupting connectivity, Russia is pushing the entire grid into a near-permanent state of emergency. This is placing heavy strain on Ukraine’s defense industry, which is often deprived of the electricity it needs to function. With Kyiv now relying on domestic defense sector output to cover around 50 percent of the country’s military needs, this disruption to production poses a grave threat to national security.

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The coming spring season will be crucial. The next few months of warmer weather should be Ukraine’s window to rebuild and recover lost industrial capacity. However, Moscow will be working hard to slam that window shut with waves of attacks made possible by Russia’s surging domestic drone production.

The continued bombardment of infrastructure targets across Ukraine will also help exhaust the country’s limited air defense ammunition supplies. Every interceptor missile used to defend a Ukrainian city or a power substation is one less available to cover front line positions. This will force Kyiv to prioritize between protecting the civilian population or shielding soldiers in the combat zone.

Another key feature of the war during the first half of 2026 will be escalating Russian attacks on Ukraine’s railways. Recent strikes on key routes linking Ukraine to Poland indicate that this campaign is already well underway. Any major disruption to rail services could cause significant economic damage and prevent millions of Ukrainians from traveling. More importantly, it would leave the army under-supplied and logistically isolated during the height of the summer campaigning season when Russia’s offensive capacity is expected to peak.

It is still not too late to counter the Kremlin’s plans, but the clock is ticking. Kyiv’s partners must urgently enhance Ukraine’s air defense capabilities and provide the country with more systems to protect the expanding list of potential infrastructure targets. Efforts should also be made to fortify strategic sites and anticipate future repair requirements by providing likely replacement components in advance.

Russia’s current strategy should come as no surprise. At the very start of his reign, Putin learned in Chechnya that pulverizing infrastructure was a reliable path to victory in a conflict that conventional military force could not resolve. In 2003, the United Nations reportedly called Chechen capital Grozny “the most destroyed city on earth.”

The Kremlin dictator now plans to secure victory in Ukraine by employing similar tactics. If Ukraine’s electricity grid and critical infrastructure are allowed to fragment further, the authorities in Kyiv may find themselves literally powerless to defend their country.

Carbon accounting has gained traction in recent years as the mechanism through which companies and countries can unlock competitive forces to drive innovation in decarbonization and energy availability. However, most emissions tracking today still occurs through a patchwork of carbon disclosure systems rather than through a true accounting framework.

The limitations of today’s carbon disclosure systems are increasingly consequential as governments adopt trade and procurement policies that require accurate emissions data. For example, emerging carbon border tariff policies, such as the European Union’s mandatory Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) that is aimed at encouraging trade in low-emissions products, require that each transaction be linked to a specific emissions footprint. Yet existing disclosure systems cannot consistently provide such granular and comparable information across borders or complex supply chains. To implement the tariffs, jurisdictions have resorted to simplified, partial accounting methods that cover only a narrow set of upstream, easy-to-measure products while excluding many downstream goods. This workaround, in turn, can create inadvertent deindustrializing effects and adds confusion and unnecessary compliance costs in the economy.

Market and policy developments suggest that there is an urgent need for a single, comprehensive, robust, and cost-effective carbon accounting system worldwide: one that identifies low-emissions production across all products and services and across all jurisdictions and consistently over time.

This issue brief proposes a concrete and achievable first step toward such a global carbon accounting system: for a group of proactive member countries in the intergovernmental Climate Club to launch a call for tender to select a single, robust, and cost-effective method for computing the carbon footprint of all products (and, by extension, companies) worldwide.

A common, trusted carbon accounting system would unlock several critical levers in the race to drive decarbonization while meeting global energy demand. It would enable finance to flow more efficiently toward high-impact, high-return decarbonization investments, allow governments to steer foreign trade and public procurement toward lower-emissions options, and support credible carbon labeling for customers seeking “greener” purchasing options.

Together, these mechanisms would accelerate decarbonization while strengthening economic security, energy resilience, and international competitiveness.

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about the authors

Vincent Aussilloux is an economist at the European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade. Just prior to his current position, he served as special adviser to the general commissioner of France Stratégie, a public think tank responsible for anticipating major challenges for the country, evaluating public policies, and informing and improving the quality of public debate. He served as the director of its economics department between 2014 and 2023. Aussilloux was also general rapporteur for the French National Productivity Council, a member of the cabinet of two ministers, and served in the Office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Trade and the Directorate General of the Treasury in France. He holds a doctorate in economics from the University of Montpellier.

Yann Coatanlem is an economist and the president of Club Praxis, a multidisciplinary think tank that promotes the use of big data in policymaking, in particular in revamping the tax and welfare system. His work has won multiple awards, including the special prize of the political economy, statistics, and finance section of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques. He spent most of his research career at Citigroup as managing director and head of multiasset quantitative analysis. He is also a co-founder of GlassView—the inventors of Neuro-Powered Media^TM—and a member of the board of the Paris School of Economics. He co-authored Capitalism against Inequalities, with a postface from Nobel laureate Philippe Aghion, and was awarded the Prix Turgot and the Prix Louis Marin. He graduated from the École nationale supérieure d’informatique et de mathématiques appliquées and the École des hautes études commerciales de Paris. He is a recipient of the French National Order of Merit, the Gold Medal of La Renaissance Française, and the Médaille d’honneur des Conseillers du commerce extérieur.

Karthik Ramanna is a professor of business and public policy at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government and a fellow at St John’s College. He teaches at the Blavatnik School on managing organizations in polarized times, which led to his 2024 book, The Age of Outrage. He also serves as principal investigator and co-founder of the E-ledgers Institute, a nonprofit organization advancing rigorous greenhouse gas accounting practices. From 2023 to 2025, Ramanna was on partial public-service leave from Oxford to advise the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, an “auditor of auditors” in global markets. From 2016 to 2023, he was director of the school’s master of public policy program. Ramanna has also taught at the Harvard Business School in both the MBA and senior executive-education programs. His scholarship has won numerous awards, including the Journal of Accounting and Economics Best Paper Prize, the Harvard Business Review McKinsey Award for “groundbreaking management thinking,” and the international Case Centre’s prizes for “outstanding case-writing.” He has a doctorate from MIT’s Sloan School of Management.

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