The Russian economy has been showing signs of severe strain in recent months as the combined toll of international sanctions, Ukrainian airstrikes, and ballooning defense spending negatively impact the Kremlin coffers. The Iran war now threatens to transform this picture in Moscow’s favor.

With energy prices already spiking and the Strait of Hormuz blocked, the world is entering a fuel crisis that could reinvigorate Putin’s war economy. The United States has already relaxed sanctions on the Kremlin in a bid to ease energy pressures elsewhere. If the current conflict becomes a prolonged campaign, Moscow may be able to repair much of the economic damage done over the past four years.

The Iran war could also provide a more direct boost for Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. With the Trump administration now firmly focused on the Middle East, the Kremlin will face significantly less diplomatic pressure to engage in US-led peace talks with Ukraine, while Kyiv will struggle to keep Russia’s invasion high on the international agenda.

Crucially, the US is expected to prioritize the supply of air defense interceptor missiles to the Middle East over Ukraine. With limited numbers of missiles produced annually, this means Ukrainian air defense crews might soon find themselves short of the ammunition required to defend their cities and infrastructure against Russian ballistic missiles. The consequences for the civilian population could be disastrous.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Despite these potential advantages, there is little sign of celebration in the Kremlin. While Russia appears well-positioned to benefit economically and militarily, the US-led war with Iran has also served to highlight Russia’s declining international influence and has underlined Moscow’s limitations as an ally.

Since the onset of hostilities at the end of February, the Kremlin has restricted itself to a limited number of statements and has largely refrained from any strong condemnation of the United States. While reports indicate that Moscow is providing Iran with military assistance including targeting data and drone warfare expertise, the Russian response has been strikingly muted and has fallen far short of America’s very public support for Ukraine following Putin’s 2022 invasion.

Putin’s cautious reaction is particularly noteworthy in light of the support Iran has provided to Russia over the past four years. Since 2022, Tehran has supplied Moscow with large quantities of drones, missiles, and ammunition. This backing proved especially important during the early stages of the war, before Russia was able to expand domestic production and diversify its lines of supply.

Despite much speculation over an emerging “Axis of Autocrats” including both Russia and Iran, Putin has so far proved unwilling or unable to repay Tehran for its earlier backing. While Russian and Iranian officials hailed the signing of a “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement” in January 2025, this has not translated into significant Russian aid since the current conflict erupted.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Fri, April 3, 2026 • 8:00 am ET

Building Central Asia’s future through regional integration

Central Asia Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Russia’s failure to robustly support its Iranian allies is the latest in a series of similar geopolitical setbacks since the beginning of the full-scale Ukraine invasion more than four years ago. In late 2022, Kremlin credibility was dented by Moscow’s inability to prevent a renewal of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, leading to the collapse of Russia’s traditional security role in the South Caucasus. US President Donald Trump has since stepped into the void to lead peace efforts in the region.

The fall of Kremlin-backed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was to prove an even more humiliating blow for Putin. For almost a decade, Moscow had invested significant military and diplomatic resources to keep Assad in power. This engagement was touted by Moscow as proof of Russia’s return to great power status. However, when the Assad regime began to rapidly unravel in late 2024, Russia was unable to intervene. Instead, the Kremlin limited itself to offering the ousted Syrian leader asylum.

Likewise, Russia proved powerless to assist Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro when he was captured by the United States in early 2026. Moscow was seen as a key strategic partner of Maduro and had provided Caracas with a wide range of financial and security backing. Days before the American operation, Russia was still voicing its “full support” for Venezuela. However, the Kremlin ultimately took no action when US forces swooped.

From Armenia and Syria to Venezuela and Iran, Moscow’s obvious inability to aid its allies in times of crisis has seriously damaged Russia’s reputation as a global power. While the Kremlin is still capable of supplying weapons and spreading propaganda, these limited tools are no substitute for the kind of substantial security support that potential partners seek.

For Putin, this matters. Throughout his reign, he has carefully cultivated a strongman image and sought to reassert Russia’s claims to superpower status. However, the world’s leading powers do not maintain their influence through rhetoric alone.

Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s repeated failure to defend its international allies has revealed the underwhelming reality behind Putin’s posturing. This loss of prestige has very practical implications for Moscow’s ability to attract partners and project strength on the world stage. Putin hoped that by conquering Ukraine, he could return Russia to the dominant role it occupied during the Cold War. Instead, he has become bogged down in an invasion that has ruthlessly exposed modern Russia’s geopolitical limitations.

William Dixon is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute specializing in cyber and international security issues. Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 10, 2026

Western leaders must abandon false hopes of negotiated peace with Putin

By Oleksandr Merezhko

If Western leaders seek a sustainable peace in Europe, they must abandon false hopes of a negotiated deal with Putin and instead demonstrate the kind of resolve that will make Russia listen, writes Oleksandr Merezhko.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Mar 12, 2026

Iran war highlights Ukraine’s rapid rise to drone superpower status

By David Kirichenko

The Iran war has sparked a sudden surge in international demand for Kyiv’s unique anti-drone expertise and highlighted Ukraine’s rapid emergence as one of the world’s leading drone warfare superpowers, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Mar 14, 2026

UN: Putin’s deportation of Ukrainian children is a crime against humanity

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s deportation of Ukrainian children is a crime against humanity, a new United Nations investigation has found. The mass abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children is part of a genocidal Kremlin plan to erase Ukrainian identity, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post The Iran war is good for the Russian economy but bad for Putin’s prestige appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The collapse of Sudan’s democratic opening in 2021 amid US sanctions relief and economic engagement is a case study for Washington as it seeks to aid Venezuela’s economic development and post-Maduro transition.
• To be effective, US sanctions relief should be phased and require the Venezuelan government to meet conditions on political and economic reforms that are difficult to reverse.
• But sanctions relief alone is not enough; the United States should also provide incentives for US companies to invest in the country as well as targeted technical assistance to aid Venezuela’s economic redevelopment.

On paper, 2020 and 2021 should have marked the beginning of a new chapter for Sudan. Following the ouster of Sudan’s former authoritarian leader Omar al-Bashir in 2019, the United States removed the country from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list in late 2020. This ended nearly two decades of trade restrictions, giving Sudan access to support from international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and opened up the prospect of much-needed foreign investment. The first Trump administration committed to a variety of economic sweeteners, including investment guarantees and development assistance conditioned on reform milestones. And in June 2021, Sudan qualified for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Under HIPC, Sudan became eligible for a more than $50 billion reduction in its public external debt—the largest HIPC debt relief operation ever undertaken.

The United States and its partners were cautiously optimistic that Sudan could finally right its long-mismanaged economy and make progress toward democratization. But in October 2021, Sudan’s moment of opportunity collapsed. The country’s fragile civilian-military governing coalition fell apart in the wake of a military coup, derailing hopes for an eventual democratic transition and leading to the indefinite suspension of its landmark debt relief program. Five years on, democracy remains elusive.

Today, Sudan is embroiled in a brutal civil war between military factions and suffers one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Sudan’s experience suggests that sanctions relief and promises of economic support following the removal of an autocratic leader do not automatically dismantle the patronage networks, security coalitions, and illicit economies that sustained the regime. Nor do they spontaneously regenerate the civic institutions and independent organizations destroyed over decades of authoritarian rule.

Sudan’s experience offers important lessons for the United States as it looks to stabilize Venezuela and rebuild its economy following the capture of Nicolás Maduro last month. To be sure, there are important differences between these two cases. Nevertheless, Sudan’s experience during its fragile political transition from 2019 to 2021 is a case study worth analyzing as the US forms its approach to Venezuela.

Both countries, for example, experienced dramatic economic deterioration under decades of authoritarian misrule, leaving poverty in their wake. In each case, natural resource wealth that should have benefited citizens was instead captured by regime-connected actors: Venezuela’s oil industry was gutted through politicization and purges of skilled workers, while Sudan’s gold and oil revenues flowed to military and paramilitary networks. Sudan and Venezuela also both suffered mass emigration crises, decimating their professional workforces. Both face the challenge of entrenched security apparatuses and criminal networks deeply embedded in state structures. And in both countries, decades of repression systematically hollowed out civil society and concentrated power in personalized patronage networks, leaving institutions severely compromised and unfit to constrain authoritarian actors or mobilize for democratic reform.

Sudan’s collapse demonstrates that sanctions relief and economic incentives alone cannot secure democratic outcomes without addressing deeper structural challenges. Drawing from Sudan’s experience, three policy approaches offer the United States a path to avoiding the same mistakes with Venezuela.

Pursue phased, conditional sanctions relief

Phased sanctions relief that conditions each tranche of relief on verifiable, irreversible institutional reforms offers the Trump administration its best leverage for lasting change. The United States removed key sanctions on Sudan in 2017 and rescinded the SST designation in 2020, leaving the United States with limited leverage when military leaders staged their October 2021 coup. In contrast, Venezuela remains under comprehensive sanctions targeting its oil sector, senior officials, and mining operations. This sanctions architecture carries significant weight, but only if deployed strategically. It is essential that the administration articulate specific benchmarks to the Venezuelan government and tie each category of sanctions relief to corresponding institutional changes.

Initial relief tranches could address humanitarian concerns and basic economic functions, conditioned on political prisoner releases and freedom of assembly guarantees. Subsequent phases could then target deeper structural reforms. Sectoral oil sanctions, for instance, would come off only after the establishment of independently audited mechanisms for petroleum revenue distribution that prevent capture by military or criminal networks. Financial sector sanctions relief, in turn, would be contingent on Venezuela establishing demonstrable central bank independence and ending its politicized monetary policy. And unfreezing official assets would be tied to concrete progress on electoral preparations with international observation.

Benchmarks are most effective when they represent institutional changes that are difficult to reverse, such as constitutional amendments, international monitoring mechanisms, or the integration of paramilitary forces into civilian-controlled military structures. Sudan’s experience demonstrates that front-loading sanctions relief without securing irreversible democratic gains creates a dangerous dynamic in which spoilers face no consequences for derailing transitions. Resisting pressure for rapid, comprehensive sanctions removal—and maintaining leverage throughout what will likely be a yearslong transition process—remains in the Trump administration’s clear interest.

Send a clear message to the private sector on sanctions relief

Sanctions relief will be most effective if it is paired with policies that actively facilitate private sector reengagement with Venezuela’s economy and financial system. Sudan’s experience following its 2020 SST delisting starkly illustrates this challenge: Despite formal sanctions removal, US companies remained reluctant to enter Sudan due to persistent political uncertainty, reputational concerns, extremely high levels of corruption and opacity, elevated compliance costs, and a weak and ineffective anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. Most critically, Sudan lacked the functioning correspondent banking relationships necessary for commercial transactions. Even as Sudan’s transitional government desperately needed foreign investment to demonstrate the dividends of democratic reform, the country remained largely disconnected from the international financial system. This undermined the country’s attempts at economic recovery, which might have provided political legitimacy to civilian leaders.

While major US energy companies have expressed near-term reluctance to restart operations in Venezuela, preparing the ground for eventual reentry requires directly addressing the structural impediments to commercial engagement. This could include detailed, sector-specific guidance from the US Treasury Department that provides safe harbors for permissible transactions, and reducing compliance uncertainty for companies and their legal counsel. This could also include high-level outreach to major correspondent banks—whose participation is essential for restoring payment channels—to rebuild relationships that have atrophied over years of sanctions. The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) could also consider establishing clear parameters for political risk insurance available to early-mover companies willing to invest in Venezuela’s reconstruction, explicitly protecting them against expropriation and political violence.

Finally, the Trump administration would benefit from making clear what actions from the Venezuelan government would trigger snap-back sanctions, allowing companies to conduct meaningful risk assessment rather than fearing arbitrary policy reversals. This strategy recognizes that sanctions removal, while necessary, is insufficient: Without deliberate efforts to rebuild commercial infrastructure and reduce transaction costs, Venezuela risks following a path similar to that of Sudan’s—remaining economically isolated even after formal sanctions are removed.

Deploy strategic economic incentives and technical assistance

Sudan’s experience is instructive: while the United States offered economic inducements, these arrived too slowly, at insufficient scale, and without a coordinated strategy to mobilize private capital and rebuild technical capacity in Sudan’s economic policymaking institutions.

In Venezuela, restoring the country’s institutional credibility requires deploying a comprehensive package combining economic incentives with technical assistance. This could include DFC guarantees for infrastructure investments, Export-Import Bank support for US equipment exports, and preferential access to reconstruction contracts for US companies willing to take the lead in a post-Maduro Venezuela.

The United States can also support a negotiated debt restructuring process with Venezuela’s creditors—the country faces roughly $150–170 billion in external obligations, with defaulted bonds alone estimated at $60 billion—and help enable access to resources from the IMF and multilateral development banks. (The IMF’s ties to Venezuela are currently suspended and Venezuela is in arrears to the Inter-American Development Bank). Paired with these mechanisms, addressing the absence of credible economic data and technical capacity remains a critical priority: Venezuela’s central bank and statistical agencies, politicized and hollowed out under the Chávez and Maduro regimes, have failed to produce reliable indicators on inflation, economic growth, employment, and fiscal balances. Technical assistance from the US Treasury Department will be essential to restoring monetary policy independence, implementing transparent foreign exchange mechanisms, and rebuilding capacity for credible economic data collection and reporting. The World Bank and IMF can also provide technical expertise for reconstructing Venezuela’s statistical agencies and establishing transparent budget processes that prevent resources from being diverted to spoiler networks.

Importantly, these incentives are most effective when coordinated with multilateral institutions. This would mean active support for Venezuela’s World Bank and IMF reengagement, coordination with the Inter-American Development Bank for reconstruction financing, and facilitating an international oil company consortium to comprehensively rebuild Venezuela’s state-owned PDVSA rather than allowing piecemeal asset-stripping. The scale and speed of economic support would need to be sufficient to demonstrate tangible benefits quickly enough that Venezuela’s population sees concrete rewards for supporting a democratic transition. This would provide opposition leaders with the political legitimacy to resist military encroachment and the other factors that ultimately destroyed Sudan’s fragile democratic opening.

The comparison between Sudan and Venezuela is imperfect but instructive. Venezuela enters its transition with clear advantages: extensive oil infrastructure, proximity to stable regional democracies, and a large, educated diaspora that could fuel reconstruction if given reason to return. But these strengths will matter little if the United States repeats some of the well-intentioned missteps in its policy toward Sudan—assuming that economic recovery will follow automatically from sanctions relief and disengaging before democratic institutions have time to solidify. Sudan showed how quickly a promising transition can collapse when economic statecraft is poorly timed or insufficient in scale. Venezuela offers a chance to demonstrate that the United States has learned these lessons.

The post Lessons from Sudan for US economic engagement with Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Colombian President Gustavo Petro will meet with US President Donald Trump at the White House on Tuesday amid the most tense period of US-Colombia relations in decades.
• Despite the two presidents’ public disputes, the United States and Colombia have shared interests when it comes to combating drug trafficking in Latin America and ensuring Venezuela’s stability.
• An Oval Office meeting that focuses on these two areas can help put bilateral relations on a better path ahead of the next Colombian president’s inauguration later this year.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s Oval Office visit on February 3 comes on the heels of the tensest year in the US-Colombia relationship in the past three decades. Based on significant policy disagreements and inflamed by the US and Colombian presidents’ affinity for bombastic declarations, the two nations careened from crisis to crisis over the past twelve months.

There have been several notable low points: In January 2025, Petro refused to accept deportees from the United States, only to back down after US President Donald Trump threatened to levy crippling tariffs on Colombia. In September 2025, Petro made an outrageous speech in New York, calling on US troops to ignore Trump’s orders. Trump retaliated by revoking visas from several Colombian officials, including Petro. And in October, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Petro and his family. But all this was just a prelude for an even more dramatic moment—when last month, Trump suggested that the United States might stage military operations inside Colombia, possibly even targeting Petro. For two nations accustomed to close cooperation and a long tradition of defusing disagreements in private, this seemed to be a startling display of how far the two governments had diverged. 

However, that may not be fully accurate. On key issues such as stability in Venezuela and the need to address transnational criminal activity, including illegal migration and drug trafficking, Colombia and the United States appear to agree on the ends they seek, even if they differ on how to reach those ends. The Trump administration obviously favors a more aggressive approach on transnational crime, including the use of military force and restarting the aerial eradication of Colombian coca crops. Petro’s team understands the threat posed by transnational crime but has failed to achieve a negotiated solution. It is in the interests of both nations that Venezuela again become a “normal” nation, a good commercial partner that no longer suffers from such turmoil that it causes millions of its citizens to flee as migrants.

So what would a productive approach to US-Colombian relations look like? Petro has some cards to play when it comes to counternarcotics and Venezuela. With the failure of his Paz Total (Total Peace) strategy, Petro is now willing to use force against illegal armed groups. That needs to be done in the context of a rigorously designed strategy—an approach that the Colombian armed forces are well prepared to develop and execute. And consistent with the long and successful history of bilateral military cooperation, US support could underpin the execution of a serious and effective military effort to push back on illegal armed groups to the benefit of both nations. Petro asking for such help is likely to get a favorable response from Trump.

Additionally, Colombia should want the US effort in Venezuela to be a success and should say so. It appears that the meaning of Trump’s claim that the United States will “run” Venezuela is that Washington has taken control of Caracas’s petroleum industry and is giving nonnegotiable instructions to the Bolivarian regime on issues such as the release of political prisoners, as well as Venezuela’s commercial and security relations with Cuba, Iran, Russia, and China. The ultimate goal, which US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described in his Senate testimony last week, is that Venezuela again become a stable partner in the region. 

Real stability in Venezuela is profoundly in Colombia’s interest. No country has received more Venezuelan migrants than Colombia, so no nation would benefit more from the return of those individuals to their home country. But they will only return to a stable and safe Venezuela. Further, Colombia would benefit economically from trade with a stable Venezuela. In 2008, two-way trade between those two nations peaked at more than seven billion dollars. Colombian exporters will be anxious to recover those markets; Petro would be wise to use this meeting to position Colombian businesses to benefit from these opportunities. 

This meeting could put the bilateral relationship on a better path. Colombia will hold presidential elections this year, and Petro is term-limited. It would be a gift to his successor, who will take office on August 7, as well as to the nation, for Petro to begin the process of recuperating the relationship between two nations that have accomplished so much together over the past quarter-century.

The post To repair US-Colombia ties, Trump and Petro should focus on counternarcotics and Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Venezuela’s post-Maduro economic reopening will require massive reconstruction, especially in energy and infrastructure.
• Colombia is well positioned to help with this due to its proximity and existing trade links, though political tensions and border insecurity pose risks.
• With the right safeguards in place, increased US coordination with Colombia can lower barriers to private investment in Venezuela’s reconstruction, benefiting the wider region.

WASHINGTON—The recent arrest of Nicolás Maduro following a US-led operation has created a fundamentally new geopolitical scenario in Latin America. Beyond its political symbolism, the event may mark the beginning of a structural reconfiguration of Venezuela’s economy, particularly its energy sector, which has historically been the backbone of the country’s productive capacity and external revenues.

After years of production collapse, underinvestment, infrastructure degradation, and international sanctions, any meaningful economic opening in Venezuela would require a large-scale reconstruction effort. This would encompass not only oil fields, refineries, and export infrastructure, but also electricity, transportation, logistics, and basic public services. The magnitude and complexity of this task suggest that the United States, while central to any reconstruction framework, will need reliable regional partners with operational experience, market knowledge, and logistical proximity.

The role Colombia can play

Within this context, Venezuela’s neighbor Colombia emerges as a potentially critical partner, despite recent diplomatic frictions between Washington and Colombian President Gustavo Petro. Colombia’s relevance is grounded less in political alignment and more in structural and economic factors that make it uniquely positioned to support a Venezuelan recovery process. A recent example is the unexpected call between Petro and US President Donald Trump, which official readouts described as constructive. The conversation reportedly paved the way for an official visit by the Colombian president to the White House on February 3, with Venezuela’s economic recovery and cross-border security coordination among the issues slated for discussion.

First, Colombia has functioned for years as a regional operational hub for US and multinational firms with historical exposure to Venezuela. Following Venezuela’s economic collapse, many of these companies relocated personnel, assets, and regional headquarters to Colombia, maintaining limited but continuous engagement with Venezuelan markets. In a scenario of gradual liberalization, Colombia could serve as a low-risk platform for re-entry.

Second, geographic proximity and existing transport links give Colombia a natural logistical advantage. These connections significantly reduce transaction costs for the movement of raw materials, machinery, equipment, and technical personnel required for reconstruction efforts, positioning Colombia as a gateway economy rather than a direct competitor.

Third, Colombia’s productive structure complements US industrial capabilities. Its intermediate manufacturing base and professional services sector, spanning food processing, chemicals, textiles, electrical equipment, engineering, and logistics, could integrate into binational or trinational value chains supporting Venezuela’s recovery.

Fourth, Colombia’s long-standing Free Trade Agreement with the United States provides a stable regulatory framework for US firms operating from Colombian territory. This legal certainty reduces investment risk and facilitates the structuring of supply chains linked to Venezuelan projects.

Recent trends in Colombia–Venezuela trade reinforce this potential. Despite political volatility, bilateral commerce has rebounded, with Colombian exports reaching almost one billion dollars in 2024, led by food products and manufactured goods. This recovery suggests that commercial channels can expand rapidly if political and security conditions improve.

Constraints and risks ahead

Despite these advantages, Washington faces legitimate concerns regarding Colombia’s reliability as a strategic partner. The Petro administration’s foreign policy signals, domestic political dynamics, and perceived ideological proximity to certain Venezuelan actors introduce uncertainty into long-term planning.

More critically, border security remains a binding constraint. The Colombia–Venezuela border has long been characterized by weak state presence and the activity of nonstate armed actors, including the National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissident groups, and criminal organizations involved in narcotics trafficking and smuggling. Without credible improvements in territorial control, any reconstruction strategy involving Colombia would face elevated operational and reputational risks.

From a US policy perspective, meaningful Colombian participation would likely require demonstrable progress in border governance. This includes expanded military and law enforcement presence, improved intelligence-sharing, and the deployment of advanced surveillance and cybersecurity capabilities, potentially supported by US assistance. Enhanced maritime control could further strengthen confidence among private investors, as well.

What’s in it for Washington

If these constraints are addressed, then closer US–Colombia coordination could yield substantial strategic benefits:

• It would lower barriers to private investment in Venezuelan reconstruction, enabling US and Colombian firms to participate in energy rehabilitation, infrastructure development, logistics services, and light manufacturing.
• It would expand US exports to northern South America, particularly in high-value sectors such as pharmaceuticals, technology, agribusiness, and professional services, reinforcing US economic influence in the region.
• It would facilitate the reactivation of regional value chains that historically linked Venezuela, Colombia, and the Caribbean, enhancing overall regional productivity and resilience.

Venezuela’s reopening represents one of the most consequential opportunities in Latin America in decades. Realizing this opportunity will require not only political change in Caracas, but also a coordinated regional strategy anchored in security, institutional credibility, and economic integration.

Colombia can serve as a pivotal intermediary in this process, not as a substitute for US leadership, but as a regional platform that reduces costs, mitigates risk, and accelerates implementation. For US policymakers, the central question is not whether Colombia should play this role, but under what conditions and with what safeguards. Clear benchmarks on security and governance will be essential to transforming potential alignment into a durable strategic partnership.

The post To boost Venezuela’s economic recovery, the US should lean into Colombia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Beginning under Hugo Chávez and then accelerating under Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela experienced one of the most dramatic economic collapses of modern history.
• The Maduro regime triggered the deepest drop in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita seen anywhere in the world since 2013.
• Catching up to the region’s average GDP per capita might require fifty years of consistent high growth—a daunting challenge for the country’s future leaders.

WASHINGTON—Nicolás Maduro is out, but the economic legacy of his policies, and of Chavismo more broadly, remains. In the more than ten years he was in power, inflation soared, businesses collapsed, investment fled and withered, and the overall output of the economy fell by over two-thirds.

The Venezuelan people will feel the effects of these policies for decades. The data available, albeit limited by the regime’s international isolation and autocratic nature, leads to one conclusion: Under Maduro, Venezuela experienced one of the most dramatic economic collapses of modern history.

Below are three charts that show the depth of Venezuela’s economic collapse and the challenge ahead for the country to recover.

Having induced the destruction of Venezuela’s productive sectors, fueled the migration of millions, and aggressively intervened in the economy, the regime triggered what we authors calculate to be the deepest drop in GDP per capita anywhere in the world since 2013. While Venezuelans’ economic woes began under Maduro’s predecessor Hugo Chávez, the full extent of the pain came after his death in March 2013. In the decade after Maduro came to power, Venezuelans lost some two-thirds of their per capita wealth.

The collapse in economic activity made Venezuelans poorer, but in addition, the regime’s policies spurred the deterioration of the average Venezuelan’s overall well-being and the country’s human development. Since 2013, Venezuela’s score has fallen on the United Nations’ Human Development Index, which factors in life expectancy at birth and education, in addition to economic figures. While most of the world, especially developing countries, saw development indicators improve over the past thirteen years, Venezuela moved in the opposite direction, with major drops in indicators even beyond economic figures.

A good way to illustrate the challenge of Venezuela’s economic recovery is by comparing GDP per capita levels with those of regional peers. Venezuela has gone from far outpacing its neighbors in per capita wealth (before Chávez came to power) to becoming one of the region’s poorest countries. Making up this lost ground should be a priority for Venezuela’s future leaders, an objective that will require a monumental economic reconstruction effort and potentially one of the most significant recovery programs of this century.

Multiple scenarios exist, but for Venezuela to catch up with its neighbors and bring its income levels back up to upper-middle income status will require concerted efforts to jumpstart its energy sector, diversify its economy, attract its diaspora, boost foreign investment, and build trust with investors and Venezuelans more broadly. As the chart above shows, catching up to the region (which itself has a lot of work to do to boost its own growth) will require half a century of above-average growth rates.

Maduro and his regime’s policies have left a long shadow, but there is a path forward for the country. Venezuela’s future leaders must set the foundations for a lasting recovery for the country.

This piece is part of “Economic pulse of the Americas,” a series of explainers about the latest trade trends in Latin America and the Caribbean, written by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. To get notified about future editions and other related work on the region, sign up here.

The post Three charts that show the long shadow of Maduro’s economic disaster in Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Venezuela needs to attract foreign investment to revive its economy and oil production. To do that, it needs to reduce its debt service costs.
• The IMF can help Venezuela address its debt overhang; a recently passed reform could allow the institution to provide support even if China were to block or delay a debt restructuring.
• The Trump administration can help support the IMF’s efforts to stabilize Venezuela, which should include a speedy restructuring that provides for a comparable treatment of different creditor classes.

WASHINGTON—Without US support, Venezuela’s post-Maduro government stands little chance of stabilizing its shattered economy. The United States is the main customer for Venezuela’s oil, US creditors hold the bulk of Venezuela’s debt, most bonds were issued under New York state law, and the White House has strong political influence over the new government. But even with US support, an economic recovery will be difficult. It’s too early, for example, to tell whether the United States has sufficient levers to initiate a successful recovery in Venezuela, and it’s unclear whether the government in Caracas is capable and willing to do what’s necessary to make a recovery stick. 

What’s needed first is clear, however. Economic stabilization requires a reduction of Venezuela’s massive debt obligations, which likely exceed $150 billion and are owed to a tangled web of bondholders, arbitration claimants, Russia, and—most problematically—China. Venezuela’s debt is where the Trump administration should start, and it should do so while working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

A debt crisis of staggering proportions

Venezuela’s external debt represents roughly 180–200 percent of its gross domestic product, making it one of the world’s largest unresolved sovereign defaults. The $60 billion in defaulted bonds once issued by the government and the state-run oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, SA have ballooned past $100 billion as a result of accumulated interest. International arbitration awards from companies expropriated by the Chávez regime add another $20 billion. And among other creditors, China holds at least $10 billion in bilateral debt, collateralized by oil shipments that give Beijing secured creditor status and operational leverage over Venezuela’s petroleum sector.

Without addressing this debt overhang, Venezuela will find it difficult to attract the massive foreign investment needed to revive its oil production. There are differing assessments of what Venezuela can realistically service while rebuilding its economy, but substantial debt reductions will be necessary. Citigroup, for example, estimates that restoring debt sustainability requires principal haircuts of at least 50 percent. Other estimates suggest even deeper reductions—down to a 30 percent recovery value—to avoid a cycle of repeated defaults that would cause permanent economic dysfunction.

Why the IMF matters

It has been encouraging to see US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent engage with IMF and World Bank leadership to discuss Venezuela’s economic reconstruction. Given the IMF’s expertise in resolving complicated debt situations and restoring macroeconomic stability, support by the Bretton Woods institutions will be critical.

At the same time, the IMF must be careful to preserve its independence and its legitimacy. Especially in cases of sovereign arrears, the fund needs to be seen as an impartial arbiter that adheres to its legal mandate and its rules-based framework. For example, the decision to recognize a new government in Caracas as a legitimate counterpart—which is necessary for Venezuela to negotiate access to the IMF’s financial resources—is up to the IMF’s executive board and to it alone.

What follows assumes that this prerequisite is met and that the IMF can embark on what is likely to be an extraordinarily complex restructuring effort. The fund has not conducted an economic assessment of Venezuela since late 2004, representing a twenty-one-year gap in formal relations. Moreover, the capacity of the government and central bank to implement necessary policies will need to be demonstrated, and statistical processes will likely have to be substantially rebuilt.

Nevertheless, an IMF program offers something no bilateral arrangement can provide: a multilateral framework that legitimizes deep debt restructuring and provides Venezuela with the financing and technical assistance to implement reforms. While designing a program that gives confidence that future claims on Venezuela will be honored, the IMF can bring credibility to debt sustainability analyses, work closely with diverse creditor groups, and impose program conditionality that prevents preferential treatment of powerful creditors, particularly China.

Who gets paid first?

In this regard, it is important to recognize that the large investment and economic needs of Venezuela should take precedence over short-term payouts to official or private creditors. Neither the IMF nor other creditors will be able to provide fresh funds without being assured that Venezuela has the capacity to repay such loans.

This means that creditors will likely need to agree to substantial deferments on interest and principal repayments. It will take time for creditor committees to form, however, and the negotiations will need to identify different options that ensure broad compatibility of treatment, including oil‑linked debt instruments and bond exchanges with different coupons and maturities.

The Trump administration will play an important role in this process. The administration’s stated goal of kickstarting Venezuela’s oil industry is dependent on a speedy debt resolution, which it can facilitate, for example, through executive orders that protect Venezuelan assets from litigating creditors. At the same time, the administration should avoid the impression that it uses its policy leverage and legal powers to help US creditors without ensuring comparable terms for foreign creditors, whether private or official.

The latter principle will be important for the position of China. Under traditional IMF rules, Beijing could until recently effectively veto a Venezuelan program by refusing to provide upfront restructuring commitments and, instead, engaging in multiyear negotiations that would leave the country in limbo while economic conditions deteriorate further. In this scenario, China would retain its secured position through oil-for-loan agreements while Venezuela remained shut out of multilateral support.

The strategic opening: Lending into Official Arrears

Fortunately, the IMF reformed its Lending into Official Arrears (LIOA) policy in April 2024 specifically to address coordination problems with large creditors in debt restructurings. The new mechanism allows the IMF to lend even as official bilateral creditors refuse to commit to restructuring—provided that the fund implements enhanced safeguards.

These safeguards are powerful: phased disbursements, program conditionality prohibiting preferential creditor payments, and quarterly reviews monitoring restructuring progress. Most importantly, once an IMF program is operational, Venezuela would be contractually bound not to provide official holdout creditors better treatment than bondholders and other creditors receive. The oil-for-loan arrangements that currently give Beijing privileged access to Venezuelan revenues would be explicitly prohibited under program terms.

As a result, China would have to choose between two options: It could participate constructively in restructuring on terms comparable to other creditors, or it could watch from the sidelines while Venezuela receives IMF support, stabilizes its economy, and implements rules preventing Chinese preferential treatment.

Should it be necessary to enact the new policy, Venezuela’s case would resonate well beyond the country itself. China is now the world’s largest bilateral creditor, but recent debt restructurings in Zambia, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, and Ghana faced lengthy delays, with months or years passing from staff-level IMF agreement to financing assurances. The LIOA reforms were designed precisely to give the IMF leverage in such situations. Venezuela would become the highest-profile test yet of whether these reforms achieve their intended purpose.

Charting a path forward

The Trump administration’s best path forward is to pursue a sequenced strategy to achieve broad international buy-in while minimizing the potential for Chinese obstruction. To do this, the administration should:

First, clarify government recognition and lift sanctions. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez governs under a ninety-day mandate that lacks European Union recognition. Washington should work with other countries to establish a transitional framework—likely requiring elections—that provides the legitimacy necessary for IMF engagement.

Second, unlock Venezuela’s frozen special drawing rights (SDRs). The approximately five billion dollars in SDRs are Venezuela’s own reserves, not new lending. Releasing them provides immediate liquidity for stabilization and humanitarian assistance while IMF program negotiations proceed. If properly executed under international supervision, this would demonstrate US commitment to Venezuela’s economic recovery rather than merely extracting oil resources.

Third, coordinate creditor groups early. Representing major bondholders, the Venezuela Creditor Committee has already expressed willingness to negotiate a restructuring. The administration should facilitate such discussions to quickly establish realistic recovery expectations, including by discouraging holdout creditors.

Fourth, encourage Venezuela to formally request Chinese participation in restructuring on terms comparable to other creditors. When it does this, Caracas should give Beijing a four-week window to respond, as required under IMF policies. If China provides constructive commitments, then these should be incorporated into the program framework. But if China holds out, then the United States should direct its IMF executive director to support enhanced safeguards under the IMF’s LIOA policy, proceeding with program approval despite Chinese resistance.

Fifth, design robust program conditionality. Besides identifying appropriate macroeconomic policies, along with governance and other structural reforms, the IMF program should include strict caps on debt service payments to ensure comparability of treatment, prohibition of secured lending arrangements such as oil-for-loans, and transparent reporting on all creditor interactions. These safeguards would protect both IMF resources and the integrity of the restructuring process.

The strategic imperative

The Trump administration’s Venezuela intervention raised profound questions about US power projection in the post–Cold War era. Answering those questions requires more than military force—it requires strategic sophistication in wielding economic and institutional tools. An IMF program deploying the new LIOA mechanisms, if necessary, to ensure China’s active participation while delivering consensual and sustainable debt relief would offer precisely that opportunity. The question is whether Washington possesses the diplomatic patience and multilateral discipline to see it through.

The post How the IMF can help Venezuela stabilize its economy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 12, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Fox News article titled “Marco Rubio emerges as key Trump power player after Venezuela operation.”

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Fox News on Trump Venezuela policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

He also emphasized that Venezuela can “no longer cozy up to Hezbollah and Iran in our own hemisphere.” 

There are clear implications of the Maduro arrest with respect to US-Iran policy and President Donald Trump’s calculus on strategic action against Washington’s adversaries. The US president has indicated he is weighing “very strong” options on Iran as demonstrations there escalated and the death toll rose sharply over the weekend, according to rights groups.

And as Rubio indicated, the operation could also have a more immediate impact on Tehran’s interests and operations abroad—with Venezuela serving as a foothold for Iran and its proxies in the Western Hemisphere.

Our experts break down Iran’s ties to Venezuela and the impact Maduro’s capture could have on Tehran’s interests both in and outside of Iran’s own borders.

Iran-Venezuela relations: From oil to resistance axis

Venezuela-Iran relations have strengthened in recent years: Both countries are oil producers, both have struggled under a robust Western sanctions regime, and as Tehran upgraded its relationship with Caracas, its proxies, such as Hezbollah, have established themselves inside Venezuela’s borders—creating a strategic foothold in the Western Hemisphere. 

Both countries are founding members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and had an official relationship before the 1979 revolution in Iran that saw the overthrow of the shah. As the Iranian revolution unfolded and the Islamic Republic came to power in Tehran, Venezuela was one of the first countries to recognize the new Iranian government.

This relationship intensified, however, when Maduro’s predecessor, the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, became president in 1999.

Between 2001 and Chavez’s death from cancer in 2013, Chavez and his Iranian counterparts engaged in dozens of diplomatic visits, and “the two countries signed an estimated three hundred agreements of varying importance and value, ranging from working on low-income housing developments to cement plants and car factories,” according to analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 

Under Chavez, Tehran’s development projects in Venezuela “boosted Chavez’s image and advanced his anti-imperialist agenda throughout the region.” And through Venezuela, Tehran leveraged the partnership to bolster its posture in South America, including in Bolivia and Nicaragua. 

By the tail-end of Chavez’s rule in 2012, Iran’s investments and loans in Venezuela were valued at $15 billion, according to CSIS. 

Beyond oil and diplomatic agreements, gold smuggling has also shaped the relationship model between Tehran and Caracas. Venezuela holds the largest gold reserves in Latin America (just counting Central Bank reserves, and without including geological gold resources, which would place the country in the fifth place for gold reserves worldwide). Additionally, reports indicate that gold has been smuggled to Iran for years as a mode of payment for Iranian assistance to revive Venezuela’s oil sector. 

A base for Hezbollah and the IRGC 

Joze Pelayo, associate director for strategic initiatives and policy at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, explains

Against this backdrop, Iranian-backed Hezbollah and its affiliates have used Venezuela as a strategic hub in the Western Hemisphere. The country has served as a sanctuary for Hezbollah to evade sanctions, a center for operations and money laundering, and a base for its transnational criminal and drug trafficking network. 

Hezbollah has flourished in key locations in Venezuela—establishing itself within business networks such as Margarita Island and the Paraguaná Peninsula, both with coastal access and a significant Lebanese diaspora community.  

Iran also used the gold market in Venezuela to finance Hezbollah’s operations.  

In 2022, a seizure order signed by former Israeli Defense Minister Gallant and published by the National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing in the Ministry of Defense exposed a smuggling ring involving gold being transported on sanctioned Iranian flights with proceeds directed to Hezbollah.

In addition to all these exchanges, Iran’s Quds Force (the external arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps responsible for asymmetric warfare, cover operations, and intelligence) maintains a robust presence in Venezuela to support Maduro in times of crisis, according to a report from December 2025.  

The hierarchical structure in Venezuela is headed by Ahmad Asadzadeh Goljahi, who oversees operations and heads the “Department 11000,” a Quds Force subunit linked to international terrorist plots, and “Department 840,” involved in overseas assassinations. It is then no surprise that the Iranians attempting to abduct US journalist Masih Alinejad from her home in New York were supposed to make a stop in Venezuela before taking her to Iran.  

Maduro’s capture and the potential realignment of Venezuela with the United States represent a major setback for the Quds Force operations and financing. Such a shift could significantly disrupt the group’s transnational criminal and drug-trafficking networks, oil-smuggling scheme, and other illicit activities tied to Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran.  

One potential silver lining: Under US custody and influence, Maduro (and possibly Acting President Delcy Rodriguez) could provide critical intelligence as witnesses and cooperators, assisting to expose the extent of these networks, how to properly root out these toxic elements from the country, and key figures the United States could go after next.

A US signal to Tehran 

Kirsten Fontenrose, nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, explains

The Maduro case is strategically relevant less as a template than as a signal. It suggests a US willingness to act decisively against leaders already criminalized and sanctioned, rather than allowing standoffs to persist on the assumption that the risk of escalation alone will deter action.

The Trump administration framed Maduro’s capture as a law-enforcement arrest rather than a military campaign. The United States did not invoke humanitarian intervention, collective self-defense, or congressional authorization for interstate hostilities. Instead, it relied on longstanding criminal indictments and sanctions authorities. Maduro has been under US indictment since March 26, 2020, for narcotics trafficking and narco-terrorism, and he has been subject to comprehensive Treasury sanctions well before the January 2026 operation. The legal basis for such extraterritorial law-enforcement action rests on domestic authorities rather than the law of armed conflict—a distinction that is controversial but not unprecedented in US practice. 

For Tehran, the relevance is not the legal argument itself but the political signal embedded in its use. Iranian strategic planning has long assumed that US concern about escalation—particularly actions that could be interpreted as leadership targeting—would impose practical limits on Washington’s behavior. The Maduro episode complicates that assumption. It also reinforces a second point: US leverage does not depend exclusively on military operations. In this case, years of sanctions enforcement, financial pressure, indictments, and diplomatic isolation preceded the arrest, demonstrating that decisive outcomes can be pursued through non-military instruments even in high-risk contexts. 

That sequencing intersects with current thinking about the timing of pressure on Iran. Analysis by Rapidan Energy Group Chief Executive Officer Scott Modell published in late 2025 argues that early 2026 presents unusually favorable market conditions for intensified pressure on Iranian oil exports. The analysis points to soft global demand growth, rising non-OPEC supply, spare capacity among OPEC+ producers, and subdued price expectations, suggesting that concerns about oil-price spikes—often a key political constraint on US action—would be less binding in the first quarter of 2026. If that assessment holds, market considerations would be unlikely to restrain US policymakers contemplating additional economic pressure on Iran during this period. 

Trump’s public statements following the Venezuela operation reinforce this interpretation. He framed the action in terms of accountability and deterrence, not regime change or nation-building. His emphasis on speed and decisiveness is consistent with earlier US decisions favoring limited, time-bound uses of force—particularly in counterterrorism and retaliatory contexts—over extended military campaigns. 

This posture aligns with the policy orientation of figures shaping the administration’s approach. Homeland Security Advisor Stephen Miller has emphasized coercive clarity; Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff has advocated transactional diplomacy backed by leverage; Vice President JD Vance has expressed skepticism toward open-ended military commitments. Reporting also suggests a US Central Intelligence Agency leadership preference for intelligence-driven, more aggressive collection and disruption posture. 

Recent US actions elsewhere provide additional context. Strikes against Iran-aligned militias in Iraq following attacks on US personnel in 2024, and counter-ISIS airstrikes conducted with host-nation consent in Nigeria in December 2025, illustrate a preference for responding quickly to defined threats without prolonged warning or phased escalation. These cases do not establish a doctrine, but they reinforce the impression of a US approach that favors early, bounded action over incremental response. In this context, Operation Absolute Resolve is meaningful because it unsettles a core assumption within Tehran—that leadership insulation and escalation risk reliably constrain US action. 

The core implication for Iran, then, is strategic rather than operational. The Maduro seizure suggests that the United States is prepared to act decisively against leaders who are already criminally indicted, comprehensively sanctioned, and politically isolated, and that it may do so during periods of internal strain rather than waiting for those pressures to resolve. 

None of this implies imminent leadership targeting in Iran. But it does suggest that Washington is reassessing assumptions about timing, leverage, and leadership vulnerability. 

The post The Venezuela-Iran connection and what Maduro’s capture means for Tehran, explained  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 9, Tressa Guenov, director of operations and programs and senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security was interviewed on Times Radio about the US-Russia relationship. She argues that though the Trump National Security Strategy does not name Russia as an adversary, oil tanker seizures demonstrate a harder line from the US against Russia in the Western hemisphere.

Staff

Tressa Guenov

Director, Programs and Operations and Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The post Guenov on Times Radio about how Venezuela impacts the US-Russia relationship appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Venezuela’s new acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, must satisfy Washington’s demands while maintaining sufficient support among the Venezuelan elite to avoid a regime fracture.
• Rodríguez’s most complex challenge will be managing Venezuela’s deep entanglements with Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba as the Trump administration demands that the regime cut ties to those countries.
• Venezuela’s long-repressed civil society will need to work to remain relevant amid a power transition dominated by US economic interests and the regime’s factional politics.

The United States’ extraction of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from his bunker on January 3 triggered an explosion of activity across Venezuelan social media. Across Instagram, TikTok, and WhatsApp status updates, millions of Venezuelans shared jubilant reactions to images of the former dictator in custody. Venezuelan diaspora communities from Buenos Aires to Madrid posted celebratory videos, while domestic users circumvented internet restrictions to express relief and hope.

The regime’s communication apparatus—typically one of its most formidable weapons—collapsed during the crucial first fifteen hours following the operation. Targeted strikes on antennas disrupted the radio communications of the security forces, while an electricity outage impacted the area around the Fuerte Tiuna Army Base. However, internet and phone communications continued to function normally. State TV and radio stations were broadcasting prerecorded programming rather than providing critical news coverage. Chavismo took refuge on Telegram channels and groups.

When government communications finally resumed, conflicting statements revealed chaos within the regime. Late on January 3, former Vice President Delcy Rodríguez proclaimed Maduro “the only president of Venezuela” and demanded his release while simultaneously assuming the role of acting president. In contrast, US President Donald Trump claimed that she was cooperating with his administration and was willing to fulfill all his requests regarding the US takeover of the Venezuelan oil industry. This dissonance highlighted the regime’s turmoil, torn between defiant rhetoric for domestic audiences and pliant negotiations with Washington.

The regime’s double game

Hours after Maduro’s removal, María Corina Machado, the leader of Venezuela’s democratic opposition movement, whose candidate won 67 percent of the vote according to tallies from the stolen 2024 election, declared on social media “Venezuelans, the HOUR OF FREEDOM has arrived!” However, despite her overwhelming popular legitimacy and moral authority, she operates under the constraints of surveillance and repression. The opposition’s mobilization capacity remains uncertain, as the Maduro regime’s systematic repression has crushed the country’s civil society.

For her part, Rodríguez confronts an unprecedented challenge for a Venezuelan leader: She must satisfy Washington’s demands while maintaining sufficient Chavista coalition support to prevent an internal fracture or a military coup. The Trump administration demands sufficient cooperation to enable US oil company operations, likely including transparent property contracts and regulatory stability—precisely the institutional environment that Chavismo systematically dismantled. Rodríguez making such an agreement with Trump would alienate the regime’s hardliners, who would view her accommodation as a betrayal. Thus, Rodríguez may be unable to guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump wants to run in Venezuela.

Her public contradictions reflect this impossible position. In her first televised addresses as interim president, she demanded Maduro’s immediate release to demonstrate loyalty to domestic audiences. Less than twenty-four hours later, however, she declared it a priority to move toward a “balanced and respectful” economic cooperation between the United States and Venezuela.

This double game cannot persist indefinitely. Rodríguez must choose between accommodating Trump’s demands or preserving Chavista unity. Trump’s threat that if Rodríguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro” makes clear that there will be consequences of noncompliance. Purging the hardliners may be Rodríguez’s best option.

Navigating the geopolitical minefield

Perhaps Rodríguez’s most complex challenge is managing Venezuela’s deep entanglements with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba while simultaneously partnering with the Trump administration. This is especially the case after the Trump administration demanded that Venezuela immediately cut ties and cease intelligence cooperation with Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba. These relationships represent more than diplomatic alignments—they constitute binding financial obligations, operational dependencies, and strategic commitments that cannot simply be abandoned without triggering massive economic and security consequences.

China presents the most significant financial exposure. Venezuela owes Beijing around twenty billion dollars in loans. These debts are secured through oil-for-loan arrangements that require repayment through crude deliveries, with China currently absorbing more than half of Venezuela’s oil exports (approximately 746,000 barrels per day in November 2025).  

Beyond petroleum, Chinese state enterprises control critical Venezuelan infrastructure. Huawei built and maintains control over Venezuela’s national fiber-optic backbone. China Electronics Import & Export Corporation built and operates the VEN911 surveillance system. ZTE Corporation designed the Homeland Card system and operationalized the Patria System database used for social control. These companies don’t simply provide services—they embed operational control within Venezuela’s digital infrastructure, creating dependencies that cannot be severed without system collapse. Expelling Chinese technology companies would require the complete reconstruction of Venezuela’s telecommunications and surveillance systems.  

Russia’s Strategic Partnership Treaty with Venezuela, signed in May 2025, commits Caracas to comprehensive cooperation with Moscow across the hydrocarbons, military technology, and strategic sectors. Russia is Venezuela’s primary supplier of naphtha and diluents—essential additives for processing Venezuela’s heavy crude. These Russian commitments create immediate conflicts with a potential US partnership, as the Trump administration’s demands make clear. The energy deal announced by the Trump administration on January 7 indicates that US diluent will be sent to Venezuela, meaning that Russia will have to withdraw from that market.

Iran provides Venezuela’s most operationally sensitive international cooperation—drone technology production at El Libertador Air Base, where Iranian personnel set up operations. On December 30, 2025, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA, the Venezuelan company operating in a joint venture with Iranian companies at drone manufacturing facilities in Venezuela. This military-technical cooperation directly threatens US interests and almost certainly constitutes a nonnegotiable red line for Washington.

Cutting ties with Cuba would resent the deepest ideological and operational challenge for the regime. Cuban intelligence advisors remain embedded throughout Venezuelan security services despite the neutralization of Maduro’s personal protection unit. These advisors provide counterintelligence expertise, interrogation training, and repression coordination—exactly the capabilities Rodríguez needs to maintain internal control against potential coup attempts. Cuba’s own survival depends on Venezuelan oil shipments, with Havana receiving subsidized petroleum. Severing Cuban intelligence cooperation would affect operational expertise within the security forces, potentially triggering a military fracture. Yet Washington has demanded the immediate severance of Venezuela’s ties to Cuban intelligence. Moreover, on January 3, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a warning to the Cuban leadership: “If I lived in Havana and was part of the government, I’d be at least a little concerned.” He also emphasized that Cuba would no longer receive oil from Venezuela.

Democracy deferred

Each day of ambiguity increases pressure from all directions, making Rodríguez’s balancing act increasingly untenable. There are three competing scenarios: First, Rodríguez could successfully navigate between Washington and Chavismo. Second, hardliners could resist accommodation with the United States, triggering Trump’s threatened “second wave” operation. Third, a rebellion could replace Chavista leadership, opening the door to a transition.

Amid this uncertain picture, Venezuelan civil society, having demonstrated extraordinary resilience through the October 2023 primary elections and the July 2024 presidential campaign despite systematic repression, now confronts a different challenge. It must fight to remain relevant amid a power transition dominated by US economic interests and Chavista factional negotiations. In the days following Maduro’s capture, a clear priority has emerged for Venezuelan civil society: the total liberation of all the regime’s political prisoners, who currently number nearly one thousand. Only then will Venezuela’s transition to democracy truly begin.

The post Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• A Trump-promised renaissance for Venezuelan oil and gas will be difficult to achieve.
• International oil companies are unlikely to make major new investments in the country without greater legal and regulatory certainty, but it may be possible to modestly raise production through immediate steps.
• Without real change from within, the Venezuelan industry will not be able to support the survival of the current regime or address entrenched humanitarian problems.

Within hours of the astonishing US intervention in Caracas this past weekend that captured Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration framed it as, among other things, a boon to its US “energy dominance” agenda. Citing Venezuela’s vast hydrocarbon resources—arguably the largest oil reserves in the world—President Donald Trump repeatedly promised that the next phase for Venezuela will involve US energy companies helping to restore the country’s failing oil and gas production, benefiting global oil markets with expanded supply. 

But the pathway from promises to meaningful production increases is likely to be a fraught one. The Trump administration seems to recognize this, as indicated by the administration seizing two oil tankers and quickly announcing an opaque arrangement wherein the United States will acquire thirty-to-fifty million barrels of already available Venezuelan crude oil. These fast wins might help justify the expenditure of US resources to continue its naval blockade and pursue further intervention, as the administration has hinted. But these moves do not fundamentally change the dynamics above or below the ground that have wrecked the Venezuelan industry. Nor do they alter the long path to a major recovery.

Indeed, a Venezuelan oil and gas production renaissance would require, among other factors, meaningful renewed interest and investment from US and international oil companies (IOCs). This will be difficult. As the Venezuelan people look ahead to a murky future and an uncertain US-led transition, leveraging their valuable energy resources to secure the country’s democratic future may prove easier said than done. 

How an industry fell apart

Decades ago, Venezuela’s oil and gas industry was a powerhouse that promised to drive the country forward. The country boasts 17 percent of global oil reserves, with an estimated 303 billion barrels of producible crude oil. In 2000, Venezuelan oil production reached a peak of 3.2 million barrels per day, enabled by joint ventures and effective partnerships between the national oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, SA, or PDVSA, and a host of IOCs.

In the early 2000s, however, the Chávez administration oversaw a nationalization of the Venezuelan oil sector that dramatically changed the terms of engagement for foreign companies. The nationalization resulted in asset seizures, international arbitration, and marked investment decline in Venezuela’s oil-producing regions by most Western companies. Following Chávez’s administration, Maduro and his officials then faced a punishing and ever-accelerating slate of US sanctions. Beginning in 2017, the first Trump administration targeted Venezuela’s oil and gas sector as the primary engine for the Maduro regime’s deepening authoritarianism.

Today, Venezuela’s oil and gas industry is in disarray. Production fluctuates below one million barrels per day, while the wider industry reels from years of underinvestment, neglect, lack of maintenance, and limited access to the engineering and technological prowess of Western IOCs. Improving this situation will require a sea change both for the Venezuelan oil and gas industry and its governing institutions; the former cannot proceed without the latter. By extension, the next steps taken by the country’s remnant Maduro-era leadership, the Trump administration, and the Venezuelan democratic opposition movement are of paramount importance to the future of the country’s energy industry. 

A stable, secure transition

The ideal first step in returning Venezuela’s industry to its former heights would be enabling a democratic transition, leading to a government that would then pass new legislation, revamp supervisory institutions, and operate in accordance with the rule of law. As of now, however, it is unclear that such a transition is the goal of either the Trump administration or Venezuela’s remaining powerbrokers. 

This concern is not a matter of idealism but rather of hard business realities. For any major corporation to engage in a foreign industry, especially in the oil and gas sector, that corporation must know who it is negotiating with. Contract designs and terms can vary considerably, but they must be developed by reliable partners who each understand the other’s roles and responsibilities. After all, a major factor that presaged the decline of Western companies’ engagement with Venezuela (and jump into arbitration proceedings) was Caracas’s reneging on contracts governing how the Venezuelan oil and gas assets were managed in terms of investment and eventual profits. Under the framework in place today, PDVSA has a majority stake in joint ventures. But in its bankrupt condition, it would be impossible for it to meet its capital commitment for nearly any project.

At this stage, it remains unclear who is actually in control of Venezuela and for how long. The Trump administration has indicated, for example, that the United States will remain in control of Venezuelan oil and gas assets for the foreseeable future, perhaps adjusting US licensing and sanctions policy to legitimize US-controlled sales of oil stored in tankers. It’s unclear how willing the Venezuelan regime will be to tolerate this. Moreover, US control is necessarily a short-term strategy. Selling off Venezuela oil stored in tankers and depositing those funds into blocked accounts controlled by the US government will avoid forcing PDVSA to shut in existing production, ensure useful supply to US Gulf Coast refiners, and provide the US government with a significant supply of funds it can manage. But volumes of floating storage are finite, and the Rodríguez government will not remain in power if it seems to be agreeing to sell off the government’s primary source of funds for the sole benefit of the United States or American creditors. 

In addition to legal considerations, the physical risk and security outlook is crucial for any industry that requires intensive on-site, day-to-day operations. These operations must be managed by crews of skilled laborers, geologists, and engineers, to say nothing of the initial construction teams and costly repairs that will be necessary throughout Venezuela’s oil and gas regions. The Trump administration has yet to detail its plan for Venezuela’s transition process apart from the acceptance of Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s former vice president, as the acting president. But even as Trump praised Rodríguez on Saturday, he also warned her that a failure to cooperate with a US-led transition could result in another action from US forces. 

Meanwhile, the democratic Venezuelan opposition, led by María Corina Machado, has found its role and potential future influence downplayed, with Trump saying that her movement lacks sufficient legitimacy among the Venezuelan people to be a realistic alternative. Yet another factor is the vast, complex networks of substate and illicit organizations—including violent militias and their overlords—that operate freely throughout Venezuela, have their own assets to protect, and will assuredly have opinions on who should run the country. These same stakeholders—and their foreign allies, who include geostrategic adversaries of the United States—may likewise take a dim view of the acting president’s apparent complicity in passing Venezuelan crude oil along to the United States if there are not immediate, tangible benefits for doing so outside of the remnant regime’s top brass. 

Any rational business leadership would think carefully before committing itself to new investment under these conditions. For a genuine oil sector renaissance to commence, the Venezuelan government must prove that it possesses stability, legitimacy, and resilience. US promises that a conciliatory administration in Caracas (for now) can ensure these conditions will be met with justified skepticism. 

Attracting private investment

Regulatory and financial certainty are essential factors for major international oil businesses when making significant investment decisions. This is especially true when oil and gas prices are already soft, at around sixty dollars per barrel, and most outlooks predict a global oversupply throughout the coming year. In other words, for Venezuelan oil and gas investment to make fiscal sense, IOCs will require a return on investment in a reasonable timeframe. Moreover, such businesses will need reasons to believe that long-term engagement (possibly thirty years or longer) in the country will ultimately be profitable based on global oil and gas market outlooks for the next decade or more. 

The United States removing or making major adjustments to existing sanctions on Venezuela will be crucial to expanding oil production over the short run, as well as attracting new large scale private investment to the country. At present, both the Venezuelan government and its oil and gas sector (principally PDVSA) face a punishing tranche of US sanctions that have cut them off from money, credit access, partnerships, and technology essential to running the country’s oil and gas industry. As of now, any transactions between Venezuelan entities and any foreign company are subject to US restrictions, US Treasury sanctions designations, and lost access to the US financial system. This state of affairs makes the immediate reentrance of US or other Western companies impossible.

Ideally, IOCs would like to see a scenario where most sanctions are lifted or significantly eased, along with reassurance that a reversal would not occur anytime soon. In addition, they are looking for a revamped Venezuelan regulatory framework for its energy sector, including changes to regulations governing operations, trading and exports, terms for joint ventures, asset ownership, and legal rights. Lastly, the Trump administration has hinted at measures that would enable the repayment of companies that previously exited the country in compensation for their prior losses.

A revamped licensing process that allows existing investors to expand their operations could potentially lift production by 300,000 barrels a day over the course of a year, industry experts have suggested. Allowing smaller companies to invest in production sharing, including through productive participation contracts, could likewise incentivize participation. These adjustments could enable another 200,000 to 300,000 barrels a day in new production over the course of the next twelve to eighteen months, the industry experts estimate. Funds from that production could go into a blocked account, which would realistically need to be dedicated to humanitarian benefits in Venezuela, with perhaps a share reserved for repayment of US creditors. 

For now, the Trump administration has not signaled that a major softening of the existing sanctions slate is imminent and the oil blockade remains in place. The Rodríguez leadership likewise has not signaled that a reshaping of its oil and gas regulatory framework is incoming at the behest of the United States or anyone else. Instead, the administration’s new plan for selling up to fifty million barrels of Venezuelan crude oil suggests that its focus is on growing near-term, low-hanging fruit production opportunities to prevent the industry from total collapse and shut-in of its existing production.

A positive financial and investment signal might encourage buy-in and engagement from IOCs and smaller companies. One means of doing so would be creating a new escrow account, under US control but presumably with some percentage of profits reverting back to the Venezuelan government. Such a fund could serve as the deposit site for new oil and gas profits over the near-term, ahead of a full lifting of sanctions and/or successful national elections in the future. This account could be enacted through adjustments to the existing sanctions slate, and it could provide a vehicle for early seed funds to be fed into any new Venezuelan governing institutions as a revamped regulatory design is developed. Optimistically, this fund could also serve as a test run for a new sovereign wealth fund, which could help prevent a reversion to the illegitimate use of Venezuela’s resource wealth that had been a hallmark of the Maduro regime.

For now, the Trump administration is hoping that it can deliver a strong enough signal to private oil and gas companies that there can be some compensation and long-term gains to reengagement with Venezuela, if only to enable immediate, easy repairs and infrastructure salvaging. The attractiveness of that offer, and its long-term durability and legality, are yet to be seen. 

However, much more political and regulatory change will be necessary to revive the Venezuelan energy industry. Such changes will be far more difficult to achieve than handshake deals to split revenues for a handful of oil sales; moreover, these modest steps forward are far from sufficient to address the depth of the political challenges ahead. Lifting production in the neighborhood of half-a-million barrels per day might preserve what is left of Venezuelan production capacity, but it will not be enough to keep Maduro’s remnant leadership stable or meet the population’s profound humanitarian and economic needs. As a result, the entrenched challenges of migration, drug and other illicit trafficking, intensified substate violence, and perhaps de facto Balkanization of the country by various strongmen (and their domestic or foreign backers) remain palpable risks. The Trump administration, focused on resource management in Venezuela, has so far shown little interest in resolving these issues. But they will not go away, and they could derail the administration’s vision for a more stable energy industry and country.

The post What it takes to revive Venezuela’s oil and gas industry appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 7, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed in a The New Yorker article titled “The Former Trump Skeptics Getting Behind His War in Venezuela.” He contends that President Trump demonstrated the credibility of US threats through the use of military force, while distinguishing between targeted, limited applications of force and long-term wars.

The post Kroenig interviewed in the New Yorker on military action in Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 7, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was interviewed on DW News about the US seizure of a Russian flagged oil tanker carrying Venezuelan oil. He contends that the move signaled US resolve in quarantining the Venezuelan regime and adopting a firmer approach toward Russia in the Western hemisphere.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig on DW News on US oil tanker seizures in the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The ouster of Nicolás Maduro allows China to blame anything that goes wrong in Venezuela going forward on the United States, as it casts Washington as an unreliable hegemon.
• China was unable to revive Venezuela’s oil industry despite billions in investments, so it’s unclear how US companies will fare.
• Some Chinese observers think Washington just walked into another quagmire on par with Afghanistan.

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration provided quite the welcome-to-2026 jolt with its ouster of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro. Many US analysts view the move as benefiting the United States at China’s expense, since Beijing had backed Maduro and his predecessor Hugo Chávez to gain access to Venezuela’s oil. But the reality is more complex. 

That relationship wasn’t paying off as well as Beijing had hoped, but it was sticky—there was no easy way for Beijing to extricate itself from Venezuela’s cratering economy or the reputational damage it was incurring over its support for Maduro. So Chinese leaders were staying the course. Now, however, the Trump administration has put another option on the table: China can evade responsibility for anything that goes wrong in Venezuela, since Washington now owns that problem. Moreover, Beijing can portray itself as the more responsible partner to Venezuela’s neighbors, all while maintaining access to Venezuelan oil. That’s a pretty good outcome for Beijing.

Two big factors make this less of a win for the United States—and less of a loss for China—than many analysts realize. 

An oil boom won’t come easy

First, there is a big difference between oil reserves and oil production. Venezuela does have large oil reserves. But bringing them to market is complex. Venezuelan oil is a heavy, sticky crude that is expensive to extract and requires specialized refining. 

China has refineries set up to process it. But Venezuelan exports never reached the heights Beijing had hoped for. The Venezuelan military manages the nation’s state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., or PDVSA. That management has been less than stellar. Despite the nation’s immense reserves, Venezuela’s oil exports went into a nose-dive about a decade ago due to mismanagement in an era of declining oil prices. Those exports still haven’t recovered to previous highs. When China first began signing deals with Venezuela in the mid-2000s, the nation was producing around two million barrels of crude oil per day. Given the nation’s reserves, Beijing had high hopes for growth on that output. Instead, at year-end 2025, Venezuela’s strongest production was only around 900,000 barrels per day. That is nowhere near the big leagues. On Venezuela’s best day in 2025, for example, it produced less than one fourth of the crude oil coming out of China—and less than one fifth of the crude coming out of Texas. Oil accounts for around 18 percent of China’s energy consumption, and only 4-8 percent of that (depending on the day) comes from Venezuela.

To be sure, as long as it was sanctioned, Venezuelan oil was extra cheap, and Beijing was not going to walk away from cheap oil that it had already paid for via earlier loans to Caracas. But this relationship was nowhere near an energy supply game-changer for Beijing.

President Donald Trump appears to assume that US oil majors will walk in and turn this around. On January 3, he said, “We’re going to have our very large United States oil companies, the biggest anywhere in the world, go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, the oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country.” But the nation’s oil sector is a mess. Restoring production to pre-Chávez levels is, at best, a one-to-two decade project. And China has already tried to do just that: It poured in billions of dollars and sent in its own oil companies (which are very good at operating in risky environments). Exports still declined. 

There is a lot of confusion around exactly how much money Beijing has poured into Venezuela and exactly how much Venezuela has paid back via oil shipments. Those transactions are often nontransparent by design. The best estimates are that China provided around sixty billion dollars in official government-to-government loans, and around a hundred billion dollars in total when all Chinese investments in the nation are included. The thing is, Venezuela has just about paid that all back, because it paid in oil, and the oil kept flowing, albeit never at the levels Beijing was hoping for. The best estimates are that Venezuela currently owes Beijing around ten billion dollars to fifteen billion dollars in remaining oil shipments. Even if China gets nothing else, it is not exactly walking away empty handed, particularly given that much of that oil shipped at rock-bottom prices. It could be that Beijing is offloading a declining asset at an opportune time.

China may be dodging a quagmire

The second big factor that complicates this picture: Venezuela itself. The country’s future is uncertain, and its economy is heavily dependent on oil production, which is faltering. It is not yet clear who in Venezuela will have political legitimacy when the United States retreats. From a diplomatic perspective, until January 3 this was Beijing’s mess to deal with. China supported Maduro despite the fact that all evidence pointed to him losing the last election. That support was an albatross around Beijing’s neck across the region. China wants to be seen as Latin America’s preferred economic partner, but that argument is hard to make when your biggest debtor is barely functioning economically and lost support politically, as demonstrated when Maduro falsely claimed victory and hung on to power after losing the last election. The United States has taken this challenge out of China’s hands. Now, whatever goes wrong in Venezuela, China can blame it on Washington. 

China also appears eager to use this incident to paint the United States as a disruptor and a bully, in keeping with its longstanding characterization of Washington as a hypocrite when it comes to the rules-based order. That carefully crafted narrative is designed to give Beijing a free pass when it violates international rules and norms, which it does on a regular basis. 

On Monday, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “unilateral and bullying acts are dealing a serious blow to the international order.” China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency called the United States “the blatant violator” and published a cartoon image of Lady Liberty surrounded by burning oil cans, stomping on “international law” and “national sovereignty.” Beijing may view the narrative fodder it gains from the US move as well worth forfeiting the oil shipments it has not yet received from Venezuela.

For the most part, China has not spent any real political capital to push back against the US action. Instead, Beijing is keeping its close diplomatic ties to the regime and mostly letting things play out—while voicing complaints here and there—to see how it might benefit. Some Chinese observers appear to think the United States is walking into a quagmire that will keep Washington tied up (and out of China’s way) for decades.

Hu Xijin, a popular Chinese commentator who formerly served as editor-in-chief of the nationalistic Global Times and has more than twenty million followers on Weibo, is a case in point. He recently stated that “it’s very likely that Venezuela will be more expensive than Afghanistan” and “Trump’s arrest of Maduro is tantamount to making a promise that the United States will be responsible for Venezuela’s democratic prosperity to the end.” China should know just how expensive bailing out Venezuela will be, given that it already spent around one hundred billion dollars on that project.

Perhaps the worst case for Beijing is that it does not get any more oil out of Venezuela, but it successfully offloads a declining asset. Chinese leaders are likely thinking that they may get the oil anyway. Trump has stated that he plans to keep the oil flowing to Venezuela’s current buyers, including China. If that does occur, if the United States does step up to the plate to pour billions into Venezuela’s oil sector and a good portion of that oil goes to China, then this could be Beijing’s best chance at actually recouping the remaining balance on some of its earlier investments. That is not exactly a bad deal for China. But for Washington, it is not at all clear where this ends up, or how many billions this project will consume. Washington may find itself carrying the same albatross that China just offloaded.

The post Why Maduro’s removal could ultimately benefit China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 6, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig wrote an article in the New York Times titled “Trump Was Right to Oust Maduro.” He argues that Maduro threatened vital US security interests, and that his removal from power creates opportunity for better governance in Venezuela.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig featured in the New York Times on ousting Maduro appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 5, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in Politico’s “National Security Daily” on the Trump administration’s Venezuela policy. He explains that administration’s ambiguity is intentional and aimed at preventing fractures within the Republican party.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Politico on US policy in Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The biggest gamble of this weekend was the Trump administration blessing Delcy Rodríguez, who is closely tied to the Maduro regime, to run the country.
• The administration should continue to press for free and fair elections, so the Venezuelan people decide their next leader.
• In the interim, the administration must set clear, enforceable benchmarks for Rodríguez when it comes to the economy, security, and foreign influence.

WASHINGTON—The big surprise in Saturday’s stealth operation to bring Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro to justice was not the success of the mission or the fact that US President Donald Trump approved the operation. The elite Delta Force commandos are some of the best trained in the world, and the overall precision of the mission demonstrated US military might yet again. For his part, Trump has wanted to see Maduro go dating back to his first term, when he led a coalition of countries recognizing an interim government. 

Nor was it a surprise that the country has been relatively calm since Maduro’s exit. Venezuela is not a powder keg. And Venezuelans didn’t flood the streets in celebration for fear of reprisal from security forces and Chavista-aligned paramilitary forces known as colectivos. Instead, Venezuelans flocked to the supermarkets to stock up—actions that again cast light on the economic suffering of the people in a country with an annual inflation rate over 500 percent and where 90 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.  

Rather, what surprised some observers was the big gamble the Trump administration is making by giving Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president and longtime Chavista loyalist, its blessing to run the country in the interim. Trump called her “gracious” in his press conference on Saturday. As for the leader of the Venezuelan opposition, Trump said María Corina Machado “doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country.” There was no mention of the July 2024 election in which Machado was barred from running but then led the campaign of Edmundo González, who went on to win around 67 percent of the vote. This decision reinforced the strategic focus of phase one of the US mission.

How to explain this surprise? The administration is making what it sees as a strategic short-term bet on Rodríguez. Support remains strong for the Machado-led opposition with key US House Republicans forcefully voicing their support for her since the operation. Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed “tremendous admiration” for Machado on Sunday, but he refused to endorse her or explicitly speak about a transition to democracy. Thus far, it appears that the opposition’s path to power rests on competing in yet another election. Yet that effort is doomed to fail unless the next election is different from all the previous ones under Maduro.

Rubio’s answer on the prospect for a transition to democracy was that “these things take time. There’s a process.” According to article 234 of the Venezuelan constitution, Rodríguez—who was officially sworn in on Monday—can serve ninety days as acting president, followed by an additional ninety days if approved by the Chavista-controlled National Assembly. Then the Assembly can declare an absolute absence of the presidency, triggering elections within thirty days. So, expect elections to be called within six months, if the regime is following the letter of the constitution. But so far the Venezuelan Supreme Court has danced around the many constitutional provisions around Rodríguez’s appointment, saying it was due to “circumstances not explicitly provided for in the Constitution.” A similar tactic of seeking to bypass established timetables was also used over a decade ago when former leader Hugo Chávez was dying.

With all this ambiguity, when the time is ready, what can the United States do to ensure elections are actually free, fair, and transparent, and that all candidates (including Machado) can run? 

Thus far, the administration has shown little interest for elections in its public statements. That makes sense in the short run. This is an operation with a focus on transactional pragmatic realism. But elections will eventually be necessary to give political certainty to not only the Venezuelan people but also the foreign investors Venezuela badly needs. At that time, US pressure will be needed so Venezuela does not risk a dangerous repeat of previous elections—contests held in name only, without any real chance for non-Chavista-aligned politicians to officially win and assume power. 

Rubio was right that there is a process that needs to occur. Venezuela has not seen a free and fair election this century. Staging one will require a number of factors: allowing all candidates to run, permitting airtime in the media, guaranteeing the safety of candidates, ensuring that voters are not intimidated at the ballot box, verifying that votes are not manipulated, and, of course, counting the votes accurately. An election under these conditions would give a significant advantage to opposition forces, who have proved they can win even under adverse conditions.

Given the dismal state of the country, the immediate US agenda has focused on strategic rather than political priorities. In media interviews on Sunday, Rubio clarified Trump’s statement that the United States would “run” Venezuela by laying out the terms that the administration wants: an oil industry that benefits US interests and the Venezuelan people, an end to drug trafficking, the removal of the Colombian criminal groups known as the FARC and ELN, and a country that “no longer [cozies] up to Hezbollah and Iran in our own hemisphere.” So, economic interests, security priorities, and stamping out foreign influence—all priorities laid out in the new National Security Strategy. Rather than running the country in the manner of an occupation, Rubio said on Sunday: “What we are running is the direction that this is going to move moving forward, and that is we have leverage.”

Trump has repeatedly threatened continued US military action—even warning of harsher actions—if Rodríguez does not comply with US demands. But we have learned time and time again that the Venezuelan regime cannot be trusted. Words don’t matter; actions do. And domestically, Rodríguez will seek to avoid being seen as too closely aligned with US interests to ensure her continued support among regime loyalists. That was clear in her combative comments on Saturday, shortly after the operation. Most likely, she will seek to walk a political tightrope to avoid being—at least for now—in the United States’ crosshairs. That much was evident with her Sunday statement where she pledged to “extend an invitation to the U.S. government to work together on a cooperation agenda.”

The Trump administration thus needs to establish specific benchmarks—incremental steps and final results—that the regime needs to meet when it comes to the economy, security, and foreign influence. The United States must set a timeline for compliance—and refuse to tolerate any attempts by Rodríguez to delay. 

In addition to eventual elections, the Trump administration should pressure the Venezuelan regime to show it does intend to cooperate. One place to start is releasing wrongfully detained Americans from Venezuelan jails and freeing all political prisoners. But it also means means making concrete progress on key economic and security priorities such as:

• Resolving cases involving the oil assets expropriated by Hugo Chávez in 2007; 
• Advancing a new hydrocarbons framework that allows oil companies to be able to operate in Venezuela either without the national oil company PDVSA as a partner or with a foreign company as the majority partner; 
• Ensuring that foreign investments are respected; 
• Clamping down on armed groups in the country and their myriad illicit activities, rooting out the strong linkages between these groups and the regime as well as foreign adversaries; and
• Cracking down on illicit narcotics flows.

This past weekend’s mission went entirely according to plan. But the United States is now forced to depend on the remnants of the Maduro regime for the next stage in the mission. That will be a much harder task. Ultimately, what’s needed in Venezuela is a partner government that allows for the freedom of its people, respects foreign investment, and that advances US and Venezuelan security and economic interests.

The post Now comes the hard part: What Trump should do next to secure Venezuela’s democratic future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• In responding to recent rhetoric from the White House about “taking” Greenland, European leaders need to look beyond the legal infeasibility.
• The White House is correct that Greenland and the waters around it are a strategic asset—one that Europe has failed to recognize in recent years.
• If Europe wants to ensure that no outside power can exercise control over Greenland, then it must expand its military presence in the region.

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration’s resolute handling of Venezuela—framed unapologetically in terms of strategic necessity—has once again revived an idea many Europeans hoped had been buried: that the United States should “take” Greenland.

European capitals reacted, again, in a familiar way: with statements of concern and invocations of international law. That reflex may be understandable. But it is also revealing. Because if Europe’s response to US power politics is limited to declaring what is not allowed, it should not be surprised when its voice carries little weight in the new era of transactional power politics.  

Trump’s rhetoric about “taking” Greenland is neither new nor legally plausible. Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, embedded in NATO and protected by international law. There is no legitimate pathway for a Venezuela-style intervention in the Arctic. But legality alone does not create security. And Europe should be careful not to mistake moral clarity for strategic engagement.

The real lesson of Venezuela is that the Trump administration acts where it believes control is feasible, resistance manageable, and alternatives absent. If Europe wants to ensure that no outside power—not the United States, not Russia, not China—can credibly contemplate coercive leverage over Greenland, then it must focus less on protest and more on its own strategic steps.

Why Greenland matters

From Washington’s perspective, Greenland is a strategic asset. Its location astride the Greenland–Iceland–UK (GIUK) Gap makes it central to monitoring Russian—and, potentially, soon Chinese—submarines entering the Atlantic. Early-warning and missile-tracking radar systems stationed in Greenland feed directly into US homeland defense. Beyond that, Greenland is emerging as a critical node in satellite command and control, space domain awareness, and satellite tracking. Its geography allows for satellite ground stations and secure communications infrastructure that are increasingly vital as rivals develop counter-space and cyber capabilities.

That logic explains why in June 2025, the Trump administration shifted Greenland from US European Command to Northern Command. It reflects a broader view of the island as part of the emerging great-power contest in the Arctic—a contest in which Russia has already built a formidable Arctic military posture and China is positioning itself for long-term influence as a self-declared “near-Arctic state.” And Moscow and Beijing are increasingly cooperating on the development of the Northern Sea Route, which will allow for a shorter dual-use shipping route between Europe and Asia.

A new Arctic contest

Europe’s problem is not that Washington sees Greenland as a strategic asset. It is that Europe has largely failed to do so itself.

For decades, Greenland was treated as a political sensitivity rather than a strategic priority. That complacency is now dangerous. In an era of renewed power competition, territory that is weakly defended, lightly governed, or externally dependent invites pressure, regardless of legal status.

There are encouraging signs that this is beginning to change. European actors are investing in satellite communications infrastructure in Greenland to reduce overreliance on Norway’s Svalbard island and harden resilience against interference. Denmark is increasing Arctic defense spending and discussing the deployment of new capabilities in Greenland. These steps matter, but they remain too slow, too fragmented, and too cautious.

What Europe lacks is not awareness but resolve. If the objective is to make coercion impossible rather than merely illegal, then Europe must ensure that Greenland is visibly defended, deeply integrated into European security planning, and politically anchored in transatlantic cooperation.

Making Greenland unassailable

That means a sustained European presence capable of monitoring the GIUK gap, protecting critical and space infrastructure, and denying Russia and China the ability to encroach further on the Arctic region. This cannot be achieved through episodic engagement. It requires a calculated long-term commitment.

Paradoxically, this is also the most effective way to deal with the Trump administration. The US president is unlikely to be restrained by lectures on international law. But he does respond to strength, clarity, and facts on the ground. A Europe that treats Greenland as central to its own security, rather than as a liability to be explained away, can shift the Trump administration’s fixation on acquiring Greenland toward cooperating on Greenland’s security.

Greenland is not for sale. But neither should it be left exposed to a power vacuum. If Europe wants to ensure that no one can do to Greenland what the United States did in Venezuela, then it must stop relying on rules alone and start building the strategic reality that makes coercion unthinkable.

The post Greenland is Europe’s strategic blind spot—and its responsibility appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The recent US capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro is consistent with the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy.
• While the new strategy is primarily about narrowing and prioritizing US objectives globally, it is also committed to an expansive vision of US interests in the Western Hemisphere.
• The White House should next expand its concept of “hemispheric defense” and increase its military presence, further reducing Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the hemisphere.

WASHINGTON—The daring US operation that captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and transported him to the United States to stand trial for his crimes signals a dramatic shift in US foreign policy, with implications far beyond Venezuela. The Trump administration’s decision to depose the Maduro regime is the embodiment of its recent National Security Strategy (NSS), which prioritized the defense of the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere.

While most National Security Strategies are quickly forgotten, both of Trump’s strategies have served as reliable guides to his approach to foreign affairs. His 2017 NSS announced a US focus on great-power competition, principally with China, and heralded an important shift of the United States’ attention after decades of Middle Eastern preoccupation. The president’s 2025 NSS, released in December, set about prioritizing US security interests globally and identified protection of US territory and the Western Hemisphere as the central tasks of US foreign policy. Importantly, the NSS also carved out a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, citing malign activity by “extra-hemispheric powers” as a serious threat to US national security.

As such, the recent Venezuela operation should be understood as of a piece with the president’s earlier focus on acquiring Greenland, his calls for resuming US control over the Panama Canal, and his interest in stemming the flow of narcotics trafficking and illegal migration in the hemisphere. In each instance, extra-hemispheric influence has played a significant role in galvanizing Washington’s concern: Chinese outfits own key facilities along the canal. Russia and China conduct military activity near Greenland and in the High North. And Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran hold long-standing influence in Caracas. With the Maduro capture, Washington is sending a powerful signal that it is taking the NSS seriously, and that it is prepared to act swiftly to enforce the Trump Corollary.

Beijing’s ambitions in the Western Hemisphere have long been a concern for Washington, but recent trends are particularly alarming. In late December, reports emerged that China’s People’s Liberation Army was conducting war games simulating combat in the Western Hemisphere. This news came shortly after Beijing published an official strategy for Latin America that takes an increasingly belligerent tone in asserting its regional interests there. China actively supports the destabilizing Cuban regime, including by maintaining a surveillance post on the island just ninety miles from US territory. With Beijing increasing its efforts to extend coercive economic diplomacy across the hemisphere and its public interest in West African naval access fronting the Atlantic Ocean, the Trump Corollary seems poised to clash with China’s strategic posture.

The sheer number of potential flashpoints between the United States and great-power rivals such as China under the rubric of the Trump Corollary demonstrates an important point about the administration’s strategy: While the new NSS is primarily a document about narrowing and prioritizing US objectives globally, with a lesser focus on Europe and the Middle East, it is wholly committed to an expansive vision of US interests in the Western Hemisphere. This is likely to lead to near-term adjustments to US policy, with the goal of better operationalizing the Trump Corollary to address the hemispheric challenges facing the United States.

Here are three areas to watch in the coming months.

First, under the rubric of “hemispheric defense” that guided US security strategy in the hemisphere for decades, the Trump administration should expand the geographic definition of the hemisphere for the purpose of applying the Monroe Doctrine and the Trump Corollary. By stating unambiguously that the hemisphere is broadly defined as the Aleutian Islands to Greenland and the North American Arctic to Antarctica—with Central and South America and the Caribbean in between and the Pacific and Atlantic approaches to the hemisphere included—the administration could effectively place the region in lockdown, preventing encroachment by China, Russia, and Iran.

Second, to operationalize hemispheric defense going forward, the administration should expand the rotational and permanent deployment of US land, naval, Coast Guard, and air assets in the hemisphere. As the Trump administration works to reposition US forces from legacy bases in Europe and the Middle East, it could simultaneously expand or reopen US facilities in Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. It could also seek to establish or expand rotational or permanent access agreements with US partners such as El Salvador, Ecuador, the Dutch Caribbean islands of Aruba and Curaçao, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and others.

Beyond these countries, Washington could seek a more expansive agreement with Costa Rica, which lacks a permanent military and currently allows the US military access on a case-by-case basis. A new agreement with Costa Rica could look like the comprehensive defense arrangements the United States enjoys with Pacific Island partners such as the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Micronesia. Similarly, as the administration explores its options for a broader political solution to the president’s desire to acquire Greenland, the United States could request expanded access to the island under the 1951 defense agreement and begin prepositioning anti-submarine warfare and Arctic training assets there to counter Chinese and Russian malign activity in the High North.

Third, the administration can begin leveraging such force posture changes to actively deter malign activity and advance US interests in the hemisphere. Greater US forward presence in the region would, among other outcomes, help deter Chinese and Russian collaboration with the Cuban regime, which has spread chaos and destabilization across Latin America for decades. Expanding the US presence in Costa Rica and the Dutch Caribbean would help ensure access to the Panama Canal while the administration seeks broader solutions to Chinese influence. A stronger US Coast Guard and naval presence in the Caribbean would help combat narcotics trafficking and illegal migration that pose a direct threat to the US homeland. Further north, increasing US assets in Greenland would contribute to Arctic security.

While the administration’s actions in Venezuela have shocked the world and sent a strong message to US rivals in Beijing, Moscow, Havana, and Tehran, they are likely only the starting point for a longer-term and more comprehensive reappraisal of US core interests in the hemisphere and the means to achieve them. The Trump administration has a unique opportunity, built around its NSS and its audacious Venezuela operation, to reimagine the contours of US hemispheric defense for years to come.

The post The Trump Corollary is officially in effect appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• The US operation in Venezuela reduced Russian President Vladimir Putin to bluster, because the war in Ukraine is Moscow’s priority and its military has little ability to project power.
• As Ukraine peace negotiations continue, Putin will avoid doing anything to provoke Trump over Venezuela.
• If oil prices come down because of US actions in Venezuela, it will only weaken Russia further.

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration’s bold operation on January 3 meant the end of the Maduro dictatorship, but it was also another blow to Moscow’s political prestige. It is the second time since President Donald Trump returned to the White House that he demonstrated the United States could act against a Kremlin ally with impunity. When the United States delivered a massive blow to Iran’s nuclear program this past June, Putin could offer little effective support. The Russian president was reduced to bluster, just as he is now. 

As US pressure on Venezuela began to build in the fall, Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro was hoping for tangible support from Moscow. According to The Washington Post, he wrote to Putin in October asking for drones, missiles, and radars. His request was not met.

Putin himself has not commented yet on the US operation in Venezuela, but Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov phoned acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez on Saturday to express “strong solidarity” with the government, and the Russian foreign ministry publicly demanded that the United States release Maduro. That’s it.

Limits on Russian capabilities explain much of this muted response. Russia may be a nuclear superpower, but its conventional military has limited ability to project power and, as its problem-plagued war on Ukraine has demonstrated, is characterized by clear weaknesses when fighting near home. Indeed, Putin’s aggression in Ukraine is his overwhelming priority, and it has stretched, if not exhausted, his military and greatly weakened Russia’s economy. Simply put, the Russian president does not have the resources for further foreign adventures, a fact noted by some of the Russian voenkory, or war bloggers on Telegram. That was evident even before Trump’s second term as Moscow watched in late 2024 as its half-century alliance with the Assad regime in Syria collapsed when Islamic rebels took control.

But these material limits are not the only factors driving Kremlin policy. There is also the question of Putin’s approach to managing Trump’s efforts to achieve a durable peace ending Russian aggression in Ukraine. Trump has said multiple times that in order to establish this peace, he would put major pressure on the side unwilling to make peace. Kyiv has said yes to numerous US proposals to end the fighting, and Moscow has rejected every one. But by skillful diplomacy with Trump and some of his subordinates, Moscow has avoided new US sanctions (with one large exception) and the transfer of more potent US weapons to Ukraine. This must be foremost on Putin’s mind, and he does not want to waste any capital with the US president on Venezuela. Trump himself gave Putin reason for caution when asked about the Russian president during his press conference on the Maduro snatch. Trump replied by expressing his displeasure with Putin for the ongoing killings in Ukraine. 

While Putin will avoid doing anything to provoke Trump over Venezuela, the operation will likely weaken Russia’s war effort. Putin’s struggling economy rests on the income coming from its oil and gas sales—already under pressure thanks to Ukraine’s US-aided drone and missile strikes on its hydrocarbon installations. Trump has said he intends to put Venezuelan oil—still under tough sanctions—back on the market. While this may take some time, it will help him reach his goal of driving down oil prices for US (and therefore global) consumers. This will be another big hit to the Russian economy.

The post The US capture of Maduro reveals Russia’s weakness appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 4, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Wall Street Journal article titled “A New Trump Game Plan Takes Shape: Strike and Coerce.” He evokes the Maduro regime’s ties to US adversaries and affirms the US military’s ability to operate in multiple theatres.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Wall Street Journal on US operation in Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 4, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Bloomberg article titled “Trump Snatches Maduro But Leaves His Regime in Charge for Now.” He explains that the Trump administration is attempting to influence the Venezuelan vice president to secure outcomes favorable to the US.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Bloomberg on Trump’s Venezuela strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 3, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig was quoted in a Politico article titled “The hawks are winning.” He argues that widespread support for military action in Venezuela was driven less by policy conviction than by an awareness of internal power dynamics, with officials mindful of where influence resides within the White House.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Politico on the Trump administration’s Venezuela policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As 2026 opens, the most significant question facing the United States and its global partners is not what Trump has accomplished thus far, up to and including the Maduro ouster. The year ahead will be about something more consequential: What sticks? What actions get lasting traction, and what historic legacy will this peripatetic man of action leave behind?

Today’s action is not always tomorrow’s legacy

The first year of Trump’s second term was tumultuous by his own design. It stretched presidential authority, challenged constitutional norms, unsettled many allies, drove global market volatility, and dominated news cycles with a relentlessness that none of the other forty-four US presidents ventured. 

Trump’s first year back dramatically altered the weather, but 2026 will indicate whether Trumpism marks a climactic shift that permanently changes the nature of US leadership both domestically and abroad. What’s at stake isn’t just whether the United States, working alongside partners and allies, will build on its global leadership of the past eighty years. It’s what sort of America will celebrate the 250th anniversary of its independence. 

Trump likes to show important visitors around the White House, comparing himself to the greats in the portraits that decorate its walls and wondering where he will rank among them. Where he may pay too little attention, write professors Sam Abrams and Jeremi Suri in a must-read Wall Street Journal op-ed, is to the fact that “Presidents are assessed by their legacy: institutions they create, coalitions they form and governing assumptions they stamp on America. By that standard, Mr. Trump’s second term remains unsettled at best.”

Here’s a sampling of what Trump’s leadership has brought the world in the past year: NATO allies agreed to a record increase in defense spending. Iranian despots suffered direct US attacks on three nuclear sites. Gaza has a peace plan (albeit a fragile one) endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. US tariff rates reached their highest level in a century. A new US National Security Strategy warned Europe of “civilizational erasure.” And the United States removed a Venezuelan dictator, while Russian despot Vladimir Putin continued his murderous war on Ukraine with relative impunity. 

A scan of recent news, however, reveals Trump’s unfinished business: Trump has said the United States will “run” Venezuela, but details regarding what that means are few. Shortly before the new year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy paid Trump a visit at Mar-a-Lago to ensure US peace efforts don’t reward Putin’s criminal revanchism. Around the same time, Chinese President Xi Jinping mobilized his naval, air, and missile forces around Taiwan, in a live-fire drill showing off Beijing’s growing ability to encircle the free and democratic island after the announcement of an eleven-billion-dollar US arms package to Taipei. And Iranian students joined expanding anti-regime protests, with Trump promising to protect them if shot upon (“We’re locked and loaded and ready to go”). 

Trump is “the most ubiquitous president ever,” historian Douglas Brinkley recently noted. “He plays to win the day, every day.” Yet history remembers presidencies not by that measure, but rather by what outlasts them. If Trumpism proves more personal than institutional, then its effects may fade over time. If Trumpism embeds itself in how the United States defines its interests, exercises its leverage, and understands its obligations, then allies and adversaries alike will further correct course to adjust for a permanently altered America.

So will Trumpism endure or fade? There are signs pointing in both directions. Here’s what I’ll be watching over the next twelve months to sort the noise from the signal.

Venezuela and the Western Hemisphere

No US commander-in-chief has paid more attention to the daily choreography of leadership and the political theater of the presidency than Trump has. So it is fitting that he would launch the second year of his second term with his most audacious foreign policy decision yet—something The Washington Post editorial board called “one of the boldest moves a president has made in years”—though one executed as a domestic judicial matter based on a criminal indictment.

Before the 2003 Iraq War, then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell popularized the “Pottery Barn rule” that “if you break it, you own it”—a warning about the long-term costs and obligations of military intervention. Trump’s convictions against democracy promotion and nation-building suggest he’ll want to stabilize Venezuela and deliver on US interests without doing either of those things.

How he does that will do much to define US foreign policy in 2026. Can he deliver in Venezuela in a manner that advances the country’s freedom and stability without signaling to China and Russia an endorsement of “spheres of influence” that would encourage their own regional ambitions?

The early hours show how complicated the Venezuela effort will be. Trump appears to be relying on Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president who became the country’s de facto leader on Saturday, rather than turning to the opposition, which is widely recognized to have won Venezuela’s 2024 election before it was stolen by the Maduro regime. For her part, however, Rodríguez shot back, “Never again will we be slaves, never again will we be a colony of any empire. We’re ready to defend Venezuela.”

And what other actions might the Trump administration take to deliver on the vision set out in its National Security Strategy to restore preeminence in the Western Hemisphere through a “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine? Its stated aims, among others, are to prevent and discourage mass migration, ensure governments cooperate with the United States against transnational criminal activity, maintain a hemisphere “that remains free of hostile foreign incursion of ownership of key assets,” and protect “continued access to key strategic locations.” 

Alliances, Ukraine, and Taiwan

Trump has strengthened and weakened US alliances simultaneously. He’s prompted allies to spend more on defense and accept more of their own security burdens, but he’s also left them hedging against US unpredictability. Meanwhile, Russia and China have emerged from 2025 more confident that they can achieve their geopolitical goals: in the case of Moscow, to expand its sphere of influence by reversing its setbacks after the Cold War, starting with Ukraine; and in the case of Beijing, to gain greater control over its own region with an emphasis on Taiwan and a bid to assume the mantle of global leadership.

Trump could take steps in 2026 that reinforce US alliances, or he could give autocratic adversaries even more reason to test US resolve. Through his interactions with Russian and Chinese leaders—Trump talks with Putin frequently and at length, and he is scheduled to meet with Xi at least twice in 2026—he could inadvertently encourage them to press for whatever gains are possible during his remaining three years in office, introducing a period of increased geopolitical volatility. 

Trump inherited a global situation where a group of aggressors—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—have been working more closely together than any group of autocratic countries since Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan ahead of World War II. Trump’s advisers blame previous presidents for allowing the unnatural bond between China and Russia to deepen, and they still seem to hope that they can draw Moscow away from Beijing. Thus far, however, Trump has emboldened both Putin and Xi. Their countries’ military and intelligence coordination has deepened, allowing Russia’s war on Ukraine to continue.

Global trade, markets, and economics

In 2025, Trump transformed tariffs from a last resort to a preferred economic weapon with multiple aims: gaining trade leverage, raising federal revenues, incentivizing domestic manufacturing, and punishing miscellaneous misbehavior. Economic nationalism crossed from taboo to mainstream, and protectionism became modern mercantilism. 

In a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed, titled “Prepare for More Tariffs in 2026,” the Atlantic Council’s Josh Lipsky argued that Trump is more likely to continue his current approach than to amend it, even if Supreme Court decisions expected early this year temporarily set him back. “The second year of the second Trump administration is likely to look much like the first in trade policy,” Lipsky wrote, laying out several reasons why.

Perhaps, but global markets and American voters will also have a say, and they are likely to push back. I’m less sanguine than others are that the inflationary aspects of Trump’s tariff approach and the market response will continue to be muted. In particular, look for signs of eroding US dollar dominance. (You can access our own Atlantic Council tracker on that matter here.) 

No one quite knows when global investors and sovereigns will tire of financing US debt, which now stands at more than $38 trillion, or nearly 125 percent of US gross domestic product, with roughly $6 billion added every day. Even at current financing levels, the United States is paying more in interest on its debt than it spends on defense. Something must give—but how and when? 

It’s true that the US stock market held up fine in 2025, with the S&P 500 up an impressive 16 percent. Still, that outcome far undershot the 32 percent gain for the MSCI All-Country World ex-US index, the widest such margin since the global financial crisis in 2009. The S&P 500 also trailed both the DAX (Germany) and the FTSE 100 (United Kingdom), in addition to many emerging market indices. In a front-page report in The Financial Times, journalist Emily Herbert wrote that this rare year of Wall Street underperformance came due to “worries about high valuations, a Chinese artificial intelligence breakthrough and Donald Trump’s radical economic policies.”

It’s true that even a Democratic president in 2029 is unlikely to roll back Trump’s tariffs dramatically, given that both parties currently lack a free-trade consensus. But it’s also unlikely that the trade system going into the future will be so driven by one individual and his preferences. 

Watch to see whether Trump can continue to press US economic advantage in the coming year without greater economic or political blowback than he has experienced thus far. Will rising investments in artificial intelligence continue to buoy markets? Or will slowing growth, consumer concerns about affordability, and global worries about US debt levels weigh the economy down? Expect 2026 to be a year of continued economic and market volatility—but not necessarily the lasting, wholesale change of the international trading system some are forecasting, as other actors advance trade deals.

The president and his Republican Party

Perhaps the most important “What sticks?” question of 2026 is whether Trump will move toward more strategic consistency or instead double down on the improvisational approach that he believes served him so well in 2025.

His unpredictability, which his son Don Jr. praised in Doha late last year, wins him leverage at key moments, and he certainly caught Maduro off guard over the weekend. But there’s no indication that he has built a governing system or a sustainable national security strategy around that unpredictability. Durable legacies require repetition, delegation, and follow-through by a cadre of intellectual and ideological acolytes. 

“Successful political movements outlive their founders,” Abrams and Suri wrote in the Wall Street Journal. “New Deal liberalism outlasted Roosevelt. Postwar conservatism survived Reagan. Trumpism appears to be dependent on Mr. Trump’s personal authority, media dominance and capacity for conflict.” The president, who is confronting actuarial tables as he turns eighty this year, could face a starkly different Congress a year from now. That means the next several months could present a major test of both Trump and Trumpism. 

Watch in 2026 to see whether any Republican leaders translate Trump’s instincts into a more lasting doctrine—on alliances, on relations with autocratic adversaries, and on trade. Potential Republican presidential candidates such as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Senator Ted Cruz of Texas will have to gauge whether Trumpism is a winning ideology for the future.

One recent cautionary sign for Trump acolytes was the decision by more than a dozen employees of the Heritage Foundation think tank to jump ship to the previously little-noticed Advancing American Freedom (AAF), which former US Vice President Mike Pence set up in 2021. “The debate over the direction of the post-Trump right is underway,” the Wall Street Journal editorial board wrote, with Pence explaining that what attracted the individuals to AAF was finding “a consistent, reliable home for Reagan conservatism.”

In the year ahead, I will be seeking to sort spectacle from substance regarding the actions and reactions of US adversaries and allies, global markets, and Trump himself. The president changed the political and geopolitical weather in 2025—dramatically but not irreversibly. Not every shock becomes a structure, and not every provocation determines an enduring policy change. When it comes to what sticks, the stakes are both global and generational.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post The most significant question for Trump’s America in 2026: What sticks? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 4, Alexander B. Gray, a GeoStrategy Initiative nonresident senior fellow, was interviewed on Bloomberg about the decision to capture Nicolas Maduro. He explains that the Trump administration has redefined US core interests as inextricably linked to the Western hemisphere, and argues ousting Maduro eliminated a hostile regime and narrowed the strategic space for US adversaries.

Fellow

Alexander B. Gray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.

learn more

The post Gray interviewed on Bloomberg about Trump’s Venezuela policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bottom lines up front

• Venezuelan oil supply is unlikely to meaningfully move global energy markets in the near term.
• Oil may help pay the costs of US intervention in Venezuela, but Trump is likely more motivated by securing the Western Hemisphere.
• The operation to remove Maduro signals Trump will take action when it advances US interests but does not burden the American public.

Based on how prominently Venezuela’s vast oil reserves featured in President Donald Trump’s Saturday press conference about the military strike that captured Nicolás Maduro, oil does appear to have played an important role in shaping the administration’s will to advance the audacious mission. Yet it would be misguided to claim that gaining access to supplies of heavy crude oil was the impetus for the operation.

Venezuelan oil supply is unlikely to move global energy markets meaningfully in the near term. For now, the country remains under an oil embargo imposed by the Trump administration. Even under optimistic assumptions, it will take years to rehabilitate the country’s energy sector and achieve a sizable increase in oil exports. Saturday’s operation didn’t hinge on nuanced assessments of crude grades or the US refining sector’s appetite for heavy supply. Energy was the enabler of a much bolder manifestation of Trump’s foreign policy as laid out in the administration’s recently released National Security Strategy. 

The United States is now practicing an enhanced version of the two-hundred-year-old Monroe Doctrine. What Trump described Saturday as the “Donroe” doctrine seeks a Western Hemisphere free from hostile external influence and aligned with US political and economic interests. This makes political realignment in Latin America relevant to the president’s vision for the region. Trump also is likely keen on aligning his removal of Maduro and approach to Venezuela with US domestic interests. That includes not saddling American taxpayers with the price tag of another conflict, as well as stemming the recent high levels of migration to the United States from Venezuela. It also includes reducing the violence caused by cartels trafficking illegal narcotics and making whole US companies whose assets Venezuela expropriated under Maduro’s predecessor Hugo Chávez. Here, oil is the enabler that may help pay for the execution of the policy, not the ultimate prize. 

In his address from Florida on Saturday, Trump correctly sized up the state of Venezuela’s oil economy: For a country with the largest oil reserves in the world, production is a “total bust” and the full potential of those assets has not been realized. Under Maduro’s rule, production declined from around 2.5 million barrels per day to less than one million barrels a day. If there is an orderly transition of power in Venezuela, then US companies will benefit from the political transformation. 

At the same time, the United States is the world’s number one oil and gas producer. It is energy secure. This explains why Trump emphasized that revitalizing Venezuela’s oil patch will make the people of Venezuela—not the United States—“rich, independent, and safe.” Consider the example of neighboring Guyana, where the public is benefiting from oil extraction by US companies. Ensuring Venezuela stands strong alongside the United States will help achieve the president’s domestic policy goals and lessen the influence of Russia, China, and Iran in the Western Hemisphere, all while avoiding economic costs to the American public. 

The policy that the Trump administration pursued on Saturday offers insight into the president’s decision-making and the impulses driving his administration. For those countries at odds with the United States, it’s a clear signal that Trump will take decisive action when US interests can be advanced without burdening the American public.

The post Venezuelan oil was the enabler, not the prize appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nicolás Maduro is out. But who’s in? Early on Saturday morning, the US military removed the Venezuelan strongman from power, transporting him to New York to face narcoterrorism charges. President Donald Trump said the United States will now “run” Venezuela and that Maduro’s former vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, has assumed the presidency for now. What does it all mean for the United States, the Venezuelan people, and the country’s oil? Our experts have the preliminary answers.

• Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center 
• Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Democracy+Tech Initiative and a native of Venezuela 
• Alexander B. Gray (@AlexGrayForOK): Nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and former deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council 
• David Goldwyn (@Dlgoldwyn): Chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group and former US State Department special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs 

Changing the regime

• “This is the most consequential moment in recent Venezuelan history—and for the broader Latin American region,” Jason tells us. “This operation goes beyond a simple extradition: It is a regime-change effort.” 
• For now, Rodríguez—who was very much a part of the Maduro regime—is in power, though she “does not appear to have the backing of all factions within the ruling party,” Iria notes.  
• “Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability required for” the Venezuelan economic revival that Trump is calling for, Iria adds. “Chavismo no longer enjoys the widespread popular support it had two decades ago.” 
• Jason points out that Rodríguez is constitutionally obligated to call new elections within thirty days, but even that step would in effect come from the same regime that stole an election rightfully won by the opposition in 2024. Trump called for a “safe and judicious transition,” but Jason notes that “many entrenched actors are likely to resist meaningful change,” even though “real change is fundamental to US interests and to the Venezuelan people.” 

Sign up to receive rapid insight in your inbox from Atlantic Council experts on global events as they unfold.

The Trump Corollary

• Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy outlined a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, with a focus on securing the Western Hemisphere. This operation tells us the Trump Corollary “is officially in effect,” Alex says. “Washington has demonstrated a long-overdue commitment to hemispheric security.” 
• And US adversaries are watching. The operation “will be seen in Beijing and Moscow as an unambiguous sign of the Trump administration’s commitment to a security order compatible with American interests,” Alex explains. 
• The operation, Alex adds, “creates a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Washington to translate its security preferences into strategic reality” by “ensuring extra-hemispheric powers like China and Russia are excluded from meaningful influence in Caracas.” 
• Trump also sent a message to other leaders in the region. “Trump mentioned Colombia and Cuba as countries whose leaders should now know the consequences of not cooperating with the United States,” Jason points out. 

Oil outcomes

• Trump spoke of bringing back US oil companies that were booted out by Venezuela’s 1976 nationalization of the oil industry. But “few US companies are likely to return to the country until there is a reliable legal and fiscal regime and stable security situation,” David tells us. “Companies that have existing operations are much more likely to revive and expand them if the environment is secure.” 
• The United States has plenty of policy options at its disposal, David says. For example, the administration “could allow oil currently on tankers to be exported, expand licensing, and permit Venezuela to sell oil at market prices, all for the purpose of maximizing national revenue.” 
• But, David adds, “until there is clarity on sanctions and licensing and more information on who is actually managing the central bank and ministry of finance, the prospects for Venezuelan oil production and exports will remain uncertain.” 

The post What to watch in a post-Maduro Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

So, what’s next for Maduro, Venezuelans, and US efforts in the region? Below, Atlantic Council experts share their insights.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: The US needs to remain committed to a democratic transition

Matthew Kroenig: A win for regional security, the Venezuelan people, and the US military

Alexander B. Gray: This operation sends a signal to Beijing and Moscow

David Goldwyn: Opening up Venezuela’s energy industry will come down to the details 

Celeste Kmiotek: The US strikes most likely fall afoul of international law

Iria Puyosa: Delcy Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability Trump wants

Geoff Ramsey: The mission is not accomplished until Venezuelans get free and fair elections

Nizar El Fakih: Multilateralism failed Venezuela. But it failed long before today.

Tressa Guenov: Success will require years-long US diplomatic and economic efforts in Venezuela

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watching Venezuela from Tehran

Thomas S. Warrick: Maduro’s ouster will cause shock waves in the Middle East

Alex Plitsas: Three scenarios for what could come next 

The US needs to remain committed to a democratic transition 

Many Venezuelans are hopeful that today marks the beginning of a new era. The removal of Nicolás Maduro from power is a reality that Venezuelans in the country and the nearly eight million forced to flee under his regime have long sought.

Here are three key takeaways from the operation:

First, this is the most consequential moment in recent Venezuelan history—and for the broader Latin American region. Trump’s Saturday announcement made it clear that this operation goes beyond a simple extradition: It is a regime-change effort. Maduro is now en route to New York City to face criminal charges, but the United States intends to “run the country” until “a safe and judicious transition” takes place. That means Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president, cannot simply take power and continue his policies. In assuming the presidency, she is constitutionally obligated to hold elections within thirty days. But remember, there was a prior election in July 2024 which opposition leader Edmundo González won, according to released vote tallies.

Second, the US military operation is the start—not the end—of a new level of direct US engagement in Venezuela. Trump confirmed that a team has been designated to run Venezuela, with key figures such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio engaging with Rodríguez. While US forces are expected to provide security around critical infrastructure, broader public security and the protection of citizens remain pressing challenges in a country plagued by gangs, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and transnational cartels. Hundreds of political prisoners still remain locked up, with their fate of top importance.

Third, today’s actions are the first concrete deliverables of Trump’s new National Security Strategy with its heavy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere. And the president has made it clear that future US operations in the region are fair game as well. Trump mentioned Colombia and Cuba as countries whose leaders should now know the consequences of not cooperating with the United States.

Fourth, the United States now bears responsibility for the eventual outcome in Venezuela. The challenge will be ensuring a “safe and judicious transition” in a country where many entrenched actors are likely to resist meaningful change, but where real change is fundamental to US interests and to the Venezuelan people.

​Some commentators are arguing that the strike is illegal under international law. I am not a legal expert, but it’s worth noting that even though heads of state do enjoy immunity from prosecution under international law, few world leaders recognize Maduro as a legitimate head of state. Since 2019, the Organization of American States, the premier multilateral body for the hemisphere, has refused to recognize Maduro as president following that year’s stolen elections.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A win for regional security, the Venezuelan people, and the US military 

There are five winners of the successful US operation to remove Maduro from power in Venezuela: 

1. US, regional, and global security. The world is better off without an anti-American dictator who traffics narcotics, prompts irregular migration flows, and provides a foothold to the “axis of aggressors” (China, Russia, and Iran) in the Western Hemisphere.
2. The Venezuelan people. They now have the opportunity for a better government and a freer and more prosperous future.
3. US military power. This shows that the US military is still the finest fighting force in the world and may help Washington find its confidence and get over its Iraq-Afghanistan hangover.
4. Special operations forces. They have been eager to show higher-level officials in Washington that they are still relevant after the war on terror—and indeed even more so now.
5. Trump’s foreign policy. This is a dramatic foreign policy victory, among the top three of the first year in Trump’s second term, alongside degrading Iran’s nuclear program and increasing NATO defense spending.  

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies. 

This operation sends a signal to Beijing and Moscow 

The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, as outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy, is officially in effect. Just days after the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was reported to be war-gaming combat operations in the Western Hemisphere, and a new official Chinese strategy for Latin America refused to recognize the region as of special significance to US security, Washington has demonstrated a long-overdue commitment to hemispheric security.

The Trump administration’s removal of Maduro from power in Venezuela is not simply a message to antagonistic regimes in the hemisphere, like Cuba and Nicaragua; it is a global reestablishment of deterrence that will be seen in Beijing and Moscow as an unambiguous sign of the Trump administration’s commitment to a security order compatible with American interests.

Going forward, the administration has a unique opportunity to build upon the success of its pressure campaign against Maduro to reestablish overwhelming US strategic predominance in the hemisphere, including by tacitly shaping a post-Maduro settlement that ensures extra-hemispheric powers like China and Russia are excluded from meaningful influence in Caracas. The success of this operation creates a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Washington to translate its security preferences into strategic reality.

—Alexander B. Gray is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Gray most recently served as deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council.

Opening up Venezuela’s energy industry will come down to the details 

From an energy perspective the key questions will be who governs the country, the timeline and nature of a transitional government, the security situation in the country at large and in the oil production sites and ports, and if the US government modulates the sanctions regime and the blockade to financially support a potential transitional government. At this writing, Trump has declared that the United States will run the country until the situation is stabilized, and he declined to endorse González. Trump also asserted that US oil companies would return to Venezuela. 

It remains to be seen whether there will be resistance from loyalists of the regime and remaining members of Cuban intelligence. Few US companies are likely to return to the country until there is a reliable legal and fiscal regime and stable security situation. Companies that have existing operations are much more likely to revive and expand them if the environment is secure.

It is highly uncertain how the US administration will approach exports and management of those revenues. It could allow oil currently on tankers to be exported, expand licensing, and permit Venezuela to sell oil at market prices, all for the purpose of maximizing national revenue. It is also possible that those revenues would go into a blocked account for the benefit of a new Venezuela government.

But for now, we have no details about how these fiscal and legal arrangements will evolve. Until there is clarity on sanctions and licensing and more information on who is actually managing the central bank and ministry of finance, the prospects for Venezuelan oil production and exports will remain uncertain.

—David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC, an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group.

The US strikes most likely fall afoul of international law

Maduro oversaw a brutal regime engaged in violent human rights violations against Venezuelan citizens. Regardless of this, the US strikes on Venezuela were illegal under international law.

The United Nations (UN) Charter forbids use of force against a state’s “territorial integrity or political independence,” with exceptions permitted for self-defense and Security Council authorizations. Self-defense requires that the force used be necessary and proportional, and that the threat be imminent. None of these conditions appear to have been met. As such, the attacks appear to fall under Article 3(a) of the UN General Assembly’s definition of the crime of aggression. This provision is customary, meaning it is binding and applies regardless of US arguments that the actions are legal under domestic law.

The use of force also marked the onset of an international armed conflict between the United States and Venezuela, triggering the applicability of international humanitarian law. While so far most targets appear to have been military, Trump threatened a second “and much larger” attack “if needed.” Trump’s announcement that the United States will “run” Venezuela and may deploy forces also raises alarms around potential occupation.

Finally, as sitting head of state, international law affords Maduro full personal immunity under domestic courts—including in the United States. Since 2019, the United States and other countries have not recognized Maduro as head of state, in response to widespread election fraud, and he is widely considered an illegitimate ruler. However, as argued by the French Cour de Cassation, this immunity should apply regardless of whether a state recognizes a head of state’s leadership—precisely to prevent politically motivated arrests.

While Maduro must be held accountable for the human rights violations he has inflicted, the United States’ unlawful actions must be condemned. Allowing such precedents to go unchallenged will further undermine respect for international law, state sovereignty, and civilian protections.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Delcy Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability Trump wants

The US decapitation operation against the autocratic regime that ruled Venezuela for over twenty-five years—first led by Hugo Chavez, then by Maduro—marks the beginning of the restoration of democracy in the country. The regime was unable to mount any effective defensive military actions. Its usually strong communication apparatus failed catastrophically during the first twelve hours following the US operation to take Maduro from his residence inside Fuerte Tiuna, the principal military base of the Venezuelan army. The military command-and-control chains were clearly disrupted.

Venezuelans are eager to reclaim their country and restore democracy. There is hope that González—who was rightfully elected president in 2024—will soon take the oath, and many trust that María Corina Machado will successfully lead the transition process, which may take months or even years. The second-in-command figure in the regime, Rodríguez, who was sworn in today to take Maduro’s place, does not appear to have the backing of all factions within the ruling party. Rodríguez cannot guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump emphasized several times during his remarks on the operation. Chavismo no longer enjoys the widespread popular support it had two decades ago.

The Venezuelan people who have fought nonviolently against a highly repressive regime for over two decades will continue their struggle until freedom and democracy are fully restored.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Democracy+Tech Initiative. Puyosa was previously an associate professor at the College of Social Sciences at the Central University of Venezuela.

The mission is not accomplished until Venezuelans get free and fair elections 

With Rodríguez appearing on state television Saturday afternoon and convening a “National Council in Defense of the Nation” made up of every heavyweight in the ruling party, it seems likely that she is indeed serving as the country’s de facto leader—for now.

While she claimed that Maduro remains “the only president,” called for his release, and said that Venezuela would never be “a colony of any empire,” she also noted that the Supreme Court will be reviewing a national emergency decree signed by Maduro as his last executive act. This points to further announcements to come, in which Rodríguez will almost certainly claim that she is now the country’s interim leader.

Whoever emerges on top of the power struggle in Caracas, it is fundamental that the United States use its considerable leverage to incentivize a roadmap for a transition. It is essential that the Venezuelan people are presented with a credible plan for free and fair elections, the release of political prisoners, and a path toward economic recovery. The United States can help pave this path by offering gradual, phased sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable progress toward democratization.

It is logical for the United States to advance its own energy, migration, and broader geopolitical interests in Venezuela, but US policymakers should not consider their mission accomplished until Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their own leaders is restored.

—Geoff Ramsey is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Multilateralism failed Venezuela. But it failed long before today.

Many today are emphasizing the importance of multilateralism and warning about its erosion as a result of the unilateral US actions in Venezuela. But the reality is different: Multilateralism in the face of the Venezuelan crisis did not fail today—it failed years ago.

That failure—resounding, stark, and undeniable—is measured in millions of exiles, many now undocumented or living in precarious conditions across dozens of countries, constituting one of the largest forced displacements in the world without a conventional war or internal armed conflict. It is measured in millions of families torn apart by a regime that systematically destroyed its own society: opposition parties dismantled, dissidents disappeared, deaths under custody, widespread torture, the mass closure of independent media, expropriations that crippled the productive economy (years before any international sanction), hyperinflation that impoverished millions of working families, and sustained repression.

Meanwhile, diplomacy and multilateral institutions proved unable to deliver a single effective negotiation process leading to an orderly, peaceful, and negotiated transition—despite years of appeals by millions of Venezuelans who voted, protested, and exhausted every available civic mechanism at enormous personal cost.

And international justice? The International Criminal Court, with an investigation open since 2021, has yet to issue a single indictment—despite extensive documentation of crimes against humanity by the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and hundreds of victims. Their testimonies provided detailed accounts of a sophisticated, systematic, and nationwide apparatus of repression designed to crush dissent that has been operating in the country for several years under this regime.

Looking ahead, a central concern among Venezuelans—both inside and outside the country—is whether stability will follow, and what political order will emerge from the vacuum left by Maduro, particularly given the competing factions within the former regime. What is clear is that Venezuelans expressed their will at the ballot box: In the July 2024 presidential election, the opposition—led by González and Machado—won decisively, a result the Maduro government refused to recognize, further deepening the crisis that culminated in today’s events.

Any sustainable transition will require that this legitimate leadership, with broad and demonstrable support inside Venezuela, be empowered to lead a democratic transition through a credible and legitimate process.

—Nizar El Fakih is a nonresident senior fellow with the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Success will require years-long US diplomatic and economic efforts in Venezuela

While it’s far too soon to know Venezuela’s ultimate disposition following today’s operations, we do know that Trump says that the United States will essentially “run” the country for now. Trump has prided himself on touching many conflicts around the world—from those between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Azerbaijan and Armenia to Gaza and Ukraine—quickly claiming several as resolved. But one thing the administration has yet to prove in nearly all cases, especially Venezuela, is whether it has the sustained attention span for the years-long diplomatic and economic efforts required to bring societies out of chaos and repression.

Even a short-term endeavor of running Venezuela will cost significant US military and taxpayer resources. It will also require real diplomatic finesse to ensure that the United States remains a credible leader in the region, which has now become the centerpiece of US national security strategy. Meanwhile, China will likely continue its lower-key but serious commitment to economic development in Latin America and elsewhere around the world.

Venezuela will be a test of Trump’s strategy for US dominance in the region and whether his collective peace and security efforts—from Caracas to Kyiv—can result in real strategic advantages for the United States. The alternative would be a stack of unfinished US projects that leave real lives affected in the wake.

—Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. She previously served as the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Watching Venezuela from Tehran

From a technical and military standpoint, the US operation in Venezuela signals to Iran that Washington is increasingly confident operating against Russian-derived, layered air-defense architectures without needing to dismantle them through a prolonged, overt suppression of enemy air defenses (or SEAD) campaign. Venezuela’s inventory—anchored by S-300VM, Buk-M2, and point defenses such as Pantsir-S1, supported by Russian and Chinese radars—closely resembles the architecture Iran fields around critical sites. Yet the US operation appears to have achieved its objectives without forcing visible air-defense engagement.

Available reporting suggests the US operation evaded detection and engagement by leaning on standoff effects; persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); electronic attack; and compressed timelines. Under such conditions, systems like Buk and Pantsir may never generate a usable firing solution, while high-value S-300-class assets become difficult to employ without sustained targets, clear attribution, and political authorization. The issue is not only theoretical capability, but whether layered defenses can meaningfully influence outcomes during brief, tightly sequenced operations.

This reinforces a broader pattern Iran will recognize. Russian air defenses have struggled to impose decisive effects in other theaters—including Syria, where Israeli strikes have repeatedly penetrated layered systems, and Ukraine, where Pantsir, Buk, and S-300 variants have suffered attrition under modern ISR-strike cycles. 

Equally relevant is the diplomatic dimension. In Venezuela, as with Iran, US military action coincided with standing diplomatic offers—sanctions relief, normalization steps, and elements of proposed deals—kept on the table before and during the use of force. The combined signal to Tehran is that neither reliance on Russian air defenses nor the slow-rolling of US proposals necessarily alters the pace or structure of US action.  

Recent US strikes in Nigeria send a reinforcing signal. There the United States acted without prolonged warning or phased escalation, using remote airstrikes supported by the Nigerian government. These operations underscore a reduced tolerance for drawn-out escalation dynamics and a preference for short-duration, outcome-oriented use of force.  

For Iran, the relevance lies not in the specific targets or theaters, but in the demonstrated willingness of the United States to move decisively once thresholds are crossed. 

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

Maduro’s ouster will cause shock waves in the Middle East

The success of Trump’s bold operation to remove Maduro will cause global shock waves, including in the Middle East. Saturday’s successful operation puts Trump’s “locked and loaded” message on Friday to Iran’s leaders in a different perspective. However, the Venezuelan operation took months of planning, and there are no signs that the United States has the capability, or the intention, to pull off something similar in Iran.

Still, as a demonstration of Trump’s willingness to back months of rhetoric against Maduro with dramatic—and effective—action, Saturday’s operation should concern Iran’s leaders. Those who know their history—and the Trump administration has some like Sebastian Gorka who do—will remember that in 1956 the United States failed to follow up on its encouragement of Hungarian protesters against Soviet rule. The Trump administration ought to be aware of the dangers of vague rhetoric that cannot be followed up with action. Trump’s words to Iran and the Middle East in the coming weeks need to be made with steely-eyed capability and intention.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Three scenarios for what could come next 

The US operation to capture Maduro and transfer him to stand trial in the United States on criminal charges dating back to 2020 marks a decisive inflection point for Venezuela. What follows will hinge less on Washington’s next move than on the calculations of the regime’s remaining power brokers, military commanders, intelligence chiefs, and political enablers who are now confronted with a stark choice: negotiate an orderly exit or risk annihilation alongside a collapsing system.

In the best-case scenario, Maduro’s arrest catalyzes elite defection. Faced with legal exposure, sanctions, and loss of patronage, regime underlings could seek guarantees for safe passage, limited amnesty, or third-country exile in exchange for transferring authority to the legitimately elected opposition. Such a negotiated handover would avert mass violence, stabilize institutions, and open a narrow but viable path toward economic recovery and international reintegration. 

Another scenario is that the United States has been working secretly with elements of the Venezuelan government who will take over. 

The worst-case scenario is far darker. If regime remnants reject negotiation and fragment, Venezuela could descend into a protracted guerrilla conflict. Armed colectivos, criminalized military units, and narco-linked factions could wage asymmetric warfare, turning parts of the country into contested zones and prolonging civilian suffering long after the regime’s formal collapse. 

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The post Experts react: The US just captured Maduro. What’s next for Venezuela and the region? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Charai for The National Interest: Peace Through Strength in Venezuela—and the World appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. What does this blockade mean for Venezuela?

This blockade adds significant pressure to Maduro’s regime, as these shadow tankers act as a financial lifeline that Maduro relies on to sustain his corrupt patronage system. Sanctioned vessels operate in a global black market, transporting US-sanctioned oil that has been critical over the years to the ability for Maduro to stay in power.

Since the initial US seizure of the Skipper last week, Venezuelan crude exports have fallen sharply, effectively targeting Maduro’s main source of income. Venezuela relies entirely on tankers to export its oil, and disrupting the illegal trade that runs on these sanctioned tankers weakens Maduro’s grip on power. As of last week, more than thirty of the eighty ships in Venezuelan waters were under US sanctions.

Frankly, with the size of the US fleet amassed in the Caribbean, it was only a matter of time before this blockade began. It will be important to see which of these shadow vessels continue to try to reach Venezuelan shores and which vessels the United States determines it has the authority to seize. These ships are part of a large shadow shipping network designed to evade US sanctions and mask the destination of Venezuelan crude. This illegal trade network delivers oil primarily to China, and to a lesser extent Cuba, employing several tactics to disguise the origin, name, and shipping routes to evade US regulations.

The blockade of these sanctioned vessels provides an additional source of leverage for the United States. By cutting off a significant part of the regime’s income, the United States gains an additional chip to put on the table in discussions on ending Maduro’s dictatorship in Venezuela. This move elevates the Caribbean campaign from a counter-drug operation to one that is also cutting off the financial lifelines to Maduro, who the United States has designated as the leader of the Cartel de los Soles.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

2. What is the likely impact on oil markets in the region and globally?

Venezuela exported a little over 780,000 barrels a day in October of this year, 100,000 of which came to the United States and the rest directly or indirectly going to China. It is highly uncertain whether all or only a portion of those exports will be impacted by the blockade.

The president referred to a blockade of “sanctioned vessels,” which could potentially exclude Chevron’s 100,000 barrels per day. A respected tanker tracking outfit suggested that only 40 percent of the vessels transporting Venezuelan crude are sanctioned.

The president also made reference in social media to Maduro and his government being labeled a foreign terrorist organization. We do not yet have designations or explanations from the Treasury or State Department. It is possible that any person or entity doing business with the Venezuelan government or its national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), could therefore be exposed to liability. In this case, nearly all of Venezuela’s exports (oil or otherwise) could be impacted.

So far, the oil market has shrugged its shoulders at the blockade. Brent crude was up 2.5 percent overnight, to sixty dollars a barrel, according to Bloomberg. That is a pretty modest impact. This could be the result of the market having already priced in the impact of higher levels of naval interdiction of Venezuelan oil exports, high levels of spare capacity, or weak winter oil demand. Ordinarily, one million barrels a day of displaced oil translates into about ten dollars on the oil price, so a complete blockade of all of Venezuela’s exports, if not replaced by increased by OPEC spare capacity or commercial reserves, would be in the range of five dollars to eight dollars a barrel. Everything will depend on how the blockade is enforced.

—David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC, an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group.

3. What else could the United States do to put pressure on Maduro?

Venezuela relies on revenue from sanctioned oil exports to prop up the regime and the country’s economy. Venezuela continues to sell its sanctioned oil, predominantly to China, while accepting payment in digital assets, namely stablecoins, to circumvent US sanctions. To increase economic pressure on Venezuela, the administration should consider enforcing existing sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector, including PDVSA. Sanctions enforcement would include seizing crypto wallets and working with stablecoin issuers to seize or burn digital assets held by sanctioned Venezuelan entities. This would have an immediate impact on Maduro by taking out significant financial assets and it would be much more cost-effective for the United States and its naval forces.

Separately, as the United States increases pressure on Venezuela with a blockade, the administration should consider where the vessels will go next. As we have seen, the sanctioned tankers carrying Venezuelan oil have also carried Iranian oil. If ships cannot dock in Venezuelan ports, then the United States should anticipate where they will go instead and whose cargo they will carry, which could be Iran or Russia. The shadow fleet used by Venezuela, Iran, and Russia is a network, and to affect Venezuela, the United States needs to address the entirety of the fleet and its operators.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served as acting associate director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) Intelligence Division, in the US Treasury Department.

4. What does the blockade mean for Russia’s shadow fleet?

The US move against Venezuelan oil exports may matter less for Venezuela itself than for Russia’s shadow fleet, because it signals a shift from symbolic sanctions toward more assertive enforcement against maritime sanctions evasion.

Russia today relies on a sprawling shadow fleet—aging tankers, opaque ownership structures, flag-hopping, ship-to-ship transfers, and weak or fictitious insurance—to keep oil flowing despite Western restrictions. What the Venezuela case demonstrates is that Washington is increasingly willing to treat sanctions evasion not just as a financial violation, but as a maritime security problem.

This matters because Russia’s shadow fleet is not isolated. Many of the same vessels, intermediaries, insurers, and ship-management networks service Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan crude interchangeably. Pressure applied in one region exposes vulnerabilities across the entire system. Even limited interdictions force tankers to go dark longer, take riskier routes, rely on fewer ports, and accept higher freight and insurance costs—raising the overall cost of Russian oil exports.

For Moscow, the immediate risk is not a sudden collapse in exports but growing friction and uncertainty. Each escalation increases the probability of seizures, port refusals, or secondary sanctions on service providers—factors that reduce the efficiency and scalability of Russia’s energy revenues over time.

There is also a deterrent effect. By demonstrating that shadow fleets are visible, traceable, and vulnerable, the United States raises the strategic risk premium for Russia’s oil trade—even if enforcement remains selective.

This dynamic is being reinforced in Washington on the policy front. A bipartisan group of US senators has introduced the Decreasing Russian Oil Profits (DROP) Act of 2025, which would authorize financial sanctions on foreign buyers of Russian petroleum products and seek to choke off a key source of Kremlin revenue. The proposal includes targeted measures to penalize entities anywhere in the world that continue to purchase Russian oil, with narrow exemptions tied to support for Ukraine, underscoring Congress’s intent to close loopholes in the sanctions regime and further isolate Moscow’s energy exports.

The key takeaway is this: Russia’s shadow fleet survives on the assumption of tolerance and ambiguity. The Venezuela action suggests that assumption is weakening. For a war economy dependent on energy revenues, that shift matters.

—Agnia Grigas, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center working on energy and geopolitical economy.

The post What Trump’s Venezuela oil blockade means for Maduro and the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The past year reshaped Latin America and the Caribbean in ways that will echo into 2026. The return of Donald Trump to the White House introduced new US priorities and a greater regional focus, as the administration imposed new tariffs and elevated the Western Hemisphere as a top priority.

Elections brought mixed outcomes. Argentina handed President Javier Milei a legislative boost in the midterms. In Bolivia, voters rejected the ruling party’s candidate. Honduras held presidential elections November 30 after logistical challenges and institutional disputes. (No winner had been announced as of this writing in mid-December.)

In Venezuela, increased US military operations in the Caribbean added pressure on the Maduro regime amid a renewed focus on countering drug trafficking. Across the Caribbean, countries continued calling for more support to strengthen resilience after Hurricane Melissa caused widespread damage.

The year ahead will test the region on multiple fronts, from the long-anticipated review of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) trade pact to high-stakes elections in Colombia, Brazil, and elsewhere—as well as an exciting summer marked by the World Cup.

What might be in store for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2026? Read on for our annual ten questions about the year ahead. 

Will Nicolas Maduro still be in power at the end of the year?

Hopefully not. 

Maduro’s dictatorship has been devastating for the Venezuelan people, the country’s institutions, and the Latin American region at large. Eight million Venezuelans have been forced to flee their homes as his repressive and parasitic regime exacerbates hyperinflation and poverty and erodes democratic processes in the country. 

When Maduro stole the presidential election from the democratically elected Edmundo González in July 2024, Venezuelan authorities carried out brutal systematic repression campaigns to suppress any political dissent. 

The US military positioning in the Caribbean—which includes the world’s largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford—adds pressure on Maduro’s regime, as does the recent announcement of a blockade of all sanctioned oil tankers. Illegal oil revenue that comes through a shadow fleet of tankers helps to prop up Maduro. The Trump administration has yet to show its cards regarding whether it will attempt to negotiate an exit deal with Maduro, if it will seek to remove him through military action, or pursue another option. The US military deployment, which began in late August 2025, is one of the largest to take place in the Caribbean. But pressure will escalate for it to deliver results, and Maduro must come face to face with his increasingly limited options. There are many factors at play when it comes to the possibility of Maduro leaving power in Venezuela. The real goal should be not just for Maduro to leave power, as he could be replaced by a similarly repressive ally, but a real, long-awaited democratic transition.

After Colombia elects a new president, will Bogota and Washington return to a closer partnership? 

Yes.

The next year is bound to be an important one for US-Colombia relations, as a presidential election will be an opportunity to begin forging closer ties. Colombia has historically been one of the United States’ closest partners in the hemisphere, designated a major non-NATO ally and seen as central to preserving regional stability. In 2025 the relationship hit lows it hasn’t seen in decades. Tensions have largely been tied to clashes over the last few years between President Gustavo Petro and his American counterparts, however, rather than changes in the overall relationship at a subnational or people-to-people level. 

With approximately ninety presidential pre-candidates and more than one-quarter of voters telling pollsters they are undecided, the election’s outcome is anyone’s guess. Regardless of who wins, the next Colombian administration will inherit a complex security landscape marked by rising violence and increasingly fragmented criminal organizations, making a partnership with Washington essential. Bilateral ties are unlikely to bounce back immediately or to revert to the way they were. But both sides will have strong incentives to rebuild trust, with Bogota focused on securing US support for counternarcotics efforts and Washington aiming to control the threats of transnational organized crime.

It will be important for the next Colombian president to show early willingness to cooperate with Washington, set a pragmatic tone, and restore predictable channels of communication. Doing so, despite any political or ideological differences, will be key to rebuilding a new type of partnership that may be more focused in scope, especially at the outset.

Will the left regain ground across Latin America in the 2026 elections?

No.

Over the last two years, voters across the region have rewarded candidates running on hard security, market-friendly, and anti-establishment platforms (think José Antonio Kast in Chile, Milei in Argentina, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, and Daniel Noboa in Ecuador). The trend is similar at the subnational level. Chile’s 2023 constitutional council was decisively conservative, though it was rejected by voters. Brazil’s 2024 municipal races strengthened Jair Bolsonaro-aligned forces, and Colombia’s 2023 local elections punished Petro’s left coalition. 

Considering the regional pendulum swung left earlier in the decade and produced a crowded “pink” map, it would be simplistic or misleading to say that a conservative wave is now sweeping over the region. Voters seem to be driven more by anti-incumbent sentiment and security fears than by any left or right ideology. 

Heading into 2026, right-leaning forces are well positioned in Costa Rica, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, where crime, migration, and the state of the economy dominate voter concerns. Trends and leading candidates in Costa Rica, for example, suggest that voters are backing more personalistic candidates from nontraditional parties rather than more traditional and conservative parties. So, while we could expect at least a few of the aforementioned countries to lean right, security, anti-corruption, and economic competence might matter more than left-right labels.

Will the review of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement reshape North American trade? 

Maybe.

The review comes at a moment when all three countries face economic and political pressures. The United States might push for stronger enforcement of labor and environmental standards, and a baseline of protections for the US to prevent countries such as China from shipping their goods through USMCA countries and then trying to claim “rules of origin” benefits.

And while US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer noted December 10 at the Atlantic Council that he continues to meet separately with Mexico and Canada, the United States’ USMCA partners may also seek additional updates. Mexico could press for more flexibility in energy and automotive rules. Canada might seek updates on digital trade, dairy market access, and environmental cooperation. These issues matter but expect governments to act cautiously, with the possibility of separate bilateral protocols in the final agreement. Reopening too many chapters could create uncertainty for businesses and supply chains that depend on stable and predictable rules.

Because North America’s economies are so interconnected in autos, agriculture, and energy, even small changes could have large effects. For this reason, the most likely outcome is an integral review that keeps at least the core benefits of the USMCA intact. The three governments might add clarifications, strengthen enforcement tools, or expand cooperation without fundamentally rewriting the deal.

USMCA review can provide a pragmatic roadmap for reshaping North America’s trade, if parties are open to discussing the fundamentals to be strengthened at this point. These include enforcing clear rules of origin, transparent technical frameworks, customs modernization, interoperability, and the rule of law to protect investment and provide overall security to businesses. 

Will Milei’s economic reform agenda gain momentum? 

Yes.

Argentina has long needed sizable structural revamps across key areas including tax, labor, and pension systems to unlock sustained growth, strengthen competitiveness, and ease pressures on businesses and consumers alike. While Milei has advanced parts of his agenda through executive action, the country has now reached the point at which deeper and more transformative changes require congressional approval. The challenge is that, although the government will enter next year with a sizable minority in congress, its caucus will still need to work with moderate opposition legislators to pass key legislation. 

Many legislators appear willing to engage in dialogue to allow meaningful progress, and securing their support would both make these measures viable and send a powerful signal to markets that Argentina’s political class is broadly committed to long-term stability and modernization. That is why progress is likely, particularly when it comes to tax and labor reform. But the ultimate outcome will depend heavily on the administration’s ability to negotiate with provincial governors, whose delegations form a majority of the moderate opposition bloc. Watch out for early successes in the first months of 2026, which might set the tone for the legislative agenda throughout the year, defining the scale of the administration’s ability to pass reforms. 

Will Latin America and the Caribbean surpass their growth projections for 2026? 

Yes.

Although Latin America is expected to continue experiencing relatively slow growth in 2026 compared to other emerging-market regions, progress in US-Latin America economic engagement and improvements across several key macroeconomic variables create a credible pathway for the region to exceed current projections.

Economic forecasts suggest that 2026 will not be a transformative year for most countries. Argentina and Guyana are the primary exceptions, with Guyana standing out as the only Caribbean country among the world’s thirty fastest-growing economies. Even so, the region has meaningful upside potential on trade. Stronger-than-expected export performance could lift regional growth, especially if recent announcements on commodities lead to further reductions in trade barriers with the United States. A pickup in demand from major markets, including China, could provide an additional boost. These improvements would help offset the decline in the region’s overall trade surplus projected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

At the same time, a gradual easing of monetary policy in the European Union (EU) and the United States could help revive foreign direct investment flows, which have slowed since the post-pandemic surge. When combined with country-specific recoveries such as Argentina’s stabilization process and continued gains from energy and mineral projects across the region, these factors create a realistic opening for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to surpass the current IMF growth projection of 2.3 percent for 2026.

Will the United States counter Chinese investment more aggressively in Latin America? 

Yes.

The Trump administration’s sharp rhetoric toward governments seen as aligning with Beijing has already signaled a tougher stance, and this pressure will grow as Washington confronts the strategic nature of China’s investments in the region. While US companies invest far more than Chinese firms in overall volume, much of that investment in the region goes to low-risk service sectors. 

China, meanwhile, is expanding its influence through targeted bets on critical minerals, energy, infrastructure, and transport, which shape long-term supply chains and political leverage. For the United States to remain competitive, it will need to shift its policies to encourage more strategic investment. This means reducing costs and risks for US firms, expanding development finance tools, and partnering more closely with multilateral banks to help US companies enter the sectors in which China currently dominates. 

The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is due to be reauthorized and recapitalized in 2026. This will help to provide some of the capital necessary to lower the barrier of entry to US companies engaging in capital-intensive projects such as infrastructure and extractives—two sectors in which China has had stronger influence in LAC. The unveiling of a holistic economic diplomacy initiative by the White House, such as America Crece 2.0 (a more comprehensive version of its predecessor during Trump’s first term), could further support US efforts in the region.

Will the Caribbean improve hurricane response and coordination? 

Maybe.

Better coordination will require stronger regional planning and risk management, but past storms have shown the severity of the challenge. Partnerships with the Inter-American Development Bank and programs such as One Caribbean can help prepare projects, support public-private partnerships, and manage political risk. 

Local participation in risk mitigation remains essential because many Caribbean firms operate as family businesses with deep community ties. If countries and investors work together by expanding financing tools, strengthening regional institutions, and supporting resilient infrastructure, the Caribbean can recover more quickly and prepare for stronger storms.

Jamaica is an example of the daunting challenge ahead. For more than a decade, Jamaica kept a primary surplus above 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and reduced its debt, earning US bipartisan recognition for steady governance. In September 2025, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Global Ratings upgraded Jamaica to BB minus with a positive outlook. But Hurricane Melissa caused almost $8 billion in damage, nearly half of Jamaica’s annual GDP. The country’s $250-million catastrophe bond will likely pay out in full. Yet that amount cannot cover losses of Melissa’s scale. 

Across the region, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries lose an estimated 2 percent of their infrastructure capital stock each year to climate-related damage. The growing frequency of severe storms raises insurance costs and stretches already limited public budgets.

Will security remain the top voter priority across upcoming elections? 

Yes.

Voters across Costa Rica, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil will head to the polls with security top of mind. 

In Costa Rica, concern over rising violence jumped from 30.3 percent to 43.7 percent between November 2024 and April 2025. Fifteen of the twenty presidential candidates have placed security at the center of their agendas, with many proposing education reform and youth-focused opportunities to tackle the roots of violence.

Peru has seen one of its most violent years since 2017. Homicides are up 12.8 percent and extortion complaints 27.4 percent compared to 2024. Instability peaked after the attempted assassination of a cumbia band triggered President Dina Boluarte’s impeachment and the swearing in of Jose Jeri as her successor. With protests, unrest, and a surge in criminal extortion targeting informal workers and small businesses, voters will demand immediate solutions.

In Colombia, “total peace” efforts fell short, deepening the security crisis and straining relations with the United States, the country’s long-standing security ally. Armed groups expanded control, coca cultivation reached record highs, and violence surged. This included large-scale displacement in Catatumbo, an attack on a police helicopter that killed thirteen officers, and a bombing in Cali. Nearly one-third of Colombians now see security as the country’s top problem.

In Brazil, security will compete with economic concerns, but October’s Operação Contenção in Rio de Janeiro, the deadliest police raid in the country’s history with 120 victims, has pushed violence to the center of public debate. Gangs continue to control neighborhoods and challenge state authority. While economic pressures remain significant, security is poised to drive the political conversation in 2026. 

Will the United States lift the additional 40 percent tariffs on Brazilian goods? 

Yes.

The additional 40 percent tariffs on Brazilian goods are likely to be lifted or significantly reduced in 2026. Trump and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva had a positive meeting in Malaysia in late October, and trade negotiations have been ongoing and a priority ever since. The United States and Brazil share a long-standing diplomatic relationship, and the United States has historically enjoyed a trade surplus with Brazil. Many imports from Brazil supply US demand for products that are not produced domestically, such as coffee and bananas; others are imported as input for US manufacturing, such as wood panels and airplane parts.

The Trump administration has already begun rolling back some of the additional duties. On November 20, several Brazilian products were removed from the list of those subject to the additional 40 percent tariffs, including beef and coffee, for which Brazil is the United States’ top supplier. A Supreme Court decision on the legality of International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)-based tariffs—expected soon—would also impact Brazilian and global tariffs: Because the administration cited IEEPA to levy the tariffs, a ruling against the use of IEEPA in this way could put all of the administration’s added tariffs on Brazil at risk. Together, the diplomatic momentum, economic reasoning, and legal backdrop all point toward favorable conditions under which many of these tariffs could be lifted in 2026. 

Bonus question: Will Argentina repeat its World Cup title?

Maybe.

Argentina will enter the 2026 tournament with its eyes firmly on back-to-back glory, but the biggest wildcard is Lionel Messi. The captain has given no guarantees that he will lead the team next summer, leaving fans wondering whether “La Pulga” will take one more shot at the world’s biggest stage. Even without certainty about his presence, Argentina remains one of the strongest contenders, backed by a talented roster.

But the region will not make it easy. Colombia returns to the World Cup after eight years with a revitalized team eager to prove it can compete with the best. Brazil will arrive hungry to reclaim its historic position in the World Cup hierarchy, with pressure mounting after more than two decades since it last lifted the trophy. Mexico will face the added pressure of competing as a host nation. Ecuador, Paraguay, and Panama will all look to make their mark and test regional rivals.

The tournament will unfold across the United States, Mexico, and Canada, setting the scene for an unforgettable summer. Argentina is well positioned, but the path to glory will be anything but simple. There is no certain answer for now.

This publication was updated December 17 to reflect news developments.

Issue Brief Nov 19, 2025

Why modernizing CAFTA-DR matters for the United States, and options for updating the trade pact

By Enrique Millán-Mejía, Antonio Ortiz Mena, and Rocío Rivera Barradas

Central America and the Dominican Republic are emerging as key partners for US economic security. The United States has a unique opportunity to reform its free trade agreement with the region—CAFTA-DR—to strengthen these ties.

Americas Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Nov 7, 2025

Hurricane Melissa left $8 billion in damage. Jamaica needs US support to get back on its feet.

By Patricia R. Francis, Maite Gonzalez Latorre

After the devastation caused by Hurricane Melissa, Jamaica needs the United States to invest in the country’s resilience and economic recovery.

Caribbean Climate Change & Climate Action

New Atlanticist Nov 6, 2025

The expert conversation: What’s Trump’s endgame in Venezuela?

By Matthew Kroenig, Jason Marczak

We spoke to Matthew Kroenig and Jason Marczak to shed light on the US campaign of attacks on alleged drug boats and lay out what’s next.

Conflict Human Rights

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

Learn more

The post Latin America and the Caribbean in 2026: Ten defining questions for the year ahead appeared first on Atlantic Council.

And the now-released National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly states the United States’ goals for the Western Hemisphere: “Enlist and Expand.” The latter goal includes ridding the hemisphere of a regime that advances priorities clearly in contrast to NSS objectives by providing safe haven for criminal groups, profiting from trafficking, and welcoming the influence of foreign adversaries. And as the United States seeks to secure access to critical supply chains, Venezuela presents an untapped opportunity. 

Although US President Donald Trump has been evasive on what exactly his plans are for Maduro, it’s clear that the president is not authorizing the largest US naval deployment in the Caribbean in forty years—dubbed “Operation Southern Spear” by the Pentagon—only to counter small drug boats. It’s part of his NSS. Trump has recently spoken with Maduro, and reports indicate a possible deal being brokered for the dictator’s departure from the country. 

But there have been rumors of Maduro’s downfall many times before. Hopefully, this time it comes to pass. Without Maduro, Venezuela and the hemisphere would rid itself of a cancer. 

The opposition’s democratic blueprint

A democratic transition in Venezuela must begin with Maduro out of power, but it entails much more than that. It is imperative any opportunity for change is not usurped by many malevolent actors in Venezuela, including Maduro’s generals and high-ranking members of Venezuela’s intelligence agency, the Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional (SEBIN). Drug trafficking guerrilla groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), as well as armed pro-government paramilitary forces known as colectivos, are also a concern. Corruption lines every inch of Maduro’s regime, so much so that the US Department of State recently designated the Cartel de los Soles as a foreign terrorist organization. The Cartel de los Soles is the term used to describe the de-centralized military structure within Maduro-controlled armed forces that facilitate drug trafficking and other illicit activities for profit. 

A democratic transition depends not only on the failure of these malign groups to derail the process, but also on the success of democratic forces that share similar interests to those laid out in Trump’s NSS. Here it’s worth looking back to July 28, 2024, the day of the Venezuelan presidential elections. Maduro, backed by friendly electoral authorities, stole the election and declared himself winner. In that election, opposition activists were able to gather more than 83 percent of the voting tallies and electoral records, demonstrating that Edmundo González Urrutia, candidate for the Plataforma Unitaria Democrática, had won around 67 percent of the vote. Since then, González has been forced to flee Venezuela, and opposition leader and 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado remains in hiding from Maduro’s regime in Venezuela.

Critically, opposition leaders still have the weight of their sweeping electoral win behind them. They have reiterated time and again a plan for a democratic transition when Maduro leaves power—a plan that includes economic revitalization and the rapid re-instating of civil liberties and human rights for Venezuelan citizens.

Machado herself has laid out her plans for Venezuela’s first hundred days post-Maduro. She has emphasized that before those hundred days are up, freedom of speech would be restored and new leadership would address the most pressing aspects of the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Further, the opposition has pledged to adopt reforms to curb food insecurity in the country. After immediate social needs are met and processes are in place to continue pulling Venezuelans out of malnutrition and other poor conditions, Machado has said she would enact her plan to begin revitalizing the economy. It’s an ambitious plan—after so many years of corruption and mismanagement under Maduro—but also one that will require continued US support in the days and months following a Maduro exit and a transition that would empower democratic forces. 

“A trillion-dollar opportunity”

The Venezuelan opposition’s team of economists have laid out a plan for what Machado’s economic team calls a “trillion-dollar opportunity”—a free-market, liberalized Venezuela open to investors, including the United States.

In her plan, Machado notes Venezuela’s abundance of natural resources, ranging from the world’s largest oil reserves to vast deposits of gold, iron, and other minerals. She argues that a legacy of public investment since before former leader Hugo Chavez came to power and hollowed-out institutions because of Maduro’s dictatorship open a unique path to streamline reforms by removing bureaucratic obstacles and opening Venezuelan goods for international trade with partners around the globe. Machado drives home the point that because so many private-sector opportunities are unexplored in Venezuela, the country is sitting on a gold mine for those who invest in these sectors after Maduro’s grip on the country ends.

The opposition’s main reform programs, which include rule of law, security and defense, and an economic relaunch, provide the United States with a distinct opportunity to create a partnership with one of the most resource-rich and strategically located nations in South America. The positives of Venezuela becoming a friend and an ally of the United States would have been inconceivable in Washington’s policy circles just a few years ago. And such an outcome would significantly advance the NSS’s “expand” goal.

These reforms are an ambitious overhaul of the parasitic political system that has plagued Venezuela for decades. And even though it could take some time for full implementation, it’s an agenda that would amount to a new dawn for Venezuela.

Looking beyond Maduro’s Venezuela

Maduro is noxious—both to the people of Venezuela and the wider Latin American region. In the past decade, almost eight million Venezuelans have fled their homes as Maduro’s parasitic and clientelist regime has enriched itself on the backs of its people. The mass exodus as a result of Maduro’s policies has resulted in a domino effect of instability in the region, notably with the high influx of refugees, who have brought fragile institutions in countries such as Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile to a near breaking point. Moreover, catastrophic medical and food shortages have jeopardized the lives of millions of Venezuelans, while Maduro’s regime denied the existence of a crisis. 

After Maduro stole the election from González in July 2024, his regime carried out a colossal campaign of violence and repression, forcibly disappearing, unlawfully imprisoning, and torturing citizens suspected of supporting the opposition and challenging the regime. Since the election, more than two thousand people have been detained for ties to the opposition, many of them with no contact to the outside world since their imprisonment. 

At this pivotal moment for the Venezuelan people and the region, momentum must not be lost for Venezuela’s transition to democracy. Its democratically elected opposition has a plan for the first hundred hours, the first hundred days, the first year, and beyond. It’s time to see that plan in action.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post After Maduro appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hopes are high that this moment could present momentum for the long-awaited democratic transition in Venezuela, and US policy should continue to press hard for it. Still, while Washington should continue to ratchet up pressure on the Maduro regime, a military intervention would hold first- and second-order risks to global energy and food markets.

Strikes limited to counternarcotics targets are unlikely to affect energy production or food markets. But any action attacking the regime itself or damaging single points of failure in the energy system, such as ports, is another matter altogether. Some proponents of military intervention in Venezuela are hopeful that any intervention would be relatively small and contained; skeptics, conversely, warn that air strikes could unleash unpredictable forces and lead to “difficult choices about whether and how to escalate.” With President Donald Trump reportedly seeking to speak directly with Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, a diplomatic solution may also emerge. We leave it to others to assess the dynamics and pathways of a coercive campaign. Still, if a small-scale intervention becomes a large one, several consequences are likely. 

Even with high US domestic oil production, spare production capacity in the Gulf, and a well-stocked US Strategic Petroleum Reserve buffering crude markets, the loss of Venezuela’s heavy-sour barrels would tighten already-strained diesel markets. More dangerously, a conflict could spill over into regional oil or ammonia infrastructure—especially Trinidad and Tobago’s Point Lisas complex—likely resulting in an increase in fertilizer and food prices, which could potentially set off another bout of global inflation. 

Global oil markets and Venezuela 

Although it is still a significant player, Venezuela is at present not as important in oil markets as it was in pre-Hugo Chávez times. Venezuela exports stand at 800,000 barrels per day (bpd), or a little under 1 percent of total world oil consumption (although exports briefly exceeded one million bpd in September). Most export volumes head to China, directly or indirectly, while US imports have fallen below 100,000 bpd in recent months. 

In the event of a US military intervention, Venezuelan production and exports would almost certainly plummet. Furthermore, US military strikes on Venezuelan territory could cause the regime to retaliate, especially if the United States attacked Venezuelan military installations or leadership offices. Venezuelan retaliation could take several forms, including sabotaging production to handicap a potential successor regime, attacking neighbors that seem to be supporting US military action, and fomenting internal political instability that makes continued operation unsafe.

Venezuela’s history shows how quickly production can drop even absent a military intervention. In 2002–2003, a Venezuelan oil workers’ strike, led by opposition to then President Hugo Chávez, reduced Venezuelan oil exports from three million barrels per day to less than 200,000 barrels per day. 

At the same time, high US domestic crude and natural gas liquids (NGL) production, significant spare production capacity in Gulf states, and continued expectations for an oil market glut will put a ceiling on global oil prices—even if Venezuelan production outages occur in the short term. Additionally, the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is well stocked. 

But the longer-term picture is much more mixed. Venezuelan production would likely require several years to recover from any large-scale US military intervention. Though imperfect, comparative experiences point to the challenge of bringing postwar oil production back online. During the US invasion of Iraq, for instance, Iraqi liquids production fell to zero for several months after the invasion; annual production did not return to pre-war levels until 2011. Libya’s experience, too, suggests a disorderly political transition can severely hamper oil production. Since Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi’s overthrow in 2011, Libyan liquids production has never returned to prior levels: 2024 annual production stood at 1,188 kbpd, down 32 percent from 2010 levels.

The incompetency of the Chávez and Maduro regimes leaves open the possibility that a post-Chavismo Venezuela could eventually see higher production. Indeed, the Venezuelan opposition has released a thoughtful and credible plan for bolstering oil and mining production, including by pursuing best practices. However, rebounding production will depend on several factors. For example, capital and labor will need to return to Venezuela. State-owned Petróleos de Venezuela, SA, which is debt-laden and has deferred maintenance on key pieces of field infrastructure, will need to be overhauled. And many of Venezuela’s reservoirs, which have suffered from poor production practices, will need to be restored. 

Long-term Venezuelan outages would therefore likely lift oil prices, especially diesel. This is because Venezuela’s heavy-sour crude oil grades are highly suitable for producing diesel, which is a key input into virtually every industry. Recently, the International Energy Agency has warned that middle distillate markets—including diesel—are already tight. Accordingly, if Venezuela production is removed from the market, then diesel prices could shift higher, which is likely to increase global inflation. 

Indeed, if US policymakers undertake military intervention in Venezuela, then they should both anticipate higher inflation via diesel markets and prepare for a post-intervention environment wherein Venezuela’s oil production takes time, and requires support, to fully rebound. 

Horizontal escalation risks

A US military intervention in Venezuela might have wider regional impacts should the Maduro regime, faced with an existential threat, escalate a conflict horizontally to other countries or regions via semi-deniable proxies.

Horizontal escalation would expand the aperture of commodity-related risks. For instance, energy infrastructure in Colombia, especially pipelines, could be one such target, given links between Caracas and the ELN, a US-designated foreign terrorist organization. The ELN operates extensively in the Venezuela–Colombia borderlands, where the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline has been regularly attacked since it opened in 1986, including as recently as July of this year. An attack by ELN on a Colombian pipeline—either implicitly or explicitly supported by Caracas—would offer Maduro an opportunity to increase the costs of a conflict in an asymmetric or deniable manner, as even short-lived outages in Colombia would compound Venezuela’s supply losses and harm US refinery economics.  

Maduro seems unlikely to approve an attack on Colombian infrastructure, for now, given his need for a diplomatic lifeline with Colombian President Gustavo Petro, a fellow leftist. But his calculus could shift after Colombia’s upcoming legislative and presidential elections in early 2026. If leftist candidate Iván Cepeda prevails, Maduro will likely still seek to preserve ties with Bogotá, but after the election he is less likely to worry that escalation might electorally empower his opponents. If a non-leftist candidate wins, conversely, Maduro may feel freer to escalate inside Colombia. Crucially, Colombia’s exports of heavy and medium sour crude oil, including medium-sour production in Caño Limón sent to the Coveñas terminal on the Caribbean for export, are highly suitable for producing middle distillates. About 40 percent of Colombian crude oil was shipped directly to the United States in 2024, and many Panama-bound shipments are transshipped to US Gulf Coast refineries. Accordingly, losses of Venezuelan and Colombian crude may significantly impact domestic fuel prices, especially for diesel. 

Trinidad and Tobago’s ammonia supply chains are also vulnerable to disruption in a military conflict, especially one that expands beyond Venezuela. While accounting for only 2.5 percent of all global ammonia production, Trinidad and Tobago is responsible for 15-20 percent of global ammonia seaborne trade, and the country is the second-largest exporter to the United States, after Canada. This supply chain centers on Point Lisas, which sits on Trinidad’s west coast in the Gulf of Paria, directly facing Venezuela, about fifty kilometers away, leaving it exposed to disruption and retaliation in a prolonged conflict with the Maduro regime. Point Lisas has limited redundancy, with potential single points of failure such as the Phoenix Park Valve Station, a key hub for processing and routing gas feedstock to ammonia plants.

If Maduro sympathizers disrupt Point Lisas with cyber or kinetic attacks—including asymmetrical methods such as drones—then the effects will be felt throughout the Americas and potentially beyond. While the United States and Europe are Trinidad and Tobago’s largest ammonia partners by volumes, Mexico’s, Chile’s, and Brazil’s fertilizer markets are disproportionately exposed. Accordingly, an outage at Point Lisas would reverberate throughout the region. Mexico, too, would be impacted: It imported 250,000 tons of anhydrous ammonia from Trinidad and Tobago in 2024, while domestic ammonia production stood at only 319,000 tons. Due to deep US-Mexico agricultural ties—22.8 percent of US agricultural imports in 2024 by value hailed from Mexico—a fertilizer disruption at Point Lisas would likely send US, regional, and global food prices higher. 

Carry a big stick, but think before swinging

The Maduro regime is one of the world’s worst, and it lost its legitimacy long ago. And while Maduro must step down, US policymakers should think carefully about the consequences that would accompany military force.

The United States’ strong domestic oil production and Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Venezuela’s limited role in global oil markets, and a projected state of market oversupply all lower the probability of an immediate crude-oil price spike in the event of hostilities. Yet a long road ahead for Venezuela’s oil production to rebound, as well as the possibility of spillover to other oil- or ammonia-producing countries, speaks to a wider and perhaps deeper set of inflationary risks that policymakers and market participants should take into account. 

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report. 

David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC (GGS), an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group.

The post How a Venezuela shock could raise global oil and food prices appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Crypto adoption is Venezuela’s response to US sanctions

In recent years, the United States has imposed sanctions on Venezuela in response to the Maduro government’s repression of opposition groups and “subversion of democracy.” Much of this US economic pressure has come since 2017, when the Trump administration issued a series of executive orders that it then expanded. In 2019, the United States enacted full blocking financial sanctions against PDVSA (the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.) and the Central Bank of Venezuela. 

Venezuela’s oil sector was particularly exposed, given its complete reliance on PDVSA—a company already weakened by aging infrastructure and chronic underinvestment. This overreliance on PDVSA left both the energy sector and Venezuela’s broader financial system acutely vulnerable to financial sanctions.

This year, the Trump administration has increased economic pressure further, imposing a 25 percent tariff on buyers of Venezuelan oil in March. However, the Maduro government has not yielded to US economic pressure by ceding power. Instead, it has adopted sanctions evasion methods developed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—a group for which my colleague Kimberly Donovan and I coined the term “Axis of Evasion” due to their shared tactics and cooperation in circumventing Western sanctions. 

Like Iran and Russia, Venezuela needed to receive oil payments from China outside the reach of Western financial oversight. Transacting with cryptocurrencies is one such evasion method, which North Korea, for example, has used in the past to launder the proceeds of cybercrime. Last year, Russia softened its restrictive stance on cryptocurrencies by allowing companies to use them in cross-border trade. Reports from this year indicate that Russia has been receiving oil payments from Chinese and Indian customers in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, with transaction volumes reaching tens of millions of dollars. 

The Venezuelan government has spent several years experimenting with cryptocurrencies, most notably with the launch of the state-backed petro (PTR), which was launched in 2018 and collapsed in 2024. As US sanctions on Venezuela intensified in 2019 and the years since, the Maduro regime grew increasingly interested in leveraging digital assets to facilitate oil transactions—leading to US Department of Justice indictments against individuals brokering these deals. Over the past year, Caracas has turned to USDT, a dollar-pegged stablecoin issued by the offshore company Tether, as an alternative vehicle for international payments.

Tether has previously faced scrutiny over its alleged involvement in illicit finance and money laundering. Notably, Tether has also worked with the US Department of Justice in an investigation that led to the dismantling of the online infrastructure supporting Garantex, a sanctioned cryptocurrency exchange implicated in facilitating Russia sanctions evasion and money laundering by transnational criminal organizations. By 2024, Tether had also frozen forty-one wallets that were using USDT to evade sanctions on Venezuela’s oil. 

By the end of first quarter of 2024, PDVSA began requiring new clients to use digital wallets and make payments in USDT for spot oil deals. Subsequently, Venezuelan authorities enabled a limited number of banks and exchange houses to offer USDT to private companies, in exchange for bolívars. In July alone, an estimated $119 million in cryptocurrencies were sold to the private sector. This shift marked the growing use of cryptocurrencies, predominantly USDT, as a substitute for physical US dollars in domestic financial flows. While crypto still represents only a small share of total oil trade by value, it plays an outsized strategic role by offering sanctioned regimes a parallel payment channel outside traditional banking.

Sanctioned oil trade schemes between China and Venezuela

Similar to other “Axis of Evasion” countries, Venezuela transports oil to China via shadow fleet tankers—sometimes called “ghost ships”—employing at-sea evasion tactics such as turning off trackers during ship-to-ship transfers and rebranding the Venezuelan crude oil as Malaysian. By 2020, official Chinese imports of Venezuelan oil dropped to zero, while Malaysian oil imports surged to a sixteen-year high. 

Like Iran and Russia, most of Venezuela’s oil is refined by small independent Chinese refineries known as teapots, primarily located in Shandong province. Although China officially halted imports of Venezuelan crude after sanctions in 2019, China remains the primary destination for Venezuelan crude exports. In September, approximately 84 percent of Venezuela’s exported oil went there, either directly or indirectly. Thus, it is widely reported that Venezuelan oil goes to China, and that Venezuela ends up with USDT. What remains unknown—and needs investigation—is the payment chain that connects these two facts.

New Chinese investments in Venezuela’s oil sector

Venezuela has historically had investments from Chinese companies in its oil sector. While China National Petroleum Corporation halted operations in Venezuela in 2019 due to the risk of US secondary sanctions, reports from August indicate that the smaller China Concord Resources Corp (CCRC) is investing one billion dollars in two Venezuelan oil fields. In May 2024, CCRC signed a twenty-year shared production agreement, aiming to produce sixty thousand barrels per day by the end of 2026. Under this deal, lighter crude will be supplied to PDVSA, while heavier crude will be exported to China. 

This development carries two major implications. First, it challenges the strategic framework through which the United States has traditionally approached sanctions on Venezuela. Washington has long operated under the assumption that escalating sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector would deter foreign companies from operating there due to the risk of secondary sanctions—and, until now, that assumption has largely held. A twenty-year production agreement with a smaller Chinese firm, however, suggests that Beijing may no longer be willing to adjust its trade and investment decisions in Venezuela according to US sanctions.

Second, if CCRC can indeed raise production to the stated levels and deliver half of the output to Venezuelan authorities, restricting the Maduro regime’s access to cryptocurrencies may become the only remaining lever to curb its oil revenues. That said, CCRC has no prior drilling experience, underscoring the need for caution and close monitoring of whether it can realistically meet its production targets.

What should the US do next

Recent reporting by Reuters and the New York Times indicates that sanctioned entities—including PDVSA—are now using crypto to receive oil payments. To ensure the Maduro regime is not using cryptocurrencies to undermine the Trump administration’s sanctions strategy, the US government, in coordination with partners and allies, should build out the intelligence picture regarding Venezuela’s use of stablecoins and other digital assets to evade sanctions. After identifying the key actors and wallets involved, the government can use targeted sanctions and law enforcement actions, consistent with past actions against Venezuelan oil-trade–related schemes. It should also share relevant information with private-sector partners, particularly stablecoin issuers and exchanges. The government should then request their cooperation on freezing wallets linked to sanctioned individuals, which issuers and exchanges have done before.

Understanding how to counter sanctions evasion through cryptocurrencies is critical—not only in the context of Venezuela, but for the overall integrity of US financial sanctions. Our Axis of Evasion research shows that sanctioned regimes often replicate one another’s tactics to bypass restrictions. With Russia’s oil giants Lukoil and Rosneft now under sanctions, Moscow is likely to adopt Venezuela’s approach of using stablecoins to facilitate oil payments from Chinese buyers. Developing a clear strategy for how US sanctions and law enforcement authorities address the use of dollar-pegged stablecoins and other cryptocurrencies is therefore essential. Doing so would not only disrupt Venezuela’s ongoing sanctions evasion efforts. It would also send a powerful signal to other heavily sanctioned countries that the United States will not tolerate the use of digital assets to undermine its sanctions regime. 

Maia Nikoladze is the associate director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Energy Sanctions Dashboard

This dashboard focuses on US sanctions and restrictive measures placed on crude oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela—including the unintended consequences and the lessons learned.

The post How Venezuela uses crypto to sell oil—and what the US should do about it appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 22, Jake Sotiriadis, nonresident senior fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, appeared on Fox News to discuss President Trump’s proposed Russia-Ukraine peace deal and the administration’s actions in Venezuela.

Fellow

Jake Sotiriadis

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

The post Sotiriadis on Fox News on Ukraine peace deal, Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 7, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig published an article in Foreign Policy titled “Trump Should Oust Maduro.” In the article, Kroenig lays out how President Trump could remove President Maduro from power without using military force.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President, Geostrategy and Fellows and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig in Foreign Policy on ousting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Maduro faces increased pressure, including the risk of impending US military strikes, he has turned to Venezuela’s autocratic allies for help. According to reporting by the Washington Post, Maduro has implored China, Iran, and Russia for missiles, radars, drones, and other military capabilities and assistance.

Of these three countries, Russia has long been the most important for Venezuela, and Maduro reportedly sent his request directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin in October. But with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine now in its third year and the country’s already weakened economy facing increased pressure from a new wave of US and European Union sanctions, there are significant limits to the aid that Moscow can provide Maduro—and an open question whether it will continue its assistance if the Venezuelan leader is threatened.

A long-standing partnership

Russia and Venezuela have long had close ties, with the partnership deepening significantly after then Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez reached out to Putin in 2000 for much-needed support. In the twenty-five years since then, Russia has been a vital source of military and economic aid for Venezuela. While Russian state-linked oil companies receive some oil in return for their investments, the real benefit of Moscow’s investment in Venezuela is geopolitical. In return for arms and money, Russia gains a significant foothold in South America, helping to fulfill Putin’s ambitions of making Russia a great power and challenging the United States in its own hemisphere. Russia’s support for Venezuela furthers the Kremlin’s ability to act as a spoiler for US interests, and it has the potential to pull US attention and resources away from opposing Russian aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe.

Russian oil companies have invested in Venezuela for decades, and this investment helped ensure that Venezuelan state-owned oil company PDVSA was able to sustain its output in recent years. Last month, Russia and Venezuela signed a Strategic Partnership Treaty, which calls for expanded collaboration in sectors such as energy, mining, transport, communications, and counterterrorism. Yet, the financial returns on these investments have not always been substantial. In 2019, Reuters reported that Russian companies had yet to break even on the billions of dollars’ worth of investments in the country’s oil sector over the preceding decade. Even so, Russian companies also have the exploration rights for oil and gas reserves, which are potentially worth billions of dollars. These untapped reserves continue to incentivize Moscow’s sustained presence in the country despite its early investments failing to provide a financial windfall.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine became the Kremlin’s main priority and a drain on Russia’s resources, Moscow has dialed back interest in, and likely its aid to, Venezuela. However, Russia continues to value projecting the image of a formidable ally, investing instead in cultivating ties through military diplomacy. Russia and Venezuela have carried out at least nine military exchanges since 2022, and this included Venezuela hosting part of Russia’s 2022 International Army Games. Though reduced from earlier years, Russia does still provide Venezuela military aid. In July, Venezuela opened a factory to produce Russian Kalashnikov munitions, and last week, a Russian transport aircraft linked to the Russian military landed in Caracas.

In the past, Russia has been willing to deploy military assets to Venezuela when the regime has faced threats. In December 2018, Putin sent two Tu-160 strategic bombers alongside other aircraft to Caracas as Maduro faced international pressure following the election in May of that year, the outcome of which was rejected by Venezuelan opposition candidates. Then in early 2019, as Maduro continued to face opposition, Russia deployed the S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Venezuela, a clear sign of support.

What will Russian support look like this time?

Russia has had success in propping up its autocratic allies in the past. Most notably, Russia’s direct military intervention in Syria in 2015 helped change the course of the civil war and propped up the regime of Bashar al-Assad for years. But the Kremlin’s support for Assad waned after it launched the war in Ukraine, which contributed to the Syrian regime’s collapse in December 2024. This delivered a blow to Russia’s credibility as a reliable ally for Putin’s autocratic friends and should serve as a warning to Maduro.

Maduro’s appeals to Moscow for help may result in some aid, but he should not expect Putin to be his savior. Russia continues to face real economic constraints that limit its ability to provide an economic lifeline to Venezuela. When Maduro traveled to Moscow in August to mark eighty years of the bilateral relationship, he came home without any new loans or funding. Trade between the two topped out at $1.2 billion in 2024, less than a third of Russia’s trade with other Latin American nations such as Brazil and Mexico. With Russia’s wartime economy facing stagnation and potential decline, Moscow is likely hesitant to spend already limited funds on propping up Maduro.

Significant Russian military support is also unlikely to be forthcoming, even if the United States launches some sort of targeted strike within Venezuela. Today, Russia’s war against Ukraine has made it more reliant on China, Iran, and North Korea. As Russia scholar Angela Stent wrote in an Atlantic Council report released last month, these countries are “essential for Russia’s continued prosecution of the war.” Notably missing from this list of key allies is Venezuela. And even being part of this group, sometimes referred to as an “axis,” does not ensure Russian aid. Though Iran is a critical supplier of Shahed drones, the strategic partnership treaty between Moscow and Tehran signed in January stipulates that Russia will not come to Iran’s defense if it is attacked by Israel or the United States.

Indeed, following the US strikes on Iran earlier this year, Russia responded with words of condemnation, but no tangible actions of support. Instead, Moscow welcomed the distraction from its war in Ukraine that the attacks provided. Should the United States strike Venezuela, Moscow would likely repeat this playbook and avoid coming to Venezuela’s aid in any meaningful way.

Expect Russian bluster over real benefits  

Despite the limits he faces in providing economic or significant military aid to Maduro, Putin certainly still wants to be seen as a reliable and valuable partner to autocracies around the world. One option that Putin may employ is nuclear saber-rattling. Earlier this year, Russian lawmakers proposed deploying nuclear missiles to Venezuela and Cuba. While nothing has come of this threat, such statements allow Moscow to convey support for its ally in Caracas without undertaking action.

Don’t be surprised if, to up the ante now, Putin openly muses about such deployments in the coming weeks. But Russia’s economic constraints and its focus on Ukraine mean that there is simply not much that Moscow can really provide to Venezuela. Bold rhetoric from the Kremlin will continue, but not much else is likely to follow.

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The post Facing the threat of US strikes, Maduro has requested Russia’s help. He shouldn’t expect much. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Trump’s initial social media post mentioned the designation of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua (TDA) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It also included the assertion that the TDA is under the control of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, allegations of the TDA’s responsibility for illegal acts, and the claim that the ship was headed toward the United States. (Yet US Secretary of State Marco Rubio later indicated that its destination was likely Trinidad or another Caribbean country, and it was reported on September 10 that the ship altered its course—seemingly turning around—before the strike.) Trump’s post also claimed that the individuals were “terrorists killed in action.” Rubio later said Trump intended to send a message to cartels by destroying the ship rather than interdicting it.

On September 4, Trump sent a letter to Charles Grassley, the president pro tempore of the Senate, informing the Senate of the “military action.” He made the report “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” and he said that the strike was made under his Article II constitutional authority. The letter indicated that “[e]xtraordinarily violent drug trafficking cartels” have “complex structures with […] financial means and paramilitary capabilities,” and that “some states in the region” are unable or unwilling to address the “continuing threat . . . emanating from their territories.” He therefore claimed that this was a use of military force in self-defense.

This strike comes after Trump signed a directive in July authorizing lethal force against certain Latin American drug cartels that his administration has designated as terrorist organizations, though the directive has not been made public. It is hardly the first time the US military has launched strikes on alleged members of a non-state armed group designated as a foreign terrorist organization. However, every attack by the US military outside US territory must be assessed individually under international law according to the legal frameworks that apply, the status of the targets, the means (e.g., weapons and military equipment) used to carry out the attack, the manner in which they are employed, and the context of and justifications for the attack, among other considerations.  

Because there are several outstanding questions on the specifics of the attack—including whether there is proof that the boat was carrying drugs—a legal analysis is complicated and implicates a number of legal frameworks. Here are five areas of law that are relevant to consider in this case, and the accompanying questions that arise.

1. Maritime law: Although the United States is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), US policy is to act “in a manner consistent with its provisions relating to traditional uses of oceans.” Assuming the strike did occur in international waters, as Trump claimed, Article 88 of UNCLOS reserves the high seas for peaceful purposes. While maritime law does authorize certain enforcement operations, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has held that force is meant to be a last resort. Rubio said Trump had the option to interdict the ship and instead chose to destroy it. Rubio’s comments, and the September 10 report that the ship changed its course and was hit multiple times before it sank, suggest that US military personnel could have safely interdicted the ship. If so, force was not necessary. In that vein, Mark Nevitt, a retired commander with the Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, has observed that the Coast Guard is the United States’ primary maritime law enforcement agency, and that it has the authority “to search, seize property, and arrest persons suspected of violating US law upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction.” For use of force, the Coast Guard follows “strict rules” relying on warning and disabling shots. Those rules do not appear to have been followed in this case.

2. Use of force (jus ad bellum): Article 2(4) of the UN Charter requires that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The main exception to this prohibition falls under Article 51, which allows the exercise of the right of self-defense. Some states view Article 51 as allowing use of force against a non-state armed group on the territory of a second state if that second state is “unwilling or unable” to address the armed group. Trump’s September 4 letter invoked both self-defense and the “unwilling or unable” test. However, the targeted ship does not appear to have been flying under a state’s flag, nor did the attack occur in territorial waters of any state. Because this action apparently fell outside any state or territory and was against a non-state actor, it would seem to fall outside this particular legal framework. Nevertheless, while no country has claimed the individuals killed, the strike could (though not necessarily) be considered an armed attack on the country of which the individuals are nationals. In that case, the strike does not seem to have met the imminence, necessity, and proportionality requirements under Article 51. Notably, any use of force under Article 51 requires a report to the UN Security Council, which the United States does not appear to have issued so far. 

3. International Humanitarian Law (IHL): IHL would only apply if the United States is in an armed conflict. Trump’s September 4 letter invoked the War Powers Resolution and used language seemingly indicating that the administration believes the United States is involved in an armed conflict against “[e]xtraordinarily violent drug cartels.” However, the existence of an armed conflict—triggering the relevance of IHL—is assessed under international law, based on the factual circumstances, according to specific criteria. 

Under IHL, there are two types of armed conflicts. A non-international armed conflict involves one or more non-state armed groups and may additionally involve state forces. An international armed conflict involves at least two states. For the United States to be considered engaged in a non-international armed conflict with a non-state armed group, the armed group would have to be sufficiently organized and the violence sufficiently intense. In this case, it appears unlikely that the conditions have been met. If Venezuela had effective control over the TDA’s actions, then the United States and Venezuela could be in an international armed conflict. When invoking the Alien Enemies Act, Trump asserted that the TDA operated “at the direction, clandestine or otherwise, of the Maduro regime,” but a memo declassified in May indicated that US intelligence agencies do not believe the Venezuelan government is controlling the TDA. So it also appears highly unlikely that the conditions for an international armed conflict are present. 

But given the administration’s rhetoric and the fact that subsequent US military operations could result in an armed conflict—if, for example, the United States uses force against the TDA in Venezuela without Venezuela’s consent, and/or if both the TDA evolves to meet the organizational requirement and the violence with the United States intensifies—it is still worth briefly assessing the September 2 strike under IHL to determine whether similar future strikes might be legal. 

If there were an armed conflict between the United States and a non-state armed group and IHL applied, and if the US targeted a boat of individuals for the same reported reason—that is, the individuals were alleged to be involved in drug trafficking—it still would most likely be unlawful. Such individuals would likely not be lawful targets under international law, barring evidence that they were combatants or directly participating in hostilities. Likewise, if the boat does not have a military function, a strike would not be a militarily necessity nor would it be proportional to any military advantage anticipated. Indeed, even if the individuals were part of the non-state armed group party to the armed conflict, if they were not taking direct part in hostilities against the United States, a strike in this situation could be considered a war crime of murder under the US War Crimes Act and international law. 

4. International Human Rights Law (IHRL): The United States is a signatory to human rights treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 6 of the covenant establishes that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their life, and Article 4 specifies that states cannot make derogations (that is, formal exemptions) related to this right, even in times of public emergency. As noted by former US State Department Attorney-Adviser Brian Finucane, the US Department of Defense Operational Law Handbook views the prohibition of murder under IHRL as a peremptory rule under customary international law, meaning a rule “so fundamental and universally accepted that [it does] not permit any derogation, even by treaty.” Assessed according to these criteria, this strike appears to have been an extrajudicial killing in violation of IHRL and Department of Defense provisions.

5. Domestic law: Finucane also notes that Executive Order 12333 prohibits assassinations by anyone employed by the US government or working on its behalf. Finucane cites executive branch legal doctrine as defining assassination as including “the targeted killing of individuals,” and notes potential exceptions for self-defense or for lethal force consistent with IHL. Rubio’s statement that Trump chose to destroy rather than interdict the ships, and the ship’s reported course reversal, imply that US military personnel could have safely interdicted the ship. Assuming that was the case, lethal force was not necessary for self-defense. The attack therefore appears to violate the US prohibition on assassinations, as well as other US laws.

Ultimately, the strike—and the language used by administration officials about the strike—paint a troubling picture regarding how the United States will approach the TDA and related groups. While it is of course important to hold transnational criminal organizations like the TDA accountable through judicial processes, lethal force is, according to guidance from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), meant to be “a measure of last resort.” Consider the case of former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, who presided over a policy of extrajudicial killings of drug suspects and now finds himself in International Criminal Court (ICC) custody subject to an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity. 

Given the current facts, the ICC is unable to exercise jurisdiction over this strike. For it to have jurisdiction over any attacks going forward, there would need to be a confirmed armed conflict and/or widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population—or evidence of other categories of crimes under the Rome Statute—among other requirements. For now, any legal accountability for the boat strike would most likely involve processes under domestic law—whether under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or in civilian courts. The domestic courts of the victims may also have jurisdiction.

As Nevitt noted, this “preemptive lethal strike against an alleged drug boat continues the White House’s effort to blur the lines between law enforcement and the U.S. military’s missions and authorities.” Going forward, certain situations—imminent threat of attack against the United States, UN Security Council authorization, or the consent of the state where US strikes would occur—could mean that US military force outside US territory would be lawful. In the context of an international armed conflict, military operations would be lawful so long as they complied with IHL. 

However, absent these situations, from a legal perspective, the actions of the TDA and other transnational criminal organizations should be a matter of law enforcement. As such, lethal force is reserved only for when, as per the ICRC, it is “strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The post Was Trump’s strike on an alleged Venezuelan drug boat legal? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US military can and should have been more involved in confronting narcotics trafficking in the hemisphere, but for a variety of reasons resisted doing so since the 1980s. To be sure, the US Coast Guard, a military force, has been deployed in this space for decades, and US collection assets have provided critical assistance to law enforcement for years. But the Department of Defense consistently opposed the use of its assets in interdicting drugs. Why is that? 

Drawing in part on my time as US ambassador to Colombia from 2014 to 2019, there are at least four reasons why the Defense Department shied away from the mission in the past.

First, the Defense Department has argued that it faces competing priorities. Traffickers use a variety of methods to move their product, but the safest and cheapest method for them is maritime, by go-fast boats or semisubmersibles. As such, interdiction requires US Navy assets, vessels, helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft. The Navy has consistently viewed its presence in East Asia to confront Chinese actions as a higher priority, and it retains its responsibilities in Europe and the Middle East. The counternarcotics mission didn’t rate.

Second, the US force is constructed for military operations, not law enforcement. It is true that attack aircraft, cruise missiles, and other sophisticated hardware are not particularly useful in going after the dispersed threat of maritime narcotics trafficking. However, as noted below, US Navy vessels have other capabilities that can help set up law enforcement endgames.

Third, US military leadership is reluctant to take on a new mission that is likely never to end. It is not wrong to be concerned about this. As successful as the United States was in Colombia, narcotics production and trafficking never ended, so the mission remained.  

Fourth, any force, military or police, that takes on organized crime must be aware of the possibility of corruption. Over the years, this threat has affected both US and Colombian law enforcement communities.  

But when US forces are intelligently deployed, excellent results can be achieved. In 2016, in response to my request, the US Navy briefly deployed the USS Lassen, a guided missile destroyer, to the eastern Pacific drug transit zone. The Lassen has unique capabilities—it’s fast, has state-of-the-art sensors and communications capabilities, and is equipped with two Seahawk helicopters. In just two weeks, it interdicted forty tons of cocaine, representing 10 percent of total interdictions that year. 

One would think that this would have convinced the Department of Defense to repeat the exercise, but in my remaining three years in Colombia, it did not send another gray hull to the region to conduct counternarcotics activities. Even when, a few years later, Colombia designed and led a unique multinational maritime interdiction effort called Operation Orion, I was unable to convince the Pentagon to send any US Navy vessels to support this effort. (It’s important to note that the US Coast Guard, under the able leadership of Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, did step up in support of Operation Orion.)

The Defense Department missed an opportunity then, and it is capable of supporting interdiction today. Done in a manner consistent with the law, and in support of law enforcement activities, US military assets can play a useful role in protecting the homeland from narcotics trafficking.

Kevin Whitaker is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and he served as US ambassador to Colombia from 2014 to 2019.

The post Why the Pentagon had been reluctant to combat narco-trafficking in the Western Hemisphere appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. How is the US military’s role in the region changing?

The Trump administration’s actions to increase US military capability and presence in the Caribbean and Latin American region are decisive, send a very clear message, and, I believe, are long overdue. However, we shouldn’t be surprised by this. During the administration’s first term, it launched one of the largest US military operations in this region against drug cartels under the operational command and control of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which laid the groundwork for what we’re seeing in the second term. 

In April 2020, US SOUTHCOM received Navy destroyers, Coast Guard cutters, surveillance aircraft, and Army units for this counternarcotics mission that continued into 2021. In his January 2025 inauguration speech, US President Donald Trump announced his intention to designate drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists, which took place in February. Trump also called for the total elimination of cartels and TCOs, and he is following through with his mandate. The designation unlocks new tools for US law enforcement and the US military to target these groups and their financial networks. 

For decades the United States has been interdicting drug vessels in the Caribbean. As I have said many times, the United States can’t simply interdict its way out of this. Deadly drugs continue flooding into the United States and killing Americans. Venezuela is one of the largest humanitarian crises of our time, with over eight million Venezuelans having fled the country into Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries whose economies were greatly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and are having a really hard time supporting this continued increased migration flow.  

Maduro, who stole the 2024 Venezuelan election from Edmundo González, is a bad actor aligned with US adversaries Iran, Russia, and China (known as the “Axis of Aggressors”) and the drug cartels and TCOs. With his close relations with Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing, Maduro facilitates relationships with Cuba and Nicaragua, perpetuating illegal activities close to the southern coast of the United States and destabilizing the wider region. Last year at US SOUTHCOM, we determined that the drug cartels/TCOs amassed over $310 billion in revenue in 2023, which is more than five times the combined defense budgets of the thirty-one nations in LAC. Also, the administration increased the bounty on Maduro to fifty million dollars, and it has said this is a war on narco-terrorists. 

In order for US SOUTHCOM to be successful in this counternarcotics mission for Team USA, it needs persistent military capability and presence all the time—not just one or two times a year for a couple of weeks. The Western Hemisphere is the hemisphere we live in, and it has desperately needed our consistent and persistent attention for many years. While in uniform, I testified that the region needed an Economic Recovery Act similar to the Marshall Plan in 1948, due to the crime wave that ensued after the COVID-19 pandemic. The actions taking place today are getting after this deficit of US presence, and Team USA is on the field with their jerseys on, and strategically engaged in the region. 

—Laura J. Richardson is a retired four-star general in the US Army who commanded SOUTHCOM from 2021 to 2024. She is on the Atlantic Council’s board of directors and the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center‘s advisory council.

2. Could US strikes in Venezuela be next?

We should take Trump at his word when he hints that the United States is evaluating the possibility of striking targets inside Venezuelan territory. It’s a bad time to be operating a drug smuggling business off the coast of the eastern state of Sucre, to be posted in a guerrilla encampment in western Táchira, or to be running a cocaine lab along the Colombian border in Zulia state. One big challenge for US military planners, however, is that Venezuela has a functional air defense system, which it has kept running with the help of Russian advisors. Any strikes in Venezuelan territory may have to first take out air defenses, which could further complicate US relations with Moscow at an already tense moment.  

There is also the risk that any strikes on Venezuelan infrastructure or military assets could provoke an escalatory response from the Venezuelan armed forces. So far, the United States has carefully avoided striking any target that could destabilize the country or risk provoking an internal armed conflict. Last week, the USS Jason Dunham kept a cool head when two Venezuelan F-16s flew over the vessel twice in less than twenty-four hours, suggesting that—for now—the White House is interested in avoiding direct engagement with the Venezuelan military. That could change, but for now I think we’ll see continued saber rattling that appears aimed at signaling to disaffected elements of the Venezuelan armed forces that now is the time to rise up against strongman President Nicolás Maduro. The problem with this approach is that US-backed operations have failed to produce such cracks inside the Venezuelan government over the past twenty years.  

All of this points to the big question: Is the United States looking to advance regime change, or is it looking to advance democracy at the same time as it advances energy, migration control, and other geopolitical interests? The past few weeks have seen a military buildup and mounting pressure, but as recently as July, Washington eased restrictions on Venezuela’s oil exports after negotiating a prisoner release. Even now, in spite of the tensions, the United States and Venezuela are cooperating on the president’s migration agenda. The US government is funding twice-weekly Immigration and Customs Enforcement deportation flights that take off directly from US military installations and land in Venezuela’s largest airport. All of this suggests that the White House is moving forward an “America first” approach that is focused on advancing US core interests while also taking transnational drug trafficking seriously. Careful targeting, clear communication, and a focus on the importance of restoring democracy through targeted pressure and strategic engagement will be crucial in the weeks to come. 

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and former director of the Venezuela program at the Washington Office on Latin America.

3. How are US military operations affecting the wider Caribbean? 

In the wake of the US deployment of naval assets to the region, most Caribbean leaders have issued statements for the region to remain a “zone of peace.” However, the region currently is far from peaceful. The Caribbean is a transit point for small arms and drugs, both of which fuel gang activity, homicides, and crime in many of the islands. In fact, some Caribbean countries have among the highest homicide rates in the Americas. Further, Maduro’s persistent aggressive antics on the border with Guyana—via naval, land, and air incursions—have dissipated the mirage that the Caribbean region remains peaceful. Therefore, the United States should work closely with Guyana to ensure that the country does not become a victim to any aggression from Maduro as he gets backed into a corner by current and future US operations.  

Still, while a more aggressive approach toward counternarcotic operations might be warranted, ad-hoc operations will not provide long-term security in the Caribbean. What’s needed are sustained efforts backed by financial and technical assistance. Fortunately, the Trump administration and the US Congress have the tools at their disposal to do so through pending renewal of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Increasing the budget of CBSI is a must. Presently, the proposed $88 million allocated to the Caribbean across thirteen islands barely puts a dent in stemming the movement of illegal guns and drugs. Further, continued diplomatic outreach to Caribbean leaders is needed to ensure that counternarcotic operations are a cooperative mechanism, ensuring that most governments come onboard. In addition to helping stem the flow of drugs in the region, US-Caribbean cooperation will have the added benefit of potentially isolating Maduro further from his regional allies.   

—Wazim Mowla is the fellow and lead of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

4. How can the United States declare victory in this operation? 

Trump came to office promising to put an end to “forever wars” abroad, while also promising to take seriously the threat of transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, and to address it with US force if necessary. Thus far, that’s what this operation is seeking to achieve—and balance. The challenge for the White House is clear: What is a win in this counternarcotics operation and how could it be sustained? If the operation ratchets up to strikes inside Venezuela, then how is this done in a way to avoid further destabilization that could have cross-border impacts? With multiple armed groups operating in Venezuela and a military that has so far shown allegiance to Maduro, a US missile strike on drug labs, for example, could bring secondary ramifications. And would any strikes inside Venezuela be limited to only counternarcotics targets or could they include Venezuelan military installations?  

The last major US military operation in Latin America came during Operation Just Cause to oust Panama’s Manuel Noriega over thirty-five years ago, but that was an operation where the US relied on precision bombs rather than long-range missile strikes. Success in this operation would likely involve long-term, significant ratcheting up of US military presence to halt drug smuggling operations at sea. 

Maduro is clearly thinking of a plan B, one that involves sparking an internal armed conflict if this US operation goes beyond counternarcotics and attempts to remove him from power—through direct US actions, an internal uprising, or a combination of both. Venezuela’s militia may not number four million, as Maduro has claimed, but there are certainly enough fighters to fuel a years-long civil war that could accelerate outward migration and fuel instability in South America. In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas numbered just twenty thousand at their peak in the 1990s, and they unleashed havoc on the country. With that number they were able to threaten not just the Colombian countryside but the power centers in Bogotá and other major cities. That should be a cautionary tale for anyone who thinks that regime change in Venezuela will be quick or easy if it leaves out segments of the Venezuelan population. 

So, what’s next? In the coming days, Maduro may reach out via his ongoing communication with the White House, potentially making offers around oil and critical minerals, or otherwise seeking to leverage Venezuela’s natural resources to strike a deal. If this happens, then the administration should proceed with caution and press for democratic reforms, the release of political prisoners, and an end to the persecution of opposition activists. Maduro is a serial abuser of dialogue, so any offers should be clearly weighed against past noncompliance. Of course, the focus of any kind of future talks should be on how to advance a peaceful, democratic solution—one based on credible commitments rather than false promises. 

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post What to know about Trump’s war on drug trafficking from Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. Why is the Trump administration deploying warships to the southern Caribbean?

The United States is deploying a group of Navy warships and other vessels to the Caribbean due to Trump’s laser focus in going after transnational organized crime. It’s an action that has precedent, with Trump having deployed naval assets to the Caribbean in 2020, as well. This move coincides with the recent doubling of the reward (to fifty million dollars) for information leading to the arrest of Maduro for being “one of the largest narco-traffickers in the world.” 

Additionally, the US Department of Justice has indicted the Venezuelan strongman for being the head of a drug trafficking network in the Venezuelan military, known as the “Cártel de los Soles.” Here, notably, when the Trump administration labeled the group a “terrorist organization” last month, it did not give it the same Foreign Terrorist Organization label as other drug cartels. Instead, it created a new class of individual sanctions that the Treasury Department could use to go after individuals associated with the network. Importantly, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt reaffirmed on Thursday the degree to which the Venezuelan leader is a menace, noting, “Maduro is not a legitimate president. He is a fugitive head of this drug cartel.”

These actions are drawing renewed attention to the actions of the Maduro regime. At a time of competing global crises, his authoritarian regime has managed to deflect sustained international pressure for democratic change, maintaining an iron grip on power. 

Just over a year ago, Maduro blatantly disregarded the results of Venezuela’s latest presidential election—an election in which opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez won more than twice as many votes according to vote tallies obtained by the democratic opposition—and earlier this year, he claimed an illegitimate mandate to remain in office. 

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

2. Why should the world care about what’s happening in Venezuela?

Once a thriving democracy, Venezuela is mired in a yearslong crisis with regional and global implications. Political repression is prevalent and nearly eight million Venezuelans have fled Maduro’s regime. In this environment, armed groups and organized criminal structures, including drug trafficking groups, have thrived and benefited from a close relationship with authorities.

Maduro is not just a danger to the Venezuelan people but also to the broader region and the world. Maduro has violated Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their government, and has remained in power through a deepening campaign of repression against pro-democracy actors. A testament to this are current and former Venezuelan political prisoners and freed US hostages—the world should know about the abuses they faced at the hands of the Venezuelan government. 

Each day under authoritarian rule is a day lost for the Venezuelan people. While there is no easy solution to decades of democratic erosion, recent developments—including an increased bounty placed on Maduro and the release of American hostages—offer a window of opportunity. Those who want to see Venezuelans free must remain committed to seizing this moment, and to standing with those fighting for freedom and democracy in Venezuela.

—Jason Marczak

3. What are the chances of this escalating into military conflict?

This deployment of naval assets is an important show of force, but it does not mean that the United States will engage in military strikes. This should be a warning to the regime to not detain Venezuelan politician María Corina Machado. Trump came to office promising to end wars, not start them. 

This would fit with recent actions by Trump that seem to support engagement, including sending Special Envoy Richard Grenell to meet with Maduro in Caracas in late January. It would also explain why the United States continues to seek cooperation with the Maduro regime on deportation flights. There were nine deportation flights to Venezuela last month, and the vast majority of those flights were charter flights, paid for by the US government and sent directly from US Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention facilities in Texas, Florida, and elsewhere to Caracas. These flights would not be possible if there were not regular communication between Washington and Caracas. 

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

4. How is Maduro leveraging these developments?

Maduro and other Venezuelan officials have blasted the US operation as a mere psychological operation meant to spark regime change, while also noting that military intervention is unlikely. Maduro also announced the mobilization of the Bolivarian Militia, claiming millions of civilians are ready to take up arms even though observers have pointed out that many militiamen are simply pensioners or poor Venezuelans who participate in the program to receive government support. Maduro also ordered 15,000 Venezuelan troops to the Colombian border and imposed a nationwide ban on drone flights. Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino said that naval vessels will patrol Venezuela’s territorial waters, including routes vital to the country’s oil exports.

Ultimately, Maduro appears to be using this moment to rally domestic support while also trying to gin up support throughout the region. This past week, the government sent a letter to United Nations member states asking them to denounce the US operation as an escalation. Colombia, for its part, has responded by saying that the country received personal assurances from US representatives that military intervention in Venezuela is off the table. 

—Geoff Ramsey

The post Why are US warships heading toward Venezuela? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the Trump administration recalibrates its policy toward Caracas, Colombia continues to grapple with instability caused in part by neighboring Venezuela. The number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees journeying to Colombia has plateaued, but the country’s resources are strained and its security situation is worsening as armed groups and criminal organizations continue to use Venezuela as a haven beyond the reach of the Colombian military. Meanwhile, the United States has cut foreign aid and centered its Venezuela policy around prisoner releases, deportations, and curbing migration. Despite differences in priorities and political approaches, opportunities exist for the United States and Colombia to engage in mutually beneficial actions that promote domestic and regional stability.

This issue brief, based on multiple consultations with US-Colombia Advisory Group members following a private expert briefing in December 2024, outlines the shifting dynamics in US and Colombian policy towards Venezuela. It makes recommendations for stronger US-Colombia coordination to promote stability in Venezuela and the broader region through diplomatic channels, security and intelligence cooperation, regional migration policy, and integration and regularization of migrants in Colombia.

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she provides strategic direction to the center’s work on Venezuela and Colombia. She has supported the work of the Venezuela Solutions Group and the US-Colombia Advisory Group and has coordinated events with high-level policymakers, business leaders, and civil society members from across the Americas. Together with Geoff Ramsey, she leads the center’s work on individual sanctions in Venezuela and created the Venezuela Individual Sanctions Tracker.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Ramsey is a leading expert on US policy toward Venezuela and has traveled regularly to the country for the last decade. Before joining the Atlantic Council, Ramsey directed the Venezuela program at the Washington Office on Latin America where he led the organization’s research on Venezuela and worked to promote lasting political agreements aimed at restoring human rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law.

The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Advisory Group is a nonpartisan, binational, and multi-sectoral group committed to advancing a whole-of-society approach to addressing the most vital policy issues facing the US-Colombia relationship—with a recognition of the broader implications for bilateral interests across the region more broadly.

At its founding in 2017, the Advisory Group was co-chaired by Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). Upon Blunt’s retirement, Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) assumed the honorary chairmanship alongside Cardin from 2023 until 2024.

Sep 29, 2021

US-Colombia Advisory Group

The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Advisory Group, is a nonpartisan, binational, and multi-sectoral group committed to advancing a whole-of-society approach to addressing the most vital policy issues facing the US-Colombia relationship—with a recognition of the broader implications for bilateral interests across the region more broadly.

Issue Brief Jul 10, 2025

Two US policy options for Venezuela: Shaping reform vs. ‘maximum pressure’ toward regime collapse

By Venezuela Solutions Group

The White House faces a choice: Should it use sanctions leverage to try to extract concessions from Nicolas Maduro on energy security, migration, and democratic reforms? Or should it bet on a return to “maximum pressure” in the hopes of precipitating a transition in Caracas?

Democratic Transitions Energy & Environment

New Atlanticist Mar 26, 2025

An ‘America first’ approach to Venezuela is taking shape

By Geoff Ramsey

US tariff threats against countries importing Venezuelan oil seem geared toward extracting concessions from strongman leader Nicolás Maduro.

Economy & Business Energy Markets & Governance

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

Learn more

The post How the US and Colombia can tackle crime, migration, and fallout from Venezuela’s crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

US policy toward Venezuela is at a crossroads, with a degree of uncertainty still hanging over the new administration’s approach. The White House faces a choice: Should the United States try to use sanctions leverage to obtain limited concessions from Maduro on energy security, migration, and democratic reforms? Or should it bet on a return to “maximum pressure” in the hope of deepening existing fissures among Venezuela’s ruling elites and hastening a more immediate transition?

This issue brief, informed by the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Venezuela Solutions Group, explores two options through which the Trump administration could adopt an “America First” policy towards Venezuela.

Option I: Shaping incentives for an economic and democratic opening

The Trump administration could leverage sanctions on individuals and the energy sector to attempt to push Maduro toward political and economic reforms that advance the administration’s stated interest in Venezuela accepting deportees from the United States. This would involve shaping incentives for Maduro and his inner circle to extract concessions that could move Venezuela toward a gradual opening.

Policy recommendations:

• Adapt the first Trump administration’s Democratic Transition Framework to lay the foundations for creative power-sharing arrangements.
• Advance migration policy cooperation and refrain from exacerbating outbound migration.
• Issue conditional sanctions licenses in exchange for economic and political benchmarks.
• Expand the footprint for US and Western-aligned energy firms in Venezuela while displacing Russia, China, and Iran.

Option II: Broad pressure to advance regime collapse

Alternatively, the Trump administration could revise its previous policy of maximum pressure, especially if Maduro does not cooperate with policies to reduce outbound migration and the influence of US geopolitical rivals. This involves using pressure mechanisms including sanctions, indictments, and law enforcement to attempt to provoke a fissure in Maduro’s inner circle. Divisions in Caracas could break the government’s hold on power and incentivize a democratic transition in which a new coalition in power is more willing to work with the United States on migration and security interests.

Policy recommendations:

• Remove all licenses allowing oil companies to operate in Venezuela.
• Pursue investigations and prosecutions against government officials tied to money laundering, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities.
• Tighten enforcement of secondary sanctions on Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran- based organizations.
• Ramp up individual sanctions.
• Bolster the Venezuelan democratic opposition and civil society.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s (AALAC) Venezuela Solutions Group focuses on advancing a peaceful, democratic solution to Venezuela’s crisis as well as furthering policy coordination between the United States and allies in Europe and across the Americas.

Jul 24, 2024

Venezuela Solutions Group

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Venezuela Solutions Group is a diverse group of experts and practitioners from Venezuela, the United States, Latin America, and Europe, brought together to advance the conversation on how to reach a peaceful, democratic, and negotiated solution to the crisis in the South American country. The group comprises former government officials, civil society leaders, private sector leaders, humanitarian voices, economists, and leading experts on Venezuela who work to promote debate and propose actionable and concrete policy recommendations in order to advance policy innovation in addressing the situation in Venezuela. 

New Atlanticist Mar 26, 2025

An ‘America first’ approach to Venezuela is taking shape

By Geoff Ramsey

US tariff threats against countries importing Venezuelan oil seem geared toward extracting concessions from strongman leader Nicolás Maduro.

Economy & Business Energy Markets & Governance

Trackers and Data Visualizations Mar 3, 2025

Venezuela sanctions tracker: Who is the international community sanctioning in Venezuela?

By Lucie Kneip, Geoff Ramsey, Ilona Barrero

International actors including the US, Canada, and the EU have imposed sanctions on individuals responsible for acts of corruption, human rights violations, and the breakdown of democratic rule in Venezuela. How aligned are these countries on sanctions, and where do gaps exist?

Americas Europe & Eurasia

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

Learn more

The post Two US policy options for Venezuela: Shaping reform vs. ‘maximum pressure’ toward regime collapse appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As with any recent tariff announcement by Trump, the devil is in the details. Venezuela currently exports oil and gas to a variety of countries, ranging from US rivals such as China and Russia to US allies such as India, Spain, France, and a number of small Caribbean nations. Is Trump interested in slapping an additional 25 percent tariff on Chinese goods sold in the United States, on top of the current 20 percent tariffs? Is he willing to impose tariffs on US allies? And are any of these countries willing to risk those tariffs in order to continue receiving Venezuelan crude oil and gas? All of this remains unclear.

What is clear is that, at the same time that Trump is seeking to box out foreign companies, he is preserving space for US companies to operate in Venezuela’s oil sector. Just hours after the president announced the tariff plan, the US Treasury Department announced that it had extended the “wind down” period it had previously given Chevron to pull out of Venezuela. Instead of the original deadline of April 3, the US oil major now has until May 27 to end its operations. But the fact that the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) extended this license, coupled with the reality that previous OFAC licenses that have been framed as “wind down” notices (like the limited General License 8) have been renewed consistently since 2019, suggests this wind down could evolve into a more permanent arrangement. This license has so far only permitted restricted activities, but other licenses allowing European and other companies to operate have so far remained in place. It is too early to be certain, but there is a chance that Chevron may be allowed to continue to operate in Venezuela, but on a tighter leash.

Such an approach would fit with Trump’s “America first” agenda. So far, US sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector have done nothing to dislodge Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro from the presidential palace in Caracas and may have actually pushed Venezuela further into the orbit of US global rivals. Until Chevron was given a green light to deepen its operations in Venezuela in 2022, oil sanctions created an opening for China and Iran to emerge as Venezuela’s primary trading partners. Iranian traders received Venezuelan oil in exchange for condensate, which Venezuela’s state-owned oil company then mixed with its extra-heavy crude in order to sell it on the global market at steep discounts, largely to Chinese firms. Russian firms, meanwhile, have maintained limited but important investments in the country’s oil sector even in the face of secondary sanctions. Essentially, US sanctions were subsidizing cheap oil for China and preserving undue influence to Russian investors—all to the detriment of US interests.

As for US allies and partners such as Spain, France, Italy, and India, there is likely no need for the administration to escalate matters by imposing tariffs. Instead, OFAC could simply end specific licenses and comfort letters, which provide specific guidance allowing certain companies to operate. Of course, doing so might compound the problem further by creating an opportunity for US rivals to step back in and exert their influence, especially if US energy firms are also instructed to pull out of Venezuela. If that happens, expect an increase in Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence over Caracas. China has made clear that Venezuela is an “all-weather strategic partner” of Beijing and is unfazed by the threat of tariffs. Instead of signaling its compliance with the new executive order, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has issued a statement rejecting US influence in Venezuela and asserting that the tariffs would only hurt US consumers. Venezuelan oil is expected to continue to flow to China’s market, even in spite of a current slowdown caused by the uncertain climate.

Trump and his cabinet are almost certainly aware of this risk. They understand that it is not in the US interest to simply sit back and watch Venezuela, the country with the largest oil reserves on the planet, drift further into the arms of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. This is likely why, in spite of the recent rhetoric, the White House sent Presidential Envoy for Special Missions Richard Grenell to Caracas in February to begin conversations with the Maduro government. Grenell’s work has so far secured the release of six American hostages and convinced Maduro to accept repatriation flights of Venezuelan deportees.

Ultimately, the White House seems to be advancing an approach that Trump knows well: making a deal. With conversations ongoing and the door left open to Chevron and other US companies to continue operating in Venezuela, even if foreign companies are forced out, the administration seems to be preserving space for an agreement. An attractive deal might include concessions on migration, such as an acceleration in repatriation flights to match the administration’s interest in increasing deportations. It could also see some concessions on oil, such as the passage of legal reforms allowing US companies to assume majority ownership of joint ventures with the state oil company. But it should also include concessions that could move Venezuela toward a gradual democratic opening. After all, offering sanctions relief to shape internal incentives in Maduro’s inner circle is precisely what drove the government to organize, and to ultimately lose, last July’s presidential election.

There is a slim, but counterintuitive, opportunity in the fact that Maduro has said he will promote reforms to Venezuela’s 1999 constitution. Of course, Maduro is unlikely to agree to anything that will threaten his control in the immediate term, and he probably sees constitutional reform as a way to further entrench his power. But if Washington is open to expanding a US footprint in Venezuela’s energy sector, that gives US policymakers significant leverage as the ruling party debates any reforms. The United States should use this leverage to advance its oil and migration interests. But Washington should also seek verifiable progress on benchmarks such as the release of political prisoners, an end to the persecution of opposition activists, competitive electoral conditions, and perhaps a roadmap toward power-sharing and restoring the country’s democratic institutions.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post An ‘America first’ approach to Venezuela is taking shape appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Tannebaum quoted in the New York Times on Trump’s secondary tariffs strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After Nicolás Maduro took power in Venezuela following the death of Hugo Chavez in 2013, he began to accelerate the consolidation of power and erosion of democratic institutions begun by his predecessor. In response to Venezuela’s authoritarian slide, the international community has imposed sanctions on individuals responsible for acts of corruption, human rights violations, and the breakdown of democratic rule.  

The United States, Canada, and the European Union (EU) have led the way on these sanctions, and between them have created an extensive list of individuals who have seen their assets frozen, been denied visas, and been shut out of the financial order in these countries. This tracker provides an interactive tool to search the list by sanctioning country or individual, with the aim of highlighting gaps in sanctions between countries and visualizing the progression and composition of country-specific sanctions regimes.  

Venezuela individual sanctions tracker

Explore the tracker below to see which individuals are sanctioned by which countries. Select the column titles to sort alphabetically or by country.

US sanctions timeline: Major milestones

This graph does not include sanctions issued by the United States on January 10, the date of Nicolás Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The Obama administration sanctioned seventeen individuals in the early years of Venezuela’s crisis, the first Trump administration sanctioned 135, and the Biden administration sanctioned 50.

A shift in US security policy, through sanctions

The second Trump administration has pivoted its focus to security, vowing to take down transnational criminal organizations, and it has employed sanctions, among other tools, in pursuit of this aim.

For example, on July 17, 2025, the United States sanctioned six members of the Venezuelan prison gang Tren de Aragua, including the head of the criminal organization, Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores (alias “Niño Guerrero”). This new wave of sanctions also includes other high-ranking members of Tren de Aragua, such as Yohan Jose Romero (alias “Johan Petrica”), who is responsible for the group’s illegal mining operations in Venezuela, and Wilmer Jose Perez Castillo (alias “Wilmer Guayabal”), who is accused of collecting bribes in Venezuela. Furthermore, Guerrero’s wife, Wendy Marbelys Rios Gomez, was also sanctioned, along with Felix Anner Castillo Rondon (alias “Pure Arnel”), who leads the Chilean Tren de Aragua cell known as Los Gallegos. 

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described Tren de Aragua as a “destabilizing influence” in the region, and earlier in the year, the US officially designated Tren de Aragua as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.  

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Ilona Barrero is a project assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

Created in partnership with the Atlantic Council's Economic Statecraft Initiative.

Jul 24, 2024

Venezuela Solutions Group

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Venezuela Solutions Group is a diverse group of experts and practitioners from Venezuela, the United States, Latin America, and Europe, brought together to advance the conversation on how to reach a peaceful, democratic, and negotiated solution to the crisis in the South American country. The group comprises former government officials, civil society leaders, private sector leaders, humanitarian voices, economists, and leading experts on Venezuela who work to promote debate and propose actionable and concrete policy recommendations in order to advance policy innovation in addressing the situation in Venezuela. 

Issue Brief Jan 8, 2025

Recalibrating the use of individual sanctions in Venezuela 

By Geoff Ramsey, Lucie Kneip

As Maduro consolidates power in Venezuela, who has the United States sanctioned—and are those sanctions working?

Democratic Transitions Elections

Online Event Mon, November 18, 2024 • 7:30 pm ET

Enhancing international coordination on Venezuelan migrant integration

How can the US and regional allies develop a comprehensive response plan for the expected increase in Venezuelan migration as Nicolas Maduro looks to extend his illegitimate rule?

Central America Colombia Conflict Crisis Management

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

Learn more

Housed within the GeoEconomics Center, the Economic Statecraft Initiative (ESI) publishes leading-edge research and analysis on sanctions and the use of economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives and protect national security interests.

Learn More

The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

Explore more

The post Venezuela sanctions tracker: Who is the international community sanctioning in Venezuela? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The “maximum pressure” strategy employed from 2018 to 2022 against the illegitimate Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela did not serve US interests. Stringent oil sanctions imposed on Venezuela forced the retreat of Western oil firms from the country, principally benefitting adversaries. During the maximum pressure campaign, Venezuela’s oil production was rerouted to China at discounted prices, Iran supplied the diluent Venezuela required for oil production, and Russian investors became more critical amid a dearth on Western investment.  

A democratic transition remained elusive while repression and human rights violations continued. Venezuelans suffered, US adversaries expanded their influence, and Maduro remained. 

The current system of issuing specific licenses for Western oil producers to operate in Venezuela has yielded superior results. The benefits of this policy have been the following:    

1. Venezuelan oil exports have been diverted to friendly nations.
2. Treasury has increased visibility on all oil-related transactions, decreasing the clandestine shipment of oil through shadow tanker fleets operated by the Chinese defense establishment, Iran, or PDVSA.
3. Compensation to the regime is limited to taxes and royalties, which are required by Venezuelan law.
4. The system has enabled the return or reemployment of qualified engineers and technicians to restore production from degraded oilfield infrastructure.

The incoming US administration should prioritize inflicting more harm on the regime and its enablers than the Venezuelan people—or US interests.

To do so, sanctions must be linked to clear objectives. An uncalibrated reapplication of maximum pressure would cede influence to China, Russia, and Iran, while doing little to loosen the regime’s grip on power. Instead, the existing system of specific licenses should be maintained and expanded. To punish Maduro, the administration should continue to target individuals who enable his illegitimate rule, adding to the 180 individuals already sanctioned by the Treasury. A targeted sanctions policy—not maximum pressure—is the only way to ensure that US actions to confront the Maduro regime impose their desired effect, and do not play into the hands of Beijing, Moscow, or Tehran. 

Former staff

William Tobin

Former Assistant Director

Global Energy Center

Africa China

EnergySource Dec 3, 2024

There’s a more effective way forward than “maximum pressure” for Venezuela

By David Voght and Patricia Ventura

Following the fraudulent outcome of Venezuela’s July election, there is growing pressure on the United States to reintroduce sanctions to expel Western firms from the nation’s oil sector. However, preserving the existing policy, which restricts the regime’s financial access while promoting energy security and countering foreign influence, might prove more effective.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

EnergySource Oct 2, 2024

China’s cleantech growth strategy sets its sights on Brazil

By Joseph Webster, William Tobin

China is relying on cleantech exports to help drive economic growth, but with the United States and other developed nations becoming increasingly hesitant to purchase Chinese imports, China’s cleantech sectors need to search for alternative markets. Brazil has emerged as a potential top buyer, but it must walk a fine line to avoid becoming overly dependent on China.

Brazil China

EnergySource Sep 12, 2024

After Venezuela’s stolen election, here’s how the US should craft an effective sanctions policy

By David L. Goldwyn

As Venezuela’s political crisis worsens, the United States has a role to play in advancing the country’s democratic cause and also inflicting pain on the Maduro regime, while minimizing negative impacts on Venezuelans, the broader region, and US interests. This will require crafting a smart sanctions policy based on lessons learned and five key elements.

Energy & Environment Geopolitics & Energy Security

Keep up with the latest from the Global Energy Center!

Sign up below for program highlights, event invites, and analysis on the most pressing energy issues.

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

learn more

The post ‘Maximum pressure’ sanctions on Venezuela help US adversaries, hurt Venezuelans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

He’s tightening his grip. Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro was inaugurated for a third term as president on Friday despite international observers, including the United States, determining that his victory in last year’s election was fraudulent. Maduro’s swearing-in was accompanied by a new round of US sanctions against Venezuelan officials and comes one day after the government briefly detained opposition politician María Corina Machado. Below, our experts explain what Maduro’s inauguration means for the region, the Venezuelan opposition, and the future of US sanctions policy. 

• Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab
• Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
• Geoff Ramsey (@GRamsey_LatAm): Senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

What Biden did, and Trump can do

• “The Biden administration has slightly increased pressure” on Maduro’s regime, Iria tells us. While the United States has sanctioned two thousand individuals and raised the bounties on Maduro and his interior minister, Diosdado Cabello, US oil giant Chevron maintains its license to operate in Venezuela. “The new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro and Cabello from power,” she argues.
• After it takes office in ten days, the Trump administration should work with regional governments, says Jason, to “accelerate diplomatic coordination to give new momentum to the opposition and to make life harder for Maduro and his accomplices.”
• Despite the regime’s escalating crackdown on the opposition, “it is easy to overstate how strong Maduro really is,” Geoff argues. He points to Maduro’s post-election cabinet reshuffle to empower hardliners, coupled with the elevation of Cabello, a longtime rival, as “a sign of just how few friends Maduro has left.”
• Geoff advises the incoming Trump administration to take note of internal divisions in the Maduro regime that can be further undermined by economic pressure. “Sanctions alone are unlikely to unseat Maduro,” he says, “unless they are accompanied by a clear roadmap to lift them, giving fence-sitting regime figures a blueprint to follow.”

Regional rejection

• Maduro has brought Latin American leaders “from across the political spectrum together to reject his new power grab,” Jason tells us. Chilean President Gabriel Boric, Argentinian President Javier Milei, and Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino, he notes, have all rejected Maduro’s claim to victory in last year’s presidential election.
• The highest-ranking foreign official at Maduro’s inauguration, Jason points out, may have been the speaker of Russia’s Duma.
• “The continued large-scale regional rejection of Maduro is no small feat,” Jason says, given Latin America’s historical divisions. “But the critical question,” he adds, “is how to avoid complacency and leverage this unity to further support the democratic opposition.”

A mobilized opposition

• Amid Maduro’s third inauguration, “Venezuelans are again taking to the streets in large numbers, demanding a transition to democracy and the inauguration of González,” says Iria. The Biden administration should use this opportunity to take more “meaningful action” against Maduro, she argues, as “the opposition is now strategically united, the people are mobilized, and the ruling coalition is showing cracks.”
• Regional governments working to pressure Maduro, Jason says, should also strive to “avoid burdening the Venezuelan people with more hardships.” Pressuring Maduro’s government while sparing the Venezuelan people from the worst effects of sanctions is “a delicate tightrope to walk” Jason adds, but is “necessary to give further hope to the overwhelming number of Venezuelans who cast a vote for democracy and freedom in July.”

The post What the world can do about Maduro appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: Latin American leaders across the political spectrum are rejecting Maduro’s power grab

Geoff Ramsey: Trump should take note of the Maduro regime’s internal tensions

Iria Puyosa: The new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro from power

Lucie Kneip: The Venezuelan opposition will need to unite around a theory of change

William Tobin: Going forward, the US should better balance oil sanctions with sanctions against individuals

Latin American leaders across the political spectrum are rejecting Maduro’s power grab

The voting tally sheets overwhelmingly showed that González won Venezuela’s presidential election on July 28, 2024. It’s even a point on which Trump and US President Joe Biden agree. Both have referred to González as president-elect, with Trump doing so over social media yesterday following the reported detention—and release—of opposition leader Machado.

So, in what type of country does a president lose an election—and there’s evidence to back it up—but then goes ahead and assumes another term anyways? “It’s a dictatorship,” says Chile’s president, Gabriel Boric, in reference to Maduro’s government. Boric is one of many Latin American leaders who have categorically rejected Maduro’s claim that he won the July presidential election. On that point, there is agreement among Boric on the left to Argentinian President Javier Milei and Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino on the right—both countries which González has visited. González also visited the United States in the past week, where I had a chance to speak with him. 

In a fragmented and polarized region, what Maduro has achieved is to bring leaders from across the political spectrum together to reject his new power grab. Brazil, Colombia and Mexico—although not recognizing Maduro’s win—unfortunately had representatives present at today’s inauguration. But at least the presence was limited to the current ambassadors serving in the country. Perhaps the highest-level foreign official at the inauguration was the speaker of Russia’s Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin. 

The continued large-scale regional rejection of Maduro is no small feat. The region is historically divided. But the critical question is how to avoid complacency and leverage this unity to further support the democratic opposition. Regional governments, including the incoming Trump team, should accelerate diplomatic coordination to give new momentum to the opposition and to make life harder for Maduro and his accomplices. At the same time, these governments should work to avoid burdening the Venezuelan people with more hardships. It’s a delicate tightrope to walk, but it’s necessary to give further hope to the overwhelming number of Venezuelans who cast a vote for democracy and freedom in July.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Trump should take note of the Maduro regime’s internal tensions

By assuming yet another illegitimate mandate based on a fraudulent election, Maduro has confirmed that he is willing to cling to power at all costs. Opposition leader Machado and election winner González are deeply popular in Venezuela, but Maduro has the guns and thugs on his side—and he’s not afraid to use them. Yet in spite of the mounting number of political prisoners and the recent reported detention and release of Machado, it is easy to overstate how strong Maduro really is. 

In the wake of July’s stolen election, Maduro has had to reconfigure his cabinet completely, placing more and more power in the hands of hardliners in the Chavista coalition. A key benefactor of Maduro’s drive to assume a new mandate is Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, a longtime rival who Maduro has kept at arm’s length since taking power in 2013. Entrusting him as top enforcer may well be a sign of just how few friends Maduro has left inside Chavismo. Others in the coalition, meanwhile, may well have doubts about the idea of six more years of economic chaos, violence, and international isolation. 

When Trump takes office on January 20, his team should take careful note of these internal dynamics. The goal should be to combine pressure with incentives that can disrupt regime cohesion, presenting key figures in the ruling coalition with dilemmas in a way that makes a democratic transition more appealing than clinging to power. For this strategy to work, the next US administration will have to keep sanctions policy nimble and responsive to events on the ground, and avoid a “set it and forget it” approach. Sanctions alone are unlikely to unseat Maduro, unless they are accompanied by a clear roadmap to lift them, giving fence-sitting regime figures a blueprint to follow. The first Trump administration’s Democratic Transition Framework, presented in 2020, laid out a vision for change involving power sharing and reconciliation, and it may be worth dusting off this time around as well.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro from power

In response to Maduro’s illegitimate swearing-in for another term as president of Venezuela—despite González’s electoral victory—the Biden administration has slightly increased pressure on his authoritarian regime. The new measures include raising the rewards for Maduro and Cabello to a maximum of twenty-five-million dollars and sanctions against two thousand individuals involved in repression, violation of human rights, and electoral fraud. However, the US oil company Chevron’s license to operate in Venezuela remains in place.

Indeed, the new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro and Cabello from power. The ruling coalition, which White House representatives are now labeling as “narcoterrorists,” can continue to collaborate with transnational criminal networks that include allies in Iran and Russia while simultaneously increasing repression against democratic political leaders and human rights defenders in Venezuela.

Venezuelans are again taking to the streets in large numbers, demanding a transition to democracy and the inauguration of González. The Biden administration has an opportunity to take more decisive action to support Venezuela’s democratic re-establishment. Helping to pave a clear path for Venezuela’s return to democracy could become a significant legacy for Biden in the Western Hemisphere. Delaying meaningful action could risk losing this crucial opportunity, especially since the opposition is now strategically united, the people are mobilized, and the ruling coalition is showing cracks.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The Venezuelan opposition will need to unite around a theory of change

Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration is the latest scheme in the authoritarian government’s campaign to eliminate resistance to its consolidation. To add insult to injury, regime affiliates briefly detained Machado during her first public emergence after months of hiding, rattling supporters domestically and abroad. While swaths of the Venezuelan opposition quickly condemned her detention, it remains to be seen how the opposition will respond to tests of its ability to unify in 2025, given differences in attitudes toward electoral participation, negotiations, and pressure tactics.  

Heading into the 2025 subnational elections, opposition coalition candidates will have to determine whether it’s worth throwing their hat in the ring given the electoral conditions. Some may decide that the government’s blatant fraud at the national level will be even more easily achieved at the local level, while others may seek to draw on the infrastructure of their strongholds to procure as much regional power as possible, in which case they will need to develop a clear strategy of mobilization. The regime will seek to exploit these conflicting strategies to undermine the opposition’s political will to rise to the occasion.

Maduro’s government has historically proven adept at taking advantage of internal divisions by providing opportunities for disgruntled splinter groups within parties to gain footing by positioning themselves more closely to regime affiliates. This strategy of party cooptation is likely to continue in many of the major parties unless the opposition can find a way to resolve internal differences and coordinate on defining a theory of change.

Beyond electoral participation, opponents of Maduro will continue to face repression through the targeting of political figures, journalists, and human rights activists, as well as crackdowns on protests and digital censorship. Maduro’s best strategy is to stoke fear and fatigue with protests and mobilization. International allies will be critical in supporting political participation and free speech as Maduro seeks to further stifle these tenets of democracy.

—Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Going forward, the US should better balance oil sanctions with sanctions against individuals

As Maduro illegitimately steps into office for his third term today, Venezuela’s oil sector is in sustained yet marginal recovery. In recent months, Venezuela surpassed the one-million-barrel-per-day milestone for the first time since mid-2019.

The oil sector in Venezuela has been experiencing a secular decline since the early 2000s, and production output from Venezuela’s degrading oilfield infrastructure began to drop dramatically during the first half of 2014. An oil price crash sent dominoes cascading for Venezuela’s state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, SA, which faced declining demand at the same time as it confronted a sizeable volume of maturing debt, the beginning of central bank monetization, and intensifying operational inefficiencies. 

The sanctions imposed on the oil sector under the “maximum pressure” campaign from 2018 to 2022, spanning the Trump and early Biden administrations, exacerbated but did not cause this decline. However, the strategy did divert most of Venezuela’s oil to China at discounted prices, and led Iranian service company NIORDC to play a key role in maintaining output. Phantom traders from China and Iran handled virtually all of Venezuela’s exports in 2021.

The recent uptick in Venezuelan oil output has come with the reentry of Western firms, most substantially since April 2024 under the US Treasury Department’s policy of “specific licensing.” Under this policy, individual firms can seek authorization from the Office of Foreign Assets Control to operate in Venezuela under transparent and restricted terms, which strictly limit remuneration to Maduro’s enablers. Under this policy, approximately half of Venezuela’s exports have been routed to the United States or to Europe since May 2024. This effectively represents a diversion from China and increases transparency.

There is doubt that a renewed maximum pressure strategy would achieve its aims. In any case, it is incumbent on the Treasury Department to ensure that Maduro cannot use the oil sector as a cash cow, and to continue to tighten its clasp around Maduro’s network of enablers through individual sanctions.  

—William Tobin is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he focuses on international energy and climate policy.

The post Experts react: What does Maduro’s third-term power grab mean for Venezuela’s future? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Evolution of freedom

Since 1995¹, Venezuela’s overall Freedom Index score has significantly declined, with a decrease of more than twenty-eight points. Initially, the country’s freedom score was just 1.4 points below the Latin America & the Caribbean regional average, but its scores on all three subindexes have declined and the gap between Venezuela and the regional average now exceed thirty points. The national statistical system has faced a significant setback, with data either disappearing or remaining outdated. Venezuela has outperformed the region on only one indicator—women’s economic freedom, with a significant increase of thirty-five points since 1971, and over eighteen points since 1995, making this evolution a consistent trend in the society.

Venezuela’s poor performance in the twenty-first century can be attributed to the political and ideological project known as “socialism of the twenty-first century,” which aimed to dismantle the institutional framework established during the democratic period, 1958–1998, and replace it with a system rooted in socialist ethics and production mode, with a geopolitical scope, and where individual freedom is no longer a value.

Its economic subindex improved by over eight points from 1995 to 2000, driven by trade freedom, but has since declined. The most significant driver of the decline has been the erosion of property rights, with 1,423 documented cases of expropriations, interventions, occupations, and confiscations . Additionally, the “land rescues” under the 2001 Land Law resulted in the seizure of five million hectares, equivalent to 5 percent of Venezuela’s territory, according to the National Land Institute. From 2014 to 2019, the Organic Law on Fair Prices, enforced by the National Superintendence for the Defense of Socioeconomic Rights, led to 149,811 actions, including inspections, closures, and fines. As a result, the economy stagnated, supply chains were dismantled, and the violation of property rights exacerbated uncertainty, heightened risk perception, discouraged investment, stifled job creation, and deepened poverty.

Since 2020, a series of pseudo-privatizations have occurred, under the Anti-Blockade Law, which allows the suspension of legal provisions, the use of exceptional contracting mechanisms, and the classifying of actions as secret or confidential. Alongside this, an indeterminate number of affected companies and assets have been returned without transparency, and have not adhered to the basic standards of reparation or property rights restitution.

The socialist model currently guiding Venezuela’s policies is marked by excessive populism and state intervention. Economic activity and entrepreneurship are severely hampered by widespread government interference, inconsistent regulatory enforcement, and a heavy bureaucratic burden. The lack of transparency in government decision making, the shrinking of market size, and entrenched cronyism have resulted in a market with little competition and virtually no freedom for investment.

The government’s lack of transparency and accountability and a setback in the official statistical system have been other key factors in undermining economic freedom, making it difficult to base decisions on reliable information and fueling misinformation. This issue is particularly evident in the erosion of information related to the national budget and its management, with clear political intent, allowing the executive between 2006 and 2012, the discretionary and opaque management of large public funds for social programs known as “Misiones,” which failed to produce positive social outcomes.

At the same time, political freedom in Venezuela has drastically declined, with a nearly fifty-five-point drop since 1995 in the political subindex. Initially, Venezuela outperformed the regional average by twelve points but now lags by more than forty points, with the gap widening after 1999. Electoral performance has steadily worsened, with sharp declines between 2012–13 and 2016–17. The presidential election on July 28, 2024, particularly exposed the subordination of the electoral and judiciary branches to the executive, disregarding the popular will and eroding the integrity of elections as a means of democratic alternation.

Legislative checks on the executive have collapsed by 85 points since 1995. Although there was an apparent improvement between 2014–2016, when the democratic opposition won a qualified majority in the National Assembly, this progress was undone by a Supreme Court decision loyal to the executive, followed by the establishment of a Constituent Assembly that stripped the National Assembly of its powers. The situation seemed to offer some hope in 2018–2019, with the emergence of an interim presidency and mounting international pressure and sanctions on the regime. However, the anticipated political change toward greater freedom never materialized.

The rule of law, as measured by the legal subindex, has eroded, with the score dropping dropped by over twenty-five points in Venezuela since 1995. Initially, scores were above the regional average, but this trend reversed in 1998, leading to the country’s current position below that average. Judicial independence and effectiveness have sharply deteriorated, with significant declines between 1997–2000 and 2003–05, after which they have remained consistently low.

The main drivers for the decline in the rule of law during this century are a) the consolidation of executive supremacy, enabled by the expansion of presidential powers in the 1999 Constitution and the frequent use of decrees and special powers through enabling laws; b) the increasing role of the military in controlling and implementing government policies; and c) the rise in corruption and lack of transparency, bypassing legal accountability standards. The decline has been further compounded by a 73 percent drop in judicial independence between 1995 and 2017. These elements have eroded democratic governance and undermined institutional integrity.

In 2019, the UN Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to investigate human rights violations in Venezuela since 2014. Its latest report issued in September 2024 focused on the post-electoral crisis following the presidential elections of July 28, 2024. The report highlighted a significant intensification of the state’s repressive apparatus, documenting serious human rights violations, including brutal crackdowns on protests, which resulted in twenty-five deaths, hundreds of injuries, and thousands of arrests, including 158 minors. The report detailed arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, including sexual and gender-based violence, all of which escalated during this period. Additionally, the report noted an increase in harassment and judicial persecution of journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and key civil society actors. This repression worsened following the approval of the Law on the Supervision, Regularization, Action, and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organizations (August 2024), which imposed severe restrictions on the operations of these organizations.

Evolution of prosperity

Since 1995, Venezuela’s Prosperity Index score has experienced significant fluctuations, while the regional average has generally improved. Between 2003 and 2012, Venezuela saw a period of growth, followed by a sharp decline, placing it among the lowest-ranked countries in terms of prosperity. This decline demonstrates how undermining the institutional framework that safeguards individual freedom, freedom of expression, and political and economic liberty can devastate a society’s prosperity and the quality of life of its citizens.

The perception of progress in income per capita during the positive period was largely driven by an oil price boom that was managed wastefully. Even before oil prices reversed, the country was left impoverished, with a destroyed middle class, crippling debt, and a lack of basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity, transportation, and telecommunications, as well as of public goods like security, healthcare, and education. Furthermore, Venezuela lost nearly a quarter of its population to migration. Today, its prosperity has fallen below early 2000 levels, reaching a state of low prosperity.

Between 2013 and 2021, Venezuela’s economy contracted by more than 75 percent (as measured by GDP). Despite apparent recovery rates in recent years, the economy remains far too small to meet the population’s needs, and without a robust institutional framework ensuring transparent and fair rules, sustainable growth and improved quality of life remain elusive. Since 2008, Venezuela has suffered from double-digit inflation year-over-year, reaching hyperinflation between 2016 and 2019, which would be overcome by a process of dollarization.

Given the lack of updated and verifiable official economic data², the World Bank in 2021 unclassified Venezuela, which previously classed as an upper-middle-income country. For the size of the economy at that time, Venezuela could have been classified as a low-income country.

Official socioeconomic data is scarce and irregular, so it is thanks to the National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI) conducted by well-reputed Venezuelan universities that we know that in 2021, 94.5 percent of the population lived in poverty, with extreme poverty affecting two-thirds of the households, due to the combined effects of a collapsed economy and the COVID-19 pandemic. Those figures improved by 2023 when extreme poverty dropped to 59.1 percent and multidimensional poverty to 58 percent, but in rural areas, both indicators remained over 70 percent, so the population is still struggling. This starkly contrasts with the year 2000, when seventy percent of the population belonged to the middle class, and fewer than 25 percent lived in poverty.

The education system has become increasingly substandard, with significant deterioration since 2013. However, the true extent of this decline is difficult to assess due to the manipulation, absence, or lack of updated official statistics, which can lead to misleading information being reported to multilateral organizations. The education crisis is marked by crumbling public school infrastructure, a shortage of underpaid teachers, inadequate educational coverage, high student dropout rates, and a significant reduction in both the reach and consistency of the school feeding program. This downward trend extends to university education, where enrollment dropped by 24 percent between 2008 and 2018, and by 60 percent in the country’s major universities from 2012 to 2024. According to the 2023 ENCOVI report, only 60 percent of students regularly attend school with some degree of normality, while 40 percent have irregular attendance.

The decline in educational quality is further highlighted by an Early Grades Reading Assessment test, where third grade students achieved, on average, only 57.3 percent correct answers. Additionally, seventy-five percent of students scored below 76 percent, with just 25 percent achieving between 76 percent and 100 percent correct answers, underscoring the significant gaps in learning outcomes. The situation deteriorated further during the COVID-19 pandemic, as schools were unprepared for virtual learning. The post-pandemic period brought additional challenges, with many schools being looted, resulting in the loss of supplies, furniture, and electrical wiring and damage to infrastructure. Compounding the crisis is the government’s response to teachers’ demands, which has involved threats, harassment, and surveillance. This hostile environment, coupled with poor working conditions and restricted freedom of speech, has driven many educators to quit their jobs or leave the country altogether, exacerbating the already fragile state of the education system.

In contrast to the improving health outcomes in much of Latin America, Venezuela’s health performance has stagnated and deteriorated. Once outperforming the regional average, the country fell behind in 2009 and is now more than three points below the regional mean. Various indicators reflect the decline in the overall health of the Venezuelan population during the twenty-first century. Life expectancy dropped from around seventy-three to seventy-two years, while the infant mortality rate increased from 17.9 per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 21.1 per 1,000 by 2017. Maternal mortality surged to 125 per 100,000 live births by 2015³. By 2020, nearly one-third of Venezuelans were food insecure, and the 2017 ENCOVI survey found that 64.3 percent of the population had lost weight due to food shortages. Additionally, once-controlled communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and diphtheria resurfaced, with malaria cases rising from 35,500 in 2009 to over 400,000 by 2017. By 2018, over 80 percent of hospitals reported shortages of basic medicines, and many healthcare facilities lacked electricity and clean water.

This situation stems from a combination of factors: lack of investment in public services worsening healthcare; infrastructure collapsing due to corruption, poor maintenance, and a lack of new investments; ineffective public policies; the exodus of healthcare workers and skilled professionals because of low salaries and poor working conditions; widespread shortages of food and medicine; rising poverty; and persistent inflation and hyperinflation. These issues result from the model imposed at the beginning of the century, which dismantled the institutional framework, curtailing liberty and economic opportunities.

Additionally, Venezuela has experienced significant environmental degradation, jeopardizing the prospects for future generations. The massive and uncontrolled exploitation of the Orinoco Mining Arc, which encroaches on Indigenous territories and Areas Under Special Administration Regime with government knowledge and authorization, has drawn serious concerns from social, environmental, and human rights organizations since 2016 regarding its harmful implications for Indigenous communities and biodiversity. This mining project has led to significant destruction in the Amazon region in Venezuela, with illegal mining operations deforesting 1,000 hectares of Canaima National Park and damaging 2,227 hectares in Yapacana National Park. Moreover, mercury pollution has affected the Ventuari, Caura, Caroní, Cuyuní, and Orinoco rivers.

Petróleos de Venezuela, the national oil company, has also neglected environmental and safety protocols, increasing accidents, including spills in sensitive ecosystems such as the Orinoco River and Lake Maracaibo. The Global Gas Flaring Tracker from the World Bank indicates that Venezuela’s flaring intensity quadrupled between 2012 and 2021, with the amount of gas flared in 2022 exceeding the amount of gas recovered for productive purposes. This practice contributes to higher emissions of harmful gases, placing Venezuela fifth globally in gas flaring.

Several indicators highlight the environmental harm in Venezuela. Global Forest Watch tracks increased deforestation, the Living Planet Index reveals a decline in biodiversity, the Water Quality Index assesses levels of water pollution, and the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), and the Global Carbon Atlas, reflects the environmental stress caused by fossil fuel extraction and energy mismanagement. The Air Quality Index (EPI-Yale) indicates issues related to inadequate industrial regulation and vehicular emissions, the Waste Management Index (EPI) shows a decline in waste management capacity, with improper disposal of solid and hazardous waste, and the Environmental Vulnerability Index highlights high vulnerability due to poor natural resource management. These indicators collectively demonstrate the country’s ecological deterioration across multiple dimensions. This troubling environmental situation stems from a lack of rule of law, corruption, and influence peddling, leading to the indiscriminate depletion of natural resources and the contamination of the environment to the detriment of future generations.

The path forward

Venezuela’s current situation is critical: Citing the nation’s institutional and social fragility, the International Monetary Fund placed it on its List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. The International Monetary Fund has alluded to a government that is either unable or unwilling to fulfill essential state functions such as providing security, justice, and basic services to the majority of its population, with weak institutions, nonexistent governance, and high poverty levels.

This crisis is the result of nearly twenty-five years of the socialism of the twenty-first century model, which has eroded the progress made in the previous century. From the outset, various levels and forms of resistance to this model have emerged, yet the regime has maintained its grip on power through various means, increasingly revealing its authoritarian nature over time. Despite these challenges, the population has demonstrated remarkable resilience, remaining active and committed to pursuing political change that could reverse the current situation by leveraging its available natural, human, and financial resources.

Thus, this moment can be seen as a crossroads, a tipping point, a moment of bifurcation, with the potential to shape the future. The political driver at play will serve as the catalyst for two vastly different scenarios.

1) Scenario 1: Oppression and poverty. This scenario envisions the end of Venezuela’s liberal democratic republic model, resulting in the entrenchment of tyranny and the subordination of all powers to the executive. Venezuela could become a significant node in the multidimensional networks of illegality.

If the popular will, as expressed in the 2024 presidential elections, is disregarded, the country may plunge deeper into a society marked by diminished freedom and prosperity. Venezuela is unlikely to reintegrate into global financial flows, facing obstacles in renegotiating its debt with multilateral organizations and receiving the necessary support to address its complex humanitarian crisis.

In this context, recurrent macroeconomic imbalances are expected, leading to increased economic volatility and a shortened investment horizon, which would elevate risk premiums. Maintaining policies to stabilize the exchange rate and control inflation would become increasingly difficult, with restrictions on credit and foreign currency inflows. That will widen the gap between official and parallel exchange rates, fostering the debasement of the national currency and deepening dollarization.

To manage these macroeconomic challenges, fiscal and parafiscal pressures on the private sector would intensify, making production less profitable and riskier, promoting informal economic activity, reducing domestic supply, and reigniting inflationary pressures.

The prevailing situation would hinder the ability to address social needs, exacerbating poverty and exclusion. As popular dissatisfaction rises, the government is likely to respond with increased repression, leading to a heightened militarization of public spaces and severe human rights violations. This dynamic would contribute to the further erosion or outright extinction of the rule of law, undermining freedoms of expression and association, as well as civil, political, and economic rights.

Such conditions would foster opacity in public fund management, heightening corruption and enabling arbitrary public policies and decision-making processes. An ongoing source of income may come from continued licenses for oil resource exploitation or from actors unconcerned about the reputational risks of engaging with a sanctioned state, which would likely result in lower prices for oil sales.

In this tyrannical scenario, characterized by a lack of freedom and a bleak future, a significant new wave of migration could emerge, predominantly involving very low-income groups. This influx would put pressure on neighboring and destination countries, potentially fueling anti-migration policies and discriminatory attitudes.
The consolidation of a tyrannical regime would facilitate the exploitation of Venezuela’s valuable natural resources to support illicit networks, transforming the country into a hub of regional, hemispheric, and global instability.

2) Scenario 2: Freedom and prosperity. This scenario envisions the reestablishment of Venezuela as a liberal democratic republic, anchored in Western values of freedom, individual dignity, and prosperity. Under this vision, Venezuela could reclaim its stabilizing role in the western hemisphere.

If the democratic alternative—which won the presidential elections on July 28, 2024 and transparently demonstrated its results to the world—gets into power, it will pave the way for a positive future. This could not only enhance freedoms and respect for political, civil, and human rights but also improve the quality of life and spur economic growth.

The recovery would be guided by a proposed plan called Venezuela: Land of Grace—Freedom, Democracy, and Prosperity, advanced by the team supporting the political leader Maria Corina Machado, and built on three foundational pillars: (a) free development of individuals: recognizing the intrinsic dignity and creative potential of free individuals; (b) a state at the service of the citizen: protecting life, liberty, and property, ensuring access to justice and public security through independent branches of government, with a focus on efficiency, transparency, and public-private partnerships in managing services as well as education, healthcare, and security; and (c) free market economy: unlocking the country’s potential by transforming its abundant resources into wealth through citizens’ efforts, fostering entrepreneurship, and stimulating economic growth.

With these pillars in place, a myriad of opportunities could arise to restore citizens’ quality of life in an ambiance of freedom and peace. A robust institutional framework and a stable macroeconomic environment could attract investments across various productive sectors, enhancing domestic supply, creating jobs, and improving living conditions for households. Full support from multilateral organizations, following the renegotiation of defaulted external debt, could guide the nation toward overcoming the humanitarian crisis and significantly reducing poverty levels.

Venezuela could emerge as an energy hub due to its vast reserves of hydrocarbons and renewable energy resources, bolstered by private investments, reclaiming its status as a major player in oil and gas production and refining, and resuming its role as reliable supplier within the western hemisphere. In this scenario, Venezuela could contribute to reducing global geopolitical tensions, combating illegality, and promoting freedom and peace.

Sary Levy-Carciente is a research scientist at the Adam Smith Center for Economic Freedom, Florida International University; former president of the National Academy of Economic Sciences (Venezuela); and dean of the faculty of Economic and Social Sciences (Central University of Venezuela). LevyCarciente is a Fullbright fellow at the Center for Polymer Studies, Boston University; and visiting researcher at the Department of Economics, UMASS. Levy-Carciente is the author of the International Property Rights Index (Property Rights Alliance) and the Index of Bureaucracy (Florida International University).

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

Read the Book

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post Venezuela’s 2024 stolen election compounds challenges to stability and democratic renewal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Venezuela continues to grapple with a deep political and economic crisis, the international community is at a critical juncture in shaping its response. The stolen presidential election of July 28 marked a watershed moment, signaling the country’s further descent into authoritarianism under Nicolás Maduro’s regime. In this context, policymakers in the United States and other countries are likely to continue to impose sanctions against political, military, and economic elites as a means of seeking to exert pressure without worsening the humanitarian situation. 

With over eight million Venezuelans displaced by the crisis, US and other international policymakers are cautious about the unintended consequences of tightening existing oil and financial sanctions. Although the outgoing Biden administration at one point said it was evaluating whether to rescind privately issued specific licenses that authorize energy companies to maintain a foothold in the country, it has not done so, partly out of an interest in preventing the worsening of economic conditions. Instead, the Biden administration prioritized sanctions against individuals responsible for Venezuela’s deteriorating human rights situation. On September 12, the Biden administration sanctioned sixteen government-linked individuals, including leaders of the National Electoral Council who oversaw the stolen election, and members of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice who validated the fraudulent results. Biden’s Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the goal of the individual sanctions is to “promote accountability” for those undermining democracy in Venezuela. Three months later, Canada’s foreign ministry announced it would add five of these same individuals to their sanctions list for fraudulently declaring Maduro the winner of the July election. The US added an additional 21 individuals to the sanctions list in November 2024. Following Maduro’s illegitimate inauguration in January 2025, the US, Canada, and the EU all announced additional sanctions on regime officials and affiliates.

This interest in targeted sanctions is likely to continue under the second Trump administration, given that Trump’s first term saw heated internal debate over the potential impact of broader economic sanctions on Venezuela’s migration crisis. Indeed, the use of individual sanctions accelerated under President-elect Trump’s first presidential term even as he oversaw the imposition of broader sectoral sanctions targeting Venezuela’s links to the international oil and financial markets. 

With Trump returning to the Oval Office, here’s what policymakers should know about the use of individual sanctions—and what can make Venezuela sanctions policy more effective.

The sticks: A history of the Venezuela sanctions regime

From 2009 to 2015, Venezuela-related sanctions were few and primarily targeted kingpin leaders involved in drug trafficking and financial support for Hezbollah. In March 2015, Executive Order 13692 created the country-specific sanctions regime on Venezuela. Seven military officials were initially sanctioned for their involvement in stifling protests. This program allowed the United States government to sanction individuals involved in human rights abuses, corruption, or the undermining of democratic processes. In November 2018, Executive Order 13850 created a new Venezuela-related sanctions program under which the United States could freeze assets and prevent actors from conducting corrupt transactions with the Venezuelan government to move money. In August 2019, Executive Order 13884 blocked Venezuelan government assets and enabled sanctions on actors assisting the Venezuelan government, and an initial seven military officials were sanctioned for their involvement in actions undermining democratic processes. 

This graph does not include sanctions issued by the United States on January 10, the date of Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The Obama administration sanctioned seventeen individuals, including the first seven military officials sanctioned under the Venezuela-specific sanctions regime. After Trump took office in January of 2017, the number of individual sanctions increased dramatically, with forty-one issued in 2017 alone. The administration issued twenty individual sanctions in 2018, forty-nine in 2019, and twenty-five in 2020. (These numbers do not include individuals who were sanctioned and later delisted). Under the Trump administration, some of the sanctions targeted Venezuelan access to the US dollar and to international financing, and therefore Venezuela’s ability to reconcile its sovereign debt. The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy took off in 2019, which saw the imposition of over 180 Venezuela-related sanctions, including the forty-nine targeting individuals. That year also saw the first implementation of sectoral sanctions on industries including oil, gold, finance, defense, and security.

This shifted under US President Joe Biden. Until September 2024, Biden had not added a single Venezuelan national to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list since taking office. However, after the July 28 stolen presidential election, the government-backed National Electoral Council declared incumbent Nicolás Maduro the winner, despite opposition candidate Edmundo González emerging as the clear victor following the opposition’s independent collection and publication of over 80 percent of the official actas, electoral vote tallies produced by each voting center. Roughly a month and a half after the election, the United States announced new sanctions on sixteen individuals, for obstructing the elections and intensifying post-election repression, ultimately forcing Gonzalez to flee the country. Two more rounds of sanctions were announced in November 2024 and January 2025.

The carrots: When and why individual sanctions have been lifted

The Biden administration largely opted for a different approach than the first Trump administration, seeming to prefer carrots over sticks. On multiple occasions, Biden took Venezuelan nationals off the list. 

In December 2021, the administration announced it would no longer designate the former Colombian guerrilla movement, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), as a terrorist group. As part of a package of ninety-two FARC-linked delistings, the Treasury Department lifted sanctions on five Venezuelans including Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, a military officer and former Venezuelan minister of interior who worked as a go-between between the FARC rebels and the Venezuelan government.

In June 2022, the Treasury Department announced that it had lifted the sanctions on Carlos Erik Malpica Flores, a former national treasurer and vice president of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA. Malpica Flores is also the nephew of current Venezuelan first lady Cilia Flores, and his delisting was reportedly part of an effort to induce the Venezuelan government to restart negotiations with the opposition—and indeed, days later opposition and government representatives met in Oslo. In November 2022, two other nephews of Flores, known as the “narcosobrinos” due to their involvement in transnational drug trafficking operations, were released as part of a prisoner swap that included the release of ex-officials of Citgo, the US-based subsidiary of PDVSA. 

In July 2023, the Treasury removed Carlos Rotondaro, former board president of the Venezuelan Institute of Social Security (IVSS), from the SDN list. Sanctioned for “economic mismanagement and acts of corruption,” Rotondaro was reportedly delisted for providing information to the United States on financial movements made by the family of Haiman El Troudi, former Minister of Planning and Development and Minister of Public Works.

These delistings fit with the Biden administration’s broader reticence toward announcing new sanctions on Venezuela. Rather than rolling out new sectoral sanctions, the Biden White House sought to incentivize a democratic opening by issuing licenses to US and Western oil companies to operate in the country despite broader oil and financial sanctions, in exchange for a series of agreements between the government and the democratic opposition that led to the July 28 election. 

Biden was not alone in attempting to use sanctions relief to incentivize change in Venezuela. Even as the first Trump administration ramped up the use of individual sanctions, it also offered sanctions relief to individuals who “take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses and speak out against abuses committed by the government, and combat corruption in Venezuela.” As part of this strategy, the Trump administration lifted sanctions in two cases. In March 2019, the Treasury delisted the wives of Raúl Gorrín and Gustavo Perdomo, two regime-linked businessmen who reportedly tried to work as middlemen between Washington and Caracas. According to press accounts, Gorrín worked to support a failed attempt to overthrow Maduro in April of that year, and Treasury’s removal of his wife and the wife of his business partner from the sanctions list was a decision made in exchange for his support for the coup.

In May 2019, after the uprising failed, the United States delisted Manuel Cristopher Figuera, former Director General of Venezuela’s National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). Figuera had taken part in the coup attempt and fled the country when it failed. In its press release, the Treasury Department stated that the move “demonstrates that U.S. sanctions need not be permanent and are intended to bring about a positive change of behavior.”

Who’s on the list?

The United States has rescinded the visas of almost two thousand Venezuelans and currently sanctions 202 Venezuela-linked individuals on the SDN list (as of January 13, 2025). Of these 202, eighty-one have been sanctioned primarily for their current or former roles with Venezuelan security and intelligence outfits. Nine have worked in the military counterintelligence branch known by its Spanish-language acronym DGCIM, eleven have worked in the intelligence branch (SEBIN), thirty have worked in the national armed forces (FANB), twenty-six have worked for the national guard (GNB), and seven have worked for the national police (PNB). Some of these individuals have worked for multiple branches of the security or counterintelligence service. 

The United States also has a history of sanctioning key Venezuelan political officials. Maduro has been sanctioned since 2017, and his wife and son have been sanctioned since 2018 and 2017, respectively. Attorney General Tarek William Saab was sanctioned in 2017. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and her brother, Communications Minister Jorge Rodríguez, Former National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello and his wife and brother, and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez were all sanctioned in 2018.

Beyond key officials of the Venezuelan government and their affiliates, the United States has also sanctioned several economic and financial elites linked to operations with the government or the state-owned oil and natural gas company. Veronica Esparza Garcia, Joaquin Leal Jimenez, and Olga Maria Zepeda Esparza were sanctioned in 2020 for “operating a sanctions-evasion scheme benefitting the illegitimate Maduro regime and PDVSA.” In early 2021, Alessandro Bazzoni, an Italian citizen, Francisco Javier D’Agostino, a dual Spanish-Venezuelan citizen, and Philipp Paul Vartan Apikian, a Swiss citizen, were sanctioned for their ties to “a network attempting to evade United States sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector.” Apikian and his company, Swissoil, were removed from the sanctions list in June 2023. Bazzoni and D’Agostino were removed in January 2025.

Additionally, as of September 2024, eleven individuals connected to Venezuela have been sanctioned under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and classified as “specially designated narcotics traffickers.” The sanctions connected with this particular designation are separate from the Venezuela-specific sanctions programs created by executive order but have been perceived by observers as connected to the US-led pressure campaign. 

Coordinating sanctions with allies

This graph does not include sanctions issued by all three countries on January 10, the date of Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The United States, with its current list of 202 designees, is not the only government that has sanctioned individuals related to Venezuela. Canada currently sanctions 115, and the European Union (EU) sanctions sixty-nine. Of the 202 US-sanctioned individuals, Canada sanctions eighty-three of the same individuals, while the EU sanctions fifty-eight. Forty-eight individuals are currently sanctioned by all three parties. Most of these were sanctioned by the United States months or years before they were sanctioned by Canada and the EU. These include high-level officials such as Delcy Rodríguez, Tarek William Saab, and Diosdado Cabello. However, it is notable that the EU has not placed individual sanctions on Maduro himself. Neither Canada nor the EU has placed sanctions on any individuals sanctioned by the United States that we have classified as economic elites. 

Of the thirty-two people that Canada sanctions that the United States does not, a number are judicial officials such as magistrates and individuals associated with repressive acts. All except for one were sanctioned between 2017 and 2019. The eleven individuals sanctioned by the EU that are not sanctioned by the United States include people known to have committed human rights violations and officials contributing to the erosion of democracy and democratic institutions. Most of these were sanctioned between 2020 and 2021.

How effective are individual sanctions?

Individual sanctions can allow decisionmakers in Washington to signal a policy stance and provide a degree of accountability, which may be useful to victims of Venezuela’s authoritarianism. Listed individuals are unable to travel to the United States and they cannot operate directly in broader financial systems. There is an argument to be made that this makes the target’s life uncomfortable or at least more difficult, whether the sanctions involve freezing assets, limiting their mobility, or restricting business operations. Individual sanctions may also serve as a measure of justice for human rights victims. However, in Venezuela so far there is little evidence that being added to the individual sanctions list encourages defection. Only one case of a sanctioned official defecting exists (Manuel Christopher Figuera). Other key individuals who have defected, such as former Oil Minister Rafael Ramírez and former Prosecutor General Luisa Ortega Díaz, were never sanctioned by the United States (although Ramírez was sanctioned by Canada).

One way to tighten the strategy for individual sanctions involves targeting more overseas assets of Venezuelans who have contributed to political and economic destabilization, and those of their family members and associates. While some of the assets of more prominent Venezuelans have been seized, a number of Venezuelan officials still own properties in Miami and other US cities, Latin America, and Europe. According to a 2022 joint investigation by Armando.Info and El Nuevo Herald, at least 718 companies in Florida are owned by current or former Venezuelan officials, including over two hundred that are owned by members of the military. Most of these owners have not been sanctioned. While an SDN designation implies that all US properties and financial assets of the individual will be frozen, some sanctioned officials continue to have access to large financial networks through assets held by family members or affiliates who are not sanctioned. Ramping up the targeting of the asset networks of current or former affiliates of the dictatorship could potentially create more room for those affiliates to consider the value of remaining loyal to Maduro, while avoiding harming the Venezuelan people.

The key question lies in how international actors can sanction individuals in a way that pulls the regime apart instead of consolidating it. Maduro has honored some of those sanctioned with replicas of independence leader Simón Bolívar’s sword. After the most recent wave of sanctions, government officials have painted being sanctioned as a badge of honor, a sign of loyalty to the revolution. According to Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, being sanctioned is a recognition of officials’ “morale, physical and professional integrity, and their leadership.”

One way to mitigate this is to follow sanctions announcements with targeted, discrete, and strategic communication with sanctioned individuals on the steps needed to get off the list, as occurred in the case of Manuel Christopher Figuera. Similar communication could occur with individuals the government is considering sanctioning, as may have been the case with Ortega Díaz. Coordinating more closely with multiple countries to impose parallel individual sanctions on individuals can help the international community to align on sanctions priorities. This may include advising interested international allies on the creation of their own legal sanctions frameworks. 

But sanctions should not be the only manner of engagement with regime affiliates. The goal should always be to identify and engage those most likely to support democratic reform from the inside. This means empowering moderate elements within Chavismo and isolating hardliners to maintain the potential for a peaceful, democratic solution.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

The authors would like to thank Brennan Rhodes for his research support in contributing to this piece. 

Jul 24, 2024

Venezuela Solutions Group

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Venezuela Solutions Group is a diverse group of experts and practitioners from Venezuela, the United States, Latin America, and Europe, brought together to advance the conversation on how to reach a peaceful, democratic, and negotiated solution to the crisis in the South American country. The group comprises former government officials, civil society leaders, private sector leaders, humanitarian voices, economists, and leading experts on Venezuela who work to promote debate and propose actionable and concrete policy recommendations in order to advance policy innovation in addressing the situation in Venezuela. 

Memo to… Jul 24, 2024

Memo to the president: Seizing the opportunity for a democratic solution in Venezuela

By Geoff Ramsey, Jason Marczak, Brian Fonseca, and Eduardo Gamarra

Venezuelans head to the polls for a presidential election July 28. Whether incumbent Nicolás Maduro or opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia is declared the victor, the United States and its partners have a major opportunity to bring all parties together to negotiate a power-sharing agreement and restore the economically devastated country’s democratic institutions.

Latin America Venezuela

Online Event Mon, November 18, 2024 • 7:30 pm ET

Enhancing international coordination on Venezuelan migrant integration

How can the US and regional allies develop a comprehensive response plan for the expected increase in Venezuelan migration as Nicolas Maduro looks to extend his illegitimate rule?

Central America Colombia Conflict Crisis Management

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

Learn more

The post Recalibrating the use of individual sanctions in Venezuela  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

2024 was a transformative year for Latin America and the Caribbean. Elections brought some surprises, but the region also bucked the global trend as continuity was the theme in the Dominican Republic and Mexico, where Claudia Sheinbaum made history as its first female president. Further south, Brazil played a pivotal role as the host of the Group of Twenty and Peru welcomed the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, asserting Latin America’s leadership on the global stage.

Meanwhile, the region faced enduring challenges—from Nicolas Maduro’s ignoring electoral results in Venezuela to the growing influence of transnational criminal organizations. The region remains trapped in a low-growth economic environment with considerable strains on fiscal revenue, while a strong hurricane season reinforced the importance of building greater resilience across the Caribbean. China’s influence surged, with increased, notable new investments and Colombia’s decision to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

What might be in store for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025?

How might the incoming Trump administration engage with the region? Can economies across the hemisphere grow beyond current predictions? How will leaders address security challenges? Might new tech hubs emerge?

Take the quiz and see if you agree with our predictions for 2025!

The post Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025: Ten predictions to shape the year ahead appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Fri, December 6, 2024 • 7:00 am ET

Chevron CEO Mike Wirth on the future of energy policy

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Mike Wirth, chairman and chief executive officer of Chevron, discusses his vision for policies that address both energy security and environmental protection in an increasingly complex global landscape.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment Energy Transitions Geopolitics & Energy Security

According to Chevron* Chief Executive Officer Mike Wirth, there’s a rising “recognition” that the energy transition is “going to take longer than people would have hoped a few years ago.”

At a December 6 Atlantic Council Front Page event, Wirth argued that building what is essentially “a separate energy system”—a zero-carbon energy system—“in parallel” is going to require new infrastructure and new investments. “That’s going to take time,” he said.

Wirth explained that while finding solutions for climate change is at the forefront of policy discussions in Europe and the United States, developing countries are more focused on solutions that enable energy access and affordability. But, Wirth said, there are no “one-size-fits-all solutions.”

“The reality is some of these solutions work better in some places than they do in others, and none of them serve all the different needs of a diverse economy,” Wirth said. He added that he thus appreciates the flexibility of the Paris Agreement, in allowing countries to make their own nationally determined contributions based on their own contexts.

With President-elect Donald Trump soon to reenter the White House, Wirth said that he expects to see continued growth in conventional energy and also in “new technologies that address future market demands.”

“The US is an energy superpower. We have a strong diverse energy economy, and it is fundamental to our economic competitiveness,” he said. “We need all of these solutions” to satisfy future demand for energy.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, in which the Chevron head discussed the future of the energy system under a new US administration and the impacts of geopolitics on energy.

The four-year outlook

• Wirth said the next US administration needs to craft policies that “balance” between three “tradeoffs”: Mitigating environmental impact, ensuring access to affordable energy, and maintaining national security.
• Wirth said that he believes Trump understands “the importance of a strong energy economy for a strong US economy.” He added that he expects the Trump administration to “reduce the regulatory burden” that the energy industry faces, and that there will be continued growth and advancement in both renewables and conventional energy.
• The next administration may want to take a look at the United States’ sanctions on oil-producing countries Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, Wirth noted. “Enforcement of those sanctions has been designed to allow those barrels to continue to come into the market” in part to avoid spiking oil prices, he said.
• “They haven’t really crimped supply, they’ve just redirected supply,” he argued. And that, he added, has created “certain risks” as the countries that have been subject to sanctions have looked into other, more dangerous ways to sell and ship their energy. For example, Wirth explained, Russia has resorted to using a shadow fleet, which poses risks for other ships and the environment. “That’ll be another issue that the administration will grapple with,” Wirth said.
• Chevron is the only US oil company allowed to operate in Venezuela. Wirth said that while the company has not yet discussed this with the incoming Trump administration, Chevron wants to maintain its presence there. “Other companies have left Venezuela. They’ve been replaced by and large with companies from two countries: Russia and China,” Wirth said. “If we were to leave,” he added, there is “no doubt” Chevron’s operations would meet the same fate.

Energy and geopolitics: “Fundamentally intertwined” 

• Wirth said that energy and geopolitics—including the conflicts unfolding around the world—are “fundamentally intertwined.”
• Considering Europe’s scramble to decrease its dependence on Russian gas following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Wirth argued that “Europe is going to have to reassess its overall approach to energy supply.”
• The United States, Wirth said, can be “an important source of supply to our allies” in Europe and beyond. “We’ll need to be in that future to avoid creating the same kind of single-point dependence that has existed.”
• On the conflict in the Middle East, Wirth said that Chevron has shut down natural gas platforms in the eastern Mediterranean. “These facilities have been targeted by rockets and missiles from Hezbollah,” he said. But, he added, “the naval version of the Iron Dome has proven to be effective in interdicting,” Wirth said.
• In discussing the technologies supporting the energy transition, Wirth warned that China has a “very strong hold” on the supply chains for materials—including rare earths and critical minerals—that make up technologies such as solar panels and electric vehicles.
• “You see a lot of the mining activity going on in Africa . . . and a lot of the processing goes on in China, which gives China a lot of influence over supply pricing,” he said. “We haven’t diversified the supply chains for some of these inputs to new energies nearly enough.”

Katherine Walla is the associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council. 

Note: Chevron is a donor to the Atlantic Council. 

Watch the full event

The post Chevron CEO Mike Wirth on what to expect on energy under the Trump administration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But despite the fraught politics of the OFAC licensing system, Washington should stick with the current policy—which regulates cash flow into Venezuela, distances the country from China and Iran, and strengthens transatlantic energy security—rather than returning to the “maximum pressure” strategies that preceded it.

Sign up for PowerPlay, the Atlantic Council’s bimonthly newsletter keeping you up to date on all facets of the energy transition.

Maximum pressure, minimal results

In January 2019, the first Trump administration imposed broad sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company, PDVSA, which expanded into a “maximum pressure” campaign that barred US oil companies from operating in the country and extended sanctions risk to non-US firms.  

Stricter sanctions contributed to an abrupt decline in Venezuela’s crude oil production. Output crashed from 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd) in January 2019 to 430,000 by July 2020—although the effects of long-term underinvestment, national blackouts, and COVID-19 also impacted oil operations during this period.

The economic fallout from Venezuela’s oil bust intensified a wave of emigration that had begun in 2015. But the sanctions failed to dislodge Maduro—and polling, both internally and among the country’s diaspora, showed they were unpopular with most Venezuelans.

PDVSA quickly learned how to circumvent the sanctions. Secondary sanctions aimed at preventing companies from selling Venezuelan oil abroad were overcome through an extensive network of phantom traders.

As a result, by the end of 2020 China and Iran had emerged as Venezuela’s primary trading partners. Between July 2021 and July 2023, Venezuela imported over 35 million barrels of Iranian condensate as diluent used to produce 400,000-500,000 bpd of extra heavy crude oil. Over this two-year period, Iranian traders acquired over 47 million barrels of crude in exchange for that condensate, with nearly all shipments routed to China clandestinely and at steep discounts. These swaps circumvented sanctions and strengthened ties between Venezuela and Iran.

Course correction

Two years into the Biden administration the policy changed. In November 2022, OFAC issued General License (GL) 41 to Chevron, permitting it to resume operations under an agreement with PDVSA that allowed the US company to manage key aspects of its joint ventures, including procurement, crude marketing, and finance. Under GL41 and other specific licenses, Chevron can swap oil for US-sourced diluent. All production from joint ventures is required to be sold on the US market. Greater operational control has allowed Chevron to improve working conditions and mitigate safety and environmental risk.

In October 2023, GL44 lifted nearly all sanctions on PDVSA to induce the Maduro government to hold free and fair elections. However, the license was allowed to expire in April 2024 when the regime failed to recognize Maria Corina Machado or her designee as the opposition candidate in the presidential race. Instead, OFAC adopted a policy of issuing “specific” licenses to companies on a case-by-case basis for limited projects or activities.

Joint ventures operating in connection with specific licenses pay the Venezuelan government taxes and royalties in bolívars—not dollars—up to 50 percent of sales, as required by Venezuelan law. Payments to PDVSA are not allowed. Thirty percent of the value of each cargo is reinvested into operations and maintenance. The private partner manages this reinvestment, ensuring an additional layer of accountability. Funds are channeled to strictly vetted service companies.

Finally, 20 percent of each cargo is earmarked for the repayment of debt owed to the minority partner.

Detractors of the licensing regime express frustration with a lack of public information. OFAC licenses are diplomatic tools that permit certain economic activities within restrictions that result from challenging geopolitical conditions. Consequently, key information related to license activities is not made public. But “non-public” does not mean “opaque.” Detailed reports on all activities are filed with OFAC. Information on crude trades is available from numerous subscription sources.

Objectively, specific license holders do channel hundreds of millions of US dollars into the Venezuela economy through private banks. Many economists agree that the flow of these funds into the domestic economy plays a crucial role in stabilizing the exchange rate and managing inflation, which benefits all Venezuelans.

Better than the alternative

Given the unverifiable election results and subsequent human rights abuses in Venezuela, many question why the US government would authorize foreign oil operators to generate revenue from Venezuelan crude. The answer is that OFAC licenses are far more effective at regulating the cash flow from these sales than the maximum pressure sanctions of 2019 to 2022, when Western companies were divorced from their joint venture activities.

The issuance of specific licenses directed Venezuelan oil exports away from China and toward the United States, Europe, and India. In 2024, Venezuela exported 310,000 bpd to China, down from 491,000 in 2021. The share of oil exports marketed by phantom traders decreased from virtually all in 2021 to about 60 percent in 2024. Venezuela’s reliance on Iranian condensate ended, as OFAC-licensed companies are now allowed to import Western-sourced diluent for extra-heavy oil production.

If specific licenses are revoked, the consequences would not align with US energy and security interests, and may bring unintended costs for the opposition and the Venezuelan people.

PDVSA knows how to skirt maximum pressure sanctions and is well prepared to do so again. If those sanctions return, PDVSA would regain full discretion over revenue generated by approximately 300,000 bpd of crude exports, giving the Maduro regime direct access to more money than it currently receives—with no transparency requirements on how it uses it.

Crude sales would be diverted back to China from the United States, Europe, and India. Large discounts would effectively subsidize Chinese imports at the expense of Western company debt repayment. PDVSA would likely resume its reliance on Iran—instead of the US Gulf Coast—for diluent supply.

Venezuela accounts for just 1 percent of global oil production and has limited influence over oil prices. But with instability in the Middle East, it does no good to the United States to lose access to supplies so close to home. Removing Western companies from Venezuelan oil production would only increase energy security risks.

A fine line

Investors face a delicate balance in contemplating engagement with Venezuela, where human rights abuses and corruption pose real risks to moral integrity and financial viability. But the existing approach to OFAC licenses has found a productive middle path that provides greater economic stability, transparency, and control over the flow of revenue to the Maduro regime.

The United States remains limited in its ability to deliver a satisfactory political resolution in Venezuela. Although sanctions are historically ineffective at forcing regime change, they are likely to remain given Venezuela’s complex socio-political environment. But by retaining the existing system and avoiding a return to maximum pressure, the United States can act pragmatically to improve conditions for the Venezuelan people, support more effective mobilization for change, address global geopolitical priorities, and enhance transatlantic energy security.

David Voght and Patricia Ventura are experts on Latin American oil and gas markets and its energy transition.

The views expressed in this analysis are the authors’ own, based on independent research, and do not necessarily reflect those of any clients.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

Read more

EnergySource Dec 2, 2024

Extend and expand the Nord Stream sanctions now

By Alan Riley

The US Senate is moving toward preserving sanctions on the Gazprom-owned Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which expire at the end of 2024. The Senate must press ahead and extend those sanctions to Nord Stream 1 as well. By doing so, the United States would strengthen Ukraine’s security and Europe’s energy independence. Sign up for PowerPlay, […]

Europe & Eurasia Financial Sanctions and Economic Coercion

EnergySource Sep 12, 2024

After Venezuela’s stolen election, here’s how the US should craft an effective sanctions policy

By David L. Goldwyn

As Venezuela’s political crisis worsens, the United States has a role to play in advancing the country’s democratic cause and also inflicting pain on the Maduro regime, while minimizing negative impacts on Venezuelans, the broader region, and US interests. This will require crafting a smart sanctions policy based on lessons learned and five key elements.

Energy & Environment Geopolitics & Energy Security

EnergySource Jul 31, 2024

Pragmatism can improve Mexico’s energy outlook

By David L. Goldwyn and Antonio Ortiz-Mena

Claudia Sheinbaum’s victory in Mexico’s presidential election marks a crucial juncture for the country’s energy future. Sheinbaum’s initial moves are a promising beginning to maximizing Mexico’s economic potential, which requires significant clean energy investment.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

learn more

The post There’s a more effective way forward than “maximum pressure” for Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Donovan quoted by Reuters on how the incoming Trump administration could utilize sanctions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Standard national security practice is to value the protection of intelligence, assets, methods, and sources, only sharing information on a strictly need-to-know basis. National security professionals maintain strict adherence to this culture, which is underpinned by a system of security clearances and information classification levels. This system is a cornerstone of effective national security, protecting the intelligence from getting into the wrong hands, the sources gathering the information, and the methods in which the information is obtained.

Hostage and wrongful detention cases represent a unique operational environment, as they involve the family members of the hostage, who are rarely counterterrorism experts, national security professionals, or diplomats. Imagine having a family member held hostage in a foreign country and feeling like an outsider in the efforts being carried out to secure their freedom—a reality that was initially addressed nearly ten years ago.

In 2015, the approach to managing hostage-taking and wrongful detention incidents involving US nationals inherently changed, guided by policies created by the Barack Obama administration. The policy changes were the result of an extensive review that Obama personally ordered following the murders of four US nationals, including James Foley, at the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) in Syria and complaints from families in these and other cases about their treatment by the US government.

A cornerstone of the policies introduced was the recognition that families have an important role in these cases. As such, the policies enshrine a requirement for intelligence sharing between the US government and hostage families. For example, the family of a hostage who is currently held in the Middle East should be privy to intelligence related to the geopolitical situation impacting that country and thereby impacting their loved one. Families must be at the center of hostage policy for several compelling reasons:

1. Reducing the emotional and psychological impacts on the family Families with loved ones held hostage find themselves in crisis—stuck in a geopolitical situation that often depends on government assistance or leadership to resolve. As US nationals, the families deserve support and transparent updates from the government during this intensely traumatizing period. A lack of transparency intensifies the stress they feel.
2. Involving the most crucial stakeholder Apart from the hostage, the families are the single most important stakeholder in these cases, with their primary concern being the swift recovery of their loved one. They have the greatest motivation, and it is in their collective interest to treat intelligence prudently.
3. Cooperating in resolution In numerous hostage cases, families actively contribute to the efforts to bring their loved ones home, whether by communicating with hostage takers themselves or providing valuable intelligence on the case secured through their private means. Additionally, as positions in and out of government rotate, families are often the only stakeholders in long-term cases that retain valuable historical knowledge of the case. Kidnapping—by states, terrorists, or criminals—is not always solved by governments or governments alone. In fact, when the government partners with families and operates as a united front, it can galvanize national and international support, avoiding fractured and, ultimately, counterproductive efforts.
4. Broadening options Given the uniqueness of these situations, innovative methods of resolution are explored and sometimes required to bring hostages home. Families frequently contribute unconventional ideas and solutions, assisting the government in considering and exploring creative strategies. Diversity of ideas, connections, and approaches can make the difference.  

The Obama administration introduced Presidential Policy Directive 30 (PPD-30) and Executive Order 13698 (EO13698) in 2015. The directive was designed to enhance efforts to respond to these crises and ensure a coordinated and effective approach across the US government. PPD-30 established two new operational offices, the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell (HRFC), an interagency group within the FBI, and the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (SPEHA), an office within the State Department designed to oversee the diplomatic response to hostage and wrongful detention cases.

PPD-30 emphasizes support for hostage and detainee families, recognizing their vital role in the resolution process and the importance of transparent communication and information sharing with them. Furthermore, EO13698 mandates improved intelligence and information sharing across agencies and prioritizes information sharing with appropriate parties, including the family.

Five years later, in 2020, the Levinson Act, in the name of former Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) agent Robert Levinson, who was abducted in Iran in 2007, passed into law. This law codifies provisions in PPD-30 and EO13698, including, but not limited to, engagement, intelligence sharing, and transparency of updates with families. Finally, in 2022, Executive Order 14078 (EO14078) addressed the need for enhanced coordination and communication with families. In practice, this means the parents of a man being wrongfully detained in China, for example, as the most invested parties in the resolution, would be a collaborative partner with the government and have access to information related to his well-being, the geopolitical situation, challenges surrounding ongoing negotiations, and be brought to the table to share ideas and updates of their own.

Collaborating with families and identifying relevant intelligence to expeditiously declassify and securely share it is a complex task that is not without challenges, of course. The practice inherently runs counter to the culture within national security agencies, which prioritizes protecting sensitive information. Should certain information be leaked, it could compromise ongoing operations, endanger national security goals, or disrupt delicate diplomatic relationships. Moreover, protecting sources and methods of intelligence gathering is critical to maintaining the integrity of the collection process and safeguarding agents and assets.

These reasons make it easy to revert to the comfort of guarding information from a national security perspective. However, President Obama’s policies require national security professionals to work against their training in this regard, and the cultural pull towards secrecy requires constant vigilance to overcome. Officials must continue to resolve to minimize the risks of sharing information by working hard to declassify information swiftly to share via strict protocols and secure communications channels. Additionally, officials have a responsibility to ensure families understand the information being shared and internalize the potential risks if shared further. It is worth noting that prioritizing collaboration and aiming for a quicker resolution inherently minimizes the risk of a leak because as cases are resolved more swiftly, the opportunity for an information leak from any party diminishes. As the timeline extends and families continue to wait for a resolution, frustration grows, making it imperative for the families to fully understand the risk of potential leaks in their knowledge of the negotiations and other intel related to the case.

It is important to recognize how challenging it is to ask professionals to go against their institutional ethos and recognize that while the traditional culture of protecting information is imperative in the vast majority of national security challenges, hostage and wrongful detention cases are unique. These unique national security issues require recognizing the value of the family’s involvement in the response and, thus, a unique shift in culture towards proactive information sharing. Policies enacted in 2015, nearly a decade ago, and codified by subsequent law, create a receptive environment for officials to partner with hostage families. In the absence of partnership, trust breaks down, families are isolated, the relationship erodes, and the safe release of the hostage is put at risk.

Institutional changes endure more easily than culture. Especially in the revolving door of US government service, where officials working on hostage policy change every few years, the work of cultural change is never done. It is vital that current and future officials managing hostage and wrongful detention cases are cognizant of the origin of the guiding policies and laws. They must avoid using the classification of relevant information as a shield for not proactively identifying and declassifying information pertinent to families. Embracing the practice of sharing information with families will not only lessen the trauma families feel and build strong partnerships, but experience shows that openness and transparency often lead to better outcomes for hostages and wrongful detainees. The US government must collectively, and at all levels, work to adhere to the spirit as well as the letter of these policies and directives and make every effort to reinforce and improve the culture of information sharing with hostage and wrongful detainee families that President Obama and the authors of the policies and laws envisioned.

Liz Cathcart is the executive director of Hostage US and an active member of the Atlantic Council Counterterrorism Project.

The post Balancing a culture of secrecy and collaboration: Information sharing with hostage families appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Within minutes of a disputed declaration of Nicolás Maduro’s victory—which “could not be verified or corroborated” by the only independent, international observers there and spurred brutal crackdowns on protesters—Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian, in a press briefing, congratulated Venezuela on its “smooth presidential election” and Maduro for his “successful reelection.” As calls rose for transparency and recognition of the Venezuelan voters’ will—nine Latin American nations, among others, called for a review of the vote—Lin doubled down: “I made clear China’s position yesterday. The Venezuelan people’s choice should be respected.” That same day, Chinese leader Xi Jinping declared that Beijing will “firmly support Venezuela’s efforts to safeguard national sovereignty, national dignity, and social stability.”                                 

In August, I participated in the American Foreign Policy Council’s annual delegation to China and had the opportunity to voice my frustrations over Beijing’s support for Maduro directly with Chinese decision makers. Senior leaders at both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (a Ministry of State Security-affiliated think tank) gave similar responses. They told me that China does not interfere in the affairs of other countries and that there are claims of election interference across the world, including in the United States’ most recent presidential election. In these cases, in which one party contests the vote, one official asked me, what would you have us do?

Nothing, actually. If China truly was the neutral, nonjudgmental partner that it claimed to be, Beijing could have chosen inaction, gotten out of the way, and allowed the will of the people to run its course. It also could have sided with the preponderance of evidence suggesting fraud—as dozens of other nations have. But by issuing these statements of support for Maduro, and speaking out so quickly, China decisively put its finger on the scale to help prop up a fellow autocracy, upending the will of a democratic movement.

Life support for Maduro

China’s longstanding support for the undemocratic regime in Venezuela is financial and material as well as diplomatic. In the 2000s, Beijing gave President Hugo Chávez tens of billions of dollars in investments and loans-for-oil deals. Maduro, Chávez’s hand-picked successor, took office after Chávez’s death in 2013, and since then, China has provided critical life support to his increasingly oppressive regime in the form of loans, cash, and investments.

Beijing’s support has at times included acting in accordance with Maduro’s interests during elections. In January 2019, when opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared himself acting president, over fifty governments officially recognized his election. China stayed silent. That silence benefited Maduro, but Beijing cited noninterference as the reason for their inaction. In December 2020, Venezuela’s major opposition parties boycotted parliamentary elections, which they described as fraudulent and failing to meet the minimum requirements to qualify as free, fair, and transparent. Those elections were rejected by more than fifty-five countries, including the United States, members of the European Union (EU) and the EU-led International Contact Group, the Organization of American States, and the multilateral Lima Group. China, Russia, and Cuba were the only countries that recognized the 2020 parliamentary elections as legitimate. In January 2023, when the Maduro regime attempted to block a legitimate vote for National Assembly president, Beijing again remained silent.

Concrete proof of Maduro’s loss

The Venezuelan democratic movement pulled off a massive achievement in gathering clear evidence of electoral fraud in the presidential elections in July. In the weeks leading up to the election, roughly five thousand workshops were held for tens of thousands of volunteers, although some estimates place the size of the group closer to one million (out of Venezuela’s population of 28.3 million people). Volunteers were trained on electoral laws, including their right, as volunteer observers representing political parties, to obtain copies of their polling location’s voting tally. When election day came, volunteers faced significant hostility from soldiers, police, and Chavista loyalists guarding the polling stations. And yet, a mass democratic movement, operating in one of the world’s most oppressive regimes, succeeded. In an impressive logistical feat, volunteers gathered 83 percent of the voting tallies across the country, and, within forty-eight hours, digitized them and uploaded the results to a public website. The result was concrete proof that the opposition candidate, Edmundo González, had won 67 percent of the vote, compared to Maduro’s 30 percent.

The tallies have since been verified by five independent analyses: the Associated Press; the Washington Post; Colombian nongovernmental group Misión de Observación Electoral; Walter R. Mebane Jr., University of Michigan professor of election forensics; and the New York Times, whose analysis of partial voting tallies both broadly replicated the opposition’s estimates of the results within two percentage points and ruled out the possibility of a Maduro victory by any margin

Maduro nonetheless declared victory, backed by Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, which announced that he had secured 51 percent of the votes, compared to 44 percent for González. As the opposition party revealed that it had evidence to prove that its candidate had won, most of the international community came to a similar conclusion about the fraudulence of the official tally. The Carter Center, which was invited to observe the election, issued a statement that the vote “did not meet international standards of electoral integrity,” and that the outcome “cannot be considered democratic.” In the following twenty-four hours, the United States, EU, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and the United Nations all cast doubt on the legitimacy of the election results.

Out of step with Latin America

China—Maduro’s longtime friend—stood apart from the crowd. One big question now is, to what degree will Beijing’s support for Maduro constitute a reputational hazard for China in Latin America and beyond?

China is now firmly out of step with most nations in a region where Xi hopes to deepen relations. All of Latin America, aside from Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Cuba, has either rejected Maduro’s reelection claim or expressed concern over the official election results. Mexico, which famously avoids entanglement in foreign controversies, has asked to see the National Electoral Council’s voting records. Even those who are not concerned with the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela will surely resent the resulting massive influx of migration putting a strain on the economies of Venezuela’s neighbors. On this matter, China is also at odds with several of its BRICS partners, both in the region (Brazil) and beyond (India and South Africa).

The extent to which this incident will factor into decision making in Latin American countries vis-à-vis China remains to be seen. As observers, we can only hope that citizens across the region are taking note of what seems to be a clear lesson from the China-Venezuela relationship: If you are looking for a partner who will allow you to shape the future of your own country, look elsewhere.

Caroline Costello is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.   

The post China’s support for Maduro should be a warning to democracies in Latin America appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The government has responded to massive protests with heavy repression. More than 2,400 people have been arrested in the postelection crackdown. At least two dozen have been killed. Maduro has blocked or restricted international news sites and social media platforms including X and Signal. The National Assembly passed a law to increase the regulation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in mid-August. While the fine print is not yet public, human rights activists fear the law will stifle the efforts of even the most apolitical CSOs, including health and humanitarian organizations. An arrest warrant for González forced the election winner into exile, and opposition leader María Corina Machado’s allies continue to face harassment and detainment.

Amid these bleak circumstances, the worst thing the international community can do is succumb to fatigue. While Venezuelans must lead any effort to advance a transition, the United States and its Latin American and European allies must coordinate sustained and targeted efforts to encourage dialogue and prevent further regional destabilization. In the lead-up to the January 10 presidential inauguration, regional leaders must push for a credible negotiations process to preserve space for a democratic transition while preventing Maduro from drifting further toward Russia and China. The way the United States and its allies engage with or isolate Maduro in the coming months will have hemispheric implications for both migration and security.

A combination of negotiations and targeted pressure led the Maduro government to organize a July 28 presidential election that reinforced the true extent of his unpopularity and illegitimate rule. Future efforts to pair negotiations and pressure should build on this model of multilateral coordination by leveraging the unique positioning of a variety of actors. Governments are critical players, but multilateral organizations including the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States can also push for credible negotiations. Each country or organization should recognize the opportunities and limitations that it holds from its respective position. 

Brazil and Colombia

Brazil and Colombia have declined to explicitly condemn Venezuela’s election as fraudulent. Rather, they have remained engaged with the Maduro government while calling for transparency, initially stepping in to shoulder the burden of mediation along with Mexico. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said he was “disappointed” with Maduro’s behavior regarding the election, but that Brazil will maintain relations and work toward a “negotiated” solution. The costs of an electoral condemnation and a potential break in relations would be immense for Brazil and Colombia, neighbors of Venezuela that have struggled to mitigate the increase in drug trafficking and violence that have been perpetuated from within the country. Both countries have received an influx of Venezuelan migrants and refugees: Brazil hosts more than 568,000, and Colombia houses over 2.8 million. This number is expected to rise in the coming months as Venezuelans who once held out hope for political change leave the country.

Brazil and Colombia have proposed measures such as new elections and power-sharing arrangements, which were swiftly rejected by both the opposition and the government. Questions remain as to how committed these countries are to pushing for a transition of power. In the next few months, both countries can benefit from playing the middle ground by maintaining discussions with both the United States and the Maduro regime while pressing Maduro to respect the will of the Venezuelan people. They can leverage their relatively stable relations with Venezuela to push for credible negotiations in ways that other countries cannot. While negotiations alone will not guarantee a peaceful transition of power, they are a necessary element, even when dealing with an actor with a record of using them to suit his own interests. 

The United States, Canada, and the EU

The United States, Canada, and the EU have been more vocal in their rejection of the government-announced election results. As the main imposers of sanctions on Venezuela, these countries should lead the coordination of sanctions policy in the months leading up to January’s presidential inauguration, and, absent a transition of power, in the period following. This requires a clear consensus on sanctions objectives and timeframes. If one country communicates specific parameters for sanctions relief, the same parameters should be reflected in corresponding sanctions regimes—though this coordination can be challenging at times given how the legal framework for US sanctions differs from that of its partners. 

Sanctions can be useful in advancing certain policy objectives, but can be ineffective or harm local populations when misused or improperly implemented. Sanctions are more successful when they involve multilateral coordination, establish concrete objectives, and clearly state the conditions required for sanctions relief. Between now and January, the United States and its allies should develop consistent messaging on conditioning sanctions relief and/or new sanctions with progress on negotiated political agreements. The first step in this process involves clarifying objectives and timeframes for meeting specific conditions. The international community must find creative ways to incentivize the Maduro government to remain at the negotiating table and involve the Venezuelan opposition in defining a path forward. 

Both domestic and international coordination on sanctions is critical. While the United States has already sanctioned more than 140 individuals connected with the Maduro government or who are otherwise contributing to the Venezuelan crisis, additional individual sanctions, particularly on economic and military elites, could help increase targeted pressure on government allies to reconsider their commitments to another six years under Maduro. The United States announced new sanctions on sixteen individuals last week, including some involved in ratifying the government-announced election results or issuing an arrest warrant for González. However, unilateral sanctions have limited effectiveness and should be paired with coordinated efforts to balance pressure and incentives. For example, the United States and regional allies should identify Maduro affiliates who are more open to dialogue and discuss ways to either lower the costs of defection or incentivize them to encourage change from within their circles.

Domestic coordination on messaging is key for presenting a coherent foreign policy strategy that balances pressure and incentives. While bipartisan action is hard to come by in the current US political environment, consensus across party lines is still possible. Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Rick Scott (R-FL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Michael Bennet (D-CO), and Representatives Mario Díaz-Balart (R-FL), María Elvira Salazar (R-FL), and Carlos Giménez (R-FL) condemned the Maduro government for committing fraud and recognized González as the winner of the election, stating that “this is not about political ideology, this is about defending the will of the Venezuelan people.” Future joint statements should emphasize the common goal of upholding Venezuelans’ right to self-determination, regardless of which party sits in the White House come January. The United States and other regional host countries must address the needs of millions of displaced Venezuelans who remain in political and economic limbo, which will require both bipartisan and international coordination.

The United States, the EU, Canada, Brazil, and Colombia must account for their respective abilities to leverage political and economic incentives to encourage favorable actions from the Venezuelan government. Meanwhile, Chile, Peru, Panama, and other countries that have called for transparency in Venezuela’s electoral process should continue to push for dialogue and an end to the government-led repression. Maintaining space for dialogue through sustained coordination and support for the Venezuelan people is the best chance that democratic leaders have to help move toward a transition of power and greater stability in Venezuela.

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she contributes to the center’s work on Venezuela and Colombia.

The post To prevent further destabilization in Venezuela, regional leaders must trade chaos for coordination appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: Democracies need to make life miserable for Maduro

Kevin Whitaker: Democracies should use Venezuela’s military and private sector to squeeze Maduro

Samantha Sultoon: It’s time to tighten sanctions and limit Maduro’s access to the UN

Diego Area: González now has an opportunity to lead renewed diplomatic efforts from abroad

Iria Puyosa: With Venezuela’s opposition under siege, now is the moment for coordinated international support

Democracies need to make life miserable for Maduro

González ultimately saw no other alternative. He was left with two choices: face arrest—and likely torture—by the Maduro regime or continue the fight for Venezuelan democracy from abroad.

At age seventy-five, the choice was Spain—a longtime destination for those fleeing Maduro’s autocracy. But it’s not a choice he should have had to make. Instead, it’s a reflection of the inability of the international community to force Maduro’s hand after published vote tallies showed that González bested Maduro by more than 30 percentage points in the July 28 presidential election. While Brazil and Colombia have sought to find some type of negotiated solution, the actions of Maduro—including detaining over 2,400 people—show that he is only looking to double down on this newest campaign of repression.

González’s departure leaves opposition leader María Corina Machado to fight for a restoration of democracy in Venezuela. She will need regional and global democracies to back her up with more than just statements. Words don’t resonate with Maduro unless backed up by actions to make life miserable for him and those closest to him. Here, the recent seizing of Maduro’s plane in the Dominican Republic should be a warning of what more could be coming his way, especially with greater international coordination.

Months before his election, González said, “We’re confident that on the day the opposition vote will be so massive our victory will be indisputable.” He was right. The victory of the opposition is clear. Now, what must be made clear to Maduro are the consequences of the most blatant vote grab in recent regional history.

—Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Democracies should use Venezuela’s military and private sector to squeeze Maduro

González’s tragic if understandable decision to leave Venezuela represents the failure of a well-conceived effort to achieve an institutional exit from dictatorship. A government-in-exile will be doomed to irrelevance. González’s departure will increase demands from supporters in the United States from both parties, along with the astonishingly stalwart Machado, to impose new sanctions. But “maximum pressure” failed before and will again, as Maduro enjoys the support of an authoritarian bloc led by China. Moreover, sanctions on the oil sector could rebound with catastrophic economic and political consequences if they feed an otherwise likely fresh wave of emigration. Internationally, the Brazil-Mexico-Colombia diplomatic gambit appears defunct. The Venezuelan street has been largely silent.  

The bitter reality is that Venezuela’s best chance in decades for an institutional democratic exit from dictatorship failed. Maduro and his thugs plainly see that neither sanctions, nor negotiations, nor popular pressure has dislodged them, despite González’s undeniable electoral victory. 

For supporters of democratic change, recognition of the inadequacy of our tools is not the end of the discussion. The center of gravity of the regime remains the armed forces, where we lack entree. That path needs to be (re?) examined, perhaps in the persons of the hard men and women who led US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. These former officials’ will and professionalism can have special purchase with those leading Venezuela’s armed forces. They could explain to the Venezuelan generals that their responsibilities should be to support and defend Venezuela’s institutions, not the interests of the repressive Maduro regime. Meeting their unique responsibilities will bring them credit; continuing to support the dictatorship will damage Venezuela’s national interests and will have direct implications for them as individual leaders. In addition, there could be a shared interest in confronting the criminal groups sheltering in Venezuela that feed the flow of migrants and drugs to the United States.

Another unexploited angle is with the Venezuelan private sector, which has profited from collusion with the Bolivarian regime yet enjoys access to US and other Western markets. Finally, while the current leaders of Latin America’s genuine democracies in Mexico City, Brasília, and Bogotá have demonstrated their incapacity or unwillingness to press forward, civil society in all three nations can be mobilized in support of democratic change in Venezuela.  

Critically, we all must acknowledge the unsustainability of the situation. A continuation of Maduro’s dictatorship will bring pain to Venezuela and a renewed flood of migrants, to the detriment of all involved.

—Kevin Whitaker is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and a former US ambassador to Colombia. 

It’s time to tighten sanctions and limit Maduro’s access to the UN

The abrupt departure of Venezuelan opposition leader González, less than two months after the disputed Venezuelan elections, most likely reflects the level of aggressive threats the Maduro regime made against him. In addition to last week’s arrest warrant accusing him of falsifying public documents, instigation to disobey the law, conspiracy, and other charges that clearly seek to undermine the integrity of the opposition’s vote tally, regime officials have made every effort—public and private—to undermine and intimidate González and the opposition into submission. This aggressive effort to deny the Venezuelan people democratic representation by those for whom the people clearly voted in the July elections is quintessential Maduro. Time and time again, when the opportunity for a fresh start is offered, Maduro and his cronies throw it away and suffocate the will of the Venezuelan people. Declaring Christmas in October will not allow Maduro to gloss over his continued destruction of the Venezuelan economy.

While the Biden-Harris administration is carefully balancing multiple global conflicts and the United States’ role within each of them, its efforts to support the people of Venezuela will need to be redoubled, and quickly. Without González in the country and without credible, transparent election results shared publicly, the Venezuelan people will be left to wonder why they turned out to vote in the first place. They will also certainly question where the United States, European Union, and others that voice support for Venezuelan democracy do not back up their words with clear public actions.

Tightening sanctions on Maduro and his cronies responsible for continuing to undermine democratic processes and institutions in Venezuela, along with the regime’s ongoing corruption and human rights abuses, is one available step. Another public messaging step could be limiting access during the upcoming United Nations General Assembly in New York. If Maduro and his cronies seek to participate in such global gatherings, then there should be a minimum bar for entry that disallows those who squander democracy until they’ve publicly changed their ways. Further public (and private) efforts should be coordinated across the Group of Seven (G7) or other international alliances to highlight for Maduro the isolation he is inviting if he is sworn in again in January. While unlikely, there is still a narrow window for change that remains.

—Samantha Sultoon is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, a former director for Threat Finance and Sanctions at the National Security Council at the White House, and a former sanctions policy expert for the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. 

González now has an opportunity to lead renewed diplomatic efforts from abroad

A new chapter begins in the courageous struggle to liberate Venezuela from a dictatorship that has lost its support base both domestically and internationally, following the flight of González to Spain. His life was clearly at risk after receiving multiple threats and an arrest warrant amid a wave of postelection repression, which the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights labeled as “state terrorism.” While this decision may seem like a retreat, it is undoubtedly a strategic move in the broader fight for Venezuela’s freedom.

Rather than disheartening those who support Venezuela’s democratic restoration, this should be viewed as a safeguard—González, with his legitimacy intact, is now beyond the reach of a regime that imprisons, tortures, and executes opponents while stealing elections and suppressing the people’s will. It also provides González with a historic opportunity to engage with more than seven million Venezuelans who have fled the country, many of whom were denied their political rights. Only 69,211 Venezuelans were allowed to vote in this year’s election.

As an experienced diplomat, González’s escape positions him to lead renewed diplomatic efforts with international allies. The Maduro regime will likely continue to channel resources into complex lobbying structures, influencing narratives and spreading disinformation in coordination with Russia, China, and Iran. But now the democratic opposition will have a legitimately elected leader mobilizing Venezuelan communities worldwide to counteract the regime’s economic and repressive power.

—Diego Area is a deputy director of strategic development at the Adrienne Arsht Latin American Center.

With Venezuela’s opposition under siege, now is the moment for coordinated international support

The Venezuelan regime’s forced exile of González has unquestionably crossed the threshold that democratic governments in the Americas and Europe have repeatedly warned against. Urgent action is now imperative, and democratic governments must go beyond mere expressions of concern and take immediate steps to support a peaceful transition of power that the people of Venezuela have rightfully earned through democratic processes. 

While it is Venezuelans’ responsibility to continue their impressive movement towards democracy, the recent crackdown against political parties and civil society has significantly hindered progress. The movement’s leaders, including Machado, are now under siege. External support is crucial for reestablishing democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in Venezuela. What can external allies do to compel Maduro to step down and ensure that a new president takes the oath on January 10, 2025?

The response must focus on severing the regime’s support from its current pillars. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug Enforcement Administration, along with agencies in partner countries, should disrupt transnational criminal networks that exploit Venezuela’s natural resources, engage in financial corruption, and have ties to organized crime. The United Nations could be a good venue for external allies to address the international support that the Maduro regime continues to receive from authoritarian states and some left-leaning democratic countries that place ideological affinity over fundamental rights. Moreover, the United States and regional countries should look for opportunities to thwart Venezuela’s security forces and ruling party paramilitaries, as they instill fear among the population—and even among the armed forces’ middle ranks—through kidnapping, incarceration, and torture.

A solid and coordinated international effort to weaken the regime pillars will enable the pro-democracy movement to force the ruling party to accept the transition, ultimately bringing about positive changes in Venezuela and the entire Western Hemisphere.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The post Experts react: Maduro has forced Venezuela’s opposition leader into exile. What should the world do now? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

More than 7.7 million Venezuelans—about a quarter of the population—have left the country since 2014, 6.5 million of whom are living in Latin America and the Caribbean. Colombia alone hosts more than 2.8 million displaced Venezuelans, which has strained its ability to provide basic services amid its own ongoing fight against criminal groups. Available polling suggests migration flows are likely to rise in the coming months as Nicolás Maduro looks poised to maintain his stranglehold on power despite the cost. His regime has severed diplomatic relations with regional countries, arrested thousands of protesters, and blocked social media platforms in the country.

Earlier this month, opposition leader María Corina Machado said that if Maduro stays in power by force, the region will experience “a wave of migration like never before: three, four, five million Venezuelans in a very short span of time.”

Moreover, Venezuelans who have already left home are unlikely to return without political change. In a survey before the July 28 election of Venezuelans residing in the United States, 65 percent stated that they would return if an opposition candidate won the election, while less than 15 percent said they would return if Maduro remained in power, even if the economy significantly improved.

“We don’t have the regional resources to handle the migration from Venezuela,” Ronal Rodríguez, a researcher at the Colombian Migration Observatory in Bogotá, told the Associated Press this month. Young Venezuelans who already migrated have begun bringing over older relatives to see if conditions improve before the January presidential inauguration, but Rodríguez warns this could become a permanent flow.

As of May 2024, Colombia housed more than 2.8 million Venezuelans; Peru, more than 1.5 million; Brazil, more than 568,000; and the United States, more than 545,000. Chile and Ecuador host more than 532,000 and 444,000, respectively.

From January to June 2024, US Customs and Border Protection reported 114,695 encounters with Venezuelans. (This figure includes individuals who attempted multiple crossings, so one individual may be counted for multiple encounters.) In the same period last year, the United States reported 150,673 encounters. This does not include spikes later in the year: in September 2023 alone, the United States reported 72,325 encounters. The United States may see similar spikes in encounters in the next few months as more Venezuelans make their way north.

While it’s too early to tell how many will migrate, regional leaders should prepare for the worst. Backlash toward Venezuelans is rising in Chile, which has used armed forces and thermal cameras to limit illegal crossings, and in Peru and Ecuador, which have tightened visa restrictions and required arriving Venezuelans to present difficult-to-obtain passports.

Venezuela’s largest gang, Tren de Aragua, and other criminal organizations have taken advantage of migrant outflows to push into host countries, increasing violent crime. But trying to curb legal migration has only increased illegal migration. For desperate migrants, detainment, trafficking, and death might be a possibility, but for those who stay, they are often a certainty.

So, how should the United States and its regional partners prepare for this expected increase in migration from Venezuela?

Develop plans for transitioning from temporary to more permanent response strategies. Several major host countries, including the United States, Colombia, and Brazil, have developed distinct responses to the influx of migrants by granting various forms of temporary legal status to Venezuelans. Under Colombia’s temporary status program, for example, qualifying Venezuelans can obtain a ten-year permit, which includes work authorization, labor protections, and access to public education. Widespread rollout has seen more than 1.9 million Venezuelans approved for permits. Last September, the United States expanded Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to half a million Venezuelans, allowing them to live and work in the country legally and adding to the estimated 240,000 previously covered.

Neither program is perfect. Colombia’s program has been critiqued as offering only “liminal legality” because it does not offer a direct line to permanent residence. The United States’ TPS program likewise does not involve a path to permanent residency, though some politicians have cautioned that expanding TPS will incentivize additional migrants to journey to the United States and will allow people to stay indefinitely if their status is extended. However, the TPS extension has been praised in other US political circles because it grants work access, increases self-sufficiency, and relieves strains on local resources.

Brazil’s two-year renewable permits for Venezuelans grant similar rights and access as Colombia and the United States. After two years, however, Venezuelans can apply for long-term residence and, potentially, citizenship. Brazil also implemented a mass asylum grant in 2019 which has been extended to more than a hundred thousand people. Unlike many countries, Brazil grants work authorization to asylum seekers, leading more Venezuelans to seek the asylum route there.

While much attention has been directed toward temporary status programs, there is a clear discrepancy between the long-term nature of the Venezuelan crisis and the temporary nature of these programs. For migrants and refugees, temporary status often adds to their insecurity, rather than mitigating it. Most programs last only a few months or years and involve complicated renewal processes. Most also do not necessarily offer direct paths to permanent residency, making it harder for Venezuelans to invest in their futures.

For many countries with convoluted or heavily bureaucratic immigration systems, short-term programs, such as TPS, are useful for providing more responsive options for displaced persons. However, the majority of displaced Venezuelans have obtained legal status through more institutionalized programs, including mobility and residence agreements and asylum and visa programs. Improving the adaptability and applicability of existing immigration infrastructure involves clarifying qualifications and application steps, reducing processing time, and demystifying any renewal processes. Expanding and simplifying access to these programs can provide greater stability for Venezuelans, allowing them to integrate more rapidly and bolster the host country’s workforce.

Invest in improving working conditions in host countries. Most urgently, host countries should focus on improving conditions in sectors with high degrees of informality, temporality, and low pay. These sectors often have higher concentrations of Venezuelan migrant and refugee laborers.

In Colombia and Brazil, access to work permits has not necessarily led to formal employment, and Venezuelans often face poor working conditions and labor abuses. In Brazil, a 2017-2021 survey found that more than half of all displaced Venezuelans were earning less than the Brazilian minimum wage.

Host countries can start to improve working conditions by fostering public-private partnerships between civil society actors, trade unions, migrant associations, and government actors. These partnerships can work to improve wages, educate migrants on their rights, and prevent and challenge labor abuses. Expanding the network of institutions that invest in these efforts to create a more robust support system can create benefits not only for displaced Venezuelans but also for the economies of host nations.

Strengthen international coordination toward Venezuela aimed at mitigating its ongoing political and economic crisis. Without progress on a democratic transition in Venezuela, the United States and regional partners will need to take steps to either accommodate Venezuelans’ displacement on a more permanent basis or provide support to governments that are willing to do so. Greater humanitarian assistance and public-private partnerships can alleviate the worst of the widespread poverty and suffering facing Venezuelans both at home and abroad.

Mitigating the refugee crisis will also improve the economic and security situation of Colombia and other host countries, returning benefits for Venezuela’s neighbors. Regional leaders must continue to support negotiations and prioritize efforts to address Venezuela’s political and economic crisis to mitigate the impact of the projected mass exodus in the coming months.

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she contributes to the center’s work on Venezuela and Colombia.

The post Amid rising insecurity in Venezuela, the US and its partners must prepare for a new wave of migration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post El-Fakih quoted in El Mundo on Venezuela’s Supreme Court finalizing Maduro’s election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post El-Fakih quoted in La Nacion on Venezuela’s Supreme Court ruling’s legitimization of “electoral mega-fraud” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, experts from the Atlantic Council and its Venezuela Solutions Group answer five pressing questions about the country’s ongoing political crisis.

1. What is the situation in Venezuela since the election?

Venezuela is experiencing a deepening of its crisis. The lack of transparency in the electoral process and the failure of the CNE to present the electoral bulletins have led the country into a chaotic situation. Repression is increasing by the day, reaching levels that exceed anything previously seen in Venezuela. Respect for the right to demonstrate and for the popular will of the people are fundamental pillars of any government that calls itself democratic. The world cannot remain silent in the face of the systematic and violent repression of opponents and dissidents in Venezuela.

—María Ángela Holguín is a former foreign minister of Colombia and a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Venezuela Solutions Group. 

The situation in Venezuela is deeply alarming, especially given the fact that the government has not presented detailed results for each polling station to back up its figures. Transparency in the process of counting votes is essential. A thorough verification of the election results must be carried out to ensure that they faithfully reflect the will of the Venezuelan people. This verification must include a complete count of all tally sheets, which the CNE must provide without further delay.

—Miguel Vargas is a former foreign minister of the Dominican Republic and a senior advisor to the Venezuela Solutions Group.

2. What exactly is the issue with the election results?

The voting, counting, and tallying system used in Venezuela includes a mechanism for verifying its operation and auditing its results through what is known as the “paper trail.” This paper trail consists of physical records and voting receipts that verify whether the results announced by the CNE reflect the valid will of the voters. The paper trail includes several components, such as the receipt given to each voter after casting their ballot. This receipt allows voters to confirm that it contains the candidate’s name and the organization they supported. This is the first step in the verification process. Voters then place this receipt into a secure box.

At the end of the voting process, the machine immediately prints out the voting record. For the presidential election on July 28, 30,026 voting machines were deployed for the CNE, each corresponding to a separate voting table. Consequently, 30,026 original voting records were printed and kept in the custody of the Plan República military personnel. Once the machine transmits the results, copies of the voting records are printed for all witnesses. These witnesses must verify that these copies are accurate reproductions of the original records printed by the system.

Additionally, each voting record features a QR code summarizing the data printed on the record. Following the transmission, up to 54 percent of the machines are audited by manually opening the boxes containing the printed voting receipts to ensure that the data on the records is accurate.

Starting on Monday, July 29, the opposition began publishing digitized images of the voting records collected by its witnesses. It is important to note that in many cases, Plan República agents prevented opposition witnesses from accessing this material. As of the time of this report, the opposition has managed to collect, validate, and digitize 83 percent of the election records.

However, the CNE has reported hacking of the 30,026 private transmission lines for the machines (one encrypted line per machine) and has refused to disclose the results broken down by center and table. This has made it impossible to compare the opposition’s copies with the results released by the CNE. Additionally, the telecommunications audit and phase II verification, scheduled for July 29 and August 2, respectively, were suspended. These reviews are crucial for assessing the consistency of the announced results.

Trust in an automated voting system is not a matter of faith. Trust is built through auditability, and to date, the Venezuelan government has obstructed the auditability of the results. After more than two weeks, there are also reasonable concerns about the custody of physical electoral materials and databases. The initial international request to present the voting records is proving to be inadequate.

—Eugenio Martínez is the director of Votoscopio, a Venezuela elections specialist, and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group. 

3. What role can other countries in the region play? 

Latin American countries have a crucial responsibility at this moment. It is necessary to support efforts to promote credible negotiations that will lead to a peaceful and democratic solution in Venezuela. However, it is imperative that any negotiations incorporate the desire of both the Venezuelan people and all of Latin America to respect the rule of law and democratic order in Venezuela. Only through a firm commitment to these principles can we move toward a solution that reflects the will of the Venezuelan people.

—Miguel Vargas

Faced with this reality, it is imperative that Latin American countries continue to demand electoral transparency and condemn repression and the violation of human rights. It is essential to increase diplomatic coordination and demand transparency, independent auditing, and respect for the popular vote. Only with a firm and coordinated position in the region will we be able to engender a way out of the deep crisis in Venezuela, which must occur through a credible and realistic negotiation process with the accompaniment of guarantor countries. 

—María Ángela Holguín

4. Is there any hope the Maduro regime will negotiate a transfer of power?

We must start from the premise that Maduro’s government made a political decision in ignoring the results of the presidential election. This implies a radical break with popular sovereignty, which Chavismo proclaimed as the foundation of its legitimacy. The cost of this rupture is as high as the associated costs of international isolation and of reversing steps taken toward economic stabilization, because it enshrines the divorce between the ruling coalition and its popular bases. However, the dominant coalition perceives that it can stay in power if it manages to deflate the strong feeling of change and, above all, unity, through the weakening of the leadership of María Corina Machado and González, in a kind of repetition of the resistance-attrition strategy it used to address the 2019 crisis with the interim government of Juan Guaidó.  

The ruling coalition tries to do so through repression and self-isolation. It is attempting to prevent an internationally supported negotiation from forcing it to recognize the opposition’s victory. And it is doing so with a degree of open, articulate, and express support from the military that had not been necessary to exhibit in the past. The efforts of Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva are geared toward opening a crack to move Maduro from his position, which at this time is completely insensitive to the usual list of incentives. Thus, it is not foreseeable that in the short term an effective negotiating body can be built to ensure the verification of results. Perhaps it is necessary to start, as in serious armed conflicts, with more basic areas of agreement, such as advancing mutual guarantees and respect for human rights.

—Colette Capriles is an associate professor and researcher in philosophy, politics, and social sciences at Simón Bolívar University and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group.

5. How is the US working to advance a democratic transition?

On August 11, the Wall Street Journal reported that Washington is engaged in secret talks with Maduro, and may be offering him and those around him an amnesty from US narcoterrorism charges in exchange for a democratic transition. This news may be a sign that the Biden administration is trying to preserve space for negotiations behind the scenes. However, Maduro is a serial abuser of dialogue and, should these efforts fail, it is likely that the White House’s patience will run out. The good news is that the United States still holds considerable leverage, which can be used to shape elite interests and maximize opportunities for a democratic solution. 

For the Biden administration, the challenge lies in finding a balance between applying targeted, effective pressure on elites and preventing Venezuela from drifting further into Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence. Some in Washington fear that a return to “maximum pressure” could drive Maduro closer to the United States’ geopolitical rivals. Individual sanctions may be a more appealing strategy, but it will be crucial to focus this pressure on fostering a democratic opening while avoiding actions that strengthen regime unity. More than 160 regime members have already been sanctioned—many of whom have been celebrated in public ceremonies and awarded replica swords of Venezuela’s liberator, Simón Bolívar. Bringing pressure to bear while avoiding anything that helps unify Maduro’s coalition at his weakest moment in years will be absolutely crucial.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Will Maduro negotiate a transfer of power? And four other questions about Venezuela’s political crisis. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Goldwyn, Wald, and Shaffer quoted in S&P Global on Trump’s stance on oil sanctions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 30, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Jason Marczak was interviewed on BBC Newshour about the results of Venezuela’s presidential election.

More about our expert

Staff

Jason Marczak

Vice President and Senior Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Argentina

The post Marczak interviewed by BBC Newshour on Venezuela’s election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 30, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted in The New York Times about the Venezuelan election.

More about our expert

Fellow

Geoff Ramsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Colombia

The post Ramsey quoted in The New York Times about Venezuela’s presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 30, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed on BBC’s World Business Report about the Atlantic Council’s Memo to the President outlining scenarios and paths forward for Venezuela.

More about our expert

Fellow

Geoff Ramsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Colombia

The post Ramsey interviewed by BBC World Business Report appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted on NPR’s All Things Considered about Venezuela’s contested election.

More about our expert

Fellow

Geoff Ramsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Colombia

The post Ramsey quoted on NPR’s All Things Considered appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 29, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director Jason Marczak of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by The Hill about Venezuela’s contested election.

More about our expert

Staff

Jason Marczak

Vice President and Senior Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Argentina

The post Marczak quoted by The Hill on Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 29, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed on DW’s The Day (broadcast on PBS in the United States) about the evolving situation following Venezuela’s presidential election.

More about our expert

Fellow

Geoff Ramsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Colombia

The post Ramsey interviewed on DW’s The Day appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 29, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director Jason Marczak of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by AP about Venezuela’s contested election.

More about our expert

Staff

Jason Marczak

Vice President and Senior Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Argentina

The post Marczak quoted by AP on Venezuela’s election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

He’s not giving up without a fight. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s election commission declared him the winner in Sunday’s vote, despite ample evidence of fraud and intimidation. Opposition candidate Edmundo González declared victory as the United States and other countries expressed concerns about the results. What will be the opposition’s next move? How will Maduro respond? And what role will regional and global powers play? We polled our experts for the answers.

• Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
• Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab
• Geoff Ramsey (@GRamsey_LatAm): Senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

How to steal an election

• The stage was set for this moment in the months leading up to the vote, when the regime banned opposition leader María Corina Machado, with González ending up on the ballot. Then, as Jason points out, only small delegations from the United Nations and the Carter Center were allowed to monitor the vote, meaning “the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results.” 
• The González camp said he won about 70 percent of the votes that his team was able to verify—while Venezuela’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won 44 percent of the vote, with Maduro earning 51 percent. Jason notes that “it would be a mathematical miracle for Maduro to prevail” based on how the opposition has described the votes that it has seen.
• The public isn’t fooled, Iria tells us, noting the “outpouring of messages and videos on social media” from witnesses on the ground indicating their certainty that González won. “This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy,” she adds.
• As of this afternoon, those voters are mobilizing in the streets, creating a new test for the regime. “Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames,” Geoff says. “He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years.”

Pressure from abroad

• In addition to the “serious concerns” expressed by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, several countries throughout the region called for more transparency around the vote count—including neighboring Colombia, where, as Jason notes, “President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro.”
• Without full results and an independent audit, “the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure,” Geoff says, with the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe playing a crucial role.
• That international pressure will be important to uphold the will of Venezuelans, but there are self-interested reasons for regional and international powers to push for change. Jason says another six years of Maduro will lead to “new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.”

Crackdown at home?

• The major point of contention will be sanctions, which the United States reimposed in April after the Maduro government didn’t uphold its end of last year’s deal to hold free and fair elections. “I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe,” Geoff says.
• The opposition, therefore, should “exploit divisions within the ruling coalition,” Iria says. At the same time, opposition leaders should “find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017.”
• And if Maduro were to return to the bargaining table, it would look very different from the negotiations between the government and the opposition, Iria tells us. Now, she says, negotiations would no longer be about electoral conditions “but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela.”

The post Can Maduro hold onto power? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

Geoff Ramsey: Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

Iria Puyosa: A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

Diego Area: The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

The day after Venezuelans voted in massive numbers, it’s crystal clear that Maduro, a deeply unpopular authoritarian leader, was always going to claim electoral victory whether by hook or by crook. With most international observers banned from coming to the country to monitor the vote (except small United Nations and Carter Center delegations), the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results. The voting tabulations that opposition observers could verify (about 40 percent of the tabulations) showed González receiving 70 percent of the vote—a far cry from the 44 percent of votes that the country’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won.

It is important that the votes of the Venezuelan people are not an exercise in futility. Votes must be credibly counted. Here, it is imperative that the international community of democracies continue to resoundingly denounce fraud and take appropriate action. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted “serious concerns that the result announced does not reflect the will or the votes of the Venezuelan people.” Similar concerns have been raised in nearby Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. European partners have also raised concerns. Even in Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro, Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo made a “call for the total vote count, its verification, and independent audit to be carried out as soon as possible.”

The international community must continue to exact pressure so that the will of the Venezuelan people can ultimately prevail. Not doing so would mean being complicit in the disenfranchisement of the Venezuelan people. But another six years of Maduro will also have reverberations, including new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.

—Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

More than twelve hours after polls closed, the fact that authorities still haven’t released the full vote count tells you everything you need to know about yesterday’s election. It seems that Maduro has decided to condemn Venezuela to six more years of conflict and isolation. Unless the government backs up its claim of victory with the full results and opens the count up to audits from observers, the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure.

This isn’t over yet. Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames. He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years. I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe. The opposition, under María Corina Machado’s leadership, has maintained unity and message discipline, and has the evidence in hand to document fraud and mobilize the public against Maduro’s blatant power grab. The role of the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe will be crucial. It’s time for greater multilateral coordination in order to push the government to respect the will of the people and restore Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their leaders.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

The presidential elections in Venezuela turned out as forecasted: a high voter turnout, what appeared to be a decisive electoral win for the democratic opposition, and a blatant fraud that disregarded the will of the voters. 

Due to the relatively small voting centers and the presence of witnesses from local communities, the population is convinced—as we’ve seen in an outpouring of messages and videos on social media—that González won in all electoral districts. This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy. 

Maduro’s loss of political legitimacy has left the ruling coalition vulnerable to increased instability. It will likely resort to further repression against the political opposition and organized civil society. The increase in information censorship in the week leading up to the elections is a clear sign of the severe restriction of civic space. 

The democratic opposition, led by Machado, must aim to exploit divisions within the ruling coalition to weaken its power base. The Unitary Platform must also find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017. 

On the international front, Maduro is facing isolation from Latin American democracies, the United States, and Europe. Former allies, such as Brazil under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Colombia under Petro, were among the first to demand transparency in the election results. It now falls upon the United States to reevaluate the Qatar agreements. The negotiations would no longer be centered on electoral coexistence but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela. 

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

No one thought it would be easy to remove an autocrat from power, but yesterday marked a new height in the Venezuelan government’s abuses to impede the will of the people. The people of Venezuela and their leadership have endured an epic journey to overcome obstacles and unite around the ideal of change. The disqualification of candidates like Machado and Corina Yoris, who represented genuine alternatives, and the subsequent voter suppression efforts and significant irregularities in the process, illustrate the regime’s determination to retain power at any cost.

Maduro’s actions to undermine the democratic process and steal this election pose grave consequences for the future of the country and have a direct impact on Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States. By stifling free choice, the regime is not only eroding democratic institutions but also exacerbating the country’s humanitarian crisis. As a result, Venezuelans will continue to flee in search of opportunities and freedoms denied at home, contributing to an already critical migration crisis.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for a future where elections are not merely symbolic but are actual pathways to change. The integrity of the democratic process is crucial not only for Venezuela’s stability but also for the prosperity of the entire region.

—Diego Area is a deputy director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Experts react: Maduro is clinging to power after a disputed election. What’s next for Venezuela? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by the Washington Post about Venezuela’s contested election.

More about our expert

Fellow

Geoff Ramsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Colombia

The post Ramsey quoted in the Washington Post on Venezuelan election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed by BBC News about the Venezuelan presidential election taking place that day.

Venezuela is STILL waiting for results in its presidential election.

An exit poll predicts an opposition victory but both sides sound confident.

"If the ruling socialist party actually has the results then the electoral authorities should be able to prove it."@GRamsey_LatAm pic.twitter.com/wtG4DOO9U4

— Carl Nasman (@CarlNasman) July 29, 2024

More about our expert

Fellow

Geoff Ramsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Colombia

The post Geoff Ramsey interviewed by BBC News on Venezuela’s election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by Bloomberg about Venezuela’s contested election.

More about our expert

Fellow

Geoff Ramsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Colombia

The post Ramsey quoted by Bloomberg about Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted on NPR’s Weekend Edition Sunday about Venezuela’s election.

More about our expert

Fellow

Geoff Ramsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Colombia

The post Ramsey quoted on NPR’s Weekend Edition Sunday appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 26, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by the Los Angeles Times about Venezuela’s election.

More about our expert

Fellow

Geoff Ramsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Colombia

The post Ramsey quoted in Los Angeles Times on Venezuela’s election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What does the US president need to know? Our “memo to the president” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.

Bottom line up front: Although Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election will take place amid high volatility, a significant likelihood of protests, and possible repression, it represents the best opportunity for a peaceful, democratic solution to the country’s long-running political crisis. The election will most likely be followed by a political negotiation process. Venezuelan economic, political, and military elites want the last three years of economic growth and greater international integration to continue, and incumbent Nicolás Maduro has a strong incentive to connect to the global economy and avoid the resumption of international pressure. The United States and its partners should take advantage of this, offering incentives and support for a Venezuelan-led negotiation process to encourage the restoration of Venezuela’s democratic institutions.

Background: Regardless of the election results, both the ruling party and the opposition will face incentives to negotiate.

A July 12 scenario-planning exercise, held by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute, identified several possible outcomes for the election and the weeks that follow.¹

Scenario 1: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare Maduro the winner, with no documented evidence of irregularities or vote tampering.

If Venezuelan electoral authorities in the National Electoral Council declare Maduro the winner, he will face the enormous challenge of “landing the plane” and continuing down the current path of sanctions relief, global reintegration, and the restoration of diplomatic relations. He cannot credibly do so without entering into a sustainable negotiation process with the opposition, in which both parties are willing to make the significant concessions required.

• The specific aftermath of a Maduro victory will depend on whether there is clear evidence of irregularities or tampering with the vote count on election day. Maduro’s best hope of winning by the numbers is if participation is low and the opposition base is unmotivated to turn out at the polls.
• Some in Maduro’s ruling United Socialist Party (PSUV) believe they can successfully mobilize the party base to outperform polls and demotivate opposition voters, as has occurred on several instances over the last twenty-five years—most recently in the 2021 state and municipal elections. They believe they can count on the minimum of five or six million votes that Maduro received in the 2018 election, which the opposition boycotted.

Scenario 2: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare Maduro the winner, despite evidence of irregularities and vote tampering.

• Even if the ruling party were to commit documented acts of electoral fraud, Maduro’s first challenge would be to reassure elements in the ruling PSUV and armed forces leadership that he would be able to continue the last three years of economic growth. He will be unable to do that in the face of opposition protests and the risk of an escalation in the international pressure campaign—which would be almost inevitable in the case of blatant vote rigging.
• The irregularities could begin before July 28. Credible polling suggests that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia has a fifteen- to twenty-percentage point lead over Maduro, although that number is lower among the most likely Venezuelan voters. If it becomes clear that Maduro’s party has no chance of winning the vote count, even through abstention, there is a chance that the Supreme Tribunal of Justice will ban González’s Democratic Unity Table Roundtable coalition—this would likely guarantee an advantage to Maduro and dissuade opposition participation. A TSJ ruling could ensure that votes for the Democratic Unity Table Roundtable would be invalidated, and would force the base to either call for abstention, cast votes for González under less popular tickets from the Un Nuevo Tiempo or Movimiento Por Venezuela parties, or align behind an alternate candidate such as Enrique Marquez.
• The ruling party could also engage in vote tampering on election day. However, this would be very difficult to conceal given the opposition’s election monitoring efforts and the presence of independent international observers affiliated with the Carter Center and the United Nations. Previous instances of fraud, such as when observers documented tampering with voter tally sheets in Bolivar state in the 2017 regional elections, have been clearly documented by comparing results with poll witness records.
• A clearly fraudulent result would likely trigger street protests organized by opposition leader María Corina Machado and others. As in previous protest waves in 2014, 2017, and 2019, this may lead to clashes with security forces, but the prospect of these mobilizations forcing a change in government is highly unlikely. All eyes will be on Machado to gauge how she would react to low turnout or electoral fraud, and what each would mean for the prospect of unrest.
• The security forces will likely be reluctant to engage in massive repression on the scale seen in the 2014 and 2017 protests, given how this fueled international condemnation and the investigation of International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan. Elites in the military and ruling party would likely apply quiet pressure on Maduro, even as he declares victory, to demonstrate an openness to reforms and a willingness to signal an element of power-sharing with the opposition in his next term.
• Such overtures could split an opposition that has become more unified today than in the past. For ruling elites, there is no interest in reversing the last three years of economic growth and returning the country to the worst period of the country’s crisis, including greater international isolation.
• The private sector in Venezuela would likely seek to ensure the continuation of government policies that have helped jumpstart growth and slow inflation to its lowest level in twelve years. Business leaders know that a fraudulent win by Maduro would jeopardize this, with all eyes on whether the US government would return to a pressure campaign that would place investment at risk.
• An escalation of the border challenges with neighboring Guyana to deflect pressure at home cannot be ruled out, though it is unlikely. This would be a double-edged sword for the government, as the military is uninterested in assuming the risk of outright conflict with Guyana and would prefer to maintain tensions at current levels.

Scenario 3: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare González the winner.

A recognized opposition victory would face a myriad of immediate challenges. To have any hope of assuming office in January 2025, González would need to reach a comprehensive agreement with Maduro and the PSUV. Any negotiations must address complicated issues such as institutional reforms, transitional justice, the release of political prisoners, and electoral conditions for the upcoming legislative and regional elections. It is difficult to imagine Maduro ceding power without ironclad guarantees from the opposition and the international community regarding his safety, immunity, and influence, and that of his inner circle.

• The opposition’s best hope of translating polling support for González into votes on July 28 is massive voter participation. Given the opposition’s own election monitoring efforts and the presence of international electoral observers, an overwhelming margin of victory would be difficult to paper over by vote tampering.
• Voter participation at around the same level as the 2013 presidential election (roughly 80 percent) could cement an opposition win and could even force actors in the ruling party to recognize the result.
• The PSUV coalition is likely to face internal fragmentation in the event of a clear, recognized González win. While moderates in the ruling coalition may be willing to bet on their political future in a post-transition landscape, more hardline elements in the PSUV and security forces could derail a transition in pursuit of self-preservation. Here, the armed forces will almost certainly have outsized influence over a transition and would likely seek to dictate the terms of a transfer of power.
• The unity of the opposition would come under strain after a González win. While Machado has been the face of the electoral campaign over the last nine months, González is on the ballot as she is currently banned from holding office as part of a longstanding campaign against her. The opposition coalition would have to define where Machado stands in the decision-making apparatus, with the added complication that the Maduro government has explicitly refused to negotiate directly with her—and will likely continue to do so if the opposition wins. This would pose an early test of González’s leadership.
• The role of the international community will be crucial. To be credible, any opposition guarantees would have to be backed up by the United States, which could offer full sanctions relief and diplomatic recognition to Caracas, and lift bounties placed on the heads of PSUV leaders. European and Latin American heads of state also have a role to play. Still, due to its sanctions policy, the US role—and Maduro’s trust that guarantees will hold under any US administration—is vital.
• The international community should pay close attention to the prospect of fragmentation in the ruling coalition, particularly among the mid-level officer ranks in the armed forces, who will also seek guarantees and to preserve their influence.
• Having been out of power for twenty-five years, the opposition’s return to government could come with a high degree of administrative turbulence. The opposition would face significant incentives to seek technical assistance and advisory support in governance, economic reform, and public administration from the private sector, international organizations, foreign governments, and nongovernmental organizations—all while negotiating its policy approach with the outgoing PSUV, which would likely seek to retain political influence.

How the United States and international allies should respond:

1. Keep the focus on election data from credible international observers and independent monitoring efforts.
   • Prioritize data and reports from local and international independent observers, including the Carter Center and the United Nations, to assess the legitimacy of the election results. Communication with the public and international partners should be clear, consistent, and fact-based.
   • Rather than making a snap decision regarding developments on July 28, wait until the detailed vote count at the polling station level has been released, as has occurred in almost all previous elections. Delay any policy shift until there is a clear picture of the results.
   • Any actions should be grounded in verified data and credible sources to avoid hasty or misinformed decisions.
2. Explore opportunities for coordinated US and EU sanctions relief to accelerate incentives and advance negotiations.
   • Regardless of the election result, both González and Maduro understand they cannot govern a country in flames, and any effort to keep sanctions relief and normalization on the table will require them to negotiate the terms of governability.
   • There will be a deep need for greater multilateral coordination by sanctioning countries. The United States, as the only country to impose oil and financial sanctions against Venezuela, has outsized leverage, but the European Union and others that have sanctioned government officials can also place sanctions on the table to support negotiations.
   • Any solution will also require complex discussions regarding the restoration of the country’s democratic institutions while ensuring a place for Chavismo in the country’s political landscape.
3. No need to start from scratch.
   • The basis of any dialogue should be the 2021 Mexico City memorandum of understanding, which has served as the framework for international negotiations facilitated by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry with US, EU, and other international support.
   • This agreement outlined a seven-part agenda for dialogue efforts that have not been fully addressed, including guarantees of political rights for all, the restoration of constitutional order, coexistence and reparation for victims, economic reforms, and the verification and implementation of future agreements.
   • From there, talks can expand to focus on power sharing, the release of political prisoners, a judiciary overhaul, reforms of the security forces, the separation of powers, and improvements to electoral conditions ahead of 2025 legislative and regional elections.
   • The United States and international allies should focus on achievable, incremental progress rather than aiming for comprehensive solutions immediately. Small victories can build momentum and trust.
4. Promote a regional response led by Colombia and Brazil.
   • The United States and allies should emphasize solidarity among these neighboring countries, encouraging them to take lead roles in support of negotiation efforts while ensuring that Norwegian facilitators retain their influence on ongoing talks. Brazil, which has ceded space to Colombia so far, in particular could play a more active role.
   • Joint statements and actions can amplify impact, and the international community should formalize the ‘’Group of Friends’’ mechanism outlined in the 2021 memorandum of understanding. The creation of such a group, while still giving primacy to existing negotiations, would provide clarity for regional leaders seeking to coordinate Venezuela policy and allow more formal negotiating channels with Venezuela to incentivize more robust compliance with existing accords.
5. Regardless of outcome, consider the long-term benefits of an expanded Western footprint in Venezuela.
   • Specific licenses issued by the Treasury Department have allowed Western energy companies to maintain operations in Venezuela. The current foreign investment framework permits new modes of governance and payment and new rules of reporting, and provides opportunities for greater transparency.
   • Though sanctions are an important part of the United States’ leverage in Venezuela, there is space and good reason for this investment framework to be expanded. It is not in the US interest to sit back and watch as its rivals deepen their footprints in the country with the largest proven oil reserves on the planet—nor is it in the US interest to see Venezuela grow closer to these authoritarian powers and drift further into authoritarian rule.
   • Allied governments should continue to consider the broader geopolitical context, including relationships with China, Russia, and other influential countries with interests in Venezuela. The goal should be balanced policies that address these dynamics, acknowledge Venezuela’s role in global energy markets, and prioritize the humanitarian needs and human rights of the Venezuelan people.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and a leading expert on US policy towards Venezuela.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and launched the center’s work on Venezuela in 2017. He is an adjunct professor at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Brian Fonseca is director of the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy and an adjunct professor in the department of politics and international relations at Florida International University’s Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs.

Eduardo A. Gamarra is a tenured full professor of political science in the department of politics and international relations at Florida International University.

¹ Aspects of the discussion during our scenario-planning exercise informed this memo, but the memo is not meant to reflect the views of any participants other than the authors. There was, however, broad agreement that, independent of the results of the election, the winner will face incentives to negotiate the terms of governability, avoid a deepening of the crisis, and prevent another cycle of unrest and repression.

The post Memo to the president: Seizing the opportunity for a democratic solution in Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Once the most vigorous democracy in Latin America, Venezuela started down a slow path toward autocracy twenty-five years ago. It also became a model for digital authoritarianism and an exporter of democratic backsliding to the rest of the Americas. Control of the information space, widespread surveillance, and digital repression are significant pillars of the current regime’s survival. Incumbent Nicolás Maduro is counting on this, along with electoral manipulation and judicial control, to remain in power as Venezuela holds a presidential election on July 28. Nonetheless, a cohesive democratic coalition mobilizing the population across the country has a serious chance of making this election the starting point for a transition toward re-democratization.

The media landscape in Venezuela is fragmented and marked by censorship. The rise of government-run media and state control through ownership changes or censorship mechanisms led independent journalists to migrate to small internet outlets. Venezuela’s media ecosystem shrank further when the country’s economy collapsed after 2015. The aftermath of the 2017 cycle of protests saw another significant shift in the media landscape, with surviving newscasts characterized by censorship and heavily biased coverage in favor of the ruling party. In addition, censorship has caused the closure of many radio stations, leaving many areas without access to local or regional news. The National Telecommunications Commission in Venezuela routinely censors the use of certain topics and words during programming, and also bans interviews with democratic opposition leaders. It prohibits public coverage of corruption allegations or human rights violations attributed to state officials or their family members, coverage of citizen protests or demonstrations against the regime, and discussion of international courts and other human rights entities.

In their new report, “Venezuela: A playbook for digital repression,” Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, and Daniel Suárez Pérez dive deep into the state of media in Venezuela, the role it played in the country’s slide toward authoritarianism, and whether other Latin American countries will adopt Venezuela’s model of digital repression.

Additional contributions by Marco Ruíz and Valentina Aguana

Edited by Iain Robertson and Andy Carvin

New Atlanticist Mar 13, 2024

Venezuela’s opposition is challenging Maduro in the next election. The only question is how.

By Geoff Ramsey

With leading candidate María Corina Machado barred from Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election, who will the opposition to Nicolás Maduro support?

Civil Society Elections

New Atlanticist Apr 18, 2024

Experts react: The US just reimposed sanctions on Venezuela. What does this mean for energy markets and Venezuela’s election?

By Atlantic Council experts

The United States will reimpose oil sanctions on Venezuela, faulting Nicolás Maduro’s government for failing to uphold the October 2023 Barbados Agreement.

Economy & Business Elections

Report Aug 14, 2023

Protecting point-to-point messaging apps: Understanding Telegram, WeChat, and WhatsApp in the United States

By Iria Puyosa

A year-long project on protecting users’ data and privacy that analyzes the growing use of point-to-point messaging platforms in the United States and the implications their design and governing policies have for user privacy and free speech.

Civil Society Digital Policy

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

learn more

This report was made possible with support from the government of Canada.

The post How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Goldwyn quoted in OilPrice.com on US sanctions on Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: The US must ensure sanctions carve outs benefit the Venezuelan people, not just elites

Geoff Ramsey: The US balances democracy promotion with a ‘complex geopolitical reality’

David Goldwyn: The US is seeking a Goldilocks solution to sanctions on Venezuela

Ellen Wald: With US sanctions waivers withdrawn, expect China to dominate Venezuela’s oil exports

Jesse Sucher: Sanctions should change behavior. The US chose to reinforce that principle.

The US must ensure sanctions carve outs benefit the Venezuelan people, not just elites

Maduro’s ban on Machado is unjustified and unconstitutional, and left the US government with very little choice but to snap back the sanctions. But the truth is that, amid turmoil in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine, Venezuela policy is running up against a desire to avoid further upending delicate geostrategic balances. Washington is interested in allowing US and European energy companies to continue to operate in Venezuela, while also promoting competitive elections and ensuring that the money does not end up directly in Maduro’s pocket. As the United States offers a new path for consideration of specific licenses to energy companies interested in operating in Venezuela, it will be essential to work to ensure that dollars from oil and gas transactions are circulated among everyday Venezuelans, not kept in the hands of the elite. Any successful approach to Venezuela will have to find ways to address global energy concerns and undercut Russian and Chinese influence, while still advancing a democratic solution.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The US balances democracy promotion with a ‘complex geopolitical reality’

Yesterday’s announcement represents a compromise approach. By snapping back sanctions on Venezuela while still carving out space for Western energy companies to maintain operations, the Biden administration is trying to adjust its approach to promoting democracy and human rights in Venezuela to an increasingly complex geopolitical reality. This is a recognition that it is simply not in the US interest to sit back and watch as Russia and China deepen their footprints in the country with the largest oil reserves on the planet. At the same time, it will be crucial for the Biden administration to continue to find ways to incentivize lasting political agreements in ongoing negotiations between the opposition Unitary Platform coalition and the Maduro government. Fortunately, the US government continues to retain a degree of leverage. The White House can loosen or tighten the sanctions regime moving forward, and can float diplomatic recognition and other incentives as carrots ahead of Venezuela’s election on July 28.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The US is seeking a Goldilocks solution to sanctions on Venezuela

The United States made a subtle and constructive diplomatic step on Venezuela sanctions on Wednesday. It has allowed General License 44 to lapse, ending the period of open access for Venezuelan crude to reach the market, including the United States, through multiple modalities. For now, Venezuela has been punished for its abrogation of the Barbados agreement.

But the US Treasury Department was clear that it welcomes, within the next forty-five days, requests for specific licenses that serve US interests. This leaves a bureaucratically cumbersome but clear path for companies to request the ability to swap Venezuelan crude for debt they are owed, for diluent or other products to relieve humanitarian distress in Venezuela, and under conditions similar to Chevron’s existing license, which minimizes the fiscal return on exports to PDVSA. 

So the path remains open to ensuring that the Maduro government is punished, but a relief valve for migration pressure inside Venezuela is available. The new policy does not discriminate against US allies by imposing harsher conditions on them than on US companies, as was the case before General License 44. In the event that there is progress on a framework for free and fair elections from Maduro in the days ahead, the potential for a further general license remains open. 

The impact on the global oil market remains to be seen. Much depends on how many private companies apply for debt or product swaps and on whether the small but significant oil projects in Venezuela apply for licenses as well. (If they do not, then we will return to the destructive “maximum pressure” policy, which had the impact of providing cheap oil for China, a product market for Iran, and humanitarian distress leading to illegal migration to the United States and elsewhere in the region.) 

Much also depends on the ability of the US Treasury to respond to those license requests swiftly. But with this one move, the United States has avoided blame for interference in the Venezuelan elections, preserved diplomatic capital for a future day, and this time managed to punish the aggressor more than the victims. Given the grim circumstances, this was the best outcome available.

—David L. Goldwyn served as special envoy for international energy under President Barack Obama and assistant secretary of energy for international relations under President Bill Clinton. He is chair of the Atlantic Council’s Energy Advisory Group and a nonresident senior fellow with the Council’s Global Energy Center.

With US sanctions waivers withdrawn, expect China to dominate Venezuela’s oil exports

Biden’s decision to withdraw the sanctions waiver for Venezuelan oil comes at a time when crude oil prices are coming off the highest prices seen this year. Just last month, Venezuela’s crude oil and petroleum product exports hit a four-year high. However, the amount of oil in question is relatively minor on the global scale and should not impact oil prices. In September 2023, the month before the Biden administration issued the waiver, Venezuela exported a total of 797,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil, fuel oil, and methanol (according to TankerTrackers.com). More than 50 percent of its petroleum went to China. Other notable customers included the United States, Spain, Indonesia, and Cuba. By March 2024, Venezuela’s total exports had only increased by about one hundred thousand bpd, but it had significantly diversified its customers. Chinese exports dropped to 39 percent and notable cargoes went to India, the Netherlands, Singapore, Brazil, and Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba. (Note: Data on oil exports comes via TankerTrackers.com.)

Now that the waivers have been withdrawn, we should expect China to dominate Venezuela’s oil exports. US oil supplies should not be impacted since the total amount of Venezuelan oil and oil products imported by the United States before and after the waivers were issued was nearly identical. Venezuela will probably continue to export at the 895,000 bpd level because China will probably purchase additional cargoes that other nations stop buying now that sanctions are back in place. Overall, Venezuelan revenue may drop slightly as China will likely negotiate lower prices now that the competition for Venezuelan oil is significantly reduced. 

 —Ellen Wald is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the co-founder of Washington Ivy Advisors.

Sanctions should change behavior. The US chose to reinforce that principle.

When the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 44 in October 2023, the Biden administration warned that Maduro would need to show concrete steps toward democratic elections for the license to be extended. Evidently, there was insufficient progress, meaning the Biden administration has effectively decided that preserving sanctions’ integrity and US credibility are as important as the outcomes for Venezuela. Given the centrality of sanctions to numerous US foreign policy objectives, I’m not surprised to see a choice that reinforces the principle that the goal of sanctions is to change behavior.

International oil companies must now decide how much they enjoyed the fleeting access to Venezuelan crude. Venezuela had stood to gain an estimated $8 billion more in oil revenue in 2024 over the previous year’s earnings. One must wonder if Maduro can replicate that figure without the United States offering sanctions relief. 

Companies that do not wind down previously authorized transactions by the end of May expose themselves to US sanctions risks, and we could see a crackdown on third parties evading the reimposition of these sanctions. Some key players to watch are Indian and Chinese oil companies. OFAC is no doubt learning from its parallel enforcement efforts with respect to the Russian oil price cap.

—Jesse Sucher is a former official at the US Department of the Treasury, where he was a deputy director of the Office of Investment Security, and a section chief and investigator for the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect or represent those of the US government or any organization with which the author is or has been affiliated.

The post Experts react: The US just reimposed sanctions on Venezuela. What does this mean for energy markets and Venezuela’s election? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Shaffer quoted in S&P Global on Iranian oil sanctions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Goldwyn quoted in S&P Global Commodity Insights on Venezuelan sanctions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Watch the event

Public Event Tue, March 19, 2024 • 10:00 am ET

General Laura Richardson on security in the Western Hemisphere

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Gen. Laura J. Richardson, Commander of US Southern Command, discusses her vision for US security partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean.

Americas Caribbean Latin America Security & Defense

The United States isn’t ruling out deploying military forces to Haiti in response to the country’s crisis—as long as such a measure is part of an “international solution” that incorporates Haiti’s perspective, said General Laura Richardson, commander of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

“We wouldn’t discount that at any time,” she said at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Tuesday hosted by the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. “We are prepared if called upon by our State Department and by our Department of Defense.”

But while the United States isn’t currently planning to put boots on the ground, Richardson clarified, SOUTHCOM has a wide range of contingency plans that it is responsible for maintaining. For example, to prepare for potential mass migration from Haiti, Richardson said that SOUTHCOM readied its naval station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to process a possible influx of migrants.

“We want to be able to do exactly what’s right and humane and be able to take care of populations that are trying to escape,” she said.

Richardson said that it is important to ready these plans as the situation continues to evolve in Haiti. Meanwhile, she said that the US State Department is working with the fifteen-member Caribbean Community and Haitian leaders to get a transitional presidential council in place—which will pave the way not only for the selection of an interim prime minister but also for the deployment of a Kenya-led international force to restore security.

Below are more highlights from Richardson’s conversation with Politico National Security Reporter Alexander Ward, which touched upon challenges seen in other countries around SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility and China’s influence in the region.

Causes for concern

• Last month, satellite images showed the Venezuelan military bolstering its presence near the border with Guyana. Richardson reiterated the United States’ support to Guyana, saying that the United States is continuing “all of our activities, our operations, activities, and investments,” with the country and that it is important for its allies to come together and “to show strong support for Guyana in this situation.”
• With Ecuador now in a state of emergency after an escalation of violence between the government and criminal groups, Richardson said the United States has “doubled down” on its operations and activities there and has delivered emergency security equipment—it recently donated a C-130 military transport aircraft that is on the way. “As they wrestle with those hard challenges and security and instability, we have to continue with our economic investment,” she said.

China stepping in

• Richardson touched upon China’s rising influence in the Panama Canal, a Chinese military-run space station in Argentina, and reports last year that China is enhancing its spy capabilities in Cuba. “What’s happening in Latin America and the Caribbean is not new,” Richardson said. “It’s not new to the globe, and it’s not new to [China’s] . . . vision and strategy.”
• She argued that China has noticed the vast resources available in Latin America and the Caribbean—and also the relative vulnerability of the countries there, which are “still digging out” from the economic impact of COVID-19 and the “insecurity and instability” created by organized crime. “There’s not one country that’s being spared from all the challenges from the transnational criminal organizations.”
• Richardson noted that when China makes agreements with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as within the Belt and Road Initiative, they’re often “tit for tat” and accompanied by demands such as not recognizing Taiwan. “There’s always a hook,” she said.